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# Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations

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## CONTENTS

# Editorial

The world has been witnessing some spectacular movements of people's power to resist foreign domination, unequal exchange, oppression, inequality, racial discrimination and tyrannical regimes, all these months and years. Many other struggles have been focusing on a wide variety of social and political issues such as marginalisation, gender discrimination, environmental hazards, consumerism, militarism, commoditisation, etc.  In the era of neoliberalism, the struggles within and across nations assume new dimensions. Many of the critical issues of development/underdevelopment have emerged in their worst forms so much so that alterative movements have gained considerable importance today. The Third World countries have witnessed such resistances and struggles with the worsening of social and economic conditions following the global recession and economic downturn. Undoubtedly, the most vulnerable sections of the people are the poor and downtrodden who continue to bear the burden of top-down development strategies.

The importance of people's power has become quite perceptible in the year 2011 when several countries in the West Asian region (such as Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen) experienced what is popularly called 'Arab Spring,' the impact of which could be long-lasting. People in the streets of these countries took non-violent paths for many months. It is quite clear that the new uprisings in West Asia have been triggered off by the widening disparities and inequalities, consequent upon the neoliberal measures put in place from time to time. Similarly, the Occupy Wall Street movement, which began in New York, spread to hundreds of towns and cities. The Occupy Wall Street movement has been fuelled by anger over social inequality, unemployment and a vast decline in living standards for the overwhelming majority which continued to gain international support. The eruption of global protests has given voice to the mass opposition to social inequality, unemployment, war and the corporate domination of political life.

India too has been witnessing such movements. There is an array of such struggles in the country focusing on issues of development, discrimination, oppression, exploitation, militarism and marginalisation. From Narmada to Kudankulam, from Jaitapur to Manipur, there is a long line of people's movements - movements for survival, against mega dams, against nuclear plants, against special powers of the armed forces etc. For more than a decade, Irom Sharmila,

also known as the Iron Lady of Manipur, has been on hunger strike to demand that the Indian government repeal the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, which she blames for violence in Manipur and other parts of northeast India. Having refused food and water for nearly 500 weeks, she has been called "the world's longest hunger striker." On the top of all, the civil society activism of Anna Hazare launched this year for Lok Pal to help curb corruption also raised some hopes, though it all seemed to be moving in an uncertain terrain. It has been debated how much it is a sustainable movement and how seriously it keeps alive a specific agenda for social transformation. Many believe that Anna Hazare's anti-corruption movement has served as a convenient diversion from deepening social contradictions, people's anger over job destruction, poverty and the deepening divide between the rich and the poor. However, the issues raised by the movement are not out of place and must be relevant to larger issues of corporate corruption in public life.

The present volume of the *Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations*, which is again combined issues of the current year, offers critical insights and commentaries on the struggles and movements across the West Asian region as well as in the United States. While Immanuel Wallerstein analyses the contradictions of the 'Arab Spring,' Alan Hart and Ramzy Baroud try to look at it from the angle of prospects of democracy as well as unraveling the intellectual divide on the question. Fritz Tucker goes further and offers his analysis on the 'American Autumn,' a critique of the Wall Street movement. The other articles deal with a variety of issues and contemporary challenges such as the prospects of global civil society, democratisation, political Islam, multiculturalism, secularism, etc from different country experiences. The volume also offers analyses on interdisciplinary studies, knowledge question, South Asian labour, Tibetan question and the 'Rise' of China in the new millennium.

# The Contradictions of the Arab Spring

Immanuel Wallerstein

**T**he turmoil in Arab countries that is called the Arab Spring is conventionally said to have been sparked by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in a small village of Tunisia on 17 December 2010. The massive sympathy this act aroused led, in a relatively short time, to the destitution of Tunisia's president and then to that of Egypt's president. In very quick order thereafter, the turmoil spread to virtually every Arab state and is still continuing. Most of the analyses we read in the media or on the internet neglect the fundamental contradiction of this phenomenon - that the so-called Arab Spring is composed of two quite different currents, going in radically different directions. One current is the heir of the world revolution of 1968. The '1968 current' might better be called the 'second Arab revolt.' Its objective is to achieve the global autonomy of the Arab world that the 'first Arab revolt' had sought to achieve. The first revolt failed primarily because of successful Franco-British measures to contain it, co-opt it, and repress it.

The second current is the attempt by all important geopolitical actors to control the first current, each acting to divert collective activity in the Arab world in ways that would redound to the relative advantage of each of these actors separately. The actors here regard the '1968 current' as highly dangerous to their interests. They have done everything possible to turn attention and energy away from the objectives of the "1968 current," in what I think of as the great distraction. The past didn't go anywhere.

What do I mean by a '1968 current'? There were two essential features to the world-revolution of 1968 that remain relevant to the world situation today. First, the revolutionaries of 1968 were protesting against the inherently undemocratic behaviour of those in authority. This was a revolt against such use (or misuse) of authority at all levels: the level of the world-system as a whole; the level of the national and local governments; the level of the multiple non-governmental institutions in which people take part or to which they are subordinated (from workplaces to educational structures to political parties and trade-unions).

In language that was developed later on, the 1968-revolutionaries were against vertical decision making and in favour of horizontal decision-making-

participatory and therefore popular. By and large, although there were exceptions, the '1968 current' was deeply influenced by the concept of non-violent resistance, whether in the version of satyagraha developed by Mahatma Gandhi or that pursued by Martin Luther King and his collaborators, or indeed older versions such as that of Henry David Thoreau.

In the 'Arab Spring' we could see this current strongly at work in Tunisia and Egypt. It was the rapid public embrace of this current that terrified those in power - the rulers of every Arab state without exception, the governments of the 'outside' states who were an active presence in the geopolitics of the Arab world, even the governments of very distant states. The spread of an anti-authoritarian logic, and especially its success anywhere, menaced all of them. The governments of the world joined forces to destroy the '1968 current.'

## A Growing World Movement

So far, they have not been able to do it. Indeed, on the contrary, the current is gaining force around the world - from Hong Kong to Athens to Madrid to Santiago to Johannesburg to New York. This is not solely the result of the Arab Spring, since the seeds and even the revolts elsewhere predated December 2010. But the fact that it has occurred so dramatically in the Arab world, once thought relatively unresponsive to such a current, has added considerable momentum to the growing world movement.

How have the governments responded to the threat? There are really only three ways to respond to such a threat - repression, concessions and diversion. All three responses have been used, and up to a certain point, their use has achieved some success. Of course, the internal political realities of each state are different, and that is why the dosage of repression, concessions and diversion has varied from state to state.

However, the decisive characteristic is, in my view, the second feature of the world-revolution of 1968. The world-revolution of 1968 included in a very major way a revolution of the 'forgotten peoples' - those who had been left out of the concerns of the major organised forces of all political stripes. The forgotten peoples had been told that their concerns, their complaints, their demands were secondary and had to be postponed until some other primary concerns were resolved.

Who were these forgotten peoples? They were first of all women, half the world's population. They were secondly those who were defined in a given state as 'minorities' - a concept that is not really numerical but rather social (and has usually been defined in terms of race or religion or language or some combina-

tion thereof). In addition to women and the social 'minorities,' there exists a long list of other groups who also proclaimed their insistence on not being forgotten: Those with 'other' sexual preferences, those who were disabled, those who were the 'indigenous' populations in a zone that had been subject to in-migration by powerful outsiders in the last 500 years, those who were deeply concerned with threats to the environment, those who were pacifists. The list has continued to grow, as more and more 'groups' became conscious of their status as 'forgotten peoples.'

As one analyses Arab state after Arab state, one realises quite quickly that the list of forgotten peoples and their relation to the regime in power varies considerably. Hence, the degree to which 'concessions' can limit revolt varies. The degree to which 'repression' is easy or difficult for the regime varies. But make no mistake about it, all regimes want, above all, to stay in power. One way to stay in power is for some of those who are in power to join the uprising, casting overboard a personage who happens to be the president or ruler in favour of the pseudo-neutral armed forces. This is exactly what happened in Egypt. It is that about which those who are today reoccupying Tahrir Square in Egypt are complaining as they seek to reinvigorate the '1968 current.' The problem for the major geopolitical actors is that they are not sure how best to "distract" attention and advance their own interests amidst the turmoil. Let us look at what the various actors have been trying to do and the degree to which they have been successful. We will then be able better to assess the prospects of the '1968 current' today and in the relatively near future.

## Ex-colonial Redemption

We should start the story with France and Great Britain - the fading ex-colonial powers. They were both badly caught with their pants down in Tunisia and Egypt. Their leaders had, as individuals, been personally profiting from the two dictatorships. They not merely supported them against the uprising, but actively counselled them on how to repress. Finally, and very late, they realised how big a political error this had been. They had to find a way to redeem themselves. They found it in Libya. Muammar Gaddafi had also, just like the French and the British, fully supported Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak. Indeed he went the furthest, deploring their resignations. He was obviously deeply frightened by what was happening in the two neighbouring countries. To be sure, there was not much of a true '1968 current' in Libya. But there were plenty of discontented groups. And when these groups began their revolt, he blustered about how hard he would repress them.

France and Great Britain saw their opportunity here. Despite the degree to which these two countries (and others) had engaged in profitable business in Libya for at least a decade, they suddenly discovered that Gaddafi was a terrible dictator, which no doubt he was. They set out to redeem themselves by open military support for the Libyan rebels.

Today, Bernard-Henri Lévy is boasting of the way in which he created a direct link between President Sarkozy of France and the structure of the Libyan rebels on the basis of active intervention to promote human rights. But France and Great Britain, however determined, were unable to unseat Gaddafi without help. They needed the United States. Obama was obviously reluctant at first. But, under internal US pressure ('to promote human rights'), he threw in US military and political assistance to what was now called a NATO effort. He did this on the basis that, in the end, he could argue that not a single US life was lost - only Libyan lives. Just as Gaddafi was unnerved by the ousting of Mubarak, so were the Saudis. They saw Western acquiescence (and subsequently approval) of his departure as a highly dangerous precedent. They decided to pursue their own independent line - the defence of the status quo. They defended it first of all at home, secondly in the Gulf Coordination Council (and in particular in Bahrain), then in the other monarchies (Jordan and Morocco), then in all Arab states. And in the two neighbouring countries in which there was most turmoil - Yemen and Syria - they began to pursue a mediation in which everything would change so that nothing would change.

## A Current Not Easily Contained

The new Egyptian regime, under attack at home from the '1968 current' and always sensitive to the fact that Egypt's primacy in the Arab world had diminished seriously, began to revise its geopolitical stance, first of all vis-à-vis Israel. The regime wanted to take its distance from Israel, without, however, jeopardising its ability to obtain financial assistance from the United States. They became an active advocate of reunification of the split Palestinian political world, hoping that this reunification would not only force significant concessions from the Israelis but hamper the development of the "1968 current" among the Palestinians.

Two neighbouring countries - Turkey and Iran - sought to profit from the Arab unrest by strengthening their own legitimacy as actors in the Middle East arena. This was not easy for either of them, especially since each had to worry about the degree to which the '1968 current' would menace them internally – the Kurds in Turkey, the multiple factions in the complicated Iranian internal poli-

tics. And Israel? Israel has been assaulted all around by the prospect of 'delegitimisation' - in the Western world (even in Germany, even in the United States), in Egypt and Jordan, in Turkey, in Russia and China. And all the while it has had to face a "1968 current" that has emerged among the Jewish population within Israel. And, as all this geopolitical juggling has been going on, the Arab Spring has become simply one part of what is now very clearly a worldwide unrest occurring everywhere: Oxi in Greece, indignados in Spain, students in Chile, the Occupy movements that have now spread to 800 cities in North America and elsewhere, strikes in China and demonstrations in Hong Kong, multiple happenings across Africa.

The '1968 current' is expanding - despite repression, despite concessions, despite co-option. And geopolitically, across the Arab world, the success of the various players has been limited, and in some cases counterproductive. Tahrir Square has become a symbol across the world. Yes, many Islamist movements have been able to express themselves openly in Arab states where they could not do so earlier. But so have the secular left forces. The trade unions are rediscovering their historic role. Those who believe that Arab unrest, that world unrest, is a passing moment will discover in the next major bubble burst (which we can anticipate quite soon) that the ' nt' will no longer be so easily contained.

# The Arab Spring
## Hello or Goodbye to Democracy?

Alan Hart

*Israeli democracy fades to black* (the black of the blank screen at the end of a film). That was the headline over a recent article by Lawrence Davidson, an American professor of Middle East history. He argued that the suppression of the democratic rights of non-Jews in Israel is coming full circle with Prime Minister Netanyahu's Likudniks and settlers now targeting the rights of Jews as well. Events in Cairo provoked this question: Are we witnessing the fading to black of the prospects for freedom and democracy in Egypt, or, is resurgent people power going to make it impossible for the military to maintain its controlling grip? (Presumably there would be limits to how many Egyptian civilians Egyptian soldiers were prepared to kill even if the generals, desperate to protect their wealth and privileges, ordered the suppression by all means of protests and demands for real democracy).

Events still to unfold will determine the answer but in advance of them, and before Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi demonstrated a degree of panic by announcing that the election of a civilian president would be brought forward, the assessment of many informed observers was in tune with that of Marina Ottaway, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She wrote: "In the early days of the Egyptian uprising, when violence threatened to engulf the country, the military did an admirable job of maintaining order without violence and easing Hosni Mubarak out of office. Ten months later, it has emerged as the most serious threat in the transition to democracy. Recent announcements leave no doubt that the military indeed rules Egypt and intends to maintain its control indefinitely."

The best indicator of whether or not Eygpt's generals will eventually bow to people's power and let democracy have its way will be in their final decision about dropping or not their proposal that new constitutional principles should preserve special powers for the military after the handover to civilian rule. These special powers as originally proposed would give the military a veto over a new

constitution and prevent scrutiny of its vast budget. In other words, these 'supra-constitutional' principles would enshrine the military's right to intervene in civilian politics at any time of its choosing.

If Egypt's generals do seek to control the democratic process by (among other things) fixing elections as Mubarak did, they will back their actions with the assertion that they must do whatever is necessary to prevent radical Islam taking over the country. That would put them on the same page as Zionism's propaganda maestros. In a recent article for *Ha'aretz,* Moshe Arens, a former Israeli Minister of Defence and Foreign Minister, wrote the following:

> A wave of Islamic rule, with all it entails, is sweeping across the Arab world. It will replace secular dictatorships with Islamic ones. We should have expected nothing else... Observers may fool themselves into believing that the Islamic parties contesting the elections in the Arab countries are 'mildly' Islamic, or 'moderate' Islamists, but their leaders are neither mild nor moderate.

The unstated but implicit Zionist message Arens is conveying is that the Arab Spring will create more and more states that will become safe havens for Islamic terrorists, and that Israel and the West, America especially, will have to pursue the 'war against terrorism' on many more fronts with even greater vigour and escalating expense. What the overwhelming majority of all Arabs want is an end to corrupt, repressive, autocratic rule. In reality there is no prospect of Muslims who preach the need for violence and practice it calling the shots if democracy is allowed to take root and grow in the Arab world. In Egypt, for example, and whatever it may or may not have been in the past, the Muslim Brotherhood is in the process of transforming itself, now in the guise of the Freedom and Justice Party, into a modern and progressive political force which truly wants to see Egypt governed by democratic means for the benefit of all and not just a privileged elite. The only thing that could drive a significant number of Egyptians into supporting violent Islamic fundamentalism is never-ending military suppression of their demands for freedom and democracy (If this were to happen one could say that like 'Dubya' Bush and Tony Blair, Egypt's generals had become recruiting sergeants for violent Islamic fundamentalism).

In my analysis Arens' prediction of what will happen in the Arab world is a cover for the real fear of Zionism's in-Israel and in-America leaders. It is that democracy could or even will take root in the Arab world or at least major chunks of it. Why such a prospect alarms Zionism is not complicated.

Democratically elected Arab governments would have to be reflecting the will of their masses, the voters. On the matter of the conflict in and over Palestine that became Israel, what is the will of the Arab masses? In their heads, if not

always their hearts, it is not for military confrontation with Israel. It is that their governments be united enough use the leverage they have on America, to cause it to use the leverage it has on Israel, to cause or try to cause enough Israeli Jews to face reality and insist that their leaders make peace on terms which would satisfy the demands and needs of the Palestinians for justice, while at the same time guaranteeing the security and wellbeing of Jews now resident in Palestine that became Israel.

The leverage the Arab world has is in the form of oil, money and diplomatic relations. For an example of how this Arab leverage could have been used to good effect in the past I will turn the clock back to 1967. Now let us suppose that in the weeks following the Six Days War the Arab leaders put their act together and sent one of their numbers secretly to Washington to deliver this message to President Johnson: "If you don't get the Israelis back to the pre-war borders, we'll turn off the oil taps" (That is how Zionism's in-Israel leaders would have played the oil card if the boot had been on the other foot, if they had been in the Arab position).

How would Johnson (or any other occupant of the White House) have responded? If he believed the Arab leaders were united and serious, not bluffing, he would have said something very like the following: "I can't promise quick action on East Jerusalem but otherwise give me three weeks and I'll do it." In short, the Arabs would not have had to turn off the oil taps. A credible threat to do so would have been enough to motivate Johnson (or any other American president) to use all necessary leverage to bring Israel's occupation to a quick end. That's how the game of political leverage is played.

A real hello to democracy in the Arab world or at least significant chunks of it, and Egypt especially, would be very bad news for Zionism. Netanyahu is fully aware of this and is escalating his anti Arab Spring rhetoric. In his latest speech to the Knesset he blasted Israeli and world politicians who support the demands for change in the Arab world and accused it of "moving not forward, but backward." He asserted that his original forecast that the Arab Spring would turn into an "Islamic, anti-Western, anti-liberal, anti-Israeli and anti-democratic wave" had turned out to be true. In his report for *Ha'aretz*, Barak Ravid wrote:

> The speech showed an expressed lack of trust in Arab nations' ability to maintain a democratic regime; a yearning to go back to the days of ousted Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak; a fear of the collapse of the Hashemite royal house in Jordan, and an utter lack of willingness to make any concessions to the Palestinians.

Netanyahu also slammed those Western leaders, Obama especially, who had pressed Egypt's generals to tell Mubarak to go. At the time that was happening,

Ravid revealed, Netanyahu said in closed talks that the American administration and many European leaders "don't understand reality." In his last speech he called them 'naïve.' I used to wonder if Netanyahu really believes the nonsense he talks. I am now convinced that he does.

The latest developments in Cairo – the apology by two of the generals on the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) – are making me wonder if the coming days will see the removal of Field Marshal Tantawi, which is what the protestors in Tahrir Square are demanding. The two generals not only apologized for the deaths of protestors, they said, according to the BBC report I heard, "We do not aspire to power and we do not want to continue in power." If those words can be taken at face value, they suggest to me that a majority of Tantawi's SCAF colleagues have realised that continuing in power, even behind the scenes, would require them at a point to give orders to the army to shoot to kill large numbers of Egyptians, orders which would not be obeyed by the lower ranks and foot soldiers. If that is the case – Tantawi's departure would indicate that it is – the prospects for a real hello to democracy in Egypt are improving. And if something approaching real democracy can take root and grow in Egypt, the days of Arab autocrats and despots almost everywhere (probably not Saudi Arabia) may well be numbered.

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# On Freedom and Imperialism
## Arab Spring and the Intellectual Divide

Ramzy Baroud

**T**he so-called 'Arab Spring' is creating an intellectual divide that threatens any sensible understanding of the turmoil engulfing several Arab countries. While it is widely understood that revolutions endeavour to overthrow political structures and aim to change the social order and power paradigm within any given society, there is still no single, inclusive understanding of what actually constitutes a revolution. Nor is there any consensus as to exactly what a revolution is supposed to achieve.

An ordinary Egyptian is likely to determine his/her take on revolution from various angles: measurable economic advancement – or lack thereof; the ability to voice an opinion without fear of censorship or retaliation; the right to participate in collective action, and influence the overall direction of his/her country. A revolution can also delve into the realm of self-definition. Some Arab collectives have redefined themselves along religious, nationalistic or ideological lines – by re-colouring a flag or rewording a national anthem – in the hope that this would allow them to cement political change through a collective psychological departure from one era into another.

While conceptual depictions of major phenomena may be achievable, their practical application can be elusive. On January 14, just days after the ousting of Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, I warned of the failure to appreciate the unique circumstances of the Tunisian revolution, and the distinctiveness of Tunisian society as a whole:

> There is no harm in expanding a popular experience to understand the world at large and its conflicts. But in the case of Tunisia, it seems that the country is largely understood within a multilayer of contexts, thus becoming devoid of any political, cultural or socio-economic uniqueness. Understanding Tunisia as just another 'Arab regime', another possible podium for al-Qaeda's violence, is convenient but also unhelpful to any cohesive understanding of the situation there and the events that are likely to follow.

The article was a response to the media frenzy which placed all Arab societies into one category. But this failure of distinction cannot be attributed merely to

the overriding ignorance of the Western media and intellectuals in their understanding of Arabs, nor of Western governments' opportunistic relationship to the 'Arab world'. Analogous generalizations were also being employed by the Arab media and intellectuals, and even the rebelling masses themselves.

There seemed little harm in Yemeni activists relating to the Egyptian revolutionary experience, or Syrians and Libyans borrowing each other's slogans. After all, there is an unmistakable cultural and historical bond between various Arab societies, and they are rife with overlapping experiences of colonization, foreign occupation, dictatorship and popular uprisings. But what was meant to inspire a sense of shared values and experiences quickly became a fault line, exploited by those who wanted to ensure the failure of Arab uprisings, or to direct their outcomes.

It was no surprise that the Arab uprisings did not remain the business of the Arabs alone. Even before the governments of France and the United Kingdom signed their infamous Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916 - dividing Arab provinces (then part of the Ottoman Empire) into spheres of influence – the fate of the region had already been determined by outside powers. And unlike common myths associated with the 'Arab Spring,' Arab nations have repeatedly rebelled against foreign colonizers and their own despots.

The belated Western response to the Tunisian revolution - and the incoherent reaction to the Egyptian revolution in January 25 - served as a wakeup call to those who inherited the legacy of François Georges-Picot and Sir Mark Sykes Indeed, past encounters continue to define the Western countries' ties to the 'Middle East region', which is appreciated for its many economic spoils and unmatched strategic importance.

"Western security, construction and infrastructure companies that see profit-making opportunities receding in Iraq and Afghanistan have turned their sights on Libya, now free of four decades of dictatorship," wrote Scott Shane in the *New York Times* (28 October 2011). This short sentence truly sums up the motives of Western intervention, and the West's overall attitude towards its former colonies. However, there is a strange resolve among many players in the 'Arab Spring' – including in Arab media - that discount or ignore the foreign element whenever Arab uprisings are discussed. This tendency is not only intellectually dishonest and perceptibly ahistorical, it is also highly suspicious. Amid the purposeful silence regarding the self-serving and destructive role played by foreign powers, plots are being hatched against various countries under the very pretexts that led to the destruction of Iraq, Libya, and even Lebanon. Yes, in 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon, it used the concept of democracy as part of its justification.

17

However, being fully appreciative of the disparaging and exploitative role of foreign powers shouldn't allow one to turn into an apologist for dictatorship either. A more sombre reading of history shows the unshakable bond between dictators and their foreign benefactors - at the expense of the oppressed masses, who are now revolting to reset the course of history on a more equitable route. True, a revolution can be polarizing for those who are projected to either win or lose once its final outcome is determined. But intellectuals have a historic responsibility to remain vigilant of the uniqueness of each and every collective experience, and to place it within accurate historical contexts. They should not omit inconvenient truths when such omissions are deemed convenient.

This is not moral neutrality, a notion that has been articulated by South African anti-Apartheid leader Desmond Tutu in his iconic statement: "If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor." It is rather the responsibility of the intellectual to question what is taken for granted. Edward Said claimed that the ideal intellectual should be seen as an "exile and marginal, as amateur, and as the author of a language that tries to speak the truth to power." Speaking truth to power is still possible, and is more urgent than ever. The fate of a nation, any nation, cannot be polarized to the terrible extent that the Arab uprisings have. On both sides of the divide, some are cheering for foreign intervention, while others are justifying the senseless murder of innocent people by dictators.

There is possibly a fine line between the divides, and it is the responsibility of the intellectual to trace this line, and remain steadfast there. He may consequently find himself marginalized and exiled, but at least he will maintain his integrity.

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# American Autumn
## A Participant's Critique of the Occupation of Wall Street

Fritz Tucker

**N**ew York City's financial district, notorious for devious deals that crash economies, witnessed a more harmonious transaction last week. Hundreds of people came together with distinct goals in mind, and shared in a more democratic, dialogic, and egalitarian cultural exchange than what is ordinarily experienced in our society. In just twenty-four hours, the hallmarks of a true people's movement began to develop: medical centres, media centres, food delivery, sub-committees, affinity groups, and a General Assembly.

When I first heard that there was going to be a week-long demonstration of people's power in downtown Manhattan, I decided I'd go if it lasted more than one day. On the first day, the demonstrators were blockaded from Wall Street and settled in Liberty Plaza's Zuccotti Park, where they stayed overnight.

On day two, the organisers of the movement called to order a General Assembly, a forum for participants to propose ideas, set an agenda, and establish demands. The demonstration, which had been advertised online months in advance, had yet to articulate specific demands. I had hoped that the movement would echo what is presently the most popular and credible demand in the world right now: "ash-sha'ab yurid isqat an-nizam" ("the people demand an end to the regime"). Demanding this is not a cry to the oppressors to be kinder to the oppressed, but a call for action from the oppressed to overthrow their oppressors.

### The First General Assembly

I arrived on day two, Sunday, 18 September — in time for the first General Assembly. The General Assembly mostly consisted of the individuals who felt the movement should take unified action — roughly half of those in the square. Most of the other half had formed smaller "direct-action committees" that marched through the Financial District separately. Had the cops felt that the marches represented a threat, this division would have been extremely dangerous for everyone participating in the movement.

A group of "facilitators," a dozen or so people who were instrumental in mobilizing protesters in the first place, addressed the assembly through megaphones and wrote down the names of individuals who raised their hands for a chance to speak, on a list known as "the stack." Through the course of the discussion, it became clear that two goals dominated the General Assembly: one was to create a Tahrir Square-like movement in New York. The other goal—the one espoused by the facilitators—was to disrupt Wall Street for the sake of disrupting Wall Street. The main tactic for achieving this, at the time, was to gain media-acknowledgement of their agitation.

In an effort to push through their agenda, the facilitators used the typical anarchist organising-tool: forging "consensus." With over a hundred participants in the General Assembly, total agreement on the issues at stake would seem impossible. Here's how they did it:

One of the first items on the agenda was where the movement would go should the police attempt mass arrests in Liberty Plaza. Instead of putting it to a vote, the facilitators concluded that the decision should not be left to the General Assembly, but to an "action committee" that would meet separately. Decision-making authority on most issues was siphoned away from the General Assembly into smaller committees.

This decision led to a debate about whether the action committee should keep the secondary location secret from the rest of the movement in order to avoid tipping off the surrounding police. I pointed out that—as a practical matter—there would be no secrets when it came to mobilising hundreds of people. Another participant gave an impassioned speech about how our power came from unity and openness, whereas internal divisions and secrets were the tactics of our enemies on Wall Street. Veering somewhat from the topic at hand, he urged those in the crowd wearing bandanas and masks to remove them, saying they scared away potential allies. His speech drew more applause than any other during my four days in Liberty Plaza. Shortly after he finished speaking, however, about a hundred marchers returned from Wall Street, stealing all the momentum.

While everyone was distracted, the facilitators—who evidently disapproved of the direction of the General Assembly—huddled together for a couple minutes, telling eavesdroppers to go away. They subsequently abandoned their attempt to resolve how to prevent the entire movement's arrest and "switched gears" into a discussion on what the next "direct action" should be.

Within minutes, the discussion turned to who was willing to be arrested and how. Many felt that the quickest way to make the news was to get arrested, and

Fritz Tucker

that this alone would make the movement more socially relevant. Most people at the square understood that arrests are a consequence of any significant social movement; some seemed to believe, however, the converse was true: if there are arrests, it will be a significant social movement.

When the facilitators realised that the General Assembly did not approve of this, they tried to disband the General Assembly by asking if everyone needed a break. The participants made it clear that they did not need a break. When the floor reopened, I suggested that the reason for the crowd's unrest was that the leaders of the movement seemed more interested in getting on television than creating an alternative society based on equality, dialog and democracy in the square. I argued that this itself would attract the amount of people needed to remove the institutions that hold together a society based on domination. Shortly afterward, another participant gave an eloquent speech about the foolishness of trying to occupy Wall Street with only three hundred people, and the need to first occupy the hearts and minds of our fellow New Yorkers, fellow Americans, and fellow humans.

After nearly five hours, only one motion had been brought to a vote: that the 'consensus' be modified to require a mere ninety per cent majority. Spirits, however, remained high.

In the end, there was to be one big vote on whether or not we should march on Wall Street, yet again, the next morning. Most participants seemed to want to stay in Liberty Plaza to develop the culture of a mass movement.

The opposing position was—shockingly—to confront the police on Wall Street. At one point, the lead facilitator pled that we occupy Wall Street because "it's pretty clear everybody wants to." When the suggestion received little support, the facilitator exhorted, "but the name of this movement is 'occupy Wall Street'": a name chosen by the facilitators, not the General Assembly.

To forge a consensus in their favor, the facilitators engaged in creative "synthesising." Instead of voting between the two contradictory proposals, a facilitator announced that the General Assembly would vote on a synthesis of the two: those who wanted to hold down Liberty Plaza could stay, while the 'majority' (which was actually a minority) would march on Wall Street.

The General Assembly was clear about its hostility to this proposal. Overwhelmingly, the participants demanded unity. Instead of deciding which proposal the entire group should follow, the facilitators came up with a "new synthesis." The great majority of the movement would stay in Liberty Square, while a small group of direct actioneers would occupy Wall Street. The Facilitators then put this second formulation of their first proposal to a vote.

The "everybody just do what they want" proposal was liberal enough to appeal to the liberals, and anarchical enough to appeal to the anarchists. About fifty-seven people voted in favor. I think I was the only person who bothered voting against. The final decision was so uninspiring that about one-third of the people in the square paid no attention to it, and most of those who were involved didn't bother voting.

Even though those advocating the march were a minority, the procedural coup was complete. I predicted that—in the heat of the moment—everybody would end up marching, simply because it was the only mass action available.

## The Direct Action Committee

After the General Assembly, I sat in on the direct-action committee. Like I had done at the General Assembly, I let everyone in the action-committee know that if the point was to get media attention at the cost of dwindling the numbers of the movement through mass arrests, the direct-actioneers should confront the police on Wall Street, one of the most militarised parts of the first world since 9/11. Then I suggested marching north along Broadway. This would get the attention of actual New Yorkers and possibly build the movement.

But the marchers refused to look past Wall Street. I tried convincing them that they weren't going to disrupt the capitalist system, that the police outnumbered us, were heavily armed, and were quite experienced in dealing with marches on Wall Street. I pointed out that most people who worked on Wall Street showed up at five in the morning, so marching at nine was useless. I pointed out that Wall Street is a mere symbol of capitalism, and that the movement was currently oc-cupying one of the most strategic and symbolic locations in Manhattan, and per-haps the world. Whenever I brought up practical matters, the response was that the action was supposed to be symbolic. When I said the symbolism of occupying Liberty Plaza was powerful enough, the response was that it was important to disrupt the capitalist system, if even for a minute.

My last attempt to sway the action committee was by sharing my opinion that it should not be our goal to disrupt the capitalist system with no alternative solution. I argued that Wall Street represented just one group within the global capitalist system, and disrupting it would only benefit America's capitalist en-emies. I argued, furthermore, that if they didn't have something better to put in its place, even if they destroyed the capitalist system completely, it would rise violently from its ashes.

There was no way for me to know what most participants thought of my ideas. Shortly after I made my point, the direct action committee's facilitators

decided there was enough of a "consensus" made on the strategy of marching to Wall Street, and it was time to talk tactics.

## The Facilitation and Process Workshop

Later, I sat in on the first "facilitation and process workshop." This was organised to train individuals to replace the current facilitators of the General Assembly, who wanted a break from their self-imposed duties while ensuring the continuity of the hierarchy.

When I sat down, I learned that the facilitators had obtained a consensus that gave them the power to interject at any moment, whereas everybody else would have to take turns to speak. This procedure was, in theory, starkly different from the prevailing method of the General Assembly — taking turns to raise arguments or proposals through "the stack." Effectively, there wasn't much difference.

The General Assembly — like every anarchist meeting I've ever attended — left loopholes to avoid taking turns. A person could circumvent the stack's order by making one of several specified hand gestures to signify either a "point of procedure," a "clarifying question," or a "direct response." The keeper of the stack could choose whether or not to acknowledge the interruption. These rules all but guaranteed that the insiders, those who were least open to a diversity of viewpoints, most impatient, and traditionally empowered would dominate the conversation.

During the hour or so that I participated in the workshop, four non-facilitators addressed the group for about ninety seconds each. The remainder of the hour consisted of the facilitators talking among themselves, extrapolating on how vague procedural rules might apply to hypothetical situations and congratulating themselves by repeating that their process for the General Assembly was the most decentralised, democratic one imaginable.

In fact, the procedure for bringing anything to a vote in the General Assembly was highly centralised and hugely inefficient. First, a "working group" had to be formed to demonstrate that a participant's proposal had some support. The working group had to reach a consensus on the proposal's final form, which was then rearticulated before the General Assembly. The facilitator then asked whether there was a consensus from the General Assembly, at which point supporters would raise their hands and wiggle their fingers. The facilitator next asked whether there were any "blocks" — a sort of individual veto, expressed by crossing one's arms. The blocker could then explain his or her opposition to the proposal. If there was a block, the facilitator was supposed to put the proposal to a vote that required a 90 per cent majority to pass. In practice, however, the fa-

cilitators' affinity for consensus often caused them to give in to the block without further voting, sacrificing the majority's will in the name of democracy.

Frustrated by this, I proposed to the workshop a democratic, decentralised and more efficient procedure for the General Assembly, free of any designated facilitators:

Instead of someone "in charge" scanning the crowd to see whose hands were raised and writing down the order in which participants would speak, the "stack" would be formed by whoever wanted to talk forming a line. This was the only part of my proposal that was implemented.

My proposal also prohibited "direct responses" and other means of circum-venting the stack. Addresses to the General Assembly would be limited to con-crete proposals; those who seconded a proposal could speak briefly in its favor; those who opposed could speak against it. Then the proposal would be put to a majority vote. The next person in line would then get a chance to speak. No facilitators. No stack-takers. Equal rights and opportunities for all participants.

As I spoke, several of the facilitators wiggled their hands at me in a way I hadn't seen before: hands down, wiggling fingers toward the ground. This ap-parently meant they disagreed with my proposal. About sixty seconds into my proposal, the facilitators started rolling their fingers at me, a signal that they wanted me to hurry up, or risk getting cut off. I ignored this and completed my proposal. When the facilitators did this to the woman who spoke after me, an-other woman chastised them for this demeaning scare tactic.

The facilitators' failure to articulate their objections to my proposal except through sloganeering betrayed their fundamental distrust in a truly democratic process. They accused me of advocating for the "tyranny of the majority," the counter to which is easily the tyranny of the minority. They said that facilitators were needed in case somebody came up with a bad proposal, further proof that they did not trust the General Assembly to vote for themselves.

The workshop ended with plans for a second workshop, after which the par-ticipants would be given authority to facilitate the General Assembly. I decided to maintain opposition to the process.

## Revolutionary or Bourgeois Democracy

A revolutionary mass movement needs a set of unifying goals, and a unified body that can carry out the necessary actions to reach these goals. If these condi-tions are not met, the mass movement is merely a collection of groups that hap-pen to be carrying out somewhat similar actions in the same place, at the same

time. This type of mass movement is quite susceptible to harsh suppression by a modern nation-state.

The General Assembly is the natural place for the movement as a whole to decide upon actions to be carried out together. Because of the extreme procedural flaws of the Occupy Wall Street movement, the General Assembly became the main place for public dialog, even though it was the least conducive place for dialog, being that only one person could speak at a time.

The smaller organisations, action committees, informal dialogue circles and duos are the natural place for dialog, where politicking happens, where the mood is set, where the culture is created, where people synthesize their ideas into concrete proposals, where people who are prepared to propose a plan of action to the General Assembly gather enough popular support for it to be passed. The action committees, however, became the primary vehicles for deciding upon and carrying out action, in spite of the fact that their diminished size made them the least effective bodies for carrying out mass action.

The Occupy Wall Street movement was supposed to be a revolt against a hierarchal, dehumanising oligopoly. In reality, all that was created was a microcosm of the same system, but with new leaders. Like our nation's leaders, Occupy Wall Street's leaders listened to everyone's grievances, then decided upon a pre-determined plan of action that cleverly borrowed the language of their constituency. The leaders then allowed the participants to decide between this plan of action and an even worse proposal: in this case, marching on Wall Street to an unspecified end, or doing nothing. When this failed, less democratic methods were used to mobilize people.

## The Morning March

I didn't sleep in Liberty Plaza Sunday night. I was confident I could make it back for the 9 AM General Assembly, before the 9:30 march on Wall Street. A friend of mine texted me at 7:09 AM, letting me know that the General Assembly was starting surprisingly early. By the time I got there—before 8 AM—it looked like ninety per cent of the people had already left Liberty Plaza.

From what I was able to gather from the disheartened people left in the square, the leaders woke everybody up at around 6:30 AM with the promise of a General Assembly. After everybody was assembled, a couple announcements were made. At one point, somebody got up in front of the General Assembly and shouted that they should march on Wall Street immediately. Instead of voting on this proposal, those in favor started marching. As I predicted, almost everybody followed.

Forgetting, for a moment, the movement's complete ineffectiveness, I tried imagining what would happen if it succeeded in shutting down Wall Street. I couldn't help looking north, to Ground Zero, where ten years ago a small group of people carried out a highly successful operation that disrupted Wall Street for an entire week. What good came of that? The destroyed buildings are still being rebuilt. The families are broken forever. The culprits were not just vilified by the American public, but by those they considered their allies — the international Muslim community, including Islamic nation-states in militant opposition to the US.

I was wrong in my prediction that the police would use the movement's internal division to commence mass arrests. The marchers were so non-threatening to the police and to the capitalist system that instead of blockading Wall Street, the police spent the night organising a maze of barricades for the march to proceed through. A convergence of interests took place whereby the protestors got to prove to the world that the USA is not entirely comprised of war-and-financial-criminals; whereas our nation's rulers got to prove to the rest of the world, as a backdrop to the General Assembly of the United Nations, that the United States is still the one place in the world which allows its citizens to protest: as long as they're predominantly white, middle-class, male citizens.

The police's facilitation of the protest didn't stop the marchers from claiming, upon their triumphant, yet exhausted return, that the cops were scared of them — these two-hundred unarmed, untrained, unorganised, somewhat disenfranchised youths. One marcher gave a speech about how nobody could tell them that six of their comrades had been arrested for nothing; for they had disrupted trading, if only for a minute. The bell on the stock exchange, after all, had rung at 9:31. With the current state of the people's movement, America is in for a long winter.

# Conceptual and Theoretical Issues of Interdisciplinary Studies

James Petras

**T**he older tradition of philosophical and theological inspired social studies followed a discursive and reflective style of research. The approach was "totalistic" and all-encompassing, rejecting empirical and statistical behavioural research. The growth of political economy especially in the writings of Ricardo, Smith and Marx which emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth century illuminated the relationship between state and economy. Through the application of rigorous empirical study political economy was guided by theoretically informed research designed to guide policy and political practice.

Parallel to political economy, and eventually eclipsing it, was the growth of disciplinary specialisation, guided by a mathematical and abstract theorisation. This approach 'abstracted' a narrow part of the total universe of human behaviour in order to carry out detailed empirical research. To further specialisation and to enhance the prestige and influence of practioners of 'narrow' focus research, departments were established which institutionalised the fracturing of the social sciences and humanities. Over time, the limits of "specialised research" anchored in fragmented departments, to deal with systemic crises led to efforts to create a unified view of social realities.

## Contradictions of Specialisation

Applied empirical studies and disciplinary specialisation had a contradictory outcome: on the one hand it led to a wealth of empirical data and statistical historical studies, which were subject to the rigours of hypothesis testing and counter-evidence; on the other hand, while subjecting the previous philosophical ad theological narrative to a withering critique (and dismissal of most of their claim), it sacrificed the holistic approach to systems in crises and large scale changes in favor of a study of measurable phenomena, subject to quasi-laboratory controls. The scientific method gradually became associated with the narrowing of the field of research and the isolation of 'variables,' to be examined within a given set of conventional assumptions.

## The Politics of Academic Studies: 1900 -1945

Countering this tendency toward rigorous but narrow focus empiricism and mathematical abstract modeling in economics, was the growth of theoretically informed historical studies of long term, large scale change. Germany, from the mid-19th century to the rise of Nazism was the world leader in the physical and social sciences (Watson 2010). German academics were in the forefront of the organisation of 'departments', specialisation and the foremost practioners of a narrow empiricism and long-term, large scale historical changes. With the rise of Nazism, the social sciences and humanities were decimated in Germany. In the West, the collapse of capitalism, with the World Depression, provoked a major crisis in the narrow focus social sciences. The old assumptions of inevitable progress and imperial/capitalist growth were in tatters.However, most Left academics were confined to critiques of the failures of capitalist theories. There were few notable exceptions, especially in history. For the most part however, most left writers were reduced to textual exegesis of Marx and his epigones and general narratives demonstrating the superiority of Marxism.

With the onset of World War II, most western social scientists were harnessed to the state war machine. Most of what passed as "research" was propaganda and narrowly instrumental to the war aims of the state. In the East, Stalinisation precluded any original critical application of Marxism.In the period following World War II there was a brief period in which western social sciences sought to recover their critical identity especially in Europe. However, their writing was negatively influenced by the 'victors' mentality' and precluded an analysis of the imperial aims of the anti-fascist "allies". The emergence of US imperial hegemony in the West and the extension of Stalinism into Central and Eastern Europe rapidly stifled the emergence of critical political economy studies in the social sciences.

## The Cold War: The Ascendancy of Specialisation

The brief blossoming of critical social sciences and holistic humanities (1945 -1947) in the West was aborted, with the onset of the Cold War, McCarthyism and the purging of critical intellectuals, East and West. Neo-colonial wars (Korea), the economic recovery and expansion of capitalism and collectivism fostered the ascendancy of conformist academics ensconced in disciplinary departments engaged in specialised research.

With the defeats of the post war social upheavals in the West (especially in France, Italy, Greece) and the global ascendancy of US imperialism backed

by rightwing social democracy in Western Europe, the social sciences and humanities became captive of CIA funded Cold War academics (Saunders 2000). The intervention of the state and its quasi-state private foundations (Ford, Rockefeller, and Fulbright) was crucial to their ascendency. Research funding and publications revolved around conformity with the basic assumptions of the emerging American empire in prestigious universities. To secure large grants to build 'prestigious' academic 'area studies' centres revolved around producing empire centered policy papers. These political constraints encourage academics to confine themselves to their specialised discipline. Narrow focus empiricism operated within the cold war assumption imposed by the McCarthyite purges and academic blacklisting of critical political economists. The academic "gatekeepers" strengthened their hold over departments and the specialized research of the leading academic journals(Mills 1959).

## Specialised Academic Disciplines: Vehicles for Cultural Imperialism

US social science with its disciplinary specialisations became the 'model' for academic "reform" throughout the world. Generously funded by government agencies and private foundations, hundreds of thousands of overseas graduate students came under US academic tutelage. Those who returned to their home country spread the gospel that "serious social science" involved modeling, specialisation, narrow focus empiricism and reorganising faculty into 'modern' departments within disciplinary boundaries.

In many of the newly independent countries, like India, the Philippines and Indonesia intellectual debates and confrontations emerged between Marxist academics pursuing political economy approaches and the newly minted overseas 'PhDs' who operated within the boundaries of their specialisations. The debate was imbued with a strong ideological undertone: supporters of imperial modernization versus advocates of anti-imperialist social revolutions versus nationalist developmentalists. The practioners of narrow focus empiricism assumed the mantle of "rigorous scientists" and accused their Marxist colleagues of being 'ideologues.' The latter in turn responded by accusing their critics of abdicating their intellectual responsibilities by failing to face up to the "big picture", the large scale long term structures of an imperial-centred political-economic universe.

In the beginning of the post-colonial period, in the heat of the independence and national liberation struggles, the Marxists had the upper hand. Over time, especially with the onset of neoliberalism from the 1980s onward, social and hu-

manities studies were taken over by several variants of 'specialisations' – the micro analysts of markets and "civil society", the post-modern academics describing multiple identities and debating how many ethno-racial-gender-caste-class identities could be articulated in a social formation. Overseas and corporate funding flooded the academic marketplace – promoting specialisations which served corporate ad state interests over the holistic approaches of critical political economists.

## Class Power and the Rise and Fall of Academic Paradigms

The fortunes of competing paradigms and styles of research, the rise and decline of political-economy or disciplinary specialisation, was not decided merely by the logic of evidence and success in predictability within academic circles. To a large, but indeterminate extent, the prominence and pre-eminence of one or the other approach were determined – sometimes directly others indirectly - by large scale historical changes in the world outside of academia.

## Challenge of Political Realities and Myths of Autonomy of Social Sciences

The overt influence of political power over the direction of social studies in the US is a case in point. With the onset of US imperial supremacy after World War II and the economic boom which followed, in the context of rising income, debt fueled consumerism and a de-radicalised bureaucratised labour movement, social sciences were increasingly confined to 'departments' and disciplinary specialisations. Nineteenth century political economy programmes were transformed into 'Government Departments'. The latter were intent on training future functionaries into the operations of government or as pollsters and pundits analysing voting results. By definition, studies of "ruling classes" were ruled out, by the ruling dogma of "pluralist democracies". The publication of *The Power Elite* by C. W. Mills was the rare exception (Mills 1956). Needless to add, this magisterial interdisciplinary study was condemned by academic "gatekeepers" as lacking 'scientific' merit.

With the onset of the 1960s and the US - Indo - Chinese war and the massive and sustained Afro-American revolts, the younger generation of undergraduates and, especially, graduate students organised mass protests. These movements challenged imperial and racist state practices and the 'specialised fragmented lectures and readings which ignored the large scale structures of power. Students demanded readings and studies of the military-industrial complex, the segre-

gationist social and the political power structures and the closed elitist political institutions which dictated wars independently of the attitudes of youth conscripted as cannon folder.

The formal academic institutions and prestigious professors refused to budge: the new realities of imperial wars and black uprisings failed to register in the prestigious academic journals. Between 1964 and 1975, the period of the most intense imperial and racial warfare, engaging over 500,000 US troops (5 million over the 11 year war) in Indochina and 130 black uprisings (including violent combat 4 blocks from the White House in Washington D.C.),the *American Sociological Review* (ASR) and the *American Political Science Review* did not publish a single article describing and analysing the political, economic and social dynamics of the national liberation struggle or the ruling class's imperial strategy or the dynamics of popular racial revolts (Petras and Davenport 1992).

In the face of such obtuse institutional rigidity and political irrelevance, students and younger faculty organised 'teach ins' where the larger questions of world-historic significance, the political economic structures of empire and racism (among others) were discussed, debated and interpolated in an inter-disciplinary context. Non-academic weekly and monthly publications proliferated. As well, what the popes of academia deemed 'second tier' academic journals, published articles on the issues of the day. The social sciences entered into crises by the early 1970s (Gouldner 1971).

The cultural-intellectual breakthrough continued, however, in diluted form in the aftermath of the first major US military defeat in Indo-China and the opening of 'white society' to an emerging black bourgeoisie and middle class. However, with the onset of the neoliberal offensive in the Anglo-American world during the Reagan-Thatcher period, mainstream specialized academia regained hegemony and went its way in specialised arcane research and policy studies for the imperial state and corporate financial sponsors.

## Rise of Variants of Inter-Disciplinary Studies: Corporate or Critical?

Policy elites of empire and multi-national corporation are increasingly aware that politics is entwined with economics, that 'soft power' (culture) complements 'hard power' (military intervention); that ideological hegemony is less costly than military invasions. Leading political and corporate decision makers are demanding academics pursue 'holistic,' 'interdisciplinary' research to serve a sprawling empire covering diverse cultures, economies at different levels of

development and political risks resulting from burgeoning social movements (Petras and Veltmeyer 2011). Once again "political realities" outside academia influence the style, form and substance of research paradigms. Inter-disciplinary studies are in demand from the corporate end of the political and economic spectrum. Neoliberalism needs political-economic and cultural knowledge for opening markets; displacing indigenous peoples to exploit extractive and industrial activity; knowledge of consumer tastes to further sales and a whole host of other profit making activities.

A new kind of 'political economy' has come into demand, no longer centred in the quest for social emancipation but carried forward in the name of capitalist modernisation, state deregulation and free markets. The language of 'globalisation' replaces the more precise concepts of imperialism and empire-building.

In the new millennia "global studies centers" bring together different disciplinery departments to further corporate management research agendas. Political economic consultoria are established to 'get the big picture straight' for global empire builders. Ex-Marxist economists advice on how to compete in the world market. A host of new and varied 'interdisciplinary' approaches emerge to promote old and new imperial empires along with centers of post-modernism.What distinguishes the new interdisciplinary centers from the earlier critical political economy approach is not only the class point of departure (which is not usually acknowledged by the contemporary practioners) but the method by which programs are put into practice.

## Critique of Neoliberal 'Interdisciplinary Studies'

Bringing together political scientists, economists, sociologists and humanities professors to present their views and to articulate their 'perspective' simply repeats what otherwise takes place in the fragmented specialised disciplines. This approach neither transcends the limitations of disciplinary boundaries nor provides a new theoretical paradigm to inform teaching and research. The units of analysis are still derived from the organising principles of narrow disciplinary paradigms. The development of an interdisciplinary paradigm requires a conceptual framework which looks at the dialectical interplay of state structures, class and productive systems in a world-historical context (Ollman 1993). Economic institutions are defined by the classes which own and/or control them and which influence or determine state policies. At the same time state policies, promote, demote or repress different classes; and the emergence and/or decline of one set of economic sectors over another. Likewise, the predominance of one

type of economic institutions brings forth a set of classes who orient the state to subsidise and finance a strategy which maximises their growth and profits.

The interplay of domestic classes, national states and dynamic economic institutions are conditioned by the development of expanding or stagnant world markets and competing classes, states and economic enterprises. The dynamic interaction of domestic and global factors of power are in turn influenced by historical processes; the rise and decline of empires; the use and abuse of new technologies embedded in productive or speculative institutions; the impact of class, caste and national struggles and imperial wars; the changes induced by economic and financial crises. This entire ensemble is defended or attacked by cultural analysts, who provide an ideological justification or critique which reinforces or undermines the operations of the totality.

## Conclusion: Objectivity and Political Commitments

In other words, inter-disciplinary studies integrate in one body of theory the interacting structures of 'social life' (in the broadest sense of the word) and does so in a manner to promote social and political action and policies based on the class interests defined by the teacher, researcher or student (Veltmeyer 2011). There is no contradiction between objective interdisciplinary research and political commitment; between diagnosis and political advocacy and practice. Political commitments define the subject or object of investigation; rigorous interdisciplinary research will diagnose the conditions, institutions and policies which favor or undermine the advancements of the interests of the subject (Parenti 2006). Interdisciplinary research may involve overt policy advocacy or not, but the findings will be available for those who act to further their class interests over others. The application of the interdisciplinary findings to political practice is in large part shaped by the large political environment – especially the audience (the social classes) to which inter-disciplinary research is directed.

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# Rethinking Occident and the Knowledge Question

George Varghese K

The spirit of our times is to conceive things globally as it is critically actuated by globalisation. The latter has, by now, become both a physical fact and an epistemological structure; perhaps even more. From the perspective of social sciences what globalisation has achieved by now is a queer syndrome: both homogenisation and fragmentation in the other parts of the world simultaneously. That is,disuniting and disintegrating the local and indigenous structures to be assimilated into the one-dimensional actuality of the Western universal. This is neither a peaceful process nor a violent one. It is double-handed, ambivalent and seductive; which reminds one of the early colonialist/missionary duo who forayed together into the other man's world with the grit of the sword and the right of the cross. The antique devices of cross and sword have given place to more potent weapons of commodities, media litanies and aid agencies today. Market has become the fount and engine of this new evangelisation. For Jean Baudrillard, the bold critic of Western capitalism, this is only pornography. Post capitalist market has brought about the promiscuity of exchange of anything and everything in a carnivalesque global market which includes even cultural signs and human values (Baudrillard 2003:24).

We have to examine globalisation and its ramifications more pointedly in the context of global interconnections and interdependence. Though victoriously launched from the western world in the 1980s globalisation also brought chagrin to its founding fathers later with the rise of theAsian economies like China, South Korea and India. The west's dominance in many fields especially IT, small sector industries and middle level technologies was radically challenged and displaced by the Asian economies. In the main sectors like food, medicine , aeronautics, defence etc.also the dominance of the west is getting sapped off .As a result there has arisen a  general illusion  that the western knowledge system and its organisation, especially in the field of science and technology, isalso undergoing a sort of structural weakening to the advantage of the Asian world. As a corollary to this, there is a jingoistic sort of deliberation that has come up recently in countries

like India about the indigenisation of the form, content and practice of the social sciences and humanities in tune with the national ethos (see Claude Alavarez's article in EPW, 28 May 2011 and as a reply the author's article in EPW, 30 July 2011). To the best of my conviction this results from a criminal myopia of the real superiority and strength of the ordering and institutionalisation of western knowledge which is definitely going to stay much into the future. That does not mean the western knowledge and its ideology should not be contested or toppled by us. But as the usual piece of wisdom goes, the enemy can be overthrown only by gaining adeeper knowledgeof its strengths and weaknesses. Taking cue from this simple insight thefollowing part of this essay is a broad enquiry into the western intellectual disciplines from their consolidation in the Middle Ages and their transition to the present marked by spectacular explosions and diversifications.

## The Medieval Order of Knowledge

The ontogeny of   western knowledge systems and disciplines is interesting as they, like living beings emerged at a particular point of time, evolved, hybridized, died and also returned often. There were also drastic variations in the value tagged on to them from period to period. For example, while philosophy and theology were the most important disciplines in the West for a long time from the Greek days to around sixteenth century AD, their status dwindled considerably after that. The shadow of their downfall still haunts the humanities disciplines today. At present the disciplines are mainly divided into three:  the technological and natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities. There are many nuances in the politics of the epistemological republic and we can understand the present predicament only through tracing the historical trajectory of the disciplines. This scenario is rife with one more fatal contradiction. That in this republic, what we today call the oriental citizens or forms, are literally absent. Sanskrit or Indian languages or Indian philosophy for that matter are subsidiary or secondary citizens; most of them breathing their last and for the time being artificially kept alive. Hence the story is all-west, critically and viciously so. Let us have a brief look into it.

For almost 2000 years, starting from the ancient Greece of fifth century BC to Europe of sixteenth century, western pedagogy was confined to a limited set of disciplines. They were broadly divided into three divisions in its peak in the medieval and late medieval periods. The first division was 'Trivium,' constituted of logic, grammar and rhetoric, which formed what we today call the primary education. The secondary education was mainly centred on 'Quadrivium' which

consisted of astronomy, music, arithmetic and geometry. After the secondary education most of the students left the schools and only very few were qualified for higher education. Higher education was an exclusive preserve and by the Middle Ages (roughly between ninth and fourteenth centuries) this was confined to four subjects: philosophy, theology, medicine and law. Of these, theology was the most important   one since it was a   milieu dominated by the Christian pantheon and Catholic ideas. Most of the scholars were theologians. Doctors like St. Thomas Aquinas,   St. Bonaventura, St. Albert, William of Ockham, Duns Scotus etc. who contributed to theology and philosophy greatly are well known to us.

Theological and mystical ideas percolated all walks of life of the medieval world. But these mystical and superstitious ideas were given a scientific garb through deft theological construal. In that sense theology was science and science was theology. On the other hand, mathematics, number theory, architecture, music, optics, astronomy, medicine were all seriously researched upon.  Franciscans were known for their work in natural science and physics. St .Bonaventura, Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon have contributed significantly to optics and physics (Grinnell 1946:153). Despite such intense scientific quarrying into nature and natural phenomena, one superior cause capped all such researches: the glorification of god. This was the fundamental slant in the whole order of knowledge and things. From such a perspective the whole scientific order got doubled into a divine order and an earthly order. There was a godly hand behind everything.

Everything in the lower world kept concordance with the higher world for the medieval mind.  Each trivial aspect of daily life bore a mystical and divine allusion.  Take the case of the mystic, Henry Suso, cited by Huizinga.  At the time of meals he ate three-fourth of an apple in honour of the Trinity and the other quarter in memory of the love which Virgin Mary showed when she gave an apple to Infant Jesus to eat.  This last quarter he ate with the paring since little boys don't peel the apples.  After Christmas he did not eat it, for then Infant Jesus was too young to eat apples.  While drinking, he used to gulp in five draughts, to commemorate the five wounds of Christ.  Since in Bible it was mentioned that blood and water flowed from the wounds of Christ he took the last draught twice.  Thus life was completely sanctified with a profusion of divine symbolism in almost every gesture (Huizinga 1924:148).

What sorts of researches were conducted in this period? There was definitely a microphysics like the atomic physics of today.  But the problem posed was divine and angelic. An important problem which the medievals thus posed and racked their head was how many angels could stand on the head of a pin? Do angels have bodies like men and wings like birds? Could the camel pass through

the eye of a needle since this was an important biblical riddle and image raised by Christ himself? Some other interesting related questions were: did Mary take part in her immaculate conception consciously? Would the body of Christ have remained undecayed had he not resurrected? There was a macrophysics also which in turn became symbolic and at the same time numerical. Three was an important number since it was the number of the Holy Trinity. Four was another important number since it represented the four elements. So by multiplying three with four or in another sense infusing the spirit of Trinity with the materiality of the universe the medievals derived the equation for the cosmos which was twelve(Male 1972:11). Twelve thus became an important number and that was why Christ chose twelve disciples. It becomes important from another angle too in the derivative sense. The twelve disciples undertook the evangelical mission of spreading Christ's message to "all parts of the known world" which in turn is symbolic of the universe derived by multiplying three with four.

There was research in gynaecology also. Honorius of Autun highlights the importance of number forty-six for the gynecological theory of the age. Middle Ages held the view that soul unites with the body after forty-six days following conception. The significance of this number is mystically written in the very name of the first man who took birth in the world: Adam. This can be clearly seen once we transpose the letters of the name of Adam into the progression of the Greek alphabets in the numerical order.Though in the alphabetical order μ is twelfth, its numerical value is forty.

$$\alpha = 1, \quad (\delta) = 4, \quad \alpha = 1, \quad (\mu) = 40.$$

Thus, the sum of the numbers of the Greek alphabets that constitute 'Adam' is 46 (ibid: 12).

Again, as the thesis of the great historian of science, Pierre Duhem, goes it was from this theological milieu of cosmological physics, saturated with Aristotelianism, that the modern mathematical physics was born. It was also part of a divine glorification. The Aristotelian theology, represented quintessentially by St. Thomas Aquinas, postulated that the existence of infinity was contradiction in terms since it went against the theory of Aristotle. For Aristotle infinity could never exist. This in a way put a limit on the infinite powers of the Christian god. If god is omnipotent he should be able to create infinity also. Etienne Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, on 7 March 1277, condemned 219 philosophical theses of the Aristotelian theology and an important one was the limitation put on god to create infinity. This condemnation also became a mandate to the theologian-scholars to develop a theory of infinity. This infinity opened up by theologians and

scholars of Paris University like John Buridan, Nicole of Oresme and Albert of Saxony culminated in the groundbreaking astronomical and dynamical theories of Copernicus, Bruno and Galileo later. Thus Etienne Tempier's condemnation of the Aristotelian concept of the finite cosmos became   the "birth certificate" of modern physics and astronomy (Duhem 1985:3-4; Rosemann 2009:552).

## Seventeenth Century and the Formation of a New Episteme

 The theologically saturated medieval knowledge slowly crumbled and gave way to early modern disciplines by the seventeenth century. It was the "Century of Revolutions" for scholars like Bernard Cohen. The first political revolution represented by the English Civil War of 1648, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 ,  the coming and going of Cromwellian Protectorate ,  the revolution in philosophy pioneered by Descartes, the revolution in chemistry made by Boyle, the revolution in political philosophy created  by Hobbes, the revolution  in mathematics and physics introduced by Galileo, Leibniz and Newton , and the numerous  social revolutions that swept through Europe all concurred in the same period of seventeenth century (Cohen 1985 :1-12). In the context of these social and intellectual revolutions there occurred a drastic mutation in the epistemic ordering of disciplines and sciences also. Foucault's *Order of Things* analyses the nature of this mutation with remarkable depth and range. For his archaeological approach it is not the content of knowledge that mattered in this mutation but the transformation in the very principle of the ordering of knowledge that embraced a range of disciplines at a specific period. This ordering principle he called the 'episteme' of an age.

There occurred a fundamental change in the western episteme in the seventeenth century that replaced the Renaissance episteme with the Classical episteme. Renaissance episteme for all practical purposes was the medieval order of knowledge based on resemblances and similitudes. In this episteme things were ordered in a cosmological space based on their resemblance; the logic of similitude formed the principle of knowledge. Hence the aconite seed became a medicine for eye diseases since its embedding within its outer skin   resembled the eye covered with the eyelids. Resemblance had many forms and some of them were drawn from distance also. Thus the sunflower and stars are drawn into certain kinship though they are separated by great distance. Sunflower followed the course of the sun from a distance due to its affinity with this celestial star. They are bound together by a mystic force which works at the root of the zodiacal theory and symbolism. Within this relationship of affinity terms can be substituted also. Thus sunflowers became "terrestrial stars" while stars in turn

became "celestial flowers." This order of things based on resemblance and affinity crumbled by the seventeenth century and a new order of episteme emerged.

The crisis of this catastrophic shift is represented by Don Quixote whose frenzied adventures become epistemologically important. Don Quixote is the last figure of the medieval knowledge based on similitudes. He is the symbol of word itself; "a tall and lean graphism", traversing both the symbolic world of knowledge and a hostile physical terrain at the same time furiously on an emaciated horse. Don Quixote walks out of the medieval world fed into his brain through the stories and romances he read in the books. He did not know that the real world had changed radically during the period of his intellectual incubation. He was a stubborn scholar who believed only what he read and swore by it. Hence everywhere he wanted to see the resemblances of what he read in the books. Once that didn't happen he imaginarily transmogrified the world outside into his bookish reality. Hence the windmills became monsters, the flocks of sheep transformed into marching armies, and the serving girls in the inn turned into medieval courtesans.  For Foucault Don Quixote is "the hero of the Same," a victim of the medieval similitude.  His madness is nothing but a crisis in the sign and the shift in the order of knowledge from the early form to the new one (Foucault 1970:46-50).

The new order of knowledge that emerged in the seventeenth century is named the classical episteme. In the place of the medieval similitude a new principle of ordering knowledge emerged. It was constituted of three axes:  taxonomy (*taxinomia*), mathematisation (*mathesis universalis*) and the search for origin (*genesis*). Though the Middle Ages developed elaborate encyclopedias like Vincent of Beauvais's *Speculum Ecclesiae andSpeculum Naturale* the principle of classification followed in these works were illogical and often bizarre. Foucault compares it to the classification in a Chinese encyclopedia borrowed from Louis Borges. For example animals were  classified as : 1) those belonging to the emperor; 2) embalmed; 3) tame; 4) sucking pigs; 5) sirens; 6) frenzied ; 7) stray dogs; 8) that painted with a fine brush; 9) that from  long way off look like flies etc. (ibid:xv). The medievals failed to order even a library properly which is supposed to be the seat of learning. A library looked like a junk room  with assorted things like books, relics, stones , bones, feathers, skins , dried plants , skeletons , skulls , paintings , pots etc. all piled up together . They did not know the simplest way of ordering books or things alphabetically. Books were ordered according to their size, the merit of the donor, the date of arrival or by the distance of the places from which they were brought. Mathematisation, taxonomy and search for origin completely re-structured the medieval knowledge into a new epistemic format.

But the influence of medievalism still persisted. Newton wrote his great treatise in physics in Latin entitled  *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica* (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, 1687) which resembled a medieval tome.  Even the medieval god was still very much present in Newton's mechanical philosophy as the final mover of the universe and the ultimate guarantor of truth (Koyre 1957: 225-26). The other great intellectual luminary of the seventeenth century, Descartes, also accommodated the Christian god in a new form in his philosophy. The two poles of Cartesian philosophy are the "cogito" on the one side and the "ontological proof of god" on the other side. Descartes moved from the assertion of the self to the intelligibility of the world and finally to the perfection of god. In that sense Descartes' position in the history of philosophy is ambivalent; some see him as the father of moderns while others see him as the grandson of the medievals (Levi 1974:195).

## Nineteeth Century and the Trimodal Scheme of Disciplines

The change to the seventeenth  century classical episteme restructured the form and content of different disciplines and this continued till the birth of the modern episteme in the nineteenth century. In this interim period, old classifications and nomenclatures of disciplines got reshaped and reordered radically. Till the seventeenth century there was another aggregation also in operation that ordered the individual disciplines into two other broad camps: natural philosophy and natural history. All the abstract physical and mathematical sciences came under natural philosophy and all other ideas related to organisms, human life and nature   came under natural history. Note that Newton's *Principia* was written as a treatise in natural philosophy. In the span of the two centuries that separated the classical episteme and the modern episteme there occurred drastic shifts in the form and tenor of individual disciplines.  The analysis of wealth became political economy and later economics; alchemy became phlogiston chemistry and later proper chemistry; old rhetoric and grammar became general grammar and later philology; botany, zoology and early medicine got integrated into biology by 1800. Theology lost prominence as a discipline by the eighteenth century. Philosophy got restructured and became part of the arts faculty and shared its position by the side of a number of other so-called lesser disciplines like fine arts, music, painting, language, literature etc. By the nineteenth century new disciplines like anthropology, psychology and sociology emerged. The age of new hybrids also dawned with this century.

In this period a third entrant came to occupy a critical position between the pure sciences and humanities: social sciences. Before the rise of social sciences the divide was mainly between philosophy/theology and pure sciences. The

contents of these disciplines were also sharply demarcated; while philosophy/ theology tried to understand and promote the notion of "good", the sciences were concerned with the 'true.' The social sciences added a new dimension to this disciplinary divide. The birth of social science was a process that began in the eighteenth century Enlightenment and completed during the turmoil and revolutions of the nineteenth century Europe. Perhaps the most important event that contributed to the birth of social sciences was the French Revolution. The latter asserted two important things: the rights of man and the perfectibility of knowledge. A third dimension was added to it by Kant and the Enlightenment philosophers: the use of reason. Kant's philosophical tract "What is Enlightenment" was a major step in this regard which asserted strong faith in the legitimacy of individual thinking and the exercise of public reason ( Rundell 2001:13-17). But the true consolidation of social sciences occurred in the mid-nineteeth century.

Amidst the many revolutions that occurred in this period three definite ideological camps emerged. The first one was the conservative camp which found fault with the present state of things and strongly exhorted the reversion of things to the old order dominated by the church and the king. The opposite group was formed of the anarchists, communists and other radicals who questioned all forms of social control and aimed at the destruction of the status quo. Between these two polar camps a third one emerged: the liberals. They had faith in democracy and championed a mid-way path between taking things back to the Middle Ages of the conservatives and the annihilation thesis of the radicals. They championed a reformist and managerial ideology. For them things could be set aright by a rational reordering of social affairs in a collective and consensual manner. It was the faith of the liberals in the "management" of society that resulted in the growth and consolidation of social sciences in the nineteeth century.

But no sooner than its birth  the social sciences were caught up in a double-bind between the pure sciences and the humanities. 'Sociology' was founded in the model of natural sciences by Auguste Comte and specifically established it in 1846 after renaming the hitherto current "social physics." For Comte sociology has nothing to do with arts or humanities but formed the latest point in the historical progression of sciences. For him sociology is the last one in a series of sciences that began with mathematics and developed through astronomy, physics, chemistry and biology (Gane 2006:55-64). This is both a logical and historical progression. But things were not very smooth with regard to certain other disciplines like psychology and anthropology. These two dealt with human mind and human relations *per se* and could not analyze things without empathizing with the non-rational side of humans in which the scientific tools of Newtonian

sciences were of little help. So in the social sciences two sections emerged: one that followed the nomothetic epistemology of Newtonian sciences like sociology, economics and political science; and the other one that employed an idiographic epistemology of humanities represented by disciplines like psychology and anthropology. Immanuel Wallerstein's observation is most pertinent in this context: "Social science was like someone tied to two horses galloping in opposite directions. Having developed no epistemological stance of its own, social science was torn apart by the struggle between the two colossi that were natural sciences and the humanities, neither of which tolerated a neutral stance" (Wallerstein 1999:2).

Wallerstein perceives a contrasting legacy in the history of social sciences from its growth from the eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. For him in the early phase of 1750 to 1850 its disciplinarisation between the "two cultures" of science (true) and humanities (good) faced many intrinsic infantilities. There were many pseudo and proto-disciplines that put their claim as social sciences and the confusion was tentatively resolved by the mid-nineteeth century. The growth from 1850 to 1945 was more focused and selective which resulted in the standardization of social sciences to a limited set of disciplines. As Wallerstein observes:

> In our view ,there were only six such names that were very widely accepted throughout the scholarly world, and they reflected three underlying cleavages that seemed plausible in the late nineteenth century: the split between past (history) and present(economics, political science, and sociology); the split between the Western civilized world (the above four disciplines) and the rest of the world (anthropology for "primitive" peoples,the Oriental studies for non-Western "high civilizations"); and the split, valid only for the modern Western world ,between the logic of the market (economics) ,the state (political science) and the civil society (sociology)( ibid:2-3).

But after 1945 this structure broke down. There started the disintegration of the old structured disciplines like sociology, economics, anthropology etc. into new amorphous and hybridised forms. New disciplines also emerged and gained strength like the international studies and the area studies. The rise of "area studies" began replacing the old anthropology and Oriental studies to a significant extent. Hitherto marginalised groups and sections also demanded themselves to be brought under appropriate disciplines. This resulted in the formation of women's studies, minority studies, African studies etc. by the 1970s. By the 1980s, under the impact of globalisation, more specialised disciplines like the postcolonial studies, development studies etc. also emerged . For Wallerstein two most important disciplines in this series are the "cultural studies" in the interface of social science/humanities and the "complexity studies" in the

matrix of natural/physical sciences. Both these disciplines attacked the classical mode of nomothetic theorising and shifted their probe-heads to the non-system-ic, non-rational and non-predictive dimensions of reality. We are almost back again in the beginnings of the eighteenth century where amorphous systems of thought and proliferating proto-disciplines all started claiming respectability as independent disciplines. But this time it occurred more consciously and as part of creating an "interdisciplinary" approach to sciences and social sciences. This also resulted many a time in illicit predations and poachings into each other's territories.

## New Disciplines: Disintegration and Eternal Return in the Twenty-First Century

The scene in the twenty-first century is far more bewildering. This can be per-ceived in the proliferation of disciplines and areas of research at present. The subjects have become so prolific that they have started resembling the junk room libraries of the Middle Ages. The proliferation is such that the disciplines and courses have to be now organised alphabetically as in encyclopedias. Moreover, those that are classified have no patent interconnections between them either. So under the alphabet 'a' we have numerous and diverse disciplines ranging from archeology, anatomy and accounting to aesthetics, anesthesiology and Arme-nian language taught as courses in the same institution. Under 'b' we have biol-ogy, biosociology, biophilosophy and biochemistry to black studies, Buddhism and behavioral economics. According to Tight Malcolm there are thirty-nine disciplines starting with the letter 'g' taught in a standard university in UK. This includes subjects as wide as gastroenterology, general linguistics, gerontological studies and Greek to graphic design, genetics and geomatics (Malcolm 2003:393). Perhaps more astonishing are the sections subsumed under a single discipline like the legal discipline. There are hundred and forty-four subsections charted under this discipline which are given in a website. This includes sections as wide and different as audio media law, copy right law and divorce act to internet act, insolvency act and photography act.

Till the recent past, sciences operated with a specific system of knowledge and a specialised groups of professionals located in institutions like laboratories, hospitals and factories. Today this division has changed with the mutation that has occurred to both the system of knowledge and the mode of experiments. As everybody knows, today experimental gadgets like cyclotrons or "particle accel-erators" are mammoth in size compared to the modest test tubes and horseshoe magnets of earlier laboratories. With the development of 'mobile' monitoring mechanisms the form of experimentation on human bodies has also changed.

George Varghese K

Human bodies are now studied in the real life situations through images taken by sophisticated gadgets like rftMRI (Real-time Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) scanners. These images obtained through the electronic beads inserted inside the human body are studied by the experts from their own homes or offices located far away. The mobile nature of technology definitely owes to the great development in computer technology and informatics. Two important features of the modern computers are ubiquity and compression. By 1990s the computers  climbed down from the desks and tables and started travelling. They have become small and mobile. Chips, handhelds and GPS devices have begun showing up at most unexpected of locations. This is the era of ubiquitous computing or 'ubicomp', observes a scientist from the Stanford University. He observes: "And with ubiquity comes the recognition that all people in all places at all times might require or benefit from technology and therefore have to be able to use it in a productive and enjoyable way. Enter the social scientists" (*Multidisciplinary News,* Winter 2007: 11).

Today almost all disciplines have become multidisciplinary. The range of divisions and specialisations within a single discipline itself has also widened considerably so that a meld of physicians, technocrats, economists, psychologists, artists, designers etc. collaborate today to solve a common problem from diverse directions. The scientists are "different creatures" than they were ten years ago, observes Janette Schmidt, a professor in the Biological Research Centre of the Stanford University. It is not only between sciences that the disciplinary miscegenation has taken place but even across hitherto incommunicados like humanities and natural sciences. One of the four important biological research centres in Stanford University is named National Centre for Biomedical Ontology (not oncology) (ibid:5).Multidisciplinarity has become so demanding and deep-seated that the new image of a scientist or a scholar  has assumed the shape of  'T' , according to Bernard Roth , a pioneer in the Robotics department of the Stanford University. The horizontal axis stands for the range of subjects one should master and the vertical one for the depth in each subject one should command (ibid: 2). Again, the new "inter-disciplinarisation" has completely redefined the old binary of man versus nature or subject versus object. Things are shifted to an "in-between". Scott Klemmer of Human-computer Interaction Centre (HCI) of Stanford University puts it a bit wryly: "Perhaps civilization's biggest screw-up came when Rene Descartes said 'I think, therefore I am', separating mind and body. What Descartes didn't know is that it's all happening in the interface" (ibid: 11).

The super specialisation in each discipline has reached such micro-levels that the technical representations have also increased beyond our comprehension. Till now pain was considered the after-effect of a cut or mutilation that oc-

curs to the living body. It never formed a proper theoretical object of research as such. Today "pain management centres" are an important part of many medical schools in the western and north European countries. The range of adjectives to identify the nature of pain felt by a patient has also expanded disproportionately. A patient going to the pain research centre of the Stanford University can choose from a hundred adjectives like pulsing, drilling, wrenching, scalding, taut, un-bearable, nagging, torturing etc. to express his or her pain. Pain is not a medical condition alone; it has become a philosophy even. Stanford's online encyclopedia now devotes pages and pages to analyse it as a philosophy (ibid 2007: 4). Again, pain has become interdisciplinary too so that a team of experts comprising of physicians, psychiatrists, neuroscientists, anesthesiologists, experts on depression etc. all work together to conquer it.

The super-specialisation of modern disciplines have reached staggering levels which can be inferred from the savvy ones developed in the US and Northern Europe today. A few important ones start with the prefix "neuro" like neurolaw, neuroethics, neuroeconomics, neurotechnology etc. It is again an "image science" *par excellence* using sophisticated technology. "Pictures of brain, it is said, can show us why we kill, why we like Bach, why we construct stories the way we do and why we choose the wrong boyfriends" (ibid). Take the case of neuroeconomics. It is a hybrid and a quaint interdisciplinary combination.It is an interdisciplinary field that seeks to understand and explain human decision making, the ability to process multiple alternatives and to choose an optimal course of action in economic activities. It studies how economic behavior can shape our understanding of the brain, and how neuroscientific discoveries can constrain, guide and promote the theory and practice of the science of economics. It combines research methods from neuroscience, experimental and behavioral economics and cognitive and social psychology. As research into decision-making behavior becomes increasingly computational, it has also incorporated new approaches from theoretical biology, computer science and advanced statistics and mathematics.

Neuroeconomics studies decision making by using a combination of tools from the above mentioned fields to avoid the shortcomings that arise from a single perspective approach. It employs advanced imaging techniques to study the neuronic changes in the brain when it is engaged in important economic decision makings. As in pain studies where pain is studied in its occurrence in real life situations (for example, in sports through sophisticated internal imaging), here changes in the brain functions during the economic decision making are studied through brain imaging. For example, the neuronal changes in successful and un-

successful investment decisions are imaged, compared and theorised. Through the appropriate technological manipulations the ideal all-winning investment brains could be developed in the future, thus runs the dream of neuroeconomists. Again, the technology of brain imaging can also contribute significantly to the mitigation of problems like alcoholism, drug addiction etc. In short, the brain has changed from a valuation device to a process device today. In future ideal artistic, domestic, erotic and even revolutionary and terroristic brains may be developed by the new neuro disciplines.

With the twenty-first century a new episode is definitely added to the history of disciplines. But though this event has all the semblance of the new or ultramodern, on closer look we find that the things are only getting orchestrated on an epistemic grid that was at the beginning of the so-called modern age. Things go back to the pre-modern levels though in an abstract sense. When we look from a philosophical perspective like that of Deleuze this becomes evident. What occurs is a repetition, difference and becoming in the Deleuzian sense. Take the case of our seventeenth century library and its medieval incoherence and chaos. One could not walk in it without tripping on a skull or a jewel box. But today the form has completely changed making libraries "cybraries." With the infinite capacity for digitalisation, virtualisation and abstraction libraries have come to contain the world itself in a nonmaterial form. The bookless libraries are many today. The virtual and digital have changed the form of knowledge radically. The point is that one can dig deep and move into labyrinthine interconnections in the terrain of knowledge. "You can drill through a text to find the point at which child psychology veers into electrical engineering, the moment of the genesis of scientific arguments within philosophy, the places where biology bumps against chemistry and physics, where relics and stones and texts can be viewed as part of a whole"(ibid:2). It almost look like a lapse into the seventeenth century chaos of amorphous systems of knowledge and libraries before they got solidified by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries into a limited set of disciplines. But in the Deleuzian sense this is not the original chaos but a new one with a difference. As the librarian of Stanford University points out: "There is an old narrative (of knowledge) and a new narrative.The old one is a ribbon of text, a stream of characters organized from the beginning to the end. The new narrative is the old narrative with interruptions, with high-octane Java ,with links and spreadsheets and videos and citations and whatever else will help the reader make connections" (ibid).

From what we briefly examined above as the history of sciences and disciplines one thing becomes evident: that as time progresses there would occur

more and more devolutions, re-unifications and re-connections between disciplines located at different planes with intense speeds. The scene becomes truly one of Deleuzian "becoming" in that sense. There occur not only territorialisations, de-territorialisations and rhizomic interconnections between far end disciplines, but also a patent "eternal return" of a few ones  in the Nietzsche/ Deleuze sense. In the binge of the new mutations and miscegenations that are occurring to sciences and disciplines today there would be no surprise if antique proto-disciplines like alchemy or impetus physics returns tomorrow. Of course it will not be the return of the same but one with a difference in the Deleuzian sense. For Deleuze who bases his philosophy in difference and repetition this is not a mechanical repetition of the same but an ironic repetition of difference in the simulacrum of the same. "The same is said of that which differs and remains different. The eternal return is the same of the different, the one of the multiple, the resemblant of the dissimilar" (Deleuze 1994: 126).

The global tour we made enlightens us to two important facts. First is that, though there is a seeming illogic in the profusion of disciplines in the west today, it is marked by a heroic spirit for new experimentations, adventures and scientific advancement. True, its dynamic is often deleterious and fragmentary to the subject positions and cultural identity of the western humankind. Nonetheless, in the final tallying of the good and bad, the knowledge explosion only works to their overall advantage compared to the rest of the world. The second point is only an ironic corollary to the first. Our own case in post-independent India becomes a despicable story of underdevelopment and primitivism with respect to the advancement and diversification in knowledge when compared to the west. Particularly so in the fields of social sciences, humanities and the arts. With a few outdated governmental institutions given the mandate for the overall nurture of knowledge what we have witnessed is tenacious immobility, distortion and degeneration of these non-science disciplines. At the same time, there has been unquestioned growth of scientific institutions of research and education. And where new disciplines have arisen in India they are influenced by the scientific image. We are unique for the fact that we have created a discipline named 'Home Science' even as the western countries resisted doing so (In the US, there was Domestic Economics but this is not the same as Home science, which is very popular in India.) This brazen use of 'science' reflects perhaps all the ill-begotten social practices and ideals of the Indian upper class: from the patriarchal confining of the women to the traditional home space to the soporific conspicuous consumption of the rich. What we finally find is that the way out of the Indian/

George Varghese K

non-western predicament is definitely a great challenge but small steps can perhaps lead us out of the morass we have created for our students and teachers in the fields of social sciences and humanities.

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# Global Civil Society: Critical Questions

Thomas Mohan

Civil Society is among the most widely discussed concepts in Political Science and International Relations. It has also emerged as an indispensable component in development practices, human rights discourses and, most importantly, in explaining various social movements. For normative political theorists, it is a critical concept representing an ideal of inclusive participation and deliberation. Civil society can, in one sense, be identified with democratisation and liberalisation, but it is a far more comprehensive and deeper concept than democracy. Civil society embraces an entire range of assumptions, values and institutions, such as political, social and civil rights, the rule of law, representative institutions, a public sphere and above all a plurality of associations, which are indispensable as the preconditions for democracy. The idea of civil society entered political theory, when theorists began to insist that a social community is capable of organising itself independently of the specific direction of state power. Indeed, in liberal theory, civil society came to embody a whole range of emancipatory aspirations, aspirations which focussed on the defence of human rights and human dignity against state oppression, and which marked out an autonomous sphere of social practises, rights and dignity of the individual (Chandhoke 1995:26).

Most definitions of civil society conceived of it as territorially bound. It encompasses enormous diversity. It was associated with a rule-governed society based largely on the consent of individual citizens rather than coercion. For one thing, civil society is not the state: it is non-official, non-governmental. Civil society groups are not formally part of the state apparatus; nor do they seek to gain control of state office. Second, civil society is not the market: it is a non-commercial realm. Civil society bodies are not companies or firms; nor do they seek to make profits. However, the distinction between the market and civil society is in practice sometimes far from absolute (Scholte 1999:3). In terms of membership and constituencies, it includes academic institutes, business associations, community-based organisations, consumer protection bodies, criminal syndicates, development cooperation groups, environmental campaigns, ethnic

lobbies, foundations, farmers' groups, human rights advocates, labour unions, relief organisations, peace activists, professional bodies, religious institutions, women's networks, youth campaigns and more.

The concept of civil society has been, for long, a part of the Western intellectual tradition that has developed along with material, political and intellectual events in the West. However, civil society as a peculiarly modern concept emerged between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries. It is essentially a concept which belongs to the tradition of political modernity founded on individualism and defence of human rights. It signified an important breakthrough in the notion of the rights bearing individual, his relationship with the state, and his relationship with others in society. It is a modern concept because it epitomised a clear separation between civil and political sphere (Chandhoke 1995:80). The modern idea of civil society has a long tradition dating back to the times of Scottish Enlightenment and it is prominently featured in the works of philosophers like Adam Smith, Hegel, Marx, de Tocqueville and Gramsci. In particular, Gramsci's notion of civil society has found greater acceptance in contemporary IR literature for its idea of 'hegemony' (Cox 1999: 5).

There has been a resurgence of the idea of civil society since 1980s. This has been reinforced by a whole lot of developments in the erstwhile Soviet Union and East Europe, as well as with the ascendancy of neoliberalism and globalisation. On the other side, there has been a kind of uncritical glorification of the concept of civil society so much so that it has become almost a realm of consensus. Surprising it may seem, several groups such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), global funding agencies, institutions of state, trade unions, religious organisations, social movements and left intellectuals share a common ground in their glorification of civil society, almost uncritically (Seethi 2007; Seethi 2009). Besides, the privileging of the concept is equally the result of a profound dissatisfaction with the 'developmentalist' state in the postcolonial world. As a result, during the past three decades, persistent attempts have been made by human rights organisations, intellectuals and governments to revive civil society in the context of 'denial of democracy', 'state authoritarianism' and 'infringement of human rights.' Hence the origins of the recovery of civil society are political.

The concept of global civil society has become enormously popular in academic, policy and practitioner circles since the end of the Cold War. It is commonly understood as a non-state, non-market sphere in which non-governmental organisations (NGOs), activist networks, and other value-driven actors play a key role in promoting human rights, sustainable, environmental protection development and good governance. There is also an emphasis given on the pa-

cific and non-violent character of global civil society, along with the emancipatory potential of this realm. More importantly, its role in international politics is closely associated with the rise of globalisation. Civil society can be said to have globalised to the extent that society increasingly represents itself globally, across nation-state boundaries, through the formation of global institutions. The relative decline of the nation-state and the concomitant crisis of domestic civil societies have brought into focus the concept of global civil society (Shaw 1994: 650).

The words 'global' and 'civil society' have become commonplace during the 1990s. However, apart from a few political activists and policy experts, most people, including many social scientists, have little understanding of what global civil society means and implies. In a nutshell, "global civil society is the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks, and individuals located *between* the family, the state, and the market and operating *beyond* the confines of national societies, polities, and economies"(Anheier et al. 2001:17). For some, global civil society refers to the protestors in Seattle and Prague or Greenpeace's actions against transnational corporations - in other words, a counterweight to global capitalism. Yet others identify the phenomenon of global solidarity with the poor or oppressed. Or it refers to the growing connectedness of citizens: Internet chat rooms, networks of peace, environmental or human rights. It posits "the existence of a social sphere, a global civil society, above and beyond national, regional, or local societies" (ibid.: 3). The growth of global civil society has been facilitated by the growth of resources available to civil society. These resources are of two kinds: technology and money. Increases in Internet usage and both mobile phones and landlines have greatly facilitated the construction of networks and have allowed greater access for groups outside the main centres of international power.

The concept of global civil society is difficult to define and to fit into conventional social science terminology since the term "transcends conventional social science categories."  It is also difficult to measure using standard systems of social and economic accounts because all these systems tend to be territorially bounded.  Hence it is imperative to search for new social science categories that correspond to global phenomena like global civil society. In the words of Martin Shaw,

> Global social science can make an important contribution to clarifying the potential of global civil society. Civil society itself is a pre-global concept that is now being transposed into global terms. Historically it epitomised the tension of universal values and national social forms, so the general problems of globally reconstructing social knowledge are particularly evident with the idea of civil society. Globalising

civil society involves more than moving to a different level; it means understanding civil society as an active project, a contribution towards consolidating global society, and the critical 'other' of global state networks (Shaw 20003: 44).

*Global Civil Society Year Book 2001*, published by the London School of Economics and Political Science has brought forth three basic propositions about global civil society. First, the spread of the term 'global civil society' reflects an underlying social reality. The 1990s witnessed the emergence of a supranational sphere of social and political participation in which citizens groups, social movements, and individuals engage in dialogue, debate, confrontation, and negotiation with each other and with various governmental actors — international, national, and local — as well as the business world. However, the scale and scope of international and supranational institutions and organisations of many kinds have widened in recent years. Secondly, "global civil society both feeds on and reacts to globalisation." Globalisation is a new concept with different meanings and is being referred to as the "spread of global capitalism." It is also understood as the "growing interconnectedness in political, social, and cultural spheres as well as the economy, something which has been greatly facilitated by travel and communication. On the other side, global civil society is also a reaction to globalisation, particularly to the fallout of the spread of global capitalism and interconnectedness. Globalisation is an "uneven process" which has brought "benefits to many" but which has also "excluded many." It is those who are denied access to the benefits of global capitalism and who remain outside the "charmed circle of information and communication technology" who are the victims of the process and who organise in reaction: the "demand pull" of global civil society. They are now also "linking up with those in the North" who form a new kind of "solidarity movement."Thirdly, global civil society is a fuzzy and a contested concept. This could be attributed to its "newness." It is fuzzy because the boundaries of the concept are not clearly defined. It is not always clear what is to be "included" and "excluded." The fuzziness is also because the concept "steps over or outside many familiar social science categories that are frequently caught up with nineteenth-century notions of the nation state that have entered into common parlance" (Anheier et al. 2001:4-11).

## Evolution of Global Civil Society

What is new about the concept of civil society since 1989 is globalisation. The prefix 'global' has been attached to many long standing terms which opened up new fields of study and expanded existing ones such as global trade, global

economy, global communication and global governance. However, for the first time all these phenomena have come together under the catch phrase globalisation. With the concepts of globalisation and civil society gaining such currency it was inevitable that the concept of global civil society would enter modern social and political thought (Bowden 2006: 156).

Traditionally, in the Western political thought, the concept of civil society was inextricably linked up with the territorial state. Civil society was associated with a rule-governed society based largely on the consent of individual citizens rather than coercion. However, the fact that civil society was territorially bound meant that it was always contrasted with coercive rule-governed societies and with societies that lacked rules.

> It was contrasted with other states characterized by coercion—the empires of the East. It was also contrasted with premodern societies, which lacked a state and lacked the concept of individualism—Highlanders, or American Indians. And, above all, it was contrasted with international relations, which was equated with the state of nature because it lacked a single authority. Many civil society theorists believed that civil society at home was linked to war abroad. It was the ability to unite against an external enemy that made civil society possible (Kaldor 2003: 585).

The revival of the idea of civil society in the 1970s and 1980s happened simultaneously in Latin America and East Europe. This was closely linked to the global context wherein political upheavals and economic transformations were taking place in different parts of the world. In both Latin America and East Europe, the term 'civil society' proved a useful concept in opposing militarised regimes. Latin Americans were opposing military dictatorships; East Europeans were opposing totalitarianism—a sort of war society. Both came to the conclusion that the overthrow of their regimes 'from above' was not feasible; rather, it was necessary to change society. They talked about creating 'islands of civic engagement'—a concept shared by both East Europeans and Latin Americans. This was a period of growing interconnectedness, increased travel and communication, even before the advent of the internet. Hence the emergence of 'islands of civic engagement' was made possible by two things; The first was the links with like-minded groups in other countries. The Latin Americans were supported by North American human rights groups. The East Europeans forged links with West European peace and human rights groups, which supported them materially and publicized their cases, and put pressure on governments and institutions. Secondly, the existence of international human rights legislation to which their governments subscribed and which could be used as a form of pressure (Kaldor 2003: 585). Thus the new understanding of civil society represented both

a withdrawal from the state and a move towards global rules and institutions. The groups who pioneered these ideas were central to the pressures for democratisation in Latin America and the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe.

Richard Falk, noted theorist, has identified three main stages through which the idea of global civil society has; The first stage is associated with the activities of NGOs and popular movements over specific issue areas, especially war/ peace, environment, human rights and women besides the growth of global advocacy networks to promote change for these concerns. During this phase, whose background can be traced to the Stockholm UN Conference on the Environment (1972), where the conference found itself shadowed events organized civil society activists associated with NGOs, generating a "global environmental social movement." During the second stage, especially in Europe, there was intense "mobilization of society to achieve democratization and self-determination, including arenas of decision-making beyond the territorial state." This stage came into limelight in the latter phase of the Cold War that emerged in the form of "movements of opposition to the established order of the state and of geopolitics generally. The third stage of the evolution of global civil society is noticeable in the post-Cold War period which can be divided into two aspects: an "anti-globalization" movement and a "global justice" movement. In the post-Cold War phase it became ever clearer that "the world economy was capital-driven in accordance with a neoliberal ideology based on according priority to market forces and reflecting American ideological triumphalism in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse" (Falk 2005: 61-62).

## Composition of Global Civil Society

Global civil society includes both formal and informal organisations, where individuals can join and through which their voices can be heard. Global civil society is also a platform inhabited by activists (or post-Marxists), NGOs and neoliberals, as well as national and religious groups, where they argue about, campaign for (or against), negotiate about, or lobby for the arrangements that shape global developments" (Kaldor 2005: 93).

For a concise analysis, global civil society can be classified into three main categories; First, the activist version comprising the 'new social movements'(NSMs), the movements that emerged since the late sixties which have been concerned with issues such as peace, women, human rights, the environment, and offering new forms of protest. It is often seen as the 'post-Marxist' version of the concept. It pre-supposes a state or rule of law, but insists not only on "restraints on state

power" but also "redistribution of power." It also extends participation and autonomy thereby promoting "radicalisation of democracy." The 1990s witnessed the emergence of transnational networks of activists who came together on particular issues such as landmines, human rights, climate change, dams, AIDS/HIV, corporate responsibility etc (Cohen and Rai 2000: 1-17). The second, the neoliberal version is characterised as "laissez-faire politics," a kind of "market in politics." Here the civil society comprises of non-profit, voluntary, 'third sector.' The key agents are not NSMs but NGOs which not only restrict state power but also provide a substitute for many of the functions performed by the state. The globalisation of NGOs is reflective of the new policy consensus that NGOs are de-facto agents of democracy rather than products of a thriving democratic culture (Kamat 2004: 156). The third, the postmodern version, however, departs from the universalist pretensions of the activist and neoliberal versions. Civil society is a realm of "pluralism and contestation," a "source of incivility as well as civility." Postmodernists view the concept of civil society as essentially Euro-centric; "something born of the Western cultural context that is imposed on non-Western societies." Non-Western societies tend to experience or have the potential to experience something similar to civil society, but not based on individualism. They also emphasise the importance of 'national' and 'religious' identities as well as "multiple" identities as precondition for civil society (Chatterjee 2004: 27-51).

International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs) comprise the major actors in global civil society. They are autonomous organisations that are non-governmental (not instrumentalities of government), non-profit (not distributing revenue as income to owners) and formal, legal entities. Examples of INGOs include campaigning groups like Amnesty International and Greenpeace, the famous brand names of global civil society; professional societies like international employers federations or trades unions; charities like Christian Aid or CARE; think tanks and international commissions. The power of INGOS was first dramatically visible at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992, when about 1500 organisations came to play a central role in deliberations (Chandhoke 2003:83). INGOs are, however, only one component of global civil society. Individuals, grassroots groups, coalitions, and networks all play a part in a global public debate. Another lens through which to view the growth of global civil society is through parallel summits (Pianta 2001: 169-194).

The study of global civil society is best categorised not in terms of types of actors but in terms of positions in relation to globalisation. In other words, one way of defining or understanding global civil society is as a debate about

Thomas Mohan

the future direction of globalisation, perhaps, humankind itself. Thus, it could be broadly classified into four: The first position is that of the supporters: those groups and individuals who are enthusiastic about globalisation, whether we are talking about the spread of global capitalism and interconnectedness or the spread of a global rule of law as well as global consciousness. They include the allies of transnational business, the proponents of 'just wars for human rights,' and the enthusiasts for all new technological developments. These are members of civil society, often, but not necessarily close to governments and business, who think that globalisation in its present form is 'a good thing' and that those who object just fail to understand the benefits (Bhagwati 2004). The second position is that of the rejectionists: those who want to reverse globalisation and return to a world of nation-states. They include proponents of the New Right, who may favour global capitalism but oppose open borders and the spread of a global rule of law. They also include leftists who oppose global capitalism but do not object to the spread of a global rule of law. Nationalists and religious fundamentalists as well as traditional leftist anti-colonial movements or communists who oppose interference in sovereignty are also included in this group. They think that all or most manifestations of globalisation are harmful, and they oppose it with all their might (Kiely 2005: 177). The third position is that of the reformists, in which a large part of global civil society resides. These are people who accept the spread of global capitalism and global interconnectedness as potentially beneficial to mankind but see the need to 'civilise' the process. These are the people who favour reform of international economic institutions and want greater social justice and rigorous, fair, and participatory procedures for determining the direction of new technologies, and who strongly favour a global rule of law and press for enforcement. Reformists are a large category, which includes those who want to make specific and incremental change as well as radicals who aim at bigger and more transformative change (Held 2004). The final group consists of the alternatives: these are people and groups who neither necessarily oppose nor support the process of globalisation but who wish to opt out, to take their own course of action independently of government, international institutions, and transnational corporations. Their primary concern is to develop their own way of life, create their own space, without interference. This manifests itself in the case of biotechnology in growing and eating organic food, with global capitalism in local money schemes, opposition to brand names, and attempts to reclaim public space, and in the case of humanitarian intervention in making non-military 'civil society interventions' in conflicts (Mies & Shiva 1993 ).

## Criticism of Global Civil Society

Global civil society is a plural as well as contested concept because it is new and therefore can be interpreted by both practitioners and social scientists as they choose. Or, to put it another way, the term is used differently according to political predilections and inherited understandings. Among policy-makers, especially in the West, there is a tendency to conceive of global civil society as the spread of what already exists in the West, especially in the United States, as a 'metaphor for Western liberalism' (Seckinelgin 2002: 357- 376). Civil society is seen as a way of minimising the role of the state in society, both a mechanism for restraining state power and as a substitute for many of the functions of the state.

Transposed to the global arena, it is viewed as the political or social counterpart of the process of economic globalisation, that is to say, liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, and the growing mobility of capital and goods. In the absence of a global state, an army of NGOs perform the functions necessary to smooth the path of economic globalisation (Edwards & Sen 2000: 605-616, Kamat 2004 155-176). Among activists, however, civil society has a different meaning. It is not about minimising the state but about increasing the responsiveness of political institutions. It is about the radicalisation of democracy and the redistribution of political power. Transposed to a global level, this definition encompasses the need to influence and put pressure on global institutions in order to reclaim control over local political space (Kaldor 2000:105-114).

Many theorists seem to regard global civil society as denoting a 'third sector,' an alternative to both the state-centric international order and the networks of global markets.

> In other words, contemporary thinking gives us a picture of a global civil society that seems to be supremely uncontaminated by either the power of states or that of markets. Moreover, many theorists believe that global civil society, consisting of transnational non-governmental organisations, political activists, social movements, religious denominations, from trade unions to business and financial groupings, can neutralise existing networks of power by putting forth a different set of values (Chandhoke 2002: 36).

It is true that global civil society organisations have succeeded in expanding the agenda of global politics by actively promoting and focusing widespread attention on issues such as human rights, the environment, development, and banning land mines. They have challenged the new contours of the global economic order being dictated by the triumvirate of the World Bank, IMF and WTO (Wallerstein 2002: 29-39).

However, the fact is that global civil society may well reflect the power constellations of existing institutions. As Chandhoke points out, "we should treat with a fair amount of caution the assumptions that (a) global civil society is autonomous of other institutions of international politics, that (b) it can provide us with an alternative to these institutions, or (c) that it can even give us a deep-rooted and structural critique of the world order"(Chandhoke 2002: 37). For the practises of global civil society may just reinforce the intellectual and moral power of the West over the postcolonial world.

Global civil society has come to be dominated by International NGOs, even though other actors, such as political activists networking across borders and anti-globalisation movements, were playing an important role in this sphere. It is indicative of the power of the non-governmental sector that civil society has come to be identified with NGO activism both in influential terms on civil society and in policy prescriptions of international institutions today. Two factors could be attributed to the power and influence of INGOS in global civil society; First, informational revolution "has increased their capacity to collect, collate, select, and publicise information on a variety of specialised issues ranging from development disasters, to the environment, to the effect of WTO policies such a patenting, to human rights violations." The unprecedented advances in information and communications (third industrial revolution) facilitated organisations to network across the world through fax, email, Internet, and teleconferencing. The world has witnessed a new phenomenon bursting on to the political scene called cyber-space activism. Informational networks have helped organisations to gather and put together data on, for example, violations of human rights, muster opinion and activism around the issue, publicise information through the international media, and pressurise both national and international organisations to change both their mind and their manners. Secondly global NGOs have become "influential simply because they possess a property that happens to be the peculiar hallmark of ethical political intervention: moral authority and legitimacy." They possess moral authority because they "claim to represent the public or the general interest against official- or power-driven interests of the state or of the economy." As the upholders of an ethical canon that applies beyond nations and cultures, international actors in civil society now define as well as set the moral norms, which govern national and international orders. In short, global civil society actors "legislate and mandate a normative and thus a morally authoritative structure for the national and the international community" (Ibid.: 41).

Yet the idea of global civil society is stalked by two troublesome questions. The first question concerns representativeness and accountability. The second

question is related to the norms that are privileged by global civil society actors. Global civil society is dominated by a handful of actors and not all actors find either access or voice in this sphere. As Chandhoke observes:

> Not every group possesses the necessary vocabulary, the powerful rhetoric, the rich and evocative imaginaries, and the fine honed conceptual tools that are capable of drawing resonances in the public sphere of civil societies. Nor can every social movement or political group, for rather mundane reasons of logistics and funds, be present in global civil society or even in their own civil society to put forward its own perspective on the vital problems that affect human kind deeply. Like national civil societies, global civil society can prove to be exclusive and exclusionary, empowering for some and disempowering for many, accessible to some and inaccessible to many (Chandhoke 2005: 360).

The issue of representation is particularly significant because a majority of INGOs that are prominent in global civil society and that represent the interests and needs of the Global South are located in the West. So the question naturally arises whether the citizens of the countries of the South and their needs are adequately represented in global civil society or are citizens as well as their needs 'constructed' by practices of representation. In this process, civil society may undergo both depoliticisation and disempowerment. To put it starkly, citizens are disempowered rather than empowered when highly specialised, professional and bureaucratised NGOs tell them what is wrong with their daily existence and how they should resolve the problems of their collective lives (Kamat 2004:162).

Matters become even more troublesome when we realise that INGOs hardly ever come face to face with the people whose interests and problems they represent, or that they are not accountable to the people they represent.

> For this really means that while INGOs are in the business of representing, they are not in the business of being accountable to the people. And considering that most people who are being represented are excluded from access to global civil society organizations, and that a great many of the organizations who are active in global civil society are beyond the reach of genuine democratic activity, the issue of accountability gains some salience here (Chandhoke 2005: 362).

Hence, democratic politics is devalued when INGOs regulate political initiatives and constitute human beings as subjects of political ideas formulated elsewhere. They have taken up a formidable range of issues and activities. "For they dictate what kind of development should be given to particularly the people of the South, what kind of education they should receive, what kind of democracy should be institutionalised, what rights they should demand and possess, and what they should do to be empowered"(Ibid).

In conclusion, it could be contended that the concept of global civil society should be analysed through a critical lens. Even though global civil society has ushered in a normative turn in global politics, it still reflects the existing power structures of global system. This could be well understood by the prestige and influence of Western NGOs in global civil society. The valid question is whether the actors in global civil society could undermine the existing power constellations and bring about a normative global order based on justice, rights, peace and democracy.

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# State, Civil Society and the Process of Democratisation
## A Study on Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram

Joshy P. M.

State-society relations have been undergoing a radical transformation during the last few decades and, with the advent of neoliberalism, many right-wing origanisations have emerged, providing a new impetus to the political process. Civil society too has become a critical realm of activity which fosters both the democratic and undemocratic engagements. In fact, under neoliberalism, the notion of civil society has achieved a different meaning. In the traditional liberal understanding, the civil society has been understood as "a realm which protects the rights of the individual from the arbitrary power of the State." However, for the last three decades, the civil society has been seen as "a space detached from the state." Meanwhile, there is a concerted effort to transpose the Third World state from the developmental thinking and in the name of 'good governance,' 'radical democracy,' 'grassroot development' and 'people's participation,' a vast array of NGO network is being deployed as the civil society. It is through this new version of civil society that the neoliberal agencies have been trying to transcend the class antagonism and thereby smoothening the process of financial globalisation. Paradoxically, the shrinking state has also been too much militaristic in the implementation of the laws and treaties of the market. Here, both the state and civil society have been generating 'insecurity complexes' in the society.

While the civil society is being appropriated by the neoliberal institutions for developmental purposes, say as an 'alternative' to the state, many undemocratic/revivalist/fundamentalist forces have been making inroads into this sphere. Many of them sought to gain political strength using tradition, culture, religion etc by putting across sensitive issues for mobilisation. All these trends might affect the democratic process in countries where cultural diversity is critical and complex. The liberal spirit behind seeing civil society as "an essential pre-requisite for democratisation" is being threatened today with the very manipulation of the realm by the neoliberal institutions, on the one hand, and the revivalist/fundamentalist forces, on the other. By arguing that civil society is an 'alterna-

tive' to the state, neoliberals try to undermine its role in the larger context of democratic practices. It is in this background that the working of a Hindu Right organisation, Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram(VKA), and its ramifications in the Indian socio-political system are analysed. The Hindu Right in India has been penetrating into the society through a number of organisational networks in the civil society. The Sangh Parivar is a conglomerate of such organisations (the RSS, VHP, Bajrang Dal, VKA etc) which are dedicated to the 'Hindutva' agenda. The VKA, an integral part of the Sangh family, has been concentrating on the tribal areas in order to prevent the Christian missionary activities and to assimilate the tribals into the broader framework of the Hindu social system.

## State and Civil Society

Much before neoliberalism emerged as a 'new version' of liberal ideology, many libertarians had argued for a 'minimal state.' They held that many of the powers of the modern welfare state "are morally illegitimate." Institutions of the state violate the rights of citizens when they punish, or threaten to punish individuals. The state also violates the rights of citizens when they force, or threaten to force, individuals "to transfer their legitimately held wealth to the state in order to provide for pensions, to help the needy, or to pay for public goods" etc. Robert Nozick asserted that nothing more than the maintenance of peace and the security of individuals and property by the state can be justified (Nozick 1974: 149). Friedrich August von Hayek had already reflected on this theme of 'minimum' dispensation (Hayek 1960). This line of thinking gained a lot of attention since the 1980s. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc created necessary conditions for the minimalist school to assert its position. This also became inevitable for legitimising the process of globalisation. The situation was gently used by the right-wing forces in many countries. They created a general feeling that there was no alternative to the liberal ideology and institutions. This was the time when the neoliberal global institutions were trying to incorporate the Third World economies into the world capitalist system. Richard Falk notes:

> The historical unfolding of economic globalization in recent decades has been accompanied by the ascendancy of a group of ideas associated with the world picture of neoliberalism. This ideological outlook as "the Washington Consensus," which accurately highlights the "made in the USA" package of the neoliberal scheme of things. This neoliberal scheme points to the general direction of autonomous markets and facilitative states (Falk 1999: 1).

In accordance with the dictums of the world financial institutions, the Third World states have been forced to structurally adjust their economy and polity.

Accordingly, the role of the state has changed from a major 'provider' in the society towards a 'facilitator' for the global finance capital. The state has withdrawn from many 'social security' realms and in the name of civil society, western aided NGOs become the stakeholders of development. According to the neoliberal perspective, "civil society consists of associational life – a non-profit, voluntary 'third sector' – that not only restrains state power but also actually provides a substitute for many of the functions performed by the state" (Kaldor 2004:9). The transfer of power and functions of the state to the civil societal organisations is the dictum of the Washington Consensus. Neera Chandhoke highlighted the political meaning of Washington Consensus: (a) the state, particularly in the Third World countries should withdraw from the social sector; (b) the market should be freed from all constraints and people in the civil society should organise their own social and economic reproduction instead of depending on the state (Chandhoke 2002: 43). The Washington Consensus thus understood the pre-eminence of the market over the state. The post-Washington Consensus packages sought to replace the state with the civil societal organisations. It is viewed that only through a strong civil society under the guidance of NGOs can foster democracy (ibid: 43-45).

The neoliberal appropriation of civil society is aimed at weaving an 'apolitical' realm and a 'consensual pattern' of capitalist development. This is an attempt to transcend the class antagonism and to integrate every nook and corner of the Third World economy into the market logic of the world capitalist system. The World Bank sponsored structural adjustment programmes demanded the active involvement of civil society in the implementation of the economic packages. The 1997 *World Development Report* was specifically devoted to "State and Civil society." It emphasised the importance of strengthening the statist institutional mechanisms in terms of providing adequate support to the smooth functioning of the market. The then president of the World Bank introduced the Report titled "The state in a changing world" and accordingly the "development requires an effective State, one that plays a catalytic, facilitating role, encouraging and complementing the activities of private business and individuals" (World Bank 1997). The report promotes the contracting out of the delivery of social services to NGOs (ibid: 88). The report specifically mentioned the importance of NGOs in the emerging developmental scenario.

The new-found role of the state as a facilitator of global finance has implications for the common people. The changed equation between the state and civil society in a globalised environment has inevitably generated new forms of security threat. Indeed, globalisation is equated with Westernisation. As such resistances are underway in the non-Western societies against the unilateral imposi-

tion of Western values. Meanwhile, there is also cultural hybridisation and the resulting assertions of new right forces (like the Hindu Right in India) which tend to undermine the process of democratisation. These forces have been appropriating the civil society by penetrating into it. The new developmental pattern under neoliberalism provides a fertile ground for the assertion of such anti-democratic forces across the world.

## Hindu Right Strategies

The Hindu Right in India has been asserting by deploying a series of issues, and the common denominating factor is the critical notion of 'security' which the Sangh Parivar has been perpetuating for crystallising the Hindu 'self' by distancing it from an imagined threat of the 'other'- the Muslim (Joshy and Seethi 2010; Joshy 2010). The decades of 1980s and 1990s were marked by the growing fear generated by the Hindu Right that the minority Muslim population was increasing its presence in India, challenging Indian sovereignty and rule of law, and controlling the politics of the country. The 'insecurity' of the Hindus was blown out of proportion, and the BJP, RSS, VHP and other Hindu Right organisations had worked hard within the civil society in the task of securitisation of the Hindu identity. According to Nadadur, the BJP and other Hindu Right organisations played on "the fears of the Hindu majority" that the "Muslim population posed a threat to Hindus in India." This was based on the growth of Islamic fundamentalism and the changing voting patterns of the Muslim population (Nadadur 2006). The Hindu Right organisations and their leaders persistently talked about the 'threats' to the Hindus. A study circulated by the RSS in the aftermath of the 1991 Census read that "the fact remained as prominent as ever that the rate of population growth of Muslims is much higher than that of the Hindus, particularly in some areas where the majority is on the verge of being reduced into minority" (BJP 2006; Nadadur 2006). In a concerted effort through a number of organisations working in the civil society, the Sangh Parivar generated an 'imagined insecurity syndrome,' and coincidently it seeks 'security' from the posted 'threats.' In this scenario, the Hindu Right highlights the idea of 'Hindu Rashtra' where the identity of the Hindus can be secured.

The opening up of the Indian economy for the neoliberal global reforms has heightened an insecurity complex in the society. The Hindu Right forces have culturally manipulated the currents and appropriated it politically. The economic reforms in India in accordance with the dictums of the world financial institutions have adversely affected the poor sections of the people in the society. The

gap between the haves and have nots, both nationally and globally, has increased (Peet 2010). The economic reforms also badly affected the primary sectors as well as small - scale industrial sectors. In the aftermath of the Gujarat violence there were studies conducted on how the 'reforms' generate social tensions and community conflicts (Chatterjee 2010). The role of the Hindu Right organisations in the riots was well documented. In fact, the changed state-civil society relations under neoliberalism has been generating new 'insecurity complexes' among the common psyche. The withdrawal of the state from the society, the major source of provider, has adversely affected the vulnerable sections in the society. Indeed, the insecurity complex emanated out of the globalised environment has forced many identities to come out to the centre stage. The 'right assertions' of these deprived sections in India like the dalits, adivasis and women have invigorated the civil and political domains. This critical process has expanded the democratic arena and also changed many political equations both locally and nationally. The privileged position of the upper class/caste combines was threatened by these developments in the society. It is in this background that one can read the ascendancy of the Hindu Right in India. However, in the post-Mandal scenario, the Hindutva forces recognised that the support from these sections was so decisive for attaining political power. Parlay Kanungo notes:

> To counter 'Mandal' politics, which had checkmated Hindutva's growing influence among the backward castes in north India, the RSS initiated 'social engineering.' This was a major shift from Golwalkar's traditionalist perspective which preferred 'Sanskritisation' as the ideal instrument of social change. Besides approaching the backward castes, the RSS also speeded up its work among Adivasis and Dalits through its affiliates like the Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram and Seva Bharati (Kanungo 2010: 91).

The RSS strategies like 'Samajik Samarasta' (social harmony) and 'Samarasya Sangama' (confluence for harmony) are directed to contribute to the development of the villages. However, these are strategies to attract the marginalised sections towards its political project rather than offering them any substantive economic alternative. They give greater emphasis on "compassion, fellow feeling and social harmony" rather than on a concrete developmental alternative (ibid). Through various strategies the Hindutva forces have been trying to make new 'bandutvas' (relationships) with the marginalised sections wih a view to incorporating them into the broader framework of the historical *varna* system of the Hindu social system. Virginius Xaxa viewed that the acculturation of the tribes, the 'absorption' or 'assimilation' into the Hindu society was natural and a slow process. Unlike conversion into Christianity, the transition is more of a process than event. However, the Hindutva categorisation of tribes as 'Hindus'

is misleading. The protagonists of Hindutva overlooked the differences and stick on the 'similarities.' But as a natural religion the tribal religion shares many attributes in common with the religious practices of the tribes in America or Africa as with Hinduism in India (Xaxa 2009: 19-36). With the help of  the institutions working in the civil society, the Hindu Right has been trying to expand and strengthen its base in the society.

The Hindutva is an attempt to homogenise the pluralist Hindu folk through various mobilisations in the civil society. In this process, the Hindu Right  appropriates the mobilisational space of the marginalised by manipulating history and mobilising them against certain highlighted 'threats' like the Christians and the Muslims.  However, the self  assertion of the deprived sections in the society has been restructuring the socio- political arena by making it more inclusive. On the contrary,  the mobilisation under the banner of Hindutva is an attempt to keep the system more exclusionary by strengthening the old social hierarchies and distorting the age - old 'composite culture' in the society. The images like friends/foes, insider/outsider, civilised/uncivilised are the core of the  Hindutva thinking. Through the organisational networks in the civil society, the Hindu Right has produced/reproduced the security issues, which were moulded in an antagonistic cultural frame. The Muslims, Christians and communists were treated as the 'other' of the Hindu 'self.'  It is evident in the writings of the ideologues of the Hindutva as well as the resolutions passed by various Parivar organisations (Savarkar 1993, 1967; Golwalkar 2000; BJS 1961, 1965). Savarkar, the prime ideologue of the  Hindutva, defines a Hindu:

> A Hindu means a person who regards this land of BHARTVARSHA, from the Indus to the Seas as his Father- Land as well as his Holy–Land that is the cradle land of his religion. To the 'converted Christians and Muslims 'the Hindustan is the Fatherland' as to any other Hindu. Yet it is not to them a 'Holyland' too. Their holy land is in Arabia or Palestine. 'Their mythology and Godmen, ideas and heroes are not the children of this soil. Their names and outlook smack of a foreign origin, so, their love is divided (Savarkar 1989: 113).

However, the Hindutva's approach towards the marginalised sections like the dalits and adivasis is strategic. In their discussions they gently avoid the oppressive caste system and the bitter experiences of those communities by characterising Muslims and Christians as the  'other' of the Hindu 'self.' They have portrayed Muslims and Christians as the root cause of their pathetic conditions and diverting these frustrated minds against those religious minorities. It was well documented that the Sangh organisations like the Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram, Vanavasi Seva Sangh etc were in the forefront of the violence aginst the minori-

ties elsewhere in India (HRW 2000; South Asia HRDC 2000; Awaaz 2004). Without understanding the politics of such organisations in the civil society, DFID and USAID argue that "given the strong tradition within faiths and/or religions towards a service orientation, the Faith Based Organisations (FBOs) can be used to disburse development aid" (Patel 2010). In this background we will examine the working of the Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram, an integral part of the Sangh conglomerate.

## Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram

The Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram (hereinafter VKA) was formed by Balasaheb Deshpande along with another RSS leader Morubhau Ketkar with a financial and moral support from the Maharaja of Jashpur. The VKA is dedicated to counter the Christian Missionary activities in the tribal areas and to integrate the adivasis into the Hindu society. The VKA has been providing infrastructural facilities and financial assistance to the adivasis. They have been running social and educational institutions among the adivasis. The educational activities include single teacher schools, primary, middle and high schools, free hostels, Bal Sanskar Kendra- Balawadi,  informal schools, libraries etc. In their schools and hostels local languages are not banned but Sanskrit and Hindi are glorified. The VKA claims to have over 10,000 projects and through these organisational networks they are meeting three ends: 'dharm jagaran' (religious awakening) or conversion in order to expand numbers, recruitment of full-time workers for the Sangh and implimenting the Parivar agenda in the streets, and fomenting violence against the minorities (Sundar 2010). However, the long-term objective of the RSS is to strengthen 'Shakha' across the country gradually by replacing informal organisations (Kanungo 2002). Thus the schools, hostels and hospitals are just means to implement the Hindutva agenda in the tribal areas. A pamphlet on Kalyan Ashram says:

> A large number of patriotic, disciplined jayati youth, committed to social service is the outcome of our hostels. The routine of these hostels is different from the boarding houses. This hostel is the place where boys and girls can be brought up as a patriotic, cultured, strong disciplined youth, which is the utter necessity of our nation  (AB-VKA: 'Worshiping Motherland')

The daily routine at both the girls' and boys' hostels stretches from early morning prayers to Shakha attendance to an evening Shakha followed by 'arati' and 'bhajan,' 'which appears to create an almost trancelike impact on the students. There are weekly discussions on national events, specifically from the point

of view of the Sangh. During the cultural celeberations, girls are more involved in the ritual activities, especially on the occations of 'Janmashtami' and 'Rakhee.' Rakhee celeberations are very important as concerned with the VKA, because in this occasion the 'Vanavasis' perform tying 'rakhees' to non-'vanavasis', thus establishing a bond between the communities (Sundar 2009). Such a way the VKA integrates the tribals to the Hindu social system.

Balawadi is an introduction to formal education. The children, who are six years old, can join these centers. The course duration of such centres is six days, two to three hours per day. Bal Sanskar Kendras are conducting informal education to both boys and girls between three to twelve years old. In these centres the students get informal education, charming songs, Bhajans, alphabets, numericals and the basics of community life. However, these songs and Bhajans are not based on their own culture but the celeberation of the dominant Hindu culture. After the completion of this course they can go to schools. The Kalyan Ashram is also running single teacher schools, Adult education centres, coaching classes and village libraries. The Ekalavya Sports project is an attempt to equip the adivasis for sports and games. Every four years the VKA conducts an all India sports event and the children from the Sangh Parivar sponsored schools can be participated. The Christian children are discouraged. The Kalyan Ashram is also active in the areas of economic development, women empowerment, self-help groups etc. The Shraddhajagaran is providing awareness about the Hindu customs and tradition to the adivasis (for the above cited information we are indebted to a pamphlet issued by the VKA). The VKA newsletters play a vital role especially in the areas where reading materials and alternative source of information are scarce. The focal theme of all these newsletters is the "danger" of Christian conversion and the 'universal importance of lord Ram (Sundar 2009). In such a way the Hindu Right forces through various networks in the civil society have been trying to communalise the adivasi space and mobilise them against certain highlighted 'imagined' threats.

The Hindutva has been following a different cultural strategy among the adivasis and dalits. It is not directly imposing one meta-narrative of the past among the various caste and tribal groups, rather than to "recreate, reproduce and revise the various forms of pastness" and linking it with an imagined past, which they called – the Ramarajya. According to Badri Narayan, the sense of collective past is a major tool for identity assertion. The sense of pastness helps the communities to fight the anxieties and insecurities that emanated out of their increasing feeling of temporariness. The sense of pastness, especially among the dalits, represented in the forms of folklore, popular histories, myths, rituals, commemorative ceremonies etc. which tells the stories about not only their glorious past but also their

constant struggles for survival. From 1980s onwards some of the political parties have been mobilising these communities by reinvoking their sense of pastness and politically appropriating them (Narayan 2009:9-12). The Sangh Parivar has been trying to occupy the mobilisational space of the marginalised through manipulating the historical facts and dividing the society into friends and foes. One of the websites of Vanavasi Kalyan (2009) describes:

> The tribals are part and parcel of the Sanatana Dharma. The all pervasive Aditi, referred in Upanishads, is the mother of Aditya the sun of god Indra, Agni, Vayu, varuna are the basic natural forces worshiped by tribals in different forms. The great epics, Ramayana and Mahabharatha, are originated from forest. Valmiki the author of Ramayana was a tribal. Shashadri's love and affection towards Rama, brotherly feeling of Rama embracing Guha, the Nishada and the tribal king give us a glimpse of the tribal character and value systems during Ramayana.

> Ekalavya from Nishadha tribe is one of the inspiring characters of Mahabharatha, who learned archery through the statue of Guru Dhronacharya and excelled Arjuna, the great warrior to whom Sri Krishna narrated Bhagavad-Gita. It is again the tribals who give information of Dhuryodhana hiding in Vyshampayana to Pandavas resulting in the victory of Pandavas in 18 days' Dharma Yudh at Kurukshetra.

However, the VKA resist the terminology of 'indigenous peoples.' Instead they prefer to call them 'Vanavasis' (forest dwellers) as against 'gaonvasis' (village dwellers) or 'shahravasis' (city dwellers). This is an attempt to posit the tribals in the bottom of the Hindu social hierarchy and culturally approprite them for implementing the poliitcal agenda of the Sangh Parivar, the Hindutva. The Hindu Right has been pursuing a policy by which it has partaken with the local cultural celebrations of the dalits and adivasis and gradually bonding those cultural communities to the broader framework of the Hindu social system and highlight the Brahminical system as the true value system. They have been celebrating the mythical characters of those traditional communities in a colourful manner and adding Hindutva flavors to those celebrations. The heroes of these communities are imaged as the chivalrous warriors of the Hindu mythology. The Hindutva claimed that the dalits and the adivasis were the saviors and protectors of the Hindu religion, and they become detached from the Hindu religion because of the Muslim invasion. The Hindu Right has been propagating the notion that before the invasion of the Muslims untouchability did not exist in the Hindu society. The conclusion derived from such fake stories spread by the Sangh Parivar combine is that the practicing untouchability and the pathetic condition of the dalits are not because of the Brahminical order but because of the domination by the Muslims (Narayan 2009:49-51). However, the very essence of the caste system, its ordering tendencies, its code of conduct Manu samhitha were totally discarded from the Hindutva discussions. Historically, the tribals were outside

the social ladder of the Hindu social system. As a part of their political project, the Hindu Right has been trying to incorporate them specifically for two purposes: one is to strengthen their organisational and political base, the second one is to use the frustrated adivasi youths for implementing the Sangh agenda in the streets. The ideology and the overall mobilisational tactics reveal the fact that the Hindu Right forces have been trying to crystelise the old social hierarchies and mobilise the dalits and adivasis against the other minority communities like the Muslims and the Christians.

## Conclusion

In a globalised environment, many forces have come to the centre stage in their struggle for scarce resources, protecting their cultural identity and also in various ways opposing the exploitative nature of the present socio-political system. The self assertion of these groups certainly contributes to a lively space for democratisation. In India, the struggles of the marginalised sections like the dalits, adivasis are aimed to find a space in the historically excluded socio-political spheres. Their struggles make it more inclusive and ultimately foster the process of democratisation. The critical activities of these sections are endangered by the homogenising imperatives of the Hindutva forces. By placing these sections against the Muslims and Christians, the Hindu Right has been obscuring the exact reason behind the deprivation of such communities in the present socio-political system. This process reduces the space for democratisation, because it gives no room for a friendly dialogue between the 'self' and the 'other.' The Hindutva experiments tend to thwart the critical endeavors of those marginalised people and thereby ensuring the upper class/caste domination.

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Joshy P. M.

# South Asian Labour Crisis in Dubai
## The Prospects of Indian Policy in the Arab Gulf Region

M.H. Ilias

The recent South Asian labour unrest in Dubai appears to be a different sort, though there are many unprecedented developments that go into the making of contemporary political history of the region. By no means is the unrest first of its kind, but it is unparalleled in scale, visibility, reach and political consequences. The massive open demonstrations have raised many eyebrows and the government in the UAE is concerned with the demonstration's content and popularity. What is more significant is the way they were organised; it was previously unimaginable in a place where labour unions remained illegal and protests of any sort could end in termination and immediate deportation. This newfound assertiveness among the South Asian labourers is not isolated; it is a region-wide phenomenon with slow but lively spread. Almost simultaneous to the strikes in Dubai, in neighbouring Bahrain, the predominantly Indian workers of a Saudi based dairy firm Almarai launched the longest-ever strike in Bahrain's history.

The Arabian Gulf at present is an arena of new sorts of political expressions that provide an alternative to much talked-about Islamic radicalism. The Arab Spring with a spillover effect allover the region has left untouched any of the Gulf states though the magnitude varies from one country to another. Looking at the present political scenario, one can find ample indications of the assertiveness of many sidelined social actors. Anger is rising in Saudi Arabia's Eastern province — a strong Shi'te bastion— over the illtreatment of the minorities in the Kingdom. Shias in Bahrain are up in arms against the repressive minority Sunni administration for their alleged programmes of de-development in Shia dominated pockets. Shias in both places could bring thousands onto the streets. Kuwait's opposition combines Islamists, emboldened by events in Tunisia and Egypt has offered a bumby road for the al-Sabha regime. Open demostrtaion of stateless Beduins with a strong back up of human rights groups has complicated the issue further. Even the tranquil monarchies of Oman and Qatar cannot ignore lively spread of the Arab Spring though the protestors in both the places

are not targeting the rulers directly. These developments may not seem surprising to outsiders, but the trend is towards a significant political advance, making possible avenues of expression that were previously precluded. Moreover, such fragmented and mostly single-issue oriented responses have collectively left a powerful mark on the politics in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States. This general mood is equally shared by half-a-dozen new stories appearing in local dailies every day on issues which are previously untouched.

It is hard to believe that South Asian labour unrest is an isolated development. It is rather a pointer to a larger political change and the actual issue is revolving around the new type of social stratification attached to the process of globalisation.[1] Although it constitutes only a small part of this article's concern, it seems appropriate to give a gist of current social cleavages in the GCC societies, since this must be the root cause of the sorry state of affairs. Historically, the line of social division was demarcated between citizen *watini* and foreigner *wafid*. Ethnic-national and class stratification systems, in effect, were overlapping in a confused state. The division between citizens and foreigners still runs deep in the Gulf and is taking new turns. In addition, the societies are now stratified in terms of class and what matters more now is the different forms of separation and control in tune with the new mode of social stratification (Dresch 2006; Longva 1997). Tantamount almost to a sort of *ghettoisation*, there has been a distinctive spatial segregation; there are specially designated areas or exclusive enclaves for locals and each category of expatriates. In Dubai, for instance, there are "areas labelled frankly on bus route maps as 'labour camps'" (Dresch 2006:209). The only expatriate community, which is immune to this selective spatial control, is of highly-paid Americans and Western Europeans.

With its peculiar nature, the social stratification that exists in the region at present has more to do with the caste system. Throughout the Gulf, class relations of the kind are replaced in part by communal or ethnic identities (Longuenesse 1991). Gavrielides (1987:162) illustrates the situation: "Christians from Goa work exclusively as maids and governesses for urban Kuwaiti families…Baluchis are employed as door keepers by Kuwaiti families." Nepalese and Tamils from Sri Lanka generally fill up the slots of security personnel and office boys respectively, while America and Western European countries contribute many well paid managers. The middle stratum is comprised mainly of South and East Asian clerks and middle level government employees. Nationals, in addition to their national and ethnic consciousness, have a clear perception of their status in this new vertical/class hierarchy (Kapiszewski 2001:26). Likewise, there are indications of emerging class consciousness among expatriate labourers, who

constitute the lower stratum, though it is not well developed due to several legal constrains regulating the life of immigrants. The class division is becoming more profound with the government effort to institutionalise it with complex sponsorship legislation, unequal compensation structure and nationalisation and controlled access to opportunity for non-nationals. The recent cases of labour unrest have brought into focus the hostile relationships inherent in new social structure.

Also worth-mentioning is the issue of gross human rights violations. All six GCC countries have faced criticism from international human rights groups for discrimination against the expatriate labourers. Blue-collar Asian labourers generally amount to an exploited underclass with no rights, no unions, and no role in the social process. The GCC administrations turn a blind eye to their poor wage structure, non-payment of salaries, lack of medical care and sub-standard housing. In Saudi Arabia, a recent Human Rights Watch Report says many of the country's more than one million South Asian labourers live in "conditions resembling slavery."[2] The same document highlights the widespread practice of forced, round-the-clock confinement of Indian maids, often in unsafe conditions. The low skilled employees are often provided with substandard living conditions, including overcrowded apartments or lodging in unsafe and unhygienic 'labour camps', often lacking electricity, potable water, and adequate bathing facilities.[3]

Finally, there is the issue—perhaps the most critical of all—seeing the foreign presence as a threat to national culture and identity. The new demographic composition, which previously was neither so arcane nor so menacing, has generated a great deal of debate over the huge presence of South Asian workers, whose population amounts to almost ten million and outnumbers locals in some of the Gulf States. Making up ninety per cent of the work force, they constitute nearly four to one in every Gulf society. A large part of worry is about Indians, who outnumber locals in places like Qatar. Recently, the GCC authorities have changed the way they look at the overwhelming presence of expatriates. In a ministerial meeting of GCC members held in 2005, Abdul Rahman Al-Attiya, General Secretary of the Organisation, had openly shared his uneasiness and warned about the possible repercussions of the situation. He stressed on "the need to look at the massive presence of expatriate workers basically as national security issue and not merely as an economic matter…"[4] This worry was also echoed in the Gulf Cooperation Council's  meeting held in Doha in 2008. Along with serious regional issues of security, common energy policies, joint nuclear energy plant and currency union this issue topped the agenda of talks.[5]

This article's major concern, however, does not hinge on the new demographic composition and the resultant worries of the GCC states. It focuses on India's outlandish 'helplessness' in articulating its position in the region, especially with regard to Indian labourers. It is not at all a thing of minor importance as Indians make up nearly sixty per cent of South Asian labourers. According to the most recent figures available, the 3.1 million Indians working in the Gulf send home about 7 billion US dollar a year.[6] But, there is a long-held apprehension, how far Indian policy is earnest in taking up the issues of these labourers. The point here is not just the GCC countries' policies alone, but the limited prospects of Indian policy as well.

There are profound changes in India's foreign policy making in the post-Cold War international context. 9/11 also provided a fundamental component for the new mode of strategic relations to emerge in the regional politics. The new scenario has brought a crucial strategic significance to India because of its location contiguous to two troubled zones; the Middle East and Central Asia (Aron 2004:9). For the GCC countries also this decade represents a remarkable shift towards 'look east' policy, widening the region's geopolitical vision and reaching out to potential strategic partners like China and India (in addition to traditional partnership). So, more than just having an economic importance, the India-GCC relations now have great significance in terms of political as well as strategic dimensions.

There is a growing synergy between India and the GCC states as both the regions share considerable symmetry in the perception of regional and global economic and strategic issues. From a narrow basket of issues, which was often taken for granted by both sides, India-GCC economic relations have now graduated to more dynamic engagement. The change has been mirrored in the technological field. Indians' confidence in the region has grown immeasurably over the years, thanks to the success of its professionals and firms. India is making real strides and finishes first among the countries that provide cheap and cutting edge technologies to the GCC countries.

It is again of particular importance, when it happens at a time the global financial meltdown has necessitated the search of Gulf countries for alternate countries for investment. In the likelihood of a 'post-American' phase of global economy, governments in GCC see India and China as arenas of greater importance for the diversification of their economies beyond oil. Current international economic and financial situation provides a unique opportunity for India to leverage the vast surplus funds in the Gulf for its development needs and to accelerate trade and investment flows.

Nonetheless, Indian policy in the region is still an enigma to those who watch it closely. No comprehensive re-examination has been undertaken in this newly configured global and regional situation. Indian policy makers believe that the purposes are better served by continuity; status quo is comfortable and there is no internal pressure to change the policies. The labour issues, no doubt, mark India's inability to trade its regional influence for the betterment of its people in the GCC and generate a volley of perplexing questions. Is Indian policy in the region based on a realistic view on India's strengths and interests? Is India getting unnecessarily bent out of shape? Why are large sections of its policy makers so uncritical of the draconian labour rules in the Gulf Countries? And why do they always love to ignore the fact about the criticality of Indian workers in a more globalised world?

India seems to be holding an insubstantial fear, which has constantly been dubbed by media and diplomats that if the Indian government complains about the treatment of citizens in the Gulf, then the Gulf States can seek low-wage labour elsewhere. Such a fear and zealous avoidance of criticism leaves Indians to accept the stringent rules imposed by the Gulf countries unilaterally. But, unlike in the 1970s and 80s, when the majority of Indian labourers had little bargaining power, the present Indian migration in the Gulf cuts both ways; contributing significantly to the technological well being of the receiving countries, simultaneously doing so to the welfare of sending country. With the advent of globalisation the in-flow of foreign workers is purely determined by economic factors. The movement of foreign labour in the Gulf therefore has, to a large extent, been influenced by the force of global free market. With business firms searching for the cheapest workforce, as cheaper to employ and more efficient workforce, Indians have taken the advantage of the situation. That is the reason why Indians are being given priority in recruitment even when gulf countries are cutting down on expatriates in order to overcome the pinch of recession and to bring down the unemployment rate among its citizens.

It is true that with an array of formal labour agreements India has been tactically involved in massive negotiations with the GCC states for last few years. But these agreements with slim prospects could not produce tangible advances towards the formulation of a better policy and the current Indian claims are not so much transferable in the region or often fail to project much of new dynamics in the India-GCC relations. The current situation clearly demonstrates the need for new means of communication that go beyond identifiable modes of negotiations and formal agreements; they may include different levels of bargains and gestures of meaning making. This article also seeks to analyse the current situation

in which there is a need for India to reinvent itself and re-orient the policies. It also exemplifies the relative success of bargain by illustrating the cases of Filipino labourers in the GCC states.

## The Criticality of Indian Labourers

Much of the migration from India to the Gulf has now been stimulated only by economic considerations, though there were earlier religious or cultural driven movements of people. As 'easy escape' from the economic hardships being the prime motivation, oil rich states in the Arabian Peninsula became the major port of call for all recent waves of migration. A close look at the process would reveal that two types of demand, in general, stimulated labour migration to the Gulf. As Willoughby (2006:224) notes, "firstly, the creation of an infrastructure for exploiting the petroleum riches required both highly trained professionals and manual labourers." The second wave of immigration of Indian workers to the Gulf stretches back to 1980, when the region witnessed an economic boom. The rise in oil price persuaded the Gulf states to adopt a more global orientation for their economy and production base. "As the per capita GDP soared, the demand for durable consumer goods, educational and health services and information technology generated a powerful employment multiplier effect that pulled foreign workers into a broad array of occupations (El-Musa 1997:362)." Neither skill levels nor size of the indigenous population was adequate for this export-led growth. So unlike the earlier one, the new lot was comprised of un-skilled, semi-skilled and highly skilled workers.

Options of the GCC countries regarding the workers and their nationalities also wavered at different times with the shift in international and regional political equations. Until mid seventies, the Gulf governments' major option for manpower reserve for the then budding oil industry was fellow Arab sates, like Egypt, Jordan and Yemen. But when oil price began to escalate, they turned to a cheaper labour reserve in Pakistan. Nonetheless, what had driven them was not only the market consideration, but also the political as well as pragmatic one. The leftist Arab nationalist ideological orientation of a large-chunk of Arab manpower exporting countries (mainly Egypt, Iraq and Syria) offered a great source of worry for the monarchic Gulf rulers. Moreover, as a staunch Cold War ally of the US, Pakistan had benefited from the strong anti-Soviet and anti-Arab socialist postures of the Gulf governments.  But in the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the integration of Gulf economies into the global economy, market consideration began to overpower all other regional as well as ideological considerations. Indian

participation in the Gulf labour market expanded dramatically in the early 80s, as the diversification of oil economy further required the import of cutting-edge skills alien to the earlier labour force.

The Gulf War, in the meanwhile, brought a political dimension to this choice. The rulers in each state sought to minimise the presence of low-wage Arab workers, who might pose great political challenges to authority (Willougby 2006:238). Spectacular support received by Saddam from different non-GCC Arab nationals for his move to conquer Kuwait culminated in the eventual expulsion of tens of thousands of Arab migrants, particularly Palestinians and Yemenites. The region-wide growth of Islamic fundamentalism vindicated this position further. Even though the powerful regional organisations like the Arab League have made routine calls for giving priority to Arab workers, theses declarations were never really implemented.[7] Especially after 9/11, security concerns have strong leverage on the choice of labourers. In the changed politico-religious context, expatriates from Pakistan and other Muslim countries are regarded by some as posing a potential threat to the stability and safety of the Gulf States. Although, initially, their linguistic, cultural and religious compatibility with the nationals had made them more attractive to authorities, these groups have now been suspected of spreading extreme ideologies, which often call for the overthrow of 'un-Islamic' dynasties in the Gulf. Fearing further encirclement of 'radical Islam', many GCC countries are much concerned about the presence of other Arab nationals. The Kuwaiti Ministry of Interior, for instance, restricted the entry of workers from Iraq, Iran and Syria in 2005, due to the "security reservations."[8] This worry has of course been reflected in the GCC countries' new dynamism in employment creation for Indians since early 2000, despite nationalisation, hard fiscal management measures during the financial crunch and accelerated plan for replacement of dominant labour groups with new ones. Indians are generally considered to be a safe national group presenting no major threat to the Gulf monarchies, except a demographic one. Furthermore, in the security-obsessed situation, the religious diversity of the Indian work force is well accepted in many of the Gulf countries.[9]

Besides the enormous amount of positive political effects, the influx of cheaper foreign workers from India has also helped boost the economy. Availability of competent labour of international standing at a relatively low price is a real plus in the age of globalisation. The immigrants from South Asia are earning only 75 per cent of the average Gulf wage. An end to the high levels of migration to the Gulf Countries, thus, may lead to a fall in the economic growth rate and threaten higher inflation. So, the current choice of labour has got two major re-

wards of monitory and safety. Nevertheless, the picture is not as rosy as painted here. Most of the GCC states are now more concerned about the large amount of money being sent out by the Indians. A substantial amount of hard currency earnings is flowing to the home country as direct remittances. These remittances often constitute a large portion of the GCC countries' GDP. Similarly, the Indian community's pattern of huge earnings and low spending has become a major cause of displeasure for the GCC States. The presence of a foreign work force normally stimulates the domestic consumption of goods and thereby boosts local markets. This is true in many expatriates' case, but Indians' case marks a noticeable exception. Compared to Sri Lankans and Filipinos, Indians show less interest in purchasing goods from local market. Mushrooming duty paid shops and the availability of the same items at amazingly cheap price in India restrain most of the Indians from purchasing nonessential items from host countries.

There is still tremendous pressure from employers in UAE and Qatar to employ more Indian labourers despite area-wide economic crisis. Media reports state that major contracting companies in UAE and Qatar are frantically trying to hire labourers from South Asia (Aneja 2007). India is still the number one supplier of labour and about eighty per cent of new workers are from India. In Dubai and Doha, many mega projects face long delays to finish off due to shortage of skilled Indian manpower. Labourers are less enthusiastic to the appreciation of Indian currency and the consequent low exchange rate of the Gulf currencies. A booming economy in India also means that many no longer see the need to travel to the Gulf. Risks to their living in the Gulf are inflation and currency instability due to the (fixed) dollar-peg system. Inflation touches double digits in Qatar and the UAE and recently hit a 16-year peak in Saudi Arabia.[10] The labourers have started complaining bitterly that the money they earn in the Gulf stretches less far when sending to their families in India. An average Indian worker in the UAE construction industry makes about UAED 800-1000 (USD 175-250) per month. In the present economic regime, this is not enough to meet their own expenses in the Gulf and support a family in India.

With the tremendous pressure from employers, the governments in the Gulf have taken a soft stand regarding the labour strike, which could otherwise end in severe punishment of people who are involved. Companies do not want the government deporting any more workers as they are having trouble finding enough to complete the works. The newfound assertiveness is only the tip of iceberg and the circumstance provides a clue to Indian labourers' calculations in striking, even if they are aware of the dire consequences of termination and deportation.

## Nationalisation: A Failed Agenda?

Nationalisation with its wide range ramifications like replacement of expatriates with locals and the introduction of quota systems for expatriates has been a serious point of concern in the region. Although seldom pursued vehemently, direct policies and plans to phase out the reliance on foreign workers are active. Unemployment is on the rise all over the region with rapid expansion of the number of young nationals.[11] Many GCC states in the present situation cannot afford to employ every citizen who wants a job. In such a circumstance, replacement of non-nationals with nationals seems to be a top priority. With a view to making this replacement process smooth, a wide range of measures have been taken by governments. These include: reservation of some posts exclusively for nationals, introduction of quotas for nationals in many of the job categories, increasing the cost of foreign labour, by levying a fee on those who employ them, awarding tenders for private companies meeting quota requirements, introducing skill-based education and creating sufficient employment opportunities for nationals (Kapiewski 2006:5). The most prominent method is to force companies to hire locals and impose quotas in the name of Omanisation or Saudisation. Saudi took a decision in 2003 to put a ceiling on the level expatriates to 20 per cent by 2013.[12] Kuwait implemented a similar cap, reducing the number of expatriates in government jobs to less than 35 per cent.[13] In Qatar, government ministries and municipalities put a vehement nationalisation into action, leaving many Indian expatriates jobless. Oman has a more robust strategy of nationalisation and it is said to be the only country that made considerable headway in downsizing the expatriate workers. The current nationalisation has badly affected South Asians.

However, the targeted nationalisation remains a distant dream and the process has met several obstacles. Only in certain fields like banking and the hydrocarbon sector they could achieve a position close to the target. Most of the job opportunities coming in current phase of Gulf countries' development are in manufacturing, construction and other allied services, which require skills that have traditionally not appealed to nationals. The private-sector jobs are, generally, designed for expatriates, with long and strict working hours and salaries that don't meet local standards. Work in the private sector is sometimes perceived as debasing the nationals' social status.[14] Because of their 'superior position,' locals are averse to accepting the low-skilled, low-salaried posts and they are inclined to work mostly in the government sector. The majority are employed in simple jobs like administrative support, clerical and security services. But the case is not so in the states with low growth rate, like Oman, where all sorts of jobs are attractive for relatively poor locals.

Nationalisation measures meet the same problems in highly-skilled job fields. Mismatching profiles of nationals have hindered the removal of other nationals in highly-skilled positions. In UAE, for example, there are abundant job opportunities in information technology, but the education and training systems are unprepared for the boom in this field. Economic diversification efforts have, thus, made expatriate participation more inevitable. The other reason is the alleged non-flexibility of nationals, especially in terms of salary and work culture. Despite emerging strains of unemployment and competition in the labour market, the wage structure of nationals, throughout the region remains high and uncompromising. There is wide-held criticism from within that a significant per cent of nationals are not productive and often fail to perform their tasks to the standards set by local governments.

Furthermore, the mandatory nationalisation and the quota system have attracted the wrath of entrepreneurs across state lines. They genuinely fear that such moves finally will lower productivity and erode profit. Nationalisation in UAE (encapsulated by the term *Emiratisation*), for instance, was grudgingly accepted by private sector companies, though they were asked by the government to employ more locals to curtail the rate of unemployment. Ironically enough, the drive in many Gulf States has met fierce opposition from the nationals themselves. The sponsorship regime, *kufala*[15] makes the citizens privileged employers and business owners, drawing surplus from the foreign presence. It also allows nationals to make money out of selling visa documents and to extract rents through discriminatory pricing (Dresch 2006:203). Nationals, fearing a considerable drop in their sponsorship money have come vehemently against the nationalisation agenda. So, nationalisation, contrary to the highly-placed wish, cannot contain unemployment pressures, though it may lead to increased employment of nationals in government sectors regardless of their competencies and skills. Nevertheless, progress has been made to nationalise certain areas of employment, such as gold and vegetable markets in Saudi Arabia, though large scale nationalisation remains next to impossible.Oman is the only state, which continues to go ahead with nationalisation though other states have taken serious measures, especially in the wake of financial crunch.

Aware of the pitfalls of a sudden nationalisation, some states have developed other strategies like reducing the domination of one nationality with the quota system. Saudi pioneered this move and established a quota system for foreigners in which no nationality may exceed 10 per cent of the total population.[16] In a similar move, Bahrain is about to impose a quota system for the number of unskilled Indian labourers allowed to work in the country. It also had proposed

for putting a six year cap on foreign labour at the last GCC meeting. Bahrain's move may be sparked mainly by growing concerns about the impact of India's new assertiveness on the Bahraini labour market. The Indian embassy in Bahrain has proposed a minimum-wage structure for its nationals. Anyway, as a solution to overdependence on Indian labourers, a sweeping labour reform is on the card in Bahrain. The administration has made foreign labour more expensive by charging companies a monthly levy for each foreign employee in addition to a visa fee of almost USD 500.[17] Given its large demographic and unemployment problems, a radical reform, in terms of reducing the amount of time of 'certain group' of expatriates may be a great issue for Bahrain. Bahrain's anxiety, however, is not shared duly by other countries and this unwillingness of neighbours to endorse the proposal has prevented a GCC wide agreement.

As a long-term strategy, almost all Gulf States now encourage an open labour market system to bring competition and internationally competitive wages. This option, to deal with the growing Indian presence necessitates bringing in labourers from Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. The availability of cheap-to-employ migrants from elsewhere in South and Southeast Asian countries offers a viable alternative. But, such moves for the replacement of relatively expensive Indian workers are insufficient. The governments brought many controlling measures and administrative regularisations to halt the movement of Indian labourers in excess. The UAE, for instance, fixed matriculation as the minimum requirement for labours. But the unavailability of skilled and competent labourers in bulk number torpedoed their plan. The latest example is of the State of Qatar, which took a complete U-turn to the earlier decision to limit the number of Indians despite the constant pressure due to increasing unemployment and economic crisis. The Labour Ministry in Qatar is now in a massive hunt for skilled workers for its booming gas and construction industry and bringing tens of thousands of new workers from India.

## Kerala Experience

The massive flow of manpower seems more of a bane than a boon for India. It obviously drains highly skilled people which, in turn, may hamper the efficiency of a fast developing economy. The old theories of brain drain may appear to be a cliché in the context of extensive transnational flow of labour and capital. But Kerala's experience demonstrates how the absence of key workers hinders many developmental projects.

With the largest stock of Indian Gulf migrants, Kerala's experience deserves special mention. Kerala supplies one-half of the almost three million Indian

workers, though it represents only 3.1 per cent of the Indian population. The State's historical trade and cultural link with the region may be the major reason for this disproportionate contribution. As a result of migration, the state has witnessed a series of diverse economic and social changes. The Gulf migration provided a new lease of life for the otherwise poor employment situation of the State. Unemployment was a structural problem in Kerala for more than 30 years after Indian independence and has now partly been 'reduced' by massive emigration of Keralites to different parts of India and abroad. The economic effects of out-migration have been studied by many scholars with emphasis on the positive effects. However, all 'positive impact' literatures have failed to assess the new dynamics. There are equally important adverse effects; the major one being the emergence of a new phenomenon, 'replacement migration.' Huge exogenous money and the shortage of skilled workers and consequent increase in labour charges here have made Kerala another 'Gulf' attracting migrant workers from other states. "By accepting low wages and poor living conditions, these outside workers are taking away a lot of work that should legitimately have gone to resident workers" (Zacharia 2003:9).

Emigration of skilled workers has created a shortage of labourers at home. The process of out-migration resulted in a reduction of the supply and increase in the demand for certain categories of workers(Prakash 1998). The shortage became most acute in places where the Gulf migration was high spurring wage rate. This in turn led to a massive influx of Tamil labourers with lower wage structure. Replacement migration has thus been a natural result of emigration and there is a correlation between the growth of rate of wages of skilled workers and the positive trends in the process of migration.

Apart from this, there is the issue of 'brain drain' as well. The issue becomes severe crippling to the state's productive capacity, when a large number of professionals (90 per cent of whom belong to the age group of 20-35) leaves the home country. Indian software professionals (almost 70 per cent from Kerala), for instance, constitute more than forty per cent of those employed in the Gulf's software field. IT sector in Dubai itself has employed more than 30 per cent of Kerala-hatched professionals. This is really a significant loss as outsourcing is still a fast-growing part of the IT services business in India. Entrepreneurs investing in Kerala complain of the 'handicap' high wages and labour scarcity, while labour markets in the Gulf are taking a considerable per cent of Kerala's skilled workers. The picture has completely changed from the 1970s and 80s, where two-thirds of the migrants had no technical training.

Besides the scarcity of labourers and high wage rate, process of migration has brought some other unwelcome socio-economic changes with the creation of a 'money order economy.' Remittances from the Middle East are estimated at 20 per cent of the state's income, second only to spice exports. A distinctive effect of this economy depending largely on foreign remittance is its vulnerability to any change in the Gulf economy. Malayalees have been more concerned by the rising exchange rate relative to Gulf currencies than they have been more enthusiastic about high rates of GDP growth. High appreciation for Indian Rupees often generates much of displeasure.

The re-absorption and rehabilitation of return migrants has been the other matter of concern. The economic downturn resulting from the decline of oil prices and massive nationalisation drive in Gulf employment presents two major causes for the return of emigrant workers.[18] Early to mid 1990s witnessed an increasing trend of return migration, although the trend is still on.[19] The after effect of return migration may be less this time, but the studies show that many were employed in low skilled or unskilled jobs such as petty traders, helpers and kitchen assistants in hotels and restaurants and their lack of skills left more than 30 per cent of them unemployed (Prakash 1998:3213). The crucial issue is of the selective use of Indian labourers in certain categories. While the low or unskilled labourers are replaced by cheaper ones from other South Asian states like Nepal and Sri Lanka and are forced to return to Kerala, the employers insist on the stay of semi-skilled or highly skilled labourers beyond their contract period. They are reluctant to leave skilled Indian labour and prefer to keep workers who have already gained enormous experience (Kapiewsky 2006:5). There is a related issue of disenchantment of people with traditional low-paid jobs back in Kerala. The return migrants generally show unwillingness to re-enter into their earlier job, even if the wage rates have considerably increased and their economic condition is in decline ( Zacharia 2003:9).

## India-GCC Relations: Shifting Policy Options

During the pre 9/11 period, three factors had considerable importance in India's policy towards the GCC countries in particular and the Middle East at large; namely, India's energy needs, presence of a thriving expatriate community, the India-Pakistan rivalry and Pakistan's politico-religious affinity with the Gulf States. But beyond energy imports and manpower exports, New Delhi had enjoyed a goodwill, thanks mainly to India's consistent support to the Palestinian cause, though India had a specific strategic expectation of reciprocal support on

the Kashmir issue (Aron 2004). The old policies, however, have now lost their raison d'être and the major issues like India-Pakistan rivalry became a less important one. The new situation forced India to re-orient its policy towards the region, as part of a larger rethink of its approach to international affairs. Again 9/11 and its aftermath confirmed the shifting compulsions of statecraft underlined by shared strategic concerns.

However, India is now caught in a diplomatic dilemma. India's Middle East policy has become a 'delicate dance' (Aron 2004) as New Delhi maintains a somewhat balanced relation between the Arab world and Israel. This balancing act is necessitated by its need to establish close defense ties with Israel with a rationale of combating terror and accessing a supply of sophisticated weapons, on the one hand, and soaring energy needs and warm economic links with the Arab Gulf countries, on the other. The policy driven by neoliberal pragmatism rather than the ideological commitments, endorses both economic engagements with the Arab countries for meeting its energy needs, simultaneous to close relations that India has forged with Israel. India's new strategic stance towards Israel may correctly be defined by a consonance with America's interest in the region. Although it was started through back channel interactions, Israel has progressed to become India's second largest arms supplier after Russia and there is a convergence of interests and strategies in the fight against terrorism (Aron 2004). Nonetheless, there is a growing synergy between India and the GCC countries as both are drawn to each other by common political issues relating to terrorism and see each other as potential strategic partners. India is so tactical; not to allow its warm relation with Shiite Iran to spoil the party, while recognising Iran's capacity to supply gas for its future needs.

Above all, there is a plethora of economic opportunities in the region in technology and services sectors that go beyond India's erstwhile role as provider of labour force and importer of oil (Gupta 2006). There has been an avalanche of recent bilateral agreements, a massive flow of investment capital and almost a ritual sort of exchange of business delegations between India and GCC States. The signing of the Framework Agreement on Economic Cooperation between India and GCC countries in 2004 was an indicator that marked a change in the India-GCC economic relations. The GCC is now a target market for India's main export products, including garments, food stuffs, machinery and mechanical appliances. By now, India has outstripped many erstwhile suppliers of technology. The present 'look east' policy of the majority of the Gulf States in terms of technology and advanced services makes them heavily dependent on India and China. This dependency is quite explicit in software, machine tools and au-

tomobile Industry.[20] India's exports of its own software or licensing of its own intellectual property (IP) amounts to be about $ 4.5 m in each year, a considerable fraction of its service exports to the Gulf countries.[21] Similarly, India is now host to Research and Development (R& D) centres for a plethora of Gulf—based transnational companies and scientific research centres. An MoU for cooperation has been signed between King Saud University, Saudi Arabia and Indian Institute of Science, Banglore. For cooperation in peaceful use of outer space and joint research and information technology, another MoU has been signed in 2010 between Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and King Abdul-Aziz City for Science and Technology. By this measure, Gulf dependency on Indian firms is very much noticeable.

India's exports are more highly evolved like those of China. In terms of market share, India occupies a prominent position in UAE's and Oman's import market; it is the largest import source for UAE (about 11-5 per cent of market share) and third largest for Oman (about 5-3 per cent).[22] Taking GCC nations together, India has emerged as the third largest trade partner after the EU and the US. Keen to boost their trade and economic ties further, bilateral Free Trade Agreements are being persuaded between India and the Gulf countries.

The trade has expanded beyond oil with exports and imports surging substantially. India's total trade with the GCC countries has risen to USD 22.5 billion in 2006 from USD 5.6 billion in 2001.[23] As a group, the GCC is India's second largest trading partner, the largest single origin of imports and the second largest destination for exports from India. The share of GCC in India's trade, without taking into account the oil trade,  has increased from about 7.1 per cent in 2001 to 8.7 per cent 2007.[24] While India's exports to GCC countries grew at nearly 27 per cent per annum to USD 16.3 million in 2007, imports (excluding oil) from the region were valued at USD 6.2 billion in 2007, growing at about 22-4 per cent per annum.[25] Moreover, with the liberalisation of the economy rapidly underway, GCC investors have started focusing on India as a major investment destination. The GCC countries have already invested around USD 406.3 million constituting around one per cent of total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) received by India since the beginning of open up policies.[26] Besides it, the Gulf (especially Dubai) has become a re-exporting hub for Chinese goods to India. This vigour extends to energy and petrochemicals as well. India and China, the two Asian giants are profoundly transforming the world's oil balance. A report says, "by 2030, India would import as much as the US and Japan today."[27] The International Energy Agency has projected that India's oil demand is expected to rise from 2.83 million bpd in 2006 to 5.5 million bpd by 2025. [28] Serving Asian customers China,

India and Japan is now central to the GCC countries' petroleum policy as these countries collectively become their number one customer. Their keenness to forge long-term strategic partnerships with Asian countries emanates from their need to diversify the customer bases and to reduce their political and economic overdependence on traditional buyers.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's recent visit to Oman, Saudi Arabia and Qatar is considered by many a part of India's larger engagement with the Gulf. His visit has been followed by the visit of Vice President's visit to Kuwait in April 2009. Indian President Pratibha Patil paid a successful visit to UAE in November 2010. During Prime Minister's visit, India has sought surplus funds from these countries to sustain the flow of investments at a time of global credit squeeze and signed agreements relating to bilateral investments with Oman and Qatar. India and Oman have agreed to set up a joint investment fund. With trade between India and Oman going up by double digits, the fund, with the initial seed amount of USD 100 million, will become an "important gateway" for the inflow of funds from the GCC countries.[29] The fund will be used to finance various projects in the fields of tourism, infrastructure, health, telecom and urban infrastructure in either country. During Vice President's visit to Kuwait, India has signed a pact with Kuwait in soft sectors like education, culture and science and technology. The billion dollar investment surplus with Kuwait's investment body was the other major output of this visit. "Both sides had identified information technology, energy, human resources development as well as trade, investment and finance as the pillars of their relationship."[30]

On the strategic front, India has established strong military ties with some of the Gulf countries in response to the new phenomenon of al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism. Common threat from terrorism means that India's interests don't differ much from those of the GCC countries. The defense ties have risen to a higher level following some of these countries' decision to institute a strategic dialogue and sign defense cooperation agreements with India. The UAE has signed a defense cooperation agreement with India in July 2003 providing export and import of weapons, military training, sharing of military medical services and coordination in security-related issues.[31] A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defense cooperation aiming at promoting greater cooperation in this field, including export and import of arms was also signed in 2004. Previously, India and Oman had agreed in October 2002 to hold joint military exercises and cooperate in training and defense production. The two sides have agreed to step up defence cooperation by upgrading their joint naval exercises during Indian Prime Minister's recent visit to Oman. The naval exercise with Oman named "Tamar

al-Tahir" (Benign Fruit), was increased in complexity from 2009. There was an extensive talk on elevating India-Oman ties to a strategic level, during the then External Affairs Minister Pranabh Mukharjee's visit to Oman in the same year. Both sides discussed measures to intensify cooperation in the defence field by undertaking more high level exchange of personnel and equipment. With Qatar, India has already signed a defence cooperation agreement. Bilateral talks have taken place between India and Saudi Arabia with a view to improving defense and military relations through joint military exercises, launching of annual naval exercises and supply of military aircraft and ground systems. Anyway, the security of the region is of paramount concern to India and it contributes a lot to the stability of the region by sharing its experience in combating terrorism, expertise in maritime security and military training.

## Bilateral Labour Agreements

India has signed labour agreements with all the GCC countries, except Saudi Arabia. The agreements aim to secure Indian emigrants against exploitation, maltreatment and abuse and protect their rights in the host countries. The agreements are also designed to forge bilateral partnerships to expand the overseas employment market for Indian workers. It is also true that with an array of formal labour agreements, the country has been tactically involved in massive negotiations with the GCC states for last few years. But these agreements with slim prospects often struggle to produce tangible advances towards the improvement of the plight of Indian labourers in the Gulf. Why do the agreements fail to yield the desired results? Why do they not live up to the much-hyped expectations? These need to be examined here.

## Bahrain

India and Bahrain signed a labour welfare agreement in December 2008. The agreement sought to ensure the safety and security of the large number of Indian workers there. The agreement seeks to help ensure the smooth flow of workers from India, as per the requirements of the kingdom. Indian workers make up a bulk of Bahrain's expatriate population with around 150,000 workers in total. The formation of a joint committee to implement the agreement and as well as review employment opportunities in Bahrain was the major highlight of the agreement. The committee has the right to discuss any issue which has a direct link to Indian labour.

The agreement followed a Memorandum of Understanding, which was signed in 2007. The MoU delved into labour mobility and manpower development and provided an institutional framework for strengthening bilateral co-operation in the deployment of Indian workers in Bahrain. The agreement also recognised the existence of several malpractices which needed to be curbed, like substitution of contracts, delayed or non-payment of wages, harsh working and living conditions, denial of contractual facilities, ill-treatment and physical abuse of workers. Most significantly, the agreement proposed to bring all categories of workers under the protection of labour laws. So far, domestic workers, most of them woman migrants, do not come under the ambit of labour laws.

Further, the MoU ensured that all employment contracts will have to be in conformity with the terms of the work permit. The agreement also says that all contracts will have to be authenticated by the Bahrain government. Besides, the agreement allows for facilitation of manpower recruitment – that has to be in conformity with laws of both nations – and mutual sharing of information and experience. Interestingly, Bahrain is one place where a close monitoring of the provisions of the agreements takes place. Besides, the Indian embassy has fixed a minimum wage of BD1,000. Initially, Bahraini authorities instituted tough measures like a 'quota system' for Indian workers, but the huge demand for skilled and semi-skilled Indian labourers forced them to back-pedal. The Bahraini proposal aimed at implementing a quota system all over the region and limiting the period of a foreigner's stay in a Gulf State to six years was rejected outright by the other Gulf countries.

Another MoU between India and Bahrain was signed on 17 June 2009. The purpose of the MoU has been to enable protection and welfare of all categories of employees under the labour law and regulation in Bahrain. This MoU categorically insists that "every demand for employees shall state the required specifications and qualifications for jobs and types needed. It shall include the duration of contract, the conditions of employment, including the salary agreed on, the end of service benefits, medical facilities, leave entitlement and other facilities such as transportation, accommodation etc."[32] The terms and conditions of employees, as per this MoU, shall be defined by an individual labour contract between employee and the employer, and the employer shall not have the authority to amend or vary the provisions of the labour contract except for the purpose of improving the terms and conditions of service benefit for the employee. The two parties decided to establish a joint committee for the proper implementation of this MoU.

## UAE

India signed a similar labour agreement with UAE in 2008. Before that a MoU ensuring a safeguard for all categories of Indian workers and their protection from exploitation, under the UAE Labour law was signed between India and UAE in December 2006. The provisions of the MoU included proposals like payment of salary through banks, a compulsory health insurance scheme for workers, better housing facilities, issue of smart cards and regular Joint Committee Meetings between the two sides to discuss steps to enhance cooperation in employment of Indian workers and their training needs in three major sectors – construction, hospitality and tourism, and health care.[33] It was also decided to set up a grievance redressal mechanism for Indian workers, under which a monthly meeting would be held between Labour Attaches of the Indian Embassy in Abu Dhabi and the Consulate in Dubai and officials of the UAE Ministry of Labour. A counselor (Community Development Affairs) has also been appointed by MOIA at Abu Dhabi to look after the interests of the overseas Indian community in the UAE.

The present agreement is very comprehensive in terms of addressing a wide array of issues. Under the new agreement, the terms and conditions of the employment contract will have to be in conformity with the work permit that the employer obtains from the UAE government. All contracts will have to be authenticated by the UAE government and the employer will have no right to change the contract conditions. As a step towards enforcing the agreement, Dubai authorities made it compulsory for domestic workers and their employers to sign contracts that specify their terms of employment, including salary details and leave cycle.

Although this step has been welcomed, Indian Consulates in the UAE complain that they still do not receive contracts that Indian domestic workers may have signed with their employers.[34] Complaints regarding underpayment or delayed payment of wages, substitution of contracts, and denial of contractual obligations to workers by their employers are still common.

## Oman

India and Oman signed an agreement on labour welfare in 2008. The agreement covers different categories of labour, including domestic workers. Besides, the Indian diplomatic mission in Oman has taken several steps for the welfare of Indian household workers. These include making prior attestation of labour agreement by the embassy mandatory to allow household workers to leave

India, orientation programme for household workers prior to their leaving India, contractual binding for the sponsor to provide a pre-paid mobile phone to the household worker on arrival, the sponsor allowing the household worker to report to the embassy within four weeks of his/her arrival in Oman, free legal assistance for any household worker who is ill-treated, and the embassy paying for the medical treatment and airfare in deserving cases.

Apart from this, India and Oman signed an agreement in the field of manpower designed to check illegal recruitment and human trafficking and creating employment opportunities for Indians in that country during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to the country in 2008. Along with this agreement, India has fixed the minimum wage for Indian domestic workers in Oman at 75 Omani riyals (approximately $195) per month. Above all, Oman has distinction of having a labour regulatory authority promptly taking up worker's complaints with the employers involved. Issues like living and working conditions of workers are strictly monitored.

## Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia

Qatar was the first Gulf nation to sign an agreement with India way back in 1985. An additional protocol agreement was signed in 2007. Certain broad principles have been discussed in this additional protocol agreement. They include: declaration of mutual intent to enhance employment opportunities and for bilateral cooperation; the host country to take measures for protection and welfare of the workers in organised sector; statement of the broad procedure that foreign employer shall follow to recruit India workers; the recruitment and terms of employment to be in conformity of the laws of both the countries; a Joint Working Group (JWG) to be constituted to ensure implementation of the MoU and to meet twice a year alternatively in each of the two States.[35] Similar MoU was signed with Kuwait in the year 2007. The major highlight of this MoU is the insistence that the employer or the registered recruiting agency must ensure that the employment contracts are authenticated by the: (a) Kuwait Chamber of Commerce and Industry or by the competent authority; (b) Kuwaiti Ministry of Foreign Affairs; (c) Indian Mission in the State of Kuwait; (d) competent authority under the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs of the Republic of India.[36] Efforts are underway to explore the possibility of a similar MoU with Saudi Arabia.

The JWGs are primarily meant for resolving bilateral labour issues and monitoring the implementation of the MoUs. Additionally, according to the MOIA annual report 2010, JWGs serve as a "platform to deal with issues such as model

contract, minimum wages, documentation requirements, labour dispute re-dressal, retention of passport, substitution of contracts, dealing with recalcitrant employers, practical solutions to problems of exploitation and abuse of workers etc…"[37]  Although India has not signed a labour agreement with Saudi Arabia, top-level negotiations are actively on for the formulation of a comprehensive deal. Regular meetings of the Saudi-Indian Joint Commission are a significant step towards it.

The labour agreements with many of the GCC states did not produce tangible advances. The Indian labourers in these states still express the view that the government is not helping them as they suffer from extreme exploitation. Though the Indian insistence on bringing new legislation for the protection of workers under the host countries' laws was well appreciated and considered as the first indicator of India's changed position in the region, as yet, the new policy regime has not proved its worth. Indian efforts to develop a better working atmosphere and minimum salary for labourers have also failed to find traction.

## The Question of Bargain

The dynamics in strategic and economic relations has not yet been resonated in the issues like exchange of labour between both. India is not ready to use what leverage it can in the interest of Indian workers. The relations of old mould still lurk and there is a striking slip from Indian side in taking up the issue of its labourers the way it deserves. Why cannot India use its vast influence over the GCC countries to better the position of labourers? According to the latest statistics available with the External Affairs Ministry, the GCC hosts 4 million Indians, primarily low income contract labourers.[38] A rough estimate suggests that fifty per cent of the Non Residential Indians work in the Gulf and their remittance accounts nearly fifty per cent of the 26 million that came to the country in 2006 by way of remittances from the overseas Indians.[39] The issues of this expatriate community are seldom discussed aloud at bilateral forums.

Indian efforts to develop a better working atmosphere and minimum salary for labourers constantly fail to find traction. The most recent is the MoU signed between India and Oman in November 2008. The two sides signed a MoU aimed at improving the working conditions of the Indians in Oman, especially in case of dispute between the employees and employers. India and UAE have signed an agreement in December 2006 for cooperation in manpower recruitment. This MoU ensured a safeguard for all categories of Indian workers and protection of them from exploitation, under the UAE Labour law. Though India has signed a similar agreement with Kuwait, this MoU was very comprehensive in terms of

addressing a wide array of issues. Under the new agreement, the terms and conditions of the employment contract will have to be in conformity with the work permit that the employer obtains from the UAE government. All contracts will have to be authenticated by the UAE government and the employer will have no right to change the contract conditions. As a step towards enforcing the agreement, Dubai authorities made it compulsory for domestic workers and their employers to sign contracts that specify their terms of employment, including salary details and leave cycle. While this step has been welcomed, Indian Consulates in the UAE complain that they still do not receive contracts that Indian domestic workers may have signed with their employees (Aneja 2007). Complaints regarding underpayment or delayed payment of wages, substitution of contracts and denial of contractual obligations to workers by their employers are still common.

Overseas affairs ministry has taken many steps to protect the welfare of Indians in the Gulf. The ministry is in the process of establishing overseas Indian community welfare funds in all GCC states. The overseas Workers resource Centre, which is a toll free helpline, has been established for Indian workers in the Gulf. The much trumpeted steps, however, produce a tiny follow-up and little happens in the subsequent period. The Labour agreements with many of the GCC states did not produce tangible advances. The Indian labourers in all the places still express anxiety that the government is not helping them as they suffer from extreme exploitation. Though the Indian insistence on bringing new legislation for the protection of workers under the host countries' laws, was well appreciated and considered as the first indicator of India's changed position in the region, as yet, the new policy regime has not proved its worth.

Why do the agreements meet the same fate and fail to materialise? Why they do not live up to the much-hyped expectations? Why unilateralism from one side, when both the participants in this exchange receive almost equal benefits? The possible answers may range from the persistence of old mould of relations, to the incapability of a regional power like India to project power in another region. The dominant perspective is closely linked to India's unrelenting effort to project itself as a "soft power."[40] It was inevitable for India to cultivate a soft power image to gathering the support of many of the Arab Muslim countries, during the Cold War and the growing India-Pakistan conflict. But this image creation exercise has now lost its currency. A more assertive posture may be more suitable as India tries to build its influence on the pillars of increased trade and strategic partnership. Anyway, looking at the nature of Indian predicament in the Gulf region, one finds that all these perspectives clearly expose India's lack of bargaining power in the region.

How do some nations attain bargaining power of higher level, while others do not? This debate has some relevance, when applying to a higher level of bargaining power acquired by relatively small and less affluent countries in the region. The Philippines possesses higher bargaining capacity in the region, despite relatively less capabilities and influences. Among manpower exporting countries to the Gulf, the Philippines is far advanced in the area of proper negotiations. The country uses a wide variety of means from formal ones like bilateral agreements and MOUs to more informal ones such as open warnings. Companies in the GCC frequently come under fire from Philippines diplomatic mission for their general lack of keenness to improve working and living conditions of the Filipino labourers. The Philippines even withdrew its labour force from the Gulf countries on human rights and wage issues in the late 1990, the period which coincided with the crisis of Southeast Asian economies. Taking such a critical step was unimaginable for a country wherein migrant remittances make up a significant source of foreign exchange and a vital element in the development strategy. The country has a relatively high dependence on the Gulf States, when compared to India and much of its oil needs (more than 80 per cent) is met by imports from the GCC countries alone. However, from its side, the Philippines is keen on labour protection. The number of bilateral agreements signed reveals the country's dedication in this regard. Most of the agreements having signed with countries hosting large numbers of Filipino workers, like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are well implemented.

Migrant workers' rights are well-specified in national labour laws of the GCC countries, but enforcement or redress mechanisms are rarely provided. Laws are there to protect workers from unscrupulous employers, but authorities seldom enforce them. Despite this general situation Filipino labourers enjoy certain privileges and the diplomatic missions have successfully translated the country's cordial relations with the Gulf countries into the welfare of labourers. Filipino Embassies in each Gulf country insist on minimum wage for their workers and there are proper mechanisms for aiding Filipino workers in distress, which do not exist for other nationals. The Philippines has put pressure on many GCC States to extend the labour laws to domestic helpers who work in risky conditions and face gender-based violence. Security and good labour relations therefore, have become serious matters of concern for local authorities, thanks to Philippines' consistent effort. It is largely the Philippines' attitude that created real pressure on the Gulf States to work towards improving the conditions of expatriate workers in the field of housing, health and wage protection. The Philippines' 'patron-client' relationship with the US may be pointed out by some

as the real source of its high bargaining power in the region. It may be true to a limited extent, as the Gulf countries tend to show a soft corner with an intention to 'appease' America's 'all weather ally.' Being close to the United States, the Philippines may receive favourable treatment in the region. But this explanation does not offer a clear answer to the puzzle, when India too finds a place in America's good book now.

## Conclusion

The living and working conditions of Indian blue-collar workers leave much attention to ask for. The region has earned the dubious distinction of having some of the worst labour conditions in the world. There is no minimum wage, if there is one it will not be implemented by many of the employers. Unfair labour practices seriously demean the guest workers and they face exploitation, abuse, intimidation and violence at the hands of employers. The recent strikes are, therefore, not the causes but serious symptoms of a huge social crisis. Indian administration's attitude in this regard requires a far more critical and even-handed discussion. The Indian policy in the region has come under virulent attack for its alleged lack of comprehensiveness to accommodate the new realities in the post-Cold War era. A close look would reveal that many of policy determinants remain almost intact, though most of them have lost their rationale in the new context.

India's political position makes a splash in the region through many creative interventions and strategic partnerships. Its technological influence in the region has grown incalculably, thanks to the success in its export of machineries and software professionals. The Gulf Sates have begun to see India as a promising avenue for surplus investments. The widespread receptivity in the region, however, is not reflected in the exchange of labour between India and the Gulf countries. The bolder claims, which are made of all these achievements have a hollow ring. They stir only the surface of the region and the bargain seems to be on continued decline because of a non-assertive stand in issues concerning Indian workers.

What is apparent in India's case is the lack of political grit to address labour ambiguities. Fearing the possible wrath of the Gulf States, which may ultimately lead to the replacement of Indian workers by other nationalities, such a discussion may seem to be uncomfortable for Indian policy makers. But the recent experience from Bahrain, where Indian embassy has fixed a minimum wage of BD 1000, demonstrates that the concern is imaginary. Initially Bahraini authorities instituted tough measures like a 'quota system' for Indian workers, but the huge demand for skilled and semi-skilled Indian labourers forced them to back-pedal.

The Bahraini sponsored proposal aimed at implementing quota system all over the region and limiting the period of a foreigner's stay in a Gulf State to six years was also out-rightly rejected by other countries.

Unlike earlier migrations, the massive flow of Indian labourers to the region obviously epitomises globalisation. Indian workers have developed an expertise of global standing and continue to contribute in economic development in most of the receiving countries. This is quite evident from the Gulf employers' reluctant attitude to replace Indian labourers with cheap labourers of other nationalities, despite tremendous pressures. Similarly, the present experience suggests that rulers are keen to avoid the political challenges to their authority that the presence of expatriate workers from various Muslim countries including Pakistan might pose. Muslim countries' misfortune represents a giant Indian opportunity in the Gulf (Sullivan 2007). Against this backdrop, India's GCC policy needs a radical shift and the efforts are required to address a magnitude of problems, which would otherwise remain unsolved. The most urgent task for India is to make wider use of its edge in the region. The old ways of doing bilateral relations cannot be sustained for too long. The new situation has made it easy for India to adopt a long term strategy to expand its influence and thereby to increase its power of bargain vis-à-vis labour exchange.

## Notes

1. With its multitude of socio-economic expressions, the process also has brought new distinctions among population. From a horizontal sort of stratification with anecdotal horizontal family/clan division, the GCC societies are now moved to a vertical one with pertinent class distinctions.
2. *HRW Report,* 12 November 2007.
3. *International Herald Tribune,* 25 September 2005.
4. *Gulf News*, 24 November 2005.
5. *Gulf News*, 29 November 2008.
6. *Indian Bureau of Foreign Employment Annual Report 2008.*
7. Many of the GCC countries have enacted laws and many religious leaders have promulgated *fatwas* stressing that employment should be offered firstly to the nationals, secondly to the citizens of other GCC countries, thirdly to non-Gulf Arabs and only then to other foreigners. See Kapiewsky (2006:68).
8. *Arab Times*, 29 August 2005.
9. Although Muslims constitute more than 50 per cent of Indian workforce, other religious groups are also duly represented with significant numbers. Only demolition of the Babri Masjid cast a shadow over this whole-hearted acceptance, but it did not contribute a profound change in the GCC Arabs' choice of labours in all states except in Saudi Arabia. See Prakash (1999:45).
10. *The Economist,* 26 April 2008.

11   The GCC has one of the world's youngest and fastest growing populations. 61 per cent of Saudi population is under 25 years old, compared with 50 per cent of India's, 39 per cent of China's, and 30 per cent of Europe's.

12   *Bahrain News Agency*, 11 April 2008.

13   Ibid.

14   Ibid.

15   The sponsorship system means that expatriate workers can enter, work and leave the host country only with the assistance of their local sponsor.

16   *Riyadh Daily*, 3 February, 2003.

17   *The Economist*, 26 April 2008.

18   Majority were those who returned from Saudi Arabia (around 3 m). The other Gulf states from which emigrants returned in large number were UAE, Oman and Qatar. See Zachariah et al. (2003).

19   The recent decline of oil price and resultant financial crisis has made many Malayalee Gulf migrants jobless.

20   Triumphant story of Tally, the Indian accounting software for small business shows, how Indian programmes in the region hit the market, comparing with foreign packages that are often 'atrociously expensive' and require highly skilled manpower to run.

21   *The Assocham Study Report* on India-GCC Free Trade Agreement, November 2007.

22   www.manoramonline.com, accessed on 3 May 2008.

23   *The Assocham Study Report 2007.*

24   Ibid.

25   *Global Investment House's Report,* October 2007. ( www.globalinv.net).

26   Among the Gulf States, UAE is the largest investor in India, accounting around 79 per cent (USD 321.1m) of the total investment made by the GCC countries followed by Bahrain (32.7m), Oman (24.51m), Saudi Arabia (19.18m), Kuwait (8,87m) and Qatar ( 0.09 m). ibid.

27   *The Economist*, 1 December 2007.

28   Ibid.

29   *The Hindu*, 10 November 2008.

30   *Indian Express,*  9 April 2009.

31   *The Times of India* ,1 July 2003.

32    See the document of Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of India and the Kingdom of Bahrain on Labor and Manpower Development available on the official website of Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs,  www.moia.gov.in (accessed on 20 March 2010).

33   For further details see the text of MOU between the Government of the UAE and the Government of India in the field of manpower available on the website www.moia.gov.in, accessed on 15 March, 2010.

34   See Atul Aneja (2007).

35   For further details refer to the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of India and the State of Qatar on the regulation of the Employment of Indian Manpower signed on 11 April 1985, available on the website of MOIA, www.moia.gov.in (accessed on 20 March 2010).

36    See the text of MOU on Labor, Employment and Manpower Development between the Government of Kuwait and the Government of the Republic of India. Available on www.moia.gov.in (accessed on 20 March 2010).

37    See *India Annual Report 2010*, New Delhi, Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs.

38    www.manoramonline.com , 3 June 2008.

39    *The Hindu*, 9 January 2008.

40    Soft power refers to "the ability to influence the preferences of other nations through the exercise of norms, assuming leadership role in international institutions, culture, diplomacy and efficient national leadership, whereas, 'hard power' denotes to one with sizeable military force, nuclear weapons capability and enormous wealth." See Nye(2004) for further debate.

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100

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M.H. Ilias

101

# Political Islam in Palestine Revisited
## The Case of Fatah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad

Samuel J. Kuruvilla

One of the defining attributes of the Arab world since the end of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War has been the rise and growth of Pan-Arabic nationalism (*al-Qawmiyya al-`arabiyya*) in the region. Arab nationalism was an ideology that sought to restore the lost glory of the Arab people based on their ancient heritage and culture, with an emphasis on modernisation and secularism in the present world context. The emphasis in Arab nationalism was on political union, reminiscent of the Arab world as it had been once united under the Abbasid and Umayyad Caliphs of the early Islamic era. While Arab nationalists were overwhelmingly exposed to Western culture and European rationalist education, they sought to be fiercely nationalistic and independent in that they were extremely critical of Western interference and proxy-control in the Middle East. However, one of the defining drawbacks of Arab nationalism was an inability to institute lasting democratic transformation within their respective territories in the Arab world. The continuance of European colonialist/mandatory policies in the Middle East, post-World War I also impacted negatively on the hopes and aspirations of Arab nationalists. The creation of the predominantly Jewish state of Israel out of the crucible of the Second World War as a homeland for European and other Jews of the Middle East, Africa and Asia also created a point of conflict with Arab nationalistic aspirations in the region. The presence of the Jewish state which was perceived as a colonialist 'European' implant in the region, encouraged the overt ( and covert) militarisation of the region as both peoples, Jews and Arabs sought to take sides in the post-World War II Cold War to gain the necessary military advantage over each other. Militarisation benefitted the 'new' state of Israel the most as they were able to benefit from a largely well educated 'European' origin population that could well adjust to the usage of Western arms and technology in the region. Israel also benefitted from Western support, first that of France and the UK, and later that of the US in their wars with the neighbouring Arab powers such as Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

Samuel J. Kuruvilla

In fact, the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 and its implications and consequences resulted in the death-knell for Arab nationalism as the pre-eminent 'ruling' ideology of the Middle East. It was Arab nationalism that sought to define Palestinian nationalism as the basis for a new Palestinian identity. The Palestinian national identity was comprehensively defined in the 1988 Independence Declaration which stated that Palestine was,

> An Arab state, an integral and indivisible part of the Arab nation…in heritage and civilisation. It is the state of the Palestinians everywhere where they enjoy their collective national and cultural identity……..under a parliamentary democratic political system which guarantees freedom of religious convictions and non-discrimination in public rights of men or women, on grounds of race, religion, colour or sex.[1]

The Palestine Liberation Organisation's (PLO's) aim was to establish a secular state in the entire present 'land' west of the Jordan, a land where Christians, Jews as well as Muslims would enjoy equal rights and be able to co-exist in peace. Ever since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, there has been a movement in the Middle East that has sought to re-instate Islam as the main idea behind the modern Middle Eastern nation-state. One of the earliest of these organisations in the Levant was that of the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna. He emphasised the link between faith and creation, something that Muslims in general take very seriously indeed. All forms of secularisation and westernisation, particularly on the Turkish Ataturk model, were rejected as inconsistent with the true practice of Islam. There should be no separation between Church and State. Al-Bana revived the emphasis on a world-wide Islamic state or Empire. He stressed the 'international' bond of the Islamic *Ummah* (brotherhood). He exhorted his disciples to be willing to die for the actualisation of the Islamic Empire, thereby giving rise to the whole phenomena of Islamic Jihad. The rise of many independent Arab states after the end of the Second World War also resulted in the rise of Arab nationalistic regimes in many Arab nations.

The subsequent successful attempts by the West to destroy Arab nationalism as a step towards Arab unity resulted again in a rise in Islamism in the Arab world. The post-1967 revival of Islamist attitudes in the light of the Arab defeat of 1967 was also accompanied by a simultaneous emphasis on the modern-day validity of Islamic law or *Sharia* as the 'sine qua non' of Islamic rule in the Muslim world. The prime exponent of this ideology was the Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Qutb. Qutb was a revolutionary in the Arab and Islamic worlds in that he ad-

vocated the *Qu'ran* and the *Sharia* as the sole basis on which modern rule may be maintained in the Arab-Islamic world. It was Qutb's call on the people of the Islamic world to confront and get rid of their individual oppressive and corrupt rulers that caused his ultimate death at the hands of the Egyptian ruler Nasser. Qutb emphasised the importance of the rule of Islamic Law, the *Sharia*. He also produced a reworking of Islamic history while in prison in Egypt, arguing that the secularisation of Egypt meant that it was not an Islamic state, but was still in a state of *Jahiliyya* (religious ignorance), approximately similar to the situation of the Arabs before the advent of Islam.

He was strongly against any kind of individualistic rule, believing in the supremacy of the rule of God through the medium of God's Law. He declared that all problems in the Islamic world were because rulers did not act according to the rule of *Sharia*. Active steps should be taken to overthrow such rulers and the existing political order, in favour of a *Sharia*-based one. Inspired by Qutb's teachings, two groups broke away from the mainstream Brotherhood to form the *Takfir wal-Hijra* and *al-Jihad* organisations, which were committed to achieving the Islamic state by violent and immediate means, thereby forsaking the gradual-ist approach of the parent organisation. These two organisations were together known under the title of *al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya* (the Islamic Groups) and actively resorted to terrorist tactics to achieve the projected Islamic state. Their argument was that these were the only methods to lead from a state of *Jahiliyya* to a society controlled by *Sharia* law and *Shura* (consultation) between the leaders and the people (Sofer 2001: 152-153).

Palestine as an allied territory of Egypt, both largely controlled by the British after the First World War, was particularly susceptible to developments in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood established a Palestine branch rather late in 1946, to-wards the end of the British Mandate. The Brotherhood managed to spread quite fast, with chapters in many Palestinian cities, due to support from the Mufti of Palestine, Haji Amin al-Husseini, who was a close friend and confidante of the Brotherhood's supreme leader Hassan al-Banna. Membership in the Muslim Brotherhood was a common bond that united many of the early leaders in the Palestinian national movement in exile. The Brotherhood was particularly active in Gaza, because of the Egyptian influence there.

Among the early Palestinian resistance leaders drawn to the Brotherhood in the first instance was a 20-year old engineering student in Cairo University called Muhammad 'Abd-al- Ra 'uf al-Qidwa al-Husayni (alias Yasir 'Arafat) and one of the lions of the resistance Khalil al-Wazir (alias Abu Jihad). The Brotherhood had a military wing, in keeping with its ideology listed above and this proved

to be highly attractive as well as beneficial for many Palestinians in exile as well as those in Gaza and the West Bank (Sayigh 1991: 80-81). Later, political Islamic organisations like the Brotherhood managed to get a considerable footing in the Palestinian refugee camps of Transjordan (including the West Bank) in the 1950s. The Brotherhood's emphasis on Jihad against the Israelis and the need for Palestinians to themselves take up arms in defence of their own country, without relying on outside support, struck a sympathetic chord in the hearts of many refugees.

The Brotherhood in Palestine placed an emphasis on sports and scout activities, mock military training, and other such activities. This was based on their experience as a mass-based party in Egypt, whose main support base was among the rural peasantry and urban under-classes. The Brotherhood focused on Arabism and Arab unity, but only as a tool towards a greater Islamic unity. They were opposed to Arab nationalism, as a tool that was used by secularists so as to divide the Arab and non-Arab Islamic worlds. For the Brotherhood, it was anathema to worship the modern nation as a counterpart or even competitor to the attentions of the people, in place of God.

The so-called Islamic Liberation Party was another competitor for the attention of the Palestinian Muslim peasantry, which recognised Islam as the sole basis for statehood and taught that a unified Islamic state must be set up before a jihad against Israel could be launched. Both parties actively sought recruits among police and paramilitary forces in the West Bank and Jordan. Palestinian peasants of Muslim background readily accepted the 'fusion' of Arabism and Islam propagated by these respective political parties (Sayigh 1991: 49). Many of the traditionalist parties of the Arab world and of Palestine were unable to expand their base beyond the relatively restricted group of educated urban dwellers in the cities and towns of Palestine.

One of the reasons for this was the division prevalent in Palestine and throughout the Arab world, between 'educated' urbanites and the rural masses. In addition, many of the Arab nationalist parties had a disproportionate number of Christians in their membership as well as secularised urban elites (Sayigh 1991: 50). Coupled with all this was the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood was the only socio-political organisation that was accepted in Jordan, after the official banning of all political parties in April 1957 (Sayigh 1991: 52).

The 1967 war resulted in discredit to the concept of a trans-national Arab state and gave a fillip to Islamist tendencies among the Arab masses. Coupled with this was the Oil Crisis of 1973-74 that propelled the oil-rich Arab states into the world limelight, with their use of oil as a bargaining tool in the political

and military crises of the early 1970s. The Gulf Kingdoms and Emirates were all conservative Islamic Sheikhdoms where the more austere Islam of the Arabian Desert was in practice. Increased oil-money meant that these states were able to attract hundreds of thousands of Arab and other workers to their countries in search of work, which in turn meant a spread in radical Islamic values through these people further abroad. The same period also saw the Afghan Civil War that resulted in the almost total destruction of that country under first the Soviet occupiers and their local allies and late under the Western and Arab-Islamic backed Mujahidin that resulted in the overt Islamisation of Afghanistan with its consequent spill-over effects in Pakistan and throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds in the 1970s, 80s and 90s of the 20th century.

The 1970s saw the revival in calls for a worldwide Muslim state where the *Sharia* would be the sole determining and controlling factor. There was a revival in grassroots work among Islamist groups and parties in the Palestinian territories and also within the state of Israel, which paved the way for the later formation of parties like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. There was tacit Israeli support for this as Islamists were regarded as a counterweight to the 'secular' Palestinian nationalist forces. The Islamic Revolution in Iran, while inaugurating a professedly *Shi'ite* regime, was an additional boost to the Islamists as they saw how Iran under the clerics managed to devise a completely new theocratic state, that nevertheless had democratic attributes.

The 1980s also witnessed the catastrophic Iran-Iraq war that was again another Cold War-sponsored proxy war that was fought between the then powerful Baa'thist dominated Iraq on the one side and the newly formed Islamic republic of Iran on the other side. The weakening of Arab nationalistic states that took place throughout the 1980s, particularly after the signing of the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, resulted in the Palestinians having to weigh their own options regarding the viability or success of ever establishing a Palestinian state on all of the former territory of the Mandate of Palestine. US and Israeli refusal to acknowledge or talk with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and their voice for independence also played a role in weakening the Palestinian resolve vis-à-vis the state of Israel. The existence of the state of Israel slowly came to be accepted by the Palestinian people and their supporters as a *fait accompli*.

In 1988, the PLO as the premier organisation, embracing many different factions working towards Palestinian liberation, took a public commitment towards accepting the so-called two-state solution as the basis for the resolution of the decades old Israel-Palestine imbroglio. The Islamist parties in Palestine and Israel,

have on the contrary never accepted the reality of the state of Israel on the soil of the 'Holy Land,' made holy, according to them by the purported '*Qibla* of the Prophet Mohammad' (his reputed 'journey' from the 'Temple Mount-Dome of the Rock' precincts to 'heaven,' via the medium of a mythical white horse).

The Palestinian political organisations espousing Islamist views such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, in addition to a number of other organisations currently active (including those with supposed links to *al-Qaeda*) have also rejected the secular orientation of Palestinian national politics and struggle as it has been historically practiced. Hamas spent the entire period of the late 1970s and 1980s building up its social service network in the Occupied Territories and they were particularly well placed to render useful services to the people of Gaza and the West Bank during the First Intifada of 1987-1993. Palestinian Islamists have been widely noted as gaining in influence since the early 1980s.

Hamas (*Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya*) which grew out of the work of the Islamic Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip has always been strong in this region, while the corresponding Islamist militia known as Islamic Jihad has been strong on the West Bank. The founding head of Hamas was the late Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, who was a refugee in Gaza born in undivided Palestine in 1938. Palestine was considered a Muslim land and the Palestinian problem a Muslim problem of concern primarily to the Islamic world. Islamic Jihad too had a similar early development as an off-shoot of Palestinian Islamist activists that had grown close to the Muslim Brotherhood after the comprehensive Arab defeat of 1967. Many of their early cadre had been born in Gaza and were educated in the Strip as well as in Egypt, where they came under the influence of the Brotherhood. The Islamic Revolution in Iran was a major influence on the Palestinian Islamists as they were increasingly disillusioned with the Brotherhood's resistance against organising armed activities against the state of Israel, probably in deference towards the wishes of the Egyptian state against needlessly provoking the Israelis.

The early leaders of Islamic Jihad were influenced by *Shi'ite* Islamist theology coming from Iran, particularly the thought of Ayatollah Khomeini, with its emphasis on rebellion against tyrannical authorities. Islamic Jihad grew throughout the 1980s, thus making it a major influence poised to take an important role in the first Intifada, along with its brother Hamas organisation. Both these groups made extensive reference to the writings of both Hassan al-Banna as well as Sayyid Qutb in their writings.

They also make extensive references to Abd'al-Karim al-Qasim, the great Palestinian leader of the Arab Revolt of the 1930s. References to Qasim as well as Khomeini show the reliance of these groups on Palestinian Nationalism as well as

the Jihadist roots of political Islam. Islamic Jihad, in particular, was disillusioned with the Islamic Brotherhood over their espousal of 'faith' as praxis without Jihad (holy war or struggle), while the PLO took the path of Jihad, without sufficient faith and belief. Both these groups took an essentially philosophical attitude towards the conflict with the Israelis, emphasising the 'essentially unchanging' nature of conflict with the Israelis and seeking the destruction of the Zionist state as a corrupting influence in the heart of the Arab and Islamic world and its substitution with an Islamic state of Palestine. Both these movements drew their membership primarily but not exclusively from the lower middle class populations of Gaza and the West Bank, a population mainly scattered in the numerous refugee camps in the region.

Hamas and Islamic Jihad have focused on the transformation of Palestine into an Islamic society as a preliminary step in the liberation of the whole undivided land of Palestine from the Zionist Jewish forces. The two Islamic groups listed above have always emphasised the interdependence of faith and politics in every aspect of the life of the people of the country (Sayigh 1991: 625-631). Palestinian politics has thus since the late 1970s been increasingly polarised between an upper and educated secularised and Westernised urban class that supported the PLO and other secular Palestinian and Arab Nationalist parties while, the lower classes, made of the large refugee populations, plus the rural residents and the urban 'uneducated' classes largely supported the Islamist parties such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Hamas was the more popular of these two groups having taken the pains to develop a vast social movement and base among the impoverished refugees as well as rural and poor urban Muslims of Palestine. They emphasised a strict following of Islamic guidelines as regarding piety, good familial settings, a sound Islamic based education network and awareness of the need to supersede Israel with an Islamic state. When Hamas was first founded, they emphasised what was termed 'sensory isolation' in Arabic *(al-in 'izal al-shu 'uri)*, as a must for good Muslims to be able to live in a non-Islamic society. By this they were referring to what they saw as a non-Muslim ruled society where Sharia law was not enforced as was the situation in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza in the 1970s.

Against a reflection on their Muslim Brotherhood roots, early Hamas activists sought to get involved in armed actions against Israel using the military-political framework of Fatah (the premier PLO organ). The Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas kept out of direct military confrontations with the state of Israel (and as a result, were encouraged to function and grow by Israeli military commanders in the Occupied Territories, as a non-violent and anti-national counter to the

108

influence of the PLO) till the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987. This was in keeping with the prerogative of the Islamic Brotherhood to keep out of direct military action in the two decades after 1967.

Hamas refused to cooperate with the nationalist leadership of the PLO and the First Uprising, on the grounds that it was focused on creating an Islamic state, and not a secular one, while refusing any kind of compromises with the Israelis. In August 1988, when the organisation openly published its founding charter for the first time, the Hamas Covenant called on all Palestinian Muslims to wage holy war on the state of Israel as the only solution to the Palestinian problem. The founding Charter of Hamas, a document that the organisation has never changed since then or modified in any way, despite widespread demands from Israel and the West, over a proviso calling for the destruction of Israel, confirmed the move-ment as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

It was Islamic Jihad along with a faction within Fatah that professed Islamist leanings that was led by the one-time PLO Planning Centre director as well as Christian-born Munir Shafiq (a close relative of the former Anglican Bishop of Jerusalem, Riah Abu el-Assal) that first started military actions against Israeli tar-gets during the mid-to-late 1980s before the start of the popularly inspired First Intifada. Armed attacks were initiated by the Hamas organisation from August 1988 onwards and though severely suppressed by the Israelis, Hamas was able to survive due to their unprecedented network of social service organisations, based mainly in mosques and Islamic institutions that helped to maintain the momentum and Islamic ideology of the group, even when a majority of Hamas leaders were in jail or exile (Sofer 2001: 161-162).

It should be noted in this context that since March 1993, as a result in the upsurge in suicide-terrorist attacks due to the widespread resistance to the Oslo Accords among Islamist and radical Palestinian circles, Palestinians both Chris-tian and Muslim, from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been prevented from freely entering Jerusalem and the territories of the state of Israel in general, thereby inhibiting the rights of the people to worship freely at their holy sites such as the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Al-Aqsa Temple Mount Com-pound. This in turn has made its impact on the Christians of Palestine, especially in the wake of recent Hamas victories at the 2006 polls in Palestine, both on the West Bank and their own regional powerhouse of Gaza.

Many Christians reported how Hamas operatives visited Churches and Christians institutions before the defining Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, reassuring them that if elected, the radical Islamist party would do nothing that would jeopardise their continued existence, lives and religious and social

rights and status in the Occupied Territories as well as in any future state of Palestine, ruled by the group.

Nationalist Christians did not express any surprise at the victory of Hamas, as the widespread disillusionment with the Palestinian National Authority was very evident in Palestine during this period. The overwhelming consensus was that the democratic decision of the people must be respected. As a respected Palestinian nationalist Christian put it: "I am utterly confident that the Palestinian government headed by Hamas will not distinguish between a Christian and a Muslim. All citizens will be equal before the law and their religious freedoms will be respected as they are respected until now. *Hamas* will cooperate with them for the good of the homeland and the citizens. We are not afraid of those who believe in God, the compassionate, the merciful, but rather we are afraid of all those who wrongly exploit religion, politicise it and interpret it according their interests. This is what is practiced by many religious Jews. I am certain that the prophetic voice of we Christians will not be silent under any Palestinian government. Rather it will remain loud demanding right and justice and criticising falsehood. We will not be silent if injustice is done to anybody be he a Christian or a Muslim. At the same time, we have to cooperate with the authority and to help in building the bridges of religious and cultural dialogue with the Western societies and with the Christians in particular" (Khoury 2006: 183).[2]

The failure of secular nationalist Arab states to build viable and stable societies with responsible democratic frameworks has meant that a large proportion of the people of the region, and especially the vast majority of those who have not progressed materially under these regimes, have suffered disillusionment with these forms of regimes. The corresponding rise of Jewish fundamentalist forces after the 1967 war as well as the rise of Islamic fundamentalism coupled with the collapse of the Soviet Union left many secular or left-leaning Arab Christians in a quandary. After fighting for over 150 years for a separation of 'Church and State,' these people were faced with a novel situation demanding their adjustment to predominantly theocratic regimes in the region in the future. Faced with the Islamist current in the Middle East, with its insistence on combining religion and state so that each complements the other, Arab secularists, Muslims as well as Christians have been faced with a stark choice of assimilation-coexistence and migration from the region (Chesler 2010: 41).

Legislative and presidential elections have been held consecutively since 1996 in Palestine. The first presidential election in 1996 was won by the late former Chairman of the PLO, Yasser Arafat. Following his fall from favour with the West and in particular with America and the state of Israel, the incumbent

President Mahmud Abbas was first elected as Palestinian Prime Minister and later on the untimely death of Arafat, was re-elected as Palestinian President. In 2005, Palestinian municipal elections to various town and area councils were held after a long lapse. The 2006 legislative elections were held on 25 January 2006. For the first time ever in the history of Palestinian democracy, the radical Islamist grouping Hamas won 74 seats out of the 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Assembly that were in the public electoral sphere (Khoury 2006: 174).

Fatah, the main Palestinian Liberation Organisation grouping along with the US and Israel sought to sideline, boycott and deny Hamas its electoral victory in the January 2006 elections and the right to form the next Palestinian government. The resulting clash between the two rival Palestinian factions led to Hamas taking over the Gaza Strip in June 2007. Palestinian internal politics since then has been characterised by a fractured polity, with Hamas's control of the Gaza Strip meaning almost total isolation for the people of the Strip from the outside world, as Israel has enforced a strict blockade of the area from both land as well as sea to put pressure on the radical Islamist grouping, thereby putting the people of the Strip under incredible economic and social hardship and suffering.

Hamas's control over the Gaza Strip and virtually half of the Palestinian political spectrum has also given the Israelis a good excuse to desist from serious or meaningful peace negotiations with the Palestinians on the pretext of not having a suitable partner for peace in the region, Hamas being ideologically committed to the establishment of an Islamic state on all of the historic territories of Palestine, much of which is now the state of Israel. The founding Charter of Hamas mentions that the state of Israel would be eventually destroyed by Islam (Hamas Covenant 1988).

Hamas has never to date formally repudiated this founding Charter of principles that seek to guide the Palestinian Islamic Movement. Hamas and Fatah have periodically sought to bury their differences and come together in a show of unity to form a pan-Palestinian national government of unity, but these efforts have also been stoutly opposed by Israel and also by the US under the pretext of having nothing whatsoever to do with a 'fundamentalist' Islamist grouping such as Hamas. It remains to be seen whether Hamas and Fatah will really be able to cooperate together in forming a national government as being envisaged in the present-future as the two parties have never had a history of collabourating effectively with each other and indeed have only had an experience of intense political and sometimes fratricidal rivalry and conflict.

Hamas' leadership at present appears seriously divided over the post-effects and impact of the ongoing Syrian and Iranian crises in the region. Iran is a serious

backer of both Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The external top leadership of Hamas led by Khaled Meshaal were based in Damascus till recently. However the Civil War-like situation at present in Syria with the Alawite Ba'athist regime of Bashaar al-Assad fighting against a predominantly Sunni-majority Free Syrian Army rebels, with the consequent large-scale deaths and bloodshed that have been going on since the uprising broke out in 2011, has meant that Hamas has had to re-evaluate its ties with the Syrian regime. The Syrian regime is the last old-guard 'republican' socialist Ba'athist regime still surviving in the fertile Levant.

The reconciliation process with Fatah and the PLO is at present deadlocked over multiple procedural tangles and leadership issues. The Hamas leadership that have been internally based in the Gaza strip for many years now under a siege of virtual isolation are almost pathologically suspicious of the 'liberal' views of the secular Fatah movement in the West Bank. On the other hand, they derive considerable encouragement from the upsurge in the fortunes of the Islamist parties in the recent free elections that were held in Tunisia and Egypt. The fall of the last maverick of the old guard Arab nationalist revolutionaries, Colonel Mu'amer Gaddafi in Libya was also another boost in the armpits of the Islamists.

Whatever the current travails vis-à-vis Israel or Fatah in the West Bank, Hamas sees itself as being on the right side of history as regards the its current status in the Arab and wider Islamic worlds. It views the present crises in the Arab and greater Middle Eastern world as being in the nature of a passing 'crisis of existence' that will stabilise with the passage of time. After that, and after waiting with fortitude (Sumud in Arabic) through the present difficulties, the Hamas leadership believe that their view will emerge triumphant in the Palestinian context. However the present internal leadership in the Strip does not believe in making any present compromises with either Israel or the Fatah-led PNA for future gains.

### Notes

1    See 'Palestinian Declaration of Independence,' in *Documents on Palestine* (1997): Volume 1, (Jerusalem: PASSIA), 331-332.
2    Comments recorded by this researcher in conversations and interviews with Palestinian Christians during my July-August 2007 field trip to the region.

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Samuel J. Kuruvilla

# Indian Muslims and the State in Post-Gujarat Predicament
## A Critique of the Crisis of Indian Secularism

M.P. Mujeebu Rehman

**'M**uslim,' in the academic and popular parlance is often treated as a problematic or 'sensitive' category. The discourses centred on the Muslim, the world over, surprisingly share a common perspective that 'he' is a dangerous person to the humanity. Though the mentality of 'the other' was there in the air long before, the publication of Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilization* and the incidence of 9/11 expanded the divide between the Muslims and the rest. It was in the context of 9/11 that the siege mentality came into breed in the Euro–American circles, and 'war on terror' being its essential outcome. The United States' foray into the bloodshed, the embargoes in West Asia and the battle in Afghanistan all contributed to creating an obvious 'the other.' As a result, an interesting characterisation of the Muslim self was found reflected in the official American cultural talk as 'good Muslim' and 'bad Muslim' (Hamdani 2002: 766-775). Those who supported the US in the 'war on terror' were considered to be 'good Muslims' while those who opposed it were 'bad.' And, indeed, it has been the responsibility of a Muslim, as in the case of the protagonist of the film *My name is Khan* and heroin of the Malayalam movie *Anwar,* to prove h-is/er own identity as not a terrorist, or a 'bad' Muslim. Public and private spaces are under strict vigil in order to book the last terrorist. The most unfortunate episode in the drama is that India, a democratic state founded upon strong secular credentials, has been dancing to the tunes of the US and its allies. Incidentally, the Gujarat pogrom occurred in the subsequent year of the attack on the World Trade Centre. If we take the 9/11 incident as a reference point, from then onwards the Muslim citizen has been found to be subjected to state's the surveillance. Any analysis of these developments must be done in the broad frame work of the politics of global capitalism. Current trajectories in Indian politics are usually traced to the watershed period of the late 1980s and early 1990s which witnessed both the neoliberal restructuring of the economy and the emergence and rapid rise of explicitly political organisa-

tions that espoused Hindutva ('Hinduness'), a self-defined ideology of Hindu supremacy and cultural nationalism (Lankala 2006: 86-102). Whatever be the result of the 'war on terror' campaign in the west, the most significant outcome in the political scenario of South Asia was the denunciation of civil rights in the shadow of newly formed Acts and the promotion and propagation of an image of terrorism (Chatterjee 2009: 142). The first part of this paper analyses the representation of Muslim in the nationalist discourses and the second part is in the form of analysis of the concerns of Muslims on the basis of idioms in the post-Gujarat India. The paper seeks to present a hypothesis that the concerns and representations of Indian Muslims have not changed much from the period of partition to the present. Various Acts enunciated in the name of preventing terrorism, fake encounters, prolonged incarceration of the innocent youth without trial, murder of the brilliant investigation officers (who had been instrumental in identifying the real culprits of the aforementioned explosions), nonimplementation of the recommendations of the Sachar Commission and the Ranganath Mishra Commission etc. are visible constituents to come to the conclusion that the secular, multicultural India is in a state of crisis. It is the right occasion to review the crisis of secularism in India as a decade has passed since the Gujarat pogrom let loose by the state/Hindutva project of cultural nationalism.

There is a strong argument that Indian secularism actually breeds communalism: communalism is the supplement to the logic of a secular state which has been shared by Marxists as well. By refusing to accept any responsibility for the sin of sundering the mother country, the secular state 'treats ' communalism as an aberrance, an irrational outburst, a disease, which it must control, if not cure. And belying its professed secularism, the practices of the secular state and its policing of communalism actually engender communalism (Ansari 2001: 9-27). A Muslim in India has therefore to reconstitute him/herself as a critical subject. A Muslim is a critical subject not by virtue of his/her religious concerns but because of the sudden burden of colonial and nationalist policies and practices, that is as the result of political and historical circumstances. Muslims in India are seen as the repositories of irrationality and violence, and this leads to the creation of the siege mentality which forecloses any attempt for a serious and considered engagement with Islam or within Islam. Another argument is that Indian secularism is in decline and the possible alternative being the religious tolerance (Nandy 2010: 321-344).

At independence, India opted for a socialist, secular and democratic system which was never an accident. The ethos of the Indian national movement were certainly a determinant factor here. The leaders of the movement, more signifi-

cantly Gandhiji and Nehru, had understood the multicultural 'wonder that was India,' and according to them no other administrative form than a democratic secular state could be instituted in the postcolonial scenario. And in the realm of secularism, Nehru overshadowed Gandhiji in more than one occasion. As Sunil Khilani writes:

> Nehru was one of the few intellectuals who, through his study of the European historical experience, saw the vital importance of these two lessons: that democracy is the only acceptable standard of political legitimacy for the modern state; and that if this is linked to faith, the consequences will be catastrophic. Most importantly, he was one of the rare Indian intellectuals who had studied not only European but also Indian history: and he was able to relate his reading of European history to his own reasoned understanding of the pattern of Indian history - in particular, to his insight that the distinctive configuration of power and belief or faith which all large scale political entities in India had adopted was one where political power kept a distance from the beliefs of society, and interfered only minimally. (Khilani 2009: 101).

However, the nationalist leaders kept their promise in principle by making the Indian Constitution an inclusive one.

Zoya Hasan's analysis of the relationship between the state and minority communities is significant in this regard. Zoya argues that the constitutional provisions for religious liberty and cultural rights of minorities have proved inadequate in protecting them against discrimination and exclusion. Taking the argument further, she suggests that the state's failure to ensure the socio-economic development of India's minorities is tantamount to discrimination. Her argument is substantiated by the fact that although widespread evidence of the dismally poor socio-economic status of Muslims led the Gopal Singh committee to declare them to be a 'backward community' in India as early as 1983, and government reports do acknowledge the backwardness and deprivation of Muslims, there are very few policies aimed at redressing it (Hasan 2004). Indeed, government policies in economic upliftment of the minorities are conspicuous by their absence. But the practice of Indian democracy proved to be discriminative and exclusive as far as the minorities are concerned.

Post-partition discourses on nationalism in India created a strong sense of 'we' and 'they' between the Muslims who opted to reside in India and the rest of the population. According to Gyanendra Pandey, even the overtly hardcore secular Congress/Socialist men failed to maintain their secular credentials while engaging in either public discourses or in legislative Assembly debates. Pandey challenges the idea that Hindus as the natural heirs of India; if we consider the Hindus as such, there comes the question, which Hindus? Interestingly, the Hindu communalist was having a privilege of being Hindu nationalist. There

M.P. Mujeebu Rehman

were, of course, signs of a growing 'Muslim' nationalism over the same period of Hindu nationalism. However, politically active Muslims were not divided into 'Muslim nationalists' and 'secular nationalists.' They were divided instead into 'nationalist Muslims' and 'Muslims' - and here the proposition extended, of course, to more than just those who were politically involved. The Hindus - or the majority of politically conscious Hindus, for there were in this view many who formed part of a large inert mass, and at least a few who were loyalists - were, in other words, nationalists first and foremost. Whether they were Hindu nationalists or secular nationalists was a subsidiary question (Pandey 1999:608-629). In nationalist discourses, suspicion and hatred grew towards Muslims who decided to remain in India. Pandey takes some instances to show how disastrous and venomous were the implications of those statements.[1] Interestingly, as a reply to which the Muslims had to declare that the members of the community were loyal to the Indian Union and "shall defend it against anybody to the last drop of their blood." That last contention, according to Pandey, had become a password to citizenship, as it were: it is a password that has been demanded of Muslims in India, in one form or another, ever since.

It is a fact that Nehru was disappointed by the words and deeds of his fellow Congressmen. In one of his articulate papers, Mushirul Hassan writes: Nehru was pained to discover that some of his comrades in the nationalist struggle were harassed simply because some distant relative of theirs was in Pakistan. Mohanlal Saxena, Union Minister for Rehabilitation, ordered the sealing of Muslim shops in Delhi and UP. Purshotamdas Tandon, president of the UP Congress, was stridently communal. Govind Ballabh Pant, Chief Minister of the state, had an equally dismal record. He made it known that Muslims would not be employed in government or recruited in police. He discouraged the teaching of Urdu and suspended aid to Urdu-medium schools. Though Nehru inducted Pant into the Central Cabinet in order to contain his anti-Muslim proclivities, the UP Chief Minister and his successors made sure that, "for all practical purposes, the doors of recruitment for minorities for our all-India or State Services, are largely closed." In the Congress itself, as the Prime Minister discovered to his horror, it was difficult for Muslims to secure elective posts. Nehru was agonised. In May 1950, he shared his anguish with his chief ministers, who, more often than not, turned a blind eye to his exhortations (Hasan 1990: 25).

Indeed, they were the people who chose to stay back in the country of their birth. Their decision was prompted by other considerations as well - property, business and family ties. But this was not all. There were still others who were committed to a secular and democratic polity. They were the people who were

neither swept by appeals in the name of Islam nor lured by the prospect of improving their material fortunes in the promised land of plenty. Even those supportive of Jinnah's political initiatives were unable to tear themselves apart from their socio-cultural moorings. Thus Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan and the Nawab of Chhatari, friends of the Nehru and Sapru families, decided to stay in India, for Jinnah's Pakistan, more than anything else, threatened to destroy their cross cultural networks and age-old inter-communal linkages (ibid). When the reality of Pakistan dawned, Jinnah was diffident to cross over to the other side. Like so many men of his generation, he must have been pained to bid adieu to the sacred shrines of Muinuddin Chishti and Nizamuddin Auliya, to the cities of Mir Anis, Ghalib and Mir Taqi Mirto a cultural and intellectual tradition which was rich, composite and dynamic(ibid). Asghar Ali Engineer writes:

> our country saw the tragedy of partition at the time of independence. This partition was also the direct result of a sense of socio-political exclusion and fear of further exclusion in united independent India on the part of Muslim educated elite. The British colonial rule provided opportunities for more education, particularly to the scions of jagirdars; (feudal lords) and it was this educated Muslim elite which headed the partition movement. It is interesting to note that Muslim Ulama who had their roots among poor and illiterate masses never provided any leadership to the partition movement. On the contrary, they vehemently opposed it. The Jami'at-ul-Ulama-i-Hind (JUH) remained a staunch ally of the Indian National Congress and even accepted the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and opposed the two-nation theory of Jinnah. Maulana Husain Ahmed Madani, the then chief of JUH wrote a book *Muttahida Qaumiyyat aur Islam* (Composite Nationalism and Islam) and exposed the fallacies of two nation theory (Engineer 2007: 6).

Engineer's argument is that the socio political exclusion of Muslims was the main cause of the partition of the country.

It is a fact that the partition violence was not the end of the communal polarisation; rather the lessons from history show just the opposite. The examples of pogroms direct us to conclude that each decade after independence witnessed highly hostile and inhuman confrontations in the name of religion. The major bouts of Hindu-Muslim violence in post partition period were in Jabalpur (1961), Bhiwandi, Jalgaon and Malad (1970), Jamshedpur (1979), Moradabad (1980), Jaipur (1990), Ayodhya, Bombay and other Indian cities after the destruction of the Babri mosque by Hindu fundamentalists (1992-93), Gujarat (2002) etc. (there were hundreds of cases of violence in different parts of the country also). The Gujarat violence has shown that it was entirely a unique case of the involvement of the state apparatus, showing overt partiality. That is why scholars are comfortable to call it 'genocide' rather than communal violence. Arvind Rajgopal calls it

'the Gujarat experiment' (Rajgopal 2009: 208-24), as the subsequent gestures of the Sangh Parivar testify to it.

The reports of mayhem, looting, rape, arson and vandalism proved to be conspiratorial and destructive. Instances of burning people alive, tearing of pregnant women's womb etc were unparallel in the history of communal confrontations. Apart from the death toll of approximately 2500 people, the cultural symbols of Muslim community were brutally dismantled throughout the state, ranging from mosques, madrasas to the dargas etc which collectively come 240 in number including a 400 year old mosque and the tomb of Vali Gujarati. Some experts had compared this with the destruction of Bamyan Buddhas or wrecking of Tibet's monasteries by the Red Guards. Hindu gangs have smashed delicate mosque screens, thrown bricks at Persian inscriptions, and set fire to old Korans.[2] According to the National Human Rights Commission(NHRC) report, around 535 religious places of minority communities in around 16 districts had been damaged during the riots. Gujarat, in this sense, can be considered as the landmark in the history of secularism in India, because it was the first state sponsored violence aimed at the ethnic cleansing of Muslim citizens of the country. This was triggered after the Godhra carnage of February 2002 in which 57 VHP Karsevaks returning from Ayodhya by Sabarmati Express were killed. Some official and Peoples' Commissions had raised suspicion about the burning and killing of the karsevaks from outside the train and instead they offered a conclusion that the fire came from inside the compartment while cooking.[3] Interestingly, the foot soldiers of all atrocities were those who belonged to scheduled castes and tribes. There was no discrimination of the victims either rich or poor, layman or professional and even former MP and family was not left free. All the machinery of state remained idle or partial towards Muslims and the scared Muslims were displaced. The anti-climax of the all episodes was the reinstating of Narendra Modi's administration in the election held after eight months of the riot. The reason for the victory of Modi, according to him, was 'the Gujarati pride'(*gaurav*).

If Gujarat can be taken into account as a reference point, the status of India as a secular state is in the waning. A review of the last ten years' experiences in India may reveal the fact that the Indian secularism is in crisis. This section of the paper attempts to examine the various incidents that affected the secular fabric of India since the Gujarat violence. What followed in India after Gujarat for a decade has not been a signal of hope in the practice of secularism. The most important thing is the metamorphosis of the state to a police state, creating an emergency situation throughout the whole country. As a result, any acts disrupting or having remote possibility of which came under the surveillance mechanism

of the State. It was in this context that fake encounter cases were fabricated. Fake encounter cases of Ishrat Jehan and four others, Syed  Sohrabuddin Sheikh and his wife Kausarbi, Jamia students at Batla House etc marked a period of unchallenging power of the Indian state. These were not at all challenged as it was a case of 'nationalism' and 'national security', and, of course, there were some provisions of incarceration without trail in the backdrop of TADA and POTA.  Thus many explosions and violence were manufactured to defame and demoralise the Muslim community in general and youth in particular. More importantly a new trend of Hindutva sponsored explosions also was exposed during the same period. For example, explosions in Malegaon, Samjhauta Express, Mecca Masjid etc. naturally led to the imprisonment of the innocent Muslim youth though the culprits were in the Sangh folder. The ghettoisation is another overt strategy of marginalisation of the community, by which all sorts of rights and benefits of administration are denied. The persuasive role of Indian media in the whole process of creation of 'fundamentalist/terrorist scare' is obvious. Thus the image of Muslim has been equated with a terrorist and the 'enemy within.'

The discourses that followed the Gujarat killings and after testify to the fact that the Indian Muslims are deemed to be 'second citizens.' For example, soon after the Gujarat violence,  Babubhai Rajabhai Patel of the Hindutva outfit Bajrang Dal declared public about the victims of the revolt as "they were Muslims. They had to die. They are dead" (Jha 2006).  The former RSS spokesman MG Vaidya on 27 February 2002 stated that all Muslims may not be terrorists, but most terrorists are Muslims.[4]  The Gujarat Chief minister directed the top policemen "to allow the Hindus to vent their anger on Minorities."[5] K.S. Sudarsan, the then RSS chief "angered women and Muslims by pressing Hindus to have as many children as they can to avoid being swamped by Muslims." Pravin Togadia, Secretary General of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad warned of a "storm ahead which was not going to be limited to Gujarat'' and indicated clearly that its next target would be five States-Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Delhi-where it is gearing up to spread the "Hindutva" ideology... All Hindutva opponents will get the death sentence and we will leave it to the people to carry this out."[6] To Togadia, the enemies of Hindutva included secularists as well. The statements regarding the madrasas and their alleged role in manufacturing and maintaining terrorism in Bengal initiated by the then Chief Minister Budhadeb Bhattacharya also needs special attention.  He stated in a press conference at Calcutta on 24 January 2001: "Certain madrasas, not all madrasas- I repeat, certain madrasas – are involved in anti-national propaganda. We have definite informa-

tion on it. This cannot be allowed" (Chatterjee 2009: 144). Though this generated a heated debate in the political circles, the so-called secularists or leftists share the same views with regard to the State and nationalism per se. The most significant thing is that the war on terror gave legitimacy to any sort of terror hunting than ever before.

The state-sponsored fake encounters and imprisonment without trial were followed by the Gujarat carnage links with the project of ethnic cleansing in India. Ishrat Jehan's case is the first among this series. Ishrat and three others were shot dead on 14 June 2004 alleging Leshkar- e-Toiba terrorists by the anti-terror squad of the state police. Another case was of Sohrabuddin Sheikh and his wife from Andhra Pradesh, who were killed on 26 November 2008 by the police in an encounter allegedly attempted for killing of Chief Minister of Gujarat. Batla House incident was also having the similarity. Four young students of Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi were shot on 19 September 2008 out of which two died for their alleged terrorist links. All these cases were proved to be fabrications by the Supreme Court and other legitimate agencies of national and international authority. A large number of Muslims have been arrested on ill-founded suspicions of terrorism in India, said United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR) Special rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asma Jahangir.[7] The official data of the official human rights watchdog, National Human Rights Commission, has included Batla House encounter among fake encounters in the country. In the last 16 years (1993-2009), there were 1224 fake encounters across the country. The September 2008 Batla House encounter in which two alleged terror suspects were killed was also registered as a fake encounter, the NHRC data say.[8] An associated fact in this regard is the reports of missing youth and detention of innocent youth across the country on the charges of suspected involvement in various explosions.[9] Though the culprits were proved to be the members of the Sangh Parivar, the suspects are still behind bars as under-trials.

Equally important are the cases of explosions and violence that erupted in the country in the post-Gujarat years. As soon as the news of the Mecca Masjid explosion came the search for the perpetrators by the police led to the Muslim pockets. National Investigation Agency (NIA) officials also learnt that the money was paid to Sunil Joshi by Nabakumar Sarkar alias Aseemanand in June 2006 in the presence of Bharat Bhai, who was arrested a few days ago. At a meeting held at the residence of Bharat Bhai at Thakur Ghar in Valsad, Gujarat, Sunil Joshi, Sandeep Dange, Ramji, Lokesh Sharma and one Ashok alias Amith had attended it. "At the meeting, chaired by Aseemanand, they had planned to execute blasts

at various places, especially targeting Muslims, with an intention to create terror among the people."[10] Samjhauta Express blast also put the members of the Muslim community at the shadow of suspicion. Around midnight on 18 February 2007, bombs were set off on the Delhi-Lahore Samjhauta Express, a twice-a-week service. This happened a day before Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri was to arrive in India for talks. The incident occurred near Panipat in Haryana, 80 km north of Delhi. 68 persons were killed, 42 of them Pakistani civilians, besides some Indian citizens, and army jawans guarding the train.   After over three years, the probe was handed over to the National Investigation Agency in the middle of 2010 by the Central government. At that time, there were reports that the Hindu right-wing groups that were involved in the Malegaon and Ajmer blasts were also involved in the Samjhauta Express blast. The Americans had in the meanwhile, in early 2009, identified a Pakistani, Asif Kasmani, of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, as involved in the Samjhauta Express blast, and moved the UN to declare him as an international terrorist. Americans generally do not make such claims easily.

The Anti-Terrorist Squad of Maharashtra led the way in unearthing the complicity of Hindu right wing groups in the Malegaon blast of September 2008, and filed charge sheets against 11 accused, including a serving Army colonel and a Sadhvi, in January 2009. The National Investigation Agency, the Central Bureau of Investigation and the ATS Units from Maharashtra and Rajasthan have been working closely to break open the blast cases.  Malagaon explosion of 29 September 2008 in which seven persons were killed also created havoc. This explosion took place in the communal sensitive district of Malegaon when people were going to a shrine on *Shab e Barat*. The chief perpetrator who was absconding Parveen Matalik was arrested by Maharashtra anti-terrorist squad. The number of arrested persons in this case including Matalik became twelve. Before this, ATS arrested eleven persons in connection with Malegaon explosion including Sadhvi Pragya Thakur, Shrikanth Prasad Purohit and others. Minister for Minority Welfare, Salman Khursheed, admitted that the Muslim youths arrested in connection with Malegaon explosions suffered atrocities.[11] Another report related to a Unani doctor testifies to this statement. For instance, Farog Makhdoomi, a 2006 Malegaon bomb blast suspect, got five-year imprisonment in various Maharashtra jails. The ATS had claimed that Makhdoomi, was one of the prime conspirators. But the ATS claims fell short during the probe after Swami Aseemanand, member of a right-wing outfit, confessed his role in the blasts. The report goes on to state that  Makhdoomi, now 38, was released on bail along with six others. He received RTI answers and references in around 50 lakh pages in the jail.[12]

## Sachar Commission

The report submitted by Justice Rajindra Sachar in the context of the status of the Muslims in India may be worth examing. The Commission attempted to explore the status of the Indian Muslims and submitted several recommentations in the report in 2006. The report shares, among other things, the concerns of the Muslim community in India with regard to identity, security and equity. While discussing the identity related concerns, the Report states: "Muslims carry a double burden of being labelled as "anti-national" and as being "appeased" at the same time (Sachar 2006: 11).  It says that the Muslims live with an inferiority complex as "every bearded man is considered an ISI agent" (Sachar 2006: 14; Basant & Shariff 2010: 3-4) and "whenever any incident occurs Muslim boys are picked up by the police" and fake encounters are common. In fact, people argue that police presence in Muslim localities is more common. Social boycott of Muslims in certain parts of the country has forced them to migrate from places where they lived for centuries. Communal tension or any untoward incident in any part of the country is enough to make Muslims fear of their safety and security. The lackadaisical attitude of the government and the political mileage sought whenever communal riots occur has been on record. The governmental inaction in bringing to book the perpetrators of communal violence has been a sore point. On the other hand, the police, along with the media, overplay the involvement of Muslims in violent activities and underplay the involvement of other groups or organisations. There is an underlying feeling of injustice in the context of compensation to riot victims.[13] In the domain of equity, the Commission shares serious concerns of the community. The Report argues that the perception of discrimination among Muslims is widespread, leading to a sense of alienation, and thus seen by the community as an important cause of inequity. It highlights backwardness in education as the key concern of the community.

Apart from education, employment is other major concern. Low participation in governmental jobs is partly seen as a result of discrimination. The employment situation has deteriorated because globalisation and liberalisation processes appear to have affected Muslim occupations more adversely than others. This coupled with low bargaining power of workers, results in low incomes. Non-availability of credit curtails the ability of the community to improve its economic status; areas with concentration of Muslims are designated as 'red zones' where credit flows are virtually non-existent. Discrimination in implementation of government programmes and in infrastructure provisions adds to the problems in the economic sphere (Basant & Shariff 2010: 3-4). One of the crucial findings of

M.P. Mujeebu Rehman

the Report is shocking. That is with reference to the common practice of missing of Muslim names in the electoral roles in a number of states (Sachar 2006). Apart from ghettoisation[14] of Muslims from mainstream social spheres, the Report delineates the most heinous way of alienation from political spheres, denying them the constitutional safeguards of reservation. A number of Muslim concentration assembly constituencies have been declared as reserved where only SC candidates can contest election. The Muslims are being systematically denied political participation (Sachar 2006). Thus the Report has to be seen in two dimensions; firstly it is a historic report as far as the Indian Muslims are concerned. Secondly, it has succeeded in making public the information regarding the campaigns of the Hindutva brigade and others. The Report of Ranganatha Misra Commission (2007) followed by Sachar also recommended the introduction of forceful measures of affirmative action.

However, what followed after the submission of the report was actually a litmus test for the Indian secularism and democracy. Apart from instituting a ministry for minorities in states, and Maulana Azad Scholarship Scheme, the government used to play political gimmicks in the context of elections. The Government of India showed a lukewarm response towards the reports and as part positive gesture it introduced enhancement of seats in the auspicious educational institutions in the country. Though the additional seats increased by the Central government were not to harm the students from general quota, the initiative was challenged in the court. As a natural course, the court stayed the government measure for the lack of 'sufficient solid data.' When this problem was solved later, the premier institutions played another game to deny entry to the students from backward sections including Muslims, that is the cut off marks of entrance tests was increased. The underlying fact was that the concern of the community that the plight of Indian Muslims cannot be eliminated by overnight was re-established. The ongoing fight against the implementation of the recommendations of Ranganath Mishra Commission also must be seen in connection with this. This raises concern about the future of Indian secularism and democracy.

Another most serious issue with regard to the secular fabric of the Indian state is the Hindutva project of distortion of Indian history in different streams.[15] If one is institutional, the other is in informal ways. By institutional, it means that rewriting of history text books of almost all classes aimed at claiming primacy of the Hindus as the primary citizens of India, giving Hindu culture antiquity of 5000 years and legitimating the Hindu right's administration in India. There was no consultation with the Central Advisory Board of Education, or with established educational bodies or committees of specialists, which had been the

normal procedure in the past. As a result, the old books prepared by the eminent historians of international repute were withdrawn to be rewritten by the non-historians. The Hindutva version of history is expounded by non historians such as engineers, computer specialists and by religious organisations. So there has been little understanding of historical method and the complications in handling source material or theories of historical explanation (Thapar 2009: 191-207). For instance, the date of Rig Veda has now to be taken back to be 3000 BC (as opposed to the general belief of 1500 BC), which is untenable on the existing textual evidence. The same is the case of the Aryan origin, which seeks to maintain the theory that Aryans were the indigenous people, earlier formulated by Dayanand Saraswati and V. D. Savarkar. That is why, they claimed the origin of Aryans in Harappa with discovery of the image of a horse in Harappa (later proved to be a computer distorted image). This reminds the use of archaeology by the Nazis to prove the Aryan origins of the Germans.

The mode of writing and propagation of history by the Sangh Parivar is offensive for more than one reason. The historical narration in those centres goes like this: Jesus Christ wandered the Himalayas and drew his inspiration from Hinduism. A Hindu named Samundra Gupta built the Qutb Minar, originally known as Vishnu Sthambha. The Taj Mahal was really a Hindu Temple known as Tejo-Mahalaya (Shiva's Palace). The Red Fort in Delhi was a Brahmin palace. And the largest holocaust in history was perpetrated by Muslims against Hindus in India. These "historical truths" have been taught for many years at more than 22,000 Vidya Bharati schools operated by the Hindutva movement composed of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) also known as the World Hindu Council, Shiv Sena (Shiva's army) and the Bajrang Dal (brigade of the monkey god).[16] As Romila Thapar observes, the teaching of hindutva version of history takes the form of a kind of catechism, as is evident from the history textbooks used in schools in Gujarat and in the schools run by the RSS, the Sishu Mandirs(Thapar 2009: 203). Surprisingly, no state or central government could take necessary constitutional measures to curb the menace of saffronisation of history and education as well.

## Conclusion

The communal violence in Gujarat in 2002 was not an isolated incident. Considering the historical facts, it was simply one stage of the project of communalisation started ever since the partition itself. However, it was a landmark in the history of secularism in India. It challenged the secular credentials of the state

of India; that the state itself became the sponsor of all atrocities that targeted the Muslims. It is argued that the post-Gujarat scenario in India is bleak as far as the Indian Muslims are concerned. The secular state fails to protect the constitutional privileges of the minorities in India. And, more importantly, the Hindutva version of nationalism is always deemed to be 'accepted' though it challenges the very principles of secularism and democracy. For example, teaching of distorted version of Indian history and culture in the educational institutions under Sangh Parivar has not been a serious issue for the state or central governments to the present. Whenever the state launches some new initiative in the case of the Muslim community, technical and official excuses, court or protests rule the roost. The delay in the implementation of the recommendations of Gopal Singh Commission (1984), Sachar Commission (2006), Ranganath Mishra Commission (2007) etc. invites special attention. The Babari Masjid verdict which came after a prolonged period (after 44 extensions ) was quite challenging as far as the Muslims were concerned; yet they accepted without much ado about it. The denial of civil and human rights simply for being a part of minority community is against all values of Indian secular state; the news regarding thousand of graveyards of unidentified bodies in the military camp in Kashmir is shocking as well as disturbing. The denial of compensation or meagre amount given to the victims of the communal riots (in the case of Gujarat from Rs. 400 to 500 to each family) also shows the failure of the state. It is a fact that the cumulative anguish of the members of the community, especially the educated youth is naturally made use of by some terrorist outfits, having transnational links. The growth of National Development Front (presently FDPI) in Kerala is the most conspicuous example, but proved to be highly dangerous for the community itself. The communal and militant polarisation adversely affects the community and helps to further the alienation from the mainstream. Interestingly, while the political society acts to be so communal or having banal position in terms of secularism, the courageous fights undertaken by members from civil society, legally and politically, are commendable. However, the disruptive activities on the part of the Muslim outfits are by no standards could be justified; in the present-day scenario, it may lead the Indian Muslims further to be secluded.

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## Notes

1    For example, the education minister of UP, Babu Sampurnanand mentioned a lurking fear about the potential loyalties of Muslims in independent India. Durga Das, a young correspondent of the pro-Congress Hindustan Times, went further and de-

M.P. Mujeebu Rehman

manded the building of a strong state by liquidating enemy pockets, and of a strong army on the Nazi model. Govind Ballabh Pant, Congress Chief Minister of UP stated that secular, human sympathies-was driving home the same point. Every Indian Muslim should "realize clearly" what loyalty to the nation would mean if Pakistan invaded India, he declared. "Every Muslim in India would be required to shed his blood fighting the Pakistani hordes, and each one should search his heart now, and decide whether he should migrate to Pakistan or not." Socialist leader Ram Manohar Lohia, (1947) pointedly asked Indian Muslims to "surrender arms and ... be loyal citizens of India, ready to fight, if need be, against Pakistan or any other country." Deputy Prime Minister of India, Vallabhbhai Patel, put it in the Constituent Assembly debate on minority rights, these were the measures that had resulted in "the separation of the country": " Those who want that kind of thing have a place in Pakistan, not here (applause) ... we are laying the foundations of One Nation, and those who choose to divide again [sic] and sow the seeds of disruption will have no place, no quarter here . . . (Hear, hear!). According to Mahavir Tyagi, they [ Muslim] have been separate in every matter for a long time past and in a day you can't switch over from communalism to nationalism. Vallabhbhai Patel on another occasion told the Muslims: "you must change your attitude, adapt your-self to the changed conditions ... don't pretend to say 'Oh, our affection is great for you.' We have seen your affection. Let us forget the affection. Let us face the realities. Ask yourself whether you really want to stand here and cooperate with *us* or you want to play disruptive tactics"... All these statements are explicit examples of the anti-Muslim attitude of the so called nationalists, the replication of general trend as well. All cited in Pandey (1999:608-629).

2   *The Guardian,* 29 April 2002 reports this brutal incident extensively.

3   U.C Banerjee Commission was having this opinion. However, it was discarded later by Shah and Nanavati Commissions and which underlined the role of Muslim mob in the conspiracy and arson.

4   *Anada Bazar Patrika,* 28 March 2003.

5   This was the statement in an affidavit submitted to the Supreme Court by Sanjeev Bhatt IPS, Deputy Commissioner of intelligence in the State Intelligence Bureau.

6   Neena Vyas, *The Hindu,* 28 December 2002.

7   Moinansari, "Persecution & Horrible Mistreatment of Muslims in India-UNCHR," www.rupeenews.com, 22 March 2008.

8   Mumtaz Alam Falahi, "NHRC lists Batla House as fake encounter," 26 March 2010 www. TwoCircles.net.

9   Yogendra Yadav gives a fairly large report on the meeting of several well-known human rights groups, including ANHAD, Foundation for Civil Liberties, INSAF, and the Jamia Teacher's Solidarity Association, held a one-day national-level meet in New Delhi last under the banner 'Tracing Sangh Terror Links and Stories of Innocent Muslim Boys'. A number of top political leaders, including AB Bardhan of the CPI, Sitaram Yerchury of the CPI (M), Ram Vilas Paswan of the Lok Janshakti Party, and senior Congress leader Digvijay Singh, as well as noted journalists and human rights activists from across India testified to the alarming phenomenon of Hindutva terrorism. The representatives from Asamgarh, Gujarat, Mumbai, Delhi, Malegoan, and Hyderabad elaborately discussed the sufferings due to extra judicial powers of the state. One of the participants from Hyderabad told an interesting story that when

he obstructed the police from arresting one 'maulana', the police warned him of "re-peating of Gujarat" (Yadav 2001)

10   Times News Network, 28 November 2011.

11   "The Muslim Youths Arrested, Malegoan Explosion suffered atrocities," see www. rina.in, 2 February 2011.

12   *Times of India*, 26 December 2011.

13   According to Asghar Ali Engineer, the compensation given to the Gujarat riot victims was a laughable amount of Rs.400/- to 500/- each for a family, see *The Hindu,*11 December 2011.

14   "Fearing for their security, Muslims are increasingly resorting to living in ghettos across the country", states the Sachar Report (Sachar 2006: 14).

15   The Indian History Congress had appointed a Commission to examine the distor-tions/ errors and to submit a report (see Habib, Jaiswal and Mukherjee 2003).

16   See "Safronization of Indian History Elicits Deafening silence,"www.ivews.com, 1 December 2003.

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M.P. Mujeebu Rehman

# Multiculturalism in South Korea
## Role of Foreign brides in the Transformation of Korean Identity

Sreejesh N. P.

The modern nation-states are a composition of multicultural identities, kaleidoscope of ethnicities, and innumerable combination of family values and traditions. The drastic changes in the material culture and the subsequent spread of information and communication technologies in the last two decades have given rise to a situation where international migrations are becoming a common experience. However, the cross-border movements of different ethnic identities and their settlement in the monoethnic nations have spontaneously created social complexities and tensions among various groups in different parts of the world. In such a scenario, the changing ethnic and demographic landscape of the world through international marriages demands special attention and exploration within the framework of multiculturalism. Since the beginning of 1990s, South Korean society has been undergoing tremendous diversification of its population with a visible shift of ethnic landscape and homogeneous character, due to the drastic rise in international marriages. A rapid upward trend in the number of cross-border marriages has been observed in Korea since the early 1990s. After 2004 the cross-border marriages were between 11 and 13 per cent of overall registered marriages in Korea. Korea is a single ethnocultural nation with the notion of Koreans as a single ethnic group of pure-blood originated from a common ancestor.

This paper seeks to understand multicultural transformation of Korean identity through two variables such as international marriages and birth of mixed race children. The discourse on multiculturalism in Korea is composed by multiple layers of social function. One the one hand, this study scrutinises the external dynamics such as the force of globalisation, unification Church, and commercial marriage brokers or agencies as a 'push factor' for shaping international marriage between Koreans and foreign brides. On the other hand, the impact of serious internal crisis such as decline of birth rate, increasing trend of death

rate, high sex ratio at birth, and gender imbalance is observed as a 'pull factor' to the promotion of international marriage in Korea. Subsequently, these factors have a role in the transformation of Korean identity. There is not only permanent settlement and cultural presence of divergent ethnic foreign brides, but it also gives birth to the nation's next generation of bi-racial or bi-ethnic children. The rapid transformation of Korean ethnic landscape and social structure raises serious questions on identity and cultural diversity. It also challenges the essentialist logic or definition of their mono-ethnic national identity and citizenship.

## Locating Monoethnic Identity Formation of Koreans

Korea has been considered as one of the few ethnically homogenous nation-states in the world. The construction of the monoethnic identity of Koreans had gone through different paradigms such as traditionalism, modernism, colonialism and globalisation. The historical roots of Korea as a nation are complex when it is analysed at the social, cultural, ethnic and anthropological levels. In the East Asian regional setting, Korea is located in a central part and it shares border with China and Russia and lies just across the sea from Japan. The Korean Peninsula covers area of approximately 220,000 km. Many mythical artifacts, believed to have been used by human beings around 700,000 years ago, were discovered in a cave in Korea. The ethnic origin of national identity can be traced back to legendary founder, Tangun (Gil-sang 2005: 14). According to this legend, Tangun was the offspring of a deity called Hwan-ung who supposedly came to Paektu-san with a band of followers in response to spiritual prayers from a female bear and female tiger and then mated with the bear and after she was transformed into a woman, yielded a son, Tangun. This son of a deity is considered to be the founder of Korea in 2333 BC. The legend around Tangun is very popular in the Korean Peninsula. The domain of Korean academics and nationalists have recognised Tangun as being more acceptable to interpret the complex character of the archeological historiography of Korea. The founder of Gojoseon, Tangun is remembered by Koreans as 'Grandfather Tangun.' Throughout the 5,000 years of Korean history, the legend of Tangun has empowered the people of the Korea to unite and overcome difficult times, and also served as a symbol of Korea's long history and traditions in which Koreans take much pride (ibid: 48).

From the very beginning itself, Koreans shared a sense of nationhood based on blood and ancestry. Scholars like Shin,  Freda and Yi (1999) examine the Korean historiography and argue that "the idea of Korean nation was 'ethinicised' or 'racialised' through a belief in a common prehistoric origin, that inevitably produced a deep sense of collective oneness" (Shin et al. 1999: 469). Choi (2008)

also supports this argument and points out that "the myth of ethnic/national origin and implication of pure blood reinforce the belief that Korea has been and should be like one big family or kinship groups which shares common language, history, culture, life style, tradition, customs as well as political institution" (Choi 2008: 2). The emphasis on shared sense of ethnic national unity was intended to produce strong in-group homogeneity and conformity among the Koreans. Such an (imagined) unity increases expectations for all members to conform to certain shared norms or customs (Shin & Chang 2004: 141). The establishment of the epistemological base on the formation of Korean ethnic identity was strongly asserted by some of the nationalist scholars in the early phase. For instance, Shin (2006), one of the important scholars in the study of Korean ethnicity has quoted Shin Chae-ho, a leading nationalist, who considers Korean history as being ethnic and traces it to the mythical figure Tangun. According to Shin Chae-ho, the Korean people were descendants of Tangun, who merged with Buyo of Manchuria to form the Goguryeo people. This original blend, Shin contended, remained the ethnic or racial core of the Korean nation, a nation preserved through defense and warfare against outside forces. The nation was defined as "an organic body formed out of the spirit of the people…descended through single pure bloodline" (Shin 2006: 1).

Since the 1850s, the transformation of the modern world order and hegemonic expansion of imperial powers had created some tension in the Korean Peninsula. Faced with imperialist encroachments, from both the East (Japan) and West, Koreans developed the notion of a unitary nation to uphold its autonomy and uniqueness. Enhancement of collective consciousness and internal solidarity among Koreans against the external threat was contextually more urgent. At the same time, the Western project of Enlightenment and its ideas like freedom, progress, and rationality had contradictory relations with the Confucian values in the East Asian region. Confucianism was a determined factor to shape social, cultural, economic, and political history of the East Asian region in the early phase. In the philosophical and cultural history of the East Asia, Confucianism has been considered as a dominant way of interpreting the world to legitimate one's own traditional values. Moreover, the formation of Korean's national identity was closely related to imperial domination of Westerners. The resistances of the Koreans against Western civilisation were exemplified by the Eastern Learning (Donghak)[1] movement. The Eastern Learning confronted the Western learning of Catholicism by stimulating anti-imperialist and anti-colonial sentiments among the people. Moreover during the period of Joseon Dynasty, this struggle had strengthened in a visible manner which openly rejected the western notion

of modernisation project. For instance, during Heungseon Daewongun's[2] administration, who acted as a regent during the minor years of King Gojong, Korea's foreign policy was generally categorised as a 'seclusionist policy' (preventing the Western strategic expansion of 'Catholicalism' withholding traditional values).

During the colonial period, which lasted from August 1910 to August 1945, the identity formation of Koreans was strongly shaped by anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle and its sentiments. Under the colonial rule, Korea's national identity was questioned visibly. The long-term objective of the Japanese policy in Korea was complete assimilation of the Korean nation into the Japanese national entity so that, ultimately, Korea could become integral part of the Japanese empire. Shin and Chang (2004) argues that the Japanese assimilation policy was based on colonial racism which claimed that a 'common origin of the Japanese and Korean peoples,' but Japanese were always subordinate to them. They stressed that "Koreans are without a doubt a unitary nation in blood and culture" that has reinforced the homogenous ethnic national identity (Shin & Chang 2004:122). As a result, the project of Japanese cultural assimilation had been injected to resurrect ethnic notion of nationalism among Koreans. As a defense, the Korean nationalists went to assert the greatness of Korea's cultural heritage through a quest for Korea's historical origin (Allen 1990: 791). One of the ultimate powers of the coloniser is to define the terms and representations in which the colonised articulate their own sense of self identity (Schmid 2002: 135).

The term 'culture', which appeared as a central theme, "promoting Korean culture and establishing the foundation of cultural politics," was a concept used by Korean intellectuals to break the colonial epistemological block (Mo 2007:153). In response to colonial racism, Korean nationalists advocated the purity and distinctiveness of the Korean nation or race. They extensively studied and reevaluated Korean history, culture, and heritage to provide a 'scientific' basis for the distinctive origin of the Korean nation. Ultimately, the threat of Japan over Korean cultural identity was very much helpful to raise the significance of Korean ethnic identity in the mainstream debates of a nation and national culture.

In post-colonial times, the process of nation building was mainly determined by the ideological discourse of Communism and Capitalism. From the very beginning of the state formation, the ideologies of communism and capitalism had tried programmes to build distinctive systems at economic, political, and ideological levels. North Korea adopted communist model, at the same time South Korea has a propensity to the capitalist bloc. The legitimation of political system was an important subject for both Koreas at the beginning of the Cold War. The stimulation of civic nationalism through various organisation of state authority

was a difficult mission because the feelings and thoughts of Korean people are closely rooted with ethnic, linguistic and cultural notions. After independence in 1945 and despite peninsular division into North and South, the unity of the Korean ethnic nation or race was largely taken for granted. Neither side disputed the ethnic base of the Korean nation, spanning thousands of years, based on a single bloodline of the great Han race. Instead, both sides contested for the sole representation of the ethnically-homogeneous Korean nation (Shin 2007: 5).

In South Korea, leaders like Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee have extensively used nationalist rhetoric for legitimising the new state formation. Syngman Rhee, the first president of Korea proposed the ideology of 'One People-ism' as the state policy of the new nation. Park Chung-Hee never questioned the fact that Koreans are of 'one race and one people' and constantly stressed Korea's mytho-historical derivation from a common ancestor, Tangun (Hee 1970: 21). Interestingly, the unique nature of monoethnic identity was instrumental to the rise of a 'developmental ethic' for building Korea as a 'developmental state.'[3] The high level of labour productivity of Korean industrial workers has been one of the most important factors in the phenomenal economic development since the mid-1960s (Amsden1989: 4). In fact, for the realisation of rapid industrialisation and the assimilation of individuals into a new work culture, the state actively promoted the values of Korea's historical heritage and ethnic homogeneity. In the 1960s and 1970s, Korea's academia had given emphasis to anthropological studies which studied the structure and function of the village community as a homogeneous unit (Hanhee 2003: 112). The building of national identity of Koreans was a central question within the frame of capitalist ideology. However, Jenelli points out that Korean capitalism was "a unique human creation that is socially constructed and culturally informed" (Janelli 1993: 235). The short nationalist history of Korea between 1980s and 1990s draws attention to some significant turn and twist in national and international politics. Establishment of democracy by the rise of popular movements in 1987 and Korea's deep engagement to the global capitalism was an influential factor in defining the present realities of Korea.

Against the background of these historical facts, Korean ethnic identity and its reproduction of nationalism can be analysed within the framework of Smith's (1986) conception of ethnic revival of nationalism. Smith's idea about nation and nationalism such as the 'ethnic origin of nations and ethno-national revival' has been providing some insights in helping us understand the complexities of an ethnic construction of national identity in modern times. The core argument of Smith's thesis is that nations and nationalism spring up on the basis of pre-exist-

ing ethnie and their ethnocentrisms, but that in order to forge a 'nation' today, it is vital to create and crystallise ethnic components, the lack of which is likely to constitute a serious impediment to nation-building (Smith 1986: 17). As a support to Smith's theorisation on the formation of ethnic national identity, Craig Calhoun argues that myth and symbols of ethnic communities exist in both modern and pre-modern times, and with substantial continuity through history (Calhoun 1993: 227).

Smith's core argument is that pre-modern roots of contemporary nations and nationalism can be traced in the context of Korea where Koreans are still maintaining enormous pride in how their ancestors created an ethnic form of nation-state. We can see this in Korea's roots as an ethnic nation being traced back to Tangun as a legendary founder. Moreover, Smith argues  that nation-building is a historical process where both elements – political and ethnic – operate at varying degrees depending on specific historical and political conditions and for him "every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms... Sometimes civic and territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular components that are emphasised" (Smith 1991: 13). During the Cold War period, the form of Korean nationalism was civic or political, because Korea was seeking to establish their own sovereign states; they needed to attach a certain political criterion of membership to their respective regimes. Since the post-Cold War period, new political developments such as democratisation, globalisation, and absence of ideological rivalry, emergence of new generation, and desire for 'self-sufficiency' are leading to a complex resurrection of ethnic and linguistic notions of nationalism. This complex process has intertwined more or less to shape modern Korean national identity and nationalism. Recently, the emergence of various political movements in Korea has highlighted some elements of ethnic notion of nationalism in the form of Smith's ethnic revival.

## Contextualising International Marriage Migration in Korea

In order to understand the transformation from monoethnic identity of Koreans into multicultural identities, we need to analyse two interrelated variables such as a rapid increase in international marriages and birth of mixed-race children. The immigration of foreign spouses to Korea through international marriages has become an emerging trend in recent years. A rapid upward trend in the number of cross-border marriages has been observed in Korea since the early 1990s. The statistical data by Korea National Statistical Office since 1990 provide more details on the increasing pattern of specific number of marriages (see the table-1

Sreejesh N. P.

for detailed analysis of the increasing pattern of marriage migration). This trend still continued in 2010, when there were 34,235 marriages. After 2004, the cross-border marriages were between 11 and 13 per cent of overall registered marriages in Korea. Interestingly, there were dominant characteristics of the international marriages between multi-ethnic foreign brides with monoethnic Korean men. Same as more or less marriages have taken place in a reverse trend between Korean women and foreign men. Most of these brides came from China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippians, Japan, Russia, and other Asian countries (Wang 2002).

### Table I: International Marriages, 1990-2010

| Year | Total Marriages in Korea | Total Number & Percentage of International Marriages | Foreign Wives | Foreign Husbands |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1990 | 399,312 | 4,710 (1.18) | 619 | 4,091 |
| 1991 | 416,872 | 5,012 (1.20) | 663 | 4,349 |
| 1992 | 419,774 | 5,534 (1.32) | 2,057 | 3,477 |
| 1993 | 402,593 | 6,545 (1.63) | 3,109 | 3,436 |
| 1994 | 393,121 | 6,616 (1.68) | 3,072 | 3,544 |
| 1995 | 398,484 | 13,494 (3.39) | 10,365 | 3,129 |
| 1996 | 433,911 | 15,946 (3.67) | 12,647 | 3,299 |
| 1997 | 388,591 | 12,448 (3.20) | 9,266 | 3,182 |
| 1998 | 375,616 | 12,188 (3.24) | 8,054 | 4,134 |
| 1999 | 362,673 | 10,570 (2.91) | 5,775 | 4,795 |
| 2000 | 332,090 | 11,605 (3.49) | 6,945 | 4,660 |
| 2001 | 318,407 | 14,523 (4.56) | 9,684 | 4,839 |
| 2002 | 304,877 | 15,202 (4.99) | 10,698 | 4,504 |
| 2003 | 302,503 | 24,776 (8.19) | 18,751 | 6,025 |
| 2004 | 308,598 | 34,640 (11.22) | 25,105 | 9,535 |
| 2005 | 314,304 | 42,356 (13.48) | 30,719 | 11,637 |
| 2006 | 330,634 | 38,759 (11.72) | 29,665 | 9,094 |
| 2007 | 343,559 | 37,560 (10.93) | 28,580 | 8,980 |
| 2008 | 327,715 | 36,204 (11.05) | 28,163 | 8,041 |
| 2009 | 309,800 | 33,300 (10.75) | 25,142 | 8,158 |
| 2010 | 326.100 | 34,235 (10.50) | 26,274 | 7,961 |

Source: *Korea National Statistical Office*

Korea has faced sharp shortage of brides in recent years. There are multiple factors playing a significant role in increasing marriage migration which are including economic, political, social, and cultural dimensions. External and internal factors can be identified as key forces, due to the rapid expansion of international marriage in Korea. Externally, globalisation, Unification Church, Commercial Wedding Brokers or Agencies are identified as a determining factors. Internally, Korean society has been undergoing a serious internal crisis by the rapid decline of birth rate, increase of death rate, high sex ratio at birth, and gender imbalance.

Let us first examine the significance of the external factors that shape international marriages in Korea. The era of globalisation is characterised by a compression of time and space. Globalisation refers to the massive social transformations that have occurred over the past few decades which now connect countries, communities and individuals, thereby reducing the significance of geographical boundaries and national identities (Giddens 1990: 64; Harvey 1989: 184; Robertson 1992: 60). Modern transportation, increased human mobility, and the shifting economic and political fortunes of many countries have contributed to this phenomenon of demographic heterogeneity. As global economic disparities widen, men, women and families from poor countries seek to better their lives through migration. A drastic rise in the number of marriages in the international, or transnational context has occurred in the final decades of the twentieth century, reflecting deepening globalisation processes including increasing number of individual working, studying, and traveling abroad. Marriage migration is indeed a part and parcel of 'globalisation from below' (Tseng 2010: 44).

As a developmental state, Korea's deep engagement with globalised world order by promoting the national interest has resulted in Korea becoming a major part of the global capitalism. The logic of globalisation has made a visible impact on the economic, cultural and social structure of Korea. Since 1980s, cross-border migrations of the people between Korea and other countries have become a common phenomenon. A rapid increase of international marriages in Korea had a significant impact of cross-border movements of the people by the force of globalisation. Korea has experienced a rapid increase of foreign visitors and residents since the '1988 Seoul Olympic Games.' This transformation had been strengthened after the 1997 crisis when the state adopted the logic of globalisation. As a result, the presence of foreign brides was more visible in every corner of Korea. The growing trends of international marriage by globalisation bring changes into re-construction of gender identity as it intersects with race, ethnicity, and nationality. With growing marriage migration, Korea, which had long

Sreejesh N. P.

been considered as a racially and ethnically homogeneous country, has become more diverse than before (Kim 2008: 11).

Religious organisation was another important external factor to determine marriage migration into Korea during the early years. These marriages were mainly arranged by the Unification Church[4] which was the Holy Spirit Association for the unification of world Christianity. As part of the religious uplifting, the Unification Church found its mission easier through international marriages. Unification Church organised mass wedding ceremony in Korea between Korean men and foreign brides. The International 'Marriage Blessing Ceremony' is the best known ritual of the Unification Church; the ceremony has welcomed participants from many faiths. Often Unification Church has organised marriages predominantly between Korean men and Asian brides. Japanese women came to Korea to get married to Korean men and also they had Korean education before coming to Korea. Similar is the case of Filipinos who were matched with Koreans through the Unification Church (Kim 2008:3). Therefore, more or less other foreign brides from European countries married Korean men through the supervision of Unification Church.

The significant features of these marriages were generally found in the rural area of Korea. These forms of marriages have been becoming a very common phenomenon among Koreans not only with Asian countries like Japan, Philippians, Vietnam, Russia, Pakistan etc. but also from other Western countries.

The role of Marriage Brokers is a third external factor for running international marriages in Korea. Historically, in Korea arranged marriage system was very common. There were certain privileged classes who used arranged marriage as a major mechanism for maintaing or improving their own class status. These marriages were arranged by the initiative of relatives between men and women. Since 1970s, marriage system has changed with the impact of rapid urbanisation in Korea. Thus the traditional Korean custom of arranged marriage system has been replaced by the brokered marriages. Also these got popular acceptance among Koreans, because they are considered as a continuation of earlier custom. Because of the population explosion and the greater mobility of the Korean masses, marriage brokers have emerged to bring families of like backgrounds together according to a type of Confucian system (Kim 2008: 167).Then a number of licensed and unlicensed commercial marriage brokers or agencies have appeared in the later years. The emergence of the licensed marriages bureau was an indication of the impact of industrial transformation of the Korean society (Hyo-jae 1983: 175). At the same time, most of the unlicensed semiprofessional matchmakers (called Madam Ttu, or Madam Procuress)[5] emerged in urban areas (Cohen 1992: 175).

The first marriage consulting centre in Korea was founded in 1986, and a few others followed soon thereafter (Kim 2011: 79). But in 1999, when the Family Ritual Code regulating marriage ritual was suspended, government licenses were no longer required to engage in commercial matchmaking. Then consulting centres sprung up throughout the country, and their numbers have increased dramatically. *Korea Times*, one leading newspaper in Korea, reported that there were 1,800 matchmaking companies across the nation (*Korea Times* 2011). Often marriage tour programme were arranged by the marriage brokers or agencies. Government-funded and private matchmaking agencies were also noticed in rural and urban areas of Korea (Freeman 2011:18). Currently a number of licensed and unlicensed commercial marriage brokers or agencies are functioning with the partial consent of the government.

Secondly, this study also seeks to show the impact of internal crisis in the rise of international marriage in Korea. Korean society has been undergoing a serious internal crisis, due to the decline of birth rate, increasing trend of death rate, high sex ratio at birth, and gender imbalance in recent years. This visibly has reflected in the demographic structure of Korea. The decline of birth rate is becoming one major internal social challenge to the Korea. The report by the Korea National Statistical Office (2011) indicates that the number of births would decrease from 470,000 in 2010 to 409,000 in 2030 and 285,000 in 2060 (Korea National Statistical Office, *Population Projections for Korea: 2010-2060*). In 2009, the number of children born in Korea was lowest in the world. One the other hand, the number of deaths would increase from 255,000 persons in 2010 to 453,000 persons in 2030 and 751,000 persons in 2060 (ibid). Consequently, these two issues directly affect the demographical structure of Korea. Recently, the lack of large number of working age population was becoming a serious social and economic crisis in Korea. The rapid shrinking pattern of population is identified as a main reason for the absence of working population in Korea. The recent statistics of UN Population Division reported that in order to keep the size of the working age population (15-64 years old) constant at its maximum of 36.6 million in 2020, the Republic of Korea would need a total of 6.4 million immigrants between 2020 and 2050 (United Nations Population Division 2001). In a way, marriage immigrants through international marriage have been considered as a major resource to maintain the shortage of accurate labour force for the coming years in Korea.

Since 1980s, Korea's demographic composition has changed with the impact of high sex ratio at birth (the number of male births per 100 female births). There were increasing trends in the pattern of sex ratio at birth, which subsequently lead to the gender imbalance in Korea. In fact, the sex ratio was 106.4 men per

100 women in 2009, which is expected to reach 112.3 men per 100 women in 2025 (Korea National Statistical Office 2007). The normal sex ratio at birth is around 105, so the number of extra males will increase over the years in Korea. In addition, the sex ratio of men to women in their most 'suitable' years for marriage is considered 26-30 year-old males and 24-28 year old females which is gradually increasing to 118.9 in 2010, 122.3 in 2011 and 2012, 120.0 in 2013 (Korea National Statistical Office 2001). As a Consequence, the gender imbalances directly lead to the accurate shortage of marriageable women. The large shortage of brides has been clearly observed in the marriage system of Korea now a days.

Earlier, the male child preference was a dominant social practice among Koreans. This was the cause for a serious imbalance in sex ratio at birth in favour of males since the late 1980s (Park & Cho 1995: 64).The transformation of society through urbanisation and modernisation reproduced the notion of a model family to be arranged as a nuclear family by restricting the birth of female. There are number of reasons which can be attributed to the practice of son preference as a social order in Korea. In the ancient history of Korea, the practices of the son preference were very dominant in the traditional family value system. Most of the historical documents, proverbs, folklore and taboos show the existence of a strong preference for sons in Korea (Lee 1973: 218; Kim 1969: 374). The strong son preference was more related to the traditional social system, particularly the kinship institution and related normative culture, which was deeply rooted in Neo-Confucian philosophy (Kwon & Lee 1976: 1). Understanding the rationale behind sex preference is a key to deciphering the dynamics of the sex ratio in Asia what Miller calls 'patriarchal demographics' (Miller 2001: 1086). The cultural past of Korea was deeply influenced by the patriarchal order of the Confucian norms and values.

The use of technology in a pessimistic manner has been observed as a major reason in the present gender imbalances of Asia. In Korea, sex-selective abortions were reported many times as a major or minor case. Often these unethical social practices got a wider consensus among the urban section of the society. There are various reasons which legitimatise the practice of sex-selective abortion in Korea. At the individual and family level, a son is often preferred as an 'asset' since he can earn and support the family; a daughter is a 'liability' since she will be married off to another family, and so will not contribute financially to her parents. This is rooted in the notion of son-selective reproductive behaviour (Kim 1997: 20) among Koreans. These factors provide plausible explanations to the responsible sex-selective abortion. Sex-selective abortions seem to have played an increasing role in some countries experiencing 'missing women,' most notably

Sreejesh N. P.

China, South Korea, and recently also India (Banister & Coale 1994; Park & Cho 1995; Croll 2000). As a consequence, sex-selective abortions have been directly resulted in the shortage of females in Korea. Even though there are restrictive laws in Korea, sex-selective abortions are reported as a hidden social practice.

In fact, these external and internal factors are playing a role in the rapid expansion of international marriages in Korea. Since the 1990s, the rapid increasing trends of international marriages has restructured the conventional notion of marriage system in Korea. This has become visible with the large presence of foreign brides in every corner of Korea. Against the background of these external and internal factors, we can observe its function in the rapid rise of international marriages in Korea. One the one hand, the globalisation, Unification Church, and Commercial Marriage Brokers or Agencies are functioning as a 'push factor' for shaping international marriages between Korean men and foreign brides. On the other hand, the impact of some serious internal crisis such as decline of birth rate, increasing trend of death rate, high sex ratio at birth, and gender imbalance are a 'pull factor' to the promotion of international marriage in Korea. Today's striking imbalance between number of boys and girls in Korea means there will be corresponding mismatch between prospective husbands and brides. The boom of international marriage is claimed as a tool for Korea to solve the problems of the shortage of potential brides. Interestingly, there are a large number of Korean bachelors searching for brides in the poorer corners of China, Southeast Asia and Central Asia (Kim 2009: 287). At the same time, these international marriages are becoming very complex, because the presence of multi-ethnic foreign brides has made deep cultural impact on Korea's homogeneous society. Now various research data and government documents have reported that the number of foreign brides will significantly rise in Korea over the next decade or so.

## Role Foreign Brides in the Transformation of Korean Identity

The rise in international marriages has helped the country move closer to becoming a multiracial society. The large presence of foreign brides in Korean society gives birth to nation's next generation in the name of bi-racial or bi-ethnic children. The growing number of the birth of mixed-race children has strengthened the transformation of monoethnic Korean identity into the multi-ethnic identities which has been observed as a serious concern in the ongoing debates on multiculturalism in Korea. Now a days, the term mixed-blood is becoming very popular in Korea which is used to identify the multi-ethnic origin of people who live in Korea; therefore in their parents one person might be a foreign national. It became the subject of wider discussion when the arrival of Hines Ward to

Korea, who was an American football player and got the Most Valuable Player award for 2006. His father was an African-American and mother was of Korean origin. The mass media in Korea publically celebrated Hines Ward as a national superstar of Korea with statement of him that he would dedicate the award to his Korean mother. But later in one interview, he made serious criticisms against Korea, saying that, "when Hines was in high school, there was an inter-school friendship match for the Korean students. Since he was good at baseball, a school invited him to play. But, after the game, when the kids went out to eat, the person who put together the event only took the Korean kids, leaving Hines behind" (The Chosun Ilbo 2006). The Koreans had mistakenly denied the past to him without giving proper recognition of his identity.

In fact, Hines issues opened wider debates on recognition and representation of mixed-blood children to the homogenous Korean society. Professor Hiwon Yoon from Seoul National University said that "before, the view on the half-Korean was very bad. The half-Korean was associated with low class and low status. But this is changing" (Mehlsen 2010:1). Moreover, Hines phenomenon is rooted to end discrimination toward people from 'mixed blood' and it became a topic for consideration, including a proposal to revise the language in Korean school textbooks that teach the myth of Korean racial purity and the relationship between 'purity of blood' and patriotism in civil ethics, history, and other disciplines (Lee 2008: 57).

Even estimation of projection about the number of mixed race children differs, though it stands at around 50,000 as of the end of 2006. The Ministry of Gender, Equality and Family has said that the "number of interracial children has risen from 44,258 in 2007 to 121,935 in 2010" (The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family 2010). Most of the recent research data and government report indicate that increasing trend of international marriages has also resulted in some statistical observation that by 2020, there will be 2 million mixed-race births.

The growing number of bi-racial or bi-ethnic children from the 'international marriages' directly adds ethnic diversity in Korea. Among the offspring of inter-racial and inter-ethnic unions, the most numerous are bi-ethnic children (offspring of Korean individuals and persons of other Asian heritage). They are called 'Kosians', with the prefix 'Ko' deriving from 'Korean' and the suffix 'sians' from the term 'Asian'(Kim 2009: 85). Since 2004, the word went into wide usage after a certain popular media used it during a special feature on international marriages in the Korean countryside. While the term might suggest children produced by marriages between Koreans and individuals of any other Asian or ethnicity, in fact, the term is generally used to refer only to children produced by

Sreejesh N. P.

marriages between Korean nationals and nationals as the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Pakistan. According to the INGO Pearl S Buck International, by 2020, the government predicts that some 33% or 1.7 million of all babies born in Korea will be 'Kosians' (Lynn 2007: 89).

In a way, 'migration through marriage' suggests that there is a sense of openness within Korean society that men and women could build social organisation such as family regardless of nationality, ethnicity, and region. The rapid increase in the number of migrant women in recent years has initiated a new type of family known as the 'multicultural family' (Mee 2007: 100). The word 'multicultural family' first appeared in government documents at the suggestion of an NGO. In 2003, Hifamily, a family centred activist organisation, submitted a petition to the National Human Rights Commission saying that the use of the word 'mixed blood' was a human rights violation, and sought to replace the term with 'the second generation of a multicultural family.' Since 2005, migrant women have been at the centre of the Korean government's attention, and hence started using the word 'multicultural family.'

The transformation of the ethnic landscape in Korea is visible with the presence of various cultural communities as a reflection of international marriages. Korea is in the beginning stage of becoming a multicultural society. Almost "two million foreigners now reside in the country, including women who have married Koreans, international students and businessmen...changing the cultural orientation of Korean's long prised ethnic and cultural homogeneity"(Hwang 2011:1).With the deep filed survey about the rapid changing demographical order of Seoul city, Kim and Kang (2007) have identified the living patterns of various communities such as foreigners living in residential communities, cultural communities, and commercial communities. In their conclusion, they locate 'Seoul as an ethnic village' with the presence of various foreign cultural communities such as Indian community known as 'AnaPurna' which is a small friendship association mostly composed of women and families of embassy staff (Kim & Kang 2007: 75).

The complex social transformations that have taken place in the ethnic landscape of Korea have created a lot of challenges to the dominant ideologies of nationalism, homogeneity, ethnic homogeneity and citizenship and so on. (Belanger et al. 2010:1109). The increasing ethnic diversity has naturally spawned the rise of the concept of multicultural society and multiculturalism as an important key word describing contemporary Korea. Although these terms are being frequently referred in the media and the academia, they are often misused and misunderstood, as they are used indiscriminately and interchangeably. Kore-

ans have had to address the rapidly changing ethnic composition and the future of the nation's identity, cultural mores, and politics. Some scholars rhetorically question the legitimacy of the Korean historiography. For instance, in his extensive archeological study, Kyung-Koo (2007) critically evaluates that "Tangun was not perceived as the symbol of the blood ties of the Korean people, but as the founder of the nation: his importance lay only in his having been a political leader, not a biological progenitor." And also upholds the role of Gija to shape Korea as a civilised nation and criticise the Tangun only as founder of the nation (Kyung-Koo 2007: 12).Thus Korean academia is more focused in giving the conceptual and theoretical explanation for understanding this social phenomenon by emphasising on social and cultural identity of Koreans.

Multicultural transformation in Korea has become a major discourse in the circle of civil society organisations. Various civil society organisations critically evaluating multiculturalism in Korea often have been limited to the state-sponsored multiculturalism. It needs to be reconsidered. The central concern of entire criticisms is the emerging trends of multiculturalism. The state always considered multiculturalism only instrumentally and provisionally so as to overcome the internal structural crisis of the society. Yoon (2008) classifies two forms of multiculturalism in Korea, that state-led multiculturalism and citizen-led multiculturalism. The state-led multiculturalism represents government policies and citizen-led multiculturalism is mainly propelled by civil society movements (Yoon et al. 2008: 3).The economic consideration of state policies had been questioned by civil society organisations. For instance, in 1994 there was public demonstration under the banner of Citizens' Coalition of Economic Justice (CCEJ) one of the most influential NGOs in Korea (Lim 2010: 58). The drastic changes in demographic composition and the concomitant inflow of international marriages reflect how the nation is fast becoming a multicultural and multiethnic society and importantly it also indicates that accepting ethnic diversity has become inevitable in a society.

## Conclusion

This paper argues that the contemporary multicultural discourses provide some crucial insights in terms of  explaining  the transformation of the Korean mono-ethnic social structure and it is essential to understand the nature of the diverse players and their involvements in promoting multicultural communities. These arguments are reasonably put forward with the emphasis on the contemporary social realities and changes in Korean social structure. External and internal factors have been observed as a determined force in the transformation of Korean

society into a multicultural form. Externally, the force of globalisation has redefined the scope of social and cultural interactions among nations and societies through international marriages in Korea. And also the Unification Church and Marriage Brokers are identified as key external players to strengthen multicultural marriages in Korea. At the same time, high sex ratio at birth, low birth rate, increasing trend of death rate lead to gender imbalance in Korea. Subsequently these issues seriously affect the internal structure of Korean society. Ultimately, these changes pave the way for shaping international marriages in Korea.

Korea has a tremendous prospect for building a 'healthy multicultural society.' The government and its people have the responsibility not only to accept the reality of increasing social heterogeneity, but also to embrace a new multicultural vision. However, this will not be easy for the Koreans due to their sense of national identity which has deep historical roots in their belief in the oneness of blood and culture. In fact, the current situation of Korea's multiculturalism and multi-ethnic transformation must be regarded as an urgent social reality. In the 1970s and 1980s, debates on multiculturalism was mainly dominated by two major schools of thoughts of 'liberals' and 'communitarians' (individualists and collectivists). Among the various theoretical debates, Kymlicka's conception of multiculturalism can provide an adequate theoretical framework for understanding the complex character of multicultural realities in the present globalised world. He identifies the existence of the multilayer of minorities (national minorities, immigrant groups, isolationist ethno religious groups, metics etc,) and argues for the preservation of their rights, equality, and justice in fair terms (Kymlicka 2002: 354). Theoretical insights from Will Kymlicka will help us to explain how and why the representation and recognition of multi-ethnic foreign brides and mixed-blood children is an immediate task in the monoethnic social structure of Korea. Kymlicka argues that throughout the world immigrants demand a more tolerant or 'multicultural approach' from the states to maintain various aspects of their identity like religion, language, cultural practices, and ethnic heritages, etc (Kymlicka 2002).

As a major player, the state needs to promote multicultural policies that are inevitable for avoiding social tension between multi-ethnic identities and mono-ethnic identities in Korea. The Korean nationhood was defined ethnically where the state exclusively defines the nature of its national identity and citizenship on the basis of geographical origin, ethnicity, language, and culture. Therefore the state should reconsider the conformist definition of national identity and citizenship in light of emerging social complexities, for the reason that the ethnic definition of citizenship of Koreans was a product of a particular historical period.

Apart from this, it is necessary to spread the idea that we should accept diverse cultures of foreign settlers in Korea and expand our capacity to effectively respond to globalisation in multiple ways. Moreover, the vibrant public sphere of Korea including civil society and NGOs has been campaigning for the rights, justice, equality, and recognition of foreigners as minority communities in the dominant monoethnic social structure of Korea. In short, the contemporary social transformation in Korea demands more openness and attention from the part of academics and policy makers who cherish the values and ideals of multiculturalism.

## Notes

1.  Korean Peninsula had witnessed number of anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist movements in the end of the nineteenth century. Tonghak (literally means Eastern Learning) was one of the significant movements in the cultural and social history of Korea. It appeared in the 1860s as a new Korean indigenous religion which founded by Ch'oe (1824-1864). In Korea, Catholicism was considered as Sohak (western learning), therefore the new religion titled Tonghak (eastern learning) which sought to build alternative to the Korean by introducing new mode of spirituality. It was a combined form of such aspects as the meditation of Buddhism, ethics of Confucianism, primal nature of Shamanism, Taoism cultivation of energy and the personal God of Catholicism to oppose 'Western Learning' (Catholicism) arose from the indignation of the lower classes of  yangban (ruling aristocratic class) oppression and foreign influence in Korea, especially Christian missionaries. It was not only a religious movement but a social movement as well and concerned with the peasantry and the improvement of their conditions and reform of the corrupt government. The idea of the dignity and equality of all men was to influence future democratic movements. Many scholars have observed historical significance of this movement. I-sop Hong has observed, which resulted in awakening the Korean people to the necessity of strengthening their racial unity (I-sop1966: 15). Another important argument put forward by Chong-sik Lee is that, the Tonghak, "a religion which 'carried a seed of nationalism', emerged in the early 1860s and gained momentum in the early 1890s, as Korea's existence was threatened by alien powers. Indeed, the Tonghak movement became a milestone in the history of Korean nationalism, as it was the first large-scale mass movement of the commoners" (Lee 1965: 22).

2.  During the mid 1860s, the global polity was in shadow of Western imperialist system and power struggles. In the case of Korea, Heungseon Daewongun's administration adopted more critical polices to defend penetration of the foreigners into Korea by asserting national identity. These policies directly opposed to the western powers such as French and US domination. The idea of these entire policies had based on the isolation from the outside powers to articulate own alternative administration. For considering the protection of Koreans, he stated that "Foreign barbarians have invaded our country. If we do not fight, we must make peace with them. If we make peace with them, it would lead us to the selling of the country. Let our posterity be warned of this for ten thousands of years" (cited from Nahm 1983: 20).

3.  The rapid industrialisation and economic growth of Korea got attention of the world and the realm of economic research. See for details, A. Amsden (1989), "Asia's Next Giant: South Korean and Late Industrialisation." G. White (1988), "Developmental State in East Asia." H.J Kwon (2002), "Welfare Reform and Future Challenges in the Republic of Korea: Beyond the Developmental Welfare State", which discuss following the economic crisis of 1997, Korea has moved from welfare developmentalism to extending the coverage of its National Pension Programme to the whole population and has strengthened its financial sustainability and accountability. Reforms to enhance the efficiency of the National Health Insurance Programmes have also been carried out, although here financial sustainability remains a challenge. Yi and Lee (2003) "Changing Developmental Characteristics in the Korean Labour Market Policies" this was deeply intertwined with the rapid expansion of the developmental ethics among Koreans.

4.  The Unification Church was founded in 1954 by Moon Sun Myung .It was formally established in Seoul as the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, reflecting Moon's original vision of an ecumenical movement. The doctrine of the church is explained in the book Divine Principle, which draws from the Bible as well as from Asian traditions. In the 1990s, Moon began to establish various peace organizations, since then the official name has been the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (FFWPU). Now the members of the Unification Church are found in fifty countries. In Korea, members are estimated to be from 250,000 to three million. Since 1960, the mass wedding ceremony is arranged by unification of church which has become very popular in Korea. The characteristics of the marriages are different nationalities or between different races with different skin colors, transcending ethnic backgrounds. Now days the activities of the unification of church is becoming very popular among the Koreans.

5.  Madame Ttu (Madame Procuress), women who claim huge fees for matching the sons and daughters of the wealthy and powerful. The name Madame Ttu or 'Madame Procuress,' came into popular usage through the apt and outrageous characterisation of a professional matchmaker in Park Wanso's novel of the contemporary matrimony, Staggering Afternoon (Laurel Kendall 1996:135), "the Resurrection of Madame Ttu (Hanguk Ilbo, 26 February 1984). Basically, this is considered as an unlicensed and unauthorized marriage agency in Korea. After the death of one Vietnamese bride (Hoang Thi Nam) in 2010, Madame Ttu also came under the regulation of government. These matchmakers mostly arranged marriages between children of the newly rich and privileged. Now a days it is very popular among the Koreans.

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Sreejesh N. P.

# India-China Relations: The Tibetan Roots

Joseph Antony

**T**he popular perception regarding the Sino-Indian relations has been stereotypically riveted around the unresolved border problem. India has been concentrating all its energy in the resolution of the border dispute for the last several decades. But an amicable solution still eludes. In this situation, one of the cardinal problems which had critically defined the Chinese perception on India is found missing. It is the Tibetan question. It was, in fact, the Tibetan question which sharpened the ideology-based Chinese foreign policy vis-a-vis India. The first decade of Sino-Indian relations was marked mainly by their interaction on Tibet. A permanent and peaceful relation between the two countries and their emerging neighbours will be challenging as long as the Tibetan question persists. China and India can solve the border question bilaterally. But the Tibetan problem is trilateral and, to some extent, multilateral. This makes the Tibetan question more complex.

The presence of the Dalai Lama and his 120,000 followers in India still haunts the Chinese national psyche. A statement or a foreign visit of Dalai Lama is enough to create some ripples in Sino-Indian relations. The self immolations by the Tibetans in India and Tibet also are considered by China as the handiwork of Dharmasala. Whenever a Chinese leader visits India, Tibetan exiles are creating some heartburn to them. Similarly, during the run up to the Beijing Olympics 2008, the Tibetans utilised the relay of Olympic torch around the world to highlight their grievances to the world community. The Chinese administration reacted sharply to it. The world leaders called on the Chinese authorities to exercise restraint and to talk to the Dalai Lama. But "China responded with a flood of propaganda denouncing the Dalai Lama and blaming him for having instigated the riots. China's evidence for this was some protests against the Beijing Olympics in India and other countries. One such event, a quixotic "March on Tibet," organised by Tibetans in India, had been given the rather provocative name, "Tibetan People's Uprising Movement," and was therefore cited by the Chinese as irrefutable evidence of the "Dalai clique's" involvement" (Smith Jr. 2010: 4).

Joseph Antony

## Tibet Exiles: Indian Stand

The Tibetans living in India also are not happy with New Delhi's attitude towards Tibetan problems vis-à-vis China. Dhondup Dorjee, the ex Vice-President of the Tibetan Youth Congress stated:

> It is high time that India takes a stand on Tibet… If India is aspiring for a UN Security Council permanent membership, it should also take greater responsibility on the issues of human rights and not shy away from confronting these concerns… We are especially concerned as no other country besides India provides for a permanent refugee status, and in fact under the Indian constitution several of the Tibetans living in India are today eligible for Indian citizenship. Tibet shares a more spiritual relationship with India and we expect the Indian government to put forward our cause in front of the Chinese premier, which has not happened so far (Singh 2011: 2).

The Tibetan question was the first touchstone which tested the depth of the age-old friendship of India and China. The bilateral engagement between the two countries regarding Tibet presents a sad story. In fact, Tibet holds the record of breaking the age-old friendship of the neighbours, not the boundary. The dispute over boundary is the expansion of the Tibetan question. So it is high time we have a relook at the Tibet problem and how 'the roof of the world' demolished the peace of two nations. This article is an attempt to survey the events which led to permanent animosity between two great civilisations. It examines the Tibetan problem from the Chinese perception, more specifically from 1949 to 1959, during which the Tibetan question defined the Sino-Indian relations.

## Chiang Kai-shek Government on Tibet

The Tibet policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has a historical and ideological context. The pre-revolutionary governments also were particular about the recovery of all its traditional provinces. For instance, the nationalist leader Chiang Kaishek had stated categorically that "Formosa (Taiwan), the Pescadores, the four north eastern provinces, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet are each a fortress essential for the nation's defence and security. The separation of any of these regions from the rest of the country means the disruption of our national defences" (Kaishek 1947: 36). After the attainment of independence to India, the Nationalist Government in China sent several protest notes to it against the administrative control over farthermost hilly tracts of Assam. China had also attempted to demonstrate its claim over Tibet which was supposed to include large tracts of land lying on the southern side of Mcmahon Line (Mullik 1971: 59). Chiang Kaishek also protested to India in inviting representatives of Tibet for the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi in 1947(Li 1956: 198).  One of

the last acts of the Chinese Nationalist Ambassador in India was to remind the Indian Government that China did not recognise the McMahon Line and the Simla Convention of 1913-14 (India 1961).

## Chinese Communist Party on Tibet

The Communist Party of China (CPC) was also of the same opinion with regard to Tibet (Sengupta 1988:138). It stated that "there is little difference between the territorial perspectives of SunYatsen, Chiang Kaishek and Mao Zedong. From 1931 onwards, Tibet had been a favourite theme of the CPC. During that year, the Constitution of Chinese Soviet Republic, drawn up under Mao Zedong, included Tibetans along with other national minorities to enjoy the full rights of self-determination (Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank 1952: 223-224). The CPC also took note of the participation of Tibet in the Asian Relations Conference. An article published in its *People's Daily* (1947) in April 1947 stated: "as part of the imperialist plot, the "Snow Mountains and Lions," the religious pennant of Tibetan Buddhism, was displayed at the conference as the national flag of Tibet among the flags of other Asian nations. The more shameless act was that on a map of Asia displayed at the Conference, Tibet was drawn outside the boundaries of China in an attempt to make the 'independence' of Tibet an accomplished fact.

The CPC leadership was also watching carefully the moves of the new Government under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru. Certain actions by Nehru also cemented their emerging perception regarding Indian (and Nehru's) attitude towards Tibet as well as China. On the basis of it, the CPC assumed that Nehru would follow the same policies of the British imperialists. *People's Daily* commented: "the retaining of Mr Richardson's services demonstrated the collaboration of Nehru's reactionary government with British imperialism" (Woodman 1969: 215-216). The Chinese Communist leadership was worried about the imperialist machinations in Tibet and the Indian support to it. An article in another Chinese journal *World Culture* (1949), said: "today, British imperialism has become a hireling of American imperialism, and India is in effect in the control of American imperialism…British imperialism and its running dog India, through their officially controlled publications, have declared in unison that Tibet never acknowledged China's suzerainty over it, and that Britain never acknowledged China's claim that Tibet is a part of China."

China believed that, after the downfall of Chiang Kaishek, the US was turning towards Nehru. The Communist Party in another article stated that "they (the imperialists) hope to use India as their Asian base to resist the new democracies of Asia. Tibet is the natural barrier to India. They have earmarked Tibet, like

Taiwan, as part of their defence system. To preserve their rule over India, they must control Tibet. This is the real purpose of imperialism" (CPC 1949).

## Liberation of Tibet

After the liberation of China, it feared an imperialist plot to destabilise the unity of the nation. The Taiwan episode had prompted them to think in that direction. They feared that the next objective of the imperialist clique would be Tibet. Meanwhile, Communist China had bracketed India also in the imperialist group. The Chinese ambition to consolidate the lost territories and their apprehensions about imperialist tactics of torpedoing these objectives made them more aggressive towards the 'imperialists.' As a result, by using the thesis of "lean to one side," China easily identified India as the "errand boy" in "the side of imperialism." A broadcast of Peking Radio on 13 May 1950 stated: "the American government and the reactionary clique of Indian government are now conspiring an imperialistic expansion into a territory under the authority of the Chinese government – namely the province of Tibet" (*People's China* 1950). These threat perceptions had prompted the leaders of China to embark on the liberation of Tibet as the first priority of the PRC. Therefore, they entrusted the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to implement their strategy of the liberation of Tibet.

Neville Maxwell also stated the objective of Chinese leaders regarding the liberation of Tibet: "The reassertion of central authority in Tibet at the earliest possible moment had been the repeatedly affirmed intention of the Chinese communists as it had been of the Nationalists; and almost as soon as the PRC was established, it was announced in Peking that the army would shortly be marching into Tibet" (Maxwell 1971:70).

From the very first moment on the liberation of China, its new leaders are determined to liberate Tibet also. The provisions included in the Common Programme and the declarations of top leaders of China prepared the ground for the liberation of Tibet. They considered the Tibetan problem as an internal affair of China and the liberation of which was an immediate task to be completed. On 6 June, Mao stated: "What is our general policy at present? It is to eliminate the remnant Guomindang forces, the secret agents and bandits, overthrow the landlord class, liberate Taiwan and Tibet and fight imperialism to the end" (Mao Zedong 1975: 27).

In 1950 itself, within days of India recognising the new government of PRC, Marshal Zhu De, Vice Chairman of the PRC, announced that "liberation of Tibet" was on the cards (Jain 1996: 2). Peking Radio on 22 May relayed an appeal to the Tibetan Government and people asking them not to count on British or American

aid and not to be "misled by slanders of the British and American imperialist bloc aimed at sowing the discord against Chinese Nationalists" (Sen 1960: 18). The broadcast ended with a call to the Tibetan government to send plenipotentiaries to China "to conduct peace talks" in order to save "the Tibetan people from unnecessary losses" (ibid). On 5 August 1950, New China News Agency (NCNA) released a statement of Gen. Liu Po-chen, South-West China Military Affairs Commission, declaring that the PLA would soon enter Tibet to liberate it from the "aggressive influence and American imperialism." By promising "regional self-government and freedom of religion" to the Tibetans, it demanded the incorporation of Tibetan army in the "national defence forces of the Chinese People's Republic" (ibid).

## Chinese Suspicion on India

Another incident also increased the Chinese apprehensions at the Indian intentions regarding Tibet. This had also provoked an angry statement in the *People's Daily* (1950). It made a scathing attack on India and accused it of being a party to international plot against Tibet and China:

> The Nehru Government cannot deny that it has sent men to Lhasa. *The New York Times* reported from New Delhi on August 8 that the spokesman of the Indian Foreign Ministry announced that night that Bhutan had become a protectorate of India. Since the Nehru Government has announced its sovereignty over Bhutan and declared that Tibet had never recognized Chinese suzerainty, will it not declare suzerainty over Tibet? The Nehru Government has no right to declare sovereignty over Bhutan. The United Nation should examine the matter *(People's Daily* 1950)**.**

The ultimate pronouncement of China regarding the liberation of Tibet came from Zhou Enlai on the eve of the first anniversary of the establishment of PRC. He stated: "the PLA is determined to march west to liberate the Tibetan people and defend China's frontiers. We are willing to undertake peaceful negotiations to bring about the liberation of Tibet, which is necessary to the security of our motherland" (Zhou Enlai 1989:43). Subsequently, the Central People's Government in October 1950 ordered the PLA to advance and after wiping out a Tibetan main force of over 5,000 men, the PLA conquered Chamdo" (Wang Furen and Suo Wenqing 1984: 175).

Two important statements of India regarding Chinese intervention in Tibet were considered by China as extremely provoking. The first statement issued on 21 October stated:

> The Central People's Government are fully aware of the views of the Government of India on the adjustment of Sino-Tibetan relations. It is, therefore, not necessary to

154

repeat that their interest is solely in a peaceful settlement of the issue. My Government is also aware that the Central People's Government has been following a policy of negotiations with the Tibetan authorities. It has, however, been reported that some military action has taken place, which may affect the peaceful outcome of these negotiations. The Government of India would desire to point out that a military action at the present time against Tibet will give those countries in the world which are unfriendly to China a handle for anti-Chinese propaganda at a crucial and delicate juncture in international affairs. Central People's Government must be aware that opinion in the United Nations has been steadily weering round to the admission of China into that organisation before the close of the present session. The Government of India felt that military action on the eve of a decision by General Assembly will have serious consequences and will give powerful support to those who are opposed to the admission of the People's Government to the United nations and the Security Council (*Memorandum* 1950).

After one week, India delivered another note to China. It stated:

We have seen with great regret reports in newspapers of official statements made in Peking to the effect that People's Army units have been ordered to advance into Tibet. We have been repeatedly assured of the desire of Chinese Government to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means and negotiations…In the present context of world events, the invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and, in the considered judgement of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or of peace. The Government of India can only express their deep regret… (India 1950).

The Indian note and memorandum provoked a sharp reaction from China. In its reply the PRC categorically rejected the arguments raised by India with regard to the entry into the UN. It had also alleged India's approach towards Tibet was affected by foreign influences hostile to China. The PRC in its reply stated:

Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China. The Chinese People's Liberation Army must enter Tibet, liberate the Tibetan people, and defend the frontiers of China. This is the resolved policy of the Chinese People's Government. In particular, the problem of Tibet and the problem of the participation of the PRC in the United Nations are two entirely unrelated problems. If those countries hostile to China attempt to utilize as an excuse the fact that the Central People's Government of the PRC is exercising its sovereign rights in its territory of Tibet and threaten to obstruct the participation of the PRC in the UN Organisation, it is then but another demonstration of the unfriendly and hostile attitude of such countries towards China. Therefore, with regard to the viewpoint of the Government of India on what it regards as deplorable, the Central People's Government of the PRC cannot but consider it as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet and hence express their deep regret (PRC 1950a).

India expressed amazement at the allegation of foreign influences on Indian position on Tibet. India sent another clarification to the letter repeating its inten-

tion for a peaceful settlement of the Tibetan question. To this letter, Zhou Enlai, in his capacity as the Foreign Minister of China, delivered a reply on 16 November 1950. In it, he once again stated the Chinese perception of Tibet as well as the role of India in it. Zhou's letter also raised a new allegation of Indian attempt to obstruct the liberation of Tibet in the reply which stated thus:

> when the Chinese government actually exercised its sovereign rights and began to liberate the Tibetan people and drive out foreign forces and influences to ensure that Tibetan people will be free from aggression and will realise regional autonomy and religious freedom, the Indian Government attempted to influence and obstruct the exercise of its sovereign rights in Tibet by the Chinese Government. This cannot but make the Chinese Government greatly surprised (PRC 1950b).

Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister of India could discern the suspicion and distrust of the Chinese towards India and he warned Nehru that China would be a potential enemy in the days to come. Responding to the Chinese action in Tibet, Patel, in a letter to the Prime Minister of India stated that "the Chinese Government have tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intentions." But "the final action of the Chinese is little short of perfidy." Regarding Chinese perception about India, Patel wrote: "it continues to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of scepticism, perhaps mixed with a little hostility." Referring to the Chinese reply accusing India's "attitude is determined by foreign influences," and he stated, "it looked as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy"(Das 1974: 336-337).

## 17-Point Agreement

Despite all these correspondence, China continued its activities in Tibet which found success in the signing of the 17-Point Agreement between Tibetan representatives and China in 1951. Dorothy Woodman stated that the Sino-Tibetan Agreement sealed China's complete control over Tibet (Woodman 1969: 222). It is interesting to note the reaction of the Dalai Lama when he came to know about the signing of the 17-Point Agreement:

> I couldn't believe my ears. I wanted to rush out and call everybody in, but I sat transfixed. The speaker described how over the last hundred years or more aggressive imperialist forces had penetrated into Tibet and carried out all kinds of deceptions and provocations. It added that under such conditions, the Tibetan nationality and people were plunged into the depths of enslavement and suffering. I felt physically ill as I listened to this unbelievable mixture of lies and fanciful clichés (Lama 1991: 68).

But, later, the Dalai Lama conformed to the Agreement in a communication to Mao Zedong on 24 October 1951 (Jain 1960: 53).

The Chinese occupation of Tibet and its approval through an agreement brought about a basic alteration in the relation between India and Tibet. The India representative, with escorts of Indian troops continued to stay at Lhasa, Gyantse and Yatung and the Indian Mission also controlled the post and Telegraph services between Sikkim and Gyantse as well. But the announcement in New Delhi in September 1952 changing the designation of the Indian representatives at Lhasa into Consulate General, and the placing of all Indian trade agencies in Tibet under his control marked a further recognition on the part of India on the change that had taken place in the status of Tibet (Varma 1971: 24).

## Panchsheel Agreement

Although India showed its willingness to abjure its special rights in Tibet, the Chinese apprehensions about India's intentions vis-à-vis Tibet were haunting them. This was evident during the visit of Dalai Lama to China in 1954. The Chinese authorities insisted Dalai Lama on taking along with him a Chinese interpreter during his meeting with the Indian Ambassador in Beijing (Lama 1991: 102-103).

Despite these apprehensions, India and China started negotiation by December 1953. The negotiation dragged on for four months and ultimately the Sino-Indian Agreement was signed on 29 April 1954.This Agreement was valid for 8 years. While commenting on the duration of the Agreement, Sudhakar Bhat stated, "why eight years? During the negotiations preceding the signing and ratification of the Agreement, India had proposed that it be valid for 20 years or even a longer period, since it embodied the five principles which both India and China declared, should forever guide the relations not only between these two countries but among all nations. But Beijing insisted on eight years. It later became evident that Beijing had hoped completely to integrate Tibet with China within eight years (Bhat 1996: 11). The formal title of Sino- Indian pact on Tibet was 'Agreement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India.' The Five Principles or the Panchsheel defined in this Agreement were 1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, 2) mutual non-aggression, 3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 4) equality and mutual benefit, and 5) peaceful coexistence (White Paper No.I 1959: 98). The Preamble of the Agreement was the most important which mentioned Tibet as the Tibet Region of China, thus India officially recognized China's claim over Tibet. So Panchsheel Agreement was a great achievement for China.

## Dalai Lama Episode

Dalai Lama's visit to India in 1956 once again provided an opportunity to understand the Chinese apprehensions about His Holiness and India. As part of the 2500th birth anniversary celebration of Gautama Buddha, the organisers of Maha Bodhyi Society invited Dalai Lama to India. In the words of B.N. Mullik, "For several months, the Chinese would not allow him permission to come and instead suggested that a representative should be sent, but ultimately, on direct representation being made to Peking, at the last moment he was permitted to make the visit. Not trusting him alone, the Panchan Lama was also sent (Mullik 1971: 159-160).

He was also sternly warned not to discuss the India-Tibet border or the anti-Chinese resistance movement operations operating in his country (Lama 1962: 141-142). Interestingly, Dalai Lama's visit was coincided with the visit of the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to India. Both took place in November. Mullik **(**1971: 160) stated that Zhou Enlai also visited India (November 28-December 100 at this time probably to overawe the Dalai Lama by his presence and keep him under checks. Chinese apprehensions about the Dalai Lama's intentions, even after the Panchsheel Agrement, were on record. In a speech at the Second Session of the Eighth Central Committee on 15 November 1956, Mao stated:

> Here I will take up another topic, the question of the Dalai. Buddha has been dead for 2500 years, and now the Dalai and his followers want to go to India and pay homage to him. Shall we let him go or not? The Central Committee thinks that it is better to let him go than not. He will set out in a few days. We advised him to go by air, but he refused, preferring to travel by car via Kalimpong, where there are spies from various countries as well as Guomindang secret agents. It must be anticipated that the Dalai may not come back, that, in addition, he may abuse us every day, making allegation such as "the Communists have invaded Tibet," and that he may go so far as to declare "the independence of Tibet" in India. It must also be anticipated that he may incite the Tibetan upper stratum reactionaries to issue a call for major disturbances in the hope of driving us out, while using his absence as an alibi to shirk responsibility (Mao 1975: 346).

Moreover, during his stay in India, to express the Chinese anxiety in Tibetan affairs, Zhou Enlai informed the Government of India that "since the peaceful liberation of Tibet Region of China, reactionaries who have fled from Tibet to the Kalimpong area have been carrying on subversive and disruptive activities against China's Tibetan region under the instigation and direction of the US" (White Paper No. I 1959:60).

After Dalai Lama had been in India for about two months, his brother one day approached B.N. Mullik, the Director of Indian Intelligence Bueau and in-

formed him that Dalai Lama had made up his mind not to return to Tibet (Lama 1991: 129). Mullik informed this development to the Prime Minister and he took up the issue with the visiting Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. Zhou Enlai conceded that the local officers might have committed excesses and said that he would talk to Mao and suggest "not to accelerate the process of socializing Tibet" (Mullik 1971: 160). The Chinese complaints about Kalimpong as a launching pad of anti-Chinese activities, and the reported intention of the Dalai Lama not to return to Lhasa sent negative signals to the already suspicious Chinese. According to Girilal Jain, "this development strengthened China's suspicions against India, because it showed the measure of India's continuing influence in Tibet"(Jain 1960: 66).

## Kalimpong Activities

Although the Chinese authorities had slowed down the implementation of their modernisation programmes, the discontent among the Tibetans were on the increase. According to John Rowland, the anti-Chinese Tibetan underground and Khamba tribal insurgency in eastern Tibet had by 1958 reached dangerous proportions (Rowland 1971:102). The growing anxiety of the Chinese over these incidents was evident when on 12 January 1959, the Chinese Premier himself took up the activities of reactionaries in Kalimpong. In an interview with the Indian Ambassador R.K. Nehru, Zhou referred this question (White Paper No.I 1959: 60). After ten days, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered to the Indian Embassy in China samples of "reactionary propaganda leaflets' sent to Tibet from Kalimpong, which it had collected (White Paper No.I 1959: 60). In another note China had also stated that these activities "using Indian territory adjacent to China" were also aimed at "damaging China-India friendship." Hence China requested India "to repress the subversive and disruptive activities against China's Tibetan region carried out in Kalimpong (White Paper No.I 1959: 62).

Meanwhile, the discontent among the Tibetans in general and the Khambas in particular grew to a crescendo in 1959. The Tibetan rebellion and the Chinese measures to suppress it resulted in dramatic developments in Sino-Indian relations with long term impacts. The incidents started with an invitation to the Dalai Lama from the Chinese Military Headquarters at Lhasa for a theatrical show in their campus on 10 March 1959. The Militiary Headquarters insisted that the Dalai Lama would have to come alone to attend the programme.This created serious doubts in the minds of the Tibetans, and the whole population assembled in the Norbulinka Palace, the official residence of Dalai Lama, on 10 March to prevent the Dalai Lama from going to the programme. This enraged the Chinese

which resulted in the clash between Tibetans and the Chinese PLA. From 11 to 16 March the tension went on mounting. On 16 March the PLA entered into Lhasa and started pitched battles against the Tibetans. In this surcharged situation, on the evening of 17 March, the Dalai Lama and his followers left Norbulingka for India (Levenson 1989: 88). On 30 March, the Dalai Lama and his followers reached Indian territory by way of Chuthangmo, on the Assamese frontier.

China strongly protested and criticised India for granting the Dalai Lama asylum. China in its note on 16 May stated that "since 10 March 1959 when the former Tibet Local Government and the Tibetan upper class reactionary clique unleashed armed rebellion, there have appeared deplorable abnormalities in the relations between China and India. This situation was caused by the Indian state (White Paper No.I 1959:73). At this stage, China perceived, not American or British imperialism, but India as the sole culprit. It stated, "nevertheless, there appeared in India, before and after the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet, large quantities of words and deeds slandering China and interfering in China's internal affairs. Responsible persons of many Indian political parties, including the National Congress, and a few Indian publications openly called Tibet a 'country', slandered the Chinese Government's putting down the rebellion in Tibet as "practicing banditry and imperialism," demanded that the Tibet question be submitted to the UN and even proposed to the holding of a tripartite  conference of India, China and Tibet to settle the Tibet question (White Paper No.I 1959:73).

The Chinese considered the granting of asylum to the Dalai Lama and the role of the Government of India in that episode as an unfriendly act towards China. In a statement it declared: "the Indian Government announced that it had granted political asylum to the Dalai Lama in accordance with the international practice and stated that the Dalai Lama was 'not expected' to engage in any political activities in India. This would not have caused any dispute. But on 18 and 22 April, two statements advocating "independence of Tibet' and directing wanton attacks on the Chinese government were issued respectively in Tespur and Mussoorie in the name of Dalai Lama. What was particularly surprising, the "so called statement of Dalai lama" of 18 April was not only distributed by an official of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, but also carried on official bulletins of Indian Embassies abroad. Such a line of action on the part of Indian Government could hardly be considered comfortable to well known international practice. The Indian Government insisted that the Dalai Lama was entirely responsible for the two traitorous statements issued in his name. In that case, did not the impressive welcome extended to the Dalai Lama by the Indian Government and

the talks the Prime Minister Nehru himself held with him mean giving a welcome to a Chinese rebel and holding a meeting with him? All these statements and actions of the Indian government, no matter what the subjective intentions might be, undoubtedly played an objective role of encouraging the Tibetan rebels" (White Paper No. I 1959:74).

After the Tibetan uprisings in March 1959, the Chinese unleashed a spate of articles and statements accusing India in this episode. New China News Agency (NCNA) with *People's Daily* led the attack from the front. On 28 March 1959, the NCNA issued a press release both in Beijing and in New Delhi charging that "the rebellion was engineered by the imperialists, the Chiang Kaishek bands and foreign reactionaries, the command centre of the rebellion was in Kalimpong." New China News Agency noted on 27 April that the Chinese Government produced what it described as a proof of India's complicity in the rebellion. The Chinese papers published "Documents Captured by the Chinese PLA from the Rebel Commands in Tibet" (*People's Daily* 28 April 1959). The next day an article in the *People's Daily* (29 April 1959) claimed that these documents fully confirmed the charge of the Panchan Lama that "the reactionaries in India, walking in the footsteps of the British imperialists, have always harboured expansionist ambitions towards Tibet and have carried out various forms of sabotage activities."

All these statements issued by Chinese Government as well as writings in the media branded India as the epicenter of Tibetan uprisings. The anti-China activities of Tibetan refugees in Kalimpong and granting of asylum to the Dalai Lama irretrievably demolished the edifice of Sino-Indian friendship. According to Rajesh Kadian, "the uprising in Tibet and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India altered the Sino-India relationship. The already frayed façade of Sino-Indian brotherhood epitomized by the catchy phrase, Hindi-Chini bhai bhai lay tattered" (Kadian 1999: 134).

China considered the liberation of Tibet as an immediate task. Certain Indian positions and statements immediately before and after the Chinese revolution had greatly contributed to the hasty action by the Chinese leadership in the liberation of Tibet. In this process they came to the conclusion that India had kept some imperialist ambitions in Tibet and in collusion with the British and American governments. They found in India an imperialist interest over Tibet, a staunch ally of British and American imperialism, and a threat to Chinese security. This anti-Indian perception was cemented with the flight of Dalai Lama to India in 1959. This incident coupled with their perceptions on India had defined the Sino-Indian relations adversely leading to the border war in 1962 which still haunts the minds of both the political class as well as other opinion makers.

It is argued by many that a political solution of the Tibet problem may, eventually, bring peace between India and China. For China, Tibet is more important than a piece of land. The recent demands raised by China over Tawang have a link with the Tibetan problem. The entire region of Arunachal Pradesh is known in China as 'South Tibet' and Tawang is the birth place of Sixth Dalai Lama. Yet, for a permanent peace between India and China, the leaders of the two countries should initiate discussion on the Tibetan question too, and try to understand their position as well as the genuine interests of the Tibetan people.

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Joseph Antony

# China's 'Peaceful Rise' in the New Millennium

K.M. Seethi

Henry Kissinger (2011): *On China,* New York: Penguin Press.

China has been getting considerable international attention ever since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of socialist regimes in East Europe. Its emergence as one of the top largest economies in the world has brought into open several questions about how the rapid shift in global economic architecture can affect the global politics and what role Beijing is expected to play in international relations. China's adherence to international institutions and norms which the West has brought in over the past several decades has obviously helped steer China's impressive economic growth and its incorporation into the world economy. The question whether China's new economic power will translate into political and military power is being raised across nations and regions. It is also viewed with concern whether China's economic power will have an impact on the very management of the global economic system. Indeed, more than any other factor, it is the interaction between China and the West which will help shape China's political and military choices down the track. Scholars and policy makers generally agree that China's astonishing growth trajectory and dynamism make it a major force to be reckoned with.

Way back in 2005, Henry Kissinger, a major architect of the United States' China policy in the early 1970s, wrote in *the Washington Post* that the rise of China – and of Asia – would bring about a major reordering of the international system. The center of gravity of global politics has been moving from the Atlantic, where it was wedged for the many decades, to the Pacific. He underlined that the most rapidly developing countries were in Asia, with a growing means to vindicate their perception of the national interest. China's emerging role has been compared, by many, to that of imperial Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was claimed that a strategic confrontation was inevitable and that the United States had best prepare for it. Kissinger noted that this assumption

K.M. Seethi

was as 'dangerous' as it was 'wrong.' He wrote that military imperialism was not the Chinese style. Clausewitz, the leading Western strategic theoretician, had addressed the preparation and conduct of a central battle. Sun Tzu, his Chinese counterpart, focused on the psychological weakening of the adversary. China always "seeks its objectives by careful study, patience and the accumulation of nuances – only rarely does China risk a winner-take-all showdown" (Kissinger 2005). Kissinger repeats many of such arguments in his new book *On China*.

Kissinger reminded that it was ill-advised to substitute China for the Soviet Union in our thinking and to apply to it the policy of military containment of the Cold War. He wrote: "The Soviet Union was heir to an imperialist tradition, which, between Peter the Great and the end of World War II, projected Russia from the region around Moscow to the centre of Europe. The Chinese state in its present dimensions has existed substantially for 2,000 years. The Russian empire was governed by force; the Chinese empire by cultural conformity with substantial force in the background."

Kissinger's *On China* has already received global attention and voluminous reviews. Kissinger's association with diplomacy and foreign policy making has a long history. While serving as US National Security Advisor and then Secretary of State under Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, he undertook several diplomatic initiatives and missions abroad, including the American engagement of China since the early 1970s. China is certainly a country Kissinger has known for decades. His personal acquaintances with the Chinese leaders, over decades, as well as his access to the historical source material helped develop his arguments in the book. Spreading over 18 chapters, the volume deals with major questions regarding China's approach to diplomacy, strategy, and negotiation in its long history, and discusses how it impacts on the global power architecture in the twenty-first century. Kissinger dwells upon the major milestones in Chinese foreign policy from the ancient times to the present era. The first part of the book unravels the traditional China by explaining its sensitivities and strategies. Kissinger's discussion of sensitivities is a sophisticated reworking of the well-known Chinese grievance about the "century of humiliation," the years in which China was affected by European, Japanese, and American imperialists. Kissinger brings in China's earlier experiences, such as the havoc caused by the Mongols, and underlines the country's historic fear of encirclement. Placing considerable importance to the unfolding events since the emergence of Mao Zedong, the volume deals with the internal-external dynamism of the Chinese diplomacy, the Sino-European encounters, the evolution of the Sino-Soviet ties as well as its

schism, the Korean war, Sino-American thaw during Nixon era, the crisis in Taiwan Straits, the Great Leap Forward, the Sino-Indian war, Cultural Revolution, post-Mao reforms and strategies, Deng's foreign policy, Tiananmen, Jiang Zemin era, China's "Peaceful Rise" etc.

Kissinger starts his work with a narration of Mao's meeting with the top political and military commanders against the backdrop of the events unfolding across the India-China border in 1962 when the troops of both countries were "locked in a standoff over the disputed boundary." As efforts to negotiate a settlement fizzled out, "Mao had decided to break the stalemate." Mao told his commanders that India and China had earlier fought "one and a half" wars and that China had drawn "operational lessons from each." The first was reported to have occurred during the Tang Dynasty (618-907) when China had sent troops "to suppress an Indian Kingdom against an illegitimate and aggressive rival." After the intervention, both "had enjoyed centuries of flourishing religious and economic exchanges." Mao told the commanders, writes Kissinger, that the lesson learned from the ancient campaign was that "China and India were not doomed to perpetual enmity." "They could enjoy a long period of peace again, but to do so, China had to use force to "knock" India back "to the negotiating table." The 'half war,' according to Mao, had taken place 700 years later when the Mongol ruler Timurlane sacked Delhi. Mao believed that since Mongolia and China were, then, part of the same political entity, this was a 'half' Sino-Indian war. According to Kissinger, no one had questioned Mao's talk about the "relevance of these ancient precedents to China's current strategic imperatives." Weeks later, Kissinger notes, the offensive started much as he described: "China executed a sudden, devastating blow on the Indian position and then retreated to the previous line of control, even going so far as to return then captured Indian heavy weaponry." Kissinger further says: "In no other country is it conceivable that a modern leader would initiate a major national undertaking by invoking strategic principles from a millennium-old event – nor that he would confidently expect his colleagues to understand the significance of his allusions."

Kissinger's position on China is too well known, given the role he played in bridging the gulf between the West and China in the 1970s. Ruling out the possibility of China dominating the world, Kissinger said that the country's political leadership would be trying to bring its political institutions in line with its economic change. In a discussion on China he opined: "I do not believe that a country that will be so preoccupied with this fundamental change will also have the time to dominate the world."

Neither the more triumphalist Chinese analyses nor the American version—that a successful Chinese "rise" is incompatible with America's position in the Pacific, and the world—have been endorsed by either government, but they provide a subtext of much current thought. If the assumptions of these views were applied by either side—and it would take only one side to make it unavoidable—China and the US could easily fall into an escalating tension.

China would try to push American power as far away from its borders as it could, circumscribe the scope of American naval power, and reduce America's weight in international diplomacy. The U.S. would try to organize China's many neighbors into a counterweight to Chinese dominance. Both sides would emphasize their ideological differences. The interaction would be even more complicated because the notions of deterrence and preemption are not symmetrical between these two sides. The U.S. is more focused on overwhelming military power, China on decisive psychological impact. Sooner or later, one side or the other would miscalculate.

The question ultimately comes down to what the U.S. and China can realistically ask of each other. An explicit American project to organize Asia on the basis of containing China or creating a bloc of democratic states for an ideological crusade is unlikely to succeed—in part because China is an indispensable trading partner for most of its neighbors. By the same token, a Chinese attempt to exclude America from Asian economic and security affairs will similarly meet serious resistance from almost all other Asian states, which fear the consequences of a region dominated by a single power.

The appropriate label for the Sino-American relationship is less partnership than "co-evolution." It means that both countries pursue their domestic imperatives, cooperating where possible, and adjust their relations to minimize conflict. Neither side endorses all the aims of the other or presumes a total identity of interests, but both sides seek to identify and develop complementary interests.

Kissinger tried to show that he has adequate knowledge of the Chinese strategic thought, particularly those that sustained over centuries in the minds of each successive generation of Chinese policymakers and statesmen. He writes that the Chinese have been "shrewd practitioners" of Realpolitik and students of a strategic doctrine distinctly different from the strategy and diplomacy that found favour in the West. "A turbulent history has taught Chinese leaders that not every problem has a solution and that too great an emphasis on total mastery over specific events could upset the harmony of the universe." Kissinger says: "Rarely did Chinese statesmen risk the outcome of a conflict on a single all-or-nothing clash; elaborate multiyear manoeuvres were closer to their style." "Where the Western traditions prized the decisive clash of forces emphasising feats of heroism, the Chinese ideal stressed subtlety, indirection, and the patient accumulation of relative advantage."

Kissinger has always felt that the relationship between Washington and Beijing has been plagued by ambiguity. There are a number of academics and policy makers in the United States who are strongly critical of China, some of

whom characterise the US policy after the Cold War as 'appeasement.' Be it anti-Communists or human rights activists, they all seek a regime change in Beijing. However, everyone knows that there is little Washington can do to bring about the 'peaceful evolution' in China that American statesmen and politicians have called for since the 1950s.

The notion of 'China threat' centers on the growing capacity of its government to disturb the prevailing international order. Scholars argue that militarily it is acquiring the means to project power outside East Asia and to challenge the US Navy in the Western Pacific, specifically in the vicinity of Taiwan. Economically, its burgeoning need for raw materials has escalated prices on a wide range of commodities. It has expanded its extraction operations to every region and continent. Many would say that it is not clear as to what Beijing intends to do with its renewed power. The official position is that China has no aggressive intentions, that it is still a developing country, and that it will be decades before its military can compete with the United States. However, there are a number of American scholars and policy makers who doubt that the current projections of the China's rise are sustainable. Some forecast a fall of the regime; others argue that China's economy will slow down sooner or later. They also draw our attention to the mounting unrest evidenced by tens of thousands of anti-government demonstrations across the country every year. In spite of all this, China's remarkable economic growth continues, in marked contrast to the current struggles in Europe and the United States.

According to Kissinger, the strategic equation in Asia is altogether different. Elsewhere he wrote: American policy in Asia "must not mesmerize itself with the Chinese military buildup." Undoubtedly, China has been increasing its military forces, but its defence budget is less than 20 per cent of America's, says Kissinger. The test of Beijing's intentions is whether its rising capability will be used to seek to keep out America from Asia or whether it will be part of a cooperative endeavour. Kissinger suggests that the best strategy for achieving anti-hegemonic objectives is to maintain close relations with all the major countries of Asia, including China. Plausibly, Asia's rise will be a test of American competitiveness in the world now emerging, especially in the countries of Asia.

Most Chinese he encountered outside of government, and some in government, seemed convinced that Washington "seeks to contain China and to constrict its rise." The US strategic thinkers also draw attention to China's "increasing global economic reach and the growing capability of its military forces." Kissinger warns that "care must be taken lest both sides analyze themselves into self-fulfilling prophecies." He wrote: "The nature of globalization and the reach

of modern technology oblige the United States and China to interact around the world. A Cold War between them would bring about an international choosing of sides, spreading disputes into internal politics of every region at a time when issues such as nuclear proliferation, the environment, energy and climate require a comprehensive global solution" (Kissinger 2011).

Arguing that conflict is not inherent in a nation's rise, Kissinger said that the US in the twentieth century is an example of a "state achieving eminence without conflict with the then-dominant countries." Even the oft-cited German-British conflict was not inevitable. "Thoughtless and provocative policies played a role in transforming European diplomacy into a zero-sum game." Kissinger would suggest that "Sino-US relations need not take such a turn." On many issues of the contemporary era, the two countries could cooperate adequately. However, what China and the US lack is "an overarching concept" for their interaction. In the Cold War period, a common adversary facilitated the bond. Yet, common concepts have not come into view "from the multiplicity of new tasks facing a globalized world undergoing political, economic and technological upheaval." Kissinger says that most Chinese consider their country's 'rise' not as a challenge to the US but "as heralding a return to the normal state of affairs when China was preeminent." In their view, it is the past 200 years of relative weakness that represented an 'abnormality' (Kissinger 2011).

Kissinger hardly makes a case for abandoning Taiwan, but it is very clear that he still believes the relationship with China is too important to be put at risk by continued support for democratic Taiwan. Throughout his career and in *On China*, he stresses his penchant for *Realpolitik*. Kissinger admires Bismarck and others less concerned with ideals than with national interest. He sees men like Zhou and Mao as excellent strategists in his own image.

Applied in the context of the relationship with China, specifically in the years since China's rise became apparent, Kissinger argued for an end to American criticism of China's one-party dictatorship, and for an end to complaints about China's human rights abuses. Being a consistent supporter of the Westphalian notion that states keep out of the internal affairs of other states, Kissinger pronounces the Chinese to be today's model Westphalians. If Washington wants to avoid conflict with a rising China, it would be wise to yield on these points and concentrate on those issues in which the PRC and the United States have shared interests.

Looking back, he believes everything depends on circumstances: "There are instances of violations of human rights so egregious," he writes, "that it is impossible to conceive of benefit in a continuing relationship; for example, the Khmer

Rouge in Cambodia, and the genocide in Rwanda. Since public pressure shades either into regime change or a kind of abdication, it is difficult to apply to countries with which a continuous relationship is important for American security. This is especially the case with China, so imbued with the memory of humiliating intervention by Western societies."

If Washington's insistence on democratic governance is made the main condition for progress on other issues with China, Kissinger concludes, "deadlock is inevitable." Those who battle to spread American values deserve respect. "But foreign policy must define means as well as objectives, and if the means employed grow beyond the tolerance of the international framework or of a relationship considered essential for national security, a choice must be made." That choice "cannot be fudged," he insists, even as he attempts to protect his flanks with a fudge of his own: "The best outcome in the American debate would be to combine the two approaches: for the idealists to recognize that principles need to be implemented over time and hence must be occasionally adjusted to circumstance; and for the 'realists' to accept that values have their own reality and must be built into operational policies."

In his concluding chapter Kissinger finally turns to the big question: does China's rise cause an inevitable conflict with the United States? He notes the similarities with the rise of Germany a century ago and the inevitable threat it posed to the British empire. The United States and China, too, could easily fall into a cycle of escalating tension that would be hard to break. With considerable optimism Kissinger insists that "were history confined to the mechanical repetition of the past, no transformation would ever have occurred." Thus, *On China* provides several milestones in Chinese history and foreign policy from the perspective of a US former policy maker and think-tank. It is certainly an indispensible reading for both China watchers and international relations scholars.

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# About the Authors

**Immanuel Wallerstein** is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Sociology, State University of New York at Binghamton. Among his numerous books are *The Modern World-System* (1974, 1980, 1989), *Unthinking Social Science* (1991), *After Liberalism* (1995), *The End of the World As We Know It* (1999), and *The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World* (2003).

**Alan Hart** has been engaged with events in the West Asian region and their global implications for nearly 40 years as a correspondent for ITN's News At Ten and the BBC's Panorama programme covering wars and conflicts.

**Ramzy Baroud** is an internationally-syndicated columnist and the editor of Palestine-Chronicle.com. His latest book is *My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza's Untold Story* (Pluto Press)

**Fritz Tucker** is a native Brooklynite, writer, activist, theorist and researcher of people's movements the world over, from the US to Nepal.

**James Petras** is a Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University, New York. He is the author of more than 62 books published in 29 languages, and over 600 articles in professional journals, including the *American Sociological Review*, *British Journal of Sociology*, *Social Research*, and *Journal of Peasant Studies*.

**Thomas Mohan** is with a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project based in Thiruvananthapuram.

**M.H. Ilias** is Associate Professor and Coordinator at Gulf Studies Programme, India-Arab Cultural Centre, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.

**Sreejesh N. P**. is a doctoral fellow at the Korean Division, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

**George Varghese K**. is with the Manipal Centre for Philosophy and Humanities, Manipal University.

**Joseph Antony is** teaching Political Science at the Department of Political Science, Fathima Matha College, Kollam under the University of Kerala.

**P M Joshy,** Deputy Director, ICSSR Project on South Asia, Department of Politics and International Studies, Pondicherry University.

**Samuel J. Kuruvilla** is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam Kerala.

**M.P. Mujeebu Rehman** is teaching at the Department of History, University of Calicut, Kerala.

**K. M. Seethi** is Dean of Social Sciences and Professor in the School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam Kerala.

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The last name of the author and the year of publication are inserted in the text at the appropriate point. For example,

There is a view, however, that the agreement is, in fact, a continuation of the process of the last few decades (Bajpai 2005).

If the name of the author or the date appear as part of the narrative, cite only missing information in parentheses. For example,

Writing on a hypothetical possibility of India threatening to proliferate, Perkovich (2005) writes, "…..China proliferated to Pakistan and Pakistan proliferated to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. Nor does proliferation that occurred before the NPT was negotiated justify promiscuous proliferation behaviour today."

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as Vanaik and Bidwai (1989)demonstrated

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Srinivasan, Grover, and Bhardwaj (2005) found

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Srinivasan et al. (2005) found

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(World Trade Organisation (WTO) 2006)

When appropriate, the names of some such authors are spelled out in the first reference and abbreviated in all subsequent citations. The general rule for abbreviating in this manner is to supply enough information in the text citation for a reader to locate its source in the Bibliography/References without difficulty.

(WTO 2006)

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*Encyclopaedia Britannica* (2007)

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To cite a specific part of a source (always necessary for quotations), include the page, chapter, etc. (with appropriate abbreviations) in the in-text citation.

(Srinivasan, Grover & Bhardwaj 2005: 5183-88)

**Journal Article: where the page numbering continues from issue to issue**

Bajpai, Kanti (2005): "Where Are India and US Heading?," *Economic and Political Weekly*, XL(41), August 6: 3577-81.

Perkovich, George (2005): "Faulty Promises: The US-India Nuclear Deal," *Policy Outlook,* 34(4), September: 18-20.

**Newspaper Article**

**Rappai, M.V. (1998): "China: a status quo nuclear power,"** *The Hindu,* **18 June. Book**

Jalan, Bimal (1991): *India's Economic Crisis*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

**Article or Chapter in an edited Volume/Book**

Thomas, A. M. (2005): "India and Southeast Asia: The Look East Policy in Perspective," in Rajan Harshe and K.M. Seethi (eds.), *Engaging with the World: Critical Reflections on India's Foreign* Policy, New Delhi: Orient Longman.

**Website:**

"President Meets with Displaced Workers in Town Hall Meeting" at http://www.white-house.gov/news/releases/2001/12/print/20011204-17.html

# FORM IV

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5. Editor's Name
   Nationality
   Address

   K.M.Seethi
   Indian
   School of International Relations and Politics,
   Mahatma Gandhi University, Priyadarshini Hills P.O.,
   Kottayam, Kerala, India-686560

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   Raju K. Thadikkaran
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