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Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations

30 Years' Commemorative Volume

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Editorial

Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations (IJPAIR) enters the sixth year of its publication, which also marked 30 years of the establishment of the School of International Relations and Politics (SIRP), Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala. The Editorial Board of IJPAIR, therefore, decided to bring out a “30 Years’ Commemorative Volume” (Vols. 5-8) focusing on a wide range of issues at the national, regional and international levels.

It is almost a quarter century since the end of the Cold War. In the years following the events of 1989, the policy makers and academics across the world debated so much about the nature and characteristics of the emerging global system. In fact, nobody had anticipated the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the eventual collapse of the socialist bloc. Nor could many foretell the withering away of the revolutionary movements that Moscow had long backed. Having encountered all these ‘unexpected’ turn of events, scholars and policy makers started conceptualizing the pattern of international exchanges in diverse ways. Many argued that this marked the ‘end of history’ or the ‘triumph of liberal capitalism,’ or the emergence of a ‘unipolar world’ or the unfolding of a ‘complex world of interdependence.’ Then the situation began to change further and the modes of thinking became so problematic. Europe moved towards a much broader collectivity, the post-Maastricht Union; the Marrakech Declaration replaced the GATT facilitating a new international trade order; the United States’ pushed towards a new project of containment (of terrorism and fundamentalism); and the West, in general, indulged in a self-delusion of spreading democracies in the Arab world!

Obviously, the major surprises in international relations since the end of the Cold War are not the ‘advance of liberal democracy’ and the ‘triumph of capitalism’ everywhere, but a return of the earlier forms of crises in governance and development across the world. The collapse of the Soviet State resulted in the emergence of new oligarchies, kleptocracies and ‘deep States’ that have at their disposal new tools of domination and control. The global financial crisis that engulfed the United States,

Europe and other parts of the world continued to affect the pace of globalisation. The momentum of Islamism has put millions of Muslims, who constitute a quarter of the world's population, under the control of 'deep state' and more oligarchic hegemony. Ethno-linguistic groups, tribes, clans, and religious and social sectarian groups have become the decisive forces in the post-colonial and post-socialist states of Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. Ukraine, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Thailand, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Pakistan are only a few examples. Russia's power has declined considerably in the post-disintegration phase and its vulnerabilities have been increasing with its switch over to market economy in the 1990s. Though China has emerged as a major force in global power configurations, its internal stability is subject to the pulls and pressures within the system.

Given the trends underway, it is most likely that a significant number of the world's population will not be experiencing the 'fruits' of liberal democracy in the near future. This is due to a variety of factors – religious extremism, ethno-linguistic movements, tribo-cultural assertions etc – all accentuated by social divisions and widening inequality brought in by an all-pervasive neoliberal dogma which turns politics, economies and cultures upside down. There cannot be a system without the rule of law, without the instruments and institutions of governance that treat citizens objectively, without the subordination of the military to civilian control, without the regulatory agencies to keep economic and social exchanges transparent, without the social norms that sustain civic engagement and law-abidingness—without all of this, democracy will remain a distant dream.

Having experienced many unpleasant episodes of political life within and across the world, we tend to become too much complacent about the 'present,' far removed from history and remain unwary of the challenges it is already bringing. The emergence of a post-cold war system undermined whatever confidence in ideology still remained in the world. But it also appears to have shattered even our choice to understand. Let us ponder over the reality that the neoliberal drive of our time is making us even more self-absorbed and draggy than we naturally are.

Twenty-First Century Imperialism: Militarism, Collaborators and Popular Resistance

James Petras

The configuration of 21st century imperialism combines patterns of exploitation from the past as well as new features which are essential to understanding the contemporary forms of plunder, pillage and mass impoverishment. In this paper we will highlight the relatively new forms of imperial exploitation, reflecting the rise and consolidation of an international ruling class, the centrality of military power, large scale long-term criminality as a key component of the process of capital accumulation, the centrality of domestic collaborator classes and political elites in sustaining the US– EU empire and the new forms of class and anti-imperialist struggles.

Imperialism is about political domination, economic exploitation, cultural penetration via military conquest, economic coercion, political destabilization, separatist movements and via domestic collaborators. Imperial aims, today as in the past, are about securing markets, seizing raw materials, exploiting cheap labour in order to enhance profits, accumulate capital and enlarge the scope and depth of political domination. Today the mechanisms by which global profits are enhanced have gone far beyond the exploitation of markets, resources and labour; they embrace entire nations, peoples and the public treasuries, not only of regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America but include the so-called ‘debtor countries of Europe’, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Iceland, among others.

Today the imperial powers of Europe and the United States are re-enacting the “scramble for the riches of Africa, Asia and Latin America” via direct colonial wars accompanying a rising tide of militarism abroad and police state rule at home. The problem of empire building is that, given popular anti-imperialist resistance abroad and economic crises at home, imperial policymakers require far-reaching expenditures and dependence on collaborator rulers and classes in the countries and regions targeted for imperial exploitation.

Any discussion of 21st century empire building – its dynamic growth and its vulnerability – requires a discussion and analysis of 1/the types and forms of ‘collaborator rulers and classes’; 2/the new forms of imperial pillage of entire societies and economies via debt and financial networks 3/ the central role of criminal operations in global imperial accumulation.

Imperial Pillage of Debtor Countries of Europe

The greatest transfer of wealth from the workers and employees to the imperial banks and state treasuries of the European Union, North America and Japan has taken place via the so-called “debt crises”. With the political ascendancy FIRE sectors (finance, insurance and real estate) of the capitalist class, the state and the public treasury became one of the key sources of capital accumulation, corporate profits and private wealth. Using the pretext of the crash of speculative investments, the FIRE ruling class extracted hundreds of billions of dollars directly from the public treasury and hundreds of millions of taxpayers. To secure the maximum wealth from the public treasury of the debtor states social expenditures were sharply reduced, salaries were slashed and millions of public employees were fired.

The state took over the private debts in order to restore the profits of the FIRE sector and in the process reduced the average wage and salaries of workers and employees across the entire economy. The centre-piece of this new structure of imperial pillage was the imperial states acting on behalf of the financial-real estate and insurance capital of the EU and North America.

The collaboration of the governing political class and their local financial elites was essential in facilitating the long term, large scale plunder of the local economy, taxpayers, employees, negotiating the terms and time frame for paying tribute to the imperial states: Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal because the site of the biggest suction pump for imperial enrichment in modern history: entire working populations are impoverished to transfer wealth for at least the next generation and beyond. Imperialism through onerous debt extraction payments and public pillage have created the perfect mechanism for imperial enrichment, deepening class and regional inequalities and the dispossession of homes, factories and land. Cheap labor, regressive taxes, open markets, a vast pool of unemployed, are results of imperial financial dictates complemented and enforced by the local collaborator political class (conservative, liberal and social democratic) and justified by a small army of media pundits, academic economists and trade union bureaucrats.

Criminality as the “Highest Stage” of Empire Building

Lenin, in his time spoke of finance monopoly capital as the highest stage of imperialism; since his time a new and more pernicious state has emerged:

organized massive criminality has become the centrepiece for imperial exploitation and accumulation.

One has only to read the headlines of the major financial press to find trillion dollar swindles by the biggest and most prestigious investment banks, financial houses, credit agencies, risk rating corporations across Europe, North America and Asia. The famous French novelist Honore Balzac once wrote that “behind every great fortune there is a great crime”. In today’s financial world he would have to say that great criminal acts are perpetual and integral to the accumulation by great financial houses. Capital accumulation especially in the dominant international financial sector via criminality is evident in at least three major types of financial activity.

Trillion dollar swindles by all the major banks involve manipulation of the Libor inter-banking interest rates, deliberately puffing up and dumping stocks and bonds, fleecing pension funds and millions of investors of billions of dollars: packaging trillions in worthless mortgages and securities and selling them to small investors; conning Governments into taking over bad debts based on speculative bets gone south. The entire financial system for over two decades has engaged in systematic fraud, extortion of public wealth based on falsified credit and earnings reports – accumulating capital which is re-invested in new, bigger scams on a global level. Adam Smith’s “wealth of nations” would have to be rewritten to take account of the wealth of swindlers’ capitalism.

Complementary to fraud and swindles are the hundreds of billions of dollars that the leading banks accrue through laundering illicit income from billionaire drug cartels, sex slavers, body parts entrepreneurs, corrupt political leaders, tax evaders from five continents. Each year trillions are “packaged” by Oxford, Cambridge and Harvard educated MBAs employed by Barclays, Citibank, UBS and other financial leaders and dispatched to offshore accounts and ‘washed’ in upscale real estate in London, Manhattan, the Riviera, Dubai and other high end real estate sites.

Imperial capital’s profits and total wealth is enhanced by large scale illegal international capital flows from ‘developing countries’. Between 2001 to 2010 developing countries “lost” US 5.86 trillion dollars to illicit outflows. During the past decade China’s new billionaire capitalists, running the world’s biggest manufacturing sweatshops, shipped \$2.74 trillion to Western imperial banks, Mexican plutocrats \$476 billion, Nigerian corrupt elites pillaged oil wealth and poured \$129 billion; India’s new and old rich rulers sent out \$123 billion in illegal funds to the big banks of England and the Middle East. Obviously we need to update Marx and Lenin to take account of the systematic criminalization of capital as a central element in the process of capital reproduction. As capital becomes criminal, criminals become capitalists – on a world-historic scale.

Imperialism and the Central Role of ‘Domestic’ Collaborators

Contemporary Empire building is based on a complex network of overseas class, political and military collaborators who play an essential role in facilitating imperial entry and exploitation, defending its profits and privileges, and extracting wealth. Imperial armies, banks and multi-nationals operate within the framework of compliant clients, trained, selected, protected and rewarded by the imperial powers.

The US and France, together with other NATO powers have established military bases, training missions and special funds to create African mercenary armies to defeat anti-imperialist insurgents and to prop up puppet regimes which facilitate imperial plunder of the natural resources and vast agricultural lands. Imperial military commanders direct African mercenary forces from Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, Mali, Libya and elsewhere. Without these mercenary collaborators imperialist politicians would face greater domestic opposition due to loss of their soldiers’ lives and higher military expenditures.

Following Euro-American and Gulf States military intervention in Libya – over 26,000 bombing missions – the imperial forces recruited a mercenary army to protect the petrol installations and prepare public firms for privatization. France with its eye on the gold, uranium and other mining resources invaded Mali took political control and established a collaborator regime. Following popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt which overthrew established imperial client dictatorships, Euro-US imperialism endeavoured to establish a new collaborator coalition composed of pro-capitalist Islamists and the security apparatus of the dictatorships.

In Asia, in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kurdistan, imperial rulers despite over a decade of colonial wars are desperately trying to create mercenary armies to sustain client regimes to facilitate the plunder of oil wealth (Iraq and Kurdistan) and sustain strategic military bases facing China (Afghanistan). In Afghanistan after 12 years of war without victory, the US is forced to retreat, hoping to stave off an ignominious defeat by recruiting a 350,000 Afghan mercenary soldiers – proven to be of a very dubious loyalty. Despite conquering Iraq and imposing its rule, Euro-American imperialism is left with an unstable regime with growing links to Iran.

In the scramble to plunder African resources, amidst inter-imperialist competition, new imperial-collaborator partnerships have emerged: a new class of corrupt billionaire African rulers has opened their countries to unrestrained pillage. While imperial multi-nationals extract mineral wealth, the African collaborators transfer hundreds of billions in illegal flows to the imperial financial centres. Africa leads the way in the growth of illicit financial flows – 24% yearly between 2001-2010.

Western imperialism, more than ever, depends on the cultivation, maintenance of collaborator regimes – politicians, military officials, business elite – to open their countries to plunder, to transfer wealth to the imperial financial centres and to repress any popular opposition.

The entire imperial enterprise would collapse in the face of domestic anti-imperialist opposition movements ousting collaborator elites.

In Europe, imperial financial institutions depend on local political collaborators to impose and enforce so-called ‘austerity programs’, to assume the private financial debts and to transfer tribute to the imperial centres for indefinite time frames. Collaborator regimes are essential to maintaining tributary relations to their imperial rulers.

Imperialism, Militarism and Zionism

If we compare US imperialism to the expansion of Chinese global power, we will observe profound differences in the modes of operation and on-going trajectory. China’s overseas expansion is fundamentally economic – large scale investment in raw materials, markets for its manufactured goods and large scale infrastructure projects to facilitate the trade flows in both directions. It provides financial incentives, low interest loans and bribes to collaborator elites to propel economic expansion.

US-EU imperialism has emphasized and relied on military intervention, operates over 700 military bases, has military advisors in dozens of countries, is engaged in drone wars against Pakistan, Yemen, Afghanistan, Somalia and elsewhere. Military conquests have enlarged the US military presence but at enormous economic cost, leading to unsustainable fiscal and trade deficits and hundreds of billions of losses for the private sector. The Iraq and Libyan wars and economic sanctions against Iran have undermined billions in oil profits. As the US economic empire declines, Chinese global economic power rises: and their conflict and competition intensifies.

The key to the rise of a military driven empire and the eclipse of the economic component of empire building can be attributed to three inter-related factors: the extraordinary influence of the Zionist power configuration in harnessing US imperial power to Israel’s militarist regional goals; the ascendancy of financial capital and its subordination of manufacturing and resource capitalists; the increasing importance of the military-security apparatus in the imperial state as a result of the ‘global war on terror’ ideology.

The subordination of US imperial power to a small, economically insignificant and isolated state like Israel is unprecedented in world history. As is the fact that US citizens whose primary loyalty is to Israel, have secured strategic policy-making

positions in the power structure of the imperial state; including the Executive (White House), Pentagon, State Department and the Congress. The 52 Presidents of the Major American Jewish organizations exercise power via million dollar funding of legislators, parties and electoral campaigns; appointment of Zionist loyalists to strategic government posts dealing with the Middle East; private consultants to the government (housed in Zionist funded “think tanks”) and their influence in the major mass media outlets.

Although the population identifying as Jews has decreased (the only major denomination to decline by as much as 14% over the past two decades), representing less than 1% of the US religious population, the wealth, organization, tribal zeal and strategic institutional location of Israel Firsters has magnified their power several fold. As a result Zionist policymakers played a dominant role in driving the US to war with Iraq, formerly a powerful supporter of the Palestinians, and staunch opponent of Israeli colonial expansion into Palestine. Because of the political power of the Zionist power configuration, Israel extracts \$3 billion a year in aid and a total of over a \$100 billion over the past 30 years – in addition to having the US military engage in wars against Arab , Muslim and secular regimes which materially support the Palestine national liberation struggle. Never in the history of modern imperialism has the foreign policy of a world power been subject to tributary demands and served the colonial aspirations of a second rate state. This historical anomaly is easily understood through the role of its powerful overseas networks which wield power in the Imperial State at the service of Jewish colonial settlers in Palestine.

In sum, US imperialism has sacrificed major economic interests including hundreds of billions in petroleum profits, by engaging in destructive wars against Iraq and Libya and imposing economic sanctions on Iran – a telling statement of the power of Israel in shaping the US imperial agenda. Militarism and Zionism have dictated the direction of US imperial policy, greatly weakening the domestic foundations of empire and hastening its economic decline.

Militarism and Criminality Abroad and the Police State at Home

In the past imperialism was seen as compatible with democracy at home: as long as imperial wars were short in duration , inexpensive to the Treasury , resulted in the successful extraction of wealth and was based on collaborator mercenary armies, the masses enjoyed the constitutional rights and the vicarious pleasures and illusions of being part of a superior race.

Contemporary US-EU imperial expansion has provided neither material nor symbolic gratifications: prolonged wars and occupations with no definitive victories, imperial armies surrounded by overwhelmingly hostile populations and facing daily attacks from fighters blending with the population has led to profound

disenchantment among the public, and sadistic and self-destructive behaviour (high rates of suicides) among the imperial soldiers and unsustainable budget deficits.

Unreliable and corrupt collaborators and the bankruptcy of the anti-terrorist ideology has provoked wide-spread political opposition to overseas military wars. No longer convincing the public via propaganda, the US executive has instituted a raft of police state measures, suspending habeas corpus and culminating in executive decrees claiming Presidential prerogatives allowing for the extra judicial assassination of terror suspects including US citizens: Militarism and criminality abroad has spread and infected the domestic body politic.

Conclusion: Imperial Wars by Proxy and Domestic Decay

Imperialism today is profoundly linked to the domestic crises – transferring billions from domestic programs to imperial wars abroad. The bulk of wealth extracted from the pillage abroad is concentrated in the hands of the FIRE ruling class. The “aristocracy of labour”, which Lenin identified as a beneficiary of empire, has shrunk and is largely confined to the upper echelons of the trade union bureaucracy, especially those who sign off on austerity programs, tributary payments and bank bailouts. Imperialism has reshaped the class structured budgets and economies of the neo-colonies and tributary states. In the first instance it has proletarianized the middle class, polarized the classes, concentrating income in the hands of a parasitic criminal financial elite of 5% and reducing living standards for the 70% of workers, unemployed, semi-employed, public and private employees and self-employed.

Given the deepening global polarization between empire and masses and the tiny minority of beneficiaries, the entire imperial architecture depends on the central role of domestic collaborators to sustain imperial power, administer the transfer of wealth, ensure the extraction of wealth, provide a veneer of electoral legitimacy to the entire criminal enterprise and where necessary apply muscular repressive force.

Faced with prolonged downward mobility, a permanent ‘class war from above’ and, above all, the near universal recognition that welfarism and imperialism/capitalism are no longer compatible, the working classes have turned to direct action: repeated general strikes have replaced the ballot box for the millions of unemployed young workers, downwardly mobile employees, bankrupt small business people and those dispossessed of their homes in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy. Millions of peasants, and artisan workers have shed the plow, the hammer and anvil, and picked up the gun to confront imperial powers and their political collaborators and mercenary armies in South Asia, the Middle East and Africa; Arab revolts, detoured from revolution by Islamic collaborators in the first round, are rising once again: the second round promises more consequential changes.

Imperialism with its powerful bankers and advanced arms, its hundreds of military bases and monstrous expenditures, rests on fragile foundations. Who now believes that the “war on terror” has replaced the class war? The overwhelming majority of people now recognize that Wall Street, the City of London and Brussels are the real criminals, pillaging billions, laundering illegal financial flows and extracting tribute from the public treasury. Who believes today that capitalism and the welfare state are compatible? Who believes that Israel is anything but a brutal police state administering the world’s biggest open-air concentration camp for Arabs, administered exclusively by and on behalf of its Chosen People?

Today the struggle against imperialism is first and foremost a class struggle against the local collaborators: domestic politicians and business people who extract and transfer the wealth of a people to the imperial centres. Undermining the collaborators world-wide is already a work in progress. Conservatives, liberals, and social democratic collaborators in Europe have lost credibility and legitimacy – the task of the mass movements is to organize for state power.

The imperial offensive in Africa and Asia rests on unreliable mercenary armies and corrupt rulers: as the imperial armies retreat, their collaborator rulers will collapse. And out of the ruins, new anti-imperialist states will eventually emerge.

In Latin America, Venezuela, by defeating imperial military coups and electoral collaborators, demonstrates that a transition to socialism is still a historical possibility. In China the socialist revolution lives on in the hundreds of thousands of strikes and protests against imperial capitalists and their millionaire political collaborators. The capitalist counter-revolution was only a detour in the transition to socialism.

© James Petras

World-Systems, the Imminent End of Capitalism and Unifying Social Science

In Conversation with Immanuel Wallerstein

Theory Talks presents a talk with historical sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein is duly known for his world system theory, with which he offers a critical alternative to realist systemic approaches to International Relations. One could say that where Realists part from the system to analyze and predict history, world-system theory parts from history to analyze and predict the system. In this comprehensive Talk, Wallerstein – amongst others – explains why capitalism is worn out, why '68 was more important than '45 or '89, and why we need to overcome artificial divorces between different arenas in social sciences and, more generally, between philosophy and science.

What is, according to you, the biggest challenge/principal debate in current IR? And what is your position or answer to this challenge/ in this debate?

My analysis of the modern world-system argues that we are in a structural crisis, that the system is in fact unable to survive, and that the world is in a chaotic situation, which we will be in for twenty to forty years to come. This crisis has to do with the lack of sufficient surplus-value available and thus with the possible profit one can make. The system is bifurcating – referring to a situation in which there are two alternative ways of getting out of the present crisis in order to create a new, stable, world-system.

The most important current struggle is that between the two hypothetical alternative routes the world will actually choose. It's very difficult to define very narrowly these two directions, but basically there will be people trying to create a new world-system which will replicate certain basic features of the existing system but not be a capitalist system. It would still be hierarchical and exploitative. The other direction would be to create an alternative system that is relatively democratic

and relatively egalitarian. These are all very vague terms because one can't define in advance the structural details of such a future world-system. But obviously one solution would be from my point of view a better world-system, and the other would be at least as bad as or perhaps worse than the world-system we presently have. So it's a real political struggle. Again, it's intrinsically impossible to predict what the outcome will be; the only thing we can be sure of is that the present system won't survive and that some outcome will occur. We shall create, in the famous phrase of Ilya Prigogine, order out of chaos. That's my basic theoretical position.

How did you arrive at where you currently are in IR (people who inspired you, books, events, how did you conceive your ideas)?

The most important political event in my lifetime has been what I call the world revolution of 1968. For me, it was a fundamental transformative event. I was at Columbia University when the uprising there took place, but that's only a biographical footnote to what happened politically and culturally.

I've tried many times to analyze what happened exactly at that time, and what were its consequences, I'm convinced that 1968 was more important than 1917 (the Russian Revolution), 1939-1945 (the Second World War) or 1989 (the collapse of the Communisms in east-central Europe and the Soviet Union), years people usually point out as the crucial events. These other events were simply less transformative than the world revolution of 1968.

If you would ask me for the persons who influenced me, I'd have to name Karl Marx, Fernand Braudel, Joseph Schumpeter, Karl Polanyi, Ilya Prigogine, and Frantz Fanon.

What would a student need (dispositions, skills) to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a global way?

I think it's really not an easy task, but it's not impossible either. Simply 'getting a PhD', as other contributors to your website may have answered, is not sufficient for me.

A deep plunging in historical knowledge of the modern world-system – which is at least the last five hundred years – is a condition sine qua non; knowledge of the epistemological questions that have plagued modern social science is important; and then some basic understanding of how the capitalist world-system has operated as a system (including as an interstate system) over several hundred years is fundamental.

Then there is a perhaps even more important issue, which has to do with reading classics. True enough, everything classical writers say has to be re-analyzed because it's constrained by the world in which they lived and thought. But one of the real problems for the students is that they don't usually actually read Adam

Smith, Marx, or Freud. Rather they read books about them. When they say 'Marx said X', they actually mean, 'this author said that Marx said X'. Such statements are not only statements via a filter but also three-quarters of the time simply wrong or at least distorted. These reporters of views of the classical authors often cite them out of context, or cite their views too meagerly, or sometimes simply misinterpret an original text. If you try hard enough, you can make Marx into an advocate of capitalism and Smith into a Marxist. So the important rule for students is that anyone interesting enough to study is worth reading in the original.

Then there is the linguistic problem. Students, especially in the United States, should master many more languages than they do now, because translating these people is a famous problem. Marx and Weber have been mistranslated many times, as have most other important figures in social science. One of the things I say to students is 'learn the languages', despite the cultural bias that exists in the West. If you really don't want to or can't, then at least read in translation the originals.

Is the world more equal now than it was 500 years ago?

No. People who argue that look at the top 20% of the world population in terms of real income, it is true that they're doing a lot better than previous generations. But if you look, as I do, at the differences between the top 1%, the 19% below that and the remaining 80% at a world level, you get a different picture. Since, for example, 60% of the Swiss population belongs to the top 20%, it is true that Switzerland is a more egalitarian country than it was a hundred years ago. But worldwide, it's quite the opposite: the gap has grown enormously between the top 20% and the bottom 80%, and is continuing to grow.

It is also true that the gap between the top 1% and the next 19% was going down for a while. But one of the things neoliberalism did, and intended to do, was to restore the gap between the 1% and the 19% below it. That's what electorates in the West (where most of this 19% live) are complaining about these days - that their real incomes are going down while this top 1% is getting filthy rich.

Aristotle has been said to have written that 'law is mind without reason'. If law is already mind without reason, then what is the market, which does not even acknowledge law for its inherent values?

In the first place, I don't agree, because law is always interpreted. Sure, once law is fixed and consecrated, it is supposedly unchangeable and insensitive to circumstances. But there's always the human factor which consists of applying law to concrete situations. Law is always and must always be interpreted, and because of that it is malleable. And therefore controversial.

As for the market, one has to distinguish between the hypothetical market and the real market. The hypothetical market operates according to purely objective laws of supply and demand that put pressure on prices and thus behavior of rational and egoistic individuals. But in fact, this hypothetical market has never existed and most certainly does not exist in the capitalist world system. Indeed those most opposed to the hypothetical market are the capitalists themselves because, if the hypothetical market would actually be in operation, they wouldn't make a penny. The only way capitalists make serious money is if they have quasi-monopolies. To obtain quasi monopolies, they need intervention by the state in multiple ways and capitalists are totally aware of this. Talk about this hypothetical market is, subsequently, ideological rhetoric. The market doesn't actually work that way and any sane and wealthy capitalist will tell you that. Free market economists won't tell you that, but no capitalist believes in the autonomy of the market.

The revolution of 1968 brought, as you argued, the intellectual idea of centrist liberalism to an end. Since then, however, liberal capitalism has become even more deeply anchored in the world. How would you reflect on the changes the world has gone through in big lines referring to that point of view?

Before 1968, the ideology of what I call 'centrist liberalism' had dominated the intellectual, economic and political world for a good hundred-odd years, and had marginalized both conservative and radical doctrines, turning them into avatars of centrist liberalism. Now what happened in the world revolution of 1968 is that this automatic assumption that the only plausible view of the world was centrist liberalism was shattered and we returned to a world in which there are at least three major ideological positions: true conservatism, true radicalism, and the third is centrist liberalism which of course is still there – but now as one of three options rather than being considered the only viable intellectual position.

Now when you talk about 'liberal capitalism' you are referring to what is often called 'neoliberalism,' which is not at all the centrist liberalism that had dominated the world before. It is rather a form of conservatism. It has been pursuing a standard attempt to reverse the three trends that are negative from the view of world capital: the rising cost of personnel, the rising cost of inputs, and the rising cost of taxes. And neoliberalism – which goes under many names, including globalization – is an effort to reverse these trends and to reduce these costs. In this, it has been partially successful, but as all these attempts have shown (and I say 'all', because in the last five hundred years there have been quite a few), you can never push the costs back as low as they were previously. It is true that the costs of personnel, inputs, and taxes went up from 1945 to 1970 and have gone down from 1970 to, say, 2000, but

they never went back down to the 1945 level. They went up two points and went back just one point. Now that's a standard pattern in history.

I think the day of neoliberalism is absolutely at an end; its effectiveness is quite over. And globalization as a term and as a concept will be forgotten ten years from now because it no longer has the impact it was meant to have, which is to persuade everyone to believe Mrs. Thatcher's preaching: 'There is no alternative'. This was always an absurd statement, since there always are alternatives. But a large number of countries succumbed to it anyway, at least for a while.

The rhetoric about neoliberalism as the only way has now become clearly empty. Look at Europe – just look at President Sarkozy of France, who is clearly a protectionist. You won't be able to give me the name of one European country willing to give up the subsidies to its farmers, because this is both politically totally impossible at the domestic level and completely contrary to the neoliberal logic. Mandelson wants to reduce subsidies at the European level, but he hasn't got the necessary political support, which Sarkozy made very clear to him.

One has to distinguish between talk and reality. The reality is that European countries are not only protectionist, but they are increasingly protectionist and will be very much more so in the next ten years, as will Japan, China, Russia, and the United States. Alternating between protectionism and the free flow of factors of production has been a cyclical process for the last 500 years, and every 25 years or so we move from one direction to another, and right now we are moving back into a protectionist era.

Your world-systems theory talks about a certain dialectic which reached a climax in the modern, capitalist, world-system. Is there an end to this dialectics or will it continue forever?

No, this can't go on forever, because no system goes on forever. All systems are historical – that's true for physical and chemical systems, biological systems, and a fortiori for social systems. They all have lives: they come into existence at a certain point, they survive according to certain rules, and then they move far from equilibrium and can't survive anymore. Our system has moved far from equilibrium. So the processes, which one can describe, that maintained a moving equilibrium for five hundred years no longer function well, and that's why were in this structural crisis.

So no, it won't go on forever, it won't even go on for more than forty or fifty years, and furthermore those years will be very unpleasant.

I've already described the three basic costs for capitalists: personnel, input, and taxes. They always have to pay all three, and would always like to keep them as low as possible. There are structural forces that have steadily increased the cost of these factors as a percentage of sales prices over five hundred years, until

the current point where they're so high that you can't really accumulate capital to any significant degree anymore, which makes the game not worth the candle. This means capitalists are no longer going to be interested in capitalism because it doesn't work for them anymore. They are therefore already looking around for serious alternatives in which they can maintain their privileged position in a different kind of system. After five hundred years of successful functioning, the fluctuations of this system are now so great and uncontrollable that no one can handle them anymore.

You argue that social scientists in the 21st century should focus on a unified understanding of the dynamics of history, and let go approaches that focus solely on economics or politics, and might even need a whole new vocabulary in order to do so. Can you give any clues as in how to approach this daunting task?

If I knew how to get rid of the separate vocabularies of politics, economics, and culture, I'd be much further ahead. Unfortunately, I'm socially constructed just like everyone else.

There are separate issues here which one shouldn't confuse. The first is that social science divides the real world into three arenas – politics, economics, and socio-culture. This distinction was an invention of classical liberalism, subsequently imposed upon the world of knowledge, and now forms the basis of contemporary social science. It is, however, a very unfortunate mode of approaching social reality, because it divides the unique human experience into artificial spheres that each claim importance over the others, and underplaying the inseparable links of each with the other. The way out here is to arrive at a vocabulary that doesn't always push us into these separate categories for politics, economics, and the socio-cultural – something difficult to achieve but obviously very necessary.

The bigger question is the so-called divorce between philosophy and science, which is equally profoundly embedded in all our cultural institutions, including institutions of knowledge such as the university, and which determine our understanding of the world. This division between the scientific mode and the humanistic/hermeneutic mode of analysis was invented as recently as the mid-eighteenth century! Before that, no one would dare to separate knowledge in general into two artificial categories. Aristotle certainly didn't believe that: he was ready to write books on ethics, economics, science, and he didn't think he was violating any rule of separation of fields of knowledge. Even Kant, whom we now consider to be a philosopher, in the late 18th century gave courses at the University of Konigsberg on international relations, poetry, astronomy and law. To Aristotle and Kant it didn't occur that there is a need for distinct epistemologies depending on what you're talking about.

We've been dominated by this artificial distinction for two hundred years now; this double epistemology has been seriously challenged only in the last thirty years, and the coming thirty or so years should be dedicated to overcoming once and for all this distinction between antagonistic, scornful, and warring epistemologies and returning to a single epistemology of knowledge.

Now the first issue fits within this bigger question: I'm simply insisting on the fact that we are experiencing everything in a singular mode, We live in a singular world, so the historical social system should be analyzed as a single arena – I don't see where the state ends and the market starts, or where the market ends and civil society starts.

You've asserted in an earlier interview that ethnicity is a very important force in history and that it is, if anything, more present than before, but also that it's highly arbitrary. The only constant is that there's one so-called 'ethnic' group in a high stratum and another in a lower one. Can one from this statement deduce your objective, namely fighting difference, and fighting for equality?

If we talk about value-systems, I am fairly convinced that a more egalitarian world is a better one; I would like to see a more egalitarian world than the present one (which is highly inegalitarian). But then again, inequality has been a constant throughout known human history. Perhaps 100,000 years ago, when small groups roamed the earth, there was more equality, but the most important issue for us is that the modern world-system has become increasingly unequal. The social, economic, and political polarization of humankind is much greater than it was one, two, or three hundred years ago. I think it is possible that there could be improvement; I simply don't say we inevitably will see it. History is on nobody's side. There is no inevitable progress, but there is possible progress.

One of the most known concepts is that of the relation between core and periphery. In his magnum opus, Manuel Castells argues that globalization, a term you dislike, represents the fragmentation of Core and Periphery. Would you agree with that?

I don't agree with Castells, because he's misusing the terms core and periphery, which do not refer to countries. We use it that way as shorthand, to say things quickly, but it's not exact. Core– periphery is a relationship of production: there are core-like processes and peripheral processes, and they both exist in all countries. But in the United States there are, of course, more core-like processes and in Paraguay most of the processes are peripheral. A key element here is monopolization versus competition: the more competitive a product is, the more peripheral it is, because the less money you can make on it. The more monopolized a product is, the more core like it will be, because you can make more money on it. So if given kinds of

production spread out to more countries, that's because they have become less profitable within the original loci of production, not because these countries to which the processes spread are successfully 'developing.'

This has always been true, and products have always shifted from being core-like to being peripheral, because monopolies are self-liquidating. After about twenty to fifty years, no product can maintain a monopoly; it's too difficult to prevent others from trying to get in on a winning product. Products inevitably become peripheral. When they do, if former monopolists wish to make money in the world, they have to find a new product that they can monopolize for a while, and not think: everyone needs shoes, so I can always make money selling shoes. And that has been true over the past four centuries – so in that sense nothing has changed and Castells presents something intrinsic to the capitalist system as something new.

Last question. Before the millennium, you've argued that East Asia will be the new hegemonic power. At this point, the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) are growing. Is the rise of these newly industrializing powers to be analyzed as a definitive movement in the 100/150 year hegemonic cycle, or will some other part of the world take over from the United States (as you've asserted, in about 50 years)?

Well here we have to deal with different dynamics. First of all, there's what I call a structural crisis affecting the whole capitalist mode of production. If, as I've indicated before, even capitalists are looking for alternatives to the system named after them because it is simply too difficult to make serious money out of production, then a new system should arise. The growth of the BRICs is interrelated with this structural crisis of the capitalist system because they are expanding the number of people who are sharing the global surplus-value. There simply isn't enough surplus value to go around, and give the top people significant income. The world simply can't sustain a situation in which 30-40% of the world population is living at the income level of, say, Denmark – and that's what the BRICs are pressing forward on. The fact that they succeed in itself will add to the crisis of capitalism, while it is of course good for them at this point. If we wouldn't be in this crisis, East Asia might continue to increase in power as it is doing right now to form within about seventy-five years the new hegemonic power, succeeding to the United States. But the capitalist world-system is not going to last another seventy-five years.

Courtesy: THEORY TALK -13

The Moves towards 'De-Dollarization'

Prabhat Patnaik

In the wake of the imposition of sanctions against Russia by the West, following Russia's opposition to Western designs on Ukraine and Western support to the Ukrainian fascists for carrying out those designs, President Putin has embarked on a course that can potentially have far-reaching consequences for the world economy. He is trying to work out trade deals with other countries which are either themselves facing Western sanctions or are willing to defy them, and the payments on these deals are not in terms of US dollars or even Euros, but in terms of the currencies of the countries entering into these deals.

China and Iran are the obvious partners that Putin is eyeing and Russia has just entered on 21 May into an agreement with China to the tune of \$400 billion for supplying gas to the latter over the next thirty years. The significant feature of the deal, however, is that the payment will not be made in US dollars. For us in India such arrangements are not new. For decades India had bilateral trade agreements with the Soviet Union and with other East European socialist countries, where the traded commodities exchanged against one another at agreed prices and a given exchange rate, and the trade balance was settled over a period of time without involving any movement of a so-called "reserve currency" from one country to another. Putin has simply taken over an idea that had been put into practice in the days of the Soviet Union.

The advantages of such an arrangement can be understood through a simple example. Imagine country A and country B trading with one another. Every transaction between the two countries would normally have to be settled in terms of a "reserve currency," say the US dollar. If country A exports \$100 worth of goods to country B over a certain period and has \$30 worth of foreign exchange reserves (in terms of the reserve currency) at the beginning of the period which it can run down, then ignoring each country's trade with other countries for simplicity, A can buy at the most \$130 worth of goods from B. But if there is a bilateral agreement (supplementing such trade, let us assume) and each accepts the other's currency as

if it is a reserve currency, then A can buy a lot more goods from B. The magnitude of trade would be much larger. When both A and B are hard put to get the reserve currency because of sanctions, clearly bilateral trade agreements can enlarge their trade substantially.

Bilateral trade agreements in effect therefore entail that the two countries entering into agreement treat each other's currencies as if they are reserve currencies. This means a substantial increase in their foreign exchange reserves and hence trade. The increase is even more substantial when each of the partners has a shortage of the standard reserve currency, either because of sanctions by the advanced capitalist economies, or because of low demand for the goods of each in the advanced capitalist economies, from whom the reserve currency could be earned (which incidentally was the rationale for India's bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union in the old days).

This substitution of other currencies for the reserve currency which in today's world consists essentially of the US dollar is what the Russians are calling "de-dollarization." To encourage the process Russia has enacted a law whereby companies are required to have a certain minimum percentage of their trade in roubles. The implications of "de-dollarization" can be quite far-reaching. The dollar which is the reserve currency in the world economy also happens to be a currency that the U.S. central bank, the Federal Reserve Board, can print. It follows then that as long as the dollar remains a reserve currency, the U.S. can run any amount of current account deficit on its balance of payments, and simply print notes to pay for it. True, the other countries may not be willing to hold only the US currency notes but may wish to hold some interest earning dollar asset, such as American Treasury Bills or American government bonds. But when the US central bank prints money, it puts that money into circulation in the economy by buying such assets anyway, in which case if foreigners wish to move from holding dollars to holding these assets, the central bank can simply sell these assets and take back the dollars it had printed. The basic point that the US can run any amount of current account deficit remains valid.

If "de-dollarization" gets going strongly, so that other currencies are held, not just in addition to the extra dollars that would be held on account of the US current account of deficit, such as was assumed in the above example, but actually as substitutes for the US dollars in their role as reserves, then this ability of the US to run whatever current deficit it wishes to, gets undermined.

If the US still runs a current account deficit that is larger than what other countries are willing to hold as extra reserves, then the printing of more dollars than anybody is willing to hold would cause a collapse in the value of the dollar. Wealth-holders in such a case will move to other forms of holding wealth, including even

commodities, which would cause high inflation, as had happened at the beginning of the 1970s.

On the other hand, if the US reduces its current account deficit to match what other countries are willing to hold as extra reserves, then its absorption of goods will have to decrease, causing a socially-explosive drop in living standards of its population and a loss of its military might. Since it is the leading imperialist power of the world, such a loss of military might has serious consequences.

Either way therefore “de-dollarization” can become a prelude to a new conjuncture entailing severe crisis and destabilization in the capitalist world, and leading to a loss of US hegemony. It is not surprising that the U.S. has always reacted very strongly to any effort by any country to move away from holding dollar reserves to holding reserves in other currencies of the advanced capitalist world. There was even a suspicion that one important reason for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was Saddam Hussain’s reported decision to shift away from the U.S. dollar as the form in which Iraq held its considerable oil wealth.

The trend towards “de-dollarization” is not just confined to Russia and Iran which have both been hit by American sanctions and have good reasons therefore for “dedollarizing”. It covers China as well. China already holds an immense amount of claims on the US, built over the years through a persistent current account surplus vis-à-vis that country, in the form of dollars or dollar-denominated assets. It is interested therefore in diversifying away from U.S. dollar assets to other forms of wealth-holding such as gold or the Euro, as a means of reducing risks (which arise for instance when all eggs are put in one basket).

China reportedly is already diversifying away from the dollar; and some attribute the recent strengthening of the Euro to such diversification by China. It is also buying gold on a large scale, imitating India in this respect, though in the case of India it is not the government agencies (such as the central bank) but private individuals who are the main importers of gold.

Diversifying away from US dollars however is a tricky operation for China. Since it already holds immense amounts of dollars, such diversification, if it reduces the price of the dollar, can cause large-scale capital losses for China. In such a case, diversification by China would have become a Kalidasa-type exercise of lopping off the branch of a tree on which one is standing. To prevent this, diversification for China has to be stealthy, surreptitious and gradual, so that it does not attract much notice and hence does not cause a fall in the value of the US dollar (which would hurt China itself). China reportedly has been engaged in such a gradual and quiet shift away from the US dollar; and its signing the bilateral agreement with Russia can be seen as one episode in this quiet shift.

The Indian government’s attitude, not surprisingly, is totally different from that of Russia, China or Iran, and is much more subservient to the United States.

One of the problems that the country would face, if it ever decided to break the US-imposed sanctions against Iran (whatever deviation it currently has from the sanction-regime is with the “permission” of the US, and is based on India’s promise that it would only be a temporary phenomenon), is that of obtaining insurance cover for such sanction-busting trade. Apparently even the large public sector insurance companies that could insure such trade, are not large enough to manage such insurance on their own. They go even at present to Western insurance companies to obtain re-insurance for many of the transactions they cover; and the latter would certainly not provide re-insurance if trade was of the sanction-busting kind.

The obvious solution to this problem, and indeed a pre-condition for the country’s having a degree of autonomy in its policy towards Western-imposed economic sanctions on third countries, is to make the public sector insurance companies even larger, so that they do not have to run to Western companies for re-insurance. But this requires infusion of government funds into these companies; and the government has steadfastly refused to make such funds available. It does not obviously contemplate getting out of its economic subservience to the United States.

Of course, even in the case of Russia’s Putin, it is premature to read much into his current defiance of the U.S. The Russian elite typically sends its fortune to be deposited in the vaults of the Western banks in currencies of the advanced capitalist world, notably the U.S. dollar. Putin’s “de-dollarization” therefore would sooner or later run into class opposition by the Russian corporate-financial oligarchy. How Putin copes with such opposition remains to be seen. But Putin’s Russia, for all its anti-American rhetoric, is no Soviet Union. And it would not surprise one in the least if Putin soon capitulates before the West, and calls a halt to the “de-dollarization” drive.

Egypt's Current Dilemma: 'These are Regimes That Do Not Go'

Wael Deirki

With the aftermath of the 'cold war', the world has witnessed what is agreed on as the two primary waves of democratic reforms that have swept different regions of our world. Unfortunately, the Middle East was somehow 'excluded' from those two waves, only for its all-in-all ailing situation and grim future prospects to exasperate. Throughout the years of the cold war, the world's two 'superpowers' did manage and tailor world's affairs according, above all, to their needs and interests, often allowing narrow margin, if at all, to the peoples of the region to practise and enjoy their inalienable rights of self-determination, progress and prosperity the way they choose.

As the world gave no ears whatsoever to the prevailing agony, misfortunes, socio-economic and other woos and factors at play in the region; suddenly, the world was called upon to witness the 'birth' of what has come to be termed as 'The Arab Spring' or 'The Arab Awakening', which, again, was born out of the long-simmering injustices and disparities engulfing the countries of the region under the rule of those regimes that some of them were subsequently overthrown.

The case of Egypt in 'The Arab Spring'

Due to her very strategic location, huge population count and cultural and historic status; Egypt has always been at the centre-stage of most main events in the Middle East since ancient times. Today, and regardless of its internal political and economic situation, Egypt does play a significant role in the region whether in the Arab Levant or vis-a-vis the other Arab countries in Africa adjacent to Egypt. Obviously, whatever happens or not happens in Egypt will probably reverberate and resonate throughout the whole region. That was true in the past, and remains true at present, and most probably will remain true for the unforeseeable future.

In addition to the chronic socioeconomic, religious and other local factors at play here, we have other complicated and intertwined regional and international

factors. Although each and every such factor warrants by itself a specific research, my intention in this article is to tackle one theme: regardless of the efficiency or inefficiency or even the nature of the Moslem Brotherhood, and also regardless of its actions on inactions while in office; Egypt military's move on 3 July 2013, ousting the elected president Morsi from office and all that ensued thereafter, will hardly guarantee Egypt and the region the real stability, prosperity and democratic change that Egypt and the larger Middle East do badly need.

Egypt's domestic woes and the road to the 25 January 2011 revolution

Similar to most other Arab countries, the chronically simmering internal turmoil and intermittent confrontations among different political factions and the government in Egypt did pave the way for Egypt's January 2011 revolution.

There are many detrimental factors for Egypt's socio-economic, political and other woes. Egypt's huge population growth stands at the top of that. Whereas Egypt's population in 1981 were around forty-six million inhabitants, the figure jumps up to almost sixty-five million by the year 2001, only to hit close to eighty-three million inhabitants by 2011. Latest government figures itself put the number today close to 92 millions. On the other hand, Egypt's economy is somehow dependent on few resources; notably the Suez Canal whose annual revenue has recently totalled around US \$5 billion, in addition to tourism, oil and gas exports and remittances from expatriate Egyptians living abroad. Egypt also has some reasonable industries but almost nothing of a magnitude that could be of any detrimental significance.

Beside all that, Egypt's poor governance and its sterile, largely dysfunctional autocracy, have much exasperated the overall situation in the country, multiplying its crisis on many levels, notably politically and economically, thereby producing and reproducing a systematic vicious cycle that ends nowhere. It is therefore that the people have revolted against the neglect, corruption, inefficiency and tyranny of their ruling regime, insisting that their voice be heard and that their government respects their basic human rights and effect and implement genuine reforms to improve their living conditions and achieve their legitimate aspirations. They demanded a decent and dignified life, justice, freedom from persecution and oppression and from other maladies produced and sustained by what they regard as their 'irresponsible and corrupt ruling regime.'

President Mubarak's resignation from office on 11 February 2011 and the ensuing events left Egyptians and other peoples in the Middle East quite hopeful and optimistic about their democratic future. At the end of that relatively long transitional period that was somehow complicated, tense and, at times, badly manipulated by different parties-locally, regionally and internationally-a new constitution was adopted and a fair and free presidential elections was held, the

result of which brought Mohamad Morsi, representing the Moslem Brotherhood, to the country's presidential post.

President Morsi's short tenure

The election of Mohamad Morsi for the number one executive post in the country on 24 June 2012 was somehow an expected event in a country that is believed to have one really organized and efficient political movement: the Moslem Brotherhood. Since its inception in Egypt in 1928 as a Pan-Islamic, religious and social movement, the Brotherhood was able to consolidate its presence and reach throughout the Egyptian society. But also since then, it has been facing continuous repression by the successive governments and regimes that have been ruling Egypt. Intermittently though, during the fifties and eighties, the Brotherhood was completely banned from any public political presence and that turned it into a clandestine movement. Retaining itself intact, the movement, from time to time, made its presence felt throughout the country's political, social, economic and cultural life through numerous initiatives and activities, including some publicly defying political ones. The Mubarak regime's relationship with the Moslem Brotherhood has been swinging all along, at times the Brotherhood was allowed to participate in parliamentary elections while at others its leaders were imprisoned and persecuted and its lines were hit hard by the regime's security apparatus. With the ouster of Mubarak, the ban against the Brotherhood was effectively lifted and it was allowed to participate in the presidential elections equally with the other political parties and representations.

Unluckily enough for the Brotherhood as it now may seem, its candidate, Mohamad Morsi-a US educated engineer- won the elections with a very slim margin over his tail candidate Ahmad Shafiq -the ruling establishment's de-facto candidate. Now in power, the Brotherhood found itself suddenly with the huge responsibility to rule a big and quite complicated country like Egypt with a much ailing economy. Whereas the Brotherhood has huge experience in clandestine work and social grassroots networking, it has little experience, if any, in governmental work. Therefore, it was somehow clear ahead from the start that the brotherhood's ruling of the country at such an extremely delicate and contentious juncture in the country's history might prove no more than a political trap that may eventually result in the Brotherhood's outright failure, and subsequently, the risk of exiting from the country's political life, albeit temporarily.

In fact, the Brotherhood wasted no time in asserting the worst scenario that its haters and life-long rivals have expected for it. It did quickly demonstrate its considerable incapability of delivering on its numerous promises to the Egyptian people in general and its constituency in particular; not only in achieving any tangible improvements on the economic level or in the services sector, but more

importantly; in working sincerely and immediately towards a viable, inclusive government that comprises all strata of the population. Soon after the Brotherhood took office, it started consolidating in its hands as much authority as possible, be it in the judiciary, media, legislative and other branches of the state. The brotherhood's one year rule caused considerable problems and tensions not only with the security and the military but even with most of those executive branches of the state.

The Brotherhood's life-long rivals, in turn, did waste no time, not only in further exposing the Brotherhood's failures and genuine mistakes but they even did everything available to them to further engulf the Brotherhood-president Morsi in this case- with all possible wrongdoing and failures, thereby inciting other strata of the population to venture out again to the streets, effecting, this time, another revolution against the Brotherhood's rule.

Egypt's Military

Apparently, one of the Military's most illustrated reasons or excuses for taking its move on 3 July was 'the failure of the Brotherhood to deliver on its promises and to good govern the country.' Although such a claim is textually valid, any unbiased examination of the situation will quite easily refute it outright. Given Egypt's status politically, economically and socially when the Brotherhood were set to govern it, it might have been, and still is, utterly impossible for any political party or government to bring about the miraculous change that 'the Brotherhood could not effect' as later claimed by the military.

During the period between February 2011 and July 2013, Egypt was governed outright by the Military. Due to the general domestic situation mentioned above, multiple mistakes and wrongdoings did occur on many levels. Internal strife and political manipulations did further exasperate the already tense situation therein; even setting the stage for other problems and complications that later exploded during president Morsi's tenure. Therefore, to blame the Brotherhood or hold them the sole responsible for all that six-decades-legacy of negatives, would be, at best, naive and immoral. Obviously, it takes time for real changes to be effected, especially with such societies that have been ruled somehow savagely for many successive decades-something that would definitely entail a long list of repercussions from all sorts that are virtually impossible to overcome over night. Besides, such abrupt and sudden changes effected by peoples' revolts would normally perpetuate these negatives-exactly as we have been witnessing in the Arab countries that did succeed in deposing their old tyrannical regimes and started to rebuild their economies and societies anew, sometimes even from close to scratch.

It only follows that such excuses by the Military are totally baseless. Therefore, it will be indispensable in order to fully understand the situation in Egypt to look thoroughly at its Military and its historic role in the society and government. In

fact, there is a wide-prevailing perception inside Egypt and abroad that Egypt's Military-effectively governing Egypt since the so-called July 1952 revolution- is just another state inside the Egyptian state, a typical deep state with a well-established system of deeply-rooted and intertwined economic interests representing, in reality, an autocratic military junta that may not be necessarily visible in as much as it is invisible.

Right from the start, there were deep doubts as to whether the Military will sincerely relinquish power or allow any real changes in the society. For the Military, it may be incomprehensible to just forsake and relinquish its historic, deeply-rooted authority to the Brotherhood or any other political party as easily as some may imagine. Actually, one may see today that the Brotherhood's win in the presidential elections and its subsequent taking over of authority was a kind of blessing for the Military given the Brotherhood's inexperience in government, and its inherent nature and character flaw as a theological movement that sanctifies its authority and legitimacy, thereby allowing a very slim margin, if any, for other players to take any role in governing. Apparently, that was the typical profile that suits the Military and empowers it to easily vindicate its continuous hold on power and its uncontested 'duty' or 'right' to intervene once 'the higher interests of the state are endangered.' Had another, more credible and efficient political party taken over power as a result of the presidential elections, it might have been far more difficult for the Military to vindicate its last move on 3 July 2013. Actually, it was the Brotherhood's defects and flaws that empowered the Military's 'patriotism' rhetoric and the rubric of 'safeguarding the state and the highest interests of the country', enabling it to retake power from the Brotherhood and president Morsi. Obviously, the Military's talk of patriotism is just the classical tactic that is often resorted to by autocrats in the Middle East to command the support of the public once their grip on power is endangered or upon planning to take over that power.

The Military's move of 3 July

It was quite apparent from the sequence of events, months before the July 3rd, and especially in the days preceding that date, that all was set on track for the Military to take the move it took. Starting from 25 June and culminating with the 'masses of the millions' on 30 June, not only huge masses of real opponents to the Brotherhood did venture out to the streets against the Brotherhood but were also joined by other masses representing other strata of the society of which it could be discerned that these were, one way or another, implicitly deployed by the Military and its huge social web. Obviously, such huge masses of peoples in the streets accompanied by an excellently orchestrated discrediting media campaign against the Brotherhood, were thought by the Military to do the required job of further inciting the general public against the Brotherhood and facilitating the Military's well-orchestrated upcoming

move. With huge demonstrations and sit-ins sites in Cairo's streets and squares, representing both, Morsi's proponents and opponents, and with intermittent clashes erupting; the Military was quite vocal in its stance, quickly giving an ultimatum on 1 July 2013 of forty-eight hours to the political parties to 'sort out their differences and agree...otherwise the army will intervene....' The Military, through its leader Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi quickly uncovered the main elements of their plan to replace *Morsi* with an interim government, severing the constitution and calling for elections in a year time. *Morsi*, on the other hand, delivered a speech pledging to defend his legitimacy and totally refusing to step down.

On 3 July 2013, the Military deposes president Morsi, sets him under house arrest in a mysterious location under its full authority, institutes the Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court as an interim president until the next presidential elections without an exact time frame given. Later on, the Military announces what it called its 'Future Roadmap' that includes the steps and measures that the Military intends to implement at a later stage to 'bring back stability and civil rule to the country.' In the meantime, most Muslim Brotherhood leaders, including the Brotherhood's strongman, deputy head Khairat el-Shater are arrested, and tens of thousands of Morsi supporters remain camped out in two mass sit-ins in Cairo's squares. The next day, Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court Chief Justice Adly Mansour is sworn in as Egypt's interim president. He dissolves the Islamist-dominated upper house of parliament as Morsi's supporters stage mass protests demanding his return. Clashes and violence between pro- and anti-Morsi groups break out in Cairo, Alexandria and elsewhere leaving at least thirty-six dead. Ensuing was Egyptian soldiers opening fire on pro-*Morsi* demonstrators in front of a military base in Cairo on 8 July, killing more than fifty. Each side blames the other for starting the clashes near the larger of the two sit-ins, close to east Cairo's *Rabaa Al-Adawiya* mosque and square. On 14 August, the security and military forces succeed in ending the two pro-Brotherhood's mass sit-ins accompanied by fierce clashes and confrontations. Mansour puts forward a time line for amending the constitution and electing a new president and parliament by mid-February 2014 while the Brotherhood refuses to participate in the process. Since then, the country is experiencing a continuous, albeit intermittent; clashes, confrontations, pro-Brotherhood demonstrations, and other forms and manifestations of instability and unrest, particularly in the universities where the Brotherhood retains a significant presence of members and supporters.

Regional reactions to the 3 July move

Interestingly enough, the three major regional powers: Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran have had different, and at times, publicly opposing reactions to the Military's move of July 3rd.

For Saudi Arabia, the archrival of the Moslem Brotherhood since the mid seventies or so, removing the Brotherhood from power in Egypt was a matter of necessity and urgency dictated by the following factors:

1. The historic connection between Egypt's Brotherhood and their counterpart and other like-minded movements in Saudi Arabia and other countries of the 'Gulf Cooperation Council'-which poses a direct threat to the rule of the Saudi Royalty. Obviously, any 'victory' by any of all of those may empower the rest-which is a source of considerable apprehension to all GCC countries.
2. The Egyptian Brotherhood started to favourably respond to Iran's rapprochement gestures-thereby posing another more dangerous threat against the Saudi and other GCC royalties.
3. Given Saudi Arabia's regional foreign policy that is largely regarded as restraint and conservative, Saudis felt apprehended that a Moslem Brotherhood's rule in Egypt risks elevating an already tense regional situation, further complicating existing woos and hampering their alliance with the West, particularly with the United States. Saudis are presently focusing on the possible 'existential threat' posed by Iran against them and the whole Gulf region. Any additional rivalries or crisis may aggravate the challenges ahead and render them less resilient, and distract them away from their main preoccupation. Throughout the recent past, Egypt's military has been Saudi Arabia's most reliable strategic partner, providing a valuable strategic depth against any possible intruders-something that the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood is unable to deliver.

It is therefore that Saudi Arabia wasted absolutely no time in lending its full, unequivocal and unusually explicit support for Egypt Military's move. Almost for the first time, Saudi Arabia took a very vocal public stance not only against regional contenders like Iran or even Turkey but against international ones as well, like the US, or so it seemed. Saudi Arabia unusually rushed to compensate Egypt for the US proclaimed intention to sever its economic and other assistance to Egypt. Almost a week after the 3rd July takeover, Saudis announced a US\$12 billion rescue package in cash and debt guarantees beside huge similar aid from other Gulf countries like Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. In an article by Rod Nordland (2013) published in *The New York Times*, the writer considers that the Saudi "rescue package ... dwarfs direct military and economic grants from the United States (\$1.5 billion) and the European Union (\$1.3 billion) combined," only to conclude that "The gulf Arabs' deep pockets made the United States' contribution seem important largely for its symbolism."

As for Turkey, the Brotherhood's rule in Egypt could have afforded its Islamic 'Justice and Development' ruling party led by Prime Minister Rejeb Taib Erdogan, with a valuable asset in his quest to re-establish his country's historic role as a leader of the Sunni Moslem world, with Erdogan as its spiritual mentor and his ruling

party as the new Sunni Moslems' legitimate reference. Erdogan and his party seems to believe that it's time for such a revival, albeit with a different texture, applying 'soft power diplomacy' comprising economic and commercial relations, technical assistance and training beside other tools. For Turkey, the Brotherhood's rule in Egypt has the potential to embolden its status against both, regional contenders like Iran, and international ones like the US, the European Union, and of course, the Russians. Thus, Turkey found itself suddenly losing some long-awaited, quite promising assets in Egypt at a time when it's simmering and sometimes rhetorically explosive competition with Iran has enough potential to reach a dangerous edge. Erdogan rushed to heavily denounce the 3 July move, labelling it as an 'illegitimate and outright coup d'état,' calling on Egypt's Military to immediately surrender authority back to the country's legitimate ruler, simultaneously calling on all regional and international powers to refrain from acknowledging this de-facto situation imposed by Egypt's Military. Nevertheless, it was apparent that Erdogan was in no mood of opening up a public conflict with Saudi Arabia over this issue, knowing for sure that Saudi Arabia will not only show its maximum perseverance in its stance but will also deploy its huge media apparatus and resources towards that goal. At the end, Erdogan choose to water down his tone against that move, realizing that it is quite meaningless and counterproductive to face up to Saudi Arabia on this issue, especially with the relevant ambiguous US position.

As for Iran, what applies to Saudi Arabia and Turkey in this case does largely apply to Iran vice versa. Iran has had huge expectations from the Egyptian Brotherhood's rule in light of its considerable past experiences and significant abilities to manipulate such movements to serve its present and future interests, most notably against both Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and of course, vis-a-vis the West in general and the US in particular. But here again, Iran's pragmatism, at least publicly speaking, was obvious and impressive. Realizing that there is not much to do against the new situation and troubled by the hesitant and ambiguous US position, Iran opted for a low profile posture, at least for then.

International reactions to the 3 July Move

Normally speaking, there are only two international positions that matter most in this regard: the US position and that of the European Union-although the later is somehow integrated with the former and only complements it; economically and financially.

The US reaction

For Egypt Military's move to succeed, going on the offensive on many fronts was a must. The Military knew for sure that their move would be endangered only if the United States would vehemently oppose it and publicly denounce it, besides

taking concrete and practical measures to fowl it. Therefore, one of the Military's earliest tactics was to launch a well-orchestrated media campaign concentrating on the supposed relationship between the US and the Brotherhood, in addition to numerous accusations arguing for 'the *Obama* administration's clear pro-Brotherhood bias.' Participants in that campaign were the Egyptian so-called 'Nationalist Papers' and other 'independent' newspapers and media outlets. Not only Egyptian, but other Arab media outlets contributed significantly to that campaign, such as Saudi's *Al arabiya* T.V Satellite station that saved no efforts in its intensive coverage of the events in Egypt, pre and after the 3rd July move. Although *Al arabiya* did host different and opposing points of view, still, it was apparent that its coverage concentrated on one main theme: Brotherhood bashing. That campaign was much intensified following the July move, with those same Egyptian and other newspapers and media outlets concentrating more on the supposed 'intimate' relationship between the US and the Brotherhood, and the Military's 'patriotic responsibility to face up to the Brotherhood's conspiracies.'

That was the general atmosphere surrounding the move of 3 July. Somehow taken by surprise, the United States therefore found itself in a somewhat awkward position. On the one hand, feeling unable to meaningfully effect anything tangible in the situation due to the US distraction with other more pressing issues, and, on the other, unwilling to really effect anything in light of the complexity and volatility of the situation and the huge dangers involved. It therefore opted for a reaction that was, and still, vague and hardly any concrete. On 3 July, President Obama issued a statement saying he is 'deeply concerned by the decision of the Egyptian Armed Forces to remove President Morsy and suspend the Egyptian constitution.' He called on 'the Egyptian military to move quickly and responsibly to return full authority back to a democratically elected civilian government as soon as possible through an inclusive and transparent process, and to avoid any arbitrary arrests of president Morsy and his supporters.'

The US stopped short of calling the move a coup d'état as US laws prohibit extending any financial aid to any country believed to have its legitimate leader ousted or removed by that country's military-which in the case of Egypt- would have left the US with no valuable leverage over the country and its military at a time when the US has some vital cooperation with Egypt's military, notably: the high profile cooperation in counterterrorism, and Egypt's critical role in perpetuating peace with Israel.

Soon after, on 15 August, in remarks he delivered at the White House on the unfolding situation in Egypt, president Obama did speak about the special relations that tie the two countries, emphasizing his 'administration's intention to continue working with Egypt's Military on issues of mutual interests' but equally announcing

that 'The United States had informed Egyptian authorities it had cancelled a joint military drill' named 'Bright Star' that had been scheduled for September. The drill, dating back to 1981, is seen as a cornerstone of US-Egyptian military relations that began after the Camp David Peace Accords between Egypt and Israel.

Later on, in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly annual meeting, president Obama stated that 'the United States will maintain a constructive relationship with the interim government, which promotes core interests such as the Camp David Accords and counterterrorism,' adding that 'Morsi was democratically elected but proved unwilling or unable to govern in a way that was fully inclusive.'

The next US move came on 9 October when the administration announced that it would withhold several, so-called 'big-ticket' military items from Egypt. Those items included Apache attack helicopters, Harpoon missiles, M1-A1 tank parts and F-16 fighter jets. The move also includes withholding \$260 million meant for the Egyptian state's regular budget.

The Hamas connection

It is well known that Israel's security has always been at the top of US list of priorities in the Middle East. In recent years, the Hamas movement-an acronym of *Islamic Resistance Movement* has been ruling the Palestinian Gaza strip since almost a decade and has border territories with Egypt. Hamas has been at the forefront of Palestinians' clandestine and overt action against Israel causing much troubles and dangers against it. Egypt's Moslem Brotherhood retains a close relationship with Hamas, based on their common theological understanding of Islam and attitude against Israel. The Brotherhood therefore enjoys a significant leverage over Hamas, rendering it capable to influence its policies and decisions. The Brotherhood has succeeded in recent times to lure Hamas to water down its rhetoric and curb its actions against Israel when the need arises-something that the US celebrates obviously enough.

US-Egypt relations

Seemingly, the 3 July move was a heavy surprise for the US, proving, inter alia, that Ambassador Anne Paterson's understanding and reading of the Egyptian internal situation is considerably poor. Therefore, she was quickly withdrawn from Egypt following the 3 July move: first, as a US demarche against the Military's move in itself, and, second, possibly as an initial frustrated reaction to the US mishandling and misinterpretation of the overall situation in Egypt. Following Mubarak's ouster, Paterson was hastily recalled from her ambassadorial post to Pakistan to be nominated as the US ambassador to Egypt. There have recently appeared some rumours in Egypt claiming that she has been working on a Pakistani experience replica in Egypt: setting a complicated structure by which the US would be able to

manage the different Islamic movements and parties through a viable and effective military establishment that retains a very good relation with the US, thereby enabling the latter to safeguard her interests and retain an important saying in the country's politics and external relations.

If that proves true, then the US would have had considerably misunderstood and misinterpreted Egypt's society and internal politics and dynamics. In spite of all odds, the Egyptian state has always retained its main state composure since old times. The Moslem Brotherhood itself is not an authentic part of that composure but rather a transient one, dating back only to the thirties of the twentieth century. There are also other checks and balances in Egypt that do not exist in Pakistan: the Coptic Christians, a vivid and so entrenched civil society, a unique cultural heritage, Egypt's geographic location in Africa and its deeply-rooted relations therein, let alone its geographic proximity and direct historic connection with the heartland of Europe's cradle of wisdom and reasoning in Greece and Rome to which ancient Egypt has marvellously contributed. Those are considerable assets and factors that do certainly embolden the state and detaches it from religious extremism. All in all, Egypt's history, its present and future make it imperative on Egyptians to denounce and renounce such gross deviation from their state's mainstream that was manifested by the Brotherhood's rule of their country. In fact, and although hardly sincere, it was exactly those assets that the Military relied heavily upon, and smartly and quickly exploited in order to take its July 3rd move.

Following the successive US positions against the Military's move, particularly withholding important military items from Egypt, its military reacted cautiously but decisively, on one hand criticizing those US positions while on the other reaffirming its keen interest to maintain Egypt's good relations with the United States.

Apparently, Egypt's Military is in no mood to face the US, realizing how detrimental the US position could be for the survival of the new facts the Military imposed on the ground. Now, it is trying to walk on edge, watching how the US position will be further elaborated although the Military looks somehow relieved by now regarding the US position. Later on, while commenting on the US freeze on delivering the military items to his country, Egypt's Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy stated that 'Egypt will have to turn to other sources for military equipment.' Obviously, he is implying here that Egypt may possibly resort to Russia, as a way to lure the US and discourage her against going too far in her criticism of the Military's move. A scholar at The Middle East Institute in Washington, Mohamed Almenshawy (2013), wrote an online article in which he quotes Minister Fahmi as saying that 'Cairo's relations with Washington have become "turbulent" ...that the Egyptian public has adopted an unprecedented negative perception of the United States.' The writer concludes by expecting that the US-Egypt bilateral relations will experience further difficulties in the future.

The European Union's reaction

Whereas Egypt's political turmoil may well be a source of deep apprehension in the US, essentially regarding Israel's security while, actually, hardly posing any direct threats against US security; it is Europe for whom Egypt's turmoil could be of serious repercussions against its security and stability given the obvious geographic proximity and much interconnectivity between Europe and Egypt. Obviously, Egypt's security and stability is of a paramount importance for Europe.

Following the 3 July move, the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton issued a statement that, effectively, expresses hopes and includes some urges and calls on or upon but actually contains not one single word denouncing or unequivocally criticizing the Military's move.¹ During a visit to Cairo then, Ashton met with the interim president, Adly Mansour, and regretted 'being unable to meet Morsi,' adding that she believes 'he should be released.'

In fact, one may assume here that this position has been quite disappointing to the millions of Arabs and other Middle Easterners who were hopeful that the EU's position would be clear enough in opposing Egypt Military's move. In an explicit Western criticism of that EU's position, Bruno Waterfield (2013) wrote a very interesting article in the British *Telegraph* on 4 July 2013. He accuses the EU outright of 'Appeasing the Military Coup d'état in Egypt', describing its statement as 'disgraceful, dishonest...expressing the deep moral vacuum...meanly mouthed platitudes shrouding a "realist" diplomacy that accepts dictatorship in the name of stability.' He harshly criticises not only the EU statement and lady Ashton but also the US and British positions for 'neglecting to even mention... [let alone] condemning an army coup d'état ...[that] it is clearly exactly that ..[because] then the US and the EU would be forced to take sanctions against the Egyptian regime... interrupt[ing] the cosy world of diplomatic bureaucracy.' He labels the street protests as part of 'the contents of politics that should lead to new elections not [the military taking the step it took.]' The writer concludes by denouncing the Egyptian liberals' rejoice at the arrest and jailing of their political opponents, considering that as 'a deadly principle to establish in politics,' and affirming that the West's reaction and the international acceptance means that 'it is armed state power not voters, or political debate, that has the final say in Egypt.'

Return of the old regime

Probably, the best way to summarise the current situation in Egypt is by quoting Hazem Saghieh (2013) – a prominent Arab intellectual and writer – who inked an interesting article entitled: 'These are Regimes that Do Not Go,' published last August by the *Al hayat*-a London-based Saudi newspaper. Saghieh states it bluntly that the current Egyptian regime and the like in the region are simply: 'regimes that

do not go.' He labels the current Egyptian Military's status as the 'regime of July 23' [1952]-the old Egyptian regime that has—effectively—been ruling Egypt since 1952. Saghieh sets it clear that 'what the 23 July regime is saying is that it is not ready to accept the change that has been opened by the January 2011 revolution.' He recounts the recent events only to conclude that the Egyptian regime is one of those regimes that may intermittently change their outlook while retaining their grip on power by keeping the core essence of the autocratic military rule intact and in effect.

Practically speaking, the Military's move is nothing less than an outright coup d'état, but with a seemingly peaceful and legitimate nature. Whereas the very classical coup d'état involves opposing military units suddenly getting into fierce infighting over authority with a lot of bloodshed all along, or something of that nature; this one in Egypt did achieve the same results but with an Egyptian flavour: no military infighting but with a significant bloodshed immediately thereafter, this time against absolutely armless civilians. With that move, Egypt and the whole region did receive a big blow and setback as the new wave-the third wave of democratic change- that peoples of the Arab World have long been expecting; has virtually turned into a mirage.

Today, Egypt's Military is doing everything available to it to reverse any gains that the Egyptian people might have attained as a result of their 11 January 2011 revolution, beside doing its utmost, albeit hardly visibly at times, to further consolidate power in its own hands. These are some of what the Military is currently doing to attain its purposes:

Amendment of the interim constitution

The Military has set a new committee to amend the national constitution, away from that put forth by the pro-Islamic establishment following Mubarak's ouster. Amr Moussa, a former Egyptian Foreign Minister during Mubarak's era and Ex-Arab League Secretary General were appointed president of 'The committee of 50' as it was called since it comprised fifty personalities. The Brotherhood refused all that is related to the committee, labelling it as totally 'unconstitutional and illegal.' On 22 October 2013, the committee held its first and closed meeting. Spokesman for the committee declared that the committee remains intent on concluding its work by 3 December 2013 which is exactly sixty days from the start of its work as was originally mandated. The committee's work did face some considerable criticism and discrediting by many political parties and personalities.

Maha Abu Bakr, member of the politburo of the '*Tamarod* [Rebellion]' movement and a substitute member of the '50 Committee' said in an interview with *Al Arabiya* Satellite T.V station on 22 October 2013 that 'there are increasing doubts that the committee's outcome would be reliable enough.' She claimed that

‘there are huge procedural and organizational wrongdoings and flaws surrounding the committee’s work such as the Committee president’s decision to hold its first meeting behind closed doors rather than holding it transparently as the case should be.’ Citing another flaw, she said that contrary to the initial arrangement and the will of the majority of political factions in the country, the committee has held its first meeting exclusively with its original members without the substitute ones attending or participating as was the initial arrangement, thus possibly depriving the Committee from their positive contribution especially that they represent the wider political spectrum.’ She did explicitly convey her fears that ‘at the end, the draft constitution would be adopted in a secretive manner behind closed doors and would subsequently lose its credibility with the Egyptian people once it is declared and put to public vote.’

The Military’s role in appointing the defence minister

The Military is also proposing that the nomination of the Minister of Defence should not be the exclusive right of the president or the political establishment and that the so-called ‘Higher Council of The Armed Forces’ should retain a reasonable authority over such nomination. The military explains its position by claiming that the military establishment’s highest posts should not be subject to political manipulation or bargains, and that the establishment should retain a considerable degree of independence from the political establishment in a way that facilitates the execution of its detrimental role of ‘guaranteeing the country’s sovereignty and security.’

The fierce media campaign

Although bashing the Brotherhood has become fashionable following the 3 July move; it is the Military’s unprecedented media campaign against the Brotherhood that remains, by far, the more implacable, intrigues and dangerous since it is the government that is setting such a tone, knowing in advance that this will reverberate and resonate throughout the whole society. The campaign relies primarily on the so-called ‘The Nationalist Newspapers’ of *Alahram*, *Aljumhuriyah* and *Alakhbar* that are owned and run by the government’s “Supreme Council for Journalism”.

On 21 October 2013 for example, *Alahram* newspaper had more than eight articles of the kind published in one single edition. Following is a review of some of them and others:

- a- In an editorial entitled: ‘The Brotherhood Buys The International Media,’ (2013) the paper hails ‘Britain’s Financial Times who ...refused to publish a paid article proposed by the Brotherhood against ‘other European newspapers such as Britain’s The Guardian and Germany’s *Frankfurter Allgemeine*

- Zeitung.*' The newspaper bluntly denounces many American and European newspapers and media outlets who 'submitted to the Brotherhood's money and accepted to publish such paid articles that misinforms and deludes the public opinion by labelling the great Egyptian people's revolution [the 3 July move] as a coup d'état,' accusing them to have 'sold out themselves...career, credibility...and their consciousness against the Brotherhood's money.'
- b- Another article in Alahram by Ismail Juma'a (2013) harshly bashes the United States, quotes some Egyptian political and military experts recounting the details 'of an American plot' to use the Brotherhood in order to implicate Egypt in continuous conflicts that drain its resources...[aiming] to disintegrate it.' Speaking of the 3 July move in poetic, heroic and patriotic terms, it concludes by expecting a harsh US fight back utilizing all resources available, 'with the goal of preventing the newly arising Arab alliance under Egypt's patronage.' The next day, On 22 October, the same paper came up with close to five articles-almost with a copy contents as those of the day before.
- c- "The Tails of American Globalization" was the title of an article by Yusri Abdullah (2013), trailing back the bloody history of the Brotherhood to its founder Sayyed Qutub, calling him "a terrorist," then relating it all to 'the American enterprise and its European complicit partner in the region, while another article in the same edition written by Ashraf Abdul Muneim (2013) basically likens the tactics employed by the Brotherhood to those of flocks of Ants, Bees and Locusts where they successively attack the target in huge formations until the enemy falls apart.' He explains how the Egyptian security forces succeeded in employing some counter tactics that foiled the formers,' and greatly rejoices at 'the considerable skills gained.' Addressing the reader, he concludes that 'thou do not be surprised once "The Arab Spring's Arrows" are reversed back, and the US, other Western and Arab countries rush to the Egyptian army and security forces applying for help and for acquiring those skills.'
- d- Similarly, Ismail Juma'a, (2013) in another such article blames it all on 'the joint US-Turkish-Qatari conspiracy employing huge resources, utilizing the Brotherhood through terrorist activities to effect every possible harm against Egypt to end up dividing it,' even implicating both Pakistan and Turkey as the venue for those partners' meetings. Anticipating further unrest with the Brotherhood soon continuing their fight back against the Military; the writer harshly criticizes the 'weakness of the government,' calls upon it to be 'far more decisive in its fight against the Brotherhood.' Apparently, the writer incites the Military's strong and decisive reactions, vindicating, in advance, any possible violence on its part.

- e- Two similar articles in *Al Youm El Sabea* (2013)-an ‘independent newspaper’-depict the Brotherhood as an Octopus terrorist organization with super reach and unprecedented, internal and external capabilities to rein terror wherever and whenever it deems necessary. One of the articles calls upon ‘the government to immediately identify the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and all its leaders, staff, supporters and members as actual members in this terrorist organization.’ What is quite amazing is that the paper does not seem to recognize that those it labels as ‘terrorists’ do count a couple of millions of the Egyptian people, plus or minus, beside that they have just elected the Brotherhood’s candidate to the presidency of the country, only a year ago. The paper’s article of twenty-one lines has the root word ‘terror’ deployed eighteen times exactly.

Instead of the government sincerely adhering to its sacred responsibility to set the right conciliatory and civic tone to relax the society and defuse tension, thereby enhancing it for all parties to come to terms and agree on what is good for the national interests; the government is leading such an aggressive, hardly responsible, and nationally divisive campaign. Obviously, the government fails to realize the detrimental role its own language and tone could play in setting the right tone for the country’s political discourse. What could be stunning here is not only the exceptionally bizarre contents of hundreds of similar articles in as much as the dehumanization, language and lexicon that are being employed to smear the Brotherhood and hold it responsible for every single malady in Egypt, past and present-something that does necessarily cast serious shadows at the sincerity and maturity of the Military, and exposes its proclaimed ‘noble intent’ to attain a society that is inclusive of everyone, and to guarantee prosperity, social peace, stability and modernity for the country. By setting on such a track, the Military is refuting its own claims that it is exactly that very social peace, stability and prosperity that it is intent on protecting and perpetuating. Of course, the Brotherhood’s counter media campaign against the Military is similarly reckless and divisive but the point that makes the real difference here is that it is nonsense putting the two on equal footing, not only because it is the Military that is ruling now but also because it is on the basis of these very values that the Military is vindicating its whole story, and still, it respects not.

The proposed new Protest Law

The interim government has proposed a new ‘Protest Law’, quickly trying to have it passed and implemented as soon as possible, but the draft law was immediately showered with unprecedented criticism and doubts not only inside Egypt but also by other external parties including Amnesty International. Those reverberations convinced the government to withdraw it on the basis that it intends to put it to

'societal dialogue.' Justice Minister, Counsellor Mohamad Amin was quoted by *Alaharam* newspaper² as saying that the interim government, and 'due to time constraints, has quickly submitted the draft law to the Presidency and The State Council directly without it being reviewed first by The National Council for Human Rights, but it now decided to relegate it first to the said council.' The paper also quoted Ahmad Bura'i, Minister for Social Welfare with similar contents, adding that 'the government will soon regain the said draft law and will negotiate it with The National Council For Human Rights and other legal and revolutionary organizations as part of the necessary legislations for the interim period.' Apparently, the interim government realized that to pass and implement the draft law in such a manner will certainly create huge problems and resistance from most political and legal parties in the country and abroad. It has therefore quickly decided to avoid all that and to follow another path, albeit hardly any more sincere. The prevailing feelings and expectations by most relevant parties reflect growing fears that the new law may significantly entrenches on the human rights of the people to organize demonstrations expressing their views. Interestingly, a small piece of news in the *Al ahram* newspaper³ on 23 October reads as follows: 'Prime Minister Hazem Albiblawi has met yesterday with Jalal Said, Cairo city's Mayor...[who] asserted that a committee will be set to follow on the development of the Tahrir square....'

Now, as it is well known, Tahrir square is the main square in Cairo that hosted the huge demonstrations and sit-ins since the very beginning of the Egyptian revolution back in February 2011. What the Military might be trying to do is to effect some kind of deep changes on the square to render it an improbable and inappropriate location for any future demonstrations or sit-ins, *a la* measures implemented recently by the authorities in the city of Manama, the capital of Bahrain, who changed the profile, appearance and nature of the *Alluolua'a*–Pearl square in Manama city where the anti-Royal family demonstrations and mass sit-ins were staged during last year. Ironically, what some autocratic authorities think is that by effecting similar profound changes to the appearance and nature of a symbolic location like the *Tahrir* or Pearl squares, you will be rooting out from peoples' minds the idea or the thought of demonstrating or revolting against the government and the regime!

In the same token, Amnesty International (2013) responded to this draft law by issuing a two-page Public Statement on 18 October 2013 in which it states the dangers that such a law would pose on social peace and order. The statement details and explains many items in the draft law, proving its illegitimacy and impracticality, besides showing how the law constitutes real entrenchments on democratic and other civic and human rights norms and laws. Amnesty International does courageously compares this draft law with that promulgated during president Mori's tenor only

to conclude that this one 'is more repressive than similar legislation proposed by Mohamed Morsi's government.' The Statement concludes by saying that 'President Adly Mansour should not sign any protest law that does not fully meet international law and standards.'

The upcoming Anti-Terrorism law

Following the 3 July move, and in mid-August, the interim government imposed the 'Emergency law,' for a period of three months ending mid-November 2013. The government intended to introduce a new Anti-Terrorism draft law soon then to fill up the expected vacuum in November, but ignored that for the time being, possibly for the following reasons:

1. It is under the jurisdiction of the 'Emergency Law' that former president *Mubarak* was and being tried. With this law invalid anymore, the government will be in an awkward position as to what to do with *Mubarak*.
2. Introduction of this Law will certainly encounter considerable criticism and resistance by the opposition, the Brotherhood and others including the civil society, as it will be quite unlikely for those to accept the Military's pretext for the introduction of this law that it aims to fight terrorism.
3. Introduction of this law will be a heavy burden on the interim president himself since he will be responsible for any abuse therein, as he currently holds all legislative powers in his hands after these were suspended on July 3rd.
4. Even if one supposes that the introduction of this law is not meant from the outset to embolden the Military and enables it to face up to the Brotherhood's future activities and action; once the new law enters into force, the interim government might be tempted to apply it when it needs-something that will certainly bring the government into a new vicious cycle of escalation, this time not exclusively with the Brotherhood but also with many other possible contenders.

To sum up some different reactions to this draft law, it might be enough to quote Counsellor Ashraf Albaroudi-a justice of Cairo's Court of Appeals – in an interview with "Panorama" program broadcasted on *ALArabiya* T.V channel, evening of 23 October 2013. Albaroudi emphasizes that 'the current Egyptian penal code of 1986 does cover the vast majority of all incidents and cases pertaining to the fight of terrorism.' He clarifies that the main purpose of promulgating laws in any country is "to build confidence between the government and the citizens on one hand, and among the population of that country themselves on the other while it is obvious enough that the main goal of promulgating such laws in Egypt now is to suppress freedom of expression under the rubric of fighting terrorism." Albaroudi adds that this expected law is one of a bunch of 'exceptional laws' and that 'they

constitute a huge insult against all those who are or might be involved in their promulgation.' He concludes by saying that 'those who are setting these laws want to exchange the society's safety and security against its freedom...while enough experiences of thirty years of Mubarak's rule have taught us clearly that those who accept this kind of bargain will definitely end up losing both.'

The presidential elections and the current stand off

Whereas the election of the president was put as the final step in the so-called "Road Map for the Future" put forth by the Military itself on 3rd July; the Military-through its proxy government- seems intent on changing that, trying to delay the parliamentary elections until after that of the president, apparently in a desperate move to control and manipulate the upcoming parliamentary elections and take it in the direction that the de-facto regime wants, or at least to guarantee that whichever party wins the parliamentary elections won't be able to bring a different president-who will ultimately be the real leader of the country regardless of who is who in the parliament.

Since 3 July, the Military and their government made sure that 'ordinary Egyptians' venture out to the streets from time to time to express their 'vocal and spontaneous support' for al-sisi and his 'historic, exceptional and patriotic stance and leadership of the country.' Numerous current rumours and speculations in the Egyptian media and within the political and other elite clearly indicate that General al-sisi will resign from his military post in due course of time ahead of him contesting the presidential elections. Thus, by setting the stage for al-sisi to contest the upcoming presidential elections; and most probably to win that election, the full and unequivocal return of the old regime that has been governing Egypt in effect since the so-called July 1952 revolution will have achieved its full course.

Conclusion

As stated earlier in this article, the main theme that was illustrated upon here is that what has happened in Egypt on 3 July, and regardless of any name or code that it might be given to, does represent a considerable blow and set back to the Egyptian people's true and spontaneous revolution of February 2011 in particular and the 'Arab Spring' in general. True that the Moslem Brotherhood is not widely popular in Egypt and true that the movement's incapability to govern and to lead, at least for now, is somehow largely agreed on, still, the 3 July move could prove as counterproductive and harmful as the rule of the Brotherhood itself.

To quote Hazem Saghieh (2013) again, in an article as he says: 'Although the policies of *Morsi* and the Egyptian Brotherhood do not vindicate that coup d'état against them, those policies remain closer to follies that do utterly fail to comprehend the alphabet of politics, of running the state and the boundaries of

democratic entrust. Instead of the Brotherhood's experience becoming an example for other countries' Brotherhoods -particularly that it starts from Egypt- it ended up, in turn and instead; a burden on the later.'

In fact, had there been no such intentions of retaking power and bringing Egypt back to the status quo ante, the Military have had numerous other ways and means to set the right tone and safe track for the country, luring the Brotherhood and the other players in the society to effect the right perceived outcome for the country's multi- socioeconomic problems and power struggle. The Military have had available to it considerable assets that it could rely on to make sure that the checks and balances it imposes-and itself respects-achieve tangible results and lead to the real change and positive outcome for Egypt as a whole.

Thus, the dilemma that currently engulfs Egypt is that neither the Brotherhood's rule nor that of the Military is predominantly appealing. The continuation of the old Egyptian regime through the 3 July 3 move represents a continuation of the bitter, overtly inefficient and vastly corrupt old regime that has taken Egypt and its people absolutely nowhere after more than six decades of its rule as all facts in Egypt do clearly attest to. Egyptians do have compelling evidence that the Mubarak regime was a sterilized hierarchy, never capable of delivering or taking Egypt to where it really deserves: to becoming a modernized, democratic, enlightened country with a viable modern economy capable of responding to the increasing needs of its population. Modern history has clearly shown that militaries could be, at times, notoriously deceitful and vigorously unaccountable, and that in most developing countries, the Military talk the talk but they very seldom do walk the walk. Structurally and institutionally, the Military is incapable of that. It only follows that to permit this same regime to continue ruling a great country like Egypt would only mean that any 'presumed stability or progress' that the regime may succeed in achieving, if ever, would only be considerably short-lived. The world's huge and accumulative experiences have largely proven that true democracy is the best and shortest way for a viable society and a sustained stability and prosperity. If six decades of ruling Egypt did not suffice for the old regime to achieve anything tangible on any level, there is absolutely no reason to believe that this new version of the same old regime will, or even can, be any different. What may one expects on the short and medium range is continuous instability and tension, or may be worse. The almost daily demonstrations by the Brotherhood's members and supporters in different parts and locations throughout the country, particularly in the universities- the Brotherhood's strongholds- is only an example of what is to come. Obviously this can never be the best prescription neither for Egypt's future nor for that of the region as a whole.

It will be quite impressive if the new version of the regime truly succeeds in effecting real change and in taking Egypt to a true and viable democracy, whether

soon or thereafter but; considering the actions, measures, policies, language and propaganda that were illustrated earlier in this article, one cannot have much faith that that may happen.

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Heroic Leniency: Iran and the United States

Immanuel Wallerstein

In the diplomatic negotiations that are now quite unexpectedly blossoming between Iran and the United States, one has to say that the Iranians have shown the greater capacity for verbal formulas that catch popular imagination. When the new President of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, suggested that Iran would be willing to engage in diplomacy with what the Iranians used to call the Great Satan, everyone held their breath until we all knew if Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, would endorse these efforts.

On 17 September, Khamenei said in a speech: "I agree with what I called 'heroic leniency' years ago because such an approach is very good and necessary in certain situations, as long as we stick to our main principles." Armed with the endorsement for heroic leniency, Rouhani went to the United Nations to start the process. He and President Obama danced carefully in the public limelight, and avoided going so far as to shake hands publicly. However, both sides agreed to have U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iran's Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, meet publicly and privately to explore common ground.

One result was the Iranian suggestion to the United States that Obama telephone Rouhani, which he did. Rouhani said that the phone call showed "constructive interaction." Obama no doubt agreed with the formulation. But from constructive interaction to successful negotiations is a long distance, with not much time to complete the trajectory. The question for both sides is how "lenient" they can be in their "constructive interaction" and still "stick to (their) main principles." It does seem to require heroism.

It seems that both Rouhani and Obama would like these negotiations to be successful for the same three reasons on each side. First, they both feel that warfare would be a disaster for their own countries. Secondly, they both think that a success in these negotiations would strengthen their own hand considerably in internal politics. Thirdly, they are both keenly aware of the limits of their real power, both

personal and national. Failure would weaken them immensely, both personally and nationally.

Still, both sides find considerable (perhaps I should say formidable) opposition in their own camp. Each side needs to be able to persuade its home audience that it got the better of the deal in any final agreement. Generally speaking, a true win-win resolution of conflicts is rare, and this is a particularly contentious and long-lasting controversy, quite a nasty one in fact.

So we must explore how much room there is for “heroic leniency.” The short answer is not much. First of all, there is deep distrust on both sides. The Iranians know that the United States has been engaged in trying to arrange regime changes ever since the CIA successfully conspired to oust Mohammad Mossadegh as Prime Minister in 1953, a misdeed at last acknowledged by President Obama. They believe that the United States is still in this game, although President Obama now says it isn’t, or it isn’t any longer.

The United States remembers the seizure of its embassy in Teheran in 1979, and the long imprisonment in the embassy of its personnel. Furthermore, the United States believes that the current Iranian regime has been trying for quite some time to become a nuclear power, despite multiple denials by the Iranian authorities, including by Ayatollah Khamenei himself.

The hawks in both countries believe that nothing has changed, and that no diplomatic statements by the other side are to be given the least credence. Let us start with the best-case scenario. Let us assume that both Rouhani and Obama mean what they are currently saying, that is, that the hawks are wrong and that both men are trying honestly to find a formula that would prove the hawks wrong.

What would they have to do to prove the hawks wrong? Quite a lot. The bottom line for the Iranians is that the United States recognize that they have the same rights concerning nuclear energy that all other countries have under current international law, which is the right to enrich uranium. This doesn’t mean that Iran necessarily has to develop nuclear armaments. The Iranians note that many countries (for example, South Korea and Brazil) have levels of uranium enrichment that the United States (and of course Israel) insist be denied to Iran. From the Iranian point of view, this is not only a breach of international law but an affront to their dignity.

The bottom line for the United States seems to be some verifiable guarantee that Iran will not actually develop nuclear weapons. For how many years (forever?) the United States expects such a commitment is not at all clear. One of the problems here is that it is not so easy to verify the implementation of such a commitment.

The negotiations concerning Syria’s political future, which is being called Geneva 2, are perhaps key to the possibility of an Iranian-United States accord. The Russians, who have played the prime role in heading off U.S. military action

in Syria, are arguing for the inclusion of Iran among the participants. Should they succeed in convincing the United States and the west Europeans that this is a sensible idea, it will go some way to reassuring the Iranians that they are being taken seriously as a participant in decisions concerning their region.

But of course Geneva 2 may never take place, with or without Iran. At the moment, the so-called Syrian rebels are resisting coming, and if some come, it is not clear whether they can really commit the main fighting forces inside Syria.

Iran and the United States have important common interests in the region – in matters concerning Afghanistan and Iraq as well as in matters concerning Syria and Palestine. But to assert this objectively does not mean that this analysis will carry the day. The odds in fact seem small. But then a few weeks ago I would have said the same about the developments in Syria. There may yet be surprises.

The Iraq Crisis and Its Regional Implications

Ninan Koshy

The declaration, on the eve of Ramadan, in 2014, of the establishment of an Islamic State in the territories captured by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – often translated as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham - (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria, is one of the most significant events in the history of West Asia in recent times and having far-reaching consequences. We can no longer talk about the Iraq crisis except in terms of the crisis having led to the establishment of the Islamic State.

It is the dramatic military success of the ISIS in Iraq that led to this new phase in the developments in the region. The ISIS took advantage of two trends: growing disenchantment among Iraq's minority Sunnis towards Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Shiite-led government, which they accuse of discrimination and the increasingly sectarian dimension of the civil war, as Sunni rebels fought to oust a regime dominated by members of a Shiite sect. These came from the legacy of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and subsequent developments. In fact what we see in Iraq today is the balance sheet of the War on Terror.

In 2001, in the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, President Bush declared the 'War on Terror.' The main target was Al Qaeda but Bush expanded the scope of the war and said, "The War on Terror will now turn regimes that sponsor terror and threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction'. He named North Korea, Iran and Iraq and said "States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil aiming to threaten the peace of the world". He gave a clear warning to 'the axis of evil'. This was the background of the illegal invasion of Iraq by the USA in 2003. At the time of the US invasion of Iraq, there were no terrorist outfits in Iraq, no weapons of mass destruction and no nuclear weapon programme there. US President Bush and the British Prime Minister Blair produced false evidence to find a 'just cause' for the occupation of Iraq in the name of the "War on Terror". Colin Powell, Bush's Secretary of Defence

who had presented this ‘evidence’ before the UN Security Council later admitted that it was false.

“Iraq suffers from the legacy of mistakes the US made during and after its invasion in 2003. It suffers from the resurgence of violent Sunni extremist movements like Al Qaeda and equally violent Shiite militias. It suffers from the intense pressure of Iran and near-isolation by several key states. It has increasingly become the victim of the forces unleashed by Syrian civil war”, a report of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies said in May 2014 (Cordesman and Khazai (2014).

Saddam Hussein maintained Iraq as a nation by a combination of an authoritarian secular policy and use of force. The US invasion unravelled the Iraqi nation state and paved the way for its disintegration. Occupying armies cannot build or rebuild nations, once again it was proved. The latest example of this is Libya. What the US left, eight years after the invasion, was a Shiite dominated administration which treated the Sunnis as second-class citizens, turned against them and suppressed them. If the US had thought of continuing its influence in Iraq they were disappointed. The US plan to station troops there, after the withdrawal, was rejected by Prime Minister al-Maliki, obviously under pressure from Iran. The country came under the direct influence of Iran, with an administration loyal to the neighbouring Shiite country.

The dramatic military advance and capture of Mosul by ISIS turned a new page in the history of West Asia. The ISIS was born in 2004, an year after US invasion, first as Al Qaeda in Iraq and then two years later it was reborn as the Islamic State of Iraq. They had in it the veterans of the insurgency against the US-UK occupation of Iraq. It had nothing to do with Syria at that time.

When the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, it was the Islamic State of Iraq under the dynamic leadership of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi that helped set up the Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria Jabhat al-Nusura. There have been differences and even clashes between ISIS but from mid-2013, ISIS has retained control of a large area in Northern Syria. ISIS looks at Syria and Iraq as one “interchangeable battlefield and its ability to shift the resources and personnel across the border has measurably strengthened its position in both theatres” (Prashad 2014). The civil war in Syria came as a gift to ISIS.

ISIS is a jihadist movement claiming to represent a state, redrawing the present borders of states in the region. One of the pictures released by ISIS has the caption “Sykes-Picot destruction.” Sykes and Picot were respectively representatives of the colonial powers of Britain and France which drew the map of the region in 1916. The ISIS wants to destroy the map and the borders it delineates. The ISIS has a high level of motivation and clear territorial ambitions. Emerging from the festering civil war of Syria, it was fairly easy for ISIS to exploit the deep discontent

in Iraq created by the weak and famously corrupt government of Nouri al-Maliki. It received support from former Baathist leaders, officers and soldiers of Saddam Hussein's army who joined its ranks and Sunni tribal chiefs.

In several ways, this new generation jihadist movement is unprecedented: in the territorial gains it has made within a very short period, in the immense financial resources it has, in the military leadership whose strategy and tactics are far superior to those of the Iraqi army, the mint-fresh military equipment it has got from the Iraqi army's collapse in Mosul and other places. Its claims and gains are those of a state actor, not a non-state actor. Its ambitious goal aiming to establish a vast Islamic state governed by Sharia law in the territory from the middle of Iraq into central Syria, had been made clear from the outset.

The immediate question however is whether the ISIS will be able to retain control of the territory it has captured. Related, perhaps more important are the questions whether they will be able to win the confidence of the local populace in the territory and whether they will be able to provide a viable administration.

It is true that the discipline and motivation of the ISIS and its military strategy and tactics can be given as reasons for the collapse of the Iraqi army. But that is not the only or main reason. What the Iraqi experience has reaffirmed is that a necessary pre-condition for an effective national army is the existence of a coherent nation-state. Notwithstanding the best efforts of the US and its military, the stark reality is that an effective military force cannot be built on a fundamentally broken foundation. In the fragmented Iraqi society where ethnic divisions have been hardened by communal violence, a truly national force was almost impossible by definition. The Iraqi army acted like a vast state-sponsored Shiite militia which was used by al-Maliki, mainly for the suppression of Sunnis. It is clear that it is not motivated to defend what is left of the nation.

In the analyses we read on the Iraqi crisis, we read little about oil. The insurgents are not only fighting against the political structure in Baghdad and its security forces but they are fighting for a fair share in what al-Maliki described as "Iraq's national patrimony" namely the oil resources. They are demanding a just redistribution of the oil revenue.

Communities across Iraq, especially in embattled areas began demanding funding for reconstruction, often backed by local and provincial governments. Maliki government relentlessly and consistently refused to allocate any oil revenues for reconstruction and development projects. Instead the resources went to the building of the army and for military purchases to the tune of billions of dollars.

On June 13, two days after the fall of Mosul, "Iraqi Oil Report" noted that the power stations and other buildings in the Baiji complex were already under the control of local tribes. ISIS is capturing oil fields, refineries and power stations but not destroying them as they want to maintain them and continue their operations.

It is again oil that decided the capture of Kirkuk by the Kurds in the wake of the ISIS advance. The richest oil resources in Northern Iraq are there. Kirkuk has always been claimed by the Kurds as part of Kurdistan and historically their capital.

We should recall at this point that the oil factor of Iraq is not an internal problem but an international one and that the two Iraqi wars (1991 and 2003) were fought by the USA and its allies mainly for oil.

Commenting on a BBC programme on the 1991 Iraq war, *The Guardian* wrote in January 1996, "Perhaps the most important underlying concession in the BBC series is about why the war was actually fought. In reality the Gulf War was fought about oil, as General Brent Scowcroft admitted in the first programme" (*The Guardian Weekly*, 21 January 1996).

"What a black tragic irony that just two months ago, on the anniversary of the 2003 (illegal) invasion of Iraq *The Guardian* reminded that the mass slaughter, the incineration of swathes of towns and cities and the US and UK weapons of mass destruction was not about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction but about oil" (Arbuthnot 2014).

The al-Maliki government has requested the US administration to intervene militarily in Iraq by aerial attacks on the insurgents. Obama knows that aerial strike is not a magic wand. He had declared once an aerial strike on Damascus. He had abjectly to withdraw from the plan. He wanted to build a coalition of the willing for military intervention in Syria, but there was no willing ally. He received support for his plans for military intervention in Syria only from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.

As the CSIS Report points out, "It is hard to think of US action that could be more disastrous than provoking Iraqi resistance by attempting to reintroduce US troops, but it is equally difficult to imagine measures that could do more damage than backing Maliki without regard to his relentless consolidation of power, marginalisation of opposition groups, repression and misuse of the Iraqi security forces and exploitation of Iraq's volatile sectarian divisions" (Cordesman, Anthony and Khazai 2014).

The predicament of the US in Iraq today, raises questions about the coherence, strategic viability and sustainability of its policy in the region. It has exposed the contradictions in its policies and the fragility of its inter-state equations. If Obama had bombed Damascus that would have helped the ISIS and other militant groups and strengthened the hands of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. In Syria Obama could not bomb 'for' the militant groups. Now he wants to 'bomb' against them. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States which encouraged US military intervention in Syria have made it clear that they do not want US military intervention in Iraq. The reasons are obvious.

“The crisis in Iraq has exposed the contradictions in traditional US Middle East alliances in some ways placing the US alongside its sworn enemy Shiite-ruled Iraq while in other ways putting Washington at odds with long-time Sunni allies in the Persian Gulf who want to weaken Iran’s sway over Iraq” (*The Guardian*, 29 June 2014).

There were reports that the US and Iran may cooperate in action, possibly even military action, against the jihadist movement in Iraq. Iran has categorically stated that they do not want any American military action in Iraq. It is simple; the Iranians do not want any American military presence in the neighbouring Shiite country in its orbit. Any new equation between the US and Iran will raise fears in countries like Saudi Arabia. It would have created another strange situation of the US pitted against the Iran-backed Syrian regime and the US and Iran together pitted against the insurgents in Iraq who want to topple the Assad regime. Another factor that would affect US-Iran relations would be progress or otherwise on international negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme.

John Kerry during and after his recent visit has stated that a political solution has to be found within Iraq to solve the crisis. This is easier said than done as the odds against an ‘inclusive government’ in Baghdad are heavy. The key word in his remarks was “consensus” – consensus within Iraq involving all sections of society. But the problem is that a consensus within Iraq is not possible without a consensus regionally and even internationally among the big players. US and its allies know that a consensus government cannot be formed with the leadership of al-Maliki. Al Maliki has rejected the idea of an interim government

The real difficulty about the kind of political solution that Kerry and company advocate is that the country is already divided along sectarian and ethnic lines. A de facto partition of the country has already taken place not along the lines of a ‘soft partition’, which would have attempted to work with the three divisions Shiites, Sunnis and the Kurds to construct a federal Iraqi system with relatively autonomous territories with Baghdad as capital, that some US policy makers earlier proposed.

Kurdistan has enjoyed more than autonomy from 1991 when the US and allies established a no-fly-zone in the north of Iraq. Today it is a semi-autonomous region of Iraq and has considerably progressed in development. With Kirkuk coming under its control, the Kurds can afford to do without Baghdad. Kirkuk has given the Kurds not only the richest oil resources in the North of Iraq but also its historic capital. Kerry has pleaded with the president of the Kurdish region not to secede from Iraq but he could not get any assurance in the matter. The declaration of the Islamic State will reinforce the Kurdish aspirations of becoming a sovereign state.

The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on June 30, in a major foreign policy speech at the Tel Aviv University, called for Kurdish independence from Iraq. He said Israel would support the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in

northern Iraq. He claimed that the creation of the Kurdish state would aid in the alliance of moderate powers in the region (*Wall Street Journal*, 23 June 2014).

Developments in Iraq are sending shock waves throughout the region. The stunning advance of the ISIS has unnerved all of Iraq's neighbours.

Jordan is deeply worried about the Iraqi developments. There are reports on emerging US-Israeli-Jordan cooperation in the wake of the developments in Iraq. Israeli security sources have confirmed that Benjamin Netanyahu government is aware of the Hashemite Kingdom's concern and is assisting through various channels according to need. But the Israelis are not expecting a flare-up that could drag them into the mix in the near future.

"The Israeli Jordanian security bond grew stronger as a result of the last major shock in the Middle East, the Syrian civil war, which has sent nearly a million refugees into Jordan. King Abdullah's condemnation of Israel over inaction in the peace process has all but ceased" (*The Haaretz*, 29 June 2014).

At the same time, international media have reported that Israel has made intelligence and economic overtures to Jordan and Israeli drones have been spotted surveying the Jordan-Syria border meant to help the Jordanians prevent a possible attack from the North. This would come either from the ISIS or Bashar Assad's forces, a scenario that has become less likely over the last year, as Jordan has scaled back its criticism of the Syrian President.

Jordan relies mainly on the US for its security. Even now, roughly half the US F-16 fighter squadrons in the region are stationed in Jordan along with another one thousand or so US military personnel. The American contingent is meant to be a kind of a first strike team on the Syria-Jordan border if one is required. Now the attention will be diverted to the Iraqi border. It is likely if things escalate, Jordan will want assistance from Israel as well but the request for assistance will most likely be routed through the USA.

Turkey, which will be the country directly affected by an independent Kurdistan, appears to have reconciled itself to the imminent possibility. It seems to be giving up on the survival of a unified Iraqi state. That will be a radical shift for Turkey, a key US ally and NATO member. It realises that borders are being redrawn in the region and Iraq is practically divided into three regions. It is already planning to bolster its trade and economic relations with Kurdistan, especially with its new oil resources.

Ever since the overthrow of Saddam's regime in 2003, the Saudi regime has been emphatically hostile towards Iraq. This has been largely due to its deeply entrenched fear that the success of democracy in Iraq would understandably inspire democratic aspirations among its own people. Another reason is the deeply-rooted hatred by Saudi Arabia's extremist Wahabi religious establishment towards the Shiites. The Saudi regime also accuses Maliki of giving Iranians a free hand to

the dramatic increase of the influence of Iran in Iraq. Recent developments have intensified the Sunni-Shiite divide in the region.

The Iraqi crisis and the Syrian crisis are inter-connected. It is difficult to find a solution for one crisis alone. The declaration of the Caliphate has confirmed this, if any had doubts.

The announcement of a Caliphate by the ISIS has serious consequences. Prof. Peter Neumann, International Centre for the Study of Radicalism, King's College London said, "The declaration of a Caliphate showed how confident ISIS is, after making spectacular gains following a spectacular collapse by government forces.". He says that the significance of the announcement should not be underestimated. "It is a declaration of war, not only against the West and all countries that are currently fighting the ISIS but more importantly against Al Qaeda." ISIS now seems themselves as the legitimate leader of the jihadist movement worldwide and they expect everyone to declare allegiance to the Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (*The Guardian*, 30 June 2014).

Brookings analyst Charles Lister also thinks that the Caliphate announcement is very significant. "The impact of this announcement would be global as Al Qaeda affiliates and independent jihadist groups must now definitively choose to support and join the Islamic state or oppose it. The Islamic State's announcement made it clear that it would perceive any group that failed to pledge allegiance an enemy of Islam" (10)

The consequences of the announcement of the Islamic state will be far-reaching and a full evaluation is difficult at the moment. Two things may be mentioned. One, the beleaguered Iraqi state will use this opportunity to ask for and hopefully receive greater international support for dealing with the ISIS. Two, the ISIS declaration of an Islamic State is likely to undermine its already-tenuous alliance with other Sunnis who helped in the capture of much of northern and western Iraq.

The US has dismissed the Caliphate announcement as "meaningless." However, the reactions of the Sunni regimes led by Saudi Arabia will be watched with interest.

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European Elections 2014: Challenges and Prospects

Céline Di Mantova

In May 2014 the world witnessed elections to the two largest Parliaments - the Indian Lok Sabha and the European Parliament. European elections gave voters a chance to influence the future political course of the European Union (EU) when they elected the 751 members of the European Parliament (MEPS) to represent their interests for the next five years. These MEPs will represent over 500 million citizens from the 28 member States.

These elections were distinct in many respects. As EU seeks to find a way out of the economic crisis, it was the most important election to date. For the first time, voters assessed the efforts that have been made to tackle the crisis in the Eurozone and express their views on plans for closer integration. They are also the first elections since the Treaty of Lisbon, a treaty that invests the European Parliament with extensive powers. Among the new developments introduced by the Treaty, it empowers the Parliament to endorse the nomination of the President of the European Commission. European citizens will have a clear say in who takes over at the helm of the EU government. The Parliament - the only directly-elected EU institution - is now a linchpin of the European decision-making system and has an equal say with national governments on nearly all EU laws.

Six years after the beginning of the financial and economic crisis that affected economies worldwide, the Eurozone is still recovering from what has been one of its major challenges since the EU has been set up. This crisis has put a serious threat on the sustainability and legitimacy of the Eurozone like never before. And the numerous urgent summits organized to save the European currency - and the interconnected economies of the member states - exposed its flaws. These last few years the European project seems to be more or less reduced to technical terms, IMF standards, strict budget models and last-chance plans to save European countries from financial ruin. Decisions made jointly by the IMF and the European Commission imposed strict budget cuts on Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal in

order to reassure economic markets and rating agencies, strengthening a popular feeling of distrust towards for the EU.

If a vast majority welcomes the achievements of the European project - from a sectorial cooperation in 1953 to a vast economic zone free from custom tariffs and barriers for goods, commerce and EU citizens - economics is not enough. And the latest economic challenges –i.e. the debt and the euro crisis – enjoined the EU for closer cooperation that would not solely be economically-based.

Then, these elections provided an opportunity to assess EU politics and debate of its future path. The EU faces many challenges and decisions taken in its Parliament will very likely affect EU citizens and regional politics.

Internal challenges: legibility, legitimacy

A recent IFOP survey disclosed that 74% of French people felt distrust to the EU, a critical figure for one of the leading countries of the EU integration process since 1957. The figure equals the English result, the UK being historically Eurosceptic. High unemployment rates and lack of economic perspectives in Europe together with the debt and currency crisis made EU citizens feel Europe is no longer a place for economic prosperity and development and engaged in more criticism. The crisis not only exposed the limits of monetary integration but provided golden opportunities for Eurosceptic parties and governments that use the EU as a scapegoat for national problems. Economic and financial issues reinforced the influence of Brussels' technocrats over national budget schemes while the European Commission imposed liberal policies and strict expenditure cuts on public sectors. The lack of legitimacy of high EU officials increased the sense of malaise and alienation that many Europeans feel vis-à-vis the EU. Populist anti-European parties took advantage of the uneasy feeling of the EU citizens, feeling overwhelmed by the outcome of the process. Although protectionism and economic isolation promoted by populist and Eurosceptic parties might appear unconvincing with regard to the extensive economic integration, they have the merit of questioning the very purpose of European integration. Anti-European discourses get a new legitimacy in the light of the hurdles to the EU integration process. However, contemporary European history reminds us of the critical outcomes of empowering populist parties in times of economic crisis. It would be unfortunate - and potentially dangerous- to grant Eurosceptic parties the monopoly of questioning the future of EU integration.

Strengthen EU regional policy

The on-going Ukraine crisis already impacted the EU, since Russia threatened to cut off gas supply transiting via Ukraine to the rest of Europe. Russia in the winter

of 2009 already stopped gas deliveries to Ukraine causing blackouts in Europe. The EU and the US are currently working on short and long-term plans to reduce Europe's gas dependency on Russia. The plan includes "reverse flows" to Ukraine using pipelines from Slovakia, but Slovakia has warned that Gazprom might have the legal right to block this. The US' new ambassador to the EU, Anthony Luzzatto Gardner declared on 4 April 2014 to the press : "Let's be clear: Gazprom has been using energy as a weapon," referring to Putin's track record of using gas prices to gain political influence in former Soviet and Communist states. The latter events call for urgent EU energy politics and a clear positioning towards Russia's destabilizing attempts in Eastern Europe.

The EU's response to the Arab upheavals called for a new partnership for "democratic change and shared prosperity" with the Southern Mediterranean, as defined in the 8 March 2011 Joint Communication of the High Representative and the European Commission. It outlines an "incentive-inspired approach to assist political, social and economic reforms in the countries of the region, based on mutual accountability, and shared commitment to universal values of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law" (Zafirion 2011). The European Neighbourhood Policy, adopted in May, 2011 provides additional input on how this action should be implemented. In addition to the EUR5, 7 billion budgeted for the Southern Neighbourhood and the EUR 350 million budgeted to SPRING (Support for Partnership Reform and Inclusive Growth) promised to the countries showing progress at democratisation, institution-building and inclusive growth ; the new EU southern Mediterranean policy includes new enhancement on trade and investment, an increased participation of youth from Southern Mediterranean in the student exchange programme *Erasmus Mundus* (provided with EUR 20 million) and EUR 22 million to a Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility. The future will tell us whether the European intent is purely tactical, or if a new strategic deal is taking shape.

EU relations maintained troubled relationships with the countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean for many years, mainly because of the impact of migration issues. The Mediterranean Sea is a transnational immigration space. Tragic events linked to a strong increase of migratory pressures at the borders of Europe underlined the importance of a quick action in this area. Since 2013, 31,000 migrants intended to reach the European borders crossing the Mediterranean Sea. In the last four years, 4,000 migrants died. Europe's humanist tradition of asylum rights is being replaced by a closed-border security policy. The EU needs therefore to implement such valuable goals and continue on better integrating migration related issues in its external relations policy.

Adopt a clear foreign policy to gain visibility on the international stage

Seeking for a more active role in international affairs, the EU has developed a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). On many foreign policy and security issues, the EU member states exert a powerful collective influence. Critics assert that “on the whole the EU remains an economic power and its foreign policy have (sic) little global impact,” and points out the inherent difficulty of reaching a consensus among the 28 member states governments. A lack of consensus can hinder the development of a long-term strategic foreign strategy to an issue or a region. The EU is often criticized, for example, for lacking a clearly defined strategic approach to Russia, or to China. Furthermore, the EU foreign policy suffers from a lack of coherence and institutional coordination. Some EU members weigh trade, human rights or energy politics differently according to national interests (Mix 2013).

The EU has been exploring ways to increase their military capabilities and to strengthen greater defence integration. These efforts have met with little results so far. Most European military budgets have been reduced, exacerbated by the impact of the Eurozone crisis, which has caused many countries to adopt austerity programs. CSDP mainly focus on civilian missions and operations such as police training and rule of law. The EU shows comparative advantages as an actor in situations where government’s development is an issue. Some analysts view civilian intervention will be central in defining the future of CSDP.

The CSDP missions are generally undertaken on the basis of a U.N. mandate or with the agreement of the host country. The EU has a police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) that mentors and trains the Afghan police forces. Launched in 2006, the EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) to improve the law-enforcement of the Palestinian Civil Force. In Iraq, the EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission aims at training Iraqi police, judges and forces since the 2005 takeover. The EU has launched a number of missions to enhance the peace process of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The EU has been especially active in Africa, conducted 14 CSDP missions on that continent since 2003. The EU aimed at reinforcing political stability and governance in Niger and Sahel region, conducted a military training mission in Mali and maritime anti-piracy missions in Somalia. On the Eastern European side, CSDP also carried civilian police missions and peacekeeping operations in Macedonia, Georgia, Kosovo, Ukraine and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Besides direct CSDP operations, the EU is seeking for new partnerships. China, Japan, Russia, Australia and other east-Asian countries are now privileged partners of the US, whose foreign policy attests a shift from an Atlantic perspective to a Pacific centre of gravity. Furthermore, Europe economic future is significantly tied to the development of emerging world powers. According to Josef Janning, Associate Fellow of the Center for European Policy Studies, “the current representation of

European countries in the G-8, G-20, in IMF and World Bank, in the UN Security Council will become increasingly anachronistic.” It is crucial for the EU to design a BRICS policy (Janning 2013).

US Congress Report emphasized the enhanced role of the European Parliament in EU’s foreign policy. Although the European Parliament is not “directly involved in CDSP decision-making, the European Parliament has a influence on European foreign policy. It has 41 interparliamentary delegations that maintain parliament-to-parliament relations and representatives of many countries around the world” (Mix 2013).

International politics, regional policy and internal challenges together could define what could be the Europe of tomorrow. European elections actually provide an opportunity to give a clear content to the European integration project. However, the level of abstention varied from 10% to 83% across Europe. The most striking outcome is the victory of anti-EU parties. France is undoubtedly the country where the breakthrough of far-right party National Front (Front National) was the biggest, with 25% votes. As many others national-populist parties that scored well in the elections, it stands for exiting the Euro zone, strengthening control on borders and promotes national sovereignty. The UKIP, the winning party in the UK, wants to exit the European Union and limit immigration. Nevertheless, these populist parties will have troubles to form a group at the European Parliament since the core of their positions highlights national priority over alliances. Yet, they will be able to block and question Brussels technocracy decisions. More is needed than a plausible argument to reconcile Europeans with their institutions once more.

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Capitalists, Technocrats and Fanatics: The Ascent of a New Power Bloc

James Petras

The sweeping electoral victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India is the latest expression of the world-wide advance of a new power bloc which promises to impose a New World Order harnessing ethno-religious fanaticism and narrowly trained technocrats to capitalist absolutism. The far-right is no longer at the margins of western political discourse. It is center-stage. It is no longer dependent on contributions by local militants; it receives financing from the biggest global corporations. It is no longer dismissed by the mass media. It receives feature coverage, highlighting its 'dynamic and transformative' leadership.

Today capitalists everywhere confront great uncertainty, as markets crash and endemic corruption at the highest levels erode competitive markets. Throughout the world, large majorities of the labor force question, challenge and resist the massive transfers of public wealth to an ever reduced oligarchy. Electoral politics no longer define the context for political opposition.

Capitalism, neither in theory nor practice, advances through reason and prosperity. It relies on executive fiat, media manipulation and arbitrary police state intrusions. It increasingly relies on death squads dubbed "Special Forces" and a 'reserve army' of para-military fanatics. The new power bloc is the merger of big business, the wealthy professional classes, upwardly mobile, elite trained technocrats and cadres of ethno-religious fanatics who mobilize the masses. Capitalism and imperialism advances by uprooting millions, destroying local communities and economies, undermining local trade and production, exploiting labor and repressing social solidarity. Everywhere it erodes community and class solidarity.

Ethno-Religious Fanatics and Elite Technocrats

Today capitalism depends on two seemingly disparate forces - the irrational appeal of ethno-religious supremacists and narrowly trained elite technocrats to advance

the rule of capital. Ethno-religious fanatics seek to promote bonds between the corporate-warlord elite and the masses, by appealing to their 'common' religious ethnic identities. The technocrats serve the elite by developing the information systems, formulating the images and messages deceiving and manipulating the masses and designing their economic programs.

The political leaders meet with the corporate elite and warlords to set the political-economic agenda, deciding when to rely on the technocrats and when to moderate or unleash the ethno-religious fanatics. Imperialism operates via the marriage of science and ethno-religious fanaticism- and both are harnessed to capitalist domination and exploitation.

India: Billionaires, Hindu Fascists and IT “Savants”

The election of Narendra Modi, leader of the BJP and long-time member of the Hindu fascist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) para-military organization was based on three essential components:

- (1) Multi-billion rupee funding from corporate India at home and abroad.
- (2) Thousands of upwardly mobile IT technocrats mounting a massive propaganda campaign.
- (3) Hundreds of thousands of RSS activists spreading the “Hindutva” racist doctrine among millions of villagers.

The Modi regime promises his capitalist backers that he will “open India”—namely end the land reserves of the tribes, convert farmland to industrial parks, deregulate labor and environmental controls.

To the Brahmin elite he promises to end compensatory quotas for lower castes, the untouchables, the minorities and Muslims. For the Hindu fascists he promises more temples. For foreign capitalists he promises entry into all formerly protected economic sectors. For the US, Modi promises closer working relations against China, Russia and Iran The BJP's ethno-religious Hindu fanaticism resonates with Israel's notion of a “pure” Jewish state. Modi and Netanyahu have longstanding ties and promise close working relations based on similar ethno-racist doctrines.

Turkey: The Transition to Islamic-Capitalist Authoritarianism

Turkey under the rule of Erdogan's Justice and Development Party has moved decisively toward one-man rule: linking Islam to big capital and police state repression. Erdogan's 'triple alliance' is intent on unleashing mega-capitalist projects, based on the privatization of public spaces and the dispossession of popular neighborhoods. He opened the door to unregulated privatization of mines, communications, banks – leading to exponential growth of profits and the decline of employment security and a rising toll of worker deaths. Erdogan has shed the

mask of ‘moderate Islam’ and embraced the jihadist mercenaries invading Syria and legislation expanding religious prerogatives in secular life. Erdogan has launched massive purges of journalists, public officials, civil servants, judges and military officers. He has replaced them with ‘party loyalists’; Erdogan fanatics!

Erdogan has recruited a small army of technocrats who design his mega projects and provide the political infrastructure and programs for his electoral campaigns. Technocrats provide a development agenda that accommodates the foreign and domestic crony corporate elite. The Anatolian Islamists, small and medium provincial business elite, form the mass base – mobilizing voters, by appealing to chauvinist and ethnocentric beliefs. Erdogan’s repressive, Islamist, capitalist regime’s embrace of the “free market” has been sharply challenged especially in light of the worst mining massacre in Turkish history: the killing of over 300 miners due to corporate negligence and regime complicity. Class polarization threatens the advance of Turkish fascism.

Israel and the “Jewish State”: Billionaires, Ethno-Religious Fanatics and Technocrats

Israel, according to its influential promoters in the US, is a ‘model democracy’. The public pronouncements and the actions of its leaders thoroughly refute that notion. The driving force of Israeli politics is the idea of dispossessing and expelling all Palestinians and converting Israel into a ‘pure’ Jewish state. For decades Israel, funded and colonized by the diaspora, have violently seized Palestinian lands, dispossessed millions and are in the process of Judaizing what remains of the remnant in the “Occupied Territories”.

The Israeli economy is dominated by billionaires. Its “society” is permeated by a highly militarized state. Its highly educated technocrats serve the military-industrial and ethno-religious elite. Big business shares power with both.

High tech Israeli’s apply their knowledge to furthering the high growth, military industrial complex. Medical specialists participate in testing the endurance of Palestinian prisoners undergoing torture (“interrogation”). Highly trained psychologists engage in psych-warfare to gain collaborators among vulnerable Palestinian families. Economists and political scientists, with advanced degrees from prestigious US and British universities (and ‘dual citizenship’) formulate policies furthering the land grabs of neo-fascist settlers. Israel’s best known novelist, Amos Oz condemned the neo-fascist settlers who defecate on the embers of burnt-out mosques.

Billionaire real estate moguls bid up house prices and rents “forcing” many “progressive” Israelis, who occasionally protest, to take the easy road of moving into apartments built on land illegally and violently seized from dispossessed Palestinians. ‘Progressives’ join neo-fascist vigilantes in common colonial

settlements. Prestigious urbanologists further the goals of crude ethno-racist political leaders by designing new housing in Occupied Lands. Prominent social scientists trade on their US education to promote Mid-East wars designed by vulgar warlords.

Building the Euro American Empire: Riff-Raff of the World Unite!

Empire building is a dirty business. And while the political leaders directing it, feign respectability and are adept at rolling out the moral platitudes and high purposes, the 'combatants' they employ are a most unsavory lot of armed thugs, journalistic verbal assassins and highly respected international jurists who prey on victims and exonerate imperial criminals.

In recent years Euro-American warlords have employed "the scum of the slaughterhouse" to destroy political adversaries in Libya, Syria and the Ukraine. In Libya lacking any semblance of a respectable middle-class democratic proxy, the Euro-American empire builders armed and financed murderous tribal bands, notorious jihadist terrorists, contrabandist groups, arms and drug smugglers. The Euro-Americans counted on a pocketful of educated stooges holed up in London to subdue the thugs, privatize Libya's oil fields and convert the country into a recruiting ground and launch pad for exporting armed mercenaries for other imperial missions.

The Libyan riff-raff were not satisfied with a paycheck and facile dismissal: they murdered their US paymaster, chased the technocrats back to Europe and set-up rival fiefdoms. Gadhafi was murdered, but so went Libya as a modern viable state. The arranged marriage of Euro-American empire builders, western educated technocrats and the armed riff-raff was never consummated. In the end the entire imperial venture ended up as a petty squabble in the American Congress over who was responsible for the murder of the US Ambassador in Benghazi.

The Euro-American-Saudi proxy war against Syria follows the Libyan script. Thousands of Islamic fundamentalists are financed, armed, trained and transported from bases in Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Libya to violently overthrow the Bashar Assad government in Syria. The world's most retrograde fundamentalists travel to the Euro-American training bases in Jordan and Turkey and then proceed to invade Syria, seizing towns, executing thousands of alleged 'regime loyalists' and planting car bombs in densely populated city centers.

The fundamentalist influx soon overwhelmed the London based liberals and their armed groups. The jihadist terrorists fragmented into warring groups fighting over the Syrian oil fields. Hundreds were killed and thousands fled to Government controlled regions. Euro-US strategists, having lost their original liberal mercenaries, turned toward one or another fundamentalist groups. No longer in control of the 'politics' of the terrorists, Euro-US strategists sought to deflect

the maximum destruction on Syrian society. Rejecting a negotiated settlement, the Euro-US strategists turned their backs on the internal political opposition challenging Assad via presidential elections.

In the Ukraine, the Euro-Americans backed a junta of servile neo-liberal technocrats, oligarchical kleptocrats and neo-Nazis, dubbed Svoboda and the Right Sector. The latter were the “shock troops” to overthrow the elected government, massacre the federalist democrats in Odessa and the eastern Ukraine, and back the junta appointed oligarchs serving as “governors.” The entire western mass media white-washed the savage assaults carried out by the neo-Nazis in propping up the Kiev junta. The powerful presence of the neo-fascists in key ministries, their strategic role as front line fighters attacking eastern cities controlled by pro-democracy militants, establishes them as central actors in converting the Ukraine into a military outpost of NATO.

Euro-America Empire Building and the Role of Riff-Raff

Everywhere the Euro-American imperialists choose to expand – they rely on the ‘scum of the earth’: tribal gangs in Libya, fundamentalist terrorists in Syria, neo-Nazis in the Ukraine.

Is it by choice or necessity? Clearly few consequential democrats would lend themselves to the predatory and destructive assaults on existing regimes which Euro-US strategists design. In the course of imperial wars, the local producers, workers, ordinary citizens would “self-destroy”, whatever the outcome. Hence the empire builders look toward ‘marginal groups’, those with no stake in society or economy. Those alienated from any primary or secondary groups. Footloose fundamentalists fit that bill – provided they are paid, armed and allowed to carry their own ideological baggage. Neo-Nazis hostile to democracy have no qualms about serving empire builders who share their ideological hostility to democrats, socialists, federalists and culturally ‘diverse’ societies and states. So they are targeted for recruitment by the empire builders.

The riff-raff consider themselves ‘strategic allies’ of the Euro-American empire builders. The latter, however, have no strategic allies – only strategic interests. Their tactical alliances with the riff-raff endure until they secure control over the state and eliminate their adversaries. Then the imperialist seek to demote, co-opt, marginalize or eliminate their ‘inconvenient’ riff-raff allies. The falling out comes about when the fundamentalists and neo-Nazis seek to restrict capital, especially foreign capital and impose restrictions on imperial control over resources and territory. At first the empire builders seek ‘opportunists’ among the riff-raff, those willing to sacrifice their ‘ideals’ for money and office. Those who refuse are relegated to secondary positions distant from strategic decision-making or to remote outposts. Those who resist are assassinated or jailed. The disposal of the

riff-raff serves the empire on two counts. It provides the client regime with a fig leaf of respectability and disarms western critics targeting the extremist component of the junta.

The riff-raff, however, with arms, fighting experience and financing, in the course of struggle, gains confidence in its own power. They do not easily submit to Euro-US strategies. They also have 'strategic plans' of their own, in which they seek political power to further their ideological agenda and enrich their followers.

The riff-raff, want to 'transition' from shock troops of empire into rulers in their own right. Hence the assaults on the US embassy in Libya, the assassination of Euro-American proxies in Syria, Right Sector riots against the Kiev junta.

Conclusion

A new power bloc is emerging on a global scale. It is already flexing its muscles. It has come to power in India, Turkey, Ukraine and Israel. It brings together big business, technocrats and ethno-religious fascists. They promote unrestrained capitalist expansion in association with Euro-American imperialism. Scientists, economists, and IT specialists design the programs and plans to realize the profits of local and foreign capitalists. The ethno-fascists mobilize the 'masses' to attack minorities and class organizations threatening high rates of returns. The Euro-Americans contribute to this 'new power bloc' by promoting their own 'troika' made up of 'neo-liberal clients', fundamentalists and neo-Nazis to overthrow nationalist adversaries. The advance of imperialism and capitalism in the 21st century is based on the harnessing of the most advanced technology and up-to-date media outlets with the most retrograde political and social leaders and ideologies.

Political Transitions in India

John Samuel

The election to the 16th Lok Sabha in India signifies a deeper political shift in terms of the character and mode of democratic politics in India. While it is too early to give an account of the political consequences of such a shift, it is possible to analyse the factors that tend to influence such a shift in the Indian politics. First, the old 'Congress system'- the predominant political software that defined the Indian democratic political process is more or less extinct. It was a 'power management' adjustment that dominated the Indian political process ever since independence; a combination of patron-client party-governance system that followed the principle and practice of multiple accommodation and flexible compromises to manage the plurality of interests and identities in India. Secondly, the conventional political party dynamics is undergoing a major shift. Political parties in India are facing a structural as well as political crisis. The autonomy of political parties is increasingly compromised by the influence of corporate 'contributions' and new breed of political managers. Thirdly, the role of corporate capital in determining political and policy priorities will be significantly increased in the years to come. Fourthly, the role of new social media and new mode of technology will influence politics, policy and governance in a substantial manner.

The mainstream politics within a given society get shaped by the dynamics of public perceptions through constructing images, myths, symbolism and metaphors of change. In a networked society, these combinations of myth-making, image makeover and political symbolism often play a major role in building social and political legitimacy of a regime. Hence, the political transitions in India have multiple narratives and sub-texts that tend to shape the meta-narrative of the Indian politics. The outcome of the recent elections in India is in consonance with the shifts that happened in many parts of the world, particularly in different countries of Europe that witnessed the rise of political conservatism and a new form of virulent right wing political and policy agenda. In the last couple of years, in UK, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, the rise of right wing political conservatism

captured the control of the government. This was partly in response to economic crisis and partly due to new politics of further marginalising the migrant and minority communities. In that sense, the election in India once again signalled how economic crisis can create larger socio-political discontent, resulting in strong anti-incumbency syndrome across the board. There is a general perception that the electoral victory of the BJP marks the end of the Nehruvian consensus on Indian democracy. I would argue that the Nehruvian consensus on Indian democracy began to disappear during the emergency and the post-emergency political transitions in India. All through the last thirty years, the efforts by the various governments were to subvert or undermine or annul the Nehruvian legacy on democracy, governance and development in the national and international arena.

Competing Visions of Multiple Political Narratives

The struggle for independence is also the story of the competing visions of multiple narratives within the Indian National Congress and in the larger socio-political space of India. The Indian National Congress itself was more of an umbrella formation with a wide spectrum of competing political narratives trying to contest, collaborate and reconcile with one another. The origin of such multiple narratives can be traced back to the Renaissance in Bengal and the different perceptions of India by the newly educated neo-Brahmin elites in the early 19th century onwards in different provinces of the colonial India. These multiple narratives were, on the one hand, informed by the new ideals of modern nation-state and on the other hand informed by the predominant 'national' upper-caste identity. One can see two broad streams of such narratives: One is that of a narrative of 'accommodative' inclusive nationalism of the Congress variety and other the assertive identity driven exclusive nationalism of the Muslim League and Hindu Maha Sabha variety.

In the history of the Indian National Congress, there have been three parallel narratives competing as well as complementing each other. The first stream was that of political conformism; liberal advocacy of the socio-economic elites trying to expand the space within the system without confronting the system. The first phase of the Indian National Congress from 1885 to 1905 dominated this conformist approach within the system, largely led by the new elites such Dadabhai Navaraji. The second stream of the Indian National Congress was a narrative of liberal Hindu nationalism that combined a patronising as well as 'accommodating' approach to the dalits, other backward castes and Muslims. This approach, informed by the neo-Brahmin elites and shaped by the more radical nationalist approach, was propounded by Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Madan Mohan Malaviya. Gandhi sought to transform the upper-caste Hindu nationalist discourse to a more moderate and 'accommodative' discourse with a combination of patronising as well as inclusive

approach. So on the one hand Gandhi transformed the dominant Hindu nationalist Congress discourse propounded by the likes of Bal Ganghadhar Tilak in the early twentieth century to a more inclusive as well as accommodative narrative that combined new forms of mass-based politics with a strong undertone of the moderate Hindu discourse. At the same time, framing such a popular folk-Hindu discourse with a pan-Indian nationalism sought to co-opt the broad spectrum of multiple identities within the Indian context. This Gandhian experiment of combining the main text of moderate-populist Hindu nationalism along with the subtext of modern inclusive pan-Indian Nationalism across caste and creed influenced in many ways the very DNA of the Indian National Congress from the 1920s to 1950s. The third narrative within the Indian National Congress was that of a rights-based cosmopolitan democratic vision, influenced to a large extent by the socialists as well as social democratic experiments in Europe. This cosmopolitan and inclusive rights based approach was propounded by the socialist faction within the Congress as well as the stream of Congress leaders led by Jawaharlal Nehru. The politics of inclusive 'accommodation' and 'compromising reconciliation', built on a populist-moderate Hindu discourse of Gandhi, also sought to negotiate with the modern – cosmopolitan social democratic internationalist vision of the stream represented by Jawaharlal Nehru. While the ideological and political DNA of the Indian National Congress has been influenced by the three major streams (represented by Dadabai Navaraji, Bala Gangadhar Tilak, Gandhi and Nehru), the organisational narrative and hardware were informed by a neo-elite upper caste feudal tendency (or culture?) However, dominant political narrative of inclusive accommodation was also reflected in the character and nature of the Indian Constituent Assembly as well as in the making of the first cabinet. In many ways, Sardar Patel and Dr. Rajendra Prasad signified the broad accommodative moderate Hindu nationalist discourse of the Gandhian variety; C Rajgopalachari signified the liberal advocacy stream and Nehru signified the modern cosmopolitan democratic discourse. While these conservative as well as 'accommodative' moderate Hindu nationalist discourse in symbiosis with a cosmopolitan modern democratic rights-based discourse informed the 'nation-building' exercise of the independent India, feudal culture still remained in the sub-texts that influenced the Indian political experiments at all levels. The politics of patronisation and accommodative inclusion, informed by a feudal culture of co-option of marginalised, with a constant negotiation between identities and interest formed the core of the 'Congress System' of managing governance over a period of the last seventy years. However, the four major protagonists of the counter discourses, Dr. Ambedkar, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Hedgewar and to some extent Subash Chandra Bose, sought to challenge the inclusive accommodative discourse of patronisation on entirely different grounds.

Paradigm Shifts in Indian Politics

The first paradigm shift in the Indian political process was in the late 1960s. The major challenge to the Gandhi-Nehru legacy that combined a politics of 'accommodative' inclusion and cosmopolitan democratic politics became more obvious from 1967 onwards. The Congress hegemony was challenged by the left-wing as well as the right-wing political narratives in the late 1960s. The assertive emergence of the socialist and left forces of India sought to challenge the mainstream feudal accommodative politics with a politics of egalitarianism and emancipation. Even within the left wing narratives, a major (or the main) stream sought to challenge the system through contestation and collaboration within the larger constitutional framework, while the other stream (Maoists/Naxalites) sought to challenge the very legitimacy of the entire system through violent confrontation. At the same time, RSS began to use a three-prong strategy to influence the policy, politics and governance of India. First, through a volunteer based cadre building of children and youth and strategic infiltration of them into governance system, RSS managed to remain low profile and do a long term influence within the governance system of India. This in effect created a generation of saffronised mock-liberals in the India media, civil service and armed forces. Secondly, RSS influenced the Indian National Congress by encouraging many of its followers to subvert the Congress system from within. So if one scrutinises the political and ideological genealogy of many Congress leaders who emerged after the 1960s, one can find the RSS links in their formative stages. These swayam sevaks practiced a subversive politics within Congress by undermining the modern cosmopolitan social-democratic vision of the Nehru, and by promoting the less inclusive and more accommodative politics of the soft-Hindutva variety. The third strategy of RSS was to promote its own political party, first as Jan Sangh and then its modern and more accommodative version in the form of Bharatiya Janatha Party.

The second paradigm shift in the Indian political process was in the post-emergency period from 1977 to 1982. In fact the period of 1977-1982 also witnessed paradigm shift in the international political discourse and process. It was in 1977 that the regime change in Iran resulted in major political shifts not only in Iran but also in the USA. The advent of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher signalled a new era of assertive right-wing politics that combined aggressive political conservatism and active neo-liberal policy paradigm. It is (or was) during the same phase that Pakistan witnessed a regime change and the hanging of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the democratically elected Prime Minister of Pakistan. The regime change in Pakistan was the beginning of the new phase of cold war and the engagement with identity-based aggressive politics as an anti-dote to challenge the socialist hegemony of the USSR. During this phase, the hike in petrol price and the regime change in Egypt along with those in many other countries resulted in the increase of foreign debt

of several countries culminating in the dominance of neo-liberal policy paradigm. In the Indian context, this is the period that witnessed the withering away of the one party-Congress hegemony in the governance system. This resulted in the new assertion of identity-based political party formations by Dalits(BSP) as well as by the other backward castes(in UP and Bihar) and also brought in the proponents of Hindutva in to the mainstream of the political and governance process of India. Most of the dominant regional party formations like BSP and (BJP?) emerged during the same phase.

The Technocratic and Federalist Turn of the Indian Politics

While an increasing disjuncture of 'national' vs 'regional political discourse' emerged in the post-emergency political paradigm, a new political narrative began to dominate the policy making apparatus and governance of India. This was the emergence of a new species of urban-educated upper-caste technocrats, devoid of any grassroots political experience or ideological convictions, taking the central role in the policy, governance and eventually political discourse of India. The politics at the state level began to be dominated by the more rural and backward political class who spoke Hindi or regional languages. There was the urban technocratic elites(those who primarily occupy power positions largely due to their skill-set and less due to a strong political credibility or convictions) in the media, political parties and corporate sector. This highly educated, articulate and upper caste- urban English speaking class began to chart a new political narrative and discourse in the Indian political process. The Delhi-centric educated and articulate urban elite class began to dominate the policy and political discourse of all political parties, including that of the Congress, BJP and CPM. While in the 1970s, many of these Delhi-centric elites operated in the backroom or background of the governance and political process, by the 1980s this new urban articulate elite class began to occupy the centre stage of all national political parties ; their comfort level with the new media elites and new corporate elites resulted in a new technocratic nexus between political parties, corporate media and corporate business conglomerates. In so many ways, this contributed to the eventual ascent of the non-political Manmohan Singh, a Delhi-centric civil servant respected for his skill-sets, to the role of the Prime Minister of India.

The Congress won the 1984 elections with overwhelming majority and it was paradoxically due to an electoral wave of moderate Hindu nationalism as a reaction to the assassination of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh security guards in October 1984. The violence against the Sikh community in Delhi, in the aftermath of the assassination of Indira Gandhi, indicated the steady retreat of the Nehruvian consensus/legacy within the Congress. As the Nehruvian legacy of Congress politics began to recede to the background, a new politics with two new characteristics began

to come to the forefront of governance and political process: a) the reinvention of Sardar Patel's variety of moderate Hindu accommodative political discourse (signified by the Narasimha Rao regime) and b) a new form of telegenic – Delhi-centric urban and upper caste technocratic political nexus that dominated political parties, media world and corporate conglomerates.

Retreat of the Nehruvian Legacy

During the regime of the Narasimha Rao-Manmohan Singh in the 1990s, the Nehruvian legacy was displaced from the arena of governance as well as the political process within the Congress; eventually Congress too adopted a politics of accommodative compromises with multiple corporate interests and identity formations. So in the 1980s- and 1990s, the disjuncture between the Delhi-centric English speaking technocratic political governance process and the rural-based regional/state level politics began to pull Indian political discourse into two different directions. The political narrative of the politics at the state level began to get separated from the 'national politics'. This 'federalist' turn of the Indian political process began to create new political narrative based on language- and cast/community identity. So the contestation and collaboration between the rural based identity –driven regional politics and interest driven national politics began to dominate the Indian political process in the 1990s. This contestation and collaboration is signified by two Prime Ministers in the 1990s: Deva Gowda – the first 'outsider' (outside to the Delhi-centric national paradigm) politician to become the Prime Minister of India and I.K. Gujral- who was a representative of the Delhi-centric political elites that dominated the national politics. And the eventual ascent of Manmohan Singh actually signalled the ultimate demise of the Nehruvian legacy within the governance or within the Indian National Congress. The demise of the Nehruvian legacy was not only in terms of policy paradigm, but also in terms of the character and nature of the electoral politics.

The ascent of the Delhi-centric technocratic political elites also resulted in the new modes of fund raising through strengthening the role of corporate financing of election. It is reported that most of the elections in India are actually financed through black money (or funds), contributed by corporate interests. So instead of raising funds from the members or supporters of the party at the grassroots level, it was much easier to raise money from corporate conglomerates who sought to have a direct role in governance. It was also easy for the neo-technocratic elites to engage with the new media elites and corporate elites as they have been a part of the same 'economic growth at any cost' narrative. The corporate investments in the political party process and election resulted in outsourcing campaign and political strategy to advertising agencies. And instead of a bottom-up political process, a top down political management process began to dominate almost all political parties. The

leadership of most of the political parties managed politics with funding support from the power-centres of the party. The campaign materials, communications and election strategy were managed at the top, with the active participation of the neo-political elites with hardly any experience at the grassroots level political process. And this new culture of Delhi-centric political elitism dominated policy choices and governance process. Policy options and choices were begun to be influenced by network of corporate interests and this also resulted in consequent corruption across the spectrum of governance. The Neera Radia tapes clearly exposed how such a Delhi-centric power-nexus operated across party –lines, media houses and governance structures. Such elite take over of the mainstream political process and policy options eroded the broader legitimacy of the political parties and process.

Story of a Political Disaster Foretold

While the UPA- I sought to do a balancing act between the interest of the rural poor and the urban corporate rich with a series of legislations, the UPA -II was perceived as the government for the rich and corporate conglomerates. A series of corruption charges further eroded the credibility and legitimacy of the government and its technocratic leadership. The Right to Information, Right to Work and many other initiatives like NRHM during the UPA I sought to introduce more of inclusive economic growth. The relatively better social protection legislation and the relatively better economic growth during the UPA-1 gave rich electoral dividends for the Congress and its allies in the elections held in 2009. However, the fact of the matter was such an electoral gain seems to have created a false impression within the Congress that it was a national mandate for the new Delhi-centric technocratic policy paradigm. This wrong analysis and the over-confidence bordering political arrogance resulted in the marginalisation of voices from the states or from the grassroots political leaders. The price hike of fuel and essential commodities sent wrong signals to women across all classes and regions. The perceived arrogance of the Delhi-centric political elites to the Anti-Corruption campaign and the imprisonment of Anna Hazare(who signified the rural idealism and Gandhian legacy along with a tinge of soft-Hindutva) sent wrong signals to the rural electorate as well as the middle class ‘sick’ of corruption scandals. Arvind Kejriwal, who also in many ways a representative of the urban –centric technocratic elite, sought to create a counter discourse to the corrupt nexus among the political, economic and media elites. The Anna-Kejariwal combine was also an effort to project a rural-urban political alliance to counter the Delhi-centric political nexus among political parties, corporate houses and media. And the rather slow response of the leadership of the Congress Party to the mass mobilisation in relation to the gang-rape case in Delhi (and elsewhere) also alienated a large number of men and women across the country. Eventually, the two kinds of LPGs ensured the fall of

UPA-II. The first one was the unbridled effort to Liberalise, Privatised and Globalise resulting in unprecedented economic and social inequities and consequence economic insecurity among large sections of people across the country- and second one was the price hike of Liquefied Petroleum Gas. And the much publicised technocratic solution of Aadhaar Card and insistence of Aadhaar Card for cash-transfer instead of subsidised LPG cylinders added fuel to the fire of sky-rocketing price of food and vegetables. The economic recession also resulted in the closing down of many small and medium level enterprises and many people getting less income and consequent diminution of household budget. All those policy options and choices cumulatively eroded the political and moral legitimacy of the UPA- II and that of the Congress Party at the grassroots level. In their enthusiasm to have as many policy reforms as fast as they could, the leadership of the government was too busy to note the brewing discontent and frustrations within the Congress Party at the grassroots level and also across the larger polity in India. So the lack of political imagination in policy making and the over-predominance of Delhi-centric technocratic elites in the governance did not inspire the grassroots workers of the Congress and consequently Congress Party became more and more sedated and stagnant at the grassroots level. The grassroots workers of the Congress Party across the states found it difficult to defend food price inflation, and the price hike of petrol/diesel and LPG.

The increasing gap between the grassroots workers and leaders of Congress Party and the Delhi-centric policy makers in effect paralysed the party network and structures on the ground. There was less collective ownership for the policy paradigm propounded by the technocratic elites. One of the richest men in India was put in charge of one of the most expensive technocratic projects of UID, sending wrong signals that the UPA- II favoured the rich and powerful in the policy making as well as political choices. As the top-down policy and political process began to dominate, the entire communication and campaign strategy and their implementation was (or were) outsourced to advertising companies without any sense of agency or collective ownership at the state or grassroots level. In effect, not only communications but also politics itself was outsourced to 'experts' devoid of any experience of political dynamics at the grassroots level. This disjuncture between the grassroots network of the Congress Party and the top-down technocratic approach to electoral campaign coupled with more centralised management of election finance/funding meant that grassroots workers were not inspired to campaign for the Congress Party in many states; consequently the traditional voters drifted away from the party. The feeder mechanism of Congress Party as well as that of many other political parties got stagnant since there was no incentive for young people to join party politics. As most of the young people secured parliament seats largely as a matter of inheritance, many of the young leaders with

competence and commitment did not have much of political incentives to join the Congress Party. Many of them either chose to work within the civil society or in the corporate leadership. Increasing number of technocratic managers and telegenic personalities active in the TV studios and with zero presence at the grassroots level also send wrong signals to leaders at the state level who rose in the party hierarchy by building the Congress Party at the grassroots level.

So the enabling condition for the rise of Modi and BJP was created over a period of time due to the increasing gap between the Congress Party at the grassroots level and the technocratic policy makers in Delhi; and the tendency to dictate governance as well as party decisions from the top to bottom rather than the other way around.

Rise of the Modi-myth

In so many ways, Narendra Modi is a beneficiary and product of the politics of accommodation and compromises played by the Congress Party over the last twenty years. The Narendra Modi brand is also indicative of the co-option of a dominant narrative and at the same time making a counter-discourse to another set of narrative within the Congress system. The rise of the Narendra Modi myth is not something that began in one year or two. It actually began around ten years ago, by creating entrenched image of technocratic efficiency coupled with political imagination to influence public perceptions. The Narendra Modi metaphor was a counter-discourse to the dominant political narrative because of four reasons: a) He signified the ascent of an 'outsider' and positioned as an alternative to the Delhi-centric technocratic elites b) The story of his rise from a relatively lower caste and lower class rural background speaking in 'people's language' (always spoke in Hindi or Gujarati) inspired a large number of rural youth and rural poor c) The Modi brand also signified the rise of a 'federal' leader who proved his capability in the area of governance and in the area of electoral accomplishments in his state d) Modi brand building also was a sign of vibrant Gujarat campaign as a counter-alternative to the perception of a 'corruption-ridden' regime in Delhi. So the Modi-brand has been established over the last five years, through consistent messaging and communication strategy. On the one hand these 'counter-discursive' images helped him to project himself as a man of the rural masses, as a sign of the rural-based entrepreneurship and as someone who can 'deliver efficiently and effectively'. Along with these counter discourse, the Modi campaign managers intelligently subverted the dominant narrative within the history of the Congress Party. The campaign managers intelligently co-opted the metaphor of Sardar Vallabhai Patel that indicated on the one hand the narrative of the moderate and accommodative Hindu Nationalism and on other hand the image of a leader who stood with the rural peasants and who delivered on the unity and integrity of India. The image of

Sardar Patel as the 'steel man'- indicating strength, determination and resilience- created a sort of reflected glory in the Modi-brand. So the co-option of Sardar Patel as part of the Mody myth was a clever ploy to revitalize a dominant narrative within the history of the Congress Party and at the same time denying the Congress to claim such a legacy.

The very DNA of BJP is of assertive Hindu Nationalism, based on politics of exclusion propounded by the core ideology of RSS. However, the campaign managers of Modi narrative pushed the long term political agenda of assertive 'Hindutva' in the background and projected the 'development' 'governance' and 'economic growth' agenda into the foreground, along with the moderate accommodative soft Hindu nationalist legacy of Bal Gangathar Thilak, Madan Mohan Malaviya and Sardar Vallabhai Patel. This twin strategy of co-opting the one of these strong narratives within the Congress and at the same time projecting as a counter-discursive alternative to the Delhi-centric technocratic elites, helped to create a Pan-Indian appeal to the Modi metaphor. And the strategy to frame messages locally, as a representative of the down trodden and marginalised castes, helped Narendra Modi brand to find acceptance with the rural masses and particularly among the lower caste groups. At the same time, his projected image as a man who can deliver economic growth and good governance as well as the image of a leader who meant business influenced a large section of the middle class people in many states of India. The strategic use of social media and social network also inspired the new generation of voters to vote for Modi. In a way, this election was a quasi-presidential election and such an aggressive campaign with huge contributions from corporate conglomerates can undermine the very promises(or premise) of the parliamentary democracy and (the promises of) the Constitution of India.

Predicament of the Congress Party

In fact, both the Sardar Patel image as well as the 'development' – 'good governance' – economic growth' slogans were co-opted from the dominant narratives of the Congress Party. While AAP has co-opted the 'aam- admi ka hath' slogan and the Gandhi cap of the Congress Party, Narendra Modi and BJP co-opted the two dominant narratives of the Congress Party. Two kinds of challenges(signified by Narendra Modi and Arvind Kejriwal)- creating a counter discourse to UPA- II, robbed Congress of its dominant political narratives , election slogans and policy narrative(of economic growth and good governance). In spite of the traditional lip service to Gandhi and Nehru, over a period of the last twenty years the rise of technocratic political elites within the Congress in effect marginalised and then buried the core Nehru legacy and ideology within the governance and the dominant policy priorities of the Congress Party. Devoid of the active legacy of

Gandhi, Nehru and Sardar Vallabhai Patel, it was difficult for campaign managers of the Congress Party to reinvent or reboot the myths of the past icons that helped to create credibility and communicative advantage at the grassroots level. Void of a coherent political perspective, it was not easy to create an innovative and inspiring set of political and policy agenda, free from the baggage of the legacy of the UPA- II.

The real challenge for the Congress is when BJP seeks to occupy the accommodative moderate Hindu Nationalism along with 'good governance' agenda on the foreground and the RSS agenda of exclusive politics in the background. From various signals, the new Prime Minister will on the one hand create a new image of an assertive leader who is also willing to accommodate and include the minorities and marginalised in his broad political and policy narratives.; and on the other hand effectively re-brand the very same corporate- friendly policies of UPA-II.. This creates an ideological as well as policy challenge for the Congress Party. The new Mody-myth is about a new branding of 'popular and assertive' leader who is ready to make a new tryst with new India. And this Mody myth is now entrenched through a series of communication strategies and concerted media campaign. If Modi proved to be accommodative as well as assertive, that can certainly pose a challenge to the future strategies of the Congress and the national parties.

Hence, Congress may have to reinvent its ideological legacy and also revitalize its grassroots structures and workers and build credible leadership from the grassroots level. This also means that the technocratic policy/political elites should be in the background of the political process rather than on the foreground of the political narrative of the Congress Party. The question is whether there will be a collective political imagination to reinvent the grand old party of India.

This election has also exposed the structural limitation and political crisis of the left political parties in a number of ways. Like Congress, the left political parties also suffered from the increasing gap in perception and perspective of the Delhi-centric policy/political elites and the grassroots political cadre. Since Left parties lost the sheen in the wake of compulsions to compromise principles for the sake of quick-win in election, their moral and political credibility eroded in a significant way at the grassroots level. The real challenge for the leadership of social democratic and left parties in India will be when leaders are in a state of denial and refuse to challenge and change themselves and feel reluctant to inspire change or attract a new generation of workers and leaders at all levels.

The real challenge of the Modi-myth is to live up to the huge expectations implicit in the election mandate and at the same time being committed to the letter and spirit of the Constitution of India. The second key issue will be the challenges of imposing a dominant Modi-narrative in the form of popular authoritarianism within the government, within the BJP and within the larger polity. The third key

challenge for Indian democracy is the absence of a relatively dispersed and limited opposition within the parliament and the possibilities of the Hindutva forces dominating and subverting the civil society process within the country.

Hence, it is the historical as well as political responsibility of the Indian National Congress, secular regional parties and the left parties to work together as a responsible and responsive opposition and also revitalise their own grassroots level politics to democratise party structures and organisation to make India a vibrant democracy at all levels. Congress may have to reinvent and re-launch the legacy of Gandhi and Nehru in the context of the 21st century. The multiple political transitions in India suggest several political imperatives, thereby underscoring the need for citizens to recommit themselves to the Constitution of India.

Representation Sans Represented: Corporate Power in Indian Elections

J. Prabhash

Electoral politics in India today has become a sharply contested affair though the content of this contest has very little to do with ideas or public policies or, in a generalised sense, the interest of the people. It has become all about power in itself i.e., power as an end without any instrumental value as a means for addressing complex social issues. Thus representative democracy in the country moves by a strange logic, of representation sans represented. This simply means that politics has ceased to be a responsible exercise of public power (Hasan 2000: 20; Kothari 1992: 16). This exactly is the reason why nation wide election surveys repeatedly show that Indians increasingly view their elected representatives and political parties as uncaring, unreachable, unresponsive, untrustworthy and, more significantly, unrepresentative as well (Sirante and Rahul 2014). Surely, this is not politics in the best Aristotelean tradition of politics as self-realisation, but, as we shall see later, it comes closer to his views on plutocracy – rule of the rich.

The best proof of the unrepresentativeness of our representative system is offered by the mounting influence of money power in electoral politics of the country and its consequences in contemporary times. This, however, does not be taken to mean that it is a new development in Indian politics. Even as early as the 1960s, Chakravarthy Rajagopalachari was heard complaining that, “elections are largely, so to say, private enterprise, whereas this is the one thing that should be first nationalised” (Guha 2011). If this was the case in the 60s, the gravity of the issue today is only a matter of conjecture. If anything, it moved from bad to worse. Certain political developments since the late 70s helped this downslide. Fragmentation of the political society leading to a mushrooming of parties making political arena a highly contested domain (Katju 2009); regionalisation and ‘ethnicisation’ of the party system; subaltern resistance towards monopolisation of

political power by the traditional elites; coalition politics based on indiscriminate alliances; and a steady decline of inner party democracy are the most noteworthy developments among them (Prabhash 2010: 88). Economic liberalisation since the 1990s further accelerated this trend.

All these, cumulatively, not only robbed the political society of its moral timber but, as stated previously, pushed ideological positions and social themes out of electoral politics. With this, elections ceased to be a deliberative process and a pedagogic exercise. This naturally means that the electorate has little political incentive to choose between parties and their candidates and, on the part of the political parties they have scarcely anything substantial to offer the people in terms of policy choices. It is in such a situation that extraneous factors and considerations – from money power to muscle power and beyond – come to define electoral outcomes. Among these, money power is the most perennial source of harm to the democratic system of the country.

Corporate Power in Elections

As per the existing laws (as amended in 2011), the maximum amount a candidate can spend in the Lok Sabha election is '40 lakh and for the Legislative Assembly, '16 lakh, with a rider that there is no legal limit to the amount political parties could spend on their candidates. While this is the legal limit, actual experience shows that, on an average, a candidate for the Lok Sabha spends anything between three to fifteen crore rupees (Ray 2009: 33) and the same inflation is noticed for Assembly elections also. Money spent by parties comes as additional bounty, and there is no scarcity for them in this regard. According to one estimate, in the 2009 national elections Congress party spent '1500 crore¹, BJP '1000 crore², BSP '700 crore, DMK '400 crore and AIADMK '300 crore³ (Ray 2009: 36).

Interestingly in the digital era, novel sources of election spending by the parties and candidates are revealed. Hiring private planes for campaign purpose, media management (social media in particular), and advertising are cases in point. For instance, in the 2009 elections, BJP's expenditure on aircrafts for its many campaigners alone was estimated at '350 crore³ (Kang, 2014). Now, with coming into vogue of the paid news syndrome, media management has become an important priority for parties. Not only that galatical sums are spent on buying news, but even journalists are put on payroll⁴. As a political functionary has observed, "paid news has become institutionalised. It is no longer a question of one bad apple among journalists resorting to blackmail or undertaking public relations for money... Now, it is done at an organisation level" (Kang 2014).

Advertising and expenditure on social media also entail huge expenses now-a-days. Though accurate estimates for different political parties are not available,

the social media budget of the Congress in the coming election (2014) is pegged at '100 crore'⁵ (Kang 2014). All these are in addition to the money spent on bribing voters. To understand the gravity of the situation one need only look at the revelation made by Edward Snowden of the Wiki leaks fame about the manner in which DMK politicians indulged in this and perfected it into an art. In fact, this is a widespread practice found in almost all the states. For instance, a study by the Delhi based think-tank, Centre for Media Studies, shows that one-fifth of the Indian voters have testified to taking such bribes. According to the study, this is nearly 50% in states like Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Tripura and 25% in the country's capital (Ray 2009: 32). Thus, mobilisation of money rather than mobilisation of masses has become the chief concern for candidates and their parties. This naturally means that a great deal of politics is negotiated and decided on monetary terms.

Corporate Donation

With the need for money to contest elections increasing tremendously, membership fees and small voluntary contributions have ceased to be the major sources of funding. Their place is now occupied by tainted money through corrupt deals and corporate donations. To curry favour with moneyed interests, parties, while in power, have little hesitation to bend rules and established norms. In a sense, one can even visualise a close parallel between mounting electoral expenditure and the voluminous increase in corruption. While during the so called license-permit-raj, amount of money involved in corrupt deals remained comparatively moderate, this has reached astronomical proportion with economic liberalisation. It may be recalled that a conservative listing of financial scams since 1991 has pegged the money looted at a mind-boggling '73 lakh crore (Dasgupta 2009: 44). Neoliberalism has established a redistributive hierarchy of corruption involving politician – bureaucrat – contractor – industrialist nexus (Nayak 2011: 22) and produced a new discourse in which quick wealth, by any means, is possible and legitimate (Vasavi 2011: 16).

Recent spurt in black money which is pegged at US \$ 550 billion or 80% of the accounted money is a by-product of this. A portion of this tainted money flows into the election kitty of various parties. As noted previously, corporate funding of parties is not a recent development. It existed during the pre-independence period as well, as business groups like Tata's, Birla's and Bajaj's openly financed Indian National Congress. However, it was then thoroughly transparent and was for a nationalist cause rather than for business gains. But things changed drastically with independence as funding became opaque and that too on a *quid pro quo* basis. Amounts involved also become very huge the harnessing of which

was (is) often entrusted with professional fund raisers within political parties by their leadership. In the past, names like Uma Shankar Dixit, Motilal Vora, Nanaji Deshmukh, Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, Pramod Mahajan, Devikal, Biju Patnaik and Ramakrishna Hegde were often associated with such fund raising campaigns. On the other side, business conglomerates like Tatas⁵ and Birlas have their own electoral trusts through which they donate money to political parties (Ray 2009: 34). In other words, both political parties and business houses have perfected funding into an art and a science.

Table 1. Donation Received by National Parties: 2004 – 05 to 2011-12 (Rs. in crore)

Party	Total Donation A	Corporate/ Business Houses B	No. of donors Corporate/ Business Houses	Percentage Share of Corporate Funding (B/A)
Congress	187.56	172.25	418	92
BJP	226.46	192.47	1334	85
NCP	12.35	12.28	29	99
CPM	5.71	1.78	108	31
CPI	3.80	0.11	13	3
Total	435.87	378.89	1902	87

Note : Calculations are for financial year

Source : <http://adrindia.org/research-and-report/political-party-watch/combined-reports/analysis-total-income-and-total-assets> accessed on 23 January 2014.

Needless to say, corporate business houses are the largest contributors of money to political parties, particularly national parties. Table 1 which gives the funding details of five national parties for a period of eight years from 2004- 05 to 2011 -12 shows that 87% of their funding requirement was met by corporate donors. During this period they got ‘435.87 crore from 1902 donors of which ‘378.89 crore came through this route. Interestingly, the list of contributors included MNCs like Dove Chemicals (Bhopal gas tragedy ‘fame’), Sesa Goa and Sterlite (Vedanta group). Among the five parties, BJP was the largest beneficiary both in terms of aggregate donation (‘ 226.46 crore) and also in terms of number of contributors (1334). As could be seen from the table, this is followed by the Congress and NCP. Among the two Communist Parties, CPI(M) got the highest amount of donation in aggregate terms and also in regard to number of contributors.

Table 2. Sector-wise Donation to National Parties: 2004 – 05 to 2011-12 (Rs. in crore)

Name of corporate sector	Name of parties					Total
	Congress	BJP	NCP	CPI	CPM	
Trust & group of companies	70.28	55.66	1.70	0	0.02	127.66
Manufacture	36.81	58.18	4.53	0	0.20	99.72
Power & Oil	14.72	17.06	1.00	0	0.01	32.79
Mining, Construction & Exports/ Imports	23.07	4.78	1.30	0	0.58	29.73
Real estate	6.77	17.01	0	0	0.32	24.10
Chemicals/ Pharmaceuticals	5.54	10.12	0.70	0.002	0.18	16.54
Communication	2.81	10.32	0	0.021	0.10	13.26
Finance	4.94	5.95	2.00	0	0	12.89
Hospitality / Travels	2.87	4.73	0	0	0.03	7.62
Associates/ Association & Corporations	1.63	2.72	1.00	0.058	0.05	5.47
Shipping & Transport	1.52	2.12	0	0	0.04	3.67
Others	1.11	2.00	0.05	0.030	0.19	3.38
Education	0.19	1.70	0	0	0.05	1.94
Hospital	0	0.13	0	0	0.01	0.14
Total	172.25	192.47	12.28	0.11	1.78	378.89

Note : Figures are calculated on a financial year basis.

Source : <http://adrindia.org/research-and-report/political-party-watch/combined-reports/analysis-total-income-and-total-assets> accessed on 23 January 2014.

Sector wise analysis of donations also makes interesting reading (Table 2). About 83% of the fund came from just five sectors: trust and group of companies, manufacture, power and oil, mining, construction and export/ import, and real estate. If trusts and group of companies are replaced by communication and finance, the percentage contribution comes to 56.08. Incidentally these are the sectors which are classified as ‘rent-thick’ because of the pervasive role of the state in giving licenses and the reputation of illegality or monopolistic practices (Gandhi and Walton 2012: 12; Vasavi 2011: 5). Party wise this is 52% for Congress and 59% for BJP. The greatest contribution for the former came from trust and group of companies followed by the manufacturing sector. However, this is just the reverse for BJP.

Politics of Business and Business of Politics

With corporate money flowing in large quantities into the coffers of political parties, a mutually beneficial relationship naturally unfolds between the state and business. Consequently, business' priorities get translated into public policies and politics itself gets converted into business' profit. Soon business develops a political interest and politics a business interest. The situation here is exactly the same as George Monbiot once visualised: big business means politics (Monbiot 2011: 15), though the reverse is also true.

When politics and business enter into such a contractual relationship, its impact on the democratic system is anybody's guess. It becomes a 'democracy of business'⁷ paving the way for the pervasive influence of business on the state. The state now becomes open to the manipulative agenda of the corporate sector⁸ and legitimises the appropriation of public resources by private interests. This in turn produces a political culture of impunity (Chandoke 2014: 35) and private enrichment (Patnaik 2000: 35). Here one is reminded of Union Minister of Law, Salman Kurshid's recent outburst against the Supreme Court decision refusing bail to the businessmen accused in the 2G Spectrum scam⁹. For the state, what is of great concern is the predatory activities of the business groups rather than rule of law of the country. As Jacques Ranciere once said, "the absolute identification of politics with the management of capital is no longer the shameful secret hidden behind the 'forms' of democracy; it is the openly declared truth by which our government acquire legitimacy" (Ranciere 1999: 113).

The state is not merely subservient to business interests, it has, in fact, become captive to such forces. They (business groups) are powerful and effective lobbying organs in the country with deep roots in all major economic ministries, the Ministry of External Affairs and the PMO, including prime minister's Economic Advisory Council (Hasan 2012: 61). In return, besides financial assistance they even lend legitimacy to political parties and their leadership. The groundwork done by FICCI and Adani group in bolstering the image of BJP's prime ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi, after the 2002 Gujarat riots speaks volumes in this regard. Thus nothing in the state is above bargaining and compromise by capital. It (state) remains closed only to democratic negotiation by vulnerable categories of citizens making it explicit that its core projects are differently open to negotiation and that democracy itself is selectively available (Jayal 2000: 120 -21). Interestingly, the corporates today have succeeded even in directly sending their representatives to the Parliament and other legislative institutions, thus transforming the very class nature of these bodies.

**Table 3. Parliament: Changing Class Nature, Rajya Sabha:
Asset Position of MPs (Rs. in crore)**

Party	Seats	No. of Crorepatis	As % of Total	Total Asset	Average
Congress	63	42 (66.67)	38.76	775.02	12.30
BJP	43	22 (51.16)	20.0	92.56	2.15
CPM	14	1 (7.14)	0.91	3.13	0.22
CPI	4	Nil	Nil	1.17	0.29
NCP	4	2 (50.0)	1.82	33.70	8.43
SP	13	7 (53.85)	6.36	433.25	33.33
BSP	8	4 (50.0)	3.64	65.83	8.23
JD(U)	6	4 (66.67)	3.64	63.23	10.54
JD(S)	3	2 (66.67)	1.82	280.19	93.40
AIADMK	7	3 (42.86)	2.73	6.64	0.95
DMK	3	2 (66.67)	1.82	7.75	2.58
RJD	4	2 (50.0)	1.82	6.33	1.58
Akali Dal	3	1 (33.33)	0.91	4.39	1.46
Shiv Sena	4	3 (75.0)	2.73	24.74	6.19
TDP	2	1 (50.0)	0.91	7.18	3.59
Others	20	9 (45.0)	8.18	33.23	1.89
Independents	7	5 (71.43)	4.55	324.28	46.33
Total	208	110 (52.88)	52.89	2162.62	10.10

Note : 1. Figures given in brackets indicate percentage distribution
2. Data available only for 208 members.

Source : The table is prepared by the researcher on the basis of data provided by National Election Watch, <http://myxata.info/party> accessed on 21 January 2014.

'Money-driven' politics today has its strong reflection in terms of representation in both Houses of Parliament. This means that there is a perceptible change in their class nature as entrepreneur - politicians and dollar millionaires are getting elected to it in more and more numbers. This was the reason why a responsible politician like Jairam Ramesh was forced to concede openly that, "mining buccaneers are masquerading in Parliament as political leaders" (Chatterjee 2013: 15). One way to understand the changing class nature of the Parliament is to look at the asset position (self-declared) of its members. And this reveals, in no uncertain terms, that they are far from being representative of the population of a country in which poverty is pervasive and endemic (Beteille 2011: 79).

For instance out of the 208 members of the Rajya Sabha for which data are available, 53% are crorepatists with an aggregate asset of ₹2163 crore, and an average of ₹10 crore. Significantly the percentage distribution of crorepatists is highest in the case of many regional political outfits like JD(U), JD(S), DMK and Shiv Sena followed by parties like SP, BSP and TDP. In most cases this is also true of average assets. Among national parties, Congress tops the list with 67% of its members in this group followed by BJP (51%). The only party (national) which does not have even a single crorepati is the CPI.

Table 4. Average Assets of Lok Sabha Members: (14th and 15th Houses)

Parties	Assets: 14 th House(INR in lakh)	Assets: 15 th House(INR in lakh)	% increase
Congress	310.76	628.08	102.11
SP	153.78	241.43	57.0
Shiv Sena	151.29	308.43	103.36
BSP	119.83	462.60	286.05
DMK	105.06	455.04	333.12
BJP	96.91	307.47	217.27
RJD	56.19	136.58	82.95
BJD	53.51	427.62	792.58
CPI	25.40	25.50	3.94
CPM	22.95	37.98	65.49
Others	177.39	610.57	244.20
Total	1273.07	3641.30	286.04

Source : 1. Paul and Vivekananda, 2004: 4629.

2. [http://myxata.info/fs2009/national election watch](http://myxata.info/fs2009/national%20election%20watch).

Table 4, more or less, gives a similar idea for the Lok Sabha. Between the 14th and 15th Houses, percentage increase in the average asset of the members is an whopping 286% ie. from 1273 lakh in the 14th House to 3641 lakh in the succeeding one. Here again, regional parties remain on the higher side *vis-à-vis* national parties. The asset position of MPs of six regional parties together shows a percentage increase of 318 over their position in the previous House whereas this is only 219 for four national parties taken together. Among the former group, percentage increase is the highest for BJD(793) and in the latter group for BJP (217). At the other end the average asset of a cabinet minister is ₹75 million (Sainath 2009). That in a country where 836 million human beings have a percapita income of less than ₹20 a day, there are 306 crorepatists – an increase of 98% between 2004

and '09 – speaks volumes about the mismatch between the representatives and represented (ibid).

Table. 5 Business Representation in Parliament (1991 – 2004)

House	Business rep.	Non-business rep.	Data not available	Total
Lok Sabha 10 th House	82 (15.07)	440 (81.88)	22 (4.04)	544 (100)
11 th House	109 (20.19)	421 (77.96)	10 (1.85)	540 (100)
12 th House	78 (14.80)	441 (83.68)	8 (1.52)	527 (100)
13 th House	99 (18.33)	437 (80.93)	4 (0.74)	540 (100)
14 th House	119 (22.33)	393 (73.73)	21 (3.94)	533 (100)
Rajya Sabha 1994	8 (9.88)	69 (85.19)	4 (4.94)	81 (100)
1998	31 (12.60)	211 (85.77)	3 (1.22)	246 (99.56)
Current House	38 (15.90)	192 (80.33)	9 (3.77)	239 (100)

Note : Figures given in brackets indicate percentage distribution.

Source : Sinha (2010: 472).

Any account of the changing class profile of the Parliament will not be complete without having a look at the increasing presence of business representatives in it. Table 5 shows that Fourteenth Lok Sabha had 22.33% businessmen/ industrialists as its members and the same is 15.90% for the current Rajya Sabha. Significantly, the account for the 13 year period from 1991 to 2004 shows that the representation of this class had been increasing, with the Lower House registering an increase of 7.26% and Rajya Sabha 6.02%. This clearly indicates the extent to which businessmen and others of their ilk have now come to put a premium on direct representation in decision-making bodies in the era of neoliberalism. Though, in the absence of serious studies, one could not put forward a cogent argument that there exists a linkage between the growing presence of these people in such bodies and the changing nature of public policies – economic policies in particular – of the Indian state, still such a hypothesis could not be ruled out completely as a figment of imagination. Rising tide of corporate funding of elections, advancing level of assets of elected representatives and the enveloping presence of businessmen in Parliament taken together definitely point towards the possibility of such a connection (Prabhash 2010: 92).

As a result of all these, Indian politics today is witness to two important, but harmful, developments: politics has ceased to be a vehicle for social emancipation, and instead has become a means for private enrichment. In other words, the political space of democracy is converted into the market space of economy (Khilnani 2012: 33). This, in effect, means de-nationalisation of politics itself. As the noted French theorist Jean Baudrillard says, “the idea of politics disappears and the game of politics continues in secret indifference to its own stakes” (Baudrillard 2009: 7). Incidentally this exists along with de-politicisation and jointly they form an explosive mixture as they neutralise the capacity of politics to mediate complex and often conflicting social realities. Any attempt at bringing about necessary changes in the electoral process has to take all these into account. Therefore, such attempts have to be legal and political simultaneously. While contemplating legal measures like regulating corporate contributions to political parties, clubbing the electoral expenditure of parties and candidates together, introducing the system of state funding of elections, and establishing institutional devices to prevent the scale and scope of corruption, it is also highly imperative that political parties themselves are reformed by gradually bringing them within the ambit of Right to Information regime and strengthening inner-party democracy. At another level, mass mobilisation against the harmful effects of neoliberal economic policies has also to be undertaken as a long-term political objective. For, neoliberalism is not merely increasing socio-economic contradictions, but is opening up new avenues of de-politicisation and mega corruption.

Notes

1. Out of this, one crore was spent on acquiring the copyright of the Oscar winning Slumdog Millionaire song, ‘Jai Ho’ from its copyright holder, T-series.
2. This included a 200 crore advertising fund.
3. Even this figure is conservative given the fact that business groups often provide their own aircraft or lease planes for political leaders.
4. Recall here the media report that in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections and the subsequent Maharashtra Assembly polls, hundreds of crores of rupees had been spent to buy ‘news’ in large dailies and television channels (Sainath 2010) and that one BJP minister had 160 bonafide journalists in his payroll (Kang 2014).
5. According to available information, social media campaign of the party will be handled by Genesis Burson – Marstelley, India, and advertisement by Dentsu, India.
6. The Tata Electoral Trust does not distribute funds to individual candidates but only to registered political parties based on their strength in Lok Sabha.
7. It was president Woodrow Wilson of US who, for the first time, used this phrase in 1916. While addressing a convention of salesmen in Detroit he told the gathering that American’s “democracy of business had to take the lead in the struggle for the peaceful conquest of the world” (Grazia 2005: 1).

8. A good example in this regard is UPA Government's decision to drop/ freeze the implementation of General Anti - Avoidance Rules (GAAR), an internationally acclaimed best practice, which seeks to prevent abusive use of provisions in the law to legally avoid tax payment in the face of opposition from the corporate sector. This clearly illustrates the drastic change in the attitude of the Indian state's relationship with capital, both domestic and foreign (Chandrasekhar 2012: 16-17).
9. In the case, 17 individuals were arrested and prosecuted, including the former Telecom Minister, A. Raja and several senior executives from some of the largest telecom companies. This infuriated the minister who is reported to have asked, 'if you lock-up top businessmen, will investment come'? (Kaur 2012: 43).

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India's Foreign Policy Options under Narendra Modi

K.P. Fabian

It is difficult to predict precisely what the Narendra Modi government will do in the area of foreign policy. The pronouncements made during the election campaign and the manifesto issued after much internal consultations are primarily meant to get votes. They might not indicate the intended direction of foreign policy. It is easier, and certainly more to the point, to say what the new government should do, given the geopolitical context of the day over which no country has full control.

Some IR scholars have argued that foreign policy is determined by national interest that does not change with the government; style might change, but substance remains. This argument is flawed. To start with, how is national interest determined? Obviously, it is not like the value of pie or of the acceleration due to gravity of a falling object. Take the case of Japan. Before World War 2, Japan's decision makers assumed that it was in their national interest to invade and occupy China and the rest of Asia and establish a Co-prosperity Sphere dominated by Japan. The pursuit of such national interest eventually led to the destruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima by the newly invented atom bomb and the subsequent surrender of Japan to US. Obviously, the national interest when wrongly identified can lead to disaster. Take the case of US. Under President Bush it was considered that it was in the national interest of US to invade and occupy Iraq. Under President Obama, the national interest dictated exit from Iraq. The US misadventure in Iraq moved the world away from unipolarity. The irresistible conclusion is that national interest is seen differently by different leaders of the same nation. The temptation to make political science as 'scientific' as physics by positing an unchanging national interest independent of the decision makers of the day should be resisted.

In the case of India focusing on the national interest will not help us much in prescribing what the new government should do. Take the case of defence of the territorial integrity of the country. It might be argued that such defence is definitely part of national interest. Question: What is meant by the territory of India? Does it include POK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir) and the territory under

China's occupation? If so, how do we get them back? Through military means or diplomatic negotiations? We conclude that the search for national interest is not helpful when it comes to figuring out what policy should be.

We better start with specific topics. Take Pakistan. But before we can figure out what the current government should do, since nobody starts on a clean slate, it is important to see what went wrong with the policy of the previous government. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (2004-2014) worked hard to improve relations with Pakistan, but he failed. The main flaw in the approach was over eagerness. New Delhi worked out through the back channel a four-point agreement with President Musharraf that provided for a soft border in Kashmir across the line of control. Fortunately for India, there was no formal agreement between India and Pakistan as Musharraf's own position in Pakistan got weakened and he could not have openly formalized the agreement even if he wanted. The soft-border would have made it easier for the ISI and its associates to send in terrorists across the border; a growing number of people from POK would have stayed on and even settled down in Kashmir; the demography would have changed; and one day, the Kashmir Assembly might have passed a resolution asking India to get out. It passeth understanding that New Delhi seriously pursued such a deal that might have eventually cost us the loss of the Valley.

To understand why UPA Government did what it did, it is important to point out a fundamental contradiction in India's policy on Kashmir towards Pakistan, especially after the 1972 Shimla Agreement signed by Indira Gandhi with Bhutto. Article 6 reads:

“Both Governments agree that their respective Heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile , the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalization of relations, including the questions of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations.”

It follows logically that India does not take seriously its own declaration, sanctified by the Indian Parliament , that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. India agrees that full normalization of relations with Pakistan can happen only after or along with the ‘final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir.’ Indira Gandhi agreed to the wrongly chosen words only because Bhutto explained that his domestic political situation did not permit him to agree to treating the line of control as international boundary. He promised to agree later to accepting the line of control as boundary as soon as possible. He pleaded that if he returned to Pakistan with an aborted summit, the army might throw him out of office. Virtually, he appealed to Indira Gandhi's magnanimity.

We do know that Bhutto tried and successfully cheated Indira Gandhi. He had no intention of accepting the line of control as boundary. Indira Gandhi herself recognized the mistake. Yet, successive governments of India have agreed to include the settlement of Jammu and Kashmir as an item in the bilateral talks with Pakistan. A better course of action would have been to tell Pakistan that since it went back on its word, India was no longer bound by the Shimla Agreement to include Jammu and Kashmir as an item for discussion. Indian decision makers attach more importance to the text than to the context. Words spoken or written have to be understood in the context they were used.

An argument might be raised that by revoking Article 6 of the Agreement, India will enable Pakistan to raise the issue of Kashmir at the UN. The argument shows much confusion. Pakistan has raised the Kashmir issue at the UN even after the Shimla Agreement. It is for India to show self-confidence and signal to the world that it will not accept any discussion of the Kashmir issue at UN; there is no reason to believe that Pakistan will get much support at UN if India sends out a clear signal about its position.

The UPA government failed to be assertive and Pakistan could get away with the ISI-sponsored 26/11 attack on Mumbai without taking any serious action against the planners of the attack. Further, Pakistan cleverly made India accept the proposition that both countries are victims of terrorism without adding that much of the terrorism India is victim of originates from Pakistan. Pakistan made full use of India's misplaced eagerness to improve relations.

As we said no government starts on a clean slate. It will not be smart diplomacy to radically alter position and declare straight away that there is nothing to discuss on Kashmir except Pakistan's 'vacation of aggression' as V K Krishna Menon used to put it. To start with we need clarity in our mind. Once that clarity is there it will not be difficult to steer policy in the desired direction over a period of time. In any case, it will not be appropriate to discuss here how the change in policy should be effected.

The best starting point with Pakistan is more bilateral trade to the advantage of both. It is significant that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif brought his businessman son with him to India when he was invited to the swearing in ceremony of Prime Minister Modi. It has been estimated that the value of bilateral trade can be increased tenfold in a few years. Here again there is need for departure from the style of the previous government that treated Pakistan's willingness to discuss trade matters as a concession on its part for which India should be beholden.

Coming to China, there is need for correction. To start with, one has to be clear about what China wants from India and vice versa. China sees India primarily as a huge market opportunity for export of goods and investment; it does not see India as a rival power in competition with it given the asymmetry between the two in

GDP, military power and technology, and diplomatic clout; China has cultivated friendship with Pakistan with great care over decades, partly to strengthen it vis-à-vis India at a time when India and China were seen as competitors of roughly equal power for a leading position in the region and Asia; Pakistan will do its utmost to strengthen and deepen its relations with China in order to rectify the asymmetry between it and India; up to a point, China will respond to Pakistan's overtures; China does not gain much by settling the border dispute with India except on the basis of India's agreeing in toto, or by and large, to China's claims; so far India has shown much keenness in increased economic relations without asking for any quid pro quo on the border question; China has laid claims to Arunachal Pradesh without provoking any serious response of a retaliatory nature from India; China would like India not to show any interest in the disputes in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea and to refrain from any criticism of China's aggressive behaviour towards its neighbors in that context; in short, China would like India to accept China's 'peaceful rise' even when it is not always peaceful.

India's cardinal fault in its dealing with China has been the willful neglect of the principle of reciprocity; India accepted China's invasion and occupation of Tibet without China's giving anything in return; India gave away its rights in Tibet without seeking anything in return; now India is letting China into the Indian market with a growing imbalance in trade to India's disadvantage and increasing damage to its manufacturing sector without getting anything in return. The obvious and inescapable conclusion is that the new government in India should carefully recalibrate relations with China taking into account the importance of reciprocity. It is not necessary to elaborate further on this at this stage.

US has sent out clear signals that it is keen to cultivate the new government in India. The signing of the 123 Agreement that put an end to the nuclear apartheid practised against India by US and its allies was an achievement of the Manmohan Singh government though the question remains as to the high price extracted from India by subjecting certain crucial areas of nuclear activity subject to scrutiny. It appears that Government of India had led the US corporate sector to assume that India will not have any legislation imposing liability for nuclear accidents on the suppliers of equipment and technology under any circumstances. As it turned out, legislation on liability was passed and it is only fair that suppliers of equipment and technology are held accountable if accidents occur despite proper maintenance and care on the part of operators. The new government should not signal any desire to get investment at the cost of abandoning the principle of liability on the part of the supplier.

There is serious difficulty in working out a policy towards US in security and strategic matters: the inconsistency manifested by US in regard to international questions. The warning administered to Syria with the implied threat of military

action and the subsequent u- turn has focused attention on US inconsistency. While President Obama has announced a 'rebalance' in the Pacific, much doubt remains as to whether US will carry out the announced plans by considerably increasing its military presence in East Asia and provide military support to China's neighbors if and when China turns aggressive. India should try to learn more about the intentions and capabilities of US and the neighbors of China before taking a position in the matter.

Japan has sent out signals of keenness to cultivate the new government in India. Japan can be a source of technology and investment. At the same time, it might be difficult for India to lend support to Japan if it adopts a policy of provocation towards China.

The European Union is in a bad shape and it is important for India to focus on the bilateral relationships as it has always done.

The importance of South Asia is beyond debate, but SAARC is perhaps genetically incapable of rapid or even normal growth. While India should contribute its due share to strengthen and deepen SAARC, others have to play their role rather than complain about India's size as Pakistan often does.

To conclude, India should be more assertive vis-à-vis its interlocutors in defending its interests; India should be less fearful of China and the principle of reciprocity should be re-introduced as subtly as possible; on Kashmir, there is need to be consistent and to be more self-confident in addressing the issue should Pakistan raise it in the UN fora; the economic relations with other countries should take into account the need to promote the manufacturing sector in India; the need for more self-reliance in the defence sector cannot be over-emphasized; and there is no need to seek with monomaniac zeal the permanent membership of the Security Council.

James Madison and the Making of the Constitution of the United States

A.M. Thomas

The fundamental importance of the Constitution of the United States of America is that it is regarded as the basic rule book for the conduct of American politics. Apart from highlighting the rationale of its existence, it divides power and responsibility between the different branches of government, defines the basic nature of the relationships between governmental institutions, mentions how individuals are to be selected for office, and finally details how the rules themselves may be changed. This makes the Constitution an essential structural factor influencing all of American political life. The making of the Constitution is a fascinating and momentous story that has been repeated in many a history book where it has been portrayed as the result of a collective effort by some of the best and wisest of American minds of the eighteenth century. These men, popularly called the Founding Fathers, congregated to create a document that has endured for more than two hundred years. Although the endeavour to create this document was a collective one, the specific contribution of some men like James Madison stands apart and is worth highlighting.

James Madison has been described as the Father of the Constitution of the United States or the Father of US constitutional government. This honour has been conferred upon him mainly on the basis of his significant contributions at the time of the drafting of the Constitution, during the struggle over ratification and eventually in spearheading the effort to include the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. He was also instrumental in convening the Constitutional Convention and recording the proceedings of the same. What is being attempted here is an effort to enumerate his contributions in the making of the Constitution of the United States and to analyse what makes him distinct from the other Founding Fathers.

The task to outline Madison's contributions would be incomplete without a brief look into the circumstances that led to his assumption of a cardinal role in

the creation of the American political system. During the American Revolution the forum for interaction of the thirteen former colonies of Britain was a body of delegates called the Continental Congress which came into existence in 1774. It was this body that approved the Declaration of Independence in 1776 and drafted the Articles of Confederation which served as a body of limited rules governing relations among the colonies from 1781. These colonies or states were cautious of centralized and remote government because of their experience with the English Parliament and consequently the national government they had set up was one with limited powers. Sovereignty still remained with the separate states, Congress had no way of enforcing its decrees and there were no federal courts. The shortcomings of the Articles were evident, particularly with reference to interstate trade. Being virtually independent, with the power to levy customs duties, many states became intense commercial rivals of their neighbours and sought to gain every advantage that they could against the products of other states. There was also the problem of debt particularly in the post revolutionary period. The central government relied upon the states to comply voluntarily with its annual tax assessment, while the states were not eager to cooperate, many paying less than ten percent of what was owed. Finally, there was also the government's inability to defend American interests in foreign affairs. The confederation lacked the capacity to reach binding agreements with other nations or deal with a variety of problems that originated outside the borders of the thirteen states (Jensen 1940). The major criticism of the Articles by men like Madison was that it resulted in the failure of the states to honour their constitutional responsibilities to the Confederation, most notably in providing Congress with the revenue that was necessary to service the Revolutionary debt and to gain respect of foreign governments (McCoy 1989:40). Ultimately, the failure of the Articles of Confederation led to the common belief that a new constitution was desperately needed. The result was the convening of the Annapolis Convention to discuss problems of interstate commerce. However, only five of the thirteen states attended and the effort to discuss a revision of the Articles of Confederation did not materialise.

James Madison's national career began with his membership in the Continental Congress representing his home state of Virginia and later as a delegate to the Annapolis Convention. A graduate of the College of New Jersey (Princeton) he was earlier a delegate to the Virginia Convention and a member of the Virginia House of Delegates. Forrest McDonald (1992:72) describes him as "better versed in the theory of money than successful in its acquisition....he had been trained in the law, but he never practised his profession, and when he finally retired from politics he came to learn that he was not a very skilful farmer." With the failure of the Annapolis Convention, there were demands to convene another one. Madison along with Alexander Hamilton of New York persuaded the delegates to call upon

the states to hold a constitutional convention in Philadelphia in May 1787. The Virginia legislature considered the Annapolis report and passed an act authorizing the election of seven delegates to the Philadelphia Convention. Madison wrote the authorizing act which was a persuasive document of justification that was sent to all of the state governors and legislatures encouraging them to send delegates to the Convention (Kaminski 2006:44).

Madison, a product of the Enlightenment, was familiar with the history of governments that had existed from time to time. In the early months of 1786 he read widely from his library at Montpelier, Virginia on ancient and modern confederations. He also benefitted greatly from the philosophical treatises written by Mirabeau, Diderot and Voltaire that his friend and political collaborator Thomas Jefferson sent from France (Neary 1987:67). The conclusion of his study of Greek confederacies and the United Provinces of the Netherlands was that they were fragile and tended to be ineffective or ceased to exist when they lacked a central controlling power. The experience of the former colonies of Britain in America was no different. "Vulnerability to attack from without, intrigue by foreign governments within, and the debilitating effect of internal quarrelling, all circumstances experienced by the United States during Madison's service in the Continental Congress, convinced him that however idyllic, small or loosely organised states might seem, reality required a strong union" (Ketcham 1974: 109). In his analysis of the problems of American governments, Madison was incensed by the selfishness, parochialism and inconsistency of the thirteen autonomous states. What transpired in the Continental Congress were the evil practices of courting popularity, complaining about imagined as well as real hardships, and defaulting on commitments because of suspicion of the default of others. All these undermined the authority of Congress that he came to consider the Articles of Confederation "a mere treaty of friendships, devoid of uniformity and compulsion essential to law and government" (Ibid.:110). The lessons of history along with his own experience led him to the conclusion that the American system needed to be improved. They took the form of a memorandum that he wrote in April 1787 titled *Vices of the Political System of the United States* (Madison 2006:35-38). Here he identified twelve shortcomings of the federal system under the Articles of Confederation which can be classified into two groups: shortcomings of the federal system and the shortcomings of the state governments (Gutzman 2012). McCoy(1989: 45) states that in the years before the Philadelphia Convention Madison was more concerned with the problems of individual states and their governments namely the potential chaos emerging from popular licentiousness, than to the weakness of federal government. Reynolds (2010:75) writes that "he wanted to turn this inefficient

alliance into a true national government—and one that could check the excesses of the states and their overly democratic assemblies.”

As Madison prepared for the constitutional convention, he revealed some of his ideas or proposed principles for the convention to others. These can be seen particularly in his correspondence with George Washington and other fellow Virginians, Edmund Randolph as well as Jefferson and Edmund Pendleton. A major concern was the structure and powers of any new mechanism. In a letter to Washington he states “conceiving that an individual independence of the states is utterly irreconcilable with their aggregate sovereignty, and that a consolidation of the whole into one simple republic would be as inexpedient as it is unattainable, I have fought for middle ground, which may at once support a due supremacy of the national authority, and not exclude the local authorities wherever they can be subordinately useful” (Madison 2006: 42). In addition he also makes his thoughts clear to Washington on the nature of the three branches of government as well as on the importance of ratification of the constitution by the people (Ibid.:42-45). While doing his homework before the Convention, Madison had in the back of his mind basic questions of political philosophy, but his attention centred on specific needs and devices (Ketcham 1974: 111).

The Philadelphia Convention

The Philadelphia Convention began on 25 May 1787 with all thirteen states except Rhode Island sending delegates. The fifty five delegates who came were generally men of wealth and influence, very well educated and solidly steeped in the classics. Above all they were men with very broad experience in American politics, active in the Revolution or in the governments before and afterwards. Madison arrived early enough in Philadelphia to interact informally with as many delegates as possible. He noted that “the whole community is big with expectation, and there can be no doubt that the result will in some way or the other have a powerful effect on our destiny” (Ketcham 1990: 190). His main task was to bring the Virginia delegation solidly behind the plan for strong government he had outlined earlier to Washington and others. Moreover, Virginia being the largest and influential state, its standpoint was crucial in guiding the path to be tread. Madison had great faith in the delegates to the Convention and remarked that “individually and collectively... there never was an assembly of men, charged with a great and arduous trust, who were more pure in their motives, or more exclusively or anxiously devoted to the object committed to them” (Ibid.: 194).

Although he was just like any other delegate at the Convention, Madison on his own took up certain other responsibilities. No formal arrangement had been made to record the proceedings. Madison chose a seat in front of the presiding member, with the other members on his right and left. “In this favourable position

for hearing all that passed, I noted in terms legible and in abbreviations and marks intelligible to myself what was read from the chair or spoken by the members; and losing not a moment unnecessarily between the adjournment and reassembling of the Convention I was enabled to write my daily notes during the session or written a few days after its close in the extent and form preserved in my own hand on my files" (Ibid.:195). Madison's own sense of history made him do this and the result was that future generations got the opportunity to know what had transpired in that "dark conclave." Dan Elish (2008: 27) remarks that it was fortunate "for students of American history that Madison made the effort. The only surviving record of the convention, his transcription of the Constitutional Convention, is a priceless American artifact."¹

Before the Convention had actually convened, Madison was clear about what the primary goals of that body should be. Firstly, he wanted to replace the weak confederation government consisting of strong sovereign states with a powerful national government that could act directly on individuals and was dominant over the states. Secondly, he wanted to replace the equal representation of the states in a unicameral Congress with a bicameral Congress in which the states were represented proportionally i.e., according to population or by contributions (payment of taxes).² Thirdly, he wanted the national government to have a veto power over the legislation of the states "in all cases whatsoever." This meant that it would be armed with positive and complete authority in all cases where uniform measures were necessary. Congress, consequently should not only retain all powers that it had under the Confederation but also be given the power to regulate commerce, to levy and collect taxes, to raise an army and navy, etc. Further, Congress must also have the power (as King in Council had before the Revolution) to veto "in all cases whatsoever" any and all acts passed by the state legislatures. Madison also wanted the creation of a separate single executive. He was unclear about what powers this officer would have, but thought it might, in combination with some federal judges form a council of revision, which would serve, in essence, as third branch of legislature. Every bill passed by Congress would need the approval of this council. A federal judiciary would also have to be created to which people could ultimately appeal (Kaminski 2006: 50-52).

What emerged in the Convention has to be briefly mentioned here. There had to be a starting point in the deliberations of the Convention. These were provided in the form of a document known as the Virginia Plan, presented by Randolph but largely the handiwork of Madison. The Plan consisted of fifteen resolutions, which for the next few weeks were the foundation of the debates, and in fact formed the essential frame of government (Van Doren 1948: 265-267). Roche (1961:803) notes that the plan was a political master-stroke. It ensured the frame of discussions and the manner in which they would proceed, in short on Madison's terms. There was

no confusion over agenda since the delegates took the Virginia Resolutions as their point of departure for the purposes of discussion. The Virginia Plan called for a two-house legislature, the lower house chosen by the people and the upper house chosen by the lower; a national executive, the makeup of which was not specified—to be elected by the legislature; and a national judiciary to be chosen by the legislature.

As the debate proceeded on the basis of the Virginia Plan, the smaller states became increasingly alarmed. It had not taken them long to conclude that the more heavily populated states would control government under the plan. Accordingly William Patterson of New Jersey presented an alternative plan, the basic assumption of which was that the convention had no power to deprive the smaller states of the equality enjoyed under the Articles of Confederation. The New Jersey Plan called for the continuation of the Articles of Confederation, including one vote for each state represented in the legislature. Congress would be strengthened so that it could impose taxes and regulate trade, and acts of Congress would become the supreme law of the states. Further, there would be an executive of more than one person to be elected by Congress and a Supreme Court to be appointed by the executive. Commenting on the alternative plan Madison stated that the object of a proper plan was twofold. One was to preserve the Union and the second to provide a government that would remedy the evils felt by the states both in their united and individual capacities (Madison 2006:52). Madison questioned whether the New Jersey Plan would serve the urgent needs of the United States. He thought that “in leaving the states ‘uncontrolled’ in their power to violate laws and treaties, the plan opened the door for foreign intrigue and internal dissension.” (Ketcham 1990:206). He expressed his apprehensions that if the proper foundation of government was destroyed by substituting an equality in place of a proportional representation, no proper superstructure could be raised. If the small states really wished for a Government armed with the powers necessary to secure their liberties, and to enforce obedience on the larger members as well as on themselves he could not help thinking them extremely mistaken in their means (Madison 2006: 68).

The impasse was overcome with the intervention of the Connecticut delegation which came up with a plan that is known as the Great Compromise. It called for a House of Representatives apportioned by the number of free inhabitants in each state plus three-fifths of the slaves, and a Senate or upper house, consisting of two members from each state, elected by the state legislatures. The plan broke the deadlock because it protected the small states by guaranteeing that each state would have an equal vote in the Senate. Madison thought this idea of ensuring state equality in the Senate as unjust and an unwise violation of majority rule. He questioned giving such a poorly devised Congress undefined powers. As a large-state delegate he opposed placing their majority interests at the mercy of small-

state minority power in the Senate (Madison 2006: xvii). Writing to Jefferson he remarked that “it ended in a compromise...very much to the dissatisfaction of several members from the large states (Madison 1865:354). Nevertheless Madison would later be a defender of the decisions taken in the Convention.

When it came to create the framework of the executive branch, confusion prevailed. Americans had very little experience with elected governors before the Revolution and they tended to equate their bad experience of arbitrary executive power under royal rule with executive power in general. Incidentally, Madison knew what his colleague Randolph thought of the whole issue. The latter had a strong opinion on the subject and regarded “a unity in the executive magistracy as the foetus of monarchy.” He also saw no reason why America should follow British precedents (Thorpe 2008:322). Madison characteristically offered his views on the executive question particularly its selection. There were four alternatives. They were election by state legislatures, by the national legislature, by the people or by some specially chosen intermediate group, i.e. an electoral college. The first modes were inadmissible not only because they made the executive subordinate to legislative bodies, but also because election by any standing body would find its members negatively influenced by politicians as well as foreign elements. Madison also opposed vehemently election of the executive by the legislature (Ketcham 1990: 217). At the same time Madison and other nationalists thought this better than having the states choose the executive even though it seriously impaired the independence of the executive and thus the separation of powers. Choice by the people though theoretically sound was impractical because small states as well as the less populous South would object because of a disproportion of qualified voters in the larger and northern states. The only option, Madison would indirectly hint, was some variety of electoral college. In August 1787 a committee constituted to solve unfinished parts finally recommended a President chosen by an electoral college for a term of four years (with re-eligibility) and empowered to appoint all judges as well as executive officers, and to make treaties, all with the advice and consent of the Senate.³ Ketcham (1974:116-17) suggests that on the whole, the executive office was novel and its design revealed how deeply committed the delegates were to the sovereignty of the people. The executive was viewed increasingly not as a remote, irresponsible officer whose powers had to be restrained by the representatives of the people, but rather as one who could speak and act for all the people.

The formation of the judiciary, though it involved much less debate, was guided by the same sense of awareness of resting a government entirely on popular authority. The Convention was unanimous that there be a national court system and gave the legislative power to establish federal, district and circuit courts, but questions of appointment, jurisdiction, and relation to state courts were complicated. Madison

believed the executive could be best supported and controlled by being joined with the judiciary in revising the acts of the legislature. He thought that “unless inferior tribunals were created throughout the Republic with final jurisdiction in many cases, “appeals would be multiplied to a most oppressive degree; that besides, an appeal would not in many cases be a remedy” (Van Doren 1948:65-66). The supreme law clause satisfied nationalists like Madison that the state courts could be more sufficiently subordinate, while the growing confidence in the executive office, plus the impracticability of other plans, in the end threw the appointing power into the President’s hands (Ketcham 1974: 117).

Towards the end of the convention, Madison served on the five man committee of style that wrote the final language of the Constitution. After several weeks of deliberations, the document was ready to be signed by the delegates. While Madison signed, two of his fellow delegates from Virginia, Edmund Randolph and George Mason refused. Randolph had many objections and Mason was particularly critical of the absence of a bill of rights in the Constitution. The omission of such a bill would soon turn out to be a major criticism of the new constitution and one that its supporters would be unable to successfully defend. Five days before the convention had adjourned Mason had made a plea to include a bill of rights to the constitution only to be opposed by people like Roger Sherman of Connecticut (Van Doren 1948:162). The latter argued that rights protected by the already existing state constitutions were not repealed by the new constitution, and that they being in force was sufficient.⁴ The primary objection to adding it was that the government to be formed would be one of limited powers. Unlike state governments, which had plenary authority to act on behalf of their citizens, the federal constitution would create a government whose powers would mostly be confined to those authorized in the document. Since the plan did not repeal individual rights protected in state constitutions, and because the new general government had no authority to abuse such rights, there was no need to grant them explicit protection. Moreover, once a list was begun, it would be inevitable that some important rights would be left off. This would suggest that the federal government was authorized to abridge such rights since, it might be assumed, only the enumerated ones would be entitled to constitutional protection. Anyhow in the days following the conclusion of the Convention this would remain an issue raised throughout America. The decision not to include a list of individual rights was a misjudgement on the part of the supporters of the Constitution that would have dire consequences, some of which could be seen immediately at the Philadelphia convention. Even as the document was being finalised, several prominent delegates demanded that a second constitutional convention be held to rectify what they considered to be serious defects in the Constitution they were writing. It had taken an extraordinary effort

on the part of many individuals to organize this first convention and to bring it to a successful conclusion. A second convention could create political instability, even chaos (Labunski 2006: 9-10). Madison distinguished between the two groups who demanded a second Convention — “friends to an effective Government, and even to the substance of the particular Government in question” and those who “urge a second Convention with the insidious hope of throwing all things into confusion and of subverting the fabric just established, if not the Union itself” (Madison 1865:443). As the Constitution was being signed it did not escape Madison’s mind that he had not achieved all that he had wished. Many of his ideas were incorporated while several were rejected. McDonald (1985:208-209) in his estimate finds that forty of the seventy-one specific proposals that Madison advocated at the Convention were not approved. Edling (2003:227) states that Madison left Philadelphia disappointed because the Convention had not heeded his proposal for a Congressional veto or negative, on state legislation. He adds that “it is not surprising that the Madisonian interpretation sees the fulfilment of the Constitution in the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.”⁵ Beeman (2009:367) writes that “those misgivings notwithstanding the real wonder is that he had achieved as much as he did.”

The Struggle over Ratification

Article VII of the new constitution stated that “ratification of the conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution.” It specifically had mentioned conventions and not state legislatures mainly for two reasons. Since the constitution took power away from the states, the framers reasoned that the state legislatures might not approve it. Second, if the constitution was approved by popularly elected conventions, it would give the new government a broad base of legitimacy. Accordingly the constitution was transmitted to the states through Congress for their approval.

The great debate over the Constitution soon divided the country into two camps, the Federalists who supported the Constitution and the Antifederalists who opposed it. In the debate in Congress before sending it to the states, Federalists wanted to send it with the endorsement of Congress. Antifederalists wanted to transmit it with the criticism of the Convention for exceeding its authority and its delegates for violating their instructions only to revise the Articles. In course of the debate, Antifederalists tried to propose amendments including a bill of rights. Madison opposed this vigorously and argued that a bill of rights was unnecessary because the powers of Congress were enumerated and only extended to certain cases. To add amendments to the Constitution would create insurmountable problems. An amended Constitution would be Congress’ constitution not the Convention’s

(Kaminski 2006: 56-57). Although they controlled eleven of the twelve state delegations in attendance, the Federalists were willing to compromise because they wanted to preserve the appearance of unanimity. Congress was as usual, meeting in camera and Federalists hoped that neither the discussions nor the amendments would become known by the public. They agreed to transmit the Constitution to the states without endorsement if Antifederalists would agree to strike any dissent from the records. To avoid Congressional endorsement, the outnumbered Antifederalists agreed to compromise. Federalists led by Madison were astute politicians that they cleverly introduced the transmittal resolution with the words "Resolved unanimously" giving the false impression of unanimous approbation, while Congress was unanimously agreeing only to send the Constitution to the states for their consideration (Ibid.: 57-58).

Madison at this point had no plans of going to Virginia and involving in the campaign for ratification. At the same time he received disturbing reports that the Antifederalists were vigorously campaigning against ratification. His friends pleaded with him to return to Virginia to respond to accusations that he had helped to write a plan for a government that his opponents argued would be dangerously powerful. His supporters desperately wanted him to be a candidate for election to the Virginia ratifying convention to be held in Richmond in June 1788, insisting that only when people heard from Madison directly would they reject the attacks of the Antifederalists. Although Madison had strongly supported the plan to have delegates to ratifying conventions elected by the people, that did not mean he wanted to be a candidate. He believed that those who wrote the Constitution should not be the ones who passed judgement on it at the conventions (Labunski 2006: 22). When he realised that other Federal Convention delegates were serving in their state ratifying conventions, Madison changed his mind. He thus reluctantly agreed to stand for election. While Madison's supporters wanted him to be elected, Antifederalists like Patrick Henry led the campaign to prevent Madison's election. The campaign was very combative, but ultimately Madison won the election from Orange County to the Virginia ratifying convention. Henry's biographer, Beeman (1974:134) writes that "in Philadelphia, and later in Richmond, Madison's view of Virginia's place in the new American nation would triumph."

At the ratifying convention the Federalists succeeded in getting it to agree to examine the Constitution in great detail. On the other hand Henry used his reputation, dynamism and influence over the delegates to denounce the Constitution in broad terms. Madison responded virtually to all arguments put forth by the Antifederalists. He decried Henry's generalizations and insisted on specific objections. Madison argued that the Constitution increased the security of liberty more than any other government. He opposed a bill of rights because

the Constitution would create a government of strictly delegated powers, and the powers it had would not endanger rights. It was not possible to list all the rights the people had, and any right not listed would be presumed to be given up. The new government's powers were appropriate. Madison defended the necessary and proper clause arguing that legislative powers were limited and defined. Since the Constitution established a government with only delegated powers, "the delegation alone warrants the exercise of any power." Madison granted that the Constitution was imperfect, but amendments could be obtained when needed and in fact were easier to obtain under the Constitution than under the Confederation. Madison strongly objected to the argument that the Constitution should be amended before Virginia ratified as this was synonymous with rejection. He also asked how amendments could be obtained before ratification when Antifederalists could not agree among themselves. The convention should like other state conventions, recommend amendments to be considered in the first federal Congress after the Constitution was ratified (Kaminski 2006:68-71). The Federalists simply asked the delegates to choose between two alternatives—no union at all or a partially defective one (Beeman 1974:161).

For several weeks it was uncertain whether the ratifying convention would adopt the constitution or reject it. With assurances from Madison that Federalists would support recommendatory amendments, the convention voted by a slim majority of 89 to 79 to ratify the Constitution without previous amendments. Two days later the convention recommended that Virginia's future representatives in Congress propose forty amendments—half in the form of a declaration of rights and half structural changes to the Constitution (Kaminski 2006: 72).

The Federalist

Madison's reputation regarding ratification efforts in the Virginia Ratifying Convention is only secondary to his much famed role in contributing nationally and in a scholarly manner to the debate. Immediately after the Philadelphia Convention, Madison made plans to collaborate with Alexander Hamilton and John Jay in writing a comprehensive exposition of the Constitution in a series of newspaper essays in the state of New York under the pseudonym "Publius." They eventually were put together in book form and came to be known as *The Federalist*.⁶ The purpose of the series was to show the necessity of the Union, the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation and the nature and benefits of the new Constitution. Madison wrote twenty nine of the eighty five essays in the series: Numbers 10, 14, 18-20, 37-58, 62-63. In a letter to George Washington accompanying the first seven numbers of *The Federalist*, Madison stated that they related entirely to the importance of the Union, and that if the whole plan were to be executed, "it would

present to the public a full discussion of the merits of the proposed Constitution in all its relations” (Madison 1865:360).

Of the ones that Madison wrote, the most quoted and discussed have been No.10 and No.51. In *The Federalist* 10, the first one that Madison wrote and published in the *New York Daily Advertiser* on 22 November 1787, he deals with the extended republic, nature and danger of factions, and the superiority of a representative government to a democracy in preventing factions. He was presenting the case for a “well constructed Union.” This was actually a rejoinder to the Antifederalist writer “Brutus” who had written a few weeks ago that the wisdom of the greatest political thinkers had suggested and the experience of history confirmed that free governments could not succeed in a vast geographical area as America. An extensive republic, Brutus further stated would be impossible to implement. “If the legislature were sufficiently large to allow representatives, to know the minds of their constituents and thus speak for their views, it would be so numerous and unwieldy that it would not be able to transact the public business. Furthermore, the legislature in an extended republic would not be able to attend to the array of concerns and desires of different parts of the United States or promptly execute laws that were passed.” Brutus continued, echoing Montesquieu, that a republic must have similarities of different aspects of life, failing which there would be a clash of opinions. America was a diverse country with a large variety of climates, habits, laws and customs. Therefore a legislature formed of representatives from these distant and diverse parts would be composed of varied and incongruous principles, and would be constantly contending with each other. Finally, in an extended republic, the people would fail to develop a loyalty to their government or rulers and would be unable either to monitor their representatives or to act in unison to remove them from office if necessary. On the other hand public officials, especially executive officers, would escape public control and utilise their offices for personal gain (Ball 2003:437-447).

To understand this debate one has to comprehend the general mindset of eighteenth century Americans. Monarchies and republics were the forms of government known to people of that age. Monarchy, it was generally agreed was suitable to extensive areas and popular government to small territories. Republics were known to be delicate polities, particularly susceptible to internal upheavals and outside pressures. The larger the state was, greater the danger. The great and glorious republics of the past had all been small compared with the entire states of America or even individual states. It was considered that republican government would be suitable for a single city or small territory but would be utterly unsuitable for a large continent like America. Secondly, in those days, republic and democracy were words closely associated in the colonists’ minds and often used synonymously.

They also evoked a mixed response of fervour and apprehension. A republic conjured up for many the positive features of the commonwealth era and was associated with virtue and reason. On the other hand democracy was a word that denoted the lowest order of society as well as the form of government in which the commons ruled and was generally identified with the threat of civil disorder and prematurely succumbing to dictatorship. Throughout the colonial period and increasingly in the early Revolutionary years, the dangers of “democratical despotism” dominated the minds not merely of crown officials and other defenders of prerogative but also of all enlightened thinkers (Bailey 1967: 282-83). Dahl (2005:441) states that his guess is that Americans who were more favourable towards rule by the people tended to use the term democracy, while those who were more dubious preferred the term republic. It was under such theoretical confusions that Madison was putting forth his ideas. He states that “the two great points of difference, between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.” Lawson-Peebles (1988:140) is curt when he remarks that “Montesquieu was really writing about democracies. The United States was a republic.”

Madison begins *The Federalist* 10 by stating that “among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.” By a faction, Madison understood a number of citizens, either a majority or minority who could act in opposition to the rights of other citizens or to the interests of the community. The primary threat to liberty in republican governments was not ambitious or interested rulers but majority factions that could use the constitutional system to violate private rights and pass legislation that was opposed to the common interest. This malady of factions could be cured by removing its causes and by controlling its effects. Again, its causes could be removed by destroying liberty and by giving everyone the same opinions, passions or interests. Free societies, Madison wrote, would always contain factions. Eliminating factions would result in the elimination of liberty. Madison favoured creating conditions that would make it difficult for factions to form majorities. The Constitution was constructed in a manner that factions would be controlled and prevented from doing harm. Gibson (2008:65) states that Madison’s contention can be considered “a watershed in the transition from a classical conception of republicanism rooted in virtue to ‘a new science of politics’ rooted in the reality of interest group politics.” Madison’s reply in *The Federalist* 10 was his greatest contribution to the idea of an enlarged or extended republic. He rejected the commonly held belief espoused by Montesquieu that that republics could survive only in small confined countries with homogenous

populations and the popular notion that only small local governments could preserve freedom and that they were prone to anarchy and misrule. For Madison, an enlarged republic mitigated the evils of democracy. Further, republican weaknesses did not increase in such a situation but rather by counteracting each other, they were diminished and controlled. In an extended republic, Madison argued, the number of representatives in proportion to the constituents could be fewer than in a small republic. A smaller number of representatives, known for their wisdom, patriotism and sense of justice and elected from large districts was what Madison had in mind.

In *The Federalist* 51, Madison succinctly stated the dilemma faced by all governments. “If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” Madison wrote that the primary method to control government was through a dependence on people through elections. However, since experience had shown that elections alone were inadequate, Madison argued for additional safeguards to be provided in the Constitution. These included provisions like separation of powers, checks and balances, a bicameral legislature and the division of power between state and federal governments. He also was concerned about the dominance of state power. He felt that this had to be restricted so that the rights of individuals and the authority of the federal government were not diminished.

The Federalist was recognized at the time as the definite explication of the Constitution. It is considered even today as the most impressive commentary on and masterly analysis of the Constitution. Jefferson (1944:452) writing from Paris, stated that in his opinion it was “the best commentary on the principles of government, which ever was written.” Broadwater (2012:xii) quotes Todd Este’s description of Madison’s work on *The Federalist* which could be said of his career generally: “For all Madison’s intellectual brilliance, what made him successful in these debates were his achievements as an intellectual *politician*, for Madison fused the roles of scholarly intellect and intellectual politician as well as anyone has.” Nordquest (2008:17) traces the influence of Madison’s teacher at the College of New Jersey, John Witherspoon on him. He states that Madison learned partly from Witherspoon the theory of balanced interests that he soon applied with spectacular success in arguments for the large republic in *The Federalist* 10 and for the policy of mutually checking interests in *The Federalist* 51. The lessons he learned about the importance of reason’s context and about the particular virtues of different institutional forms were necessary background for his institutional craftsmanship

at the Constitutional Convention and for his defence of the Constitution afterward. Madison also spoke in the most precise Newtonian language when he suggested that while creating a “natural” government “its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places” (Hofstadter 1973:10). Burns (1982:46) states that “it was Madison’s capacity to combine deep political and psychological understanding—as in his summary statement of the strategy of ‘supplying by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives’—that would justify his reputation as both the intellectual and political father of the Constitution.”

The political contest over ratification lasted for more than two and half years, from September 1787 to May 1790, when Rhode Island finally joined the Union. The framers had simply stated that ratification would be based on guidelines specified in Article VII that approval by nine states meeting in special constitutional conventions. Congress had agreed to this procedure and accordingly it was transmitted to the states for their consideration. Ratification was a very close call. Most of the small states quickly approved, attracted among other reasons by the formula of equal representation in the Senate. In the largest and most important states the vote was exceedingly close. With the vote of New Hampshire, the ninth state to ratify, the Constitution technically came into being. However, proponents did not rest easily until approval was narrowly voted by Virginia and New York.

The Bill of Rights

The absence of a bill of rights in the constitution was a major issue in the fight over ratification and dominated the debate. Madison, as we saw was opposed to the inclusion of a bill of rights. In *Federalist* Nos.38, 44, 46 and 48 he wrote against its need. His arguments in this regard, scattered over them, included that the confederation did not have one, that the Antifederalists could not agree on the protections they wanted, that the states could protect citizens from an oppressive federal government and also that bills of rights were not good guarantees because the states had already proved that they were able to infringe personal liberty despite explicit protections. However, in course of time Madison softened his opposition to it. People like Jefferson certainly had influenced him (Jefferson 1944: 436-441,450-452).⁷ Madison admitted that he could not understand why so many opposed the Constitution because it lacked an explicit enumeration of rights. He eventually adopted a largely neutral attitude, holding the position that as long as amendments did not affect the structure of government and alter the delicate compromises reached at the Philadelphia Convention, amendments could be beneficial and could be safely added now that the Constitution had been ratified. His final shift, to support of an explicit bill of rights was at first tactical but finally

principled as well. Convinced as a result of Jefferson's persuasive arguments, he came to believe a bill of rights would make the Constitution a better instrument of free republican government. The clear statement of important liberties would help engraft them in public consciousness and provide a ready defence against future assaults on them (Ketcham 1974:151). In a letter to Jefferson he writes that he was in favour of it because "it might be of use, and, if properly executed, could not be of disservice" (Madison 1865:424).

Many of the Constitution's supporters felt that it would be vital to have Madison as a member of the First Congress, and some wanted him in the more prestigious Senate. However, Madison, given the peculiar nature of Virginian politics and a campaign spearheaded by Patrick Henry lost the election to two Antifederalists. Following this, Madison decided to seek election to the House of Representatives, where the same political forces again sprang into action. They created electoral districts and residency requirements that would be beneficial to the Antifederalists and in particular disadvantageous to Madison. Ultimately Madison overcame those hurdles and emerged victorious. Not only was he now a member of the House of Representatives, but also the burden of appending rights to the Constitution was his.

Madison's association with the subject of rights was something that went back to his days in Virginian politics. As early as 1772 he criticized the prosecution in some counties of Virginia of Baptist clergymen who had violated the law by preaching without a license. The Baptists had also made disparaging remarks about the Anglican Church, the "official" church of the Commonwealth. Virginia law had for a long time regulated the holding of religious services. Madison questioned whether Virginia needed an established religion and challenged the prevailing view that a state church was necessary to maintain control by the British Crown. He believed that religious liberty was essential to a free society. In 1776 as a delegate to the Virginia Revolutionary Convention, Madison had the chance to make his views on religious liberty part of the commonwealth's fundamental law. Religious freedom was eventually included in the last article of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. This eventually ended the Anglican establishment in Virginia and there was to be no more funding for the church. In 1785 Madison wrote *Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments* where he articulated the idea that religious liberty is a God-given inalienable natural right that predates the formation of society. As such, the government has no power to establish a religion, advance all religions equally, or prefer one religion over another (Grunes 2008: 106). Schneider (1957:42) suggests that Madison along with Jefferson was "religiously and intelligently devoted to freeing religious as well as political institutions from 'the deliria of crazy imaginations' and arbitrary authorities."

It was with this experience and familiarity with rights that Madison was going to the House of Representatives with the promise he had made to initiate a bill of rights. In his address to a joint session of Congress, Washington as President made reference to amendments. He made it clear that he trusted the judgement of the members in this regard. Several members at this time wanted to raise the issue of calling a second constitutional convention mainly to discuss amendments securing personal rights. Two petitions, one each from Virginia and New York were placed before the House. This was a situation Madison wanted to avoid. His primary purpose in offering amendments was to prevent the calling of another constitutional convention. The Constitution itself mentioned that a convention could be convened if two thirds of the states requested for one. Congress was bound by such a decision. Madison insisted that any formal action should be consistent with the requirements of the Constitution and to wait till sufficient number of applications appeared. After a long argument it was decided to debate over the treatment of the petitions until the amendments themselves were discussed.

On 8 June 1789 Madison addressed the House at length on the subject of amendments. The speech reflected his evolution from opposition to a bill of rights to lukewarm support, to a firm determination to advocate them “until they shall be finally adopted or rejected by a constitutional majority in the House” (Labunski 2006:192). As soon as Madison presented his motion, some members said that a discussion on the amendments would prevent other serious business of the House from being transacted. To Madison’s chagrin, some of those demanding this were fellow Federalists. Finally the issue was resolved leading to its discussion in the House. Madison proposed a new preamble to the Constitution, one that emphasised natural rights and nineteen amendments divided into nine articles. The preamble affirmed the nation’s commitment to the principle that “all power is vested in, and consequently derived from the people.” Madison’s list of amendments included enlarging the size of the House, protecting freedom of religion, speech and the press and the right to trial by jury in both civil and criminal cases; and prohibiting arbitrary searches, excessive bail, and double jeopardy. Not surprisingly, he had drawn heavily on the amendments suggested by his state’s ratifying convention and those listed in the Virginia Declaration of Rights. One thing Madison did bear in mind was not to propose amendments that would alter the structure of the Constitution but those which were least objectionable and most likely to be approved by Congress and the states. He recommended that the list of rights be incorporated into the body of the Constitution and not added at the end. The reason was that if amendments were added at the end, it would not be clear which sections of the Constitution had been modified. In his view, a supplemental list of amendments would not be considered a permanent part of the Constitution but would instead

be “a potentially ignored index,” resulting in an endless debate over whether the amendments had actually altered the Constitution. Madison’s argument was that because each amendment would modify a specific section of the Constitution, the new language should be inserted in the relevant section itself (Ibid.: 200).

The amendments were then sent to a select committee which made a few changes, replaced some of Madison’s words and delivered its report to the full House. The House then debated on it for the next ten days. Overall it largely adopted Madison’s amendments with relatively minor changes. It was then approved by the House. Seventeen amendments were forwarded to the Senate.⁸ The Senate made twenty six changes to the House’s proposals by tightening language and rearranging some amendments and combining others, thus reducing the number from seventeen to twelve. The House was willing to go along with some of the Senate’s changes but it rejected others. The twelve amendments were eventually sent to the states for ratification. Out of the twelve, the first two—on the size of the House of Representatives and Congressional pay—fell short of ratification in 1789-91. Thus what we know today as the First Amendment moved up to its exalted position not by design but because those original amendments failed to earn sufficient support among state legislatures. Nevertheless, protection for freedom of speech, of press, and of religion would become the foundation of individual liberty, without which most other rights in the Constitution would be virtually meaningless. Madison had kept his promise. Labunski (2006:256) remarks that “through the extraordinary efforts of a small man with a quiet voice, the nation finally had the Bill of Rights. By the time those amendments were added to the Constitution in 1791, the drive to hold a second convention had dissipated, and opponents of the government knew they had no choice but to work within the system.”

Madison’s future career does not come into the ambit of this piece. Nevertheless we know that he had a stellar career in public service for many more years. Along with Jefferson he would found and lead the Democratic-Republican Party, resist the Alien and Sedition Acts, serve as Jefferson’s Secretary of State, spend two terms as President of the United States, help oversee the University of Virginia and reach out “almost as if from the grave, with exhortation to his countrymen to cherish the Union” (Vile 2008: 38). His role in the writing of the constitution, its ratification and in the inclusion of the Bill of Rights to the Constitution itself is a significant chapter not only in his life but a phase in the history of the United States. In a reply to an admiring citizen who described him as the writer of the Constitution, Madison replied that the endeavour “was not, like the fabled Goddess of Wisdom, the offspring of a single brain. It ought to be regarded as the work of many heads and many hands” (Ibid: 41).

Madison’s influence on the politics and the constitutional arrangement of his era has been significant enough to prompt Dahl (1956) to describe the period as

Madisonian Democracy. Others describe it as the Madisonian Model, the attributes of which are the extent of the republic, separation of powers, checks and balances and federalism along with others. Madison no doubt provided the intellectual framework and was influential in advocating the basic concepts of the structure that was created in Philadelphia. Madison was not rigid in his political positions, and his experience with American democracy led to his modifying of his views. Liberty and justice were important concerns for him and wherever they were threatened he sought to eliminate the danger. If this danger came from the states he stood for an enhancement of federal power. On the other hand if federal government exceeded its power he shifted sides. He was initially apprehensive of minorities usurping power from majorities. Later he was concerned about majorities dominating minorities. For him a good polity was one that derived its just powers from the consent of the governed. He helped to create a novel experiment in what would come to be known as representative democracy. Madison's ideas were perhaps ahead of the times in which he lived for they were regarded too novel by many of his colleagues. Today Madison's views are accepted as fundamental statements or the basis of the political system of the United States, which is sufficient recognition of his role. Moreover his ideas on religious freedom have become part of the contemporary separationist-accomodationist discourse in the US Supreme Court. Nevertheless, one is not overlooking or diminishing the role of the other Founding Fathers. Each of them had a significant role to play throughout the process of guiding the Constitution to its fruition. Many assessments of the contributions of the delegates of the Philadelphia Convention place Madison at or near the top. Taking into consideration Madison's effort to convene a Constitutional Convention, his being a major influence intellectually and in the writing of the Constitution, being a co-author of *The Federalist*, spearheading the inclusion of the Bill of Rights and recording the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, one can readily agree that he was first among equals and deserves to be called the Father of the Constitution of the United States.

Notes

1. It was only in 1840, four years after Madison's death that his notes of the Convention were published.
2. The large states had accepted equal state voting under the Confederation because Congress had no authority over individuals. It could act only upon states. Moreover, Congress had no coercive power to enforce acts that the large states disliked and chose to violate.
3. These provisions reflected clauses drawn variously from the constitutions of Massachusetts, New York and Maryland.
4. Fatigue and the unwillingness to spend more time in Philadelphia were other factors.
5. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution in the post Civil War period defines

citizenship and mandated due process as well as equal protection of the laws for all citizens. Through the due process and equal protection clause, the Supreme Court has gradually applied most of the protections of the Bill of Rights to the states.

6. The publishers of the essays reported that they had issued a collected edition in March 1788, long before the end of the struggle over ratification.
7. Jefferson had two major objections regarding the constitution, the first being the absence of the bill of rights and the second the abandonment of the principle of rotation in office, particularly in the case of the president's unrestricted eligibility for re-election.
8. Little is known about the debate in the Senate because it met behind closed doors until 1794 and an authentic record is absent.

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The Strategic Culture of Pakistan: Role of the Pakistani Army and Policies towards Afghanistan and India

Rhea Abraham

Located in the northwest of the southern Asian continent, Pakistan neighbours three geo-strategically significant countries—India, Iran and Afghanistan standing as a bridge to three distinct regions of Asia—Central, West and South Asia. Considered one of the most populous countries in the world, with a thriving community of different ethnic groups, Pakistan’s geostrategic location derives its prowess from ancient civilizational history flourishing along the basins of River Indus. The Umayyad Arabs led by Muhammad bin Qasim occupied the regions of the now Sindh province of Pakistan in 712 AD bringing the religion of Islam to the region, which was later enhanced by Muslim Sufi saints and the Mughal dynasty into South Asia (Kaplan 2012). Though landlocked on one side, Pakistan is situated with 650 miles of coastline along the Strait of Hormuz in the Arabian Sea which acts as a suitable port for ships traversing the region of the Indian Ocean. The historical “silk route”, part of the territorial landscape of Pakistan has also helped flourish ideas, skills, trade and economic exchanges among the countries of the region. This has in turn added to the geostrategic enhancement of South Asia as a region, even for foreign rulers and business magnates.

Pakistan as a state was however created and evolved post-1947, wading through years of tribulations in formulating a strategic culture, amidst a growing military and political complex. Internally in the current security environment, ethnic and geographical variants continue to determine the division of provinces in the country which include Baluchistan comprising of the Baluchis, Shinas and Pathans, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of the indigenous Pashtuns and Chitralis, Punjab comprising of Punjabis, and Sindh formed of the ethnic Sindhis and Baluchis. Also, Pakistan’s control over Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas, post 1965 extends out to favour its geographical expansion in the region. Therefore

for a country like Pakistan situated between the cartographic landscape of South Asia and West Asia, it becomes predestined to pronounce that geography plays the key factor for its important role in the current security environment. Also, its location furnishes the fact that geography dominates the political environment and strategic culture of a country and plays an important aspect in determining the strengths and weaknesses of a nation state (Cohen 2009). Today, Pakistan exists as a nation state that is embroiled in its own devolution and conception; mainly enhanced with its position in the physical setup of the world structure.

The aim of this article therefore remains to dwell on the importance of geography and other related factors on the formation of strategic culture in Pakistan. The article aims to elaborate on various institutions mainly the Pakistani army and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) which the author argues, have conditioned strategic thinking in the country and also fuelled threat perceptions, and the concept of strategic presence and depth in the foreign policy of Pakistan and in the minds of its leaders. Finally by understanding the concept of strategic culture in Pakistan, the article aims to expound on relations with its two neighbours mainly Afghanistan and India.

Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy

Strategic culture can be defined as the collection of certain beliefs, norms, cultural and historical experiences, social values and political ideologies that govern the thought process of the dominant elite who are involved in policy making. This strategic culture in turn influences the perception of the security environment of these decision makers and their responses to the threat perspectives (Rizvi 2002). The perception of war and peace and power politics as portrayed by them helps in understanding the strategic preferences of the country, their capabilities, the role of security forces and the adversarial capacity. The way a country and its decision makers behave and respond to any security environment therefore depends on the strategic culture of that country and influences the responses and behavioural patterns of the nation state (ibid.). Every policymaking elite is concerned with the self preservation of state and its territorial integrity irrespective of situation, location or time as they tend to associate personal security with the security of the state (Cohen 2009). Elements of strategic culture may however be restrained by international system, technology and constraints of diplomacy as pressure from international community is more profound on countries enjoying strategic leverage. However such nations adopt certain policies that help them ease related tensions and expectations from the international community (Johnson 2006).

Most importantly, strategic culture helps to define the foreign policy of a country with regard to its positioning in the international system. Foreign Policy

can be defined as a system of activities evolved by nations for influencing and changing the conduct of other states and for adjusting their own activities to international environment (Khanna 2010: 2). It is a complex social process defined by built in factors, objectives, and power plays that are highly interactive and influential in establishing relations between countries and generates a number of interactive courses during its formation and implementation such as cooperation, conflict, neutrality and coexistence (Kumar 1984: 321-333). It prompts every state to behave according to certain norms, ideologies and principles which form the basis of strategic culture. Foreign policy defines the nature of national interest of a country and develops concrete objectives that are aimed to fulfil these interests (Mohanty 2010), culminating in the synthesis of the ends and means of nation states (Coulombis & Wolfe 1990). National objectives in the domain of foreign policy are therefore defined as goals which aims to preserve a territory and political interests or goals which aim to shape favourable conditions beyond territory or national boundary. They are centred on the core values of the society, the welfare of the people, security of political beliefs, territorial integrity and self preservation of national life (Kumar 1984: 341-359).

Pakistan's Strategic Culture and its Foreign Policy

Making of strategic culture

Pakistani decision making as part of its broader strategic culture is mainly inherited from its independence and struggle for Muslim brotherhood with the main security threat perception arising from India and a successive outlay to a military control over Pakistan's policymaking (Khan 2011). The foreign policy setup of Pakistan is also highly determined by the international system and domestic composition. There exists a feudal socio-economic structure in the country, with an identity based on religion (ibid.). Most importantly, Pakistan's foreign policy is based on Islamic ideology and its historical past even though the early years of non alignment under Jinnah, were intended to be based on strategy rather than pure ideology (Pakistan's Foreign Policy 2003).

Carved out of India post independence, Pakistan was built on the concept of a state for the Muslims, neighbouring other Muslim dominated countries like Iran and Afghanistan. Pakistan's security perception since its inception evolved and relied on their distinctive identity and the presence of India as its neighbour and arch enemy (Lal 2008). With the partition, there was immense separation of people, land and resources between the two countries. All policies henceforth revolved on countering India's presence in the global and regional environment and also its overall development. Pakistan's national strategy has been mainly derived from historical tensions with India and hostile perceptions that are persistent

even today, with Kashmir remaining a major irritant. Both the countries have fought three wars and continue to disagree on a number of issues such as the Sir Creek, Siachen glacier and the sharing of the Indus river water (Mezzera and Aftab 2008). Also, issues of insecurity have revolved around Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan, right from its formative years. Disputes based on the territorial claims of the NWFP and parts of Balochistan have been the centre of concern for the two neighbours since time immemorial. Also, Afghanistan remains the only country to have opposed Pakistan's admission into the United Nations in 1947. A number of border clashes in the early years severed the ties and have infuriated irreparable suspicion between the neighbours. Thus, over the years, Pakistan's fear has become permanent and immense, one from India and the other from Afghanistan, with a constant protest and want for territorial depth which forms part of its major threat perception.

Secondly, Pakistan's strategic culture is based on ideological conflict that was instilled in the nationalistic movements in the country since its independence. However in the contemporary context, issues in Pakistan have become more ethnic based than religious. Pakistan's creation had echoed difference between the various ethnic groups in the country, which has only deepened the state as weak with strong societies that lack national pride (Cohen 2011). With the creation of Pakistan, Punjab had become the frontier province and urban hub of the country. Punjabis account for eighty percent of the Pakistani army and fifty five percent of the federal bureaucracy. Urban conflict in Pakistan even today pits local Sindhis and Punjabis against Baluchis and Pashtuns (Rizvi 2002). Nonetheless, sectarian differences have been becoming prominent and a common concern of violence in the region. The Pakistan military had allowed the sectarian and jihadist groups a role in Pakistan's foreign policy during the Afghan war and continues to foster covert relations with them such as the Hezb-i-Islami and the Tehrik-i-Taliban, despite ideological differences (Rahman 2006). Minority Shias are being attacked incessantly in areas of Balochistan and the Northern Areas and also being driven out in large numbers (Pakistan Shias 2012).

Therefore, a constrained strategic culture and threat perception has instilled, from its inception, power in the hands of a few, mainly the military who have been regarded as the only protector of the external and internal security of the country, in light of the incapability of the political institutions to sustain strategic thinking among its people. Pakistan's strategic culture as accelerated by the military has helped develop certain long term policy options for the country over the years which have always included opposition to India's regional dominance such as bilateral issues between South Asian countries; assigning highest priority to procurement of defence equipments and investment; purchasing foreign weapons

supply; and using diplomatic tools wherever possible (Cohen 2009). Also, in this regard, Pakistan's defence expenditure has been comparatively high and has catered to its security threat environment and the development of its indigenous defence industry. Pakistan's weapons procurement has also been enhanced with its ties with major powers such as the United States and China. Pakistan willingly has engaged in an alliance system with the US in order to gain expertise in defence and related equipments. The development of Pakistan's nuclear programme has also aimed at complementing its threat perceptions and security.

Pakistan's foreign policy

Most importantly, based on the strategic culture of Pakistan, its foreign policy can be divided based on its evolution over different time frames. During the 1950s to 1960s, Pakistan signed a number of defence treaties such as South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in order to desert its earlier policies of isolationism and non alignment. The Kashmir issue and Pashtun nationalism however took centre stage in Pakistan's foreign policy during this period. Pakistan being occupied with its anti India sentiments diverted much of its foreign policy assets to its western neighbour. In 1959, the US and Pakistan defence pact saw a historical conjuncture in the strategic awakening of Pakistan as a country and its foray into international events thereafter. In the 1970s, Pakistan tried to divert into a neutral strategy for enhancing its security and involved in diplomacy for issues such as the Kashmir conflict with India. During the 1970s Pakistan concentrated more on the West Asian countries while rallying support for its expansion of Muslim brotherhood in the region and strongly supported the foundation of the Organisation of Islamic Conference. During the 1980s, close ties with the US was once again enhanced with the entry of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan and its geostrategic importance to help curb communism spreading into South Asia. However there was a lull in US-Pakistan relations with the nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan in 1998 and the subsequent proliferation through the A.Q Khan network. On the other hand such an event opened gateways to Pakistan to establish long lasting strategic relations with China, a country who obliged to its anti India sentiments willingly.

Today, Pakistan thrives as a third world country firm on the objectives of its strategic culture as a projection of its existence in the international security environment. Pakistan continues to cultivate relations with the US, despite a fallback brought about by the killing of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan and the blatant confirmation of the Pakistan supported Haqqani network's role in Afghanistan. China continues to be a major benefactor of Pakistan with the establishment of the Gwadar port and related developments. Also, Pakistan's entry into the Shanghai

Cooperation Organisation as an observer has opened ways for it to strengthen ties with Russia and the Central Asian countries.

However, one thing remains stagnant in Pakistan's foreign policy over the years: its constant rivalry with India and fluctuating Afghan policies in the region that helps to fuel Pakistan's thirst for strategic limelight.

Institutions that Influence Pakistan's Strategic Culture

Pakistani Army

As has been elaborated earlier, after the independence of Pakistan in 1947, the leaders of the new nation perceived external forces mainly India as a threat to the nascent integration of the Muslims of the former British colony. Along with their fear and lack of proper coordination, the new administration of Pakistan found it difficult to bring together the fragmented society in such a short span of time and faced serious domestic and external challenges. State survival became the primary concern for the leaders of Pakistan, who wanted to establish an effective federal government, strong defence system and instil a sense of immense nationalism in its people (Lal 2000). Also, the emphasis on state security and stability was given more precedence over the political and social welfare of the state and its people (Cloughley 2008). However, a total chaos remained in the governance and ruling political party that allowed the military to enter domestic politics at an early stage, as a way of bringing peace and order to the country. The increasing conflict in the political state of Pakistan gave the military, power to stabilize its hold as a constant force over the governance of the country and became a major beneficiary as it was the only agency that could coordinate both external and internal security threats. Along with the President and the Prime Minister, the Army chief began to play a very crucial role in the power structure, constituting what is described as the Triangle of Power or the Troika—a constitutional arrangement for civilian–military agreement (Rizvi 2000: 11). Secondly, the military's professional and corporate interests, the socio-economic background, orientation of the officers, internal organization, discipline and task oriented profile all attributed to the uninterrupted rise of military in Pakistan (Ahmed 2011). The military was viewed as important to the state's survival as it influenced state-building and overall security concerns (Johnson 2012).

With the Pakistan's military expansion in 1958, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) became prominent mainly because the generals, the main players in Pakistan's decision making, preferred to rely on an intelligence organization with a military character (Amin 1999: 141). The civil bureaucracy, mainly the Intelligence Bureau, (IB) had weakened due to political and military interference and corruption, but the military remained insulated and largely maintained its professionalism. In October

1958, the military assumed direct power under the leadership of General Ayub Khan, who first propagated the role of the ISI in Pakistani politics. The intelligence agencies served as tools for the military leadership to exercise their power over the political leadership (ibid.). The military always kept a check on the ISI so that it did not get highly influenced by a civilian government and used it to inform the army of developments in the country and mostly those that would threaten them (Grare 2011).

Through military support, many politicians also used the ISI as an instrument to balance the power in the country and influence their position in domestic affairs. Therefore, the need for the military to manipulate politics in Pakistan and the desire to control the country indirectly all attributed to the involvement of ISI in the strategic accomplishment and foreign politics of Pakistan.

Pakistani Army's ISI

Founded by a British Army Officer, Major General R. Cawthome in 1948, the infamous ISI was mainly designed to deal with the failure of the existing Military Intelligence (MI) during the 1948 India-Pakistan War which was caused by the lack of coordination among the three armed services. ISI was formed under British supervision as a wing of the MI to serve strategic operations in Central and South Asia, and to collect information about Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and East Pakistan (Gray and Holt 2011). ISI's headquarters at present are located in Islamabad and works under a Director General, a serving Lieutenant General of the Pakistan Army (ibid.). Today the ISI is tasked with the surveillance of domestic intelligence, coordination of intelligence duties of the three military services, surveillance over the country, its people, political parties, diplomats, communications and the conduct of covert offensive operations.

The ISI became powerful during the regime of President General Ayub Khan in 1958, who was the first military dictator of Pakistan. Suspecting the reliability of the Bengali police officers in the IB in Dhaka, then capital of East Pakistan, Ayub empowered the ISI with the responsibility of collection of internal political intelligence in East Pakistan (Chengappa 2000); which indirectly helped the ISI establish its supremacy over the MI and the IB. During the 1969 elections, the ISI and the Pakistani Army also became very active and got involved in domestic politics under General Yahya Khan, who used ISI to deal with the domestic political upheaval in East Pakistan and crush the rising Bengali nationalism (Pakistan Anatomy 2012). Till 1970, ISI concentrated more on internal intelligence rather than external as it limited its external agenda only to India in the form of border incursions and spread of misinformation. However, in 1971 Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

tried to suppress the role of ISI indefinitely. Bhutto established the Federal Security Force and gave it powers to counter the influence of ISI but was soon toppled by the ISI and the opposition parties in Pakistan who worked in tandem with each other (Rizvi 2000). In the mid 1970s however, Bhutto initiated the ISI to take charge in provinces of Balochistan and the NWFP, mainly to undermine and look upon the Pashtun and Baloch rebels involved in secessionist activities (Ghosh 2000: 15).

The ISI under Prime Minister Zia-ul-Haq during 1980s, expanded in double its strength as he made many changes to the 1973 constitution that diluted its democratic and parliamentary nature and strengthened his position as President. He empowered the ISI by making it responsible for the collection of internal intelligence and the activities of the Sindhi nationalist elements in Sindh and the activities of Shia organisations in Pakistan who were at that time, receiving support from Iran (Amin 1999). Zia focused on Islam as the centre of Pakistan's rise and the Army became the connecting network to his vision which was further enhanced with his support for the Islamist fighters in Afghanistan (Cannon 2012). He was portrayed as "pro-American" by some scholars as he agreed to work with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency in persecuting the Soviets in Afghanistan and attempted to do so by strengthening the ISI and the mujahideen with money and arms. The gravity of strategic depth in Afghanistan and further into Central Asia, was strengthened during his regime and influencing Pakistan's venture into the region. Even within the ISI, there was a sting Afghanistan bureau at Ojhri camp, near Rawalpindi which was involved in disbursing money and conducting training camps for the mujahideens, logical cells and psychological operations (Rasanayagam 2005: 107). Also during his period, Pakistan entered into strategic relations with China and accelerated its nuclear program in order to match the inescapable balance in the Southern Asian continent.

The ISI was also tasked to divert the arms and money to be used in covert operations in Kashmir and Punjab in India and also for building Pakistan's strategic capabilities. This period also allowed the ISI to influence the bureaucracy and the political parties as the military was gaining access internationally. In the 1990s, the ISI maintained its sovereign existence over extremist networks and nascent militant groups which were being formed during the Afghan war and which were being used effectively to destabilise Indian forces in Kashmir (Gray and Holt 2011). US-Pakistan co-operation also encouraged the cultivation of opium and heroin in parts of Afghanistan which was used for smuggling and poisoning techniques to lure away the Soviet troops (Raman 2001).

In the 1970s, the ISI was involved in training and funding the Khalistan movement by smuggling weapons for use by the insurgents and also providing pistols from China as part of the operations (Raje 2012). In 1990, the ISI operated

around thirty training camps for Kashmiri militants. By 2002, there were 128 ISI sponsored camps which were training militants who were also members of Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, all major irritants to India's national security (Pakistan's Army and Law 2012). The ISI has also agreed to funding insurgents in the North Eastern states of India through the Bangladesh National Party, including the Jamaat-e-Islami, which were revealed recently by the former ISI chief Assad Durani before the Pakistani Supreme Court (Roy 2012). The ISI had been funding and aiding the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and National Socialist Council of Nagaland in the 1990s, through Bangladeshi agencies and few training camps of ULFA cadres have been located near Muzaffarabad in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

During the period of President General Musharraf in 2000, the activities of the ISI through its operations in Afghanistan and the growth of the international media were exposed exponentially and thereby required reforms as an alternative strategy. The reforms however did not reduce ISI's involvement in Pakistan's foreign politics (Grare 2011). The Pakistani military and intelligence were caught between the need to support the U.S. war against terror and the need to handle the rise of an aggressive government in Afghanistan, but it was important for them to maintain control over Taliban and other Islamist groups indirectly. As US involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan increased and it was becoming an evident threat to the Pakistan military and ISI to continue their earlier operations, the ISI started slowly turning against the Musharraf regime in 2004, even as Pakistan under US pressure send its troops into the tribal belts of Waziristan region in western Pakistan, bordering with Afghanistan (Ahmed 2008: 1-2). This brought trouble for the re-emerging Taliban forces in Afghanistan and led to several problems and threats for the internal security of Pakistan. Such an event led to a brutal uprising which eventually led to the resignation of Musharraf as President of Pakistan in 2008.

Also Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani attempted to bring the ISI under civilian power by issuing a memorandum in July 2008 and to put the ISI under the control of the Interior Division. However, opposition from the military ruled out this move indefinitely. Though under the regime of Asif Ali Zardari and recently Nawaz Sharif, a new beginning was envisaged for Pakistan, it has been altered with recent changes in the political system of Pakistan that continues to fuel the role of players such as the ISI and military in the country. The ISI continues to remain a mysterious force behind Pakistan's internal and external politics and lacks any institutional checks that supervise its operations (Pakistan's Army and Law 2012).

The ISI nonetheless benefitted enormously by engaging with the US which has contributed to the technological and financial advancement of ISI as a state within a state in Pakistan, such as the installation of wireless interception equipments,

high-grade tactical information on the movement of units, strategic experts, satellite imagery for operational planning, radio equipment and training, and advice on technical matters (Yousaf and Adrin 2012). Also, the ISI has greatly influenced the media in Pakistan and has recruited informants among journalists for leaking information, including news stories against India. A London School of Economics report of 2010 also reported that despite public and international outcry against its overt activities, the ISI continued to promote the Afghan insurgency including the Taliban as its official policy and maintains an upper hand over the insurgents in terms of coercion, training and funding (Hembruff 2010).

Variants of Pakistan's Strategic Culture

Islam and Pakistan

While understanding the strategic culture of Pakistan, it becomes important to understand the importance of Islam in its national interest and related foreign policy. Even after its creation, Pakistan aimed to foster Islam as its guiding principle and root of existence. Established as an Islamic state, the founder of Pakistan enshrined foundations of social justice and Islamic socialism with equality and brotherhood (Chopra and Chadda 2009). In 1949 itself, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan appointed a board of Islamic learning that gave power to the Ulema to advise the political structure on the issues of national concern for the country. However the untimely death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah propelled Pakistan into a void of political, social and ideological imbalance. A controversy soon broke out in Pakistan, one that supported a traditional Islamic state founded by the Shariah law and the other of a modern nation governed with a secular and Western code of conduct (Haqqani 2004). The tryst remained to integrate Islam as the sole driver of Pakistan's creation as a function of the daily political and social life of the country and its people and the basis for its existence in the international environment. However, over the years, the fervour of Islamism in Pakistan subsided intermittently till it was propagated in all forms by General Zia ul-Haq after 1977.

Today, Islamism, rather Islamic fundamentalism has become a part and parcel of Pakistan's domestic, regional and international security environment. Islam remains an integral part of Pakistan's strategic culture as the country designates itself as an Islamic Republic and thereby dictates and influences the functioning of the State, the Constitution and the ideologies of the decision makers and the public. Islam forms part of the political and military strategy of Pakistan and is pursued diligently by all policymakers and authorities of Pakistan (Hasnat 2011). This component of its strategic culture was further enhanced during the war in Afghanistan, both in 1980s and in 2001.

Pakistani army, politics and Islamic fundamentalism

In the current context, the fear of Islamic fundamentalist threat continues to prevail over the foreign policy of most countries towards Pakistan. Ironically, this psychological and political landscape has led countries to support the Pakistani military as the only way out of the danger (Grare 2006). In Pakistan, no Islamic organisation has been able to challenge the military in Pakistan, but has been used by the latter for its purposes to balance rival political parties and as a national arbiter. Religious parties on the contrary do not operate in the political vacuum. The Pakistan People's Party, one of the strongest political parties in Pakistan, led by Asif Ali Zardari and the ruling party of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistan Muslim League, prevent the domination of political sphere by Islamic parties (ibid). By controlling competition among parties, by keeping them weak and allowing plurality in politics, the army controls the political system in Pakistan. The army makes sure that Islamist votes remain limited through manipulation in the elections and uses the Islamic parties to activate popular dissatisfaction. However, the moderates and the Islamists converge on a number of ideas in regard to Pakistan's foreign policies including the Kashmir issue.

Strategic depth in Afghanistan

Despite the lack of a clear definition by both Afghanistan and Pakistan on the often used concept of strategic depth, the term continues to be a customary propaganda of Pakistan's strategic culture towards Afghanistan. However, going by the military definition of strategic depth, it can be understood as the distance between the front lines of a country to its industrial zones, cities and population centres, which gives the country an advantage of time and space during an offensive and also the capability to retaliate effectively (Hakimi 2010). Restricting its importance to the foreign policy of Pakistan, strategic depth has been pursued fervently by the Pakistani policymakers with the ultimate aim of attaining a pro-Pakistan Pashtun dominated government in Kabul mainly due to the large population in the region, as an insurance policy against India in Afghanistan. Though the idea of strategic depth surfaced as such in the 1980s during General Aslam Beg's statement, it informally guided Pakistan's policy in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the region in 1990s. The Pakistani government's fear that Pakistani Pashtuns might want to secede prompted them to support a friendly government that would control such an incitement (Qazi 2011). Such a thought had been however experimented through the Taliban which captured Kabul in 1996. Therefore, Pakistan's concept of strategic depth in Afghanistan has two components to it: the military one aims for a strategic manoeuvre and space for

Pakistan, which otherwise considers its landscape narrow enough to be used in an aggression with India; and the non traditional concept that allows Pakistan to expand relations with the Islamic countries to its west via a land route through Afghanistan (Hakimi 2010).

Two major events can trace the extent of involvement of Pakistan in Afghanistan: one during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980s and the measures that followed thereafter. The funding of Pakistan during the Afghan war of 1980 allowed Pakistan to resist pressure from Moscow, avoid a pro Delhi government in Afghanistan and also create influence over the Afghan Pashtuns, through aid (Siddique 2011). The US after successfully throwing out the Soviets from the region, shifted focus to Europe after the Soviet war and allowed Pakistan to take advantage of the factional violence in Afghanistan to their benefit. The Afghan war that followed till 1996 created the Taliban and increased instability in the region of the NWFP and FATA. The influx of Afghan refugees, 85 percent of which are ethnic Pashtuns into Pakistan, mainly in the regions of FATA, NWFP, Quetta, Karachi and Islamabad, changed the synergy in the region (ibid). The Indian presence in Afghanistan came to a halt during the reign of the Taliban as was successfully envisaged by Pakistan. Also, Pakistan used the refugee card to favour its political stand among the international community. Pakistan's western borders with Afghanistan however continued to remain porous with an uncontrolled flow of people, goods, drugs and arms over the years between the two regions mainly through FATA and Dir and Chitral province of NWFP. Even today, FATA remains an area of dispute between the two countries as it remains directly controlled by the Pakistani government under draconian laws and thereby not much action has been taken to preserve the sovereignty and stability of the region (Chandran 2012).

Secondly, the 'Global War on terror' initiated by the US after the twin tower attacks in 2001, reinstated Pakistan's role in Afghanistan as one of the key players in the war against terrorism, to be used to capture Taliban and the al Qaeda. In this regard, Pakistan moved troops from its eastern borders with India to its western borders in an aim to target militants in the region. Pakistan came to be used as an important land route for the International Security Armed Forces (ISAF) as part of the rehabilitation and reconciliation of Afghanistan after the removal of the Taliban from the region (Afghanistan the Challenge of 2008). Also, the new referendum imposed by US as part of its agenda clubbed the two regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, mainly the NWFP and FATA as the "AfPak" region which the US defined as a Islamic greater Punjab, tip of the demographic spear of the Indian subcontinent towards which all trade routes between southern central Asia and the Indus valley are drawn, in turn helping to exert power over Pastunistan and Baluchistan.

For the world to see, Pakistan's concept of strategic depth concept now highlights the need of Pakistani government to support a coalition government in

which Taliban and the Pashtuns are represented, successful engagement with all ethnic groups in the region and a limited role of India in Afghanistan for trade and development purposes (Time to Get Rid 2012).

Conclusion

Analyzing Pakistan's strategic culture, its behaviour and persistent India and Afghan policy, one can perceive that Pakistan has been enmeshed in its own creation of a strategic culture that aims at projecting its strategic vision in the region and across the world. Also sustaining the frequent need for alterations in the current context, the concept of strategic culture is being revisited by policymakers in Pakistan such as the example of its "strategic depth" that determines its need for a peaceful and friendly Afghanistan which can help diminish the instability along the 2,000 km long border that both the countries share. Strategic culture continues to however dictate Pakistan's policies towards its neighbours and the larger international environment. The Pakistani army and the ISI despite huge successes in the recent democratic elections in the country continue to remain important players in setting strategic goals for the country through the political setup of the country. Also, strategic culture and its formation has allowed Pakistan to re-orient itself in the security structure of the world, and allying with countries like the United States and China for balancing its traditional threats and in turn strengthening future cooperation.

Most importantly, the Pakistani military continues to dictate terms in the country with a feeble yet present political institution; a crumbling social system and a faint judiciary; a public subjected to violence, weakening economy, demographic explosion, fluctuating foreign policies and a nuclear weapon system to its credit.

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Discrimination of Postmodernisms

P.P. Raveendran

Postmodernism is a bewildering subject¹, One cannot do justice to the range of varied questions that are raised in relation to it in a general critique. One might make better sense of the subject by taking a critical look at the evolution of the concept of postmodernism as it gets embedded in diverse theoretical and historical contexts. In order to do this, one will have to make a few discriminations among postmodernisms, the kind suggested earlier by A.O. Lovejoy in the case of romanticism and by Frank Kermode in the case of modernism (Lovejoy 1924: 229; Kermode 1968: 8). Such a move is important because postmodernism often means different things to different scholars. For some people it is a term that designates the new world order that has succeeded the putative collapse of the modern world after 1950 or so, while for some others it implies the theoretical landscape that has unfolded itself in the world of humanities and social sciences in the last three or four decades. For yet others it signifies the literary and cultural trends that have come into currency after the decline of artistic modernism. There are also scholars, mainly from the Third World, who consider all literary and cultural forms of the contemporary period emanating from the West as basically postmodern. One would also come across scholars who insist on using the term to refer to specimens of creative writing to the exclusion of everything that is non-creative or critical. A kind of theoretical anarchy seems to prevail here, prompting Umberto Eco to remark:

I have the impression that it [that is, the term 'postmodernism'] is applied to anything the user of the term happens to like. Further, there seems to be an attempt to make it increasingly retroactive: first it was apparently applied to certain writers or artists active in the last twenty years, then gradually it reached the beginning of the century, then still further back. And this reverse procedure continues. Soon the postmodern category would include Homer (1984: 31).

Eco, the fabulist that he is, is certainly overstating the case. There is nothing wrong in using the term in the specific contexts identified here. One is at liberty

to use it to imply, for example, creative writing to the exclusion of other kinds of writing, but one must be aware of the distinctions that are involved.

Hence the need for making the discrimination. One might do this by distinguishing between three successive uses of the term which, though they overlap and often interpenetrate each other, will, when separated, throw significant light on the name and nature of postmodernism. The first of these pertains to the early use of the term by such scholars as Charles Olson, C. Wright Mills, Irving Howe, Leslie Fiedler, Susan Sontag and Ihab Hassan in their writings of the fifties, sixties and early seventies of the last century. Though these writers were not the first to use the term—Randolph Bourne, the ethnologist, and Arnold Toynbee, the historian, are credited with having used the term earlier, though less systematically—they were the first to use it with a degree of consistency that allowed later scholars to exploit its philosophical potential. Barring poet Charles Olson of the Black Mountain school of poetry and C. Wright Mills, the sociologist, the scholars mentioned are all literary critics, whose criticism, however, differed radically from the period's mainstream criticism. In such of their works as "Mass Society and Postmodern Fiction" (Howe 1959), "Notes on Camp" (Sontag 1964), "Cross the Border, Close the Gap" (Fiedler 1969) and *The Dismemberment of Orpheus: Toward a Postmodern Literature* (Hassan 1971), they took an aggressively polemical tone in interrogating the assumptions on literature held by the reigning critics. This is not to suggest that these writers were working as a cohesive group or that they responded to things in an identical way. Certainly, they were different from each other as they themselves differed from some of the writers who went before them. But what binds these writers together is their opposition to the tenets of literary modernism and the modernist writing practice. In fact, artistic modernism had become a dated concept by the end of the nineteen forties, and its death in the Euro-American world was announced by several critics of the day including F.W. Bateson, Graham Hough, Donald Davie and A. Alvarez. When Harry Levin chose to write an obituary to modernism in the early sixties under the title "What Was Modernism?" which was later included in his *Refractions* (1966), he was doing so in the context of modernism's supersession by a number of new and experimental trends that emerged from alternative traditions of writing. In the presence on the horizon of a whole galaxy of radical writers—poets, fictionists and playwrights—who cried out to be analyzed and evaluated not on terms of literary modernism but on other, newer, terms, the much-touted radicalism of the literary innovators of the twenties might have sounded somewhat bogus and a great deal misplaced. A new age was around the corner, an age in which writers like Joseph Heller, John Barth, Donald Barthelme, Angela Carter, Julio Cortazar, Jorge-Luis Borges, Jean Genet, Paul Celan, Vladimir Nabakov, Ronald Sukenick, Thomas Pynchon, Alain Robbe-

Grillet and others were going to take the places once occupied by the likes of T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, D.H. Lawrence, Franz Kafka and Wyndham Lewis.

The first sense in which the term “postmodernism” becomes relevant then is in this context, that is, as a concept that makes sense in relation to literary or artistic modernism. Postmodernism for Howe, Fiedler and others implied both an extension of modernism in certain spheres and a reaction against it in certain other spheres. Modernism in this connection is used as a blanket term to describe the several artistic tendencies that dominated western culture in the first half of the twentieth century. No domain of culture was left untouched by it. Music, painting, literature, architecture – everything reflected the awareness of a new situation that compelled the artist “to reinvent the world and all its values in their art” (Spender 1963: 17). Here was a new sensibility coming into being through the writings of Proust, Gide, Rilke, Kafka, Pound, Joyce, Yeats, Lawrence and many others. These writers, who can be treated as the icons of high modernism and who constitute, in art critic Harold Rosenberg’s paradoxical formulation (1959), a distinct “tradition of the new,” represent a tendency that peaked in the period 1910-1930, the era of high modernism.

The arguments, for and against modernism, are too well known to merit repetition here. There is a large body of critical literature on this question (see, e.g., Spender 1963; Bradbury and MacFarlane 1976; Kenner 1977; Williams 1989; Giddens 1990). A crucial point to be made in this context is that modernism implied a rejection chiefly of realism in the case of narrative literature and of romanticism in the case of poetic genres. This of course is too sweeping a generalization. To be a little more specific in characterizing the changes in sensibility that accompanied the modernist revolution, one might turn to Eugene Lunn who in his book *Marxism and Modernism* (1985) has identified four key principles fundamental to the modernist revolution. These are aesthetic self-reflexiveness, montage, multiple narrative voices and demise of the integrated individual subject (1985: 34-37). An elaboration of these principles, which other theorists too have noticed, will help one in furthering the arguments regarding postmodernism made above.

Though self-reflexiveness is nowadays treated as an important principle in postmodernist writing, it was high modernism that abstracted it from literary tradition in order to make it the corner stone of its aesthetics. It did this with a view to challenging the assumptions of literary realism that set high store by the notion of the “objective” representation of reality. Traditional realists had thought that there existed some intimate correspondence between the real and its representation, a position that the modernists set out to “correct” by looking at their own individual selves, at the literary text and at the process of creation in a self-conscious way. This is the theoretical basis of aesthetic self-reflexiveness that one would find illustrated

by the classic examples of James Joyce's concern with questions of the novelistic medium in *Ulysses* or by Picasso's play on two-dimensionality in some of his paintings. Related to this is the use of montage, which too can be regarded as a way of contesting the claims of realism. Montage certainly is a technique developed by an artistic medium with a lot of realistic potential, that is, the cinema, yet it is also a technique that helps the medium to transcend the boundaries of classical realism in order to represent reality with greater force and effectiveness. The deployment of this technique in literature allowed the modernist to represent multiple perspectives in a work of art, as Eliot did in *The Waste Land* or Joyce in *Ulysses*. The use of multiple narrative voices too is related to this, as exemplified by the presence of paradox, ambiguity and uncertainty, all of which appear as important formal features in the writings of artists like Brecht and Kafka. The fragmentation of the individual subject in the novels of Joyce, Kafka and Virginia Woolf is yet another modernist trend that sets it apart from pre-modernism. The death of the integrated individual announced thus has brought in its wake a new grammar of narration that has thoroughly modified the language of literature. Perhaps this is a trait that can be said to characterize the sensibility of the twentieth century as a whole, a point that has been made emphatically by the title of Eric Hobsbawm's posthumous collection of essays, *Fractured Times: Culture and Society in the Twentieth Century* (2013).

As has been pointed out by some of the critics mentioned above, the modernist elements outlined are not rejected in postmodernism, but are extended with a new intensity. Some would say that while in modernism these characteristics indicated the writer's sense of anguish and despair at having lost her positive contact with the world, the postmodernists almost revel in this loss, turning their writings in the process into a literature of excess and abundance. This can be illustrated with any number of examples from contemporary fiction. To elaborate a little bit on fictional self-consciousness, one might be tempted to link it to the practice of eighteenth-century novelists like Lawrence Sterne and Daniel Defoe. But a closer look at the twentieth century practice would reveal that it is separated from the earlier mode in that while Sterne and Defoe resorted to self-conscious narration in order to construct a fictional illusion, contemporary postmodernists do so in order to destroy the illusion and disclose the rules and conventions of fictional composition (see McHale 1987; Waugh 1994 for extended critical discussions of this question). Thus when Doris Lessing provides several unconnected narratives representing different aspects of the writer's self in her celebrated novel, *The Golden Notebook* (1962), or when Donald Barthelme breaks up the text of his novel *Snow White* (1967) to produce a fragmented narrative, or when John Fowles provides several endings to his best-selling novel *The French Lieutenant's Woman* (1969), or when Italo Calvino

presents several incomplete stories as part of the novel *If on a Winter's Night a Traveller* (1979), or when John Barth gives a critical account of the story within his novel *Sabbatical* (1982), or when Margaret Atwood offers an embedded narrative containing several stories in her *The Blind Assassin* (2000), what each writer seeks to do is to uncover the codes and conventions of novel writing. This obviously is a move away from the practices of realistic narration. This is self-reflexivity that can be seen to reach its peak in some of the stories written a little earlier by the Latin American writer Jorge-Luis Borges and the German dramatist Bertolt Brecht. In such of his stories as "The Garden of Forking Paths" (1941), "Borges and I" (1957), "Tlon, Uqbar and Orbis Tertius" (1964), "Circular Ruins" (1964) and "The Other" (1975), Borges creates fictional situations in which the nature of reality and reality's link with fiction become objects of critical interrogation. "Tlon" is a story about a story that creates a fantasy world. So is "Circular Ruins," in which a character who invents another fictional character is baffled by the realization that he himself has been invented by the other. Brecht too, in some of his stories such as "A Question of Taste" written in the same period, creates narrative situations that are both strange and self-conscious. While conceiving such bizarre situations could be regarded as the artist's way of asking difficult questions about the present-day world, it can also be treated as an expression of certain deep-rooted suspicions about the redemptive powers of literature. Inasmuch as this suspicion had started rankling in the mind of the creative artist from the time of modernism itself, this postmodernist tenet is an extension of modernism, as are some other trends like the problematization of textual coherence and order. The death of the integrated individual subject is another trait that continues into the postmodern terrain to produce decentered subjects, the kind appearing in such novels as Julio Cortazar's *Hopscotch* (1963), Carlos Fuentes's *Terra Nostra* (1975) Mario Vargas Llosa's *Aunt Julia and the Scriptwriter* (1977), Salman Rushdie's *Midnight's Children* (1980) and D.M. Thomas's *White Hotel* (1981).

This then is postmodernism as an extension of modernism. What is the point in talking about the rejection of the modernist sentiment in the postmodernist context? One will have to delve deeper into the culture of modernism in order to answer that question. The point to note here is that modernism which in the art of Picasso or in the writings of Eliot and Joyce signified a radical and impersonal attention to art as composition had, by 1930 or so, lost its verve and vigour, and had ossified into a very conservative movement or assemblage of movements. Even a casual look at the career of T.S. Eliot, often regarded as the most typical representative of modernism, would prove the point. It has become a critical commonplace nowadays to suggest that there are two Eliots (Calder 1987). The first is the radical poet, author of *The Waste Land* (1922) and *The Hollow Men* (1925),

who, as is commonly observed, expressed through his early poems the anxiety and despair of a whole generation of readers. For the post-I World War generation, Eliot's poetry was close to its own heart. The feelings that his poems sought to communicate were not far removed from its own. If Eliot enjoyed the status of an international culture hero for the post-war readers, it was primarily because of the impact of the writings of the first phase, which struck a sympathetic chord within them. But the same Eliot was seen to move in his later works, especially in the works beginning with *Ash Wednesday* (1930), toward a new method that in effect negated all that high modernism stood for. The mythic method that he perfected in *Four Quartets* (1934-42) and the poetic plays represents the second phase of Eliot's career, which constitutes a departure from the socialized early phase. Eliot himself seems to have been aware of the change, if his words in *Thoughts after Lambeth* (1931) are any indication: "When I wrote a poem called *The Waste Land* some of the more approving critics said that I had expressed 'the disillusionment of a generation,' which is nonsense. I may have expressed for them their own illusion of being disillusioned, but that did not form part of my intention" (Eliot 1931: 12). This is the well-known "Classicist, Anglo-Catholic and Royalist" Eliot passing decree on his own liberal, less conservative self of an earlier phase. Several one-time enthusiasts of Eliot, even those among them who subscribed to conservative politics, were not entirely happy with this new Eliot. Critic F.R. Leavis was one such. Leavis, who in *New Bearings in English Poetry* (1932) was one of the earliest to discriminatingly praise Eliot for the new style of writing embodied in *The Waste Land* and other poems, is seen transferring his allegiance to D.H. Lawrence in some of his later critical works for this reason. Leavis comments in 1950 that Eliot has now become a public institution, a part of the establishment, a symbol of the canonical, elitist tradition.

This brings us to the second, and related, sense of postmodernism – postmodernism as indicating a change in the worldview of a people. The term "worldview" of course implies not a conscious and coherently formulated vision that guides people in their lives, but is related to the ways that they adopt in organizing, unconsciously, the reality around them. It is their worldviews that allow people to see the world in specific ways and to relate themselves to it. John Berger analyzed the structure of this organization in the BBC serial that he produced on visual politics, which was later published under the title *Ways of Seeing* (1972). One might be familiar with the expression "seeing is believing," but what Berger sets out to prove is that the obverse of this is equally true. Believing is seeing, a lesson that the academic world has learnt from recent developments in theory. The idea is central to the post-Saussurian tradition of linguistics, which holds that reality is language-specific and that a speaker's understanding of the world is

conditioned to a large extent by the structure of the language she is born into. It was the Saussurian linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf who presented an extreme form of this theory in his *Language, Thought and Reality* (1956), but the social semiotics associated with M.A.K. Halliday (*Language as Social Semiotic*, 1978) and a few others like Gunther Kress and Robert Hodge (*Language as Ideology*, 1979) and Roger Fowler (*Language and Control*, 1979) too can be seen subscribing to versions of this theory. Several contemporary poststructuralists also hold similar views. Language, in this view, is not an innocuous and transparent medium that allows reality to pass through it passively, but is by its very nature dense and opaque, and so is constitutive of reality. Reality, in other words, is a construct in language. This in sum was what Saussure said, and it is this that acts as a guiding principle for many postmodernists today.

This in a sense becomes an important starting point for the anti-foundationalist thinking of many postmodernists, including Foucault, Derrida, Baudrillard, Lyotard and Deleuze. Their writings provide postmodernism with a new philosophical edge which literary postmodernism does not possess. One of the earliest works in social theory that fruitfully integrated this insight into its analysis was Peter L Berger and Thomas Luckmann's *Social Construction of Reality* (1966). It was with this work that notions of "construction," "invention," and "imagining" started becoming key concepts in social theory. Roy Wagner's *The Invention of Culture* (1975), Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger's *The Invention of Tradition* (1983), Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (1983), Paul Watzlawick's *The Invented Reality* (1984), Werner Sollers's *The Invention of Ethnicity* (1989), McKim Marriott's "Constructing an Indian Ethnology" (1989), Jose Rabasa's *Inventing America* (1993), and Ronald B. Inden's *Imagining India* (2000) are among the titles that indicate the popularity of the concept across social science disciplines. For Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard and others this concept is part of their stated opposition to philosophical essentialism. For long philosophers had thought that there were certain values and beliefs which human beings of all societies and of all ages shared. This was the bulwark of liberal humanism. Now philosophy and social theory have a different set of priorities. Contemporary philosophers and social scientists are more interested in analyzing how different societies create different sets of values, beliefs, rituals, institutions and so on. This in a sense is what the postmodernist thinkers mentioned above are engaged in doing – uncovering the values and beliefs that are specific to given societies and seeing how the societies define themselves and their "others" in relation to those values and beliefs.

Another significant distinction that has to be made in any account of postmodernist theory is between postmodernism and postmodernity. Postmodernism, properly conceived, indicates a mindset, a sensibility, a way of negotiating one's relation

with a physical and cultural condition, while postmodernity refers to that physical and cultural condition itself. The distinction corresponds to the difference between modernism and modernity. Modernism, as already noted, represents the peaking of a sensibility that has been in the making over a long period of time. It does not indicate a clean break with earlier developments associated in diverse cultures with the romantic cast of mind and sensibility. Modernism's link with romanticism has been established in unmistakable terms by current scholarship on the subject, starting from the path-breaking study of symbolism written by Edmund Wilson (*Axel's Castle*, 1951) and followed through with studies by many who in a few years time were to join the ranks of poststructuralists, including Geoffrey Hartman (*The Unmediated Vision*, 1954), Murray Krieger (*The New Apologists for Poetry*, 1956), Harold Bloom (*The Ringers in the Tower*, 1971) and Paul de Man (*Allegories of Reading*, 1979). A synthesis of the observations of these several critics would allow one to see that the romantics and the modernists are held together not by the same insight into the working of the world, but rather by the same blindness, a handicap linked to the historical period. Each age promotes its own blindnesses, in the same way as each age presents its specific insights. The insights and blindnesses of both romanticism and modernism, then, are linked to the age of modernity, which began in Europe in the eighteenth century and continued well into the twentieth. If we choose to define modernity as a period concept characterized by an urge to universalize things as part of the western enlightenment project, we might argue that one of the ways in which modernity went about universalizing enlightenment was by binding the communities and cultures of the world together under the common ideology of scientific rationality.* This is a composite ideology that implies a whole matrix of socio-cultural tendencies. The ideas of linear progress, libertarian imagination, political liberalism, free enterprise, philosophical positivism and instrumental reason are some of these tendencies. Historically, as social theorists recognize now, these ideas have worked in tandem with capitalism and colonialism. And because of capitalism's European provenance, the ideology of modernity also, as several theorists point out, has a Eurocentric bias (Chakrabarty 2000). However, the Eurocentric aspect of the modernity project would not automatically make a critique of modernity non-Eurocentric. This is one reason why it becomes difficult for us to treat postmodernist theories as *ipso facto* liberating. Postmodernism, properly speaking, is politically neutral, and this should be borne in mind by the Third-World scholar taken in by the talk of the theory's emancipatory potential.

Theory's politically neutral character, however, should not deter one from drawing on some of the real insights that it can provide. To give an example,

* Modernity, especially in relation to literature, is a question that will have to be discussed in greater detail. I have done it elsewhere, for which, see Raveendran 2009: 1-12.

Foucault made it very clear in his interviews and other writings that his findings and observations on knowledge and power were not to be extended to the non-European world, about which he said he knew nothing. Indeed, his researches were confined almost exclusively to a relatively brief period in European history, that is, the three hundred years starting from the mid-seventeenth century to the middle of the twentieth century. Certain major epistemic changes took place in Europe during this period, and it is these changes that Foucault scrutinizes in his books ranging from *Madness and Civilization* (1961) to *The History of Sexuality, Volume I* (1976). True, these changes pointedly tell the reader a great deal about the constitution of man as the subject of power and the object of knowledge in Europe over the past three centuries. But the theoretical positions that Foucault takes on what he calls the “subjectification” and “objectification” of man and his analysis of the link between power and knowledge can be used to draw inferences on the working of other societies as well, as indeed they have been used by several Third-World theorists in their study of non-European societies.

To continue with the argument regarding the modernity project, Foucault would again provide the point of reference for an elaboration of the ideology of modernity. Foucault divides the three hundred years that he examines into the classical period and the modern period, each approximately of one hundred and fifty years duration. In this classification, the beginning of the nineteenth century marks the advent of modernity, which brings in its train a new regime of discourse and a new regime of power. Capitalism, colonialism, technologism and industrialism are co-extensive with this regime. Humanism and the human sciences were “born” then. Foucault would say that even the birth of “man” could be traced to the development of this regime. That is why the postmodern age that comes after the disintegration of the project of modernity becomes for Foucault a period marked by the death of “man.” The “man” who dies in the postmodern age is the being constituted in the discourse of anthropologism, of humanism. A new world is here, and is accompanied by a new worldview. This is a perception that is shared by many postmodernists, not all of them Foucauldians. Postmodernists of divergent political views, like Jean-Francois Lyotard and David Harvey, for example, could be seen to share this perception. Harvey’s *Condition of Postmodernity* (1989), incidentally, is a defining text, as defining as Lyotard’s *Postmodern Condition* (1979), both of which, following independent analytical procedures, describe postmodernity as the situation that the world finds itself in after the collapse of the modernity project. For both, postmodernity implies a condition, a physical as well as an emotional state, an architecture of the mind and of the world.

What is this condition like? What is the nature of the physical and emotional state mentioned above? Scholars and theorists answer these questions in diverse

ways. But all are agreed on the postulate that the postmodern condition implies a new socio-economic moment, whose significance can be characterized by the heightened presence of certain material indices. The theoretician of capitalism, Daniel Bell (1973), defines this moment as the “post-industrial society,” which brings in its train a new social structure that is service-oriented rather than industry-oriented. Economist Ernest Mandel (1972) and following him Fredric Jameson (1991) – the latter with some qualifications – designate this “the society of late capitalism,” in which instead of the market capital of industrial houses, it is the multinational capital that rules the system. For Guy Debord (1967), the sociologist, this is the “society of the spectacle,” an environment flooded with the images of reified objects and commodities. Speaking of commodities, there are a number of theorists and critics who consider commodification and consumerism to be the defining features of this society. Scholars like Stuart Ewen and Mike Featherstone have written extensively on this, but the most strident theorist of postmodernism undoubtedly would be Jean Baudrillard (1981), whose concept of a “simulational” world is based upon the assumption that the development of consumerism and information technology have worked together in the contemporary world to produce a new signifying culture. Ernest Sternberg (1999) is inclined to call this “the economy of icons,” in which the consumers are willing to pay good money for things that would feed their fantasies. Henri Lefebvre (1971), best known for his theory of the “everyday,” also talks about the “bureaucratic society of controlled consumption” that has come into being in the contemporary age. If “everyday” signifies something that is real and anterior to the image, the world of today, according to Baudrillard, is that of the “hyperreal,” wherein the real cannot be deemed as something that underlies the image.

These several ideas coalesce in the postmodern condition that Lyotard and Harvey are talking about. As the subtitle of Lyotard’s *The Postmodern Condition* indicates, his book is a report on the state of knowledge in the western world, which the author was commissioned to prepare by the Conseil des Universités of the Government of Quebec. Although Lyotard examines the status of science, technology and the arts, of knowledge in general, in the contemporary western world, it is to be pointed out that he does not use the term “postmodern” in a periodizing sense. “Postmodernism” for him is basically a temporal figure, an “alien temporality” that in a way precedes and constitutes modernism. This is an interesting proposal, one that would allow the theorist to eliminate the sequential link between modernism and postmodernism and recapture certain aspects of modernism as postmodernist with retrospective effect. The real point here is not that the emergence of postmodernism is thought of as coinciding with modernism, but that both high modernism and postmodernism are seen as equally repudiating

modernity's enlightenment project. This is a somewhat polemical position, in taking which Lyotard is also implicitly criticizing the stated premise of the Marxist philosopher Jurgen Habermas (1987), for whom modernity is an ongoing, unfinished project. Concepts like progress and emancipation are of continuing relevance for Habermas, and a perceived repudiation of these concepts in their writings is what prompts him to dub poststructuralists like Foucault and Derrida as "young conservatives."

In the context of this debate on the relevance of modernity, it is amusing to note that Lyotard's book also carries within it a veiled criticism of the views of Habermas. Though it is in the essay "Answering the Question: What Is Postmodernism?" written in 1982 and published as an appendix to the later editions of *The Postmodern Condition* that Lyotard (1987: 71-82), without naming his adversary, makes a full-fledged attack on Habermas, the critique of modernity is central to the original arguments of the book. Lyotard identifies the modernity project as one that perpetuates a totalizing view of the world. It is a grand narrative that seeks to dissolve the genuine differences that exist between societies and cultures in the name of scientific rationality and human progress. Insofar as they attempt to legitimate their knowledge with reference to themselves, they are also metanarratives that reproduce their knowledge almost uncritically. Here is a kind of crisis in legitimation, and in taking up this issue for debate Lyotard is obviously referring to the problem raised by Habermas in the book entitled *The Legitimation Crisis* (1975). According to Lyotard the discourse of modernity is not alone in legitimizing knowledge on its own terms. Other metanarratives that he names, Marxism and Christianity too, do this. Hence Lyotard's famous definition of postmodernism as a distrust of all grand narratives. "The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation" (Lyotard 1987: 37), and this according to him is what characterizes postmodernism of all varieties.

The legitimation crisis mentioned above embodies within itself another and a deeper crisis – a crisis in representation. This is further related to the question of the social and ideological construction of reality discussed earlier. The hegemonic sections in society always assume that there is a single, correct way of representing reality, which is treated as the realistic way of articulation. Whatever reservations one may have about postmodernism's distrust of grand narratives, it should make sense in the limited context, at least, of the epistemology of realism. For what classical realism presents before the world is a totalising, legitimizing perspective on life and society, which it is the business of postmodernism to debunk. Postmodernism's emphasis on decentering and ethnic pluralism is intended ultimately to effect such a debunking.

The philosophical dimension of postmodernism discussed above extends the debate to areas beyond literature, such as sociology, economics, politics, culture and architecture. Today a whole array of philosophers, historians, political thinkers, artists, architects and writers and an entire set of discourses are invoked in discussions of postmodernism, and this makes it an inter-disciplinary domain. Apart from the writers and philosophers whose names have appeared in these pages, postmodernism also includes architects like Paolo Portoghesi and Charles Jencks and historians like Paul Veyne and Michel de Certeau. It straddles such borderline disciplines as semiotics, narratology, feminism, ethnic studies, gender studies and culture studies. It has further led to an elaboration of the notion of textuality that takes the reader beyond the literary text to the wider realm of culture. However, one would also come across in contemporary debates on postmodernism a third use of the term, which in fact is a result of philosophical ideas impacting the literary sensibility. The postmodernist fictional techniques that scholars like Brian McHale, Linda Hutcheon, Patricia Waugh, David Cook, Arthur Kroker, Peter Stallybrass, Allon White and others identify in contemporary novels are all cast in the philosophico-literary mint of the French poststructuralists of the nineteen seventies and eighties. "Litero-philosophy" is the glamorous term that J.G. Merquior (1985: 12) uses to refer to current French philosophy that is more influential among academics belonging to the literature departments in the West than among philosophers themselves. The practitioners of litero-philosophy and the literary critics who follow them make much of such devices as parody, pastiche, fabulation, carnivalization, ludicity, heteroglossia, heterotopia, *mise-en-abyme*, parallel worlds/subworlds, narrative domains, recursive structures and aleatory procedures. Postmodernism of this variety has also discovered its own theorist – Mikhail Bakhtin – who has been retrieved from the limbo of theory's history and canonized. It was from Bakhtin that some of the terms listed above were derived. The tendency certainly is related to the past practice of Fiedler, Hassan, Sontag and others, but the philosophical interregnum has added a new theoretical punch to the concepts involved. Hassan's and Sontag's later works, incidentally, are informed by the new climate of theoretical sophistication, and this might render the kind of discrimination that has been attempted here a little shaky. On the whole, however, the discrimination holds, a fact that would prompt one to make a further discrimination, this time between the varieties of postmodernism examined above and a specifically Indian variant of it.

Can one talk about an Indian postmodernism, and if one can, how is one to theorize it? It might be easy to talk about postmodernism in India, if one were merely thinking of the perceived impact of the western postmodern sensibility on the cultural situation in this country. To speak specifically of the literary

situation in Kerala, one might go about constructing a minor tradition of literary postmodernism that came in the wake of the decline of literary modernism. There indeed are western scholars who would argue that this is the only appropriate sense in which the term could be used in discussions. “Postmodernism, if it means anything, is best kept to refer to styles or movements within literature, painting, the plastic arts and architecture,” says Anthony Giddens (1990: 45). Following this, one might note a parallelism in a writer like Ayyappa Paniker introducing the term into the literary critical debates in Malayalam in the same year as Lyotard published his work in French. Closer scrutiny would reveal that there are other parallels as well, name for name, word for word. There are even short stories and poems in Malayalam which carry the word “postmodernism” in their titles in the manner of some western works.

But this approach may not take one very far if one chooses to remember, notwithstanding Giddens’s reservations, that postmodernism is not a literary critical term alone, but implies, self-reflexively, one might say, a whole environment of cultural dominance and subordination. The dominance takes on added political significance in India and other Third World countries, which have been affected in a complex way by the introduction of colonial modernity. It was pointed out in the course of this analysis how the corpus of ideas constituting modernity has, in the West, promoted a particular ideology whose values in general are determined by the evolution of capitalism. Postmodernity, as already noted, is related to media capitalism, consumer capitalism and multinational capitalism. Postmodernism in this context can be regarded simultaneously as the cultural and intellectual response to these various forms of capitalism as well as a way of critically negotiating the impact of capitalistic development.

The question now arises whether capitalistic development in Kerala has reached such a stage as to be called late capitalist and postmodern. The answer would be an obvious ‘no’, especially, if we remember that postmodernity signifies the emergence of a new kind of society based on hi-tech images and a centrally controlled information system. It is true that international consumer culture in the era of neo-liberalism has started making inroads into the economy of India, and of Kerala, at a rapid pace. It is also true that the formal channels of information here are getting more and more centrally controlled. These of course are phenomena that have been taking place in all parts of the Third World because of increasing globalization. But these do not seem to have led to, as indeed it is impossible for these alone to lead to, a change in the character of Kerala’s society, whose relations are still largely semi-feudal. It might therefore be a little irrational to treat Kerala as a postmodern society.

There will however be problems if one decides that postmodernism is a wholly irrelevant concept that has no use whatsoever in conducting an analysis of the working of society and culture in Kerala. This is mainly because over the past few centuries Kerala has, along with the rest of the Third World, come increasingly under the political and cultural dominance of the western world. During the past three hundred years of European dominance over India, especially during the one hundred and fifty years of Foucault's modern period, the country has incorporated into its system a good share of the conceptual apparatus of enlightenment modernity, which includes positivism, scientism, liberalism, humanism, romanticism and modernism. Though some of these ideas might be valuable as agents of civility and social change, they were received here with a colonialist inflection and which has continued to influence the culture of the country even after the formal departure of the westerner. That is why one sees the literary modernism that flourished in Kerala in the sixties and seventies to be resonating with the values of colonialist ideology. Though one cannot disregard the positive aspects of literary modernism, it is to be stated that its continued ideological alliance with colonial values makes modernism suspect in the eyes of present day social critics.

It is in this context that the so-called postmodernist trends become relevant to India. It may not be sensible to define postmodernism here on the basis of the characteristics that are usually associated with western postmodernism. Even in the West there are people who would deny that society has transformed the way the postmodernists claim it has. Some of them might be challenging the new theory on behalf of a dying system, but there are also such scholars as Perry Anderson, Alex Callinicos, and David Frisby, who contest the claims of postmodernism on alternative political platforms. Indian scholars could certainly learn a lesson or two from these critics on how best to approach the issues raised by postmodernism. This might help in making further discriminations among postmodernisms beyond what has been attempted here. In any event, Indian postmodernism would be a valid enterprise if it makes bold to question the ideology of colonial modernity. The collapse of the hierarchies of knowledge, taste and opinion that is supposed to accompany the postmodernist development can become meaningful in the Third-World context only if it simultaneously leads to a deconstruction of western values. The shift of accent from the universal to the local and the turn to the "atomization of the social" (Lyotard 1987:17) should in other words be channeled productively towards a reversal of the hierarchies that are crucial to colonial modernity.

A conscious attempt to move away from colonial values, then, should be acknowledged as the hallmark of postmodernism, if the concept is to be of use in Third-World cultures. Social theorists call attention to the decolonising urge at work

in most parts of the global South. A majority of the advocates of postmodernism in Kerala may not agree with this view, but a close examination of the literary artifacts that are associated with postmodernism here would reveal that they all demonstrate a deep decolonising tendency. Whether it be the new interest shown by scholars in gender and dalit politics, whether it be the demand for a share of power aired by atomized social groups, whether it be the emphasis on questions of ecological conservation, in these and many other developments the major target of attack is the colonialist structures of thinking and feeling that entail certain responses imperative.

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Neoliberal Citizenship at Stake, Withering Away of Privacy: A Foucauldian Analysis of Aadhaar

Akhiles Udayabhanu

Identity of citizens within the neoliberal scenario is becoming increasingly problematic, especially in the domain of South Asia where the citizenship is at stake due to a variety of reasons emerging from the socio-political incidents during last two decades. Most of the countries like Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India are witnessing problems related with political stability, governance, human security, poverty and ethnic conflicts. It is in the midst of these socio-political crisis that the Indian government had decided to launch a new project namely Aadhaar. It was launched in 2009 by the United Progressive Government (UPA) government with the objective of reaching various benefits such as public distribution system (PDS) to the poor, better targeting of governmental schemes, avoiding illegal migration and thus addressing terrorism and enabling services such as opening of bank accounts etc. The government took this landmark decision in order to change the face of governance in India. For this task the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) was established with Nandan Nilekani, a technocrat as its chairperson. A major problem with this decision is that the problem of citizenship is decided to be fixed with the help of technology. In fact, UIDAI is in the background work of biometric citizenship which is undeniably a neoliberal citizenship. There are other issues regarding the biometric database maintained with the Home Ministry. When a mother database including the biometric and demographic information of the citizens is with the home ministry there are problems regarding the privacy and civil liberty. The Aadhaar project's potential to violate people's right to privacy is an important concern. In most western countries, projects to issue identity cards were shelved because of strong privacy concerns and public opinion. It is to be taken into account that only few countries have provided national ID cards to citizens. The most important reason could be the debates and questions regarding the protection of privacy and civil liberties.

A major argument was that the data collected could be misused for a variety of purposes. There is a problem of “functionality creep” if the card can serve purposes other than its original intention. The issue regarding privacy and civil liberties has been discussed in countries like the United States and the United Kingdom. Later they changed their decision in the light of the public protest.

In India one major threat to privacy and civil liberties is the promotion of private institutions in the provision of social services. It is same as in the case of UIDAI too. International private companies are in contract with UIDAI in the enrolment process. When such a data base containing the demographic and biometric information of the citizens is with private companies there are reasons to worry. There are possibilities of identity theft in an age when personal information becomes a growing commodity. There are many ways in which a state can use such a data base against its own citizens. It can be used to persecute marginalized sections of the population. The police can use it for regular surveillance and investigative processes if they are allowed to access the database. Aadhaar project is designed to be linked with the Public Distribution System for its reformation. If it is introduced in the PDS sector, it will slowly engulf the welfare schemes of the state. In many ways Aadhaar is a project which is by and large not scientific. It invites controversies and problems than identity or security. It is in this context the present analysis tries to recapture the power strategies involved in such a project with the help of theoretical concepts formulated by Michel Foucault. The major Foucauldian concepts that are discussed in this context with reference to Aadhaar are panopticon, governmentality and bio-politics.

Aadhaar: an outline history

The Unique Identification (UID) aims to give a unique twelve digit number called Aadhaar to every citizen of the country. This number is generated and linked to a person’s demographic and biometric information. Unique Identification Authority was designed by the United Progressive Alliance government which appointed Nandan Nilekani as its chairperson. The government took this landmark decision which according to them would change the face of governance in India. But the actual emergence of this project was in the year 2002 while the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee was ruling the country. The origin of this project can be traced back to the controversial report of the Kargil Review Committee chaired by K. Subrahmanyam. The other members of this committee were B.G. Varghese, Satish Chandra and K.K. Hazari. This committee was constituted to review the social, political and economic aspects and consequences of the Kargil war in 1999. In its report submitted in January 2000, the committee noted that immediate steps were needed to issue ID cards to villagers

in border districts, pending its extension to other parts of the country. In 2001, a group of ministers in the NDA government submitted a report to the government, *Reforming the National Security System*. This report was on the basis of the report prepared by the Kargil Review Committee. The report argued that:

Illegal migration has assumed serious proportions. There should be compulsory registration of citizens and non-citizens living in India. This will facilitate preparation of a national register of citizens. All citizens should be given a Multi-purpose National Identity Card (MNIC) and non-citizens should be issued identity card of a different colour and design (Ramakumar 2009: 49).

In 2003 the NDA government initiated a series of steps to prepare the national register and to give ID cards to the citizens. It was a difficult task to provide ID cards to the citizens of a country, especially a country like India having high population. So the government decided to link the preparation of this register with the census of India. But the census rules contained strong clauses regarding the privacy of the information supplied by the respondents. Hence the government was compelled to amend the Citizenship Act of 1955 in 2003 immediately after the MNIC was instituted. This amendment necessitated the creation of a new post of the Director of Citizen Registration who was also to function as the Director of Census in each state. According to the citizenship rules notified on 10 December 2003, “it shall be compulsory for every citizen of India to get himself registered in the local Register of Indian Citizens”(Ibid). The rules also specified punishments for citizens who fail to do so; any violation was to be “punishable with fine, which may extend to one thousand rupees.”

In short, the privacy clauses regarding the Census were diluted significantly by the NDA government in 2003. But the MNIC project did not refer to biometric data until 2004-05. In 2005-06 the first mention of biometric data appeared. Still, biometric standards got included in the registration without sanction from the 2003 rule. The UPA government carried forward the plans of the NDA government under a new name. The MNIC project was reconstituted as the National Authority for Unique Identity (NAUID) and was brought under the direct control of the Planning Commission.

The NAUID was established in January 2009, two months after the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 2008. After the project was established the UPA government conducted a press meet on 10 November 2008, to explain how the UID project would serve a variety of purposes: “better targeting of government’s development schemes, regulatory purposes, [including taxation and licensing], security purposes, banking and financial sector activities, etc. The UID will be “progressively extended to various government programmes and regulatory

agencies, as well as private sector agencies in the banking, financial services, mobile telephony and other such areas” (50). Unique Identification Authority was established in February 2009.

With the introduction of biometric into the national population register the Home Ministry required technical expertise. The establishment of UIDAI is partly to meet this requirement. Home Minister P Chidambaram clarified in 2009 that “MNIC has to be issued to every citizen, for which the government has decided to set up a UID authority. After the NPR is created, it will engulf the UID data base, being far more comprehensive, and will become the mother data base for identity purposes” (Ramakumar 2011:6)

The process of linking the NPR with Aadhaar can be understood easily from the Census of India website: “Data collected in the NPR will be subjected to de-duplication by the UIDAI. After de-duplication, the UIDAI will issue a UID number. This UID number will be part of the NPR and the NPR cards will bear this UID number.” In such a context every citizens will be forced to get an Aadhaar number.

Withering away of privacy and civil liberty

The Aadhaar project’s potential to violate people’s right to privacy is an important concern. In most western countries, projects to issue identity cards were shelved because of strong privacy concerns and public opinion. It is to be taken into account that only few countries have provided national ID cards to citizens. The most important reason could be the debates and questions regarding the protection of privacy and civil liberties. A major argument was that the data collected could be misused for a variety of purposes. There is a problem of “functionality creep” if the card can serve purposes other than its original intent. The issues regarding privacy and civil liberties have been discussed in countries like the United States and the United Kingdom. Later they changed their decision in the light of the public protest.

In the US there was widespread opposition when the government tried to expand the use of the social security number in 1970s and 80s. The disclosure of the social security number to the private agency had to be stopped in 1989 due to public protest. Later a health security card project proposed by Bill Clinton was set aside even after the government promised full privacy and confidentiality. Finally George W Bush introduced an indirect method of providing ID cards to US citizens in 2005 which was later known as a “de facto ID system.” The Real ID Act was introduced which made it mandatory for all US citizens to get their driving licenses reissued, replacing the old ones. New questions were added in the application form

by the Homeland Security Department. This information provided by the citizens became part of the database on driving license holders. Almost all citizens in the US had driving licenses and the information became an informal database of the US citizens. These data collected by the US government continues to be alive today. In the UK, the Tony Blair government declared its intent to issue ID cards for all UK citizens with the introduction of the ID card bill in 2004. Public opposition and protest forced the government to shelve the policy. The major debates centred around the report of the London School of Economics regarding high risk, high cost, technological and human rights issues. The report noted that:

The government's proposal is too complex, technologically unsafe, overly prescriptive and lack a foundation of public trust and confidence. Preventing identity theft may be better addressed by giving individuals greater control over the disclosure of their own personal information, while prevention of terrorism may be more effectively managed through strengthened border patrols and increased presence at borders, or allocating adequate resources for conventional police intelligence work....a card system such as the one proposed in the Bill may even lead to a greater incidents of identity fraud....In consequence, the national identity register may itself pose a far larger risk to the safety and security of UK citizens than any of the problems that it is intended to address.

LSE report in conclusion stated that:

...identity systems may create a range of new and unforeseen problems. These include the failure of systems, unforeseen financial costs, increased security threats and unacceptable imposition of citizens. The success of a national identity system depends on a sensitive, cautious and co-operative approach involving all key stakeholder groups, including an independent and rolling risk assessment and a regular review of management practices. We are not confident that these conditions have been satisfied in the development of the Identity Cards Bill. The risk of failure in the current proposals is therefore magnified to the point where the scheme should be regarded as a potential danger to the public interest and to the legal rights of individuals (Ramakumar 2009: 50-51).

These reports should be noted in the Indian context too as it generally speaks of identity and people's right to privacy. Even though all these studies were there regarding the privacy and civil liberty of the citizen's, Indian government and the UIDAI carried forward the proposed projects. When a project proposed by the government is largely concerned with the personal liberties and individual privacy of the citizens, it may lead the people to protest against the state. All over the world these kind of ID card issuing schemes were shelved because of the public opposition. But in India there were no large scale public protests against the Aadhaar scheme.

In India one major threat to privacy and civil liberties is the promotion of private institutions in the provision of social services. The government or UADAI have not discussed the factors regarding privacy concerns in any of its documents. Instead the discussions on Aadhaar have involved in open calls for sharing information with private companies. How far these private companies are reliable is a question to be answered especially in a country like India having strong data protection and right to privacy rules. Article 21 of Indian Constitution contains a guarantee of personal liberty and it is obvious that personal liberty also involves the right to privacy.

In the *Nakkeeran* case [R. Rajagopal vs State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632] the court said:

The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a 'right to be left alone'. A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of himself, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education, among other matters. No one can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent – whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. The position may, however, be different if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into a controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy (Noorani 2011: 13).

Aadhaar brings to the forefront the major violation to the right to privacy of the citizens offered by the constitution. There is always a problem of privacy and civil liberty when the ownership of a database of citizens including biometric information lies with the home ministry. The data collected can serve purposes other than its original intent. There are many ways in which a state can use such a data base against its own citizens. The database could be used to persecute marginalized sections of the population. The police can use it for regular surveillance and investigative purposes. This will lead to human rights violation.

The Indian Stamp Act 1899 and its amendment by Andhra Pradesh in 1986 provides a data protection act for the citizens. As per the 1986 amendment;

Every public officer or any person having in his custody any registers, books, records, papers, documents or proceedings, the inspection whereof may attend to secure any duty, or to prove or lead to the discovery of any fraud or omission in relation to any duty, shall at all responsible times permit any person authorized in writing by the collector to enter upon any premises and to inspect for such purposes the registers, books, records, papers, documents and proceedings and to take such notes and extracts as he may deem necessary, without fee or charge and if necessary to seize them and impound the same under proper acknowledgement. .provided that such seizure of any registers, books, records, papers, documents or other proceedings, in

the custody of any bank be made only after a notice of 30 days to make good the deficit stamp duty is given (14).

Aadhaar is in fact the violation of data protection act and people's right to privacy offered by the constitution of India.

Panopticon, governmentality, biopolitics and Aadhaar

Panopticon was an architectural plan designed by Jeremy Bentham in 1791 for prisons. It is a circular building with an internal periphery consisting of rooms with iron doors opening to the interior and the window opening to the exterior. It also includes a multi floored central tower containing wide windows with partitions. Foucault argues that "Bentham laid down the principle that power should be visible and unverifiable. Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at any one moment, but he must be sure that he may always be so" (Foucault 1995: 201).

Panopticon introduces a new form of internalized disciplinary practice. One is forced to act as if one is constantly being surveyed even when one is not. The individuals within the Panopticon are forced to internalize the disciplinary gaze. The surveillance generated within Panopticon can be termed as panoptic surveillance. The world can be seen as an embodiment of a continuous surveillance system generated and operated through different institutions. Generally panoptic surveillance is the centralised system of surveillance where the victims are being monitored without their being aware. The modern forms of Panopticon are internet, closed circuit cameras, etc. As such Aadhaar can be seen as a means to subject and discipline them and thus ensure constant visibility of its citizens.

In many ways Aadhaar can be seen as a centralised system of surveillance. The Aadhaar is designed in such a way that it is linked with the National Population Register. The data collected in the NPR which includes the name, address, gender, date of birth and relationship will be subjected to de-duplication by the UIDAI. After de-duplication the UIDAI will collect biometric information which includes finger prints, iris scans and facial scans and issue a UID number. This UID number will be part of the NPR and the NPR card will bear the UID number. Aadhaar card thus becomes a mother electronic database with the biometric and demographic information of the citizens. It is important that the ownership of this mother data base is with the Home Ministry of India. The home ministry can use this database for a wide variety of purposes other than its original intention. There are many ways in which a state can use such a data base against its own citizens. It can be used to persecute marginalized sections of the population. If allowed access to the

database, the police can use it for regular surveillance and investigative processes. The design of Aadhaar as a centralised mother data base itself and the services that are targeted to link with it also ensure constant visibility.

As Foucault argues, surveillance is a “shameful act” of supervising and imposing discipline on a subject through a hierarchized system of policing. The major effect of the surveillance in a Panopticon is to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.

Because of these reasons Aadhaar becomes a postmodern Panopticon as a generalized model of functioning and a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday lives of men. In the initiatives like Aadhaar the subject is seen but he/she does not see. He/she is the object of information, but never a subject in communication. The Panoptic model is quite valid for biometric database because these databases are meant to ensure real time tracking and profiling of citizens and turns them into subjects.

The following diagram will illustrate how UIDAI mother database is constructed




Diagram 1

In the discussion of Aadhaar card as a Panopticon the biometric information that is recorded during the enrolment process becomes problematic. No other country introduced ID card systems on a large scale as India is doing. International experience shows the biometric technology is not at all scientific and cost effective. The personal information is a growing commodity and it is a valued resource. The biometric information of the citizens of India is a valuable resource.

It is relevant to discuss the speech delivered by UK's Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg in the British House of Commons. He said, "this government will end the culture of spying on its citizens. It is outrageous that decent, law-abiding people are regularly treated as if they have something to hide. It has to stop. So there will be no ID card scheme. No national identity register, a halt to second generation biometric passports," He added, "We won't hold your internet and email records when there is just no reason to do so. Britain must not be a country where our children grow up so used to their liberty being infringed that they accept it without question. Schools will not take children's fingerprints without even asking their parent's consent. This will be a government that is proud when British citizens stand up against illegitimate advances of the state"(www.rosaonline.net/daily).

The speech of the British Deputy Prime Minister is relevant in the Indian context. This speech, directly or indirectly provides the basic notions behind ID card scheme and the biometric recording. The international experience shows that ID card initiatives were shelved because of public protest in countries like US, UK, China, Australia, etc. According to the technological experts all over the world, the technologies used for the biometric enrolment and authentication are not scientific. The reliability of UIDAI is becoming vague day by day. Still the government continues to go behind the proposed project.

The state's purpose in building up such a database using technologies can be understood in the perspective of another Foucaultian concept namely "governmentality." Governmentality for Foucault is not only the analysis of who can govern, and who is governed, but also the means by which the shaping of someone else's activity is achieved. The critic Colin Gordon argues that "Foucault saw it as a characteristic (and troubling) property of the development of government in Western societies to tend towards a form of political sovereignty which would be a government of all of each and whose concerns would be at once to 'totalise and to individualise'" (Gordon 1980 :3).

In his seminars in College de France, Foucault defines governmentality as the art of governments. Apart from politics, government uses a wide range of techniques and applications to a wide variety of objects from one's control of the self to the biopolitical control of the populations. Governmentality is applicable to a variety of historical periods and to different specific power regimes. Foucault uses this concept in reference to neoliberal governmentality, that is the type of governmentality that characterizes advanced liberal democracies. In this case, the notion of governmentality refers to societies where power is de-centered and its members play an active role in their own self-government. Because of its active role, individuals need to be regulated from 'inside'. In neoliberal democracies the

state uses certain strategies to control and regulate its citizens. States use certain strategies and techniques to know and administrate its citizens. In the Aadhaar project the strategy of bio power and bio-politics is used for the governance. It can be seen as the agenda of the government to regulate and manage the life in India. The strategy involved in regulating the population is bio-politics. This strategy includes the use of bio-power in regulating and governing life.

Bio-power is the power over bios or life, and life may be managed on both an individual and group basis. It is also a means to regulate life. For the administration of life the state has to collect statistical estimates concerning the demographic factors like fertility, nativity, immigration, dwellings and morality rates. In such a context the development of modern census can be seen as an important moment in the history of bio-power. The idea of collecting information of the population was introduced in western countries at the end of the seventeenth century and became increasingly detailed in the centuries that followed. Later the census secured data on dates and places of birth, marital status and occupation. Modern states realized the necessity of understanding the characteristics, structure and trends of their population. Aadhaar can be understood in the perspective of bio-power too. It can be seen as the agenda of the government to regulate and manage the life in India. As Aadhaar collects demographic information from the National Population Register it allows the government to have strategic estimates to govern the lives here. The strategy involved in regulating the population is biopolitics. In *The Birth of Bio-politics*, Foucault argued:

By biopolitics I meant the endeavor, begun in the eighteenth century, to rationalize the problems presented to governmental practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race...We are aware of the expanding place these problems have occupied since the nineteenth century, and of the political and economic issues they have constituted up to the present day. It seemed to me that these problems could not be dissociated from the framework of political rationality within which they appeared and developed their urgency. "liberalism" enters the picture here, because it was in connection with liberalism that they began to have the look of a challenge. In a system anxious to have the respect of legal subjects and to ensure the free enterprise of individuals, how can the "population" phenomenon, with its specific effects and problems, be taken into account? On behalf of what, and according to what rules, can it be managed? The debate that took place in England in the middle of the nineteenth century concerning health legislation can serve as an example (Foucault 2010).

In "Society Must Be Defended," Foucault insists that a bio-politics of population:

does not exclude disciplinary technology, but it does dovetail into, integrate it, modify it to some extent, and above all use it by sort of infiltrating it, embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques. This new technique does not simply do away with the disciplinary technique, because it exists at a different level, on a different scale, and because it has a different bearing area, and makes use of very different instruments. (Foucault 2003: 242).

In the Indian context the ongoing Aadhaar project can be treated as an instrument involving the state's strategy for bio-political governance. As portrayed in the diagram-1, the Aadhaar project collects demographic and biometric information of the population and records it. The government intends to link it with a wide variety of government services like the public distribution system. As such Aadhaar plays the role of a bio-political strategy for the state. It allows the government to have the characteristics, structures and trends of the population.

On one hand disciplinary institutions target individual bodies as they deviate from norms and on the other hand the state is concerned with knowing and administrating the norms of population as a whole. By this understanding and regulating the state can easily face the problems regarding birth rate, longevity, public health, housing and migration. As such Aadhaar allows the government to have the characteristics, structures and trends of the population. This makes governance easier by managing and regulating the population in accordance with the whims and fancies of the state. The biometric information of the population intensifies the access of the government to its citizens. In short, Aadhaar is a multipurpose power strategy employed by the state to discipline and subject the citizens. In many ways the Aadhaar project is not at all reliable and scientific even though the government would say that Aadhaar is symbolic of the new and modern India.” And the international experience in providing such ID cards shows that it can only bring controversies rather than development or security. It is also relevant to redefine whether Aadhaar is a strategy of inclusion or exclusion.

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Spatialising the Contemporary Urban Order

Mathew A. Varghese

Urbanisation has always had the function of absorbing capitalist surplus. For Marx capitalism was organised as a competitive structure with coercive laws. There is an imperative to reinvest in expansion. Otherwise there is crisis (devaluation, collapse of valuation schemes, etc). Urbanisation has had a role in the revival projects (Harvey 1989) in times of crisis. The public work-reengineering of Paris after 1848¹ or post world war I, for which capital and labour got employed and massive suburbanising programmes are examples. More towards the contemporary times, articulations of world slums² in cities like Mumbai and huge construction exercises (like in Dubai or *Smart Cities* modelled after Dubai), absorb capitalist excesses in ever greater scales and skew wealth accumulations. Urbanisation projects now go further from the metropolises and move the crisis around on a global scale. Securitisation of mortgages that moved crisis around and became the 2008 financial crisis is the recent instance. Urbanisation in all the cases also becomes highly political class articulations through surplus absorption.

Based on the first National Commission on Urbanisation constituted in 1985, the Government of India promulgated the 74th amendment to the Constitution. A review of the working of urban bodies was to be made to make them more 'effective'. Decentralisation and autonomy of urban bodies were to be prioritised. Postneoliberal reforms, the planning was to be predominated by global engagements—urban areas were to be generators of new economic momentum. Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) were invested with the authority to make spatial plans under projects like JNNURM.³ Urban developmental authorities, formed after independence, were losing significance.⁴ Urban bodies are now encouraged to generate their own resources. Funds will be allocated based on the assessment of performance of newly constituted urban bodies based on statutory obligations. Options from private sector and non-governmental organisations have to be resorted to. There is prioritization of foreign direct investments through

channels like Special Economic Zones (SEZs), state provisions and exceptions. New Urbanisation is a comprehensive conceptualisation of several heterogeneous and contradictory transformations; whether that is economic organisation, social regulation, or political governance. The implication of all this for human life can be often complex and unprecedented.

Mega urban renewal projects like the JNNURM envisage participation of private sector for a gamut of developmental projects interweaving individuals, regions, and states. Government would therefore explore all options such as outsourcing of service (welfare with a price!), Public-Private Participation (PPPs) etc. Self help groups and NGOs take up the erstwhile welfare spaces as well as the ones mediated by historically specific political formations. Urban Regulatory Authorities are entrusted with the responsibility to ensure private sector participation in services.

Places in certain ways become scapes filled with capitalist relations of production in the present context, like the state mediated Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and urban models. The *Shanghaification* (Patkar and Athialy 2005) of Mumbai is an example of the latter. This is a comprehensive urban spatial restructuring that would transform Mumbai into a 'world-class city' at the cost of the city's disadvantaged. This requires massive infrastructural lay outs which in turn required extensive evictions and slum clearances. Space becomes a very complicated idea when considered as replete with several relational aspects that come with living. All space is in a sense social (Lefebvre 1991: 84) and it is precisely the circulation of products that shapes social space. Others take this up in Lefebvre (Harvey 1985: 185-226) and focus on the transformation in the overall nature of capitalism, with what may be termed 'urban' setting a new paradigm.

The articulation of global forms in specific situations or territorialized in assemblages with parts that can be detached and attached to other assemblages define new material, collective, and discursive relationships. People can become components of two or more distinct assemblages (through institutions and organisations of varying scales- as members of families, dependents on markets, buyers of services etc.). The situation demands an approach that is better able to define the circumstances in which structures, biologically constituted or socially and culturally produced, can embed and articulate as everyday spatial practice.

The idea of 'trial by space' contains a radical suggestion (Lefebvre 1991: 417-418). This trial follows because the link between past and present in the current context is being attenuated or 'in dissolution' with ruptures or disjuncture. Life in urban assemblages, in other words have become 'auto referential' (Jameson 1991: xii). Accordingly there has been ruptures in the narrative continuities of past, present, and future resulting in the production of unrelated presents in time (ibid:

127). The survival or the past are swept away to leave the present as a non sequitur. In such circumstances moments or events may be enunciated afresh with its own logic and relationships. The essence of globalisation may be its 'disordering' effect on the space and the ways in which continuities across space are broken down into multiplicities, at least in urban contexts (Soja 1996: 30). Socio-spatial practice as assemblages can logically follow from such an order.

Spatial analysis offers broad and focussed view on cityscapes in terms of the production of human geographies. It pre-emptly free falls into futuristic rhetoric a la Alvin Toffler⁵ or even the more 'intimate' Abdul Kalam's *India 2020*.⁶ Instead the analysis is endowed with a multi-scalar perspective (Soja 2000), weaving together bodies, regions and cities in their complex everyday interactions. The assumption behind contemporary spatial analysis is that geographies are under radical pressures of transformation, greater in degree in the last few decades. But the change is produced at the same time. Patterns centred on metropolises or older urban planning authorities are replaced by instruments of the new process called 'regional urbanisation'. This produces newer human ecologies. In the resultant spatial ecology gradients like urban-suburban, rural-urban etc. is fast giving way to *fractal cities* or *exopolises* (ibid: 166). The idea is one in which there are cities without the classic urban centres or metropolitan cores (a nucleus like Calcutta, New Delhi or Mumbai with which surrounding areas have high degree of integration) are giving way to endless sprawl and absence of any particular core. Regions are neither rural nor urban nor suburban, but are nodal elements in polycentric decentralised global networks. Capital flows tend to accumulate in the nodal regions. There is ever more inter urban competition that in turn becomes the "external coercive power" (Harvey 1989: 10) on individual places to come 'in line' with global capitalist processes and otherwise imagine the *anomie* of being left out.

One thing is sure that there is a need to think beyond the familiar grid of nation state based on the perception that its legitimacy and capacity to act for the good of the people over whom it has claims, has been exhausted or undermined (Chatterjee 1997). The welfarist pretensions of nation states are surely getting weakened, even though the state is seldom in retreat. Employing urban spatial paradigm it may be argued that it is gaining importance in a different sense. By the 1990s' financial liberalisation, the state in effect loosened its remaining checks and balances on, among many forms of private interests, corporate capital. The corporate class has become transnational entities that grow out of all proportions. Transnationally located Indian billionaires come back to wield ever more power in the everyday running of state (*Vedanta* through massive futuristic coal investments, *Reliance* in the petroleum industry and price regulations with ripple effect on the quality of life)

through the benevolent and supportive gaze of state apparatus (ministry, military, paramilitary, *cobras* etc).⁷ The neoliberalising Indian state had already been held captive (Monbiot 2000) mainly by the corporate structures that empowered themselves during the latter half of 1900s (Tatas, Birlas, Reliance). But since the nineties the corporate form nevertheless has been getting ever more entrenched and breaking out of earlier bounds.

It becomes necessary to put things in perspective and rationalise the resort of spatial paradigm. This could be done through a process of demystification of some of the prevalent futuristic rhetoric and positivistic resonance of regional versions of urban development and progress. The specific themes within the language of urban reforms; like autonomy, flexibility, choice and security will be discussed in the light of the spatial sketch as mentioned.

Of Autonomy, Flexibility, Choice, and Security

Current urban themes (autonomy, choice, flexibility, annihilation of space through technology, futurism, security...) first floated in as fictional futurisms, the kind represented by the bestseller Alvin Toffler; the systematic transition through 'Waves' (*Third Wave* 1980), the 'Flex Firms' (*Power Shift* 1990), all imagining positive evolution of human socio-economic organisation. Everything got ever more linked, within reach and all was well. The barrage of problems associated with bureaucratic centralisations and inflexible organisations were to be solved by the coming back of family managed (entailing family 'values') flex firms, knowledge economy, and the availability of that loaded idea called 'choice'. The flat earth theologians like Thomas Friedman⁸ go even further and imagine that the world has now become a level and egalitarian playing field where everything is possible for everyone. They are hands down advocates for capitalist globalism. Such positivistic overtones keep surfacing in the routines of imaginations and promises of globalisation, premised on financial liberalisation. The plan here is to take up some of the leading motifs of urban reforms where the rhetoric is more accentuated. The idea is that spatial analysis of urban forms/orders pre-empts apolitical imaginations and theological prescriptions.

In the Indian context, cities, especially the metros, are increasingly modelled on the image of global cities/financial centres in order to function as regional nodes in the circulation of high finance, information flows and hi-tech productive activities. This partly entails changing the geography of the city on the lines of serially reproduced productive and consumptive landscape, as functions of inter-urban competition, in order to 'urgently' lure highly volatile capital flows. In practice by eviscerating geographical and occupational niches occupied by large sections of people for operationalising new ideas of growth and future (models like

Shanghaification...), the state facilitates radically new and all-encompassing spatial order – this has everything to do with the circulation of money, police presence, the normalisation of life forms, the exploitation of productivity, repression, the reining in of subjectivities (Negri 2009).

It has been consistently pointed out (Harvey 1985, 1989; Lefebvre 1991) that understanding urbanisation is critical for understanding the changing geography of capitalism; the move to flexible forms of accumulation as well as its distinct language and aesthetics. The transition from managerial forms of urbanisms to entrepreneurial forms has given rise to urban competitions and opened spaces where new and flexible forms of labour (informal...insecure) could be better implanted. The flexibility here pertains to creating favourable business climate and labour impositions. There is an endless accumulation of spectacles (Debord 1983). The spectacle is a world of competing images people negotiate everyday as with the consuming spaces (where authentication of illusion is more real than the real!). The socially wasteful investments that inter-region competitions inaugurates, pitches place against places or bodies against bodies with pretexts of freedom to compete. This ironically feeds the current forms of flexible accumulation when people increasingly become consumers of, among other commodities, services; and also when populations become flexible resource pools and agents for capital. That is precisely why urbanisation is often imagined as a socio spatial fix whenever a given order of power is about to collapse. We can easily pace this with the statist and urban solutions to contemporary ‘credit crunch’. The state does everything it could to resuscitate order by opening places as market spaces and buffering off further shocks with peoples’ assets (pension, insurance).

Our emphasis though is not only the spectacular, the seemingly virtual or super structural, and its binary called the ‘real’ as such; but about their spatial interplay. The point is how such interplay becomes the normative logic of a new order that sets in through positivistic discourse centred on optimisation of places and people as conduits for global capital. So the concern is about the real effects generated by that which is not yet fully actual (or in other terms, virtual).

Ideas like autonomy, flexibility, choice and security, oft invoked in public rhetoric and media discourse, are endowed with self explanatory significance and get priority against any possible ‘distraction’. They make an abstract whole with real effects on the environment around and generate rationale for more reform (read neoliberal-corporate). It is within the spectrum of such spatial discourse that Thomas Friedman, Bangalore, bestsellers, Manmohan Singh, developmental ‘urgencies’, and the futures of innumerable potential employees and aspirants of global incorporation can meet and tweet ‘shared imaginations’. It is imperative for

any serious thought beyond bare virtuality to understand the virtual through its real effects.

Positivist urban discourses as well as futuristic rationales often put forward the annihilation of space. They claim that with modern technology and new capitalist means of production space is about to get powdered on the anvil of temporality. Optic fibre and internet are imagined to network regions and people and make place/ space insignificant. All such claims miss out the crucial issue that while digitalisation and technology of the sort may make physical distance irrelevant for certain functions; they have significant consequences for life next door or when political dialogues are required on the ground. When the far away is imagined to have become bedfellows the physically near and new class configurations get reduced to several types of insecurities (unhygienic slums, suspect neighbourhood, new forms of violence) and rationales for security and gatedness. Portraying space as asocial and a matter only of distance, always negative and constraining (Massey 2005), generates the need to escape its most productive/disruptive elements. But 'conquering' distances seldom annihilates space as such but raise newer issues around questions like multiplicity, otherness, or difference. The annihilation of space by time¹⁰ that Marx refers to in *Grundrisse* was specific to the new ways capital operates, and he mentions this more as a necessity for capital in order to realise its full function. Experientially space seldom disappears. Rather the concrete experiences of space that people have in their everyday life (*perceived space* of Lefebvre) and the mental reconstructions of space (the *conceived* part) combine to create the lived experience, the constituent element of social life. Producing urban space, for Lefebvre, involves the reproduction of social relations bound up in it.

Now take the sense of autonomy as conveyed by the reconstitution of Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) throughout India. Post independence, urban local bodies (ULBs) were created to give voice to local aspirations, to decentralise and look after the well being of the local populace. Decentralisation would mean any act in which a central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political administrative and territorial hierarchy (Mawhood 1983/ Smith 1985). This could be administrative, fiscal, or democratic decentralisation. The latter dominated the village based polities imagined by Gandhi. It is predominantly a political idea and can have radical consequences for a functioning democracy. But administrative decentralisation is more a managerial idea which need not automatically entail devolution of power to people. This is so with fiscal decentralisation as well, post-74th Constitutional Amendment (1992), which provided the legal framework for comprehensive urban reform. Decentralisation of management and finance in effect kowtows to the globalisation. This may seem farfetched but what is involved is the replacement of hegemony of old nation

states (with welfarist expectations) by a period of increased competition, political decentralization, and a shift of accumulation to newer regions within the world system (Friedman 1998). Post neoliberal reforms, the states increasingly site deteriorating fiscal health as an excuse for lesser and lesser budgetary support to urban bodies. There is a gamut of economic literature with statistics as to the consequent urban classifications, budget allocation etc.¹¹

Burgeoning population, unhealthy living, lack of service delivery, curtailed access to traditional sources of funding; all demanding welfarist intervention, are cited for why ULBs are increasingly forced to explore sources of funding as well as new service delivery channels. Accordingly, the ULBs need to be self sustaining and, should govern efficiently. The JNNURM reforms for example have clear directives to cities as to how to govern efficiently and concomitantly become fiscally autonomous from the state. ULBs have to depend on own revenues and seek private participation. The bringing in of efficiency in tax collection, water resource dependency (one hundred percent cost recovery), revision of building bye laws, making easy the conversion of agricultural land...all needs to be placed alongside the encouragement of private participation as well as the role given to international crediting agencies. ULBs have to resort to capital markets and mobilize funds through different kinds of bonds as well as methods like pooled financing. Reforms under flagship projects like JNNURM often become obligatory if states require central support. Support will be based on the satisfaction of parameters set by rating agencies (CARE, FITCH, ICRA, CRISIL, etc.).¹²

Places are rated according to parameters set by crediting agencies or news groups and need not reflect on what goes on in physically nearby spaces. Ahmadabad municipal council of Gujarat became the best municipal council in India despite the communal violence and state mediated ethnic cleansing that marred the region.¹³ What becomes clear is that places have indeed become autonomous, but autonomous from welfare issues that pertain to people who inhabit places. They have also become autonomous from welfarist responsibilities and get obligatorily dependent on good marks from global rating agencies. What is starker and violent in Gujarat may be more nuanced and less pronounced in Kerala. The touted autonomy for all practical purposes now becomes the re-networking of spaces and places to forces that are much beyond the everydaylife of people. This is what constitutes much of the contemporary rhetoric of *vikasanam*, the countering of which is 'blasphemous'! *Vikasanam* is a Malayalam word that literally means 'to expand' - but used to convey roughly the idea of 'development' as it takes root.

Vikasanam of any sort happens only in the transition from the more primary modes of production to those that cater to services and tertiary needs. In Kerala

the capital that percolates the contemporary service or tertiary sector (hospitality, tourism, real estate, or education) is not generated domestically and comes as investments from external sources. In the newly constituted urban spaces the predominant concern is to reduce risk for the private capital than reducing risk to people because of any external contingencies. In the case of bodies that come under the direct or indirect control of new governance, they get ever more linked to market mechanisms on which there is least control. Presently welfare itself connotes investment. This, more than anything, is welfare with a cost, which in turn should necessitate full cost recovery! Welfare in effect has become the main commodity for sale and circulation.

There is progressive alienation from the immediate ecology in terms of daily requirements because the immediately physical spaces become conduits of investments- heritage, health, back offices of multinationals, sanitized investment zones, resource bases for large capital etc. There are newer dependencies on transnationally mediated or constituted consumption spaces (the malls, the supermarkets) or employment zones (the special economic zones). The fundamental principle of modern consumerism is the realization of private fantasy that is let loose from local investments (cultural, intersubjective, and social) and driven by a desire that can never get satisfied. People once let loose from mutual implications in space get networked to abstract desires and communities. They create distinctive life spaces and find fulfillment in the realization of fantasies. The commodity that gets consumed becomes more than a show to others, a pleasure in itself (Campbell 1987). The self directedness does not stand alone though. It is accompanied by other directedness; therefore the need for security, suspicion of the other, gatedness.

We now get to spatialise security, another major urban promise being a secure cosmology for all. The networked nature of contemporary urban spaces (one urban region to another, credit points mediated), it could be argued, is a feature of control societies in the making (Deleuze 1992). In the contemporary urban organisation there is no logical urban centre and a strict hierarchical relation to people and places around. The urban processes do not follow a linear or hierarchical pattern; rather urban regions get networked in a crisscross manner with functions and populations getting redistributed to suit the requirements of global capital. There is a dense web of everyday connections that can disconnect and reconnect according to a given need, with urban nodes working as accelerators or lubricants. With the waning of earlier types of linear and hierarchical organisation¹⁴ urban processes have become ever more spatial and *rhizomic*. And much in the Deleuzian sense any point in the system could get connected to any other point. And any disruption will soon get cured to resuscitate the network into full function.

In the networked system as well there is pervasive government surveillance. But closed environments symbolized by disciplinary systems give way to what gets presented as open systems of instant communication, and flows through which individuals pass. Thus in the case of consumption or even that of occupations as well the capitalist systems of yesterday changes into corporate mediated systems of 'free competition'. The physically enclosed system of production and property, in a control society gets dispersive/ rhizomic. With urban processes we can see the concomitant operation of both disciplinary and control structures: while the dominant rhetoric is one of flexibility, autonomy and networking; the disciplinary apparatus of the state assures the smooth functioning through legislatures, hassle free investment mechanisms (as in SEZs), and efficient policing. Deleuze used the paradigm of whatever dominant technology there is to explain how the control system works. Thus the communication networks became the model. But then within networks there are several protocols (like IP Internet Protocol). Protocols (Galloway and Thacker 2004) are a system for maintaining organisation and control in networks. There is no confinement in space like in disciplinary systems, but things are far from the freedom and flexibility conveyed by flat earth sermons. Here there could be innumerable 'free ways', options, choices...but in the environment of permissiveness and freedom, the options or choices in themselves become its controlling agents. Thus in order to have options one has to opt from a set of developmental patterns; choices yes, but only when translated to consumption practices. When the perceived 'malignancies' are addressed in new spatial circumstances, what becomes clear is that everything though free and permitted has at first to be devoid of it. In order to really enjoy the new spatial reality replete with freedom and flexibility the pre requisite is that one should adopt the means of control or go by certain protocols.

In the multi-scalar spatial cartography it is evident that through much of the ingredients of futuristic rhetoric a sure transformation of the Hobbesian contractual state is well in the making. Changing relations between practices of government and territories are challenging long established patters of state spatiality. Gupta and Fergusson (1997, 2002) identify two key principles whereby states are getting radically re-spatialised. They resort to case materials within India to demonstrate how states secure their authority and legitimacy through unmarked spatial practices that create effects of vertical encompassment and the African material to demonstrate the rising salience of transnational governmentality. For the contractual state the logic of rule derived more from a system rooted in territories. In the case of corporate states the logic is one of control and here control refers to the control of market.

The issue of public order which characterised the Hobbesian state is transformed now to the problems of security (Kapferer 2005). Security becomes a private matter and has been corporatized. Through a preoccupation from the states to individuals with 'security', greater violent power of dominant groups goes against a general citizenry. In the case of states any kind of resistance, as with the recent episodes of anti corporate mining activities¹⁵ gets portrayed as a security problem. The state in such contexts has surely become corporate state (ibid) but also deploying the ultimate disciplinary techniques. The military and paramilitary exercises called 'Operation Green Hunt' was announced in 2009 against 'Maoist forces' in such a context and in this case precisely after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called them the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by the country. As Arundhati Roy observed the shares of mining companies subsequently went up.¹⁶

The neoliberal state is ever more involved in making its population legible (UIDAI being the most recent situation). Legibility has always been a central problem of state craft (Scott 1998). But in contemporary context the exercise can be carried out with no classical contract with populations and by a state that has metamorphosed into a corporation. Often the life forms in question themselves start engaging in management of self as with the translation of the language of security onto bodies. In the world of neoliberal globalisation of capital and concomitant urbanisation, securitisation represents attempts to make omniscient the military rationality. Accordingly there is a spatial reconfiguration of security to the everyday management of bodies as populations (Foucault 2009). Such populations are mass individuations and are functions of the replacement of hierarchical and linear spatial organisations. The mediation of people in the process parallels larger fractalisation and fragmentation. Despite regionally distinct rationale in the urgencies for security, all of them indicate at the coming of a distinct spatial order.

Populations have to be defined by what is inside and what lies out there. Like state rhetoric of security against terrorists, urban populations now identify an extensive range of ambient threats amidst the chaos. Thus one begins to see large hoardings advertising surveillance systems and CCTVs tailor-made for home. Business start ups and sales people specialising in security and surveillance systems proliferate even in the small towns of Kerala. Through the modes of consumption (large malls for example), communication, and transportation, security permeates the everyday. The spatialised imagination of security shatters the positive connotations. Instead everything (autonomy, security, flexibility, annihilation of space) becomes more about controls and protocols. Impositions of protocols happen with consent and often through the dominant urban discourse. This makes

them all the more hegemonic in everydaylife. The present concern with security in the immediate urban spaces within Kerala in particular, is manufactured in the dominant discourse of real estate investments and land accumulations. They offer new communities and sell security. Security and segregation, for many, become symbols of status. Where once people gained social capital by getting interlinked, now its individuations and isolations that earn distinctions. And distinction, with the added aura of security, is self imposed control.

Notes

- 1 Bonaparte thought of suburbs, boulevards, replanned neighbourhoods, institute a police state, censorship-in order for the project to work there was a need for financial institutions, credit structures, that which allow a debt finance building and allow these to realise the value. But when one prods to know whether there is something inside there, there is not much!
- 2 Planet of Slums: Urban Involution and the Informal Working Class (2006)
- 3 The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission is the most recent urban initiative. The framework or some of the major components of the initiative are: Preparation of City Development Plans (CDPs) by respective cities with a 20-25 years perspective, sector-wise detailed project reports to be prepared by identified cities listing projects along with their financial plans, a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) to be signed between the central government, state governments and ULBs containing the time bound commitment on the part of states/ ULBs to carry out reforms in order to access central funds under the Mission.
- 4 The most recent example of this trend was the keeping away of the developmental authority of Kochi from a corporate investment initiative ('GCDA frets over its 'stolen' projects', *The Hindu*, 5 September 2012.
- 5 His systematic transition through 'Waves' (*Third Wave*- 1980), the 'Flex Firms' (*Power Shift*- 1990), all seemed to imagine positive evolution of human socio-economic organisation.
- 6 With a subtitle *A Vision for the New Millennium* a book by the name was published in 1998.
- 7 A mining controversy Prafulla Das, *Frontline* Volume 21 - Issue 24, November 20 - December 03, 2004/ 'Kolla Sarkar Othaashayode' (in Malayalam), by D. Sreejith, *Dilipost.in/* He was removed after pressure from Reliance, says Medha Patkar by Mahim Pratap Singh, *The Hindu*, 30 October 2012/ Are we the enemy you fear? By Tusha Mittal, *Tehelka*, November 21 2012.
- 8 *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of The Twenty-first Century* (2005).
- 9 Not with respect to active advocates of Capitalist Globalisation like Thomas Friedman.
- 10 <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch10.htm>
- 11 Central Council of Local Governments (Zakaria Committee) (1963): A Report on Augmentation of Financial Resources of Urban Local Bodies, Government of India, New Delhi/Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission's City Development Plan report for various cities/ Ministry of Urban Development (1992): The Constitution Seventy-fourth Amendment Act 1992 on Municipalities, Government of India, New Delhi/ Twelfth Finance Commission report (2005-10)/Thirteenth Finance Commission report (2010-15))

- 12 Vaidya, Chetan and Hitesh Vaidya. 2008. 'Creative Financing of Urban Infrastructure in India through Market-based Financing and Public-Private Partnership Options'. *Paper*. 9th Metropolitan Congress, Sydney, October 22-26.
- 13 Land Acquisition, Displacement, and Resettlement in Gujarat: 1947-2004. Lancy Lobo and Shashikant Kumar, Sage. New Delhi/ 'Marketing a myth' by Lyla Bavadam. *Frontline*. Volume 28 - Issue 10 :: May. 07-20, 2011/ "Cheers Ahmedabad! City is racing ahead". DNA India. 18 October 2010/"Ahmedabad best city to live in, Pune close second". The Times Of India. 11 December 2011/ In 2011, Ahmadabad was rated India's best mega city to live in by leading market research firm IMRB
- 14 This need not be a norm, as with a state like Kerala, where there have been only medium sized evenly distributed towns. But presently the urban processes have become similar to what happens elsewhere in India.
- 15 'Plunder & profit' by Venkitesh Ramakrishnan. Cover Story, *Frontline*. Volume 27 - Issue 14 :: Jul. 03-16, 2010
- 16 Arundhati Roy, "Walking With The Comrades," *Outlook India*. March 29, 2010.

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De-Romanticizing 'Secular': Political Theology of Dawla Madaneyya in the Post-Spring Arab World

M.H. Ilias

The Arab Spring, with its wide range imperatives, brought out a situation in which the Islamist groups in West Asia and North Africa (mainly in Egypt and Tunisia) began to acknowledge the popular political experience, and thereby they had to reinterpret the state and democracy as the situation got unfolded. Establishing an absolute 'theocratic' state or a completely 'secular' state, thus, became a politically non-viable option for them. Instead of that, they made an effort to create a civil state (*dawla madaneyya*) by giving appropriate space for the rights of minorities and other weaker sections in the society.¹ It does not mean that there was a complete departure from Islamic ideals. The role of religion was very visible and operative. In a more delicate act of pragmatic balancing, Muslim Brotherhood endorsed the components of both 'Islam' and 'democratic' tradition and an attempt was made by them to show that Islamist ideology and democratic governance were not poles apart. The demands for democratization of various kinds were attempted by the Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt through both religious and secular means or a combination of the two. The attempt gathered sense in two ways—by seeing democracy both as a means of constituting the body politic and as a technique of governing.²

Though the constitutional debate initiated by Morsi led eventually to overthrow of the regime in Egypt, the debate, in fact, was an open-ended one where a healthy street level public discussion on legalities of state had taken place. Taking cues from the experiences of all Arab Spring states, Sadiki (2013) liked to see the whole debate as a part of an inevitable conflict between two competing but interchangeable sets of legitimacy; democratic and revolutionary.³ The latter revolves mainly around a romantic politics in societies where the informal kind of politics was invalidated by fifty years of tyranny (Sadiki 2013). Asad substantiated this point further with his statement that the political imagination should not be

limited by the matters of legality but by a different set of criteria to evaluate what we have been witnessing in Egypt.⁴ The experiences in Egypt went beyond the procedural democratic legitimacy which often seeks formal structures, procedures and contracts that frame politics (Sadiki 2013). Rationalizing political debates in such cases always fail to understand the dynamics involved in the Arab Spring.

It is no less incorrect to say that the Muslim Brotherhood's conceptualization of civil state made a complete departure from both 'secular' and 'religious' states. This binary has been manifested in an apparent conflict between the colonially created 'modern' state and the local sense of identity that of belonging to *umma* along with the forms of political organization that stem from it such as Islamic *dawla*. The Islamic *dawla* represents a non-sovereign temporary political arrangement that is accountable to and responsible for the whole *umma*, not to a particular territory. The 'secular' state in the Egyptian context referred to a political entity created by colonial powers and supported by neo-colonial powers.

In this context, there seems to be some significance in employing the framework of post-secularism to politically analyze the character of *dawla madaneyya*. This paper is an attempt along that direction. The post-secular state does not entail the total rejection of the ongoing 'secularizing' process, but it is also not a return to the medieval theological predominance (Habermas 2006). Instead, this perspective assumes that there is the continued existence of religious ideals in a continually secularizing environment. Secular frameworks fail to explain religious determinants of the state; their normative presumption of the superiority of the 'secular' over 'religion' does not allow them to conduct an objective analysis.

Habermas (2006) defines the concept as the continued existence of religious communities and movements in a continually secularizing environment. Asad develops the thesis of post-secularism further by analyzing the failure of secularization theories in explaining religion in contemporary life.⁵ The post-secular, according to Joas (2007), does not mean a sudden increase in religiosity, after its epochal decrease with the rise of modernity, but rather a change in mindset of those who, previously, felt justified in considering the religious to be moribund. It does not reflect an increase in the meaningfulness of religion or a renewed attention to it, but focuses on a changed attitude by the "secular public domain with respect to the continued existence of religious communities and the impulses that emerge from them," notes Joas (2007). Briefly put, post-secularism offers an alternative way of approaching the role of religion in conceptualizing the state and discusses the failure of secular efforts to analyze religious practices that determines a modern state with a predominance of scientific thought and rationality at the core. It also inculcates the need of reformulating the basic presumptions of religion

and secularism in the light of emerging complexities in contemporary times. This paper addresses the need of re-evaluating the basic presumptions of religion and secularism in the light of Muslim Brotherhood's experience in establishing a 'civil state' which reflects both an increase in the meaningfulness of religion and renewed attention to it and a focus on popular 'secular' ideals.

'Modern' Arab State and Secular Hangover

The significance of Morsi's state lies in its role to problematize the binary of the category of 'religion' and its presumed opposite, 'secular.' The experiences of the creation of civil state demonstrated a new complex relationship between religious and secular that cannot really be reduced to a conflict of 'universal democratic' principles against 'sectarian commitments' nor to one of reason versus belief. In terms of outreach, composition and ideology, the body politic envisioned by the Muslim Brotherhood remained incongruent to the European concept of nation-state. Drawing upon a pre-colonial Islamic perception of politics, it also rejected the political imaginations generated by Arab nationalism as the underlying ideology.

Historically, it was believed in the modern centres of the Arab world that every society had to pass through certain historical stages and finally enter into a 'secular modern' nation-state. All social and political engineering schemes emerged with modernity in the Arab world insisted that while passing through these inescapable stages, each society had to undergo a radical restructuring of culture in tandem with the secularization of the society by purging out its retrogressive bits. The indigenous elites acquired the control of the process of secularization of culture by internalizing a native version of the civilizing mission.

The idea of secular modern-state entered most of the Arab societies through the colonial connection. Within a short span of time the concept of modern nation-state which cannot easily be isolated from the nationalist and organizational developments that took place in Europe, marginalized all other concepts of the state in the region. The European experience was internalized further with the development of modern state structure with elaborate bureaucracies, policing strategies and mechanisms of control by which post-colonial Arab states could manage their own population in the 1950s and 60s. During this period, a deep transformation of polity affecting the relation between religion and state was taking place. The evolution of a 'secular' bureaucracy was closely paralleled even in countries like Saudi Arabia, where the *wahabi* inspired nation-building in the 1930s had followed a distinctive tribal mode.⁶

Most of the states in the Arab world, however, failed to develop into viable modern nation-states though they unsuccessfully tried to emulate the path of

'progress.' As what happened in Egypt, the state was increasingly envisioned in a more idealized form-as socialist and secular. But the reality was different as most of the states did not live up to the imaginations of political elites. The opposition to the failed state came mainly from the religious groups who were sidelined during the nation-building process. In order to overcome the situation, elites in the Arab states engaged in eliminating 'problematic' opposition.

Looking at the history, one can say that the Arab states were at a time when the intellectual discourses were mostly pre-occupied either with the *umma* (global Muslim community) defined in terms of Islamic politics or *watan* (national community) defined in terms of Arab nationalism. Because of the long historical preponderance of these two concepts, Arab scholars at the initial stage did not show much of enthusiasm to endorse the concept of the body-politic based on territory, territorial sovereignty as such (Ayubi 2006: 4 & 135). With a few exceptions, the state as a concept and as an institution appeared quite alien to most of the Arab countries. As the modernization and secularization⁷ of the state did not occur at the open political domain, the role of Islamic *umma* and Arab *watan* remained operative with greater amount of social as well as religious legitimacy. The lack of social and cultural cohesion furthered the complex relations between the modern, 'secular' state and their 'religiously oriented' people. The prevalent concepts of state that Arabs tended to borrow from the West, therefore, were excessively formalistic at the initial state, though later on became instrumentalist (Ayub: 2006: 9). The newly established states in West Asia and North Africa, in fact, functioned as a colonial tool to make people of the region to fit into a frame of reference familiar and useful to the colonial masters (Al-Bargouti 2008: 3).

The Egyptian political scientist Hamid Rabi's observations are particularly significant in this context. Rabi (1980: 15-16) was a staunch critic of the basic conceptualization of modern Arab State. He did find futility in interpreting the Islamic state in the framework of European enlightenment tradition. Nation-state as it had emerged in the Arab world, according to him, was mainly an emulation of the Catholic model, seemingly with the mission of creating a direct unmediated relationship between the citizen and the state. The European model in actuality, forcing the Church to be a mute spectator and thus purging out all religious agents ended up in the hegemony of a particular religion or sect. Modern Arab states with no inspiration from the Islamic model by way of revival of the *turath* or 'cultural heritage' and guided by a distinct 'political function' (*wazifa Siyasiyya*) exemplify this mismatch (Rabi 1980: 15 -16).

Though not familiar with the vocabularies of 'voting', 'formal institutions' and 'organized opposition', the Islamic model was politically vital with an alternative

set of concepts and ideas for political equilibrium (Rabi 1980: 46-51 & 133-49). These concepts, Rabi suggested, include moderation, control between the Caliph, the *ulama* and the judges (Rabi 1980: 144-49). So, Islamic polity, in that sense, can't translate to the state in European context with well defined territories and sovereignty. It rather connotes to an organized politico-religious community or *umma*. The libertarian aspects of European enlightenment tradition, therefore, seldom overpowered the idea of justice ('*adl*') in Islamic polity.⁸ While the concepts of freedom and liberty were at the centre stage of statist discourse in the West, they carried slightly different connotative meanings in the Islamic political discourse that go transcend the limits of the state and nation.

Looking at the genealogy, one can see the state in traditional form in the Arab/ Islamic world as the outcome of two processes; a natural evolution of the Sultanic state and a reform process (Hourani 1970; Ayubi 2006: 23). Of which the latter was by and large a product of change in material aspects of society reflected mainly in administrative arrangements. The reformist tradition, though not completely, had borrowed substantially from the European experiences. This tradition did find its expression first in *tanzimat* which was introduced by the Turkish Sultan in order to consolidate his own authority internally and externally and later on carried forward by the European colonialists in order to expand their imperial market and weaken the local leadership (Ayubi 2006: 23; Laroui 1976: 129-33). Apart from extending the reach of imperial market, the modern state helped the colonialists to accommodate the then emerging social elites into their political constituency.

However, the modern state as an imported commodity came into being partly under colonial pressure and partly under the influence of imitating the West (Achour 1980: 22-23). failed to capture the popular political imagination and to transform the attitude of Arabs towards it. The Arab political imagination during that period was hinging more around other overarching concepts of cultural unity and political integration than the concept of state. Pan-Islamism with religio-political orientation and Arab Nationalism with linguistic-cultural bond were the two major ideologies that contested each other to gain the edge over the Arab public sphere⁹. The former represented a comprehensive Islamic concept of *umma* while the latter was an embodiment of secular nationalism defined in terms of a more inclusive concept, *watan*. Both had lively spread as the Arabs thought of politics in terms of a non-territorial affair. The 'foreignness' of modern state prevented it from being identified by the people emotionally (Ayub 2006: 23).

Though there were a lot of ensembles to state in Egyptian history, the history of state in the modern sense with territorial integrity based on sovereignty externally and legal institutions internally traces back to the reign of Muhammad

Ali who came to power in 1805 (Ayubi 2006: 99). He was the first to introduce the concept of citizenship and modern system of education, to build national army, compact bureaucracy and state-owned industrial networks and to create a class of political elites in Egypt (Ayubi 2006: 99). Muhammad Ali's attempt to build a 'modern state' represents a balance borrowing components from both European experiences and the pattern which was prevalent with Ottoman rule. The state system continued even after his defeat in 1840s under successive regimes, but internal contradictions and threats led to the failure of the state system and eventually to the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. What happened with the formation of modern state in the postcolonial period was the total abandonment of cultural function of the state in favour of 'purely secular' political functions. The romance of secular modern state continued to capture the imagination of political elites in the region even after the national liberation movements gained a clear hegemony in the political realm. The growth of modern nation-state system in West Asia and North Africa was directly linked to the 'secularization thesis' developed in the west keeping separation between religion and public space (Lailufar 2013). Cultural and religious specificities of each society were conveniently ignored in order to build 'modern' states. Though at ideological front, they tried to undo the ill-effects of colonialism, offering an alternative to the colonial concept of state seemed impossible for national liberation movements. This inability led to a compromise between the populist ideology of Arab nationalism and the realpolitik of colonially created Arab states with repressive apparatuses. Jamal Abdul Nasser, for instance, looked for legitimacy from both Arab nationalist doctrine and strong colonial 'secular' modern state and contained Islam in order to build a 'modern' Egypt.

Nasserite state was a combination of a modern secular colonially-inspired and Arab socialist state; both of these mutually conflicting ideas existed in one synthesis. Although the socialistic component of it was appealing to many in the third world, the 'secular' 'modern' hangover of Nasserite State made it alien to Egyptian society. Though the state machine and apparatuses of it were very much influential in the daily life of people, the state failed to create an emotional bond with the society. Despite the rhetoric of Arab nationalism, Nasser could not offer an alternative to the modern state modeled on European experiences. His perceptions, therefore, remained surprisingly vague about the issues pertaining to the nature and form of an Arab nationalist state.

Though initially attempted in creating an alternative state with Arab socialistic background, Nasser's statist experiments ended up with an autocratic one taking modern liberal state as its frame of reference. Unable to move far from the hangover of secular modern state, Nasserite state, in effect, maintained a strange balance

between the ideology of Arab nationalism and colonially created nation-state. This mismatch between the ideology of Arab nationalism and the secular modern nation state with coercive military, as happened elsewhere in the region, manifested in a brutal suppression of popular political movements. Communists and Muslim Brothers were the two major victims of such suppression.

Although the ideology of state changed from Arab Socialism to neo-liberalism, Sadat's state exemplified how neoliberalism and secularism are connected in a circuitous fashion, not just conceptually but practically through a mechanism of governance separating religion and state. It also illustrated the unique character of modern 'secular' Arab state in terms of its inherent commitment to the idea of authoritarianism. The neoliberal state, adhered to the principles of separation of religion and state and control of popular religious groups, engaged in totalitarian exercise of power. The notion of 'secularism' was seen as a bid by the Sadat regime for centralization of power and consolidation of authoritarian state.

Secular state under Mubarak also carried a negative connotation of regime's consolidation of coercive and autocratic state subordination of its policy to that of the United States in exchange for financial and military aid. Military coercion was central to Mubarak's 'secular' governance (Asad 2012: 279). On his part, Mubarak consolidated the political and economic dependence on the West re-configuring economy further, enforcing secularism and fighting Islam and traditional culture. Secularization remained to be the basic task of the government with which Mubarak sought to transform Egypt an authoritarian state with tight control. Intellectuals from both liberal and left spectrum also sided with the regime tacitly and have long supported a thorough going secularization of Egypt and crystallization of Islamist groups in the name of secularism. Most of the left and liberal critics, according to Asad, simply saw the formal separation of 'politics' from 'religion' as the solution to threat of sectarianism in the Egyptian society (2012). Mubarak found excellent justification in authoritarianism for his attempt to crush Islamist organizations. The 'secular' state functioned as a guarantor of national security especially in the backdrop of American initiated 'war on terror.'

These elements in the ideology of 'secular' state came under criticism because of its justification for state-sponsored violence in the post-Arab Spring period. The idea of state as the chief secularizing agent from Nasser's period met a rejection and religious-based 'non-modern' or 'pre-colonial' concepts of state begun to emerge in response to it. The creation of the civil state by the Brotherhood offered a bid to unpack the heterogeneous elements involved in what we mean by religion and not to focus solely on abstract theological notions. Within the strict framework of 'civil', Morsi tried to offer an opposition to pro-western neoliberal dictatorial regime. The Muslim Brotherhood, at the same time, did not hide that their goal was a state

based on *Sharia* as the frame of reference. The biggest challenge to the creation of a civil state was the remnant forces¹⁰ of 'secular' system that outlived the 25 January revolution and their supporting networks in the army, media, business, civil society and judiciary.

Digging a bit deeper, one would not surprise, why civil society movements which protested vehemently against SCAF's threat to the revolution tacitly allowed the army to sack the first popularly elected president. Even though a variety of important civil society groups emerged or survived, transformed for last six decades, the state either went to some lengths to accommodate many within its 'secular' constituency or to prevent, preempt or destroy others. The 'liberal' middle class content of civil society at times sought patronage of state in some way or the other, though they could easily break the relationship with the Mubarak state, when the revolution happened.

Muslim Brotherhood in power posited a tradition of challenge against the incommensurable divide between strong religious belief and a secular world view. The civil state they conceptualized, on its part, tried to direct others' attention to how the religious and the secular¹¹ are not so much immutable essences or opposed ideologies.

Dialogic aspects of Dawla Madaneyya

Arab spring, at least for a short while, brought a situation in which people witnessed to the unpopularity of the states in the region created by the colonial powers and supported by the neo-colonial powers. The event also contributed to de-westernize the West Asian and North African politics through the embrace of non-western (mainly Islamic) ideals of democracy. Though Turkey ignited such a move making 'civil religion' more appealing as an alternate to 'secularism', Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt made it more popular world over.

The state envisioned in Islam, *dawla* shows the character of a doctrinal or ideological ('*aqa'idiyya*) state based on a practical merger of ethical principles with pragmatic political ideals and on a non-separation of private and public (Ayubi 2006: 18). Culture remains to be an inextricable part of such a state and through *dawla* Islam presents certain cultural ideals if not a specific political model (Rabi 1980, 289-93). The Islamic state also rejects the concept of state autonomy and attempt to confine the state's function to a fixed territory and political domain. Barghouti defines it as a non-sovereign, non-territorial, temporary political arrangement that is accountable to and responsible for the whole *umma* or the whole community of Muslims, not only to a portion of it, regardless of borders and nationalities (Al-Barghouti 2008: 2).

The linguistic origins of the word state in European context and of the word *dawla* in Arab context actually imply two different things (Ayubi 2006: 15). It is the concept of *umma* or the community, especially in its religious sense, is more important in the Islamic political tradition than any concept of the state or political system (Ayubi 2006:15). The history of Islam characterizes this basic binary-of *dawla* and the *umma*. The question which of the two has responsibility for the enforcement of Islamic law has been perpetuated throughout the history. *Dawla madaneyya*, in its traditional sense, is considered to be a departure from the religious state, as opposed to the reformation of such a state in a new guise, or an understanding of the state as open, secular and flexible. But in wider senses of the term, the idea contemporarily denotes to a response to the challenges posed by both theocracy and secularism.

Dawla madaneyya, in theory, implies a contrast with military state or theocratic state not governed by clergies or generals but by technocrats who comply with a written constitution to protect the civil liberties of both Muslims and non-Muslims alike (Hassan 2012). By definition, it must be based on institutions and on consultation and the operative decision-making process should be civil in nature. Such a state rules recognizing the will of people through the categories of democratic or undemocratic, not through those of faith or of its rejection.

Dawala Madaneyya in the Egyptian context offers an alternative to the empire/caliphate and the differences are apparent in their use of *Sharia* or Islamic Law. The implementation of *Sharia* in the former context is done by the people's choice and free will. Unlike caliphate, civil state carries specific associations with democracy, constitutionalism and equality of citizens before the law. The stress here is not on the 'secular' aspects of the 'civil' but 'democratic' with strong sense of popular sovereignty.¹²

The contemporary relevance of this term, civil state, is not just associated with the political discourse induced by the Arab Spring. Though having roots to the pre-colonial debates of the state in West Asia and North Africa, it was Muslim Brotherhood which made the civil state with Islamic background popular in the 1950s (Hill 2013). Idea of 'civil state' has always attracted the wrath of other Islamic organizations mainly, *Salafis* who see 'civil state' as identical to the 'secular state' and both for them are referred to Western, opposed to Islam and therefore, illegal under Islamic legal provisions (Hill 2013). But the Brotherhood literature inculcates that the civil state is fully compatible with Islam and Sharia. It is western-modeled secularism that, in fact, is something antithetical to Islamic jurisprudence hence not suitable for the Islamic world.

The 'secular' criticism of *dawla madaneyya* with Islamic reference revolves most importantly around the issue of *sharia* as the source of law and its inherent

inability to sanction practices like the decentralization of power, plurality, and freedom of expression and public liberties (Hassan 2012). The moderate Sunni objection to the concept of *dawla madaneyya* was its alleged attempt to make the idea of rulership a religious mandate. Sunni factions see 'civil state' with Islamic background as a revival of the old shibboleths of the Brotherhood, *Hukumat e-Ilahi*¹³ considering the rulership as an organic part of religion. By insisting that rulership is fundamentally part of religion, the political process becomes an end in itself for the Brotherhood rather than a means to democratize Egyptian politics.

By re-interpreting the concept of 'civil', Muslim Brotherhood articulates that *madani* or civil in the Arab Islamic context is something that is not opposed to the role of religion in public life. In that sense 'civil' can not necessarily be often employed as a kind of euphemism for *almani* or 'secular.' The latter in the specific historical and political milieu of West Asia and North Africa shows a tendency to take on a more military anti-religious meaning, whereas, the concept of 'civil' does not dissociate completely from religion and indicates a more neutral and acceptable area of secular (Hill 2013). As articulated by the Muslim Brotherhood, there is an apparent difference in meaning between 'secular' and 'civil' here as *dawla madaneyya* is defined not in terms of its non-religious attributes but as something that stands sharply against the tyrannical rules of any sort.¹⁴ Simultaneous to maintain aspirations for a non-military state, the term 'civil state' envisages an absence of complete hegemony of a single religion in the political affairs. With the use of 'civil' in opposition to military, what the leaders of Muslim Brothers had in mind was to create a united front of both 'religious' and 'secular' forces against the tradition of 'secular' state with repressive apparatuses. The second related connotation of the 'civil state' according to Morsi was that of a 'democratic' or 'constitutional' state. While defining his vision of state, Morsi articulated that the state would be "the Egyptian national, democratic, constitutional, legal and modern state."¹⁵ Such a state, he went on to say that "is ruled by the people through an elected parliament that represents the popular will."¹⁶ In that sense, the state should be discussed in terms of its open and flexible structure that could ensure the political independence, plural religious identity and cultural specificities of the Arab world (Ramadan 2012).

The 'civil' in this sense does not insist on the separation of religion from the political sphere, but on accommodation of a multi-religious base for the polity. As Tariq Ramadan argued, the term has been adopted by the Islamist groups in the context of Arab Spring in part to distance from 'secularism' on the one hand and from Iranian-style 'theocracy' and their old call for a pure 'Islamic state' on the other (Ramadan 2012). President Morsi himself has expressed that the 'civil state' dissociates equally from 'secular' and 'theocratic-religious' government in principle

and practice.¹⁷ Brotherhood maintains the view that a civil state functions as an alternative to secularism and the hegemonic rule of one religion, both of which they argue, are the products of western political culture (Hassan 2012). The civil state with Islamic references, in Tariq Ramadan's words comprised threefold response-religious, cultural and political and cultural – to the imposition of western models (Ramadan 2012).

What Brotherhood conceptualized was a civil state based on Islamic references, with three completely independent authorities: the parliament, judiciary and the government.¹⁸ People regardless of religion and class are the paramount source of the power in such a state based not on theocratic concept. Islam, according to Morsi, confirms the independence of these authorities.¹⁹ Although, the Islamic framework to a great extent controls the government and behavior of the state, the notion of Islam cannot be imposed on the people from the top. To quote Morsi: Islam has to be initiated, created and agreed up on by the people.²⁰ Calling it a civil, democratic state guaranteeing equality and justice, Brotherhood stressed that Egypt is not following an Iranian model and has no intention of implementing, or attempting to implement, a theocratic state modeled on Iran.²¹

The re-conceptualization of the state and democracy in the new context had also echoed in the statements of many scholars who are subscribed to the ideology of *ikhwan* all over the world. Yusuf Al-Qardawi, a prominent Islamist ideologue associated closely with the movement, made it clear that it is incorrect and unjust to say that Brotherhood in Egypt is establishing a theocratic state. "The call of Brotherhood is for an Islamic civil state that by no means will end up in theocratic rule."²² The same had resonated in the words of the leader of *Ennahada* in Tunisia, Rachid Ghannouchi interpreting religious texts in a way that is compatible with the idea of secularism and civil state. He objected the notion that Islamic principles and civil state are poles apart. Ghannouchi's only objection is to secularism as a philosophy of state. There is nothing essentially wrong with secularism as a 'procedural measure' that helps a nation with cross-cultural base to build a consensus.²³

The concept *dawla madaneyya* in the Egyptian context involved a convergence of Islamism and secularism around the term civil. The secular/Islamic binary has already become meaningless with a complex set of reactions to the suppression and tyranny by the secularists. As discussed elsewhere in this paper, the term 'secular' in the Arab context was either quite synonymous with tyrannical rule or did not offer any alternative to the tyranny. In contrary to the general situation, it was actually the religious movements with its victimhood under the 'secular' rules of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, had contained space for resistance to the 'secular' politics. The ill-effects of globalization in the pre-Spring period had contributed

further to the blurring of religious-left divide. There was a near-total absence of the state in mediating the conflict between ordinary people in the society without purchasing power and the market which made the regimes mute spectator in the neoliberal context. It was again the Islamic organizations which had been very instrumental in the struggle against both tyrannical state and the imposition of American imperialism through neoliberal politics in the Arab states.

In short, *Dawla Madaneyya* in its conceptualization recognized the public relevance of religion and religious ideas in conceiving statist discourse. But their recognition moved beyond the visibility of religion with affirming its symbolic values manifest in public rituals and rhetoric, made increased cultural influences of religion on government. It also represented a democracy that moved away from its general conceptualization as a technique of government. The dialogic aspect of it should be taken as an evidence of using democracy by the Islamists Egypt as a means of constituting the body politic. The Islamic model in this context boasted a political vitality that inspired contemporary politics and offered an alternative way of approaching the role of religion in conceptualizing the state. The entire debate led to exposing the failure of secular efforts to analyze religious practices that determines a modern state with a predominance of scientific thought and rationality.

Conclusion

The creation of civil state in Egypt and Tunisia, in a sense, marked a transition of Islamist politics from the principles of revealed religion to the experiences and patterns of living traditions. This slice in history also proved that Islam and civil are not opposite to each other, but maintain shared concerns against tyrannical rule. But from the line of traditional secularist thinking, the establishment of 'civil state' by Muslim Brotherhood was conceived as yet another cycle of events leading to the expansion of Islamist forces. Many left intellectuals from inside and outside the Arab world, focused on explaining what they saw as something anomalous to the 'democratic' rule. This perspective was based on a misconception being held by the liberals and leftists alike that the genuine democratic sense in the Arab world is limited to a narrow set of secular elites. Secular paradigm in its conventional form seemed to be not sufficient enough to make sense of the situation which needs to be understood within a multilayer of contexts. The experiences of Egypt realigned the debate away from the traditional binaries of religious versus secular. The new binaries emerged in its place were democratic versus anti-democratic and freedom versus tyranny.

Notes

- 1 See the interview with Talal Asad by Nathan Schneider, *The Suspicious Revolution: An Interview with Talal Asad, Immanent Frame*, <http://blogs.ssrc.org>, accessed on 3 March 2011.
- 2 Democracy's use in the former sense in the contemporary political discourses, according to Agamben, seldom overpowers its apocryphal meaning as an 'administrative' practice with politico-managerial attributes. See Agamben (2011: 1).
- 3 See Asad (2011) the conversation by Talal Asad and Ayca Cubukcu, "Neither Heroes, Nor Villains: A Conversation with Talal Asad on Egypt after Morsi", [www. Jadaliyya.com](http://www.jadaliyya.com) accessed on 23 July 2013.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 As McLachlan (1986: 92-95) points out: two developments in Saudi Arabia worked towards the agenda of reducing the influence of religious and tribal institutions in the administration. The process of centralization of power and the introduction of modern institutions deliberately attempted to enhance the positions of ruling dynasty at the direct expense of *Ikhwan*.
- 6 Secularization in the Arab world's context means nothing but the partial displacement of tribal or religious-based perception of how the state should be organized by the bureaucratic and economic perceptions.
- 7 Except few, the Arab Scholars were not much inclined towards the idea of freedom, which was a cornerstone of modern European politics. Khair al-Din of Tunisia and Tahtawi of Egypt preferred justice to freedom. Ahmad Lufi al-Sayyid held a belief in the emancipator potential of the State to bring freedom, was an exception. For further details of this debate, see Hourani (1970).
- 8 While Afghani and Abdu advocated for Islamic unity, the proponents of Arab nationalism stood for the unity of Arabs on the basis of language and culture. Anyway, both undervalued the importance of secular state with clearly defined borders and populations as artificial political construct. See Ayubi (2006: 21).
- 9 The opposition, according to Asad, consisted of a diverse spectrum of elites; the rich businessmen who established themselves during Mubarak's neo-liberal regime; high court judges that maintained close links with the army; ambitious politicians and ex-politicians; left and liberals; army officers and journalists. The left politicians disliked Brotherhood for its ideology as well as its country-wide grassroots organizational set up. See Asad (2013).
- 10 Secular in this context is understood not simply as the doctrine of separation of church from state, but the re-articulation of religion in a manner that is commensurate with modern sensibilities and modes of governance. See Mahmood (2013) for the further details.
- 11 www.ikhwanweb.com/print.php?id=28368.
- 12 Al-hakimiyya refers to the idea that sovereignty and governance are the prerogative of God alone. Though it had a set of other contextual meanings given by the Islamic scholars like Maulana Mawdudi and Sayed Qutub, Hukumat e-Ilahi is seen by many as the inverse of the concept of sovereignty within the modern nation-state and will of the people. Almost a similar sort of idea, *wilayet al-fqaih* or guardianship of the Jurist was held by Ayathollah Khomeini and was used to justify clerical rule in Iran.
- 13 www.ikhwanweb.com/print.php?id=28368.

- 14 See Interview with Mohamed Morsi; "What to Expect from the Muslim Brotherhood", www.policymic.com/articles/380/exclusive-Interview-with-mohamed-morsi-what-to-expect-from-the-muslim-brotherhood. Morsi, September, 2012.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 See Interview with Mohamed Morsi.
- 17 See Interview with Mohamed Morsi.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 El-Arain: MB wants a civil state; Egypt will not become another Iran, www.ikhwanweb.com/print.php?id=28368.
- 21 Yusuf Al-Qardawi as quoted in Hassan (2012).
- 22 Ibid.

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The Vices of the Tongue

Jennifer Macklem

If one wished to recall how often this foolish and rash tongue failed, offended, erred, or stumbled, would it not be comparable to counting the number of birds flying across the sky? (Jeremias Drexel)

There are so many ways that we can harm others through speech. And yet we have come to accept slander, gossip, exaggeration, and blatant falsehoods as part of the political and social landscape. This text, written over four hundred years ago, shows that not much has changed. Humans can be damaging and destructive when it comes to how we talk to each other. *The Vices of the Tongue* aligns closely with issues that we face today in public and private discourse. Partisan bickering, gossip-as-news, the spinning of stories and the manipulative barrage of advertising were all addressed here, almost four hundred years ago.

Political science and international relations are broad fields that relate to almost everything. It is a challenge to make connections between my very particular, specific artistic project and wider global issues. The notion of power, its uses and abuses, is one of the threads that links my ideas together within this presentation. Drawing from a history of feminist institutional critique, the adage “The personal is political” informs my view of the importance of micro-politics. Within the magnified and intimate



scale of micro-politics, the dynamic tensions of every day encounters between individuals and groups may be mirrored or even caused, on a larger scale, by the tensions between corporate groups, collectivities and between nation states.

This paper explores my adaptation through visual art of a small, illustrated book: *The Vices of the Tongue*. As such, this document is as much a visual presentation as it is a textual one. The original book was created in 1631 and its primary interest here is its relevance to current social and political issues. The book's profane wit and barbed critique of human behavior is surprisingly pertinent today.

The Vices of the Tongue was written by a Jesuit monk, Jeremias Drexel, in what is now Germany and illustrated by the 'Sadeler' family of engravers. This 'emblem' book illustrates verbal misdeeds such as Defamation, Deceit, Excuses, Hypocrisy and so on, arranged alphabetically in Latin. Emblem books are a type of mainly didactic illustrated books printed in Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries, containing detailed images with explanatory texts. Drexel's book is a prime example. This compilation of late renaissance literature and imagery is an example of the Jesuits influence on the popular morality of the times.

My artworks study this specific Emblem book; they reflect on and appropriate both its text and images. The origins of this genre of book are of historic and literary interest, raising complex issues relating to the contested presence of Jesuits in late renaissance Europe; the sources of Drexel's imagery and ideas, (inherited in large part from early Roman mythology); the proliferation of printing presses and their distribution networks that became immersed and influential within the social dynamics of an increasingly literate world.

Underlying this project are several potential lines of inquiry: the problematic issue of prescriptive secular books produced by Jesuits; the seventeenth century combination of image and text foreshadowing our present-day surge of imagery imbedded into textual fields (as in the world-wide web); this once 'populist' book gradually becoming arcane and inaccessible, then resurfacing in a new translation, revealing a prescient social critique. These interconnected issues add complexity to the primary focus of my creative research that is almost singularly inspired by the contemporary relevance of the text and the creation of new imagery.

My methodology for this project, the ways that the art images and theories evolve on a practical level, is a reworking and combination of disparate concepts that I strive to unite and make coherent, with an awareness of the precariousness and fallibility of the very notion of coherent unity, which in turn gives rise to an appreciation of that which is incomplete or where a resolution is out of reach. Artistically, I am interested in notions of translation and adaptation, how complex human mental states can be conveyed through body language, visual imagery and

metaphor. These mental states, at times partially revealed through bodily gestures including the articulation of speech, have historic precedents.

As a creative practice, I am indebted to the contemporary form of music, called “remixing” where classics or lesser-known tunes are shredded, sampled and electronically remixed into new combinations. Using my own painted art images and composing them with selections lifted from historic sources, I alter, morph and distort these sources through digital editing techniques. My methodology can be qualified as a postmodern process that mixes together a variety of styles and temporal sources. Lifting elements of the older printed engravings, I re-contextualize their manipulated fragments into colourful environments reflective of current day sensibilities and concerns.

My artistic project is attentive to the corrosive effects of corporate and bureaucratic speech in today’s global, partisan and highly mediated culture. With *The Vices of the Tongue*, I elect to remain true to the original text and its metaphors. My task is to select the most poignant phrases, or the *punctum* of the emblem – and to condense image and text into a direct message that speaks to a contemporary readership. This is balanced by respect for the original imagery in how I pay homage to its visual style, its sense of having surfaced from a bygone era, complete with strange images still potent for perhaps unknowable reasons. By marshaling the traditional literary impact of metaphor, I respect the source material, where the telling of morality tales unfolds through the antics of a large cast of characters, some human, some animal. Drexel’s *Vices of the Tongue* is akin to folktales or fairytales, where the graphic imagery of specific scenarios is used to convey particular coded meanings. In Emblem books, the visual codes are explained in the text, and thus both image and text are mutually dependent.

The moral prescriptions range from the symbolically allusive to the precise, with their purpose being the examination and curtailing of all the possible vices of oral language. An ancillary effect of my project is in the tracing of historic affiliations that resurface in our current era. Are there similarities between the “whistle-blowing” of today, or with the destructive ramifications of gossip or verbal bullying, and how were these social weapons expressed or repressed 400 years ago? Are the warnings against such verbal transgressions, as articulated by Drexel, still valid or useful? Can, for example, the deep controversies around Wikileaks and the role of Julian Assange be revisited through an updated presentation of *The Vices of the Tongue*?

Today the vices of language circulate ever more freely via social media platforms and the web. In the fourth vice listed - Defamation (or in its Latin form: *Detractio*) – Drexel uses poetic and figurative language to describe the deep wounding that occurs as a result of the defamation of character.



The Disparaging (*detrahens*) tongue wounds in three ways. It injures by ruining reputations; it harms those who listen most attentively; and, finally, it wounds the detractor himself.

Subdividing the topic into three categories, he firstly recounts how the disparaging tongue or voice is deeply hurtful by ruining reputations; secondly, it harms those who listen most attentively, and ultimately it injures the speakers themselves. In his description of the surroundings that are also damaged through Defamation – suggesting that such damage and wounding is also environmental and is not limited to individuals - Drexel echoes this tri-part structure by evoking the divine or heavenly realm, the physical and the social. The notion of ‘extinguishing celestial grace’ as a result of engaging in Defamation, may, in contemporary popular or more secular terms, suggest something like bad karma, bad luck or negative energy. Drexel’s further explanations address how the damage from defamation is inflicted on the physical plane that we share “in common with all other animals” in addition to the social spheres. While difficult to measure, I agree with Drexel’s

assertion that societies may suffer damage as a result of witnessing or being party to the Defamation of another.

Fallax (Latin) or Deceit is the sixth of Drexel's vices. We read in *The Vices of the Tongue* about commerce, and how the merchant resorts to deception in order to increase his profits. The merchant does not intend to harm others, but in the name of profitability harm is the result. This simplistic analysis can be applied to a myriad of contemporary tensions including the Occupy Wall street movement and even large pharmaceutical companies, when their profit motivessupercede humanitarian interests. Occupy Wall Street activists, although less than coherent in their specific demands, were protesting the abuses of capitalism. When (and if) drug companies, in alliance with governments in less regulated and poorer countries such as India, forcibly dispense vaccines that are banned in the west, the damage of deceit on a collective scale is invoked. Deceit, according to Drexel, is like embracing a friend while stabbing him in his ribs.



These types are embracers of the world; these kisses of love are sword-canes of false friendship: trust who will.

The Vices of the Tongue can assist us in questioning and plumbing the kinds of hurts inflicted within contemporary culture and politics, while also subtly leavening their apprehension. This arcane and pre-classical text provokes a rereading of current social misdeeds or miscarriages of justice in light of their seeming ubiquity across eras and cultures. The light-hearted, sly and humorous tone of *The Vices of the Tongue* offers a useful tonic to the relentless barrage of distressing media information that continually flows into our lives, without desensitizing us to its importance. *The Vices of the Tongue* obliquely hints at strategies for the curtailment of some of these human vices.

One of the most striking characteristics of social reality is the phenomenon of power. “The exercise of power, the submission of some to the will of others, is inevitable in modern society; nothing whatever is accomplished without it... Power can be socially malign; it is also socially essential” (Galbraith). As we have all experienced, power is oftentimes exercised through the medium of speech. “The essential role of power in social organization is linked to inevitable conflicts of interest. Because of our ability to affirm preferences and make choices accordingly, conflicts of interest will appear in any human community, and power is the means by which these conflicts are resolved.” (Capra)

John Kenneth Galbraith distinguishes three kinds of power:

- 1) Coercive power – wins submission through force and fear
- 2) Compensatory power – wins compliance through offering incentives or rewards
- 3) Conditioned power – changing beliefs through education or persuasion

Harmful forms of language are linked to manifestations of the abuse of power. *The Vices of the Tongue* are an expression of the self-appointed role of the Catholic church in managing and restraining the baser of human impulses. In seventeenth century Germany, the church was embroiled in efforts to suppress the reformation movement. In order to preserve and extend their political control, representatives of the Catholic Church used and abused the three categories of power listed above. Some of the edicts within the *Vices of the Tongue* were no doubt directed towards the political powers that were prevalent at the time, given the Jesuit’s important and complicated relationship to the Church hierarchy.

As humans are biologically endowed with the capacity for speech and expression, speech is a specifically human power. When it used in destructive or harmful ways, the power of speech is abused. Our relationship to power - our own power and the power of others, must be carefully monitored. As another artist – Jenny Holzer - succinctly stated “The abuse of power comes as no surprise.”

Drexel calls the bombastic, domineering tongue ‘Blasphemy’, employing graphic imagery to describe the ceaseless buzzing of large bees as an onomatopoeiac metaphor for aggressive verbal dominance that silences all dissent.



The bacchanalian tongue holds no secrets; it spouts everything both speakable and unspeakable.

In 2003, George W. Bush told the nation in his weekly radio address: “The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons, is rebuilding the facilities to make more and, according to the British government, could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes after the order is given. . . . This regime is seeking a nuclear bomb, and with fissile material could build one within a year.” As a modern form of blasphemy, this quote from recent history is an example of how overbearing, bombastic buzzing is still present in contemporary politics.

In conclusion, *The Vices of the Tongue* is a handbook of personal and collective morality that is still relevant today. Via cautionary tales and mythical anecdotes it addresses interpersonal and micro-politics, providing ethical guidelines to identify and avoid the abuse of the power of speech.

(Annual lecture by Professor Jennifer Macklem at the School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala, India in February 2014)

Note

James Latham, a Jesuit priest - who was the author's undergraduate Philosophy professor at the American College in Paris - composed the first (as yet unpublished) English translation of the book in 2008, almost 400 years after it was a 'best seller' in Germany.

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Status of Women in Islam: An Analysis of Ayatollah Mutahhari's Views

Musthafa Farook P.

Mutahhari's treatment of women's issues should be evaluated in the light of the entry of western ideas and practices in Iran. The intrusion of western values on the traditional Shi'i society and the possible threat to the very existence of Islam in its original form led the Muslim *ulama* to defend the classical doctrines and practices against the innovations. The Family Protection Law passed by the Iranian government in 1967 was the occasion on which Mutahhari contemplated on women's issues and elaborated his philosophy. While the modernists criticized the law for its traditionalist contents, the orthodox *ulama* opposed it on the ground of its deviation from the true Islamic doctrines. Even while sticking on to orthodox principles, Mutahhari was not indifferent to modern arguments that were logically consistent. His views on equality of women's rights with those of men, and views on polygamy are the examples for the modernism in his thoughts. Though he is a Shi'i scholar, the texts and sources he depends for his analysis are the classical Islamic scriptures, and hence his conclusions are acceptable to both Sunni and Shi'i sects.

Gender Equality

It is generally believed that Islam is a male dominated religion and it treats women as inferior to men. All the laws of Islam are considered favourable to men and discriminatory to women. But Mutahhari strongly challenges these arguments and asserts that Islam believes in the equality of men and women. But the term equality should not be taken in the literal sense as 'identicalness' or 'exact similarity'. Islam does not believe in one kind of right, one kind of duty, and one kind of punishment for both men and women in every instance. It considers one set of rights, duties and punishments more appropriate for men, and one set as suitable for women (Mutahhari 1981:113). Islam's attitude to rights and responsibilities differs according to the nature of the creation of men and women. It means that if men

and women are to be happy and they desire the well-being of a society, they must follow their distinct natural ways. According to Mutahhari, the felicity of human society can be achieved only if each gender remains within its distinct realm. Freedom and equality are useful provided that men and women do not transcend their/ their realms. According to him, if the term is understood in its right spirit, the arguments against Islam become meaningless. Mutahhari explains that in Islam equality means parity and equity, which is different from being identicalness (Mutahhari 1981:115-16). Equality cannot be perceived as identicalness. Man and woman are similar in many respects, but they are different at the same time. Islam has prescribed common rights, obligations and punishments and also different ones. The difference in the functions and duties between men and women are due to the innate and natural differences between the two genders, not because of any discrimination or favouritism. He believes that existence of differences among individuals is as natural as differences in the characteristics of geometrical shapes. He points out that we cannot say that triangles have been oppressed because the sum of their angles is one-half of that of rectangles (*Adl-e Ilahi* quoted in Behdad 1994:783). Each has a different shape, character and value according to their inherent features. He illustrates the difference between equality and identicalness:

it is possible that a father has different kinds of wealth: he may own a commercial firm, some agricultural land and also some real estate; but, due to his having examined his sons and found different talents among them, for example, he may have found that one of them had a gift for commercial affairs, and that the second had ability in agriculture, and the third had the capability to manage real estate. When he comes to distribute his wealth amongst his sons in his life-time, bearing in mind that he must give equally to his sons in terms of the value of the property and that there should be no preference nor discrimination, he bequeaths his wealth according to the talents which he has found in them (Mutahhari 1981:116).

Here the father's act is not of discrimination, but of discretion based on the talents and aptitudes of his sons. In Mutahhari's view, this is the equality Islam propounds. Since Islamic society is the natural society, it is based on equality and fraternity. Mutahhari acknowledges that Islam is against equality if it means exact similarity. But if it is viewed as giving suitable rights and responsibilities to man and woman according to their natural differences, Islam recognizes equality among them (Mutahhari 1981:115-17). If there are differences, there are many, they are part of the creation, not because of partiality to men or discrimination against women. These differences are laid down with a purpose, just like the purpose that is found in the differentiation of functions of the different organs within a single body. He elaborates on the matter, "[I]f the law of creation has designed every organ, the eyes, the ears, the legs, the hands and the spine in a particular form,

it is not because it has given a preference to the two eyes, for example, and has unduly discriminated in their favour, showing cruelty to one part as compared with another” (Mutahhari 1981:168).

Mutahhari compares Islamic view of women and her social position with those of traditional societies and of the western world. According to him, unlike the traditional cultures and the western civilization, Islam has provided human status to women (Mutahhari 1981:113-17). The Quran has asserted that man and woman are created from a single entity, and from them emerged a multitude of human beings (*Quran* 4:1). There is no reference in the *Quran* of what is found in some religious books: that woman was created out of an inferior stock to that of man or she was created from one of the left-side part of Adam’s body (Mutahhari 1981a:119). In the Islamic view, man and woman are created for the other. He quotes the Quranic verse 2:187, which proclaims that, “They [women] are your garments/ And ye [men] are their garments” (2:187). The Quran makes a special mention of the fact that woman is a blessing for man and is a source of solace and comfort for his heart (Mutahhari 1981:123).

However, the differences between man and woman in no way indicate that either of them is superior or inferior to the other. As Amina Wadud has pointed out, by deducting from the *Quran*, Allah does not distinguish on the basis of wealth, nationality or sex, but on the basis of *taqwa* -piety (Wadud 1999:36-37). According to Mutahhari, it is the western world, not the east and Islam, that has considered women inferior to men and an imperfect being. Now they reversed their belief and elevated woman to perfection by relegating man to the background (Mutahhari1981:168-9). But Islam, on the other hand, considers both man and woman as perfect creatures of God with certain natural differences. These differences are a matter of symmetry and not one of perfection or imperfection. It is the intention of the law of creation that these differences should be the source of a better relationship among them, who are created to live together. He explains the philosophy of the differences in creation as:

[T]hese differences are the source of mutual attraction, and are designed so that the male and the female should feel love for each other. If woman had [had] the body, spirit, manners and behaviour of a man, it would have been impossible for her to attract man towards herself, and make him eager to become united with her. Likewise, if man had all the physical and mental attributes of a woman, it would have been impossible for woman to regard him as the hero of her life, and consider that her highest art is to hunt and conquer his heart (Mutahhari 1981:178).

The two sexes are created to live together, which is necessary for the existence of the subsequent generations. For living together, a strong and deeper bond

of unity is required. For this unity and resultant intimacy, a deep and intense attraction is essential. It is on the basis of this attraction that the foundation of human society and the structure for the maintaining and training of the coming generations are laid down (Mutahhari 1981:182). For developing this attraction, God has bestowed certain differences between man and woman, and hence they are a purposeful design for the existence of humanity.

Islam has not considered there to be identicalness or exact similarity of rights among men and women, but it has never believed in preference and discrimination in favour of men as opposed to women. But in his view, equality does not mean granting the same amount to all people regardless of their deserts. If so it is unjust and cruel (Mutahhari 1985a:29). Nevertheless, the Islamic equality is positive equality, not negative. He says that:

[I]slamic society is the society of equality and fraternity, not of negative equality, but rather of positive equality. Negative equality means to take no account of natural distinctions among individuals and to deny their acquired distinctions in order to establish equality. Positive equality means creation of equal opportunities for all, possession by each of his acquisitions, and denial of imaginary and unjust distinctions (Mutahhari 1985b: 95).

Ali Shariati also agrees with him in his treatment of 'equal status' issue. He says that:

[I]slam does not advocate discrimination nor does it believe in equality of men and women. What it is endeavouring to achieve is to consign the two sexes to their natural status in society.... Nature does not consider women inferior or equal with men. Nature regards the two as complementary aggregates of one single mould in life and society (Shariati n.d:10-11).

Mutahhari compares Islam's attitude to 'equality of women' with the human rights activism of the west. In the west, the society began to accept the 'equal' rights and status of women with men only in the twentieth century. Even this was not because of their concern for the deplorable condition of women, but due to the compulsions of an industrialized society.¹ However, according to him, considering the natural build and physical and spiritual needs of women, the European woman never acquired rights equal to that of man. In his opinion, if women wish to have rights and happiness equal to those of men the only way is to forget about similar set of rights with man and have faith in rights suitable for her nature. In his view, these dissimilarities in rights are in accord with justice and with natural rights (Mutahhari 1981:125-126).

Polygamy

The institution of polygamy has been viewed as the example of the mistreatment of woman by Islam. Many criticize this institution on the ground that it is against parity of women with men, and is the denial of human rights to women. But according to Mutahhari the principle that men have the provision to accept more than one wife whereas the women can have only one husband at a time, is not because Islam stands for male domination over female, but of the differences in the nature of their creation. According to him, in marriages material (sexual acts) and spiritual (kind and sincere sentiments) aspects hold sway. For a man material aspect is more important, while woman prefers spiritual aspects (Mutahhari 1981:335-36). These differences in nature determine the nature of the institution of polygamy.

Mutahhari considers marriage as the fundamental right of human beings and treats polygamy as a means to fulfill it. Generally, traditional scholars attribute certain causes for polygamy which are all centred around the sexual and economic needs of men. The causes explaining polygamy from the viewpoint of men ignore the sentiments and feelings of women. But Mutahhari dismisses all these causes and sees that the excess of women when compared to men is the real ground for the justification of polygamy. He writes that “[I]f we suppose that in the past, or at present, the number of women is in excess of the number of men fit to be married, and that monogamy is the only lawful form of marriage, a group of women will be left without husbands and would remain deprived of any kind of family life” (Mutahhari 1981a:349). Thus, in his view, for a healthy society and a balanced life in the world each man and woman should be given the facilities for a ‘family life’, because it is the basic feature of creation of human beings. According to him, every individual, man or woman, has the right for a family life and should have their share of comfort in having a wife or a husband and children just as they have the right to work, to have a dwelling, to profit from education and to have security and freedom (Mutahhari 1981a:359-60). On the basis of these arguments - the comparative excess of the number of women over the number of men and the right to marriage as a natural right, he draws the conclusion that if monogamy is the only legal form of marriage, a large group of women will be deprived of their natural human right, and it is only by the provision of the law of polygamy that this natural right can be realized.

At the same time, on polyandry, he argues that a woman having several husbands, is unethical and against natural tendencies. The important problem in this system is the difficulty in identifying the parentage of the children. As establishment of a secure shelter for the next generation and attachment between the previous and future generations is the instinctive demand of the human nature,

connection between a father and his children is a necessary element. Hence, polyandry is against the nature of human beings (Mutahhari 1981:323-24).

According to Mutahhari, the institution of polygamy was not an innovation of Islam; rather it existed centuries before the advent of Islam. Islam neither abolished nor encouraged the institution, but put certain restrictions on it. In a society, where the men could keep countless wives, Islam put a maximum limit on this number and an individual was allowed not to have more than four wives (Mutahhari 1981a:390). Even that permission was to solve the particular social problems of Arabia. The widows and orphans created by the continuous warfare and tribal feuds made the protection of women a social issue. Mutahhari underlines this point by illustrating the example of the Prophet who married widows of advanced age, who had children by their deceased husbands (Mutahhari 1981:393). Shariati who points out to this social factor says that “polygamy provided a legal and ethical means of protection and survival for widows and orphans” (Ferdows 1983:284). On another occasion he writes that, “[W]hat Islam ordains is a “limitation of the number of wives”. It does not recommend, “one must marry four”, but rather, “one must not marry more than four”(Shariati n.d:59).

Mutahhari maintains that Islam stipulated certain conditions for polygamy. The just treatment of the wives is the first and foremost condition. There must never be, for any reason, discrimination among the wives or their children (Mutahhari 1981a:390). He emphasizes the last part of the Quranic verse 4:3 which reads as “if ye fear that ye shall not / Be able to deal justly (with them), / Then only one [wife].”² Favouritism in any form and in any manner among the wives is not permissible (Mutahhari 1981:392). Moreover, “observing justice and abstaining from discrimination”, he says, “should be regarded as one of the most difficult tasks for a husband” (Mutahhari 1981:393). Even while insisting that just treatment of the wives is the essential element for accepting more than one wife, he personally believes that it is a very difficult task in practical life. In his words, “those individuals who can observe full justice with a number of wives are very few”(Mutahhari 1981a:395). Adequate financial resources to maintain the wives and physical capability and stamina to fulfill their several desires are the other conditions for polygamy (Mutahhari 1981:396-7). Unless one can fulfil these conditions, he should not marry more than one woman.

Even while defending polygamy as a social necessity to maintain the balance of human life, Mutahhari reckons monogamy better than the former. He seems to consider monogamy as the ideal type of marriage. He states that “[M]onogamy which means an undisturbed, secure family life, in other words, that the body and soul of each, the husband and the wife, are one for each other. It is evident that

the spirit of matrimonial life which is oneness and unity is attained better and with more perfection with a single spouse”(Mutahhari 1981:370). He believes that matrimonial happiness and prosperity lies in sincerity, oneness and unity, but all these things are exposed to danger in polygamy. Comparing monogamy with polygamy he explains that, “[B]esides the unusual condition of the wives, and the children with two different mothers, as also the man himself, there are such burdensome and bewildering responsibilities that to meet them is to do away with all pleasure and ease of life”(Mutahhari 1981:377). However, on some occasions the better has to be replaced by other options according to the needs of the circumstances. Even by admitting the shortcomings and drawbacks of polygamy, Mutahhari points out to the circumstances and situations that necessitate it. In short, though Mutahhari defends the institution as any traditional Islamic scholar does, he personally considers the practical difficulty of having multiple wives and believes that monogamy is the ideal base for family life. Since the purpose of family life is the unity, oneness and peace of mind for the spouses, only monogamy can serve this goal.

Conclusion

Regarding the status and rights of women in Islam, Mutahhari has a logical stand compared to other traditional scholars. Though he is not free from the orthodox notions on limiting their freedom, his views seem to be comparatively positive. According to him, Islam gave human status to women. He defines Islamic equality of women as giving them rights and duties commensurate with their natural abilities. There are differences between the two sexes, not due to any partiality or discrimination, but as sources of attraction, which is necessary for the well-being of the posterity. About the usual criticisms against Islam regarding polygamy he defends the orthodox view, he however approaches it in a novel way. Polygamy is justified provided that there is excess of women fit to be married in the society. Thus it is not meant for fulfilment of sensual pleasures. And he considers monogamy as the ideal system. His views on women’s status in society is conservative in many aspects but moderate when compared to those of many other traditional scholars.

Notes

- 1 According to Mutahhari, the western society talked of women’s freedom in eighteenth century as part of the profit motive of the commercial capitalists. While searching for the measures to minimize the cost of production, they identified women as the cheap labour force. The wages of the female labourers were cheap when compared to those of men. In order to avail these services in the factories, the women had to be brought out of these homes to the public arena of life. Here, the factory owners idealized the equality, rights, economic independence and freedom of women to achieve the latter’s entry

into the public life. That is why Mutahhari comments that the western woman should thank the machines for her so-called freedom(Mutahhari 1981a: xxix-xxx).

- 2 The Quranic verse 4:3 is the only reference of Quran which permits polygamy. It allows man to have up to four wives on the condition that he should treat them equitably and justly. But Islamic feminists like Amina Wadud believes that this verse is not for permitting polygamy, but to instruct about the treatment of orphans (Wadud 1999:83).

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Revisiting the Camp David-I Peace Process: A Prelude to Conflict Resolution in the Fertile Levant

Samuel J. Kuruvilla

The process that culminated in the 1978 Camp David Accords had their origins in the Yom Kippur (Ramadan) War of 1973. This war which resulted in the Arab states of Egypt and Syria attacking Israel to avenge their 1967 defeat changed the negotiating strategies of almost all the major players in the Middle East, except perhaps the Soviet Union. Israel won this war but only after almost succumbing to a Syrian invasion and ultimately losing a lot of strategic Suez Canal territory to the Egyptians. It was left to the Nixon administration and in particular to his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger to broker a ceasefire between the two warring groups. The US was ultimately able to use the dominance that it had established during the war to broker three agreements among the combatants—two between Israel and Egypt and the third between Israel and Syria. These agreements established dividing lines between the military forces of both sides and strict limitations on their frontline deployments to reduce the danger of surprise attack (Kissinger 2001: 68). In fact, the Sinai II Accord between Israel and Egypt in 1975 was an important step on the path that culminated in the Camp David Peace Treaty of March 1979. This second Sinai agreement contained political elements that dealt with a durable peace between the two parties. However the commitment to non-recognition was still so great that the entire negotiations process had to be conducted entirely through an American mediator (Henry Kissinger). The two sides never met except at the military level at the very end of the negotiation to sign the documents. The Sinai-II agreement had political leaders' signatures which were added to the document separately in each country (Kissinger 2001: 68).

The Arab Oil Embargo

It was the Arab world that was considered to have gained the most politically from the conflict. The war had convincingly demonstrated that the gap in military strength between Israel and the Arab countries had narrowed. The 1973 war also

added a new dimension to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Soon after the outbreak of the war, there were demands from within the Arab world to deny oil to Israel's supporters in the West. In mid-October, Arab oil exporters, meeting in Kuwait, agreed to cut production, while the UAE took the lead in halting the export of oil to the USA. Western nations were soon experiencing rising fuel prices and growing shortages, showing the extent of their dependency on oil produced in the Arab world. In early November, the member states of the European community (EC), the forerunner of the present European Union (EU), endorsed a statement calling for an Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 and asserting the need for a settlement in the Middle East that did not ignore the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people (Cossali 2001: 27). It was the first time such a statement endorsing the right of the Palestinians was made by the Europeans. An outraged Israel accused Europe of surrendering to Arab blackmail. Before they could accuse the US of the same, President Nixon quickly deputed his Secretary of State, Kissinger to the region on a series of visits to Middle East capitals. It was the start of Kissinger's legendary shuttle diplomacy. In June 1974, Nixon himself embarked on a tour of the region. America, in spite of having huge oil reserves, had experienced more inconvenience than expected by the Arab oil boycott. Nixon reassured Israel of continued US support. He was also able to please the Arabs by forecasting a new era of cooperation between the U.S and the Arab world. Arab leaders welcomed Nixon's overtures, believing that at last US influence would be used to promote an equitable settlement of the long festering Arab-Israeli dispute. American overtures resulted in the revoking of the embargo on the export of Arab oil to the US. Diplomatic relations between Syria and the USA were also re-established. Israel's international position, on the other hand, was considerably weakened by the revelation of the extent to which the world was dependent upon Arab goodwill (Kissinger 2001: 28).

The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in the 1970s

The 1970s were a period during which the PLO made many sterling successes. In fact, by the end of the decade, the organisation had representatives, some with full Ambassadorial position, in more than 80 countries. On 22 September 1974, the UN General Assembly disregarding virulent Israeli and American objections, included on its agenda for the first time the Palestine question as a subject for debate rather than as part of the general question of the Middle East. And on 13 November 1974, the Assembly in a historic move, heard Yasser Arafat, the head of the PLO, plead for the Palestinian people's right of self-determination in his much quoted 'gun and olive' branch speech (Aburish 1998: 140-142). International recognition of the PLO had an important effect on the intra-state politics of the Arab world. The effect

was felt at the Rabat conference of the league of Arab states in Morocco, in October 1974. The main item on the agenda was Palestinian representation at the proposed Geneva peace talks. Prior to this, in November 1973, the Arab states excluding Jordan recognised the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, previously known as Transjordan till 1967 when it had also included the West Bank and East Jerusalem, had always been unwilling to allow the establishment of a Palestinian state on the Occupied Territories (OTs). Coupled with this was the traditional role of Jordan's monarchs as the custodians of all major Muslim holy places in Jerusalem, prime of which was the Al-Aqsa mosque, third holiest in Islam. The mosque itself was located on a raised platform called the Haram Al-Sharif, worshipped by Jews as being the site of their lost Temple, built by King Herod over 2000 years ago. Again the site was revered by Muslims as the place from which the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) ascended to heaven. Naturally the ruling elite of Jordan were reluctant to give up all of this.

At Rabat, however, King Hussein was under the combined pressure of all the Arab states to accept the PLO's right to represent the Palestinians at all international fora. Finally, Hussein accepted a resolution that said that any liberated Palestinian territory 'should revert to its legitimate Palestinian owners under the leadership of the PLO' (Sela 2002: 158-160). This resolution helped to strengthen the position of moderate PLO elements led by Chairman Arafat, since they now had the backing of all the main Arab states to participate in negotiations as the legitimate voice of the Palestinian people. The elevation of the PLO to the state of a principal player on the Middle Eastern stage was welcomed by the Arab people. The Israeli Government however refused to have any dealings with the PLO, dismissing it as terrorist organisation responsible for the deaths of many of its citizens. The PLO's majority position on Israel itself underwent considerable change during the 1970s. Though committed by its charter to the destruction of the Jewish Zionist state and its replacement by a secular democratic Palestinian state, the middle of the 1970s itself saw the majority of PLO members willing to accept the idea of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital.

In late 1975 and early 1976, the international position of the PLO was further legitimized though a series of discussions at the UN. In November 1975, the General Assembly adopted three resolutions concerning Palestine.

- I. Establishment of a 20-nation committee to devise plans for the implementation of Palestinian self-determination and national independence.
 - II. Invitation to the PLO to take part in future debates on the Middle East.
- And

III. Defining Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination (Cossali 2001: 28).

The United States by prior agreement with the Israelis (through Henry Kissinger) was committed not to recognize or to negotiate with the PLO. They therefore repeatedly blocked and vetoed resolutions aimed at affirming the Palestinians right to establish their own state. The Israelis themselves were not interested in the PLO at the moment. Their eyes were set on Egypt and Nasser's successor as president, Anwar el-Sadat. Sadat had evinced more than enough inclination that he was primarily interested in his land of Sinai and he was quite willing to sacrifice the Palestinians by establishing peace with Israel for the sake of that land.

Sadat, Egypt and the United States

When Sadat succeeded Nasser, who died in September 1970, he was a totally unknown quantity in the West. In appearance and nature, he seemed to be quite the opposite of Nasser. He lacked the pan-Arab aura of Nasser. Even his own people did not know him. Within three years of his rule, however, he was to change this perception completely by his momentous decision to attack Israel. Egypt and Syria's combined attack on Israel resulted in changing the negotiating spectrum of the Middle East considerably. Israel was brought down from a position of unassailable strength to that of a very vulnerable state committed to finding a durable peace with its neighbours. The 1973 War and subsequent oil embargo resulted in a much more heightened consciousness among the world community about the plight of the Palestinians. Even before the war started, Sadat had showed his sense of 'realpolitik' by ditching the Soviets for the Americans. He carried this further in 1975 after the various withdrawals and military standstill agreements were negotiated with the Israelis by abrogating the Soviet-Egypt Treaty of Friendship signed in 1971. Sadat risked enmity with the Arab world and particularly from Syria, by aligning himself with the US. He knew that the Americans were committed (again through Nixon and Kissinger) to pursuing a hands-off policy vis-à-vis the Middle East. This action of Sadat resulted in Syria assuming temporary leadership of the Arab world.

Carter and the Arab-Israeli Dispute

The late 1970s were a period of more active negotiations on Arab-Israeli disputes. The Arab states supported Palestinian participation in an overall settlement providing for Israeli withdrawal from areas occupied since the 1967 war and establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza strip. The US position towards the Palestinians also was changing. The new administration of President Jimmy Carter identified the Middle East conflict as a major foreign policy concern and promised

more direct involvement in the region. In February 1977, President Carter sent his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, on a tour of the Middle East and invited Israeli and Arab leaders to visit him in Washington (Cossali 2001: 29). In March 1977, Carter spoke of the need for a Palestinian homeland. He later stated that it was essential for the Palestinians to take part in the peace process. These were positions that were unthinkable during the Kissinger era. The Israelis in turn continued to reject direct participation of PLO representatives in the peace process, but were willing to allow Palestinians to sit in other Arab delegations like that of Jordan.

Begin and the Palestinian Issue

The May 1977 elections in Israel resulted in the victory of the rightwing Likud party headed by the former Yishuv era (prior to the formation of the state of Israel) Jewish terrorist leader Menachem Begin. Begin as an individual and Likud as a party were committed to maintaining Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza, renamed in Biblical Jewish terminology as Judea and Samaria. In the approach to the 1977 election, Begin had campaigned hard for the expansion of Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories (OTs) and permanent Israeli control over the West Bank. Begin was violently opposed to negotiation with the PLO which he dubbed a 'terrorist' organisation and refused to accept the notion of an independent Palestinian state. Begin was a Polish Jew who had been imprisoned in a concentration camp by the Nazis where he had lost almost all of his immediate family. This experience coupled with his later experience in Israel's war of independence served to create in him tremendous desire for security.

For him, no amount of sacrifice was sufficient to safeguard the security and territorial integrity of the Jewish state. He was also imbued with an equally great suspicion for the 'goyim' (non-Jews). He saw all land, whether of Israel proper or the Occupied Territories (OTs) including the Golan Heights captured from Syria, as the same sacred and holy part of the Biblical land of the Jews. Begin's long exclusion from governance in Israel and Israeli Labour's treatment of him as a 'pariah' had made him very bitter and created in him a burning determination to leave his mark on the polity of the Holy Land. Almost immediately after the Begin govt. assumed office in 1977, it announced the extension of health, education and welfare services to the Palestinian populations of the West Bank and Gaza (Cossali 2001: 29). Till then the Egyptians and the Jordanians along with the UNRWA had been fulfilling these needs of the Palestinian people. Arab fears that this was in fact the precursor to Israeli annexation of the two territories were deepened by the announcement of an accelerated program of Jewish settlement building on the West Bank along with the unveiling of a Israeli draft proposal for a territorial settlement that envisaged the maintenance of the occupation through out the West Bank and Gaza. To counter

the unnecessarily aggressive new Israeli government and to mollify the Arab world, the USA and the USSR issued a joint statement on 1 October 1977 urging a Middle East settlement that would ensure the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. The inclusion of such a phrase signaled an important shift in the official U.S. attitude to the Arab-Israeli conflict and clearly troubled the Begin regime (Cossali 2001: 29).

Sadat's Attitude towards Israel

Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat made the decisive break through in peace diplomacy with a dramatic visit to Jerusalem in 1977. He decided to take this radical and quixotic step because of his extreme dissatisfaction with the progress of the American mediated peace process in the Middle East. He was also afraid of what steps the rightwing Liquid government would take with regard to the Sinai, in particular, to expand and increase the existing number of settlements there. In a speech to the Egyptian Parliament on 9 November, Sadat expressed his frustration with the lack of progress towards a peace settlement and announced that he would be prepared to go to Jerusalem to negotiate direct with Israel. His offer was immediately taken up by Israel and on 19 November, Sadat flew to Tel Aviv (Cossali 2001: 29). His initiative was welcomed in the West where it was regarded as a bold attempt to break with the sterile attitudes of the past. Within the Arab world however, Sadat's visit was seen with both skepticism and hostility. There was a general feeling that Sadat was prepared to undermine the cause of Arab unity for his own selfish purposes. Egypt's Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Fahmy resigned in protest at the proposed visit. In fact, Sadat's visit to Jerusalem had been planned a few months before during a secret meeting between Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan of Israel and Deputy Prime Minister Hassan Tuhamy of Egypt in Morocco. This meeting was primarily meant to explore the negotiating positions of both Egypt and Israel. President Sadat wanted to explore Israel's willingness to make serious concessions (Quandt 1986: 111). As a case of pre-negotiation, this meeting helped to increase the confidence of both sides that negotiation was a credible option. At the meeting, Tuhamy told Dayan that Sadat was ready to meet with Begin, provided Israel gave a prior commitment to full withdrawal from all Arab territory. Moreover, he gave indication that the Egyptian President was ready to negotiate secretly and not in a multilateral forum like Geneva. Israeli leaders, on their part, stated a readiness to withdraw from almost all of Egyptian territory but were not prepared to return all Arab lands captured in 1967 (West Bank and Gaza) (Cossali 2001: 29). The subsequent failure of three months of direct negotiations between Egypt and Israel in which the United States was an observer rather than a participant helped to convince both parties that any further process of negotiation must involve the US as a full participant, if it was to succeed (Quandt 1986: 107).

American Mediation in the Camp David Peace Process

Jimmy Carter was unique among American presidents in his deep concern to find a solution to the issues dividing Israel from its Arab neighbours. In his first speech to the United Nations General Assembly in October 1977, he made these concerns clear:

Of all the regional conflicts in the world, none holds more menace than the Middle East. War there has already carried the world to the edge of nuclear confrontation. It has already disrupted the world economy and imposed severe hardships on the people in the developed and developing nations alike (Stein 1989: 413).

When Carter came to the White House, he brought little more than a strong biblical knowledge and affection for the Holy Land. Being a devout evangelical Christian, he had a deep affinity for the state of Israel and the Jewish people. On the other hand, he had next to no knowledge about the Palestinians except for the fact that they were obviously Arab. Through out his tenure, his inability to deal with moderate Israelis as well as Palestinians coupled with absolutely no first hand knowledge of the conditions in the Occupied Territories (OTs) made him blind to many facets of the dispute. It was only after his 1983 visit to the West Bank and Gaza that he could fully understand the Palestinian side of the argument. As far as American politics was concerned, Carter was an 'outsider,' relatively new to Washington and its ways. He had been the former Governor of the state of Georgia (Quandt 1986: 30). So as far as he was concerned, it was a quick transition from local issues to those of great international significance.

Carter knows well enough that American interests would be best served if peace was brought to the Middle East. He came to know many of the leaders in the Middle East personally and established close relations with them. Most important of all, while showing a sympathetic face towards Israel, Carter was able to handle the Jewish lobby in New York and Washington relatively firmly. It must be acknowledged that Carter's achievements in the Middle East were built on the firm foundations laid by Henry Kissinger in brokering three Arab-Israeli agreements during 1974-75 (Quandt 1986: 320). Carter was also officially served by his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance who helped in drafting the Camp David Accords and the text of the peace treaty.

President Carter's original aim had been to promote a comprehensive Middle East peace that would be achieved through a series of negotiations that could conclude with the convening of a peace conference at Geneva. This was a highly controversial approach, especially after the failure of the 1973 Geneva Conference. A major point of discord about this approach was that Carter wanted to take the Soviets along, something that the Kissinger Doctrine strictly forbade. The negative

response to his policies, both at home and abroad forced Carter to reassess his priorities in the Middle East. He was forced to give up the Geneva conference paradigm of peace negotiations. Sadat's visit to Israel in November 1977 again forced the Carter Administration to change its Middle East policies (Quandt 1986: 18). The US concentrated now on meditating a bilateral peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. Ironically this was the very approach that Kissinger had always dreamed of. Carter, who had always been a critic of Kissinger, finally ended up fulfilling the task left behind by him.

President Carter's decision to invite Sadat and Begin to Camp David was the result of his frustration at the slow pace of the Middle East peace negotiations during the later part of 1977 and early 1978. The two main actors, Begin and Sadat showed no signs of dropping their traditional animosity and sitting down to serious peace talks. At the same time, Carter realized that his continued involvement in the Middle East morass was costing him political breathing space and votes at home. With his re-election bid fast approaching, he could ill afford this. Moreover, Carter firmly believed that Middle East Peace, or at least an Egyptian-Israeli settlement, was both obtainable and necessary (Quandt 1986: 206). He felt that the Egyptian and Israeli leaders suffered from distrust and lack of confidence which could be overcome by helping each to understand the other better. Carter felt that a summit meeting at Camp David would provide an ideal setting for Begin and Sadat to get to know and trust each other. Invitations were therefore issued to both parties in early August 1978 for a summit in September. Both Sadat and Begin immediately accepted Carter's invitation to Camp David (Quandt 1986: 207).

Camp David: The Course of the Negotiations

The main Camp David negotiations took place over a 13 day interval. During this time, both the Israelis and the Egyptians were kept negotiating in good faith by the presence of the Americans alone. The success of Camp David does not belong to Sadat or to Begin, but to President Carter and his team of mediators. Only Carter had the patience and influences to force two men who were of diametrically opposite nature to sit together and agree to a common purpose. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel that arose out of the Camp David talks was a tribute to the skill and mediation of President Carter, his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brezinski.

The Camp David talks lasted from 5 to 17 September 1978. Two sets of agreements were produced. One established arrangements for determining the future of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. The other elaborated principles whereby an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty could be formulated bringing to an end the state of hostilities and establishing normal relations between the two countries. The entire

process was characterized by ups and downs. The progress of the negotiations was mostly related to Begin's ability to compromise. His tenacity in holding on to each and every bargaining point ensured that success came only at the very end. After ten days of intense discussion and negotiation, almost everyone at Camp David believed that the talks had reached an impasse (Quandt 1986: 234). Faced with the prospect of failure, Carter was obliged to reconsider his initial strategy. The political costs of leaving the summit empty-handed must have been apparent not only to Carter and Sadat, but also to Begin. If agreement was to be reached, one if not both parties were going to have to make major concessions.

One of the main areas of disagreement between the two sides related to the military/civilian settlements that Israel had planted in the occupied Sinai Peninsula. Egypt naturally insisted that these should be dismantled along with the airfields and all other infrastructure that Israel had built in the Sinai during their occupation. Begin refused throughout the negotiations to withdraw the Sinai settlements. He had made his political career protecting Jewish settlements on occupied lands. So he could not be seen as compromising on this very emotive issue. Finally, all that he would agree to was that the issue would be put to vote in the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) (Smith 1992: 225).

The Camp David Accords involved enormous skills on the part of all those involved in the negotiations. The talks would have achieved nothing had the participants not been able to demonstrate the will and ability to move away from extreme opening positions and compromise on the issues that sharply divided them. For example, President Sadat began the Camp David Conference on September 6, 1978 by presenting the text of a proposal entitled 'Framework for the Comprehensive Peace Settlement of the Middle East Problem.' It contained an eight-clause preamble and two articles. The major provisions of the plan were:

- a. Withdrawal of Israel to international boundaries and armistice lines (the pre-1967 borders) in the Sinai, the Golan Heights, the West Bank and Jerusalem.
- b. Removal of Israeli settlements from the Occupied Territories (OTs).
- c. Supervision of the administration of the West Bank by Jordan and of the Gaza strip by Egypt 'with the collaboration of the elected representatives of the Palestinian people for a period not to exceed five years (the interim period).'
- d. The establishment of a national entity for the Palestinian people-linked to Jordan if the inhabitants so choose-after they exercised their right of self-determination six months prior to the end of the interim period.
- e. Recognition of the right of the Palestinian refugees to return or to claim compensation in accordance with UN resolutions.

- f. Formation of a committee composed of equal number of resident Palestinians and Israelis to administer the Holy city of Jerusalem.
- g. Implementation of these points within a framework of peace recognizing the principles of ‘non-acquisition of territory by war.’
- h. Finally, payment by Israel of full compensation for all damages caused by the operations of its armed forces and the exploitation of natural resources in the Occupied Territories (OTs) (Naaz 1991: 58-59).

As far as Begin was concerned, he was quite willing to sacrifice the Sinai for the sake of peace with Egypt (subject to negotiated conditions), but was totally unwilling to compromise on the status of the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza strip. For him, these areas formed part of Eretz Israel (Greater Israel—the original homeland of the Jewish people). He was unwilling to even grant the indigenous Palestinian people basic human rights in their own land. Begin also refused to talk about Jerusalem, holy city of three religions, but holiest for the Jews. Jerusalem was a non-negotiable issue. It was the eternal and indivisible capital of the Jews.

Thus Carter’s role in helping to broker the agreements was central. Left to themselves, Sadat and Begin would never have overcome the accumulated legacy of decades of hatred and mistrust and would have broken off their talks over any number of issues. Carter’s position on many issues influenced the final outcome. He wanted an Egypt-Israeli agreement on the Sinai, and he was prepared to press the Israelis hard on withdrawal and on the settlements to get it. However Carter was less concerned about all agreement on the West Bank and Gaza (especially when he understood the strong Israeli and American-Jewish dislike for such on agreement). He did not think that any explicit linkage between Egyptian Sinai and the Palestinian question was desirable or necessary (Quandt 1986: 257).

William D. Quandt has stated:

In the end, it was Carter who made the final judgments on what to accept and what not to accept, and it was Carter who used his influence with Sadat to get him to stay and to sign on agreement that both men knew was imperfect (Quandt 1986: 257).

Egyptian gains and losses

Egypt’s most important gain from Camp David was a commitment to full Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, including the oilfields, settlements and airfields. To get this commitment, Sadat had offered a period of three years to complete the withdrawal, security arrangements that would be monitored by the US and the UN, and a promise to ‘normalize relations’ with Israel once the first phase of withdrawal had been reached. The Accords contained general principles referring to the legitimate

rights of the Palestinian people and the right of the Palestinians to choose their own form of government. All the details dealt with the procedures and arrangements for the transitional period and not for the final status of the Occupied Territories (OTs).

Again to quote Quandt:

Israel had made no commitment to eventual withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza; nothing was said about Jerusalem; and settlements in the Palestinian Occupied Territories (OTs) were nowhere mentioned, though the Americans were telling everyone that Begin had in fact agreed to a freeze in settlement construction for the duration of the negotiations on autonomy (Quandt 1986: 255).

Sadat thus gained for Egypt, but lost on the Palestinian cause. The Camp David accords finally ended Egypt's campaign on behalf of the Palestinians and Arab national unity. The Nasserite legacy was broken. It was revealed that on vital national issues, Egypt, like any nation, would only defend its own rights and not the rights of others, however just their cause may be.

Israeli gains and losses

The Camp David agreements were greeted in the West as a triumph of US diplomacy. There was also cautious approval in Israel, where there was satisfaction that a peace treaty could be completed with Egypt without substantial concessions on the issues of Jewish settlements and the continued Israeli control over the Palestinian and Syrian territories conquered in 1967. This view was reinforced by a speech made by Menachem Begin on the anniversary of the creation of the state of Israel in 1949 in which he asserted that no border would ever be drawn 'through the land of Israel' and that we shall never withdraw from the Golan Heights (Cossali 2001: 30).

Begin has been recognised by all to be the most able negotiator at Camp David. This former terrorist leader, associated with some of the most despicable war crimes committed during Israel's war of independence, made sure he fought over every word at the negotiating table. Begin had to concede the Sinai to Sadat, thus giving up something that for Israel was very valuable. There were extensive oilfields in the Sinai that were being utilized by Israel for their domestic oil needs. In return, Begin not only won a durable peace with Egypt, but also a comparatively free hand for Israel in dealing with the West Bank and Gaza. Begin protected himself from considerable US and Egyptian pressure on the key issues of the future of the Palestinian territories, and on any form of linkage between the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and the Palestinian question. Crucial to Begin's victory was the fact that the Accords contained no controversial language like the 'inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,' the applicability of the principles of UN resolution

242 'to all fronts of the conflict,' and the need for eventual Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Israel's claim to sovereignty over all of undivided Jerusalem was not contested in the accord. Finally, Begin had only to promise a three month freeze on settlement construction in the West Bank and, Gaza. Israel's ultimate victory lay in that within nine months of signing a peace treaty with Egypt, and with Israeli troops still in the Sinai, diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel were established and ambassadors were exchanged (Naaz 1991: 61-62).

The Camp David Accords and the PLO

The Camp David accords were the first ever Arab-Israeli agreements that spelt out specific conditions for solving the Palestinian issue. Given the complexity of the issue, the only realistic approach to a solution was felt to be the establishment of a five-year transitional period for the West Bank and, Gaza. The first part of the Accords, entitled, 'The Framework for Peace in the Middle East' stated that Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the representatives of the Palestinian people would participate in three-stage negotiations to determine the area's future.

(1). Cairo and Jerusalem would negotiate and then supervise transitional arrangements for a maximum of five years. The current Israeli military and civilian administration would withdraw when the inhabitants of the areas had elected a self-governing authority in free elections.

(2). Egypt, Israel and Jordan would determine the powers and responsibilities of the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza strip. Israel would withdraw the IDF into specified locations. Local constabulary forces consisting of Israeli and Jordanian forces would patrol and thereby ensure proper border control.

(3) After the establishment of the self-governing authority a transition period of five years would begin. Negotiations to determine the final status of the territories would begin no later than the third year. These talks must include Egypt, Israel, Jordan and elected representatives of inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. The talks would be based on provisions of UN Resolution 242 and include discussions of boundaries and future security arrangements. It was specified that the final 'solution would recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements' (Friedlander 1983: 229).

On 18 September 1978, an enlarged emergency session of the PLO-EC (Executive Committee) met to discuss the Camp David accords. The EC session gave a call to all Palestinians, inside and outside the Occupied Territories (OTs), to observe a general strike on 20 September to express 'resolute resistance' to the Camp David 'conspiracy.' Arafat in a message to the US President stated that the

signing of the Camp David accords signaled the 'loss of US interests in the Middle East' (Pradhan 1994: 157).

To the PLO leaders, the accords only served to undermine the aim of Palestinian self-determination and their hopes of creating an independent state. In the eyes of the PLO, the United States' position on the question of autonomy had become a decisive factor. Thus after Camp David, the most important aspect of Palestinian diplomacy was to counter the American design to get closer to Jordan. This was to strengthen Jordan's opposition to Camp David as well as to strengthen the struggle in the Occupied Territories (OTs) (Gresh 1983: 219). They also targeted Western Europe. The ground realities in Western Europe vis-à-vis the Palestinian question and the PLO were quite different from those in the US. The Europeans had supported the Camp David accords as a process though they had reservations over the provisions related to the Palestinian question. The European states had realized that their interests were being threatened by the continuing failure to solve the 'Palestinian problem.' The European countries recognized that their economic interests were tied to developments in the region. In July 1979, Arafat met with the Austrian Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky and the Chairman of the Socialist International, Willy Brandt, in Vienna. Following talks, they issued a joint statement in which the Palestine question was regarded as 'the central problem in the Middle East conflict' (Pradhan 1994: 167).

The Arab countries' opposition to Camp David was coordinated in the Ninth Arab summit meeting in Baghdad in November 1978. The final communiqué rejected the accords on the ground that these agreements 'had taken place outside the framework of collective Arab responsibility' and had harmed the Palestinian cause by violating the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat summit conferences. It called for 'a just peace based on the total Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem' and for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The fourteenth Palestinian National Council (PNC) that met in Damascus in January 1979, also unanimously condemned the accords as 'a conspiracy that should be rejected and resisted by all means' (Pradhan 1994: 157).

Ultimately the US mediated initiative for a lasting peace in the Middle East met only with partial success. The Americans in the immediate Post-Camp David era did try to formulate a more specific peace formula that would help the Palestinians to achieve their aims short of an independent state. The Carter administration's frequently stated policy was that the Palestinian people must have the right for themselves and their descendants to live with dignity and freedom and with the opportunity for economic fulfillment and political expression. In a speech made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 27th May 1979, Secretary of State

Vance stressed that the Camp David accords recognised the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements (Vance 1979: 27). What prevented the US from recognizing the PLO was the American stand on UN resolutions No. 242 and 335 and Kissinger's famous pledge to Israel not to deal with the PLO unless Israel did so first, as a guarantee for Israel's security and sovereignty.

The US, by allowing its policy on the issue of contacts with the PLO to be dictated by Israeli policy, ruled itself out as a credible actor in the search for solution to the Palestinian problem. Another reason why the Camp David framework was totally inadequate in dealing with the Palestine issue related to the ambiguities surrounding the concept of autonomy negotiations between Egypt and Israel that began in May 1979 and continued for over a year without any agreement over the format of autonomy for the West Bank. The Begin govt. reasserted its claim to the West Bank and Gaza as an indivisible part of 'Eretz Israel' and stated that any autonomy would not apply to land and water rights which would continue belong to Israel. Israel announced plans in May 1979 for an ambitious programme of settlement construction in the West Bank and Gaza, and in September the ban on Israeli citizens purchasing Arab land in the Occupied Territories (OTs) was ended (Cossali 2001: 30). Sadat, on the other hand, called for full governing autonomy for the occupied territory, within a Jordanian entity, a stance that had the moral support of the Americans. The official American position at the end of the Carter presidency remained that Israeli settlements in occupied territory were illegal and that East Jerusalem was considered to be occupied territory despite its incorporation into Israel (Smith 1992: 257). The problem in American politics was that any party who stated this view openly would be sure to lose the influential Jewish vote and backing, thereby weakening their chances in any elections in the US. Carter achieved the Camp David accords and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, holding to established American positions that, when declared openly, destroyed his chances for a second Presidential term. It was the costs of peace that he had to pay.

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Mappilas and the Political Engagements: Myth and Reality

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On the occasion of the ninetieth anniversary of the Malabar Rebellion of 1921, a debate was triggered following the publication of an article by a renowned historian.¹ The issue had great significance though the observations of which were ahistorical. He has almost renounced the rebellion by stating that there was nothing to be proud of the rebellion, since its result was devastating. Of course, the Malabar rebellion of 1921 and the earlier revolts of nineteenth century, have considerable historical significance in the history of Kerala, though the discourses on which at times concentrated on the communal aspects. The British government was however forced to introduce many reforms related to land relations and education, immediately after the revolts in Malabar. The present paper is an attempt to examine political lineage of the Mappilas and its transitional phases and determinant factors which caused to deviate its course. The paper argues that though the Mappilas were politically sensitive and had responded to almost all political questions, it cannot be generalised in terms of the community as whole. Always a minority was on the forefront of the struggles and the major section remained passive or strived hard to maintain the status-quo. The role of social and religious reform among them and other contributory factors should be seriously studied, which led to formation of the separatist tendencies among the Mappilas of Kerala. It is also to be noted that the forces of reform, not the Mappila folk, were responsible in obstructing the Mappila's association with the national movement and the Leftist politics. Interestingly, the contradictory groups of orthodoxy and the reformists shared the same political platform when they were stake holders of the Muslim League. Interestingly, orthodoxy and reformists come together in the case of containing the spread of left politics or in resisting the issues like Shah Bano case. Headed by elitism and 'orthodoxy-reformist priesthood,' the Kerala Muslim politics has always been forcefully binding the Mappilas to their clutches and preventing the social and cultural development.

Mappilas and the lineage of Resistance

The Mappilas of Kerala can be considered to be one of the most politically sensitive sections of people in terms of their prolonged saga of resistance ever since the Portuguese period. There are ample contemporary sources to substantiate the Mappila resistance against injustice and oppression either from the native rulers or from foreign powers (Barbossa 1989/1812: 82). The Mappilas had raised strong resistance against the Portuguese and other European powers when their existence was challenged. There is an extensive volume of literature focussing on the Mappila tradition of resistance in the form of *Tahrid*, *Thuhat*, *Fath al -Mubeen*, *Uddathil Umara*, *Mahimat*, and *patappattu* etc (Kunhali 1999: 429-33; Hamza 1998: 33-39). Likewise, the Mysorean powers under Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan, who invaded Malabar in the latter half of the eighteenth century, had to face staunch resistance from the part of Mappila chiefs such as Athan Gurukkal, Unnimootta Mupan of Manjeri and Hydros Kutty Muppan of Manathala near Chavakkad (Khadir 1959). Their resistance against Mysore powers is historically significant in the context of historiography of hatred.² Interestingly, though both Mysoreans and the Mappilas belonged to the same religion, it never worked as a hindrance to resistance.

The Mappilas also showed chivalry during the initial phase of the British colonial administration. Though most of the local rulers had started to co-operate with the British on the onslaught of the Mysorean expedition, the Mappila chiefs raised protests. It is a fact that even Pazhassi Raja had made an alliance with the British to fight against Tipu Sultan. However, Pazhassi's honeymoon with the British was only for a short period and when he turned against the British, he was assisted by many Mappila chiefs and their armies extensively. Elampilasseri Unni Mutta Muppan, Athan Gurukkal and Chemban Pokker et al. in the south and Chaladi Thangal, Haidar Kunhikutty, Elampulan Kunhan, Vavantullan Kunhi, Kunhi Moideen Muppan of Elathur (Kurumbranad leader), Athi Muppan of Kadathanad etc. in the north, had aligned with Pazhassi Raja against the British till his heroic death (Rehiman 2012: 50-66). However, this kind of a collective struggle is camouflaged by the Hindutva campaign of Pazhassi as the true nationalist hero and others as passive spectators (Mohan 2007).

The presence of Mappila folk as a conspicuous political class can be traced back to the anti-British struggles since the first half of the nineteenth century. Though a single case of Mappila response to revolt of 1857 by Kunji Mayin was reported from Malabar, no evidence to an organized movement is traced so far (Logan 1951/1887: 576). However, there was an interesting case of arrest of Ponmalayil Puvvadan Kunhappa Haji and associates in the charge that the war songs (*patappattu*) they composed were inspirational to the 1857 rebels (Kunhi

1993/1982 :61). The Mappilas were influenced by many intellectuals whose sermons and writings invigorated them. The *ulema* including *Khazis* and *Sayids* played an important role in this regard. Umar Khazi of Veliyamkode was the first intellectual to call upon Mappilas to non-cooperate with the revenue system of oppressive and exploitative rulers. It was probably for the first time such an exhortation came from an *ulema* or a political leader in the country, almost a century before Gandhiji launched Non- Cooperation Movement. Sayyid Ba' Alavi and his son Syiid Fazal of Mamburam also had challenged both the caste-ridden social structure and colonial political domination⁴. Syed Fazal's *Uddathul Umara*⁵, appended with *Saiful Bathaar*⁶, a tract published in Istanbul in 1857 AD, was meant to get secretly circulated among the *Khazis* of each *mahal* in Malabar, but which was confiscated by the British. Among many other things, it demanded the lower caste Hindus not to obey the caste rules, especially not to address the upper castes as honorific 'you', which termed as positive negation (Guha 2002/1983:20-28). Indeed the British administration was concerned over the activities of these intellectuals so that they secretly deported Fazal to Mecca. The price which the British had to pay for was the life Malabar collector H.V. Connolly, whom the Mappila rebels shot at his residence during the course of the Mappila peasant insurgency in the latter half of the nineteenth century (Gangadharan 2007/2004: 25,31).

The earliest recorded revolt of the Mappila peasantry started in the year 1836, which continued until 1921. It is a fact that the British had perplexed with the challenges raised by the Mappila rebels, who were vowed to embrace death as *shahids* or martyrs for the cause of their land and belief. For instance, as Connolly observed in the year 1840, after the British acquired the political sovereignty over Malabar, there was not even a single year without a revolt. Though not political in its strict sense, the early Mappila revolts of nineteenth century enormously helped the germination of organised popular political movement in Malabar. Those revolts were aimed at the oppressive feudal lords and exploitative colonial state (Panikkar 1992/1989). The class analysis of the rebels proves that majority of them belonged to the lower sections of the society. (Kurup 2006: 67-68). Though the revolts were brutally suppressed by the British, the factors which elicited the revolt remained unresolved. Rather the British government started to act with all sorts of its strategies including imposition of surveillance modality on the people of the 'fanatic zone' and even the rebel body was under its strict observation (Ansari 2007: 36-77). The recommendations of Strange Report, introduction of the Arms Act and imposition of fine on rebel villages etc. testify to this fact.⁷

Khilafat, Pan-Islamism and Malabar Rebellion

The Manjeri Conference of 1920 is considered to be a milestone in the history of the Congress and the national movement in Malabar for more than one reason. It was

for the first time that the Indian National Congress showed its bent towards the left. The aspirations of the peasants, tenants, petty traders and the lower sections collectively succeeded in challenging the agenda of the landlords and the elites who were covertly attached to the British. The Khilafat and Non-Cooperation movement gave a fillip to the anti-colonial sentiment among the people of Malabar in general and Mappilas in particular. There were tendencies of Pan Islamism in Malabar as far back as 1864.⁸ The propagation of ideas of Jamaluddheen Afghani, Sana ulla Makthi Tangal's activities especially his evening daily, *Turki Samacharam* (*Turkish News* 1909), the Mappilas' donation of funds to the Red Crescent Society and the Indian Medical Mission under Ansari (which was sent to Turkey during the Balkan War), forty days' continuous prayer in 1912 at Perinthalmanna Mosque for the cause of Turkey etc. testify to the fact that Pan-Islamic tendencies had emerged and which was fanned by the launching of Khilafat movement in Malabar (Salahudheen 2007: 29-38).

Gandhiji and Maulana Shaukat Ali visited Malabar as part of an all India tour to elicit support for the national movement. The leaders arrived at Calicut on 18 August 1920 and were received enthusiastically by a large crowd. As Bipan Chandra observed, the Mappilas had even a stronger reason to rally round the Congress and Khilafat than Hindus. For one of the slogans raised by the nationalist leadership, was 'hands off-the Turkish Caliph', a slogan dear to the hearts of every pious Muslim, whereas for the peasants in general it was a question of freedom from exploitation by the state and the *Jenmis* only. It was to the Mappila also a question of defending someone whom he had come to regard as his religious head, a question of sacred war in the defence of his faith (Chandra 1989: 201). The call of Gandhiji to non-cooperate with the British was positively responded by a group of enthusiastic and young Mappilas such as Ali Musliar, E. Moidu Moulavi, Muhammed Abdurahiman Sahib, Ponnadath Moideen Koya ('Home Rule Moideen Koya'), Assan Koya Molla, Muhammed Molla (Perinthalmanna) along with other non-Mappila leaders. The objective of Gandhiji and Congress to revitalise the hitherto passive Muslims to the national movement was found to have materialised in Malabar, though it was short lived. Interestingly, the Congress and Khilafat committees functioned together and in many villages it was very difficult to seek for the separate identity. However in the next phase, when the illiterate Mappilas responded to the British violently, the Congress wanted to dissuade them and strived hard for controlling the rebellion spreading to other parts of the region (Menon 1969: 100). Here we can see an element of modernised and civilised Congress leaders as modest and the illiterate and pre-modern Mappila subjects, who took arms, as violent. Indeed, by the rebellion, the Mappilas were disillusioned by the Congress' attitude and gestures of the nationalist leaders especially Gandhiji, who dared to disown the rebellion

without a prick of conscience (Ansari 2007/2005: 73-76). More importantly, the Allahabad Session of the Congress (1921) outrightly discarded the rebellion on many grounds. Still the Rebellion of 1921 had helped politicisation of Mappilas and from then itself they became suspicious towards the Congress. However, a group of young and educated nationalist Muslims emerged during the course of rebellion and started to align with the national movement.

It is generally believed that the Mappilas as a whole had participated in the revolt of 1921 and the community en bloc stood anti-British. This is a false perception which demands a thorough examination. The reality is that the elite class of Mappilas had already been in alignment with the British to safeguard their vested motives. For instance, the coastal Mappilas, most of them were engaged in trade and related occupations never had associated with the Khilafath movement or the Malabar rebellion. Instead, we hear of an instance of *fatwa* issued as far back as 1894 by the *Khazi* of Calicut condemning the outbreak of violence, in the interior Malabar (Wood 1987: 52). The British had strategically brought a section of religious and spiritual leaders namely the *Khazis* and *Thangals* to their fold (Vilayil 2011: 19-24). And, more importantly, there were at least three opposing views among the Mappila *Ulema* with regard to the anti-British stance. The first group comprised of Ali Musaliar and others with an unwavering anti-British stance, following the line of armed struggle; while the second group who also followed the anti-British line but without physical or overt forms of resistance. The third group rejected the idea of anti-colonial resistance by any means and found nothing wrong to collaborate with the British. According to K.P. Kesava Menon, the British had entrusted a group from the Mappilas to oppose the Khilafat movement and it propagated that to join a Muslim with Khilafath and the Congress was against their belief. When a Khilafat meeting was planned at Putiya Ponnani, the anti-Congress wing of *Ulema* also announced a similar one on the same date that is, 24 July 1924, with the support of the British authorities (Menon 1969:91). The ultimate aim of the British was to incarcerate the anti-British *Ulema* in the name of conflicts and sabotage the rebellion. Apart from this, the British were successful in issuing a *fatwa* by Muhammed Kutty Musliar of Ponnani against the Khilafat movement and the rebellion, entitled, *Mahikul Kalafath Ala Ismil Khilafath* (The truth about the rebellion in the name of Khilafath), in the year 1921 (Razak 2007: 163). The Mappilas showed similar kind of attitude towards the whole political discourse in the later period as well. There were very obvious and contradictory streams of political trajectories within the Mappila community, who were aligned either with the nationalists or with the 'communitarians'/ pan-Islamists or the colonialists.

Mappila Engagement with Colonial Modernity and roots of Separatism

The project of reform was launched among the Mappilas as early as nineteenth century by the pioneer reformer Sana ulla Makti Thangal (1847-1912) of Veliyamkode. Among other things he may be considered to be the first intellectual to exhort the Mappilas to be patriotic and to be assimilated to the emerging modern Malayali community (Thangal 2006/1981: 503-10). As a beneficiary of the colonial educational system, Thangal challenged the orthodox *Ulema's* stance against the English and Malayalam education and 'un-Islamic' practices of the Mappila folk. Because of his interest in modern western education and his alignment with the British as the Excise inspector, the British appointed Thangal as the official preacher to spread anti- rebel feeling among the Mappilas of south Malabar. This finally caused to emerge a loyalist stream of Mappilas, which eventually led to the germination of communitarian politics.

The other reformers like Chalilakath Kunhahammed Haji (1856-1919), Hamdani Thangal (d.1922), Vakkom Abdul Khadar Maulavi (1873-1932), K.M. Moulavi (1886-1964) etc. had been instrumental to introduce Pan-Islamic ideas and the idea of reform in the Arab world to the Mappilas. The newly educated Muslims were largely attracted to the modernist ideas and became enthusiastic agents of reform and modernity. Though they were externally 'modernized', they were also becoming highly 'textual' or strictly ritualistic internally. The reformists kept criticising the tradition of a 'popular' or 'lived' Islam, along with divergent Sufi orders, the historical by-product of cultural symbiosis. Thus an attempt was made to reform the illiterate and 'uncivilised' Mappila into a modern 'Muslim', but without internalising the values of western reason, science or modernity proper.

The second phase of Muslim reform was started with the establishment of *Nishpaksha Sangham* in 1922 at Eriyad near Kodungallur, with an objective to function a mediator's role in conciliating the quarrelsome Mappila aristocratic families. Kottappurath Seethi Muhammed Sahib, Manappattu Kunhi Muhammed Sahib and nine others played significant roles in the Sangham (Kutty 1992:24), which was essentially an exclusive elite organization and later transformed to *Kerala Muslim Aikya Sangham*. In the troubled political atmosphere of post-rebellion (1921) period, the inception of *Sangham* was of great relevance. It called upon the Mappilas to attain modern education and to join government service in order to attain social mobility (Gangadharan 2007/2004:57). After twelve years of its continuous service, the *Sangham* in 1934 was merged with *Kerala Muslim Majlis*, which was established in the year 1931, on the ground that both organizations shared common objectives and programmes.

The roots of exclusivist and separatist tendency among Mappilas can be traced back to the debates within the Sangham. There were two ideological streams in Aikya Sangham with regard to the separate political entity with regard to the Mappilas. Earlier the leaders of the Aikya Sangham such as K. M. Seethi Sahib, Moidu Maulavi (Maulavi was reluctant to join the Sangham in its early stage) were active in both Khilafath and Non Co-operation Movement in Malabar (Maulavi 1981: 108). But, later on, there arose a schism on account of political identity of the Mappilas. While the leaders like Muhammed Abdurahiman Sahib and Moidu Maulavi strongly rejected the demand for separate political platform other than the Indian National Congress, other leaders Seethi Sahib and K.M. Maulavi stood for a separate political organization for Mappilas. Actually this issue acted as the core of the causal factor of the disintegration of the Aikya Sangham. Besides, there was a heated debate on the idea of 'Islamic Banking', propounded by the Sangham leaders, however was staunchly criticised and defeated by Muhammed Abdurahiman Sahib and other nationalist leaders in the light of Islamic principle that any form of interest is un Islamic. As Moidu Maulavi observed, the Majlis was founded by some moderate and pro-British leaders who could not agree with the policies of Indian National Congress (Maulavi 1981:190; Razak 2007: 310).

Though the revolt could not shatter the communal harmony in the region of Malabar, contradictory to the case of post-Khilafath movement in north India (Maulavi 1981:105), there formed a bent towards communitarian politics among the Mappilas. As K. N. Panikkar writes, although the rebellion was not intrinsically communal, its consequences were decidedly so (Panikkar 1992/1989:190). It was the hard reality that any form of political action from the part of the Congress was unfeasible for a long time in the post-rebellion Malabar (Menon 1969:125). The activities of the Hindu Congress leaders also caused to lose the credibility of the Congress. Unfortunately, such Congress leaders, who were advocates by profession, had even apologized before the court for their involvement in national movement and applied for renewal of their sanads to rejoin the court (Maulavi 1981:108).

According to a study on the community formation of the Mappilas of Malabar, the activities of the Congress were instrumental in providing the following contributory factors which resulted in the creation of a sense of separatism among the Mappilas of Malabar (Razak 2007: 304-06). Firstly, there was almost complete loss of credibility and influence of the Congress by disowning the rebellion in the Allahabad session of the Congress. Secondly, after the rebellion, the Mappilas began to recognize the Congress with the Hindus, which was mainly due to many Congress leaders' participation in the deliberations of the Hindu Conference held at Thirunnavaya in May 1929 (Gopalankutty 1983: 67-68). Thirdly, some Congress

leaders were tactless in dealing with the 'Nationalist Muslims'. For instance, in the election to the Malabar District Board held in 1939, Muhammed Abdurahiman Sahib contested from Wandoor farqa on Congress ticket. During the campaign, the Chalappuram gang distributed pamphlets in the Hindu houses branding the Sahib a Hindu fanatic.⁹ Fourthly, certain programmes of the Congress such as temple entry Satyagraha excluded the participation of the Muslims and other non- Hindus as well, which further alienated them from the national movement.

This peculiar political climate, in which the Congress and the national movement were practically defunct, was made use of to germinate and grow the separatist tendencies of Mappilas in Kerala in general and Malabar in particular. Apart from this, the introduction of separate electorate (1919) by the British also contributed in the creation of cleavages in the nationalist politics. Accordingly, in 1925 Muslim Aikya Samgham demanded separate electorates for district and taluk boards.¹⁰ Similarly the *Jamiyyathul Iqwan Samgham* of Calicut and the first Kerala Muslim Conference held at Tellicherry in 1931 also had passed similar resolutions demanding separate electorates for Muslims to the local bodies.¹¹ The Calicut Muslim Majlis Committee and even the pro-Congress Kerala Muslim Yuvajana Conference had placed such demands. Thus there emerged a situation in which the idea of separatism got legitimacy. This tendency of the Mappilas, especially the active members of the Majlis, proved to be communitarian by the election to the central legislature. The separatist stream got an upper hand on matters concerning the community by the first election, in which Sathar Sait of Muslim Majlis could win over Muhammed Abdurahiman Sahib, the Congress candidate (Pottakkad 1985/1978:311-324). The Majlis' association with the Muslim League gradually led to the formation of the Malabar district committee of All India Muslim League (AIML) in 1937 at Tellicherry. The conference was attended by aristocratic and elite section of the Mappilas such as Sathar Sait, Seethi Sahib, C.P. Mammu Keyi, Manappattu Kunhi Muhammed Haji, Sheikh Rawthar, A.K. Kunhi Mayin Haji, T.M. Moideen Sahib, C. K. Mammad Keyi, A. K. Khadar Kutty, B. Poker Sahib, K. Uppi Sahib, T.M. Moosa Sahib, Hassan Kutty Kurikkal, K.M. Maulavi et al., and it was presided over by the Arakkal Ali Raja Sahib, who belonged to the one and only single Muslim royal family in Kerala (Kutty 1992: 57).

Similarly, the Volunteer Core formed in association with the conference (later known as National Guard) consisted of highly educated and well placed elite personalities. This section of elite Muslims can be called 'Mappila bhadralok'. For instance, the captain of the Core was retired justice E.K. Moidu. And other members were K.M. Muhammed Ali (District Judge), Adv. K.M. Muhammed, K. Aluppi (former Factories Chief Inspector), Adv. A.P. Moosa, M. Mucky (former Registrar), C. O. Kunhalikkutty Keyi, Adv. B. Moosakkutty, P. Moidu (Deputy

Inspector), K.P. Mammu, Haris Mayan, Payyampalli Ummer Kutty, C.P. Pucky Keyi, Bappu Sait, Jani Sait, Nassi Sait etc. The leaders of both AIML and the Volunteer Core essentially belonged either to landed aristocratic class or educated/employed sections of the community (Kutty 1992: 57). This class disposition found reflected as a determining factor while formulating policies and *modus operandi* of the Muslim League. Similar to the north Indian Muslim intellectuals, the Muslim intellectuals of Kerala also showed lukewarm interest in safeguarding the interests of the community (Hasan 1995: 2995-3000). However, the illiterate Mappila folk were attracted to the League, where the great divide prevailed between common man and the leadership. Using the idioms and symbols of the belief system of the community, the League gradually started to claim the sole guardianship and control over the Muslim community. If the so-called reform associations mostly worked among the urban Mappilas, the League helped to erase the gap between the urban middle class Mappilas and the rural poor Mappilas. Thus the class antagonism within the community was cleverly covered up. Still the Mappilas did not respond to the idea of Pakistan positively and only Sathar Sait vehemently argued and left for Pakistan.

Mappilas and the Leftist Politics

There was a considerable increase in the enrolment of Mappilas in the Congress and national movement in the context of Khilafat Movement, tenancy question along with unchallenging leadership of Muhammed Abdurahiman Sahib. Gradually there emerged a conspicuous rift within the movement as rightists and leftists on the basis of policies and programmes. Muhammed Abdurahiman Sahib, E.M.S Nambudirippad and others were in the leadership of the left wing in the Congress and many Mappilas including tenants and workers were attracted to the movement at that time. The rightists ridiculed the move as 'Mecca- Moscow Pact'.¹² The leftists became popular due to their organizational skills and the genuineness of the issues they had taken up. They organised trade unions of labourers, peasants, students and teachers which helped to widen the popular base of the national movement. The Mappila association with the leftists helped the revival of the activities of the Congress in the rebellion (1921) prone areas of Eranad and Valluvanad taluks of southern Malabar.

Mappilas were also familiarised with the ideas of socialism and Marxism. The Communist Party was formed in Kerala in 1939 at Pinarayi in Kannur (Malabar), after its leaders resolved to dissolve the Congress Socialist Party and merge with the Communist Party. The Mappila leaders including Muhammed Ishaq, E.K. Imbichi Bava, Sadhu P. Ahammad Kutty, and K. Kunhali etc. were very prominent and dedicated members. There were also other leaders such as Edakkad Muhammed,

Koya Kunhi Naha, Nadukkandi Muhammed Koya, K.P. Muhammed Koya, Appa Koya and P.K. Muhammed Kunhi etc. whose selfless service to the party cannot be overlooked. Interestingly the first two martyrs of Kerala for the cause of communism were said to be the Mappila comrades.¹³ In the Morazha agitation (1940) and Kayyur revolt (1941), the Mappila presence was significant.¹⁴

The Mappilas also proved their organizational skills in the domain of trade union as well. Vadappuram P.K. Bava founded the first trade union of Kerala, Travancore Labour Union (later renamed to be Travancore Labour Association) on 31 March 1922 at Alleppy. P.S. Muhammed acted as the founder president till 1935, the position was held by P.K. Kunju. Soon after P.S. Muhammed left the Travancore Labour Association he founded Alleppy Labour Association. In Kochi, V.K. Kutty, C.P. Ummer, T.M. Abu, A.K. Kochunni and other Mappilas led various trade unions and V.K. Kutty was the first nominated member to represent the labourers in the Cochin Assembly.

The enthusiastic Mappilas strove hard to organise the Mappila peasants in a socio-economic milieu of the great Depression of 1930s. K.M. Ibrahim and K.M. Kunhi Moideen established Karshaka Thozhilali Prasthanam in 1932 in Kodungallur taluk, which soon spread to Mukundapuram and Kanayannur taluks (Muhammed 2010: 722-733). They had also published a periodical called *Karshaka Thozhilali*. When the Communist Party was formed a large number Mappilas joined party mostly from peasant and working class background. The Mappilas belong to the lower strata of society were attracted to the Communist Party because of its ideological and organizational appeal. The Party's attempt to address the basic issues of peasants and workers such as land, wages, unemployment, exploitation and oppression from the part of landlords had a long lasting impact. The Mappila beedi workers of Tellicherry, Ponnani, Kondotty etc. and the plantation labourers of Nilambur also became the base of the Party. The Mappila students and youth were attracted to the Students Federation and the cultural activities.

The mounting Communist wave among the Mappilas caused havoc in the Muslim League circles and they started to launch anti-communist propaganda with the blessings of religious heads. The *Ulema's* understanding of Communism, synonymous with atheism, along with the pressure of elite and aristocratic class culminated in issuing of *fatwas* aimed at dissuading the Mappilas from entering matrimonial alliances with the Communists. Interestingly the so-called progressive Muslim scholars also aligned with the orthodox *Ulema* to eliminate their common enemy, the scourge of Communism. For instance, an eminent progressive Islamic scholar, C. N. Ahammed Moulavi, known for ever for his contributions as translator of Quran, negating all the orthodox protests, wrote a book entitled, *The Wealth*

Distribution System in Islam, claiming the superior position of Islamic economic theory in order to prevent the influx of Mappilas to Communism.

It is not a surprise to know that the claimants of modernity and reform in the community, the *Islahi* Movement (the successors of which as they claim, *The Mujahid* movement, especially, *Kerala Nadvathul Mujahiddeen*) and Jama'ath-e-Islami took a hostile stance towards Communism. When the Jama'ath -e -Islami was founded in Kerala in 1946 (Jamaath -e -Islami Hind was founded in 1941), many reformers under *Kerala Jam iyyathul Ulema* (KJU) were attracted to it. In order to stem the rising tide of Communist ideology among the Mappilas of Malabar, the leaders of both Jama'ath-e -Islami and KJU collectively launched an offensive missionary organization and campaign called "Familiarise Islam" (Hassan Siddique 1998:137-44). However, the honeymoon of Jama'ath with the KJU did not last for long. In the early fifties, KJU issued a fatwa against Jama'ath culminating in breaking up of the alliance. The great difference of Jama'ath with KJU was on the issue of *Taghoot*, according to which, any form of government including democracy other than Islamic state is without the heeding of God. The Jama'ath believed that a Muslim cannot co-operate with any kind of governmental activity and its institutions. So that they decided to boycott elections and to reject join civil service (Razak 2007:168). The ideology and activities Jama'ath actually caused a retreat in terms of Mappilas' engagement with modernity, a self defeating stance in terms of the progress of the community. Similarly, it caused to prevent the Mappilas from the assimilation of the tradition of a common secular culture of the land. Thus the separatist tendencies once again caused to stall the development of the Mappilas.

Conclusion

The Mappilas of Kerala have responded to the political and social issues with great vigour from the period of European penetration itself. In the Portuguese period, the Mappilas raised strong defence when their existence was in peril. The struggles of those days were primarily for existence than the religious belief or community itself. In eighteenth century the Mappilas had to resist two powers from outside that the Mysore rulers and the British colonialism. As mentioned, the local Mappila chiefs attempted to resist the forces of Mysore and later aligned with Pazhassi Raja to fight against the British.

The Mappilas as a political class have collectively organised a series of revolts from the early years of nineteenth century itself. Though the nationalistic thoughts and struggles shaped only in a far later period, long before the Mappilas had challenged colonial oppression and exploitative social order bravely. Though

religion played the role of ideology, those revolts were not communal. The Khilafath- Non co-operation movement was eventually led to the revolt of 1921, which drastically changed the political map of Malabar. Though started with the Congress' and Gandhiji's call, both disowned the Mappilas over the matter of violence. However, for the Congress, the Mappilas of Malabar became a lost terrain forever. Interestingly, Mappilas as a single category was not totally involved in resistance movements. While the urban elite and landed aristocracy among Mappilas supported the British, the rural tenant/peasant Mappilas took arms against the British. The class factor had obviously worked in the politics of Mappilas. And more importantly a section of *ulema* had supported the British and issued *fatwas* to condemn the anti-colonial revolts. The post-rebellion (1921) period witnessed a move within the Mappila community to reform and to cop-up with the new horizon of colonial modernity. The reform was subjected to severe criticism and reformers were attacked by the orthodoxy and *ulema* within the community itself.

Though the reform succeeded in educating and 'modernizing' the Mappilas to a certain extent, it gradually opened up a way for a sense of community, leading to communitarian or communal representations in Kerala politics. The class dispositions of both reformist leaders and the Muslim political leaders were essentially of elite origin. The Mappila nationalists and the left wing in the Congress had tried their best to contain the elitist and exclusivist turn from the very beginning itself. It was because of its commitment to the poor that a group of young Mappilas and peasants, workers and plantation labourers were later attracted to the Left politics. However the practitioners of communitarian politics became victorious in dissolving the class consciousness within the community, which represented the elite upper class leaders and common man on the one side and the contradictory interests of the urban rich and landless rural poor on the other. It was materialised through the popularisation of idioms of Islam by the party- Muslim League, and placing communism as the common enemy of the community (It is surprising to see that the hostile groups of orthodox Sunni Muslims- in the Kerala context- and the *bête noire* of which, the so-called progressive Mujahids share the common political agenda and programmes within the Muslim League). Obviously, the interests represented in the name of Mappilas were of the elite and aristocratic Mappilas. And the Muslim organisations like Kerala Jamiyyathul Ulema, Kerala Nadvathul Mujahideen, Samastha Kerala Jamiyyathul Ulema, Jama'ath-e Islami etc. have collectively extended their support directly or indirectly to the communitarian politics to check the Muslims from collaborating with the left. To be precise, though the Mappilas showed great political vigour and anti- colonial resistance, there were divergent streams of political thoughts and praxis. It is a myth that all the time

the community followed a progressive stance in politics and such bogus claims are against history and the progress of the community. Indeed, the Mappila folk craved for a vigorous political representation based upon class consciousness, but which was defused by the agencies of reform and communitarian politics.

Notes

- 1 Gangadharan M.(2011): “Malabar Kalaapapam Aakhoshikkaruthu,”*Mathrubhumi Aazhchappathippu*, July 10-16: 38-41.
- 2 Contrary to the popular belief, the Mappila chiefs of Malabar fought against the Mysorean rulers without any religious considerations. The historiography popularised by the elite/ Hindu Right never highlights this aspect.
- 3 It was Vanji Cudorath Kunji Mayin of Thalasseri, a relative of Kottayam Tangal, who was arrested on the 3 September 1857, on a charge of using seditious and inflammatory language in the public streets of Tellicherry, and invoking the people in the name of God to rid the country of the *kafirs* (read as Europeans). According to Logan, the excitement caused by Mayan’s preaching was so great and as to induce Brigadier to adopt precautionary measures at Cannanore and Tellicherry, and to place the former in a state of defence. After a series of debates between the Judges various designations the Acting Justice came to a conclusion that the accused was insane, and he proposed the Government to put the Mappila Outrageous Act in force by deporting him. This suggestion was adopted and Mayan subsequently died in jail at Trichirappalli; William Logan, *Malabar*, Madras, 1951 (1887): 576; for the content of Kunhi Mayin’s speech see S.K Pottakkad et al. (1978/1985) *Muhammed Abdurahiman*(Mal), Kozhikkode Mathrubhumi: 70.
- 4 The term ‘Thangal’ is derived from a Malayalam form of polite address and commonly applied to Mappilas who trace their descent to the prophet’s family. It is therefore the equivalent of *Sayyid*. A surprising number of Mappila families find their origin in the interior Hadramauth town of Tarim, a wealthy town, dominated by *Sayyids*. See, Roland E. Miller, *Mappila Muslims of Kerala: A Study in Islamic Trends*, Madras: Orient Longman: 1992(1976):.42, fn.12, 13.
- 5 *Uddathul Umara wal Hukkam Li Ihanathil Kafarathi wa Ibadathil Asnam*, meaning ‘a weapon to Amirs and the authority against the infidels and the idol worshippers’- read the local rulers and the British.
- 6 Sayid Alavi was the author of *Assaiful Bathaar Ala man Yuvalil Kuffar*, meaning ‘the sword which is aimed at those support the infidels.’
- 7 For details of imposing fine on rebel villages, see Logan 1951(1887: 575) .
- 8 Letter from F.C. Brown to the Chief-Secretary to the Government of Madras, dated 15 January 1864, MJP, F. No. 980, 4 July 1864, cited by M. Gangadhara Menon, *Malabar Rebellion(1921-22)*, Allahabad, 1989: 69-70, F. Note.5.
- 9 See M. Rashid, *Muhammed Abdurahiman Sahib* (Mal), Calicut, 1998 (1994): 67-69; Similar instances of alienation experienced from the Caste Hindu leaders due to his association with poor Mappilas are shared by veteran Congress leader M.P. Narayana Menon. See, M.P.S. Menon, *M.P. Narayana Menon: A Forgotten Pioneer*, Angadipuram, 1992: 22-24.
- 10 *Mathrubhumi Daily*, 6 June 1925.
- 11 *Mathrubhumi Daily*, 26 May and 25 August 1931.

- 12 AICC Files p.12; part I/ 1939 (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, NMML); AICC Files, p.38, 1939-40(NMML), and B.153, cited in T.A. Muhammed, 'Leftist Movement and the Mappila Muslims', *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 71st Session, Malda, 2010: 722-733.
- 13 It was in connection with the Anti- Repression Day on 15 September 1940 by the Communist Party at Tellicherry. Kurup(1989:5).
- 14 In the Morazha agitation, out of 38 convicted, 3 were Mappilas and among four accused with capital punishment in Kayyur revolt included Aboobecker.

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Political Islam, Violence and Civil Society in Pakistan

K.M. Seethi

The news that Pakistan approved death sentences of seven ‘hardcore terrorists’ involved in the massacre at Peshawar’s Army Public School indicated the first endorsement of death sentences by the Army Chief following the Supreme Court’s judgment giving legal cover to the establishment of military courts in the country (*Dawn* 13 August 2015). The attack on the School in Peshawar killed 145 people, including 132 children, 10 staff and three soldiers. More than 100 others were injured in the blockade that intentionally targeted the school’s 1,100 students, most of whom were the children of army personnel. Pakistan lifted a seven year moratorium on the death penalty a day after the massacre and amended its constitution to allow military courts to try those accused of terror attacks. The tragedy in Peshawar, no doubt, has few parallels (Seethi 2014). However, much before the Peshawar killing, Pakistan’s image has been that of a country in a deepening crisis as a result of the Islamic resurgence and sectarian violence. Pakistan is also seen as the support base of various radical/fundamentalist/militant/extremist Islamic movements and organisations that are perceived to threaten the peace and stability of countries within and across the region. The way in which Pakistan is often portrayed is a clear indication of how stereotypes work well in foreign policy and security discourses. An attempt is made here to explore the factors that triggered the rise of political Islam in Pakistan and its implications for state-civil society relations.

The categories of ‘political Islam’ and ‘Islamism’ are interchangeably used in this paper, though these terms might appear problematic in capturing the ground level realities across countries. The basic premise of the paper is that the emergence/revival of political Islam in Pakistan is a manifestation of a deepening systemic crisis in the country where state-civil society relations have undergone major structural changes during the last 30 years or even more. Before discussing the specificities of Islamism and state-civil society relations, it would be pertinent to outline some of the problems in conceptualising political Islam as an analytical category.

Political Islam is broadly a term used to represent a variety of political activities, practices and discourses informing the ideological mission of Islam. But the mission as such is a problematic as it varies from one country to another, from one organisation to another. Therefore the attempts to homogenise these multiple identities, discourses and practices into a single, unified political Islam are fraught with several implications. Samir Amin, a prominent scholar of the radical political economy school, for instance, sees modern “political Islam as invented by the Orientalists serving British colonialism in India and was adapted intact by Mawdudi of Pakistan.” Amin says that “political Islam aligns itself with the camp of dependent capitalism and dominant imperialism.” He also goes to the extent of saying that “Political Islam is only a version of neoliberalism, extolling the virtues of the market – completely unregulated, naturally – it is also an absolute refusal of democracy.” For him, political Islam is “nothing other than an adaptation to the subordinate status of comprador capitalism.” The “discourses of globalised neoliberal capitalism and Political Islam do not conflict, but are complementary,” Amin says, and it is “in no way the adversary of imperialism, but is, quite the contrary, its perfect servant” (Amin 2007; also Amin 2001:3-6). Amin’s position is categorical within the macro-structural paradigm, but it tends to underestimate several trends and practices at the micro levels. His arguments also tend to ignore the possibility that political Islam itself could be a reaction to, or as a consequence of, globalised neoliberal policies and programmes. More importantly, Amin’s thesis does not seem to have the potential to address the complex characteristics of the state and ruling classes in the Arab world where political Islam has gained considerable momentum recently.

Advocates of political Islam, on the other hand, argue that Islam as a system of faith has something significant to say about how politics and society should be organised in the modern Muslim world. It is a kind of ‘instrumentalisation’ of Islam by groups and organisations that engage in political practices. It also offers political responses to societal challenges in the contemporary era by envisioning a future, the basis for which rests on the concepts derived from the Islamic tradition (Fuller 2003; also Denoëux 2002). The political organisations identified within the construct of political Islam have different ideological and institutional modes of engagement. Mohammed Ayooob points out that political Islam comes in different forms and dimensions and these differences are always perceptible not only among countries but within countries as well. There is something inherent in Islamism, such as the use of religious symbols and expressions that appeal to the masses that may be partly responsible for its popularity. There are also important factors such as the authoritarian and repressive character of regimes that play an even greater part in giving political Islam legitimacy and credibility (Ayooob 2008).

In that sense, the political mobilisation underway in the Arab World is perhaps an appropriate answer to the questions raised by scholars like Samir Amin. Political Islam is not a universal, monolithic phenomenon unrelated to specific socio-political formations. The diverse experiences of the self-proclaimed Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan make clear that there is no consensus over what constitutes such a system as envisaged by political Islam. The political organisations working within this general mode of political Islam adopt different strategies that are determined by the contexts in which they operate. Even within the same country, there are multiple expressions of political Islam. For example, the traditional Salafis (Wahhabists) hardly agree with the ideology of Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) of Pakistan. Jamaat is also fighting an ideological battle with other Ulama-based parties such as Jamaat-Ulema-Islam(JUI) and Jamaat-Ulema-Pakistan (JUP). Likewise, political Islam is not always against democracy as it is made out by many, including Amin. There are several instances when Jamaat-i-Islami and other Islamic parties (like Muslim Brotherhood) have participated in the democratic processes, held political power and negotiated with secular parties and institutions of modern state.

The International Crisis Group Report on Islamic Parties in Pakistan published in December 2011 says that these parties “might operate within the current political order, but their ultimate aim is to replace it with one that is based on narrow, discriminatory interpretations of Islam” (International Crisis Group 2011). This obviously is a remote possibility in Pakistan given the heterogeneous nature of the political Islam. The Report says that these Islamic parties “have also taken equivocal positions on militant jihad: on the one hand, they insist on their distinction from militant outfits by virtue of working peacefully and within the democratic system; on the other, they admit to sharing the ideological goal of enforcing Sharia (Islamic law), while maintaining sizeable madrasa and mosque networks that are breeding grounds for many extremist groups” (Ibid). It further notes that in spite of their “claims of working peacefully, the major Islamic parties maintain militant wings, violent student organisations and ties to extremist groups, and have proved more than willing to achieve political objectives through force (Ibid). The Report is certainly biased inasmuch as it is consciously avoiding any analysis of the ground realities within the country as well as the political dynamics of the Islamic political parties. It is a glaring fact that the Islamic parties in Pakistan have perceptible ideological differences.

Mustapha Kamal Pasha (2004) offers a conceptual distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Islamists in Pakistan. According to him, the new Islamists are, by and large, advocates of political Islam; they try to “transform politics through religion and religion through politics.” While the ‘old’ Islamists were willing to

accommodate secular politics, the new Islamists refuse to accept such an option. Pasha says that “learning the art of politics” from secular forces, the new Islamists seek “to transform both the state and civil society in the image of what they believe can be a truly Islamic order” (Barsalou 2002:2-3). The rise of new Islamism is traced back to the period that began with the Bangladesh movement in 1971 and continued with the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the oil embargo. The surge in the oil economy in the West Asian countries led to substantial migration of workers in the 1970s which, according to Pasha, tended to undermine the Pakistani labour movement. Consequently, some of the old Islamists transformed themselves into new Islamists. However, the new Islamism gained momentum “from political and sectarian divides reinforced by age and class and exacerbated by the circumstances growing out of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan” (Ibid). The strategy put in place by new Islamists, over years, is to take over the institutions in the Pakistani civil society with a long term objective of capturing the state. The complex and tenuous nature of the Pakistani state is also an important factor here. The state—while being unable to provide even the basic services to the people—has always sought to divert its vital resources mainly for external debt-servicing and domestic military build up. Thus, a major cause of the growth of religious radicalism in Pakistan is the failure of the developmental state and the inability of the successive governments to deliver justice to the needs of the society.

Thus, over years, the political Islam has made inroads into the Pakistani society by changing the dominant political discourses in Islamic terms. Obviously, this put the secular elites and institutions on the defensive. The process was set in motion much before the radical religious schools were set up since the Afghan crisis in the late 1970s. Meanwhile, in order to get hold of the lost ground, the state and secular elites have also deployed religion, thereby helping provide extensive backing for this ‘new’ political Islam. Votaries of political Islam in Pakistan have also been able to dictate the terms of discourses in the realm of civil society, including at the level of higher education.

The emergence of political Islam, by and large, demonstrates the rising frustrations marked by the widening gap between very visible Muslim elite in Pakistan that has taken advantage of the globalised world economy and those left on the periphery (Pasha 2004: 135-152). The social contradictions in Pakistan got sharpened since the late 1980s as the successive governments became instruments in putting in place the structural reform measures dictated by the IMF and the World Bank. It was apparently done as part of an effort to reduce domestic financial imbalances and external deficits. But the economy continued to be trapped in a vicious circle of rising poverty, low growth, low savings and low investment, resulting in massive unemployment, illiteracy and low per capita income. The

UNDP Report 2011 ranked Pakistan at 145 among 187 nations. In 2010, Pakistan was categorised as a medium human development country. Well above 50 per cent of the population was suffering from multidimensional poverty. The report says that as many as 49.4 per cent of the country's population was living in multidimensional poverty, while 11 per cent was at risk of being pushed into the category. It defined the phenomenon of multidimensional poverty using the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) which assesses the nature and intensity of poverty at the individual level in education, health outcomes, and standard of living. According to the report, 53.4 per cent of the population was suffering from intense deprivation while 27.4 per cent lives in "severe poverty."¹

Pakistan's very low literacy rate and inadequate investment in social sectors like education and health led to a decline in Pakistan's development scenario. The IMF has identified three main structural weaknesses for the economic miseries of Pakistan; (i) fiscal deficit; (ii) trade deficit; and (iii) inadequate social services to the poor and the vulnerable. The other reasons diagnosed by the IMF include internal law and order situation, an unparalleled global rise in prices of oil, food and other essential commodities, instability in international financial markets and, most significantly, "bearing the direct and indirect costs being a frontline state in the 'War on Terror.'"² Consequently, Pakistan has been forced to grapple with critical problems including growing fiscal and current account deficits; rising inflation; growth deterioration; and depleting foreign exchange reserves. Another major factor that severely disturbed the development process in Pakistan was its role in the war on terror. Pakistan had to shoulder huge socio-economic burden of being a partner in the counter terrorism campaign. The IMF says: "The anti-terrorist campaign, which followed the 9/11 event in the United States in 2001, over-strained Pakistan's budget as allocations for law enforcement agencies had to be increased significantly which meant erosion of resources for development all over Pakistan ... in addition to human sufferings and resettlement costs." Since the beginning of the campaign, "an overall sense of uncertainty has contributed to capital flight, as well as, slowed down domestic economic activity making foreign investors jittery" (IMF 2010).

Islamabad's participation in the war on terror campaign "led to massive unemployment in the affected regions." Repeated bombings, deterioration of the law and order situation and dislocation of the local populace had taken a heavy toll on the socio-economic foundation of the country. The IMF estimated cost of the war on terror to Pakistan to the level of Rs 484 billion during 2007-08. This cost was again to increase to Rs 678 billion during 2008-09. To add further, the global food crisis badly affected Pakistan in the form of price hike of food items which included over 100 per cent increase in the price of oil in the international

market since April 2007; over 200 per cent increase in the price of palm oil; and an increase of 150 per cent in wheat prices (IMF 2010). The social contradictions in Pakistan got sharpened when the economic conditions continued to worsen in the post-liberalisation period. The Islamic forces have taken advantage of the emerging situation and this gained momentum at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Islam and Islamism

The role of Islam in the making of the state of Pakistan has always been a matter of controversy and intense political debates. Though Pakistan was founded on religious sentiments and Muslim identity, the nature and dynamics of Islam continued to be a vexed question. The two-nation theory, the so called rationale of the new Muslim state, lost its relevance at the commencement of its statehood when Mohammad Ali Jinnah in his inaugural address to the Pakistan constituent Assembly clearly stated that religion was a private affair of the individual. Highlighting the equality of religions, Jinnah categorically said that the new state of Pakistan had no religion as its ideology (Jinnah 1947). However, Jinnah's outlook was not shared by his successors. Consequently, the political development/nation-building process in Pakistan showed the decline of secular outlook and the rising role of religion and other ethnic groups in all spheres of the society. Over the years, the Muslim leadership had to reluctantly acknowledge the 'longer will' of the people and promote the concept of Pakistan as a religious state. Thus, the role of Islam in the nation-building process became 'inevitable' from the point of view of regime legitimacy, especially when Pakistan had slid itself into unstable political environs in less than five years after independence.

Though Pakistan became an Islamic Republic (with the proclamation of the Objectives Resolution in 1949 and later with the adoption of the first Constitution in 1956) due to the influence of religious groups, the nation-building process (based on religion) could not accommodate the people belonging to diverse religions, sects and ethnic groups. The lack of stable democratic set up helped these groups to involve in politics in favour of their interests, thereby paving the way for the emergence of religious, sectarian, linguistic and ethnocentric conflicts in Pakistan. Such conflicts eventually helped the civil-military bureaucracy to make inroads into the political society of Pakistan. Islam was generally, and conveniently, used for political mobilisation by various political parties as well as the military autocrats from time to time.

The spectre of Islam in Pakistani politics offered a space to fundamentalist/militant activities. This religious revivalism became manifest in the seventies and eighties when General Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988) was in power. He deployed Islam as an effective tool to legitimise his power with the support of many religious fundamentalist groups (Ahmed 1996: 372-386). During this period, Pakistan

witnessed the state-sponsored Islamisation programme which also paved the way for the emergence of many sub-national movements in the country, besides creating numerous Islamic social and political institutions (Munir 1980). As part of the Islamisation programme, the military regime provided financial and other supports to madrasas and enabled Islamic parties, social groups and Ulama to do the same. The regime also encouraged the proliferation of madrasas by increasing opportunities for employment of their graduates in government agencies and state institutions. Recruitment in government services, however, went hand-in-hand with changing the social and intellectual functions of traditional Islamic education (Burki 1988). Thus, madrasas served as avenues of Islamism and extremist political activities.

After Zia's death (1988), a moderate left-of-centre Pakistan People's Party (PPP) came to power with Benazir Bhutto as the prime minister. But the Benazir government had to face the pressures by the military and its civilian ally, the Islamic Jamhoori Ittihad (IJI), an alliance of centre-right and Islamic parties, believed to have been propped up by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. The IJI consisted of JI and Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N). Obviously, the military and other state apparatuses such as intelligence agencies have played an important role in sustaining Islamist forces in the country. It is estimated that around two dozen Islamic parties now take active participation in Pakistan's political process. But their influence and legitimacy depend very much on the electoral gains that they can ensure, though the support of the military apparatus is also important. Their future also depends on their capacity to influence the state institutions, and to enter into politically advantageous alliances with the two mainstream parties that are moderate on religious matters, PPP and PML (N) (International Crisis Group 2011).

The victory of the six-party Islamic coalition, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), in the 2002 elections in the provinces of Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan was, at first, thought to be evidence of the Islamic parties' power if they were joined in a single grouping. However, the result was later confirmed to be the outcome of massive rigging by the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf, which wanted to contain its major rivals, the PPP and PML-N. Besides, the coalition as manifest in its subsequent fragmentation showed more about internal differences between the parties – especially between, the revivalist JI and the orthodox Deobandi Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) – than about their unity. Having lost the military's support in the 2008 polls, the MMA was wiped out by the PPP, PML-N and Pashtun nationalist Awami National Party (ANP). MMA's defeat was apparently due to the fact that it did not have the support of the military apparatus and that its own performance during their rule in the two provinces was disappointing. The other Islamic parties,

Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (Fazlur Rehman) and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) continue to be major political forces due to their ability to mobilise masses, and their influence on public institutions. There are other Islamist groups such as the Ahle Hadith, an orthodox, puritanical sect inspired by Sunni Wahhabi doctrine, who also plays an important role in the political process. The Ahle Hadith sect is suspected to have close links with many terrorist outfits, most notably the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD), the renamed Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (Ibid).

The ability of the Islamic parties to challenge the democratic/development processes in Pakistan is a critical question that everyone is now grappling with. It might be debatable whether these Islamic parties (labelled as political Islamists) have any significant strength to effect the socio-political transformation in Pakistan. It is believed that though their electoral base is too fragile, the Islamisation programmes put in place in the past provided them a strong legal and political apparatus that might give them some power to influence public policy far beyond their support base or numerical strength. It is a fact that the Islamists have found new support base in the civil society where the primary locus of Islamism lies today. Earlier, Islamists were the clients of the state. It suggests a major shift in its trajectory since 1990s.

The effects of neoliberal reforms, on the one hand, and the expansion of the media, on the other, were critical in deepening the social and cultural divide between the privileged sections of the state and society, and the economically poor and vulnerable. The declining Pakistani state, now unable to provide either welfare or development to larger sections of the population, vacates major spaces available to civil society (Pasha 2004: 135-152). Islamists thus appear to be intervening in these spaces, dispensing services, and thereby gaining strength vis-a-vis the state. But to imagine a 'dynamic' civil society without a stable state is to nurture an illusion that civil society can do everything, including ensuring social security and harmony. In sum the role of the state in Pakistan is still critical in ensuring social protection and social security, the inevitable factors in the making of a stable and peaceful society. Pakistan is still in search of such a state and civil society the functions of which depend on the extent to which the precepts of democratic politics and practices are incorporated into the agenda of social and political forces.

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Notes

1. UNDP (2012); Pakistan Planning Commission admitted that poverty rate had jumped significantly though the Government of Pakistan tried to underestimate the level of poverty for other reasons. The Planning Commission estimated that in 2005 there were 35.5 million people living below the poverty line but in 2008 their number increased to over 64 million. "Poverty in Pakistan," Pakistan Today, 20 January 2011 available at <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/01/20/comment/editors-mail/poverty-in-pakistan> accessed on 25 November 2012/; also see Government of Pakistan, *Pakistan Employment Trends 2011*, Islamabad: Statistics Division, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2012. http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/Labour%20Force/publications/Pakistan_Employment_2012.pdf (accessed on 25 November 2012).
2. IMF (2010). In Pakistan's scenario, where approximately two-thirds of the people live in rural areas, rural poverty is a major destabilising factor. The official statistics point out that nearly 67 per cent of Pakistan's households owned no land; 18.25 per cent households owned less than five acres of land; and 9.66 per cent owned between five and 12.5 acres, sufficient only to provide meagre levels of existence for sometimes large extended families that tend to rely on land as the sole source of income. The pattern was dismally skewed towards a few feudal families in possession of large land holdings; barely one per cent (0.64 per cent plus 0.37 per cent) of households owned over 35 acres. "Poverty in Pakistan," *Dawn*, 17 October, 2011 <http://dawn.com/2011/10/17/poverty-in-pakistan/> accessed on 25 November 2012; The Poverty Assessment of the Asian Development Bank had also documented the substantial increase in the incidence of poverty in Pakistan since the 1990s. ADB(2008).

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Ethnic Nationalism and the Formation of Korean Identity

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The doctrine of globalisation claims that the world is flat and argues that nationalism would weaken around the world as globalisation spreads its wings far and wide. Proponents of this hypothesis have confidently predicted the demise of ethnic and racial ties in modern nation-states. The rapid development and expansion of information and communication technologies, however, contests this claim. One of the important paradoxes of globalisation is that it has not only created a more interconnected world through communication technologies, but has also simultaneously spun and energised many an insular, inward-looking idea of nationalism based on ethnicity, religion, and other cultural identities. Thus, the concepts of a nation and nationalism are increasingly becoming complex today. To define the concepts of nation and nationalism, some scholars look at 'objective' factors such as language, territory, and institutions, while others underline the 'subjective' factors like attitudes, perceptions, customs, traditions, myths, and sentiment.

In Korea (both the South and North), ethnicity is a widely circulated, respected, and embraced idea, thanks to their long history of identity formation with a single ethnic homogenous group. The Koreans root as an ethnic nation traces back to Tangun, the legendary founder of the state/kingdom. Throughout history, the Koreans (both South and North) maintained and still continue to maintain a strong sense of ethnic homogeneity based on shared blood and common ancestry and it continues to shape their politics and society even today. This article first studies the formation of Korean identity through various paradigms, such as traditional, modern, colonial, post-liberation, and post-Cold War era; and secondly analyses the influences of ethnic nationalism throughout these stages in shaping the Korean identity. Through these analyses, this paper argues that ethnic nationalism is not only a crucial source of pride for the Koreans but it also inspires and defines

their socio-political and national identity. In addition, ethnic nationalism has also carried some ideas like pan-Korean nationalism, assertive nationalism, and inter-Korean nationalism into the Korean Peninsula.

Ethnicity & Nation-States

Ethnic identity generally refers to an individual level of identification with his/her culturally defined collectivity, wherein the individual finds him/herself a sense of 'belonging' within the community. Members of an ethnic community, therefore, must be made to feel, not only that they form a single 'super family', but also that their historic community is unique. There are a range of theoretical interpretations on ethnicity and its characteristics. One of the most popular definitions is by Schermerhorn, who says:

an ethnic group is defined as a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood. Examples of such symbolic elements are kinship patterns, physical(y) contiguous (as in localism or sectionalism), religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation, nationality, phenotypical features, or any combination of these. A necessary accompaniment is some consciousness of kind among members of the group (Schermerhorn 1978: 12).

The origins and characteristics of a nation and nationalism are widely discussed in political philosophy, history, sociology, cultural anthropology, and so on. Some scholars like Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983), and Hobsbawm (1983) argue that the notions of nation and nationalism should be theorising as something new and modern. Their interpretations have gone through a range of concepts--a nation is a result of 'industrial transformation'¹ of a society; nation is a creation of 'social and historical transformation';² and a nation is an 'imagined political community.'³ On the other hand, scholars like Geertz (1963), Armstrong (1982), Connor (1994), Smith (1986), and Hutchinson (1994) propose a different concept. They define nation as a continuation of long-standing patterns of ethnicity built upon pre-existing geographic or cultural foundations.

In the initial stage, ethnicity is mainly interpreted by the 'primordialists'⁴ like Edward Shills and Clifford Geertz. They define nation as a 'given' and the idea of given related with immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of language, and following particular social practice (Shills 1957; Geertz 1993: 259). They endorse a kind of social bonding or embeddedness of individuals with religion, blood, race, language, region and custom. All discourses on ethnicity are enclosed with Barth's 'transactionalist', Horowitz's (1985) 'social psychological,'

and Armstrong, Smith and Hutchinson's 'ethno-symbolic' approaches. They give different degrees of priority to the social, economic, and cultural factors, while defining ethnicity and its determining role in a modern nation. Therefore, the idea of modernist reductionism, which solely prioritises objective factors, is challenged by the ethno-symbolists who focus on the roles of pre-existing ethnicity and other varied components in the formation of a modern nation. By contesting the 'invented' or 'constructed' notion of nationalism, the ethno-symbolists argue that modernists delink the persistence of earlier myths, symbols, values, and memories in the formation of modern nation and nationalism. This approach, however, is not a complete rejection of the objective elements such as political and economic, but more focused on the subjective elements such as heritage, tradition, and ethnicity. Thus, ethno-symbolists frame the rise of nations and nationalism as a kin form of earlier collective cultural identities especially of ethnic communities or *ethnies*⁵ (Smith 1986).

Among the ethno-symbolists, Armstrong's ideas on nation and nationalism are mainly articulated in his pioneering work *Nations before Nationalism* (1982), in which he argues that ethnic consciousness has a long history and that it is possible to trace its roots to the ancient civilisations of Egypt and Mesopotamia. Therefore, contemporary nationalism is nothing but the final stages of a larger cycle of ethnic consciousness reaching back to the earliest forms of collective organisation. The most important features of this are its persistence. Thus, "the formation of ethnic identities needs to be considered in a time dimension of many centuries" (Armstrong 1982: 4). Further, Hutchinson explains that "in spite of significant differences between pre-modern and modern societies, long established cultural repertoires (myths, symbols and memories) are 'carried' into the era by power institutions (states, armies, churches) and are revived and redeveloped because populations are periodically faced with similar challenges to their physical and symbolic survival" (Hutchinson 2000: 661).

In the entire work, Smith seeks to define pre-modern roots of contemporary nations by contesting the modernist interpretation of nations and nationalism. His central thesis, the ethnic origin of nations-- claims that "modern nations and nationalisms spring up on the basis of pre-existing *ethnie* and their ethnocentrism... which is likely to constitute an essential components to nation-building" (Smith 1989: 17). According to him, "nation is named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members" (Smith 1991b: 14). Broadly, nationalism attains characteristics that are more ethnic by linking the memories of the ethno-history and the older religious myths to the striving for collective territorial recognition and political autonomy in a historic homeland (Ibid: 84). Calhoun also supports this argument and defines "ethnicity as networks

of social relationships and nation as categories of similar individuals. The past is reproducing through direct ‘interpersonal interactions’ and the latter through the mediation of relatively impersonal agencies of large-scale cultural standardisation and social organisation” (Calhoun 1997: 28).

Rise of ethnic tension in the world has been prodding for developing an adequate framework to understand these issues. Thus, Connor proposes, “long experience has convinced for the necessity to precede any discussion of ethnicity and nationalism with a new terminology that is ethno-nationalism” (Connor 1994: 23). In the same way, Brubaker says that ethnicity, race, and nation should be reconceptualised not as substances or things or entities or organisms or collective individuals as the imagery of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded, and enduring ‘groups’ encourages us to do, but rather in relational, procession, dynamic, eventful, and disaggregated terms (Brubaker 2004 :38).

Ethnic Origins of Korean Nation

The historical roots of Korea as a nation are complex when it is analysed at the economic, social, and cultural level. Geographically, Korea is centrally located and it shares borders with China and Russia and lies just across the seas from Japan. The Korean Peninsula covers an area of approximately 2,20,000 km (Gil-sang 2005:14). Various excavations point to a possible origin of the mankind in Korea around 7,00,000 years ago. The ethnic origins of Korean nation can be trace back to the legendary founder *Tangun*. According to this legend, Tangun was the offspring of the deity Hwan-ung who is believed to have come to Paektu-san with a band of followers in response to the prayers of a female bear and tiger. There bear and tiger expressed a wish to become human beings, Hwan-ung ordered them to live in a cave for 100 days and gave them a bundle of sacred mugwort and twenty cloves of garlic and said, if you eat these and shun the sunlight for one hundred days, you will assume human forms. After twenty-one days, the bear became a woman, but the tiger, unable to observe the taboo, remained a tiger. Unable to find a husband, the bear-woman prayed under the sandalwood tree for a child. Hwanung metamorphosed himself, lay with her, and their union gave birth to a son, who is Tangun. He is considered to have founded Korea in 2333 BC. Another such myth revolves around Kija, the Chinese prince of the Shang dynasty, who is claim to have founded Korea in Southern Manchuria in 1122 BC. However, the legend around Tangun is more popular in the Korean Peninsula and most Korean academics and nationalists recognise Tangun as the ethnic originator of their nation. The myth about Tangun offers a symbolic way to explain how a complex blend of tribal Asian and proto-Caucasoid people interacted and merged ethnically and linguistically to give birth to the people of Gojoseon (the land of the morning clam).

The second half of the first century BC saw establishment of three kingdoms—the Goguryeo (56 BC), Baekje (18 BC), and Shilla (37 BC)—leading to the introduction of some institutional structure in the region. Nevertheless, during the same period, there was another kingdom in the southern part known as the Kaya, which shared close cultural ties with Japan. There were a series of confrontations between them in the early phase. Eventually, the Shilla kingdom got prominence and came to unify the central and southern regions of the Peninsula in the mid-6th century. Although, the unification was merely geographical, it was a turning point in Korean history, because the Shilla defeated the aggression of the Tang dynasty, which was one of the most glistening kingdoms in the history of China, and provided an opportunity to integrate the nation with distinct ethnic and cultural identity.

Later, the Goryeo dynasty (918-1392 AD) conquered the Shilla and one of the significant changes in this period was the origin of name of 'Korea'. The Goryeo dynasty lasted until 1392 when Yi Song-gye (a military general in the Koryo dynasty) established the Choson dynasty (1392-1910 AD), which was also called the Yi dynasty. From the beginning of the Yi dynasty, the Korean Peninsula began the initial steps in its journey to the modern form of the Korean nation. During this period, Korea underwent a series of upheavals and the people were mostly influenced by the doctrines of Neo-Confucianism (Eckert, Lee, Lew, Robinson and Wagner 1991: 135). For instance, the Russian-Japanese war of 1905 and the Sino-Japanese war of 1984-85 left deep impacts over the Koreans. The 1905 conflict eventually led to the Protectorate Treaty⁶ with Japan and compelled Korean leaders to sign treaty of annexation that made Korea a part of the Japanese empire in 1910.

There are several other views on the origins of the Korea as a nation. Most scholars advocate an ethnic view since all Koreans consider themselves to be the descendants of Tangun. Irrespective of their ideological differences, majority of Korean nationalist historians hold the view that the Koreans are the descendants of Tangun. For instance, according to the prominent Korean historian Son Chita, “since the beginning of history, we (Koreans) have been a single race that has had a common historic life, living in a single territory..., sharing a common destiny” (cited from Duncan 1998). Additionally, Gi-Wook Shin, a renowned scholar on Korean ethnicity, quotes the leading nationalist Shin Chae-ho, who considers Koreans as an ethnic nation that has its origins from the mythical figure Tangun. According to Shin Chae-ho, “the Korean people were descendants of Tangun Joseon, who merged with Buyo of Manchuria to form the Goguryeo people.” This original blend remains the ethnic or racial core of the Korean nation, a nation preserved through defence and warfare against outside forces. The nation was defined as an

organic body formed out of the spirit of the people...descended through single pure bloodline” (Shin 2006: 1).

Thus, Tangun constitutes a strong content of embeddedness to build a collective consciousness by common ethnic identity. The formation of Korean identity is embedded in particular social relations and the rise of the nation is inevitable to understand the preexisting ethnic ties to determine a particular form of collective identity and development of a particular notion of a nation. As Smith articulates, nations are a historical phenomenon, not only in the generic sense that they are embedded in particular collective pasts and emerge through specific historical processes, but also because, by definition, they embody shared memories, traditions, and hopes of the populations designated as parts of the nation (Smith 1999: 10).

Evolutionary Trajectory of Ethnic Nationalism in Korea

The concept of ethnic nationalism is an essential component to define Korea as a nation. In the formative years, Korean nationalism was an extended form of Asian nationalism, which is a product of anti-imperialistic and anti-colonial movements. The colonial domination of the Europeans over East Asia (China, Japan) by mid-16 century afterwards has left a deep impact over Korea Peninsula in the mid-1860s. The Confucianism based Korean society during the Yi dynasty was highly opposed to the colonial expansion and the Western notion of modernisation. For example, during the rule of the Daewongun (1820–1898), Korea’s foreign policy was generally a seclusionist one, as it was opposed to the Western strategic expansion of Catholicism in the name modernisation. Encouraging them to fight the European invasion Daewongun told the Koreans, “Foreign barbarians have invaded our country. If we do not fight, we must make peace with them. (But) If we make peace with them, it would lead us to the selling of the country. Let our posterity be warned of this for tens of thousands of years” (cited in Nahm 1983: 20).

It is very clear that the Koreans resisted Western imperialism to preserve their traditional ethnic values and heritage. They developed self-awareness as an inevitable formula to defend their cultural values from the threat of imperialist powers. Subsequently, it led to the formation and development of the *Silhak* (practical learning) scholars in the 18th century and they promote Korean literature as a national identity based on deep knowledge. As Gellner suggests, the nationalist transformation made possible partly by the development of a literate of ‘high culture’ is an extension of its relationship to the everyday culture of face-to-face relationships (Gellner 2004: 11). Formation of these scholarly groups played a significant role in the modern nationalist historiography of Korea. As Andrew C. Nahm elucidates,

Korean nationalism originated as a result of the reform movements of the *Silhak*. Nationalist scholars of the 17th and 18th centuries promoted a drive to establish the identity of the Korean nation by discovering their unique heritage (Nahm 1983: 34).

The anti-imperial and anti-colonial struggles made deep impact over Koreans' identity. As I-sop Hong explains the anti-foreign movement (whether it was conservative or exclusive) which erupted in 1881, failed due to the Japanese infiltration. A series of other turbulent incidents, such as resistance against the Japanese army in 1882, the political reforms of 1884, and the agrarian revolt spearheaded by the Tonghak (Eastern learning) believers in 1894, resulted in "awakening the Korean people to the necessity of strengthening their racial unity" (Hong 1966: 15). The Tonghak movement in the south was aimed at challenging the *Sohak* or Western learning, and thereby help improve the well-being of the peasantry who were suffering from heavy taxation and corruption under the late Yi dynasty. The Tonghak is considered as one of the significant mass movements in the nationalist history of modern Korea. Discussing the issue, Chong-sik Lee says the Tonghak, a religion that 'carried a seed of nationalism', emerged in the early 1860s and gained momentum in the early 1890s. This movement became "a milestone in the history of Korean nationalism, as it was the first large-scale mass movement of the commoners" (Lee 1965: 22).

After the Tonghak movement, the Korean national identity became more organised and led to the formation of the Independence Club, which published a Korean language newspaper named *Tonging Sinmun* (The Independent) for promoting national sentiment among the public. The Independent made enormous efforts to stimulate national consciousness across the country for national identity. The first issue of the newspaper emphatically stated that 'to speak in the interest of Koreans and Korean's alone.' Because, 'one must know one's own national history before knowing those of others.' In an article, Heung-soo Hahn mentions that "the foremost objective of the Independence Club was to educate and awaken the people of Korea with a view to lay the foundation of a strong and self-reliant nation" (Hahn 1975: 355).

Likewise, Agrawal says the Club encouraged the public to believe in the prowess of the Korean race and to take pride in the legacy of their glorious past. It also underlined the necessity of studying national history by using the Korean alphabets (*hangul*) (Agrawal 1998: 56). The movement did help bring out the latent potentials of the Korean society to form modern and advanced nation. Hahn says, "nationalism put forward by the Independence Club became the backbone and prime mover of the modernisation in Korea" (Hahn 1975: 392). In short,

the Independence Club was the first public organisation which evolved a well-considered ideology of progressive nationalism. The wide range of literary debates created the possibility of constructing a social identity among the Koreans. Further, it underscored the significance of ethnic identity for retaining cultural tradition and values among the people.

In 1910, Korea came completely under Japanese rule following the Protectorate Treaty of 1905. It was a critical situation for the Koreans as it has stimulated an extreme sense of nationalist sentiment in them against foreign intervention. Later even nationalism assumed a colour of militant resistance and led to the formation of the Righteous Army, a body of irregular army sprung up from the continuous struggles against Japanese imperialism. According to unofficial estimates, at least 50,000,00 Koreans participated at various levels of revolt and 20,000 were killed. The ultimate goal of the Righteous Army was 'to regain national sovereignty and prevent the demise of the Korean race'. The army declared that 'our land is Korea and we are the Koreans' (Nahm 1983: 24). The colonial period saw the emergence of a number of literatures, which mainly spoke on the need for creating nationalist ideas among the people.

Ethnic Nationalism and the Identity Formation under Japanese Rule

During the Japanese colonial rule (1910-45), ethnic nationalism became more assertive and it deeply influenced the formation of Korean identity. The anti-colonial and anti-imperial movements were aimed at preserving the Korean identity and the liberation from the colonial rule. During this phase, Korean thinkers visualised their country primarily in cultural terms, as an entity distinguished from other countries by its cultural homogeneity, and a population with a common set of myths, legends, stories, rituals, and imageries. As Hyung il Pai says nationalist scholars have theorised the prehistoric appearance of a self-aware 'pure Korean race' that, since its origins, has engaged in a "continuous national historical struggle to preserve Korean identity" (Pai 2000: 2) in the face of recurring foreign encroachments. A significant element in the formation of Korean identity was the evolution of a 'we consciousness', which carried certain ethnic overtones in all nationalistic movements.

The long-term colonial policy of the Japanese was complete assimilation of the Korean nation into their national identity on the assumption that ultimately assumed, Korea could become an integral part of the Japanese empire. According to an assessment by Shin and Chang, the Japanese' cultural assimilation policy was mainly based on colonial racism, which claimed that though the Koreans shared common origins with the Japanese, they were always subordinate to them (Shin

and Chang 2004: 122). The colonial rule always questioned the Koreans' national sovereignty. As Chizuko Allen explains, the Japanese colonial policy provoked Koreans' national sentiment by 'inferiorising' them and their nationhood. Given the misfortune of colonisation and the inability to recover their political sovereignty, Korean nationalists began "asserting the greatness of Korea's cultural heritage through a quest for Korea's historical origin" (Allen 1990: 791). They advocated the purity and distinctiveness of Korean nation or their homogeneous ethnic identity as a response to overcome colonial racism. Besides, they also extensively studied and reinforced Korean history, culture, and heritage to provide a 'scientific' temper for the distinctive origins of their nation and stressed that the 'Koreans are without a doubt a unitary nation in blood and culture.'

As gradually, Korean national sentiment began to grow stronger and stronger they sought to accrue power to overthrow Japanese occupation. All these led to the emergence of various organisations to fight the Japanese. Finally, the Japanese oppression led to the emergence of the 1919 independence movement. As Lee puts it pithily, the March First Movement 1919 was the first massive demonstration of the Koreans, inspired by the principle of national self-determination and the concept of 'one people, one nation'. In addition, 2 million Koreans participated in these demonstrations, which resulted in as many as 7,700 deaths, and 45,600 getting injured apart from 47,000 arrests (Lee 1965: 101-106). Some scholars highlight this movement as the beginning of the 'modern Korean nationalism.' The manifesto of the March First Movement (popularly known as the 'Song of Independence' and the 'Declaration of Independence') signed by 33 leaders, articulately stated their views on Korean identity. The declaration stated:

The Joseon people are called the losers, the weak, the displaced, the wanderers, and the vagabonds who were expelled from their native country. Everywhere one goes across five oceans and six continents, one witnesses the painful tribulations and tears of Koreans. The worst crime is that of having no country and the most heart-rending pain is that (of) losing one's country. How can we leave Joseon's jade-colour sky and fertile land? We do not have our own land. Oh brothers! Are you going to live like animals? Are you going to live like dogs without a native land? Finally, the enraged voice of the Korean people is heard in Seoul. The march of the 20th century has begun! Fellow Koreans, come to the streets! My deaf, blind, dumb, and starving brothers! My brothers! My sisters! All of you come out into the streets (cited in Gil-sang 2005: 95).

The domination of the Japanese over their cultural identity raised the Koreans' awareness about their own ethnic identity. For instance, Ch'oe Namson, one of the key nationalist figures during the colonial times, stressed the uniqueness of Korean culture (including their language, literature, and folklore) and elevated Tangun

as the supreme symbol of their cultural and historical heritage. He went so far as to advocate a historical view of 'North-East Asia centred on Korea' (cited in Allen 1990: 787).

Ethnic Nationalism and Identity Formation in post-Colonial Era

The liberation of Korea from Japanese rule in 1945 was an important political change in the modern Korean history. The ideological conflicts between the Communists and Capitalists left a grievous political impact over the Korean Peninsula. On the one side, the Soviet Union wanted to control a sizeable group of Koreans who were part of the communists-backed anti-Japanese movements during the Second World War. On the other side, the United State moved to control over Korea by using its influence with the former Korean 'provisional' government under Syngman Rhee, who then became the first president of South Korea. Thus, the US domination remained over the Southern part, while the Soviet Union focused on the Northern part. Finally, the Korean Peninsula was divided into North and South in 1945 and the conflicting claims for sovereignty led to the tragic Korean War of 1950-53.

Even though the Koreans were under the shadow of two distinctive ideologies, both the countries maintained a strong sense of ethnic nationalism. South Korean leaders like Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee extensively used nationalist rhetoric. The Southern regime named itself as the *Taehan min'guk* or the Republic of the Great Han Race and the *Tangun* myth became the indispensable national symbol. Syngman Rhee proposed the ideology of 'One People-ism' as the state policy of the new nation. Later, Park Chung-Hee, the former Army General and the dictator of South Korea from 1961 to 1979, never questioned the belief that Koreans were 'one race and one people' and constantly stressed Korea's mythical-historical origins from a common ancestor *Tangun* (Hee 1970: 21). Furthermore, he proudly proclaimed that 'we have never given up our pride or our dignity in being a homogenous people.' Even though national division was a political and geographical reality, he went on to call up on the North Koreans as "our brethren" by stating that:

Although we are now separated into South and North, we are one entity with a common destiny, bound by one language, and by one history and by the same racial origins. Ideology changes, but the nation stay(s) and last(s). We must quickly recover our identity as the inseparable Han race, and boldly push ahead to bring about the historical point through which national identity can be revived in the northern land. We are (a) great nation, which, during some five thousand years of history, has had to confront innumerable trials and perils, and yet has shown courage amid hardships, wisdom amid crisis, and has thus triumphantly overcome adversity (Hee 1972: 22).

Park committed himself to an ethnic notion of the nation of Korea, underlining their historical homogeneity and greatness. Initially, South Korea followed a 'state-led capitalistic model for development'⁷ under which the mode of production was moderate and functioned under the spirit of their ethnic homogeneity. On the political front, however, from the very beginning of the break-up, South Korea followed the Western system of free speech and individual freedom, but internally they could not change their strong traditional and cultural values in tandem with the capitalistic system. On one hand, common language, ethnicity, heritage, cultural identity always remained in the society as an overarching influence. The state actively promoted their historical heritage and ethnic homogeneity, even as it worked towards rapid industrialisation and development.

In fact, ethnic nationalism was used as an instrument to peruse 'developmental ethic' among the South Koreans. Moral and sentimental attachment of the labour force was one of the major factors used to strengthen the industrialisation programme. As Weberian (1904) concept of the creation of 'work ethics' and the 'commitment' has played an important role in promoting industrialisation in the South Korea. As Andrew Eungi Kim and Gil-sung Park observe, nationalist elements came to encompass the entire content of modernisation, and the industrial economy was viewed as the necessary basis for a modern state and society. The slogans by which the government attempted to unify public opinion stressed on the collective aspects of work and national economic development. Invocations of nationalist sentiment also involved mobilisation of national symbols, including the flag and national anthem. The national flag could find virtually in every office and factory in South Korea, and factories would halt work and salute the flag when the national anthem was played over the public-address system each morning and evening (Kim and Park 2003: 41-42). Amsden observes that the high level of labour productivity with strong nationalistic sentiment among the industrial workers was one of the most important factors in the phenomenal economic development of the South since the mid-1960s (Amsden 1989:4).

The short nationalist history between 1980 and 1990 is very significant in the transformation of modern South Korea and in developing their national identity. The transition to democracy, activities of the civil society, and the rise of anti-Americanism were important factors triggering the idea of ethnic nationalism in the South. For instance, the Gwangju Democratisation Movement of May 1980 replaced the authoritarian state system and subsequently civil society movements were given support to spread the idea of democratic values in the country. The democratiatic movement led to mass protests involving around 8,00,000 citizens fighting 3,000 elite paratroopers of the army's special warfare command and people

made blockade in the city for several days in May (Jungwoon 2005: 1). Soon the nation saw massive public opposition mounting against the United States, apart from mass student movements against the US support to the military dictatorship. Significantly, the emergence of a new generation of political leaders, who led the anti-American movements during South Korea's fight for democracy in the mid-1980s, generated the much-needed political fire-power to the anti-US sentiment. Many Koreans felt that the United States was a hegemonic power, threatening the very idea of their national sovereignty by imposing America's imperial interests over the Peninsula.

When it comes to North Korea, Kim il Sung's, the founding leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), notion of nationhood reflects his ideological positioning, which was primarily opposed to the Japanese and American forms of imperialism, while wholeheartedly welcomed the Soviet form of socialistic imperialism. According to Kang, the political perception of nationalism in the North could be understood in terms of the interplay of the two relationships--the ties between North Korea and the Soviet Union and those between the South and the North. For the North, nationalism meant a revolutionary approach to nationhood, which was mired in a blind belief in the Soviet communism. This energised revolutionary nationalism led to the 'national war for liberation' during 1945-53 which could establish a stable socialist system through political and economic reforms and war mobilisation with the ultimate motive of reunifying the Korean Peninsula (Kang 2007: 93). However, the ideological contradictions between the Chinese and Soviet models of socialism created some tension in North Korean socialism. Following this, Kim tried to consolidate the nationalist *Juche*⁸ ideology, which was the key weapon for the ideological mobilisation of the society and the development of an alternative path different from the Sino-Soviet versions of socialism.

On the economic front, North Korea trending downs the drains of penury, indigence, and mass deprivation. Specifically, since the 1970s, the North Korean economy has been on downturn, primarily due to its excessive arms budget for military build-up, which led to a massive reduction in economic aid from other socialist countries, largely the Soviet Union and China. Coupled with these ills were some serious structural crises the North had to fight the tragic famine of the 1980s and the 1990s being the most notable ones. To sum up, one can say that the ills North Korea has been facing are the result of a nationalist ideology that has had one only one singular objective--maintaining the incumbent dictatorial regime. This also led to stringent social control as well as state-nurtured ideologies such as *Urisik sahoe chuui* (socialism in our style), *Choson minjok chuui* (Korean nation as number one) the 'military-first politics,' and a 'powerful and prosperous nation.'

Against the background of such aggressive nationalism, one could argue that even if the North remained as a communist state, the history and transformation of this country hints at the development and practices of some nationalist elements. Whenever the North faced a national crisis, its state-promoted notion of nationalism has successfully come to its aid as the state could use it as a tool for social mobilisation and control. Often these centralised command and control system enabled the regime to create various nationalist rhetoric and discourses to work in its favour and fabricate a justification for and legitimacy to the military regime. The prominent position of the state has always been the persuasive factor in shaping an emotional attachment of the public to strengthen national unity, economic stability, and prosperity. Thus, creation of political nationalism mostly depended over historical past and ethnic identity. The affirmation of Korean historiography and ethnic homogeneity is essential for retaining national sentiment among the North Koreans.

Throughout these periods, the speeches and statements of national leaders in both Koreas primarily emphasised on the ethnic origin of Korea as a nation. As per Shin et.al (1999), the official discourse of Kim Il-Sung in the North and Park Chung-Hee in the South was based on Connor's recommendation, on the premise of 'nationalist speeches and proclamations.' The speeches and works of these two figures contain a variety of propagandistic elements, but the focus is "not the sincerity of the propagandist, but the nature of the mass instinct to which he or she appeals" (Shin et.al 1999: 476).

Ethnicity and Identity Formation in Post-Cold War Era

Since the 1990s, studies on ethnicity got wider currency in the academic domain. One of the central themes in these debates is that the widespread revival of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic identities and its determining role in defining a modern nation. In particular, the proliferation of ethnic and national conflicts in the erstwhile Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has produced serious deep concerns over ethnic nationalism. The Cold War logic and its political settings always tried to suppress the memories of nationhood based on ethnicity, language, and region. Since the Cold War often denied autonomy and sovereignty of individual nations, its end brought an end to the contradictory nature of this global polity, and generated a new logic of national identity and new international relationships. In South Korea, the democratic government established in the latter half of the 1980s manifested specifically through the 'June Uprisings' (1987). Democracy has deeply influenced the present political system in the South. As Sunhyuk Kim explains, democracy has created many civil society organisations in the South such as the Citizen for Economic Justice, the League of Anti-Pollution Movements, feminist

groups, Teachers' Association for Educational Reforms, and pressure groups among others, to bring about responsive state agencies (Kim 1997:1135).

However, despite the close cooperation that the South Korean official machinery has had with the Americans, the public has been nurturing strong anti-American⁹ feelings, as evidenced in the ethnic nationalistic movements like 'assertive nationalism'¹⁰ and inter-Korean nationalism etc. For instance, Sook-jong Lee points to the two remarkable expressions of nationalist sentiment among people, as late as in 2002. The first rose from the dramatic victory of their football team in the 2002 World Cup that was jointly hosted by South Korea and Japan. Another was the 'candle light vigils' and protests against deaths of two young schoolgirls in an accident involving American forces. These two events, which took place on the same streets of central Seoul in 2002, though appear to be different on the surface, the objectives and the tone and tenor were same --one to cheer on their sports team, and the other to encourage political protests aimed at driving strong nationalistic fever with an avowed anti-imperial/anti-American tone. Moreover, these two incidents, though seemingly had different strands of culture and politics reflected the re-emergence of their ethnic nationalism, as well as stood out as a clear example and articulation of their assertive nationhood.

The East Asian currency crisis of the mid-1997 brought the till-the-other-day-booming South Korean economy to its knees and left its economic, political, and social structure crippled. An alert government unleashed a slew of measures to stimulate the bruised national sentiment and confidence to overcome the crisis. As Cho points out that, the government launched campaign billed 'Gold Drive Campaign' in 1998 following the crippling financial crisis with tremendous success as soon various media houses and other private sector organisations joined the government to drive the message across-- urging the people to donate their gold to pare national dues. A number of national media actively participated in this campaign and around 2,00,000 Koreans mopped up around \$2 billion (Cho 2008: 87).

Ethnic nationalism and globalisation have become more complex in the post-Cold War phase, thanks to the complex questions they leave unanswered than resolved. Some of the logical questions that are to find satisfactory answers are: will globalisation create a 'borderless world'?; can global culture and heterogeneous identities be replaced with national culture and ethnic homogeneity of nations? As Smith argues, "in the era of globalisation and transcendence, we find ourselves caught in a maelstrom of conflicts over political identities and ethnic fragmentation." Notwithstanding all these, he explains that globalisation, as with modernisation, inevitably produces social and cultural disruptions and only ethnic and national solidarity can fill the holes created by this process. Chains of memories, myths,

and symbols connect nations to their ethnic heritage; national identity satisfies the people's need for cultural fulfilment, rootedness, security, and fraternity. Global culture simply cannot offer, "the qualities of collective faith, dignity, and hope that only a religious surrogate, with its promise of a territorial culture and community across the generations, can provide" (Smith 1995: 2).

The linkages between globalisation and ethnic nationalism are a very complex phenomenon in South Korea. On one side, this country looks forward to become a major force in the global economic map by becoming the cynosure of the global automobile and electronics market, and on the other, Korea maintains her ethnic and cultural heritage by promoting nationalist sentiment in the citizens. In fact, Korea's rapid economic growth is not only a product of her close ties with globalisation, but also reflection of the strong nationalist sentiment. On one hand, the expansive forces of globalisation have penetrated both the external as well as the internal body of the nation state, but on the other, with improving historical experiences, and ethnic identity, Korea has maintained and developed a notion that 'their way of globalisation' ultimately carries their ethnic nationalism. The government has indeed promoted globalisation to enhance national competitiveness in a rapidly globalising world and has simultaneously sought to preserve and strengthen their national heritage and culture (Shin 2003: 18).

When it comes to North Korea, its recent nuclear weapon programme has created serious tension Peninsula in particular and in the East Asian region in general. For the North, the logic of nuclear politics has always been the key to the survival. The North has suffered many a serious economic and social crisis in the post-Cold War scenario, including large-scale famine, putting a question mark on the survival of the very country. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent fall of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe created political and economic constraints over Pyongyang. Therefore, nationalism always remains effective sources to over the dilemma of the nation. The idea of nationalism in the North often triggers inter-Korean nationalism. For instance, after the death of Kim-il Sung, the North continuously emphasised the need to promote nationalism through ethnic and cultural identity. In 1998, Kim Jong-il (the son of Kim-il Sung and the national leader) stated:

no force can ever split into two forever the single Korean nation that has been formed and developed through a long history; nor can it obliterate our national traits, the present division (of) our nation into North and South is a temporary misfortune and ... the reunion of our nation that has been divided by foreign forces is an inevitable trend of our nation's history¹¹ (Kim Jong Il 1998:1).

In 1993, the North made a new initiative for 'improving and strengthening projects to properly inherit and develop national cultural heritage.' Accordingly,

the North excavated the tomb of Tangun in 1993 and redesigned the area in Pyongyang from where the tomb was claimed to have discovered as home to 'one of the five world civilizations.' In addition, civil society has become an essential part of the political, cultural, and economic settings of the nation today, shaping and rearranging economic and social policies (Armstrong 2002:189). While explaining contemporary dynamics of inter-Korean nationalism, Gi-Wook Shin observes that due to historical experiences specified elsewhere, Koreans have come to believe that they share a single bloodline and thus belong to a unitary nation, in an ethnically homogeneous and racially distinctive collectivity. If means of globalisation intensifies one's ethnic/national identity, we can expect that the stronger one's exposure to globalisation, the better its sense of ethnic homogeneity become. Koreans also hold a strong sense of ethnic identity, as 75 percent of the respondents in a field survey agree, "Koreans are all brothers and sisters, regardless of political ideology or regional residence" (Shin 2003: 18).

Conclusion

Ethnicity is still essential to the Koreans to define their national identity and articulate their self towards the world. In both Koreas, most people do not question the racial purity and homogeneity of their nations, and believe strongly in a shared bloodline and common ancestry. Smith's (1986) idea of the *ethnic origin of nations* is appropriate to understand nationalism and formation of the ethnic identity of the Koreans. Thus, the Koreans trace their roots as an ethnic nation to the legendary founder Tangun.

The formation of the political notion of a nation was a task in Korea without recognising ethnic homogeneity. Since the break-up, both regimes sought to enforce nationalism over the people to legitimise state ideologies, but in fact, it has only produced strong ethnic sense of national sentiment among the Koreans. Given the strength attributed to ethnic affiliations, ethnic nationalism ought to function properly as an integrative force in Korea despite that fact they have been forced to live in two different territories, as Koreans from both sides of the borders believe that they belong to the same race and ethnicity for thousands of years. Thus, the common ethnic identity of Koreans is placed over the concept *Minjok*,¹² which is a most widely used term to define nation, ethnies, or race. The contemporary sense of ethnic unity was the natural extension of the historical experiences – the Korean *Minjok*.

Notes

1. The core of Gellner's argument is that a nation is an outcome of the transformation from traditional agrarian society to modern industrial society. He defines nationalism

as “primarily a political principle which holds that the political national unit should be congruent” (2004: 1). He tries to account for the absence of nations and nationalism in pre-modern ages by referring to the relationship between power and culture—the two potential partners for formation of nationalism. Emergence of industrial societies helped promote cultural homogenisation at the end of a long process inherent in their economic logic to the formation of modern nation.

2. According to Hobsbawm, both nations and nationalism are products of ‘social and historical transformation.’ These processes occur through ‘invented traditions’ by “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past” (Hobsbawm 1988:1).
3. In a fascinating study titled *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, Anderson defines nation as an ‘imagined political community which is both inherently limited and sovereign’. He argues that a nation is a cultural construct, not in a sense of building historical traditions but in being collectively imagined by all those who view and listen to the same media, sharing the same mutual idea about the nation and its surrounding world. It is similar everywhere, though it uses different symbols. “It is imagined because members of the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 1991: 6).
4. Primordialism was the earliest paradigm of the study on nations and nationalism. It is an umbrella term used to describe a view that nationality is a ‘natural’ part of human beings, as natural as speech, sight or smell, and that nations have existed since time immemorial. Edward Shils used the term in his famous article (1957) ‘In Reference to Relationships within the Family.’ Clifford Geertz is another name identified with primordialism, which uses a similar definition. The core of primordialist argument is that a nation is a ‘given’ and culture is inevitably involved in these matters. The idea of given related with immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of language, and following particular social practice (Geertz 1993: 259).
5. The nations are a delocalised and politicised form of *ethnie*, as Benjamin Akzin (1964) claims. *Ethnies* may, after all, be quite extensive and populous, and also may be organised in political forms as ethnic states. The term itself appeared in England around 1250. There are different levels of interpretation to describe the concept of *ethnie*. Walker Connor holds that the nation is the *ethnie*, which has consciousness of itself. But Smith differs and says what differentiates the nation from the *ethnie* is the “type of (public) culture, (single, territorial) economy and legal order (common rights and duties for members). For details, see Anthony D. Smith, *The Nation in History* (2000).
6. Since the 1950s, East Asia was under the shadow of the power struggle between Japan, China, and Russia. After various conflicts, Japan triumphed the region and became the powerful dominator after winning the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Throughout these power struggles, Japan always had sought to get control over Korea. Eventually, in 1905, Japan conquered Korea with a Protectorate Treaty (also known as the Eulsa Treaty) and soon made Korea a Japanese protectorate and the resultant annexation of Korea under colonial rule of Japan in 1910.
7. State capitalism is generally called an economic system in which commercial (for-profit) economic activities are undertaken by the state. For instance, Bremmer defines it as “a system in which the state functions as the leading economic actor and uses markets primarily for political gain” (Bremmer, 2010: 5).

8. Generally, scholars describe *Juche* as 'self-reliance,' however, the true meaning of the term is much more nuanced. The first syllable, '*Ju*' means 'the main or fundamental' principle; the second syllable, '*Che*' means body or self. Broadly, this means holding on to an independent position, rejecting dependence on others, using one's own brains, believing in one's strength, displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance, and thus solving one's problems for oneself with responsibility and under all circumstances. The discussion on this ideology started in North Korea in the mid-1950s. The debates mainly concerned about the ideological existence of communism and its practices in other socialist states like the USSR, China, Cuba, and North Korea and so on. *Juche* became the official ideology of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1972. During an interaction with the Japanese press, Kim Il Sung revealed stated that establishing *juche* means being the master of the revolution and reconstruction in one's own country. The DPRK claims that *juche* is Kim Il Sung's creative application of the Marxist-Leninist principles to the modern political realities in his country. The *juche* ideology is quite different from the traditional Marxist-Leninist mode of socialism. Article 3 of the constitution states that, "the DPRK is guided in its activities by the *Juche* idea, a world outlook centered on people, a revolutionary ideology for achieving the independence of the masses of people." In short, this ideology is very popular and a guiding principle for the entire nation. For instance, Oh and Hassig observe that a person without *juche* is worthless; a state without *juche* is a colony. *Juche* is North Korea's gift to the world, a world that is reluctant to accept it because (according to the North Koreans) the imperialists' led by the United States are actively scheming to defeat *Juche* and make the working people slaves to the capitalists (Oh and Hassig 2000: 15).
9. The origin and developments of anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon in Korea. Seung-Hwan Kim (2002) and Lee In-ho point out that ideological base of anti-Americanism has started in the intellectual circle in the 1980s. Ultimately, it was a desire of the Koreans to maintain their national identity and improve their 'self-sufficiency' because many believe that a hegemonic U.S is not the ultimate protector of their nation and their national identity.
10. Sook-Jong Lee discusses the concept of Assertive Nationalism in her recent article (2006). Today young Koreans are enjoying more freedom under the democratic system. They are very proud of their nationality and embrace ethnic nationalism in two dimensions--one is the mobilisation of critical opinion about the unilateral behavior of the U.S; and secondly improving the relationship with the North Koreans.
11. See for more details, Kim Jong Il-'Let Us Reunify the Country Independently and Peacefully Through the Great Unity of the Entire Nation,' 1998 ([http://: www.korea-np.co.jp/040th_issue/9804901.html](http://www.korea-np.co.jp/040th_issue/9804901.html)).
12. *Minjok* or *Minjung*, derived from the Chinese, in which, 'jok' means 'tribe' or sharing a common ancestor and 'min' means people. It refers to their belief that all Koreans share the same common blood and a common ancestor, Tangun. It is an emotionally loaded term, which has been used to great effect to secure the absolute and unconditional love and loyalty for the nation from all Koreans. The term '*minjung*' was associated with commoners in the *Tonghak* peasant's rebellion who fought against colonialism and imperialism. Since the 1980s, the word got profound support from the student movements in South Korea. In fact, the common identity that both the Koreans place over the concept *Minjok* shows that this is the most widely used term to define their sense of nation, ethnic, or race.

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Marginalisation, Identity Politics and New Social Movements

Sunil Kumar K & K.M. Seethi

Marginalisation is a complex and multi-layered concept. Nations can be marginalised at the global level, while classes and communities can be marginalised from the dominant social order within nations. Likewise, ethnic/caste/religious groups, families or individuals can be marginalised within localities. Marginalisation is also a changing phenomenon linked to many socio-economic factors and conditions. For instance, individuals or groups/communities might enjoy high social status at one point in time, but as social change takes place, they may lose this status and become marginalised. Similarly, as life cycle stages change, so might people's marginalised position. Charlesworth, while analysing the working class life in a town in England, says that it is the economic changes and the social conditions they ushered in that have consigned the people to a life of marginality which, naturally enough, manifests itself in their social status, manner and style (Charlesworth 2000: 160). Peter Leonard defines social marginality as "being outside the mainstream of productive activity and/or social reproductive activity." Leonard characterises these people as remaining outside "the major arena of capitalist productive and reproductive activity" and as such experiencing "involuntary social marginality" (Leonard 1984:180-81). The experience of marginality can also arise in a number of ways. For some people, those severely impaired from birth, or those born into particularly marginal groupings (e.g. members of ethnic groups that suffer discrimination), this marginality is typically life-long and greatly determines their lived experience.

For others, marginality is acquired by later disablement or by changes in the social and economic system. The collapse of the Soviet Union, for instance, plunged millions into unemployment. In many countries, neoliberal economic policies closed down the traditional industrial base and led to unemployment and various patterns of insecure and casual employment for many. As global

capitalism extends its reach, bringing more and more people into its system, more communities are dispossessed of lands, livelihoods, or systems of social support (Chomsky 2000; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001; Potter 2000; Pilger 2002). Indeed, argued by many, capitalist development in its current globalising phase inexorably creates increasing levels of marginalisation throughout the world, particularly as collective safeguards, from indigenous cultures to trade unions, and government welfare programmes are attacked.

Marginalisation is at the core of exclusion from fulfilling full social needs at individual, interpersonal and societal levels. People who are marginalised have relatively little control over their lives and the resources available to them; they may become stigmatised and are often at the receiving end of negative public attitudes. Their opportunities to make social contributions may be limited and they may develop low self-confidence and self esteem. If they do not have work and live with service supports, for example, they may have limited opportunities for meeting with others, and may become isolated. A vicious circle is set up whereby their lack of positive and supportive relationships means they are prevented from participating in local life, which, in turn, leads to further isolation. Social policies and practices may mean they have relatively limited access to valued social resources such as education and health services, housing, income, leisure activities and work. The impacts of marginalisation, in terms of social exclusion, are similar, whatever the origins and processes of marginalisation, irrespective of whether these are to be located in social attitudes (such as towards impairment, sexuality, ethnicity and so on) or social circumstance (such as closure of workplaces, absence of affordable housing and so on).

In sociological literature, marginalisation is defined as the situation in which people sit on the borders of two cultures existing within a society but are fully members of neither culture. This is obviously cultural marginalisation. More recently, the phenomenon of social exclusion is also understood alongside this. It means people who have been socially excluded have no significant role in society. They tend to be excluded from the regular productive systems within society and are problematic consumers of the benefits of society as a result of their economic situation and of minority status within. This exclusion may take the form of a lack of acceptance by the members of the majority social groupings but, even more significantly, it may give rise to discriminatory behaviour and violence. In such situations, a serious combination of cultural, economic, political and social exclusion with the possibility of significant consequences at the personal level in terms of a lack of self-esteem and a confused self-identity mean that the individual withdraws into a world of his/ her own. Marginalisation is thus a complex as well as very serious phenomenon. It can effectively push people to the margins of society,

where their sense of security is in every way a threatened one (Singharoy 2001: 31-32).

The situations of marginalisation are many and varied in the contemporary scene. One situation is clearly that results from migration in its various forms. International migration has been occurring in recent years at unprecedented levels and in ever greater complexity. Refugee movements have never been greater, yet they are composed of political, economic and ecological refugees who are moving across borders as well as those being internally displaced. Labour migration is at an extremely high level today with people seeking employment opportunities in other countries. Illegal migration has also gathered considerable momentum because of increasing aspiring migrants who have fewer opportunities for legal or documented migration than in the past. Marginalisation is more commonly made up of people belonging to the country in which they find themselves marginalised. One such grouping consists of indigenous people - the aboriginals of various countries who are often perceived by majority group members as 'inferior' being. Their plight is almost universally one of marginalisation and such situations have so often been comparatively problematic (Singharoy 2001: 33).

In some countries, marginalisation is related to the social conditions emerging from the status of specific castes or classes. Members of these castes or classes are born into a situation of inferior status and are, therefore, in danger of being marginalised. The caste system of India is an example, while in many other countries, ethnic identity, education, living standards, etc are being perceived as the criteria of exclusion. The degree and seriousness of the exclusion varies from country to country. It would be pertinent in this context to consider the realities of gender inequality, arising from deeply entrenched attitudes among males that the female gender is the inferior gender and are pushing women into many marginal situations (Ibid: 34).

Marginalisation is a major problem adversely affecting every aspect of the quality of life creating divisions between people. It can fragment or polarise communities in such a way that social integration is threatened and the potential for building mutually supportive communities minimised. The outcome of it can also be deleterious. If the marginalisation results in violence, it seriously undermines much of the development. It is a situation in which human rights of people are not sufficiently respected and the principles of equity and equality are flouted. The society is fragmented and many might suffer from the insecurity and poverty which is almost invariably identified with a situation of marginalisation (Ibid: 35). Eventually, marginalisation assumes international dimensions with positive and negative elements. This may take the form of international solidarity among marginalised groups such as the world movement of indigenous peoples.

Marginalisation can also cause a stream of migrants moving to some other country with adverse effects on inter-state relations.

In the past, marginalisation has generally been discussed in the context of immigrant status or the minority status of racial, ethnic or religious minority. However, one's status and range of opportunities in society as a whole was offset by the sense of belonging to one's group and the support derived from that source. Here, marginalisation is sometimes associated with low levels of aspiration which offsets the potential impact of the realities of being marginalised. In the contemporary world, two factors—globalisation and the changing role of the state—have contributed to the worsening scenario of marginalisation (Ghai 1997).

Globalisation and Changing Role of State

Globalisation is both a widespread and a multi-faceted phenomenon. The movements of goods and services, capital and labour on a massive scale are the dimensions of globalisation. International institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been established for these purposes, while trans-national corporations and international banks and governments play a crucial role in controlling the global economy. However, globalisation is not only economic but a technologically bound notion. As industrialisation makes use of the entire global labour market and gives the dominant role in large international corporations, all advances in technology have global coverage in various ways. Cultural globalisation is another aspect. The emerging economic life propels the globalisation of ideas, especially since the globalisation of technology has resulted in a revolution in the field information and communications. Satellites beam the same news, advertisement and documentaries to all parts of the globe. central to these global values are those values relating to high levels of the consumption of goods and services to place a high value on materialism. Globalisation is apparently more intensive and extensive as time passes (Singharoy 2001: 37-38).

Social development is the expansion of people's choices or options in life and, here, globalisation can have positive influence too. Certainly, there are many who would glorify the actual and potential benefits of globalisation. However, there are others who would bring to light the negative consequences of globalisation. As it is, the global economy is based on the desire of companies to make profits within a highly competitive market place. Essentially, globalisation is presented by many commentators as a situation where liberalisation policies are removing state's protection against domination and exploitation by more powerful states and forcing the weaker states to compete with all other states within a set of conditions

which are, in effect, controlled by the most powerful states. The well documented inequality between nations and sub-regions has shown that the powerful will grow wealthier. An economically unequal world has resulted in an increasingly unequal political world and this continues to be the situation in many parts of the world having their impact on the life of poor and marginalised people in all countries, both developed and developing (Ibid:40).

Marginalisation has highlighted many links between the state and globalisation. According to some scholars, globalisation today is at the expense of the power of the state. Politically, states are forced to relinquish some of their autonomy to external agencies and regional structures. Moreover, the power of the international economic agencies (such as the WTO, World Bank and IMF) to dictate economic and trade policies of states has become critical insofar as the refusal to accept their policy would result in the virtual exclusion from the world economy. Culturally, the power of any state to keep out foreign cultural influences is also extremely limited. The process of globalisation has obviously been marginalising some states and increasing the degree of inequality within states. In most states there exists a section of population which is reasonably well-placed to take advantage of this ongoing process. However, in many countries, the economic structural adjustment packages which the international institutions (like IMF and World Bank) have imposed have had a very uneven impact. States have been obliged to reduce the extent of social provision for the poor to cut back on the employment, to remove price controls on which the poorer people relied and to place more emphasis on exports from which the poor would hardly benefit. The liberalisation and privatisation policies obviously put an unfair and uneven burden on the poor and they tend to increase the degree of marginalisation within countries (Ibid: 43).

In the era of globalisation, marginalisation has been widely intensified by various forms of deprivation and poverty. In every society there will be a section of marginalised groups who bear the brunt of deprivation. Various development reports/documents suggest that all over the world more than a billion people are deprived of basic consumption needs. In developing countries, nearly three-fifths lack basic sanitation, almost a third has no access to clean water and a quarter does not have adequate housing. Hence deprivation in basic capabilities encompasses deprivation in years of life, health, housing, knowledge, participation, personal security and environment.

People who are experiencing marginalisation are likely to have tenuous involvement in the economy. The sources of their income will vary. Some will be waged and some will depend on state benefits, marginal economic activity such as casual work, or charity (Sixsmith 1999). It is not unusual for people to combine, or

move between, these various ways of getting money in their struggle for survival. Poverty, dependency, and feelings of shame are everyday aspects of economic dislocation and social marginalisation. The above two dimensions of marginalisation, poverty/economic dislocation and disempowerment/social dislocation can be regarded as vital. But being a member of a marginalised group also brings the risk of some more psycho-social or ideological threats. The first of these is the definition of one's identity by others: the ideological definition of one's marginalised identity in the interest of the dominant groups in society. There have been many examples of this, and all social movements representing oppressed and marginalised groups have pinpointed and offered critiques of the phenomenon. What typically seems to happen is that the situation of the marginalised persons is portrayed as a result of their own characteristics. What is essentially a social and historical phenomenon is presented as a biological or an intra-psychic phenomenon.

Whatever may be the negative implications of ideology, the situation of oppressed people is characterised by resistance and resilience. In resilience there is scope for an enhanced, reclaimed and re-invented identity. The very fact of being oppressed, of having fundamental rights denied or diminished, elicits attempts to remediate the situation. This can be constructive or destructive or in the pathologies of self-destruction, addiction and depression. However, attempts at remediation can also be highly positive, as in collective action to improve social arrangements. As people are affected by social forces and changing social relations, and as they organise to resist oppression and reclaim what is truly theirs, they experience changes in identification and affiliation. A person who becomes unemployed is likely to lose both the social context and network of work, and to begin seeing herself in other terms - not defined by her working life. This is likely to involve a struggle, often lost, to retain a positive self-concept and not be defeated by feelings of worthlessness and superfluity (Charlesworth 2000; Leonard 1984: Chapter 9). It is worth discussing why marginalisation is actually a problem. There is something basic to the very meaning of being human. It is commonplace to find the assumption that the self precedes society, and therefore that society is made up, in a cumulative way, from individuals. An alternative view can be found in the work of figures as diverse as Karl Marx (Sève 1975) and GH Mead (1934) who emphasised the construction of the 'human essence' (Marx) or the 'mind', and the 'self' (Mead), from the "ensemble of social relations" (Marx) or the organised pattern of social relations and interactions. In other words, we "become our selves" through the relations we enter into in the society and its communities. For those people who are severely involuntarily marginalised, their selfhood, their humanity, is threatened.

Relying on multiple sources of evidence, Doyal and Gough (1984) suggest that “there are two fundamental human needs: physical health, and autonomy.” Autonomy is further divided into two levels, autonomy of agency, the ability to initiate actions; and critical autonomy, the opportunity for participation in political processes. People who are involuntarily marginalised, then, would have to be seen as having their fundamental needs compromised. Doyal and Gough go on to argue that the abstract human needs of health and autonomy can be achieved through a process of learning: learning as a social process, involving people interacting in social groups. Learning from history, learning between groups within a society or across cultures, are all very important. In fact, they argue, the ability to translate lessons into practice is what they call ‘human liberation’ (Doyal and Gough 1984: 22). What many of these scholars have in common is the view that human life is inseparable from the ability to enter into, and critically negotiate, social relations. For marginalised persons, groups and communities, the inability to meet these expectations has negative repercussions for their biological and psychological well-being.

The social and economic positions of the members of marginalised groups are essentially structured by age-old tradition, beliefs, values, customs and processes of education, socialisation and the prevailing institutional arrangements of the society etc. Indeed, the socio-economic bases of their marginalisation and powerlessness are legitimately institutionalised within these set-ups. Hence, any development initiative only reinforces the structure of subordination and marginalisation of the vast majority. As the process of empowerment aims to demolish the structure of subordination, it immediately looks for alteration in the pre-existing structure of subordination of the marginalised groups. The process of new collective identity formation has the potential of questioning and challenging the existing order, bringing alternative order and sustaining the process of new identity formation for a considerable period of time. Here social movements play crucial roles in the creation of new collective identity (Singharoy 2001: 93)

Identity Politics

Identity politics is understood as a new kind of politics that has emerged in the democratic life of the present-day world. It is generally associated with a host of movements, group cultural communities that are committed to the practice of identity-based political articulation and mobilisation. Though these groupings occupy an ambivalent role within democratic politics and society, their influence and impact appear to be growing. Theorists of many views see identity politics (or politics of identity) as indicative of a qualitative alteration to the character and culture of democratic states. It reflects a shift away from political alignments

driven by individual interest or ideological debates towards a culture in which citizen's cluster under the banner of an encompassing group with its own collective personality and distinctive culture (Kenny 2004:1).

Identity politics has come to signify a wide range of political activity and theorising founded in the shared experiences of injustice, oppression and marginalisation of social groups and communities. Rather than organising exclusively around belief systems, programmatic manifestos, or party affiliation, identity political formations characteristically aspire to secure the political freedom of a specific constituency marginalised within its larger context. Members of that constituency insist on understanding their uniqueness that contest dominant oppressive characterisations, with the aim of greater self-determination. The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed the emergence of large-scale political movements based in claims about the injustices done to particular social groups. These social movements are supported by a theoretical body of literature that takes up questions about the nature, origin and futures of the identities being defended. Identity politics as a mode of organising is intimately connected to the idea that some social groups are oppressed; that is, that one's identity as a woman or as a native of a multicultural society, for example, makes one peculiarly vulnerable to cultural imperialism (including stereotyping or appropriation of one's group identity), violence, exploitation, marginalisation, or powerlessness (Young 1990).

Identity politics begins from analysis of oppression to recommend transformation of previously stigmatised description of group membership. Rather than accepting the negative scripts offered by a dominant culture about one's own inferiority, one transforms one's own sense of self and community, often through consciousness-raising. In the process of consciousness-raising, one begins to recognise the commonality of experiences and, from the sharing and growing consciousness, to build a politics that will change lives and inevitably end oppression. The scope of identity politics is certainly broad: the examples used in the theoretical literature are mostly of struggles within western capitalist democracies, but indigenous rights movements worldwide, nationalist projects, or demands for regional self-determination put across similar arguments. Inevitably, there is no clear-cut standard that makes a political struggle into an example of identity politics; rather, the term suggests a flexible assortment of political projects, each undertaken by representatives of a collective with a distinctively different social location that has hitherto been ignored, obliterated, or suppressed. The term is thus deployed to highlight the emergence of a new kind of social mobilisation based upon various collective identities. Gender issues, marginalised peoples' movements and other deprived sections' struggles and resistances are often regarded as paradigmatic examples of identity-oriented mobilisation. This new politics is

inherently subversive of established ideas about the appropriate boundary between questions that are political and those that are not.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., a strong supporter of the civil rights movement, argues that a liberal democracy requires a common basis for culture and society to function. In his view, basing one's politics on self-identifying as part of a marginalised group perceived to be outside of the mainstream of society causes this common basis to break down, and therefore works against creating real opportunities for ending this marginalisation. Schlesinger believes that movements for civil rights should aim toward full acceptance and integration of marginalised groups into the mainstream culture, not perpetuate that marginalisation (Crenshaw 1991).

From the above discussion of how identity politics fits into the political landscape, it is obvious that the use of the concept 'identity' raises a number of theoretical questions. Indeed, underlying many of the more overtly pragmatic debates about the merits of identity politics are questions about the nature of subjectivity and the 'self' (Taylor 1989). According to Charles Taylor, the modern identity is characterised by an emphasis on its inner voice and capacity for authenticity—that is, the ability to find a way of being that is somehow true to oneself. Whereas doctrines of equality underline that each human being is capable of deploying his/her practical reason or moral sense to live an authentic 'live qua individual', the politics of difference has appropriated the language of authenticity to describe ways of living that are true to the identities of marginalised social groups. Sonia Kruks suggests: What makes identity politics a significant departure from earlier, pre-identarian forms of the politics of recognition is its demand for recognition on the basis of the very grounds on which recognition has previously been denied: it is qua women, qua blacks, qua lesbians that groups demand recognition. The demand is not for inclusion within the fold of "universal humankind" on the basis of shared human attributes; nor is it for respect 'in spite of' one's differences. Rather, what is demanded is respect for oneself as different (Kruks 2000: 85).

For many advocates of identity politics, the demand for authenticity implies appeals to a time before oppression, or a culture or way of life damaged by colonialism, imperialism, or even genocide. Thus, for instance, Taiaiake Alfred, in his defence of a return to traditional indigenous values, argues that indigenous governance systems exemplify unique political values, radically different from those of the mainstream. Western notions of domination are conspicuously absent; in their place one finds "harmony, autonomy, and respect." He says that the "responsibility to recover, understand, and preserve these values" lies in the fact that they "represent a unique contribution to the history of ideas," and "renewal of respect for traditional values is the only lasting solution to the political, economic, and social problems that beset our people" (Alfred 1999: 5).

According to Michael Duche, the “aim of identity politics is to subvert a given legal ethical background consensus and change the constitutive nature of the body politic.” He says: “To justify exclusion, injustice and violence in dealings with the other, identity politics resorts to or creates myths about the inherently inferior nature of the other and the naturalness of the self” (Dusche 2010: 83). Duche argues that as it is “an indicator of social forces questioning and attempting to change the hegemonic ideas governing societies in the world polity,” the pervasiveness of identity politics worldwide can be interpreted as “a challenge to established norms of secular modernity and democracy.” It is “an attempt to question the framework of legitimate political expression,” thereby employing “discourse strategies that attempt to settle political controversies in non-political registers” (Ibid: 98-99). For Duche, identity politics means “the generation of political power as an all-purpose means.” “The respective identity formula normally excludes certain classes of peoples. The power thus created is frequently directed against those excluded.” It introduces “a hierarchy between the self and other” (Ibid: 83). Habermas points out that emancipation movements in multicultural societies “are not a uniform phenomenon.” They present “different challenges depending on whether the situation is one of endogenous minorities becoming aware of their identity.” However, they “are related in that women, ethnic and cultural minorities, and nations and cultures defend themselves against oppression, marginalisation, and disrespect and thereby struggle for the recognition of collective identities, whether in the context of a majority culture or within the community of peoples.” These movements’ political goals “are defined primarily in cultural terms, even though social and economic inequalities as well as political dependencies are always also involved” (Habermas 1998: 211-12).

Bhikhu Parekh writes that working classes, indigenous peoples, lower castes in India, religious minorities and others express “demands not only equal civil, political, economic and other rights but also equal respect and public legitimacy or recognition for their marginalised identities.” “Their struggle requires them to organise themselves and pursue their objectives collectively. Since their objectives include not just rights and interests but also recognition of identity, their organisations and demands are based on a shared sense of collective identity” (Parekh 2008: 31-32). He says that since marginalised identities “cannot attain their objective of gaining equal respect without radically changing the dominant culture, their politics, like all radical politics, has a strong cultural focus.” According to Parekh, the identity “gives a distinct point of reference, perspective and a self sphere. It also provides a common ground wherein people can meet as to share their experiences, articulate their common concerns, arrive at a view of the kind of society they want and the best way to promote it and other ways to

raise their level of self-consciousness.” It also “enables them to ask how they viewed themselves in the past, link up with the struggles and experiences and to construct an inspiring historical narrative” (Ibid: 33-34).

What is significant about the ‘identity’ of identity politics seems to be the experience of the subject, especially his/her experience of oppression and the possibility of a shared and more authentic or self-determined alternative. Thus identity politics rests on unifying claims about the meaning of politically laden experiences to diverse individuals. Sometimes the meaning attributed to a particular experience will differ from that of its subject. Making sense of such disjunctions relies on notions such as false consciousness—the systematic mystification of the experience of the oppressed by the perspective of the dominant. Thus despite the disagreements of many defenders of identity political claims with Marxism and other radical political models, they share the view that individuals’ perceptions of their own interests may be systematically distorted and must be somehow freed of their misperceptions by group-based transformation.

However, critics of identity politics, and even some cautious supporters, fear that it is prone to essentialism. In its original contexts, the term implies the belief that an object has a certain quality by virtue of which it is what it is. In the contemporary humanities the term is used more loosely to imply, most commonly, an illegitimate generalisation about identity. In the case of identity politics, two claims stand out as plausibly ‘essentialist’; the first is the understanding of the subject that characterises a single axis of identity as discrete and taking priority in representing the self—as if being Asian-American, for example, were entirely separable from being a woman. To the extent that identity politics urges mobilisation around a single axis, it will put pressure on participants to identify that axis as their defining feature, when, in fact, they may well understand themselves as integrated selves who cannot be represented so selectively or even reductively. The second form of essentialism is closely related to the first: generalisations made about particular social groups in the context of identity politics may come to have a disciplinary function within the group, not just describing but also dictating the self-understanding that its members should have. Thus, the new identity may inhibit autonomy, as Anthony Appiah suggests, replacing “one kind of tyranny with another.” Just as dominant groups in the culture, at large, insist that the marginalised integrate by assimilating to dominant norms, so within some practices of identity politics dominant sub-groups may, in theory and practice, impose their vision of the group’s identity onto all its members.

However, Stuart Hall says that there are two different ways of thinking about cultural identity. The first one defines it “in terms of one, shared culture, a sort of collective ‘one true self’, hiding inside the many other, more superficial

or artificially imposed 'selves', which people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common." According to this definition, "our cultural identities reflect the common historical experiences and shared cultural codes which provide us, as 'one people', with stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and meaning, beneath the shifting divisions and vicissitudes of our actual history" (Hall 1990: 223). The second one recognises that "there are also critical points of deep and significant difference which constitute 'what we really are'; or rather - since history has intervened - 'what we have become.' We cannot speak for very long, with any exactness, about 'one experience, one identity', without acknowledging its other side" (Ibid: 225). In this sense, cultural identity "is a matter of 'becoming' as well as of 'being.' It belongs to the future as much as to the past. It is not something which already exists, transcending place, time, history and culture. Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories." But, like everything, they too "undergo constant transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject to the continuous 'play' of history, culture and power." "Far from being grounded in a mere 'recovery' of the past, which is waiting to be found, and which, when found, will secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past" (Ibid: 225).

Hall, however, acknowledges that identity "is not as transparent or unproblematic as we think." Rather than "thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, which the new cultural practices then represent, we should think, instead, of identity as a 'production', which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation." Saying that "cultural identity is not a fixed essence at all, lying unchanged outside history and culture," Hall notes:

It has its histories - and histories have their real, material and symbolic effects. The past continues to speak to us. But it no longer addresses us as a simple, factual 'past', since our relation to it, like the child's relation to the mother, is always-already 'after the break'. It is always constructed through memory, fantasy, narrative and myth. Cultural identities are the points of identification, the unstable points of identification or suture, which are made, within the discourses of history and culture. Not an essence but a positioning. Hence, there is always a politics of identity, a politics of position, which has no absolute guarantee in an unproblematic, transcendental 'law of origin' (Ibid: 222).

Since 1970s, identity politics as a mode of organising and set of political positions has undergone numerous attacks by those motivated to point to its flaws. The conventional left wing arguments "seek to present struggles around identity as mere questions of recognition ignoring altogether the redistributive

claims that are today quite central to such assertions” (Nigam 2010: 51). For many leftist commentators, identity politics is something of a *bête noire*, representing the capitulation to cultural criticism in place of analysis of the material roots of oppression. Marxists, both orthodox and revisionist, and socialists have often interpreted the perceived ascendancy of identity politics as representing the end of radical materialist critique. Identity politics, for these critics, is both factionalising and depoliticising, drawing attention away from the ravages of late capitalism toward superstructural cultural accommodations that leave economic structures unchanged. For example, while allowing that both recognition and redistribution have a place in contemporary politics, Nancy Fraser talks about the supremacy of perspectives that take injustice to inhere in ‘cultural’ constructions of identity that the people to whom they are attributed want to reject. Such recognition models, she argues, require remedies that “valorize the group’s ‘groupness’ by recognising its specificity,” thus reifying identities that themselves are products of oppressive structures. By contrast, injustices of distribution require redistributive remedies that aim “to put the group out of business as a group” (Fraser 1997: 19).

The reasons given for the alleged turn away from economic oppression to themes of culture, language, and identity in contemporary politics differ. First, the institutionalisation of radicalism creates incentives for intellectuals to minimise the political importance of their own class privilege, and focus instead on other identities (in turn divorced from their economic inflections). Second, capitalist suffering may have been displaced onto other identities, interpreted through the lens of class aspiration. Third, the turn away from economic analysis may be less dramatic than some critics believe. Global capitalism is widening the gap between the over- and less-developed countries, and working to further marginalise women, ethnic or indigenous minorities, and the disabled in the so-called Third and Fourth Worlds. However, Bhikhu Parekh notes that the politics of collective identity “is a mixed blessing. It establishes solidarity among marginalised groups, empowers them, gives focus and moral energy to their cause, and challenges and opens up the possibility of pluralising the dominant culture.” As struggles are inevitably “crucial for social change and often require organised groups with clear objectives, collective identities are a necessary part of political life” (Parekh 2008: 37). He says that the “current movement for recognition is new because it encompasses a wider variety of groups, articulates its demands in the language of rights and justice and occurs in a culture that is often inhospitable to group based claims” (Ibid: 42).

Collective Identity and New Social Movements (NSM)

Collective identity represents a very significant part in relation to the NSMs and identity politics. It is the shared definition of a group that derives from its

member's common interests and solidarity. Collective identities people deploy in protest against embedded identities that inform people's routine social life (such as gender, race, ethnicity, locality and kinship) and detached identities that invoke associational membership, nationalities and other self-defining experiences (Polletta and Jasper: 2001). Many scholars try to theoretically account for the appeals to identity in the new movements in relation to individual or group autonomy or particularity. The NSMs embody the efforts for identity building vis-à-vis the political institutions. As such, through struggles to attain collective autonomy and freedom from the state intervention, NSMs uncover those issues that have been excluded by and from political decisions. They are movements for a new democracy. Their self-limiting concept of emancipation allows these movements to offer the concept of the "democracy of everyday life" and perceive democracy as the condition for recognition, autonomy, and self-affirmation. The NSMs characterise primarily as identity-claims and their actor's assertion of their particularity against pre-constituted universal identities (e.g. nation or class), as well as their demand for universal social recognition and political inclusion. Sociologists have also been attracted to collective identity as a response to gaps in dominant resource mobilisation and political process models. Collective identity is an individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community and a such it is responding to the inadequacies of instrumental rationality as an explanation for strategic choice. Finally, collective identity has been a way to get at the cultural effects of social movements (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 285). The NSMs have a special relationship with identity. As a cultural force, identity defines a group's particular needs that challenge the social control of needs. The NSMs represent forces of democratisation in which identity forms the emblem of the contemporary collective action.

The NSM theory of Italian sociologist Alberto Melucci deems identity as the cardinal characteristic that distinguishes the 'New' from the 'older' social movements. Melucci tries to theoretically account for the appeals to identity in the new movements in relation to a specific criterion with respect to a shift from the industrial to the post-industrial societies in the West and in terms of the class origins of the new movements' actors and finally, in relation to individual or group autonomy or particularity (Vahabzadeh 2001). Melucci defines collective identity as "an interactive and shared definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their action as well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their action takes place" (Ibid: 619). In the current social conditions (of the post-industrial/information society), identity emerges as a means of resistance against the forms of rationalisation of life that do not incorporate differences. The features of the identity movements are control of

the conditions of life, erosion of public-private separation, difficulty in empirically distinguishing between protest and marginality, or between deviance and social movements, search for a communal identity and search for participation and direct action (Ibid).

The NSM theory goes beyond the Marxist paradigm to understand the variety of social movements that had emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Although NSM theory does not employ the language of identity politics, it represents a major theoretical effort to understand the role of identity in social movements. It has, eventually, prevailed upon the more rationalist strands of social movement theory, resource mobilisation and political process theory to attend to issues of identity and culture. NSM theory attempts to explain mobilisation as “why and when people act.” By taking this approach, NSM theory both challenges and affirms the idea that identity politics is a distinct political practice. NSM theory distinguishes class-based movements, especially past labour and socialist movements from contemporary movements organised on the basis of ideology and values such as peace, environmental, youth, and anti-nuclear movements as well as movements organised around status (Bernstein 2005).

NSM is a late twentieth century phenomenon. It is also a new paradigm in the social movement literature. The new social movement theorists argue that contemporary movements represent fundamentally new forms of collective action, with new goals, values and constituents (Offe 1985). The term ‘new social movements’ refers to a cluster of movements that began to emerge in the 1960s under an assorted banner of students’ movements, peace movements, environmental movements, second-wave feminism, animal rights and so on. Jurgen Habermas offered a more detailed exposition and critique of his argument on the NSMs (Crossley 2002:149). However, NSMs are often depicted as inherently radical (Rodan 1996: 233).

It is argued that Marxist categories of social class have not been able to map the frontiers of social conflict nor the social composition of the movements’ support groups or membership. Nor have the movements’ goals been framed in terms of benefits for specific social classes. Although these movements have vigorously opposed many of the same forces of power, property, and privilege as the old labor and socialist movements, the form of their opposition has differed in almost every respect (Steinmetz 1994: 177). The Marxist discourse on social movements has traditionally focused on issues of state and revolution. It was believed that the proletariat would liberate them by forcefully seizing control of the centralised state apparatus. It would, in turn, allow them to bring the means of economic production under collective control. NSM theory, by contrast, focuses upon the ways in which social movements seek to achieve change in cultural,

symbolic and sub-political domains by collectively and by way of self-change. It takes seriously the feminist slogan 'the personal is political.' It is not correct to say that NSMs are any more concerned with local and sub-political issues than certain branches of the labour movement. Historical critiques of NSM theory have identified significant examples of 'identity politics' far back in the history of the labour movement. The point is that NSM theory has been instrumental in drawing that aspect of movement activity into clear relief. It has abandoned the model of politics developed within Marxism, wherein it focused upon parties, revolutions and states (Crossley 2002: 152).

NSM theory views the movements as historically new forms of collective action resulting from the macro-structural changes of modernisation and a shift to a post-industrial society. These macro-structural changes produced values concerned with achieving democracy rather than with economic survival. Thus, NSMs are viewed as the efforts to regain control over decisions and areas of life increasingly subject to state control. They seek to resist the colonisation of the life-world and to transform it into civil society. NSM theory views the movements as the efforts to "fight to expand freedom, not to achieve it; they mobilise for choice rather than emancipation." It focuses primarily on expressing identity to seek "recognition for new identities and lifestyles" (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 286).

According to Alain Touraine, Jurgen Habermas and Alberto Melucci, the NSMs do represent a new era and a paradigm shift among a particular strand of European intellectuals. Marxists maintain that capitalist societies are based on a fundamental conflict between their two major classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The 'historical mission' of the proletariat is to redefine their role and ensure the revolutionary overthrow of that order. Marxists, however, argue that the major fault line of conflict in capitalist societies is between workers and capitalists. The workers' movement is the social movement of capitalist societies. The NSMs argument is a rejection of this very specific historical thesis (Crossley 2002:150).

The NSM theorists attempt both to move beyond the tendency to afford a theoretical privilege to the working class in social movement analysis and to identify other conflicts and movements at the modern social order. Though they reject the notion that the working class is destined to be a key agent of change, they nevertheless maintain that there is a new fault line for a new order. Each type of society entails a central movement struggle. In industrial society that struggle was between the bourgeoisie, who exercised effective control over the means of material production and the proletarian movement, which sought to seize control over it. However, society has moved beyond that stage now and is moving into a post-industrial type of society. It concedes that there are a plurality of movements and political interest groups in the present era. Every society centres upon a particular

mode of organisation, which terms its 'historicity'. This gives rise to one central conflict and struggle to every case. In this respect, the NSM is about the shift in the mode of such historicity and the corresponding shift in the central struggle of those societies. It is this mode of historicity that lends NSMs their 'newness,' rather than any particular empirical feature of those movements (Ibid: 151).

NSMs are said to advocate direct democracy, employ disruptive tactics, and enact the democratic organisational forms they seek to achieve. According to Albert Melucci, NSMs challenge dominant normative and cultural codes, and the question of how difference is dealt with in a given society. Thus, NSM theory identifies a broader purpose for identity politics and does not dismiss it for being 'merely' cultural, symbolic, or psychological (Bernstein 2005: 53-54). Habermas theorises the rise of NSMs as a response to both 'the colonisation of the lifeworld' and 'cultural impoverishment.' However, interaction can assume different forms and contexts and gives rise to different levels of social organisation. It consists in direct 'symbolic' interactions by way of the mutual understanding between agents and their common orientation towards shared norms and values along with other aspects of culture, knowledge and identity. When groups of agents come together to bring normative arrangements into question they form a 'public sphere'. This is a key concept in Habermas's theory of NSMs (Crossley 2002: 154).

New social movements can be divided into four general areas: goal orientation, forms, participants, and values. Each characteristic reflects with the intervention by the system of state social control and a desire to replace these intrusive formal organisations with cooperative community networks. They also echo the desire for self-actualization within reconstituted primary group relations (Kitschelt 1981). NSM theorists stress that the new actors struggle for collective control over the process of meaning and are primarily concerned with symbolic issues and the constitution of new identities. In contrast to traditional actors, political parties and trade unions — which operate at the strategic-instrumental level of action and are concerned with material reproduction and distribution — the new movements operate at the communicative level of action and are concerned with cultural reproduction, social integration and socialisation (Cohen 1985: 106). They fight for the right to realise their own identity for "the possibility of disposing of their personal creativity, their affective life, and their biological and interpersonal experience." They are struggles for "the reappropriation of time, of space, and of relationships in the individual's daily experience" (Buechler 1995: 219). As the advanced industrial states increasingly regulate and invade everyday life, the goal orientations of the new social movements have shifted inward in an attempt to reappropriate dominion over their own lives from a system of supervisory institutions. Whereas prior social movements fought to secure political and economic rights

from the state and other institutional actors, new social movements target their activities away from the state (Cohen 1985).

According to NSMs theorists, the NSMs differ from past movements not only with respect to what they direct their energies against, but also with respect to whose interest they represent. They are interested in the provisions of collective or intangible goods that would enhance the quality of life for all sectors of society. The member of NSMs rather falls into two categories: one those who are paying the costs of modernisation and have marginalised by the development of the welfare state and the new middle class (Klandermans et al. 1988). The movements raise a wide array of issues: the eradication of discrimination and oppression, the rejection of traditional roles (worker, consumer, client of public services and citizen), the reappropriation of physical space (neighborhood, locality, the city), the cultural and practical redefinition of our relationship with nature (environment, consumerism, productivism) and the constitution of new identities (based on gender, age, locality, ethnicity, sexual orientation). They advocate the values of equality and participation, autonomy of the individual, democracy, plurality and difference, rejection of manipulation, regulation and bureaucratisation. One effect of bringing to public discussion issues which were previously considered private — like sexual orientation, interpersonal relations, biological identity, family relations — has been to blur the traditional lines of demarcation between the public and private spheres (Melucci 1980: 219).

The NSM perspective presents a non-reductionist approach to the study of modern societies, offering important insights into the nature of contemporary social conflicts. By moving beyond economic and class reductionism, the new perspective can identify new sources of conflict that give rise to new actors. The emphasis on processes of constitution of new identities and on the novelty of some features of contemporary movements has allowed NSM theorists to underline the degree to which these movements represent a break with past traditions. However, NSM theory has tended to ignore the organisational dimension of SMs. NSM theorists have little to say about organisational dynamics, leadership, recruitment processes, goal displacement, and so on. Given their emphasis on discontinuity (de-differentiation of roles, participatory democracy, etc.) no attempt has been made to compare SM organisations with more formal organisations and to apply organisational theory to the study of SMs. Hence, NSMs stress on direct democracy, spontaneity, non-hierarchical structures, small-scale and decentralised organisations. The NSMs seek the achievement of 'post-materials' values, "the preservation of social bonds, collective goods and the quality of production and consumption" (Anieri et al. 1990).

Marginalisation and Identity Politics in India

The identity politics in India has many dimensions distinguished by different situations of consciousness existing in the society. K. N. Panikkar categorises them into two: “the politics of domination and the politics of resistance.” The main aim of the first is the “quest for power for which identity is invoked as a means of mobilisation.” The second is “the politics of rights in which identity serves as a cohesive force for achieving internal solidarity.” According to Panikkar, “the identity politics of the majority religion belongs to the former, whereas the identity politics of minorities, such as Dalits and Adivasis, to the latter” (Panikkar 2011).

Panikkar says that the identity politics of marginalised groups is entrenched in opposition and resistance. “Their marginality defines their identity, and the aim of the politics emerging out of it is more often aimed at inclusion and equality.” This strand of identity politics is basically different from the politics of Hindu religious identity. While the Hindu identity aims at the hegemony over marginalised groups, the main character of the former is resistance. The identity of such groups, until very recently, was ignored by either the influence of dominant ideology or social power. For instance, women were confined to the domestic space, subordinated to the power and authority of the patriarchal ideology, which women themselves had internalised. The politics of women’s emancipation, therefore, is as much a struggle against patriarchy as against the entrenched patriarchal biases of women themselves (Ibid).

Panikkar goes on to argue that the most powerful articulation of identity politics did occur among the members of the lower castes, who were historically kept out of the mainstream life in society. The Dalit consciousness emerged during the period of the renaissance. Dalits endured “a double denial, both material and spiritual. They were excluded from common facilities such as the use of wells in villages or public roads or admission of children in schools. They were forced to live in segregated areas in villages. They did not have access to temples and could not conduct rituals at deaths or births, without the participation of Brahmin priests” (Ibid). He says that implied in these forms of exclusion was the possibility of the formation of an identity, in contrast to the Brahmanical order, which exercised ideological hegemony over the subordinate castes. The Dalit identity, however, was highly fractured, notes Panikkar, because of the existence of several castes within the ranks of Dalits. Jyotiba Phule tried to give them an ideological solidity through the work of the Satya Shodak Samaj, and B.R. Ambedkar sought to imbibe the necessary political content through agitation for social and political rights. The philosophical basis for unity was advocated by Narayana Guru in Kerala and practical programmes for promoting identity by ‘Periyar’ E.V. Ramasamy. Yet, none of them was an advocate of the continued existence or necessity of caste;

what they “tried to do was to address the then existing caste consciousness to go beyond castes.” In fact, “inherent in their conception was a denial of caste, as the only caste they envisioned for mankind was that of humanism” (ibid). However, Panikkar points out that in complete contrast to the past, not only has caste identity powerfully resurfaced in contemporary India, but has also managed to be at the centre stage as a major mobilising force in politics.

Identities other than caste and religion have gained political articulation in the last few decades. Panikkar notes that some of them exist only in the margins, struggling for social attention and acceptance; some others surface intermittently with a well-formulated agenda. The identity of sexual minorities is an example of the former, whereas linguistic and tribal identities represent the latter. All these identities are real and socially constructed, yet, they cannot culminate in politics unless ignited by a sense of deprivation and marginalisation. That is the reason why all social identities do not necessarily generate their own politics. Panikkar, however, points out that the existence of identity and its articulation in politics do not have a direct relationship. “The transition of identity into politics is an extremely complex phenomenon, mediated by a variety of factors and the conjunction of several historical forces” (Ibid).

Avijit Pathak says that a major reason behind the proliferation of identity politics in the contemporary era is that “the hitherto subdued groups are overcoming the age-old silence, and refusing to be defined through the categories of the dominant group” (Pathak 2006: 135). He says that in India there is a growing “challenge to some of the dominant ideologies of hierarchy; be it Brahminism or patriarchy or Hindu nationalism.” The nation is “characterised by the intensity of identity politics” and it is “witnessing a struggle for recognition, for cultural autonomy and difference, for a legitimate space in the politico-economic arena” (Ibid: 136). Pathak argues that “economic inequality often reinforces hierarchical differences.” Saying that women, Dalits, tribals and religious minorities are often economically exploited, he draws our attention to the perceptible “relationship between economic marginalisation and one’s stigmatised identity. The anguish of being marginalised/exploited often manifests itself through cultural politics – the politics of identity” (Ibid: 153). Pathak also notes that “caste identities are terribly hierarchical; these identities dehumanise us, limit our possibility and go against the notion of a holistic and integral personality” (Ibid: 154).

Speaking on identity politics in the context of Indian Dalits, Kancha Ilaiah says that for a people who “had no identity of their own for centuries, the struggle for identity becomes central in the realms of both thought and action. This is a historical process that remained invisible for centuries.” In the socio-economic and political structure of caste, the image of a productive social mass is presented in the manner that the hegemonic forces want to present. According to Ilaiah, historical

Brahminical texts crippled the Dalitbahujan mass life and their struggles (Ilaiah 2008). The term 'Dalitbahujan' here refers to and encompasses the Scheduled Castes and the Other Backward Classes, the "people and castes who form the exploited and suppressed majority" (Ilaiah 2001). This is what Kancha Ilaiah writes in his work, *Why I Am Not a Hindu* (1996).

Ilaiah says that identity does not form in the realm of politics as authentically as it does in the spiritual realm. In the caste system, "identity is not only an unknown quantity for several communities but is unknowable too." He reminds that the notion of human untouchability came into operation "to make the notion of identity unknowable to them." Ilaiah notes that the "spiritual operationalisation of unknowability keeps a large human mass, which does not have its own historical struggle textualised." Dalitbahujan were kept out of textual discourse through the means of spiritual violence. Human identity should be part of human organic existence. Ilaiah affirms that the instrument of caste was deployed "to cut the historical umbilical cord between the Dalitbahujan human being and his/her identity" (Ilaiah 2008). Gopal Guru would argue that "the pursuit of modernity particularly in a post-facto situation where the structures of inequalities are already in place is bound to produce different levels of inequalities among different sections in the society." As "asymmetry of a different kind is endemic to modernity," it is bound to create structures of inequalities, thereby "its own margin." Modernity based on the principle of moral minimum and moderate scarcity operates on the dynamics of competition. As the competition is uneven, modernity cannot accommodate within its core the entire population. It is bound to push certain section on to its margin. Guru says that in the Indian context, these are, indeed, women, Dalits, tribals and the invisible. "The dynamics of modernity produces and reproduces these margins through both the objective as well as subjective conditions." Marginality is a condition which, on the one hand, "assigns only the spurious modernity" to Dalit and tribal, but, on the other, it also recognises "the superiority of the upper caste modernity." Thus, marginalisation "suggests a horizontal movement" of Dalits who move from one margin to another even in the age of globalisation. The ideology of purity/pollution essentialises Dalits through "fixing and freezing the latter into an inferior identity," while it generalises the twice born identity as socially superior. The "essentialisation of this identity is achieved through the continuous denial of recognition" to Dalits as "universal subject." Thus, modernity "as a dream keeps motivating the marginal to struggle against the conditions of marginality" (Guru 2012).

No doubt, the marginalised communities in India are mostly poverty stricken, have poor access to infrastructure and information and stay in remote areas (Pathak 2006). The bases of defining marginalised groups are:

- The families that are below the poverty line and low investment in terms of nutrition, health, education and social security;
- Communities belonging to lower and backward castes;
- Communities living in remote and hilly areas where infrastructure in terms of roads, electricity and water supply are non-existent;
- Communities living and dependent on/in forests, fringes of forests areas and protected forest areas;
- Poverty is not only an economic state but is basically a process of social exclusion and marginalisation;
- This process of marginalisation excludes certain groups or communities more than the other and reduces the choices available to these groups/communities to come out of poverty;
- Most of these groups/communities are based in rural areas and are directly more dependent on the natural resources for livelihoods and sustenance.

Obviously, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and women form the bulk of the marginalised sections of the population in India. Tribals (Adivasis) provide the potential basis for the formation of social collectivity that represent marginal identities. Their lives have been conditioned by the highest incidence of poverty, illiteracy, ill-health, unemployment, powerlessness and various other forms of human deprivations which have pushed them to the edge of the social margin. Historically the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes epitomise the bottom of the social and economic hierarchy of the Indian society. Though they represent only 16.20 per cent and 8.10 per cent of the population respectively (India, *Census of India 2001*), they have the highest share of deprivation with 50 per cent of the scheduled castes and 51 per cent of the scheduled tribes living below the poverty line. According to the 1992 National Sample Survey report, while the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes altogether form 33.7 per cent of the rural households, they represent 94.6 per cent of the total landless and semi-landless households in rural areas. Significantly, in spite of landlessness, 77.11 per cent of the scheduled castes and 90.3 per cent of the scheduled tribes were engaged in agriculture primarily as labourers, where unspecified time schedules of work, low wages, gender based wage discrimination, seasonal wage variations, total absence of legal protections, extra-economic coercion, traditional bondage, perpetual job insecurity, outmigration and seasonal nature of employment are the modes of their employment. Again, more than 95 per cent of the women in these communities were agriculture labourers (India, NSS 1992).

Even after several decades of independence, the literacy rates for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes remained only 54.69 and 47.10 per cent respectively

(National Literacy Mission 2012). To a vast section of this community, access to basic essentials of life especially housing, minimum clothing, safe drinking water, medical care and even secured livelihood, is more a myth than reality. Representations of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in parliament and state assemblies never exceed the prescribed minimum quotas. State sponsored development initiatives and legal actions have brought only insignificant changes for these sections of society. It is not surprising that their accumulated deprivation and latent discontent have taken the shape of various organised movements in different parts of the country (Singharoy 2001: 86).

Displacement is one of the root causes of marginalisation faced by the tribal people. The end of the twentieth century is often identified as the era of displacement in India caused by disasters that ranged from natural calamities to man-made tragedies and by the positive effort of man in the name of development. Development induced displacement in the country has brought several economic, social and environmental problems to these people. Though development induced displacement is a traumatic experience for everyone, it affects tribals differently. Almost all analyses on displacement and policies on relocation assume the household or the family to be the smallest unit of convergent interests where the benefits and burdens of policies are shared by all members. Most of the industrial projects have invariably come up in tribal dominated areas and naturally the issue of people being forced to abandon their homelands is a matter of serious concern. However, the nature and consequences of development caused displacement and marginalisation is an area that has so far received scant attention. It is being felt that the fruits of development could not be percolated to the tribal and poverty stricken people. In the name of development, in all projects, the local inhabitants have been victimised. The interests of the uprooted tribals and weaker sections have often been relegated to the background (Mohanty 2009: 346). It is in such situations that the marginalised people get mobilised and assert for rights and privileges.

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Discontinuities of 'Indian Secularism' and Dilemma of Post-secular discourses in India

T.K. Jabir

Secularism is a concept most commonly associated with the 'Age of Enlightenment' in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century. Secularism maintains that knowledge should be derived from the human capacity for reason rather than in revealed religion (i.e. scripture). Scientifically, secularism sees the world as governed by natural processes and mechanical laws rather than the embodiment of divine meaning. The concept that 'secularism is best' should not have been seen as a mere state of affairs. However, as a value and as a structural compulsion, it is necessary for human societies.

The secular thought legitimizes the functions of the political system based on human decisions and reason rather than influenced by or dictated from divine right or clerical members. Hence, secularism is often related to or equated with similar philosophies, including humanism, naturalism, and the separation of state and religion. The political, social and cultural life of societies affects the transformation through the process of secularisation. As a process a steady notion of secularisation of society is more appropriate than a limited notion of the ideology of secularism. Globally, most of the societies have undergone a process of secularisation, particularly as its engagement with the modernity. By and large, this essay does not intend to provide a clear indication about the future of Indian secularism. What it seeks to highlight is the tension that secularism is generating in India, particularly in the wake of the rise of post-secular debates, religious fundamentalism and militancy, and the efforts to cope with them all.

Indian secularism

It is argued that the secularism in India has been in existence for centuries in its various forms, by pointing to the traditions of Asoka, Akbar, Samorine et al. India has a historical legacy of secularism before the modernity's advent and it

was the same philosophy which guided freedom movement throughout. It was this philosophy which was adopted by the Constitution makers in view of the necessity of social inclusion in India's largely diverse system. However, in the post-colonial period this legacy has been threatened at constant intervals by the vote bank politics of various political parties in India. Asghar Ali Engineer points out that the secularism "has lost its philosophical appeal and the new so called secular leaders who have emerged on the scene during and after the Babri Masjid episode, are more concerned about their vote-banks rather than the secularism of a lofty political philosophy. Their commitment is neither to secularism, much less to minorities. They only use secularism and champion the cause of minorities to seek their votes. No wonder the quality of our democratic polity is at stake" (Engineer 1999).

The idea of Indian secularism is quite different from the Western meaning of secularism, as separation of church and state. Generally, secularism has meant neutrality or impartiality with regard to religion, but in the Indian context it has also been associated with 'tolerance of all religions' and has been made to serve the agenda of minority rights to provide special treatment to marginalised minority groups, as they are subjected to backwardness historically. Several features of the Indian model are striking and relevant to a wider discussion. Basically multiple religions are part of its foundation concept. Indian secularism is inseparably tied to deep religious diversity. It has a commitment to multiple values like liberty, equality, peace and toleration between communities. That is interpreted broadly to cover the relative autonomy of religious communities and the equality of their status in society. It has a place not only for the rights of individuals to profess their religious beliefs but also for the right of religious communities to establish and maintain educational institutions crucial for the survival and sustenance of their distinctive religious traditions.

The acceptance of community-specific rights brings another feature of Indian secularism. Because it was born in a deeply multi-religious society, it is concerned as much with interreligious domination as it is with intra-religious domination. Indian secularism, according to Rajeev Bhargava, does not erect a strict wall of separation between state and religion. But it proposes a 'principled distance' between these two. Moreover, by balancing the claims of individuals and religious communities, it never intended an insistence of privatisation of religion (Bhargava 2006). By and large, the principle of secularism that was mentioned in the Indian Constitution carried the assurance that everyone has the freedom to practice their religion via Article 25 of the fundamental rights. Here it is unnecessary to proclaim secularism in order to grant religious freedom. This freedom can emerge from, and form a part of the Fundamental rights that are assured to every citizen. The principle of Indian secularism goes further and establishes equality between all religious groups. S Radhakrishnan, describes this:

We hold that no one religion should be given preferential status, or unique distinction, that no religion should be accorded special privileges in national life, or international relations for that would be a violation of basic principles of democracy and contrary to the best interest of religion and government... no group of citizens shall arrogate to itself rights and privileges which it denies to others. No person shall suffer any form of disability or discrimination because of his religion but all like should be free to share to the fullest degree in the common life (Radhakrishnan 1956).

The freedom of religion does not necessarily need secularism to support it. Equality of religions can be established via the fundamental rights of equality, Article 14. However, if it was to discontinue this, secularism would be rendered unnecessary. Secularism transcends beyond equality and freedom to declare that the state is not aligned to any particular religion. It is this meticulous loyalty that institutes the credentials of a secular state. Secularism promises that the state would neither align itself with any particular religion, principally majority religion, nor pursue any religious identities of its own (Chandhoke 1999).

Equality of all religions, and the distancing of the State from all religious groups, was specifically expected to guarantee the minorities that they have a legitimate position in the country, and that they would not be discriminated on the basis any of their identities. Theoretically, secularism established that the majority group would not be privileged in any manner. Consequently, the doctrines of a belief system, discouraged any pretension that the majority religion has any right to stamp the body politic with its ethos. Essentially, it was to send a clear message to the majority community (Hindu) just after India's independence. Various elements of Indian National Congress (INC) had demanded to associate the State with the majority religion. The assertion for two nation theory was certainly a catalyst here (Nussbaum 2008).

The demands for religious identity for India had become more than evident during the rebuilding of the Somnath temple. So as to neutralise the non-secular trend, Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1951, declared that a secular State is one in which the State protect all religions, but does not favour one at the expense of others and does not itself adopt any religion as the State religion (Nussbaum 2008). As a Nehruvian adaptation of modernity, the concept of secularism that emerged in India possess three substantial components. Firstly the state will not attach itself to any one religion, which will thereby establish itself as the State religion. Secondly all citizens are granted the freedom of religious belief. Finally the state will ensure equality among religious groups by ensuring that one group is not favoured at the expense of the other. Correspondingly, the minorities will not be discriminated against anyway (Smith 1958).

Nehru explained his notion of secularism on various occasions saying that secularism does not mean a state where religion as such is discouraged. Moreover, it provides freedom of religion and conscience, including freedom for those who may have no religion. Nehru never considered that the word secular was not opposed to religion and perhaps not very unproblematic even to find a good word for 'secular.' He said that generally, "some people think that secularism means something opposed to religion. However, that obviously is not correct." According to Nehru, "Indian secularism means it is a state which honours all faiths equally and gives them equal opportunities; that is as a state it does not allow itself to be attached to one faith or religion, which then becomes the state religion' (Gopal 1980). T.N. Madan also concurs with the idea of Indian secularism with the arguments of Bhargava. The secularism as political ideology and practice obviously does not stand for the separation of religion/church and the state in India, but rather for a non-discriminatory state, which is constrained to treat its citizens in certain contexts (where religious beliefs and/or identities are at stake) differentially rather than uniformly (Madan 2011).

The Predicament of Secularism in India

The Indian version of secularism has also been tainted at several occasions. Since India is an extremely diverse country, innumerable minority communities exist with peculiar social/religious, cultural and linguistic identities, the state has failed in several points to fulfill the principles of its constitution. In the post-Nehruvian era, we have seen the crisis of Indian secularism:

The rudest shocks come from the manner in which the government and the country are allowing themselves to be pushed off the edge of secularism into abyss of communal reaction; falling back to the frightening atavism of stagnant, dark and mediaval ethos of the Hindi speaking areas, the Madhya Desa which had witnessed ages ago the finest blossoming of Indian culture. It spells dark and dank reaction (*Economic and Political Weekly* 1966).

Indian National Congress (INC) had fallen short in the post-Nehru era with secular credentials, while the party had overtly engaged with the communal means to its political ends. Moreover INC's political hegemony as constant power swear in centre since India's independence ended with the national emergency in 1975 and since then witnessed the emergence of communal political outfits largely throughout the country. The INC has still not been able to establish that its leaders were not involved in the 1984 pogroms against the Sikh community despite ample proof to the contrary (Chandhoke 1999). The 1992 Babari Masjid demolition was also a deep blemish to India's secular credentials, as the INC was ineffectively reacted to the

dispute even as it had power in Centre during the demolition. Agressive cultural nationalism is undesirable because it is exclusive—it excludes people who do not belong to majority Hindu culture. On the otherhand, minorities have organised themselves under the umbrella of religious leaders. The polarisation of communities has resulted in retreat from a common civic space, which was painstakingly evolved by the leaders of the freedom struggle.

The rising Hindu fundamentalist movement has not only been targetting the minority Muslim community but also Christians as the enemy within the nation. The accelerated ascendancy of the Hindu Right since the 1980s presents one of the central conundrums of contemporary Indian history and politics. The forged assertions of Hindu nationalism for majoritarian, authoritarian, militaristic, and exclusionary India are fairly evident, yet it continues to make dangerous advances in vast segments of Indian society (Kumar 2008). Several scholars have noted that the Hindu Right gains a great deal of its power and effectiveness by speaking simultaneously in several languages (Tapan Basu et al. 1993). The Hindu nationalists converse on the one hand language of democracy and authoritarianism, secularism and religious intolerance, and a divisive cultural nationalism on the other. The extremely contentious vision of a homogenous Hindu *rashtra* (nation), an attempt to make society monolithic, is congruous with upper caste Hindu beliefs and practices, central to the Hindu Right's agenda. The notion of *Hindutva*-literally 'Hinduness,' more in particular, Hindu rule or Hindu nation puts in a nutshell the coercive and majoritarian manifesto of the *Sangh Parivar*, the 'family' of right-wing political, cultural, and religious organizations that comprise the Hindu Right (Kumar 2008). Innumerable cases of communal violence have pointed to the role of this right wing group, including the anti-Christian violence in Orissa in August 2008. With the reports of communal tensions in India in an ascending rate, the modernity and its values such as secularism have constantly been challenged.

Debating the prospects and problems of post-secularism

The intellectual base of post – secularism is central to the postmodern approaches. The values evolved with modernity/enlightenment have been severely criticised in the approach. The universalising theories of modernity have been rejected as those were the part of grand-narratives. Post-secular debates are not an attempt to banish religion from the public sphere; rather, it is a philosophical approach to religion that critically considers orthodox assumptions. Post-modern religious systems of thought view realities as plural and subjective and dependent on the worldview of the individual. Post-secular society is characterised by "the continued existence of religious communities in an increasingly secularised environment" (Habermas 2009). This brief definition of post-secular society identifies two

major connotations. The process of secularisation does not essentially lead to the deteriorating religious authority while the increasing religious importance would not jeopardize the secularisation process. Nevertheless, there are still communal tensions in the society. So debates do not disregard the predicament between religion and the secular. Post-secularism is intended to explain the revival of the strength of religion, in a sense religion strips off its supposed subordination to the secular modernity. It is not to create a domain on clash of both identity that is, neither religion nor the secular claims its supremacy; both of them count each other as equal opponents.

In his articulations on post-secular debates, Habermas explains three important socio-political developments that lead to the change of consciousness in the post-secular society. First, the rising happenings of religiously stimulated conflicts and the enormous broadcasting of news regarding these incidents by mass-media have contributed to the transformation of two sensitivities that is, religion is not going to disappear from the public sphere, and the gradual process of modernisation does not inevitably commission the influence of religion. Secondly, the power of religion in the development of both public opinion and private morality has been increasing. At last, the mounting figures of immigrants particularly from the Arab world with their religious traditional values in a secular social system, especially in Europe underscores the presence of religion (Habermas 2009).

According to Habermas, secularism, until the mid-twentieth century, was a social mechanism. The obligation of a secular state had to take a neutral position to ensure checks and balances among competing religious denominations (of Christians) in Europe. However, in contemporary period there should have developed a systematic and sustainable mechanism of attaining 'a balance between shared citizenship and cultural difference' (Ibid). Several cultures and religions coexist with a common national identity as a value of modernity. In the secular-modern perspective, this national identity has been a nonaligned, non-religious one generally. In this transformed reality, religious revivalism and increasing religious influence compel to rethink the process of the formation of a secular democratic national identity that ensures an equal and dignified role of religion along with the secular domain. That is the incorporation of religion to the public sphere, never be the incorporation of the latter to the former.

Talal Asad, a prominent scholar of critic of secularism/modernity, philosophically approaches secularism and its formulations. In order to demystify the history of the concept, Asad draws upon philosophies of Michel Foucault. In mapping out the secular, Foucault's notion of 'genealogy,'¹ he characterises 'genealogy' delightfully as "a way of working back from our present to the contingencies that have come together to give us our certainties" (Asad 2003). The concept of 'secular' is a quality that is often an appeal, suggesting a concept that is

transparent in general. That assumption in itself, together with the easy prevalence of 'secular' in public discourse today, is a product of the forces that form the word's genealogy (Ibid). He observes in his critique to secularism that scholars have paid more attention to 'secularism' than to 'the idea of the secular' and paid more attention to religion than to either one (Ibid). While the public discourse cannot understand secularism as a political doctrine, the absence of the epistemological sort of the idea of 'secular', is also prevailing.' By and large the 'secular' is approached indirectly and then considers 'secularism' against understandings of the nation-state and modernity; in relation to human rights discourse and its international elaborations and the universality of its values (Ibid).

The construction of the 'secular' is both formative of and consequent on Western historical narratives of collective being with the modernity. Asad draws attention to that—secularism does not clear the playing field but rather draws the lines differently: "A secular state does not guarantee toleration; it puts into play different structures of ambition and fear. The law never seeks to eliminate violence since its objective is always to *regulate* violence" (Ibid). Therefore it can be assumed that tolerance would inevitably arise in secular systems based on reason the basic constituent in modernity. This has been interrogated by several scholars.

Asad investigates the binary logic of secular modernity opposed to religious with another recognizable dichotomy, the sacred versus the profane. As an anthropologist/historian of religions, Asad's discussion notes that 'the sacred' moved from being a quality of distinct 'places, objects, and times, each requiring specific conduct' to 'sacredness' as a 'unitary domain' constructed in large part through the needs of anthropologists. To be precise, in certain culturally and historically specific settings the relationship between the object as set-aside and the bases of its sacredness, or the conduct this required, had not been a constant subject. It was the construction of 'the sacred' as a domain rather than a quality that, among other things, signalled formation of something called 'the secular'. But orienting these two as oppositions was a rhetorical move that obliterated the particular meanings of each. Moreover this was also a change from sacred quality residing in an object wherein signifier and signified were not separable to "the essentialization of 'the sacred' as an external, transcendent power" (Ibid). In a broad sense Asad points to the fact that:

Religion as a category is constantly being defined within social and historical contexts, and that people have specific reasons for defining it one way or another. Religion is associated with various kinds of experience, various institutions, with various movements, arguments and so on. That is what I am pointing to. In other words, it is not an abstract definition that interests me. People who use abstract definitions of religion are missing a very important point: that religion is a social and historical *fact*, which has legal dimensions, domestic and political dimensions, economic

dimensions, and so on. So what one has to look for, in other words, is the ways in which, as circumstances change, people constantly try, as it were, to gather together elements that they think belong, or *should* belong, to the notion of religion. People use particular conceptions of religion in social life (Debbanerji 2009).

Even if Asad does not take a side as a post-secularist, his critique can be examined in that way. He has employed for a dialogic engagement, interrogating the biases, provincial limitations and arbitrary choices within post-Enlightenment modernity through the critiquing of its limitations by alternate cultural histories, while probing these pre-modern formations for pluralities of interpretation and internal resources of human emancipation (Ibid). Contextually, a post-secular world is one in which individuals and groups may co-exist not through the policing of the boundaries of a public sphere by the nation-state, but through the development of alternate social realities of human emancipation. However, the problematic conceptualisation of Asad is that, it has doomed relevance to the present situation in India, with the alarmed ascending of a dominant Hindutva nationalism generally in India.

Post-secular debates reject secularism as alien to Indian tradition and custom and secularism as responsible for the growing communal/religious violence in Indian society. It blames the displacing of the religion from the public sphere and destroying the people's faith. Scholars like Ashis Nandy, T.N Madan et al. have argued in the Indian contexts that the external threat to secularism is only a symptom of a deeper internal crisis. The internal crisis in the sense that the conceptual and normative structure of secularism is itself terribly flawed. In different ways, such arguments point that secularism is linked to a flawed modernisation process, to a mistaken view of rationality, to an impractical demand that religion has to be eliminated from public life, to an insufficient appreciation of the importance of communities in the life of people.

The foremost critic of secularism is Ashis Nandy, who argues that 'the traditional concepts of inter-religious understanding and tolerance... had allowed the thousands-yes, literally thousands - of communities living in the sub continent to co-survive in reasonable neighbourliness' (Nandy 1997). The advent of colonial modernity has structured countless social catastrophes in Indian subcontinent. In order to sort out such harms of society, it has been advocated that a return to genuine religion and the indigenous tradition of religious tolerance as the best means to preserve and maintain a pluralist and multi-religious Indian society, which has been existed here for ages.

In this context, Nandy observes:

The traditional ways of life have over the centuries developed internal principles of tolerance, and these principles must have a play in contemporary politics. This

response affirms that religious communities in traditional societies have known how to live with each other. It is not modern India which has tolerated Judaism in India for nearly two thousand years, Christianity from before the time it went to Europe, and Zoroastrianism for over twelve hundred years, it is traditional India which has shown such tolerance. That is why today, as India gets modernised, religious violence is increasing (Nandy 1998).

Nandy elaborates further:

It is time to recognise that instead of trying to build religious tolerance on the good faith or conscience of small group of de-ethnised, middle class politicians, bureaucrats, and intellectuals, a far more serious venture would be to explore the philosophy, the symbolism and the theology of tolerance in the faiths of citizens and hope that the state system in the South Asia may learn something about religious tolerance from every day Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, or Sikhism rather than wish that ordinary Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists and Sikhs learn tolerance from various fashionable secular theories of statecraft (Ibid).

In his lengthy critique of secularism/modernity, Nandy's rejection of the ideas entrenched in two ways. His critique of modern culture and society, which approvingly and respectfully draws on Gandhi's *Hind Swaraj* on the one hand, and a critique of Hindu nationalism of a piece with the critique of Nehruvian secularism on the other. Nandy asserts that the communal nationalism is itself a product of modernity, owes its very existence to the oppositional but at the same time internal dialectical relation it bears to the other product of modernity and Nehruvian secularism. The argument is that secularism is an alien principle imposing upon a people who have never wished to separate religion from politics in their everyday life and thinking, and therefore has left the people no choice but to turn to the only religious politics available, namely Hindu nationalism. Thus, secular tyranny breeds Hindu nationalist resistance, which threatens its own form of tyranny (Alam 2002).

Peripherally, Nandy's argument is fascinating, when it analyses the receptive nature of Indian culture to the 'other' religions and cultures. However, its explanatory merits are significantly flawed by its contracting and uncritical anti-nationalism, its skewed historiography and its nationalist reminiscence. If it examines the thrust of Gandhism, there is no gainsaying the humanism inherent in Gandhi's politics. The Brahminical elements in Gandhi are also manifested, as it can be exemplified from his debates with B.R Ambedkar regarding casteism in India (Jaffrelot 2004; Omvedt 1994). Another principal fallacy with Nandy is that, the epistemology he used to analyse the history ignores the fact that, in India all the basic elements in the construction of a Brahminic Hindu ideology were in place well before the arrival of modernity. This is a problematic positioning of Nandy

in contradiction to his argument that communalism, like nationalism, is a purely modern phenomenon.

In *The Intimate Enemy* Nandy often supports a dogmatic traditionalism for no other reason than that it seems to be anti-Western and anti-modern. Nandy is making a case against modernity, and the entire project of secular liberal rationalism, which he sees as more or less inseparable from colonialism, capitalism, and all the aspects of modernisation and development he finds objectionable (Nandy 1983). That is simplistic and reductionist perspective. He has disgusted with modern hierarchies of wealth and privilege, by the inequities of modern societies and the gruesome contrast between wealth and poverty which prevails in contemporary India. Predominantly, he recognises that modern science, modern weaponry, and modern efficiency have made mass murder all the more easy and warfare all the more deadly, is oversimplified in fact (Leach 2009). It is always unnecessary to leave secular modernism from a critical examination, while there should have been a check and balance to regulate the inappropriate juxtaposing the projects of modernity, forever.

Another major critic of secularism/Indian secularism is T.N Madan, who says:

In the prevailing circumstance secularism in South Asia as a generally shared credo of life is impossible, as a basis for state action impracticable, and blueprint for the foreseeable future impotent. It is impossible as a credo of life because the great majority of the people of South Asia are in their own eyes active adherents of some religious faith. It is impractical as a basis for state action either because Buddhism and Islam have been declared state or state protected religions or because the stance of religious neutrality or equidistance is difficult to maintain since religious minorities do not share the majority's view of what this entails for the state. And it is impotent as a blueprint for the future because, by its very nature, it is incapable of countering religious fundamentalism and fanaticism (Madan 1998)

While criticising it, Madan elaborates that 'in multi-religious societies such as those of South Asia it should be realised that secularism may not be restricted to rationalism, that is compatible with faith, and that rationalism as understood in the West is not the sole motive force of a modern state'(Ibid). Moreover, 'the only way secularism in South Asia, understood as inter-religious understanding, may succeed would be for us to take both religion and secularism seriously and not reject the former as superstition and reduce the latter to a mask of communalism or mere expediency'(Ibid). The contestation of Madan too is related to the alien concept of secularism and its annoyances to traditional Indian society where the religion is inseparable from society's everyday life. The problematic contestation of Madan somewhat similarly with Nandy, which may deliberately be a mechanism to the

consolidation of Hindutva forces with the cultural nationalism, which has already been strengthened largely.

The critics of Indian secularism argue indiscriminately that the traditional concepts of interreligious sympathetic co-existence and lenience had allowed thousands of communities lived in the subcontinent with harmony and peace for ages. Post-secularists say that the indigenous tradition of religious tolerance is the best means to preserve and maintain a pluralist and multi-religious Indian society.

It is true that traditional ways of life in India have been accepted by Judaism, Christianity, Zoratrianism, and Islam before they reached major continents. The modern India has become intolerant with its modernity and the rising cases of communal violence. The post-secular critics argue that instead of creating the religious tolerance of all religions of India, the state has to learn religious tolerance from Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism and Sikhism. The state has to realise that secularism may not be restricted to rationalism. It should be compatible with faith.

The obscurity with these assessments to secularism is that its scholars disregard the in-built potential of religion towards transformation into an ideological instrument in the hands of ruling regimes to legitimise their policies, that may be against minority community. Moreover the state may have absolute power that possibly will eliminate the opposition that is opposed to state policies. In the assertions of the tradition of tolerance of Hinduism, these scholars ignore the reality of a violent, exploitative and hierarchical caste system whose operation and practices have, historically, led a vast section of humanity –not only Scheduled Castes(SCs) but also large section of the poorest among the other backward castes– to live a dehumanised life and whose political assertion in recent times is becoming intolerable to the upholders of the upper caste Hinduism (Alam 2002). Historically, the Brahminical Hinduism has never tolerated outside or inside, any challenge to its hegemonic position in the society. It successfully countered the challenge of Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism by appropriating their symbols and reducing the 'sects' of Hinduism. Above all, the large chunk of Christians, Muslims and Buddhists in India are the converts from various Hindu communities, since it has historically been cultural system of extreme discrimination, i.e., the social evils like untouchability. Several parts of India still have been subjected to this age old social evil.

The 'tolerant'(principally distant) Indian secularism has been flawed as the cases have been mentioned here. The foremost anxiety is that the post-secular debates demand the revival of religion. Moreover, as in the case of India, as a

universal phenomenon particularly in Asia, the emergence of religion as a political force and the assertion of other primordial identities on the political landscape accordingly poses an uncertainty on the inevitability, irreversibility, and universality of the process of secularisation and its capacity to eliminate the influence of religion in society, properly. A significant characteristic of the process of secularisation in any society is the popular democratic struggle. The popular struggles against feudalism and the Papacy occurred centuries ago; that is how secularism evolved in the West. Democracy and secularism are inseparable, that without the extensive democratisation of social and economic structure of society, it would have been impossible to build a genuine liberal-democratic and secular state.

Conclusion

The principal contention in this essay is that the post-secular debates in India have been a problematic project. The foremost impasses with the post-colonial/post-structural theories are, those are philosophically anti-hierarchical and anti-oppressive. It can be welcomed as critical philosophy, as a corrective force in society. It needs to emphasise that secularism is a value evolved with the formation of modern nation states. Hence it has become an essential value to be followed for the better management of minority community and their rights in any state in the world. The necessity is that the religious and political institutions must be separated from each other because both are very powerful institutions that command people's unqualified allegiance. These institutions would have the potential to use force against each other. If the two are identical or strongly overlap, then the resulting intermix thwarts autonomy more than when they are separate. The value of equality is ultimately overdue in Indian social system – ie., abandoning of discrimination on the basis of any social identity of any citizens. The wall of separation is required in order to ensure a subtle and complex egalitarian system. The necessity is that the mechanism of democracy requires that there should not be concentration of power in any one institution or in any one group (Bhargava 1994).

The post-secular debates can exist as a corrective force against the extreme secularisation. Yet, a predicament is that the communalist forces of various religions in India have been very active to take over the public sphere. They are demanding de-secularisation of India. The BJP leader L.K Advani says:

Unfortunately, for decades now, in the name of secularism, politicians have been wanting the nation to disown its essential personality. For the left inclined, secularism has been a euphemism to cloak their intense allergy to religion and more particularly to Hinduism. It is this attitude which BJP characterizes as pseudo-secularism. This attitude is wrong and unscientific [*sic*] (Advani 2008).

It was already predicted that if a cultural nationalist party like BJP was coming

to power in India, it would challenge the rationalist knowledge system by deploying the 'saffronisation' (Hansen 1999). So the whole system of knowledge would be in threat and this would have far-reaching consequences. The distorting of history would be catastrophic to its minorities. Unlike the West, the social modernisation process in India has been in less a pace. Some Islamist movements in their conferences in Kerala have been aligning with the post-secular debates to justify their inherent agenda of establishing a religious state, by quoting the arguments of scholars like Talal Asad. The advocates of Hindutva/Hindu nationalism are also chipping away the traditional Indian tolerance and accommodation. They are making secularism as an ideology of anti-Hindu and are equating it with 'minorityism' (Nayar 2004), that is as a mechanism to woo minority communities. In this context, an intellectual like Nandy fails to realise the alarming rise of such phenomena. Religions, as Jawaharlal Nehru mentioned, have laid down values and have pointed out principles for the guidance of human life. They should not be mistaken for attributes of a completely formed and closed culture that India has inherited.

The Hindutva and various communal forces have made considerable headway in India, particularly after the 2014 parliamentary elections. Since then, India has lost its initial urge for secularism, and religious conservatives are now attempting to establish their hold on the state. In order to prevent the further communal polarisation of society in India, secularism is a powerful idea, which has to continue to engage the political discourse in the long run. Secularism, both as an idea and as a practice has considerable vitality and therefore it should be prevailed in a tolerant way.

Notes

- 1 French philosopher Michel Foucault developed Nietzsche's idea that history is misconceived as 'an attempt to capture the exact essence of things'. He argues that history is inherently flawed if conducted as a search for 'origins' in the sense of essential beginnings. Genealogy is the alternative to history so conceived and 'opposes itself to the search for origins.' The heart of the concept is that there are no essences to be discerned behind historical developments, that there are no essences that explain why things developed as they did (Prado 2000).

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The Dragon in the Desert: Growing Chinese Foot Print in West Asia

Ashok Alex Luke

China's global ascendancy or the so called "peaceful rise" has been viewed as one of the most significant geopolitical and economic developments of the 21st century. Its consistent growth over the past two decades, and ability to withstand the global economic meltdown of 2007-09, its emergence as the second largest economy in the world, together with its massive military build-up as well as the growing presence in the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America had placed it as one of the most influential nations of the world. Many view China's rise as a threat to the existing global order and much of the debates on the rise of China in recent years had been related to the challenges that it may pose to the countries like the United States and India. Prior to 1979 Chinese foreign policy was more ideologically oriented. Since 1979 trade and commerce became more prominent in China's foreign policy. In 1977 China accounted for only 0.6 percent of global trade, but in 2012 it became the world's largest trading nation. As China counts along with the economically powerful nations of the world its reliance on the maritime transport will correspondingly grow as the bulk of its trade is transported by sea. At the same time it has emerged as an important donor to the third world countries by way of its "strings free" grants and undertaking public building projects in these countries. China's development strategy is based on its economic success; this can be seen in its trade pacts with other nations such as in the China-Africa Cooperation Forum where it offers economic incentives to the recipient countries in order to enhance its regional and global influence.

Chinese Diplomacy

The new trends in Chinese diplomacy have shaped the public opinion on China as a global power. Perhaps this is in contrary to Deng Xiaoping's teaching of "*Lay low, never take the lead, and bide our time.*" Some of the think tanks in China argue that

the world has been undergoing a transformation to a post-American world of multi polarity. And this has motivated China to seek an equal relationship with the United States. China's resolutions on some of the key issues such as with that of Iran, Burma, North Korea, Sudan and most recently with Syria, which proclaims its interest to involve itself in many of the global matters rather than to be a mere spectator of the world events. It calls for the reformation of the World Bank, IMF and the WTO as well as for the need of a new currency to replace the dollar as the international reserve currency (Dittmer 2012: 61-66). With the new leadership under Xi Jinping it is expected that China is likely to undergo a transformation in its economy with the goal of achieving sustainable long term growth. China's alternative design of the world model stresses on the equal, unfringeable sovereignty of all states large and small, western and non western, rich and poor, democratic and authoritarian, each to run its own best fit. There are a few areas which defines the characteristics of Chinese diplomacy such as the bilateral relations with the United States, deepening strategic partnership with Russia, reshaping the orders of multiple regions of the world especially that of East Asia, Africa, Central Asia, and finally soft power which is a mixture of economic diplomacy, cultural and ideological appeals, to promote China's global and regional influence. Xi Jinping has called for the creation of a "New Silk Road" through the construction of a network of highways, pipelines and rail lines for securing its energy interest which extends from China's Western border through Central Asia and to the oil rich West Asia which can extend up to Europe (Aluwaisheg 2014:1).

China and West Asia

West Asia or "Middle East" as it is popularly called in the rest of the world stretches from the eastern part of Iran to the Western part of Egypt. There are about 25 countries in the region of West Asia and North Africa out of which 3 countries are non Arab i.e. Israel, Turkey and Iran. It has been a place to one of the earliest civilizations of the world and looking at its historical, religious, geostrategic and geo-economic importance the region has always been a conflict zone adding to the intervention of the outside powers. Moreover the Arab uprisings that unfolded in 2011 had taken many a surprise paving way for political transitions in the region. The earliest documented evidence between China and West Asia occurred during the reign of Emperor Han Wudi between 140 and 87 BC. During the period of the Persian Sassanid Empire (226-651AD) there were frequent trade interactions between the Persians and the Chinese via both land as well as sea routes. During the Mongol rule of China (1260-1368 AD) the trade further intensified and it lead to the exchange of people, ideas, technologies and goods between both ends of Asia, and the Silk Route was an important link for this channel of communication.

Chinese Interests in West Asia

China's commerce with the West Asian region had grown exponentially over the past two decades and the Chinese interests in the region involves stability of the oil prices, investments in the region and the safety of its expatriate workers. In West Asia, China's trade with the GCC accounts for more than 70% of the Sino-Arab Trade and more than half of its oil comes from this region. China's two way trade with GCC was \$151 billion in 2012. The Gulf demands Chinese construction and manufactured goods in return for energy. Global consultancy Mc Kinsey and company predicts that bilateral trade between China and West Asia will reach between \$ 350 billion and \$ 500 billion by 2020 of which the major chunk will be from the Gulf Arab states. Chinese interests apart from energy in GCC include construction, communication, infrastructure and petrochemicals. China is also looking to import energy intensive goods like phosphate and aluminium which the GCC can produce more cheaply. Today China is the largest trading partner of Iran and the largest importer of Saudi oil surpassing the US in 2010 (Spengler 2013: 1-3).

Energy Security

Energy lies central to China's economic growth; therefore West Asia is vital to its energy interest. With its rapid economic boom China became a net oil importer in 1993, and in 2003 China surpassed Japan to become the second largest oil consumer in the world after the United States. China imported 5.4 million bbl/d of crude oil on an average in 2012. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) predicts that China will surpass the United States as the largest net oil importer in 2014 by importing approximately 6.6 million bbl/d. China's thirst for oil has grown due to its economic boom, rising incomes, growing population and increasing urbanization (EIA 2014:1). Energy security has become a major consideration in its foreign policy towards West Asia. All the growth which China had acquired over the years would come to a halt if its industrial sector gets affected due to lack of energy. It not only sees West Asia as a source of its oil but also as a trade partner. Apart from West Asia the other regions such as Central Asia, Africa and Latin America which it did not give much importance traditionally had also found geo strategic importance in China's foreign policy calculus. China's "going out" strategy which it initiated in 2002 helped Chinese oil companies such as CNPC and CNOOC to purchase equity shares in overseas exploration and production projects around the world, building pipelines to secure its oil supply. Since 2008 Chinese national oil companies had purchased assets in West Asia, North America, Latin America Africa and other parts of Asia. Energy security is not merely an energy issue; it involves national security, strategic economic interests and diplomacy. The main link between the Chinese foreign policy and the global search of oil is the sharp rise

of energy security concerns. Many a times China has shown reservations to support the sanctions proposed by the United States on some of the energy producing states which it views could be important to its energy needs. China's increasing economic and military power as well as its quest for energy security drives it to maintain good economic relations with some of the adversaries of the United States such as Iran, Sudan and Venezuela. China imports more oil from West Asia than any other regions of the world. In 2013 China imported 2.9 million barrels of oil per day (b/d) of oil from West Asia, which accounted for 52% of the total Chinese oil imports globally. The largest Chinese investments of the region in energy are in Iran and Iraq. These include Halfaya and Rumaila in Iraq and Azadegan in Iran. Scholars view that the greatest Chinese national security concern in the Indian Ocean is the vulnerability of its oil supply due to political and military dominance of the United States. More than 70% of Chinese oil passes through the Indian Ocean via Malacca Straits and South China Sea raising concerns that during the advent of a war the United States could use its military dominance to disrupt the oil supply along these routes. Safeguarding of the long distance energy transportation from West Asia is a high priority for China and Pakistan could act as a focal point in its energy transportation from Iran through the pipe line via Baluchistan to Kashgar in North West China which will further reach to all provinces (Keck 2013:1).

Chinese oil consumption grows by 7.5% a year which is seven times faster than in the United States and is expected to increase by 150 percent by 2020. The large scale transformation from bicycle to automobile industry has also increased the demand for oil in China. China looks on to other countries to sell cheap goods and arms in exchange for energy to sustain its economy. In the year 2004 more than 45% of China's oil interest came from West Asia and the top suppliers being Saudi Arabia, Oman and Iran. As per one report 70% of China's oil imports will be from the West Asian region by 2015 and this trend is unlikely to change anytime soon (Chen 2014:1).

China's West Asia Policy: The Cold War Period

When PRC was proclaimed in 1949 only a few Arab countries knew about it and many were suspicious about its foreign policy. The Arab League had even passed a resolution in August 1950 calling its members not to recognize the PRC. Even when countries such as Lebanon, Egypt, Syria and Iraq decided to recognize Taiwan as China's legal government Israel became the first nation in West Asia to recognise the Peoples Republic of China in 1950. Non interference in the internal matters of other countries has been one of the core principles of Chinese foreign policy since the beginning. Therefore China had distanced itself from mediating in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As from the early 1950s China insisted that the Arab-Israeli

conflict should be settled through direct negotiations without the interference of the outside powers. After the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, China tried to capitalize on Gamal Abdul Nasser and other Arab leaders thus the normalisation of relations with Israel were ignored. Apart from the revolutionary socialist ideas that some of these Arab regimes possessed the numerical calculus of many Arab vote over one Jewish vote in the UN lead them to engage more with the Arabs and ignore Israel. During Mao's period China's role was marginal in the West Asian affairs. At the same time it continued to support national liberation movements and revolutionary organisations in the region and provided them with material support. Egypt was the first Arab country to establish diplomatic relations with China in 1956. China became the first non Arab country to officially recognize the Algerian revolution in 1962. It also aided the revolutionaries of Yemen, Oman and the resistance forces of Palestine in the 1960's (Cooley 1972:19-34).

During Chinese Premier Zhou En- Lai's visit to the Arab world between 1963 and 1966 China firmly mentioned its commitment to the Palestinian cause. China recognized the PLO in 1965 and in the same year a PLO delegation under Ahmed Al Shukeri was received in China by Mao Tse Tung himself. Mao compared Israel with Taiwan and stated that both were bases of imperialism in Asia and that the Arab battle against West was the battle against Israel and urged them to boycott Europe and the Americans. During Mao's era the twin factors in China's foreign policy with the outside world were ideology and national interest. Though it did not have diplomatic relations, Israel voted in 1971 to admit China into the United Nations thus by expelling Taiwan and this was in much to the annoyance of the United States. The new climate for cooperation with Israel emerged only when Deng Xiaoping assumed the Chinese leadership in the late 1970s. By this time China's strong support for the Palestinian cause had undergone a change as Beijing had toned down the ideological elements of its foreign policy in the 1980s and sought to build better relations with Israel as a result of its defence ties with the latter(Cooley 1972:19-34).

China's West Asia Policy in the Post Cold War Period

After establishing diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, China's West Asia policy was a balanced one i.e. while maintaining friendly relations with Arab neighbours at the same time not neglecting its relationship with Israel. Chinese diplomacy had found itself in a complex dilemma on many occasions in order to balance the perils and prospects of its economic and strategic goals in West Asia and the international arena. China has not played an active part in the peace process but is involved in promoting its own economic interests and balancing the US hegemony in the region. China has welcomed the Oslo peace process as well as the peace agreements

between Israel and Jordan. Since then it had only given very little material support to the Palestinians were as its relations with Israel grew rapidly. China has also expressed the views that the UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 as well as the principle of land for peace constitute the basis for peace in the region. China views that the Arab side and the Israeli side should try to solve their differences through peaceful negotiations and advance the peace process based on existing agreements (Liqun 2010:1).

China supports the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to establish a Palestinian statehood and the international community should grant them the necessary assistance to achieve this in at the same time without compromising the legitimacy and security needs of Israel. Rather than placing itself in the political role of the peace process it has tried to extract economic advantage from all the parties (Zhu 2009:1). In 2002 China appointed a West Asian peace envoy at the request of several Arab states. This was the first direct Chinese participation in the peace talks. Apart from this and in the Annapolis Conference of 2008 the role of China as mediator in the West Asian peace process has been limited. Many Arab states wanted China to play the role of a mediator as they think that the United States is being partial to Israel (Kumaraswamy 2013:143-159).

The United States, China and the Region

China is pursuing policies that would prevent the US from restricting China's ability to exercise political and economic influence, this is manifested in China's granting of regional aid, expanding diplomatic relationships, its continued pursuit of energy deals and weapons technology exports to radical states in the region despite US protests. The continuing growth of diplomatic influence in the region supports China's rise to international status and helps a balancing act against the West and particularly against the United States. Beijing views that good Sino-American relations would be essential in the overall economic development of China in the region and elsewhere. Though it wants to balance the United States in West Asia, it does not want to have a confrontation with the United States. China wants to see a stable and peaceful West Asia to ensure a steady source of oil and to avoid entanglement in the region's conflict. It looks onto access business opportunities from both the pro-US and anti-US camps in the region. These competing Chinese interest and policies are contributing to the complication of US-China relations. Many view that a rising China could become a responsible stakeholder in the region in the international system, helping to solve common security, economic problems, and reducing regional and global tensions. China is likely to get into the region's peace talks if it smells an economic opportunity and all other interest are subservient and it does not want to be identified with any of the camps. In the advent of the

“shale revolution” the interest of the United States in the region is likely to go down further where as the Chinese interest in the region grows, in this context China has to play a cautious and proactive diplomacy in order to preserve peace and stability which is vital to protect its interests in the region (Kumaraswamy 2013:143-159).

China’s diplomatic and economic engagements in the region have been successful to a large extent as it maintains good relations with every country in the region such as Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia who are the allies of the Americans at the same time also with Syria, Iran, Lebanon and Gaza who are the adversaries the United States. Its approach is mostly conflict management rather than conflict resolution. China’s involvement in the region and its closeness with countries that oppose US dominance in the region may pose serious challenges to US interests in the region. China also enjoys good relations with groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah which the United States classifies as “terrorist groups.” It has also been accused that during the Lebanon war of 2006 the weapons that were used by Hezbollah were supplied by China to Iran and Syria which were eventually transferred to Hezbollah. China recognized the Hamas victory of 2006 in Gaza and advised it to recognize the state of Israel and return with the peace talks. It is widely believed by some that Chinese military sales would create more bloodshed in the region. In 2013 a lawsuit was filed by the New York Court against the Bank of China for its role in transferring money to the Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad which was used to fund attacks against Israel between 2004 and 2007. Recently its has expressed its interest to be a part of the negotiated settlement in the Arab-Israeli peace process along with the United States, Russia, EU, and the United Nations. Just as Washington tries to continue good relations with Israel and Arab nations China too continues the same (Kumaraswamy 2013:143-159).

Israel

As a result of the close proximity between the United States and Israel, and the strong influence that the US exerts on Israel prevented the China-Israel relations to mature far from its potentiality. Defence cooperation has been one of the key factors of Israel’s relations with many countries. By late 1970s China was in need of what Israel had to offer in military terms. Though China continued to politically support the Palestinian cause, Israel continued to seek military cooperation with China hoping that it would fetch political dividends in the long term. During the cold war days the US did not interfere in the military relations between China and Israel as it was keen in containing the Soviet Union. Where as after the cold war the United States began to express resentment over Israeli arms sales to China. Eg: Phalcon deal of 2000. From 2000 to the present the United States had lost considerable global economic and political influence. On the other hand China has

gained significant political and economic influence. The military invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan together with the 2007-09 global financial crises have caused much of the economic burden for the United States. And some estimates predict that China may overtake the US economy in real terms by 2016. These factors may prompt Israel to rethink its China policy. Apart from military there has been bilateral cooperation taking place in the field of hi-tech, chemical industries, communications, medical optics and agriculture (Kumaraswamy 2013:143-159).

Iran

Even when the Western countries imposed sanctions on Iran, China was able to win bids to develop the oil fields in Iran and over the years China has become the biggest trade partner of Iran. Its engagement with Iran has been based on non intervention, nuclear non proliferation and economic ties. The Chinese call for a multi polar international order, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, emphasis on sovereignty together with the suspicion on the US interest in the region brings the Iran-China partnership closer. For Iran the strategic, political and economic advantages of maintaining closer ties with China are extremely significant. China continues to be Iran's second largest military supplier after Russia and continues to be the largest trade partner and largest foreign investor. China has taken a more sympathetic position towards Iran in the UN Security Council and the IAEA which satisfies international demands at the same time not been party to the containment strategy. Though on some occasions it voted in the UN Security Council calling for sanctions on Iran, it had also vetoed some of the resolutions. China has expressed its reservations against a nuclear Iran at the same time tried its best efforts to avoid a war and ensure energy security. It has emerged as one of the key beneficiaries of the Iranian nuclear agreement reached in November 2013 between Iran and the P5+1 (Weitz 2013:1).

Saudi Arabia

Although Saudi Arabia was the last GCC nation to establish diplomatic relations with China in 1990, Saudi Arabia is of prime importance to China due to the oil value attached to the nation and the Saudi-Chinese bilateral trade reached \$74 billion in 2012. China is the second largest destination (after Japan) for Saudi Arabia's exports, China is also the largest supplier of goods and services to the Kingdom. Since 2002 Saudi Arabia has emerged as the largest supplier of energy to China and supplying more than one fifth of China's crude oil imports followed by Angola. The 9/11 incident brought about some rift in the US-Saudi relations and this brought an opportunity for the Saudis to get closer with the Chinese as part of the latter's "Look East" Policy. Though there exist some differences over the Iranian nuclear programme and Syrian conflict the Sino-Saudi bilateral relations continues

to grow at a faster rate. Though the possibility of a strategic-political alliance in the near future appears to be bleak, energy-economic partnership continues to be the core of Sino-Saudi relations (Sudairi 2012:1-5).

Turkey

Diplomatic relations were established between Turkey and the PRC in 1971. The Sino-Turkish relations improved considerably after the cold war. China has recognized the geo strategic and geo political importance of Turkey in its foreign policy, serving trade, energy and being a logistical gateway to Europe, Middle East, Caucasus and Africa. The ethnic Uyghur population of Turkish origin in Western China especially in Xinjiang (East Turkestan) continues to have strong religious and cultural affinity with Turkey. After the demise of the Soviet Union, China was very apprehensive of the resurgence of the Pan Turkish phenomena which it felt that would cause troubles on its western borders. In response to the growing call for Pan-Turkism, China began to increase its cooperation with Cyprus, Greece and Kurds who are considered as the adversaries of Turkey. The growing Sino-Turkish relations should also be looked from the perspective of the deteriorating US-Turkish relations and the delay in granting Turkish accession to the EU. The bilateral trade was estimated to be \$19 billion in 2011. The West especially NATO is sceptical about growing Sino-Turkish military ties. During the Xinjiang riots of 2009 the description of the happenings by the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan as a “near genocide” caused strong protests in China stating that the issue was an internal affair (Kumar 2013:119-141).

Syria

The Syrian crisis posed a serious challenge to Chinese foreign policy in the region. It has supported the UN mission in Syria and the Kofi Annan plan, at the same time vetoed against the three UN resolutions on Syria. China has come out with the five point peace proposals for the Syrian resolution namely 1) Political settlement to the Syrian conflict, 2) Syria’s fate to be decided by its own people, 3) Inclusive political transition, 4) National reconciliation and unity 5) Humanitarian assistance to Syria and its neighbours by the international community. Taking lessons from the Libyan experience where the western intervention had caused a regime change as well as substantial damage to the Chinese investments in Libya, this promoted the Chinese to take a tough stand on the Syrian issue contrary to the western interests. China-Syria trade was merely \$1.2 billion in 2012. Though the commercial interests with Syria are minimal, China fears that the spill over effect of the Syrian conflict to other countries of the region namely in Iraq which can harm Chinese interests therefore it wants a conflict resolution at the earliest. Though it is opposed to the use of

chemical weapons against civilians who so ever it may be but does not subscribe to the call for an air strike in Syria against the Assad regime whom the United States accuses of using chemical weapons against its own people (Tiezzi 2014:1).

Concerns over the Arab uprising

During the Arab uprising China firmly stood by its policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries as well as promoted talks for peaceful dialogue. It was opposed to the intervention of outside powers in the uprisings, including the NATO bombing of Libya as well as the Western backing to the Syrian rebels. There were several concerns for China such as its oil supply and price stability, safety of its expatriate workers, security of overseas investments, and continued access to resources elsewhere in the region which would affect its economic security. When the new regimes took over in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya China quickly established contacts and provided humanitarian assistance to them to the amount of \$ 5 million. The uprisings had not affected much on the relations between China and the nations of the region. China reached out to the new regimes of the region only after a de facto change has taken on the ground. At the same time China did not express its support to the popular protests fearing that it would pave way for some internal unrest. The Arab awakening has presented China with both political and diplomatic challenges. It has tested the states traditional position of non interference in the internal affairs of a nation. But the changes in the Arab world have not drastically undermined China's economic interest in the region. Even when Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi was ousted by the army on 3 July 2013, China did not come out harsh criticism but instead stated that it respected the choice of the people of Egypt and called for all parties to resume dialogue (Chen 2014:1). On the eve of the uprisings in West Asia, the Chinese state did impose some restrictions on the internet tightening, internet surveillance and monitored netizens on discussing the happenings in the Arab world. At the same time more emphasis was given to the state efforts for the safe exit of their citizens from the troubled regions of West Asia and North Africa. As a result of the uprisings the state did increase the social security expenditures, such as unemployment payouts, low cost housing, increase in minimum wages etc (Kuangyi 2012 :1-27).

Conclusion

One of the challenges for China in the post-Arab Spring was to deal with the political Islam in the region and it is important to see that in the post-Mubarak Egypt, it was China that the democratically elected President of Egypt Mohammed Morsi choose for his first official visit outside the region in 2012 and this shows the growing importance that China has in the region. The change in West Asia is also

an opportunity for China to increase its influence. Almost all the countries of the region would like to open their doors for economic engagement with China. It has been argued that the United States is getting weaker in the region and this gives China an opportunity to rise. Chinese leaders indicated in the past that no matter how big it becomes China will never be a hegemon. So once considering the risk and opportunities of Chinese development, one must consider not only strength and intent, but global power structures and the macro level implications of change in economic arenas. The Syrian crisis shows how China struggles to balance its interest in the region and also the differences that it has with the Arab League on UN resolutions condemning Assad's regime. China should also be cautious in its handling of its Uighur minority issue as this can have a negative impact on China in the wider Islamic world with Turkey in particular. Even during the Xin Jiang riots of 2009 the Islamic world at large (except Turkey and Iran) did not respond to a harsh criticism on China which is likely due to the economic value attached to the nation. Though China does not have too much of economic interests with Syria, Beijing views Damascus as the strategic link in its "New Silk Route" strategy. Moreover there should be more efforts to strengthen China's cultural diplomacy in West Asia which would be an added advantage to strengthen its footprint in the region. As China continues to grow in the new world order, so does the value attached to West Asia in its political, economic, strategic, defence and energy spheres, therefore it would be wise for China to take a balanced approach by not taking sides with any party to the conflict as its interest in the region are diverse, at the same time work for a conflict resolution and settlement with all the nations of the region.

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TRIPS to TRIPS-Plus: An Overview of the Indian Generic Drug Industry & Some Newfound Hurdles

Geethika G.

The Indian generic industry plays a crucial role in making affordable essential medicines available to millions across the world. The generic industry has had an arduous journey having to overcome multiple hurdles created by the big pharmaceutical companies of the North. While the execution of the TRIPS Agreement under the aegis of the WTO was only the first phase of the duel, the intensity is expected to escalate to new levels with the launch of the TRIPS-Plus standards as the third phase of the process. While the US has been the forerunner in the initiation of TRIPS-Plus standards through FTAs, the forthcoming EU-India FTA is proving to be a decisive one given India's role as the 'pharmacy of the world'. Some recent setbacks to the Indian generics at EU ports hint a rather unpleasant ambience being crafted as a dark backdrop to the negotiations on the FTA. The paper attempts to briefly analyse the tactics employed by the generic industry to thrive the different hurdles with special reference to the Indian generic industry. The HIV/AIDS patients are the worst hit population under the new IPR regime and their plight is taken to illustrate the severity of the access to medicines crisis and to highlight the gravity of the task at hand for the generic industry.

Today, one third of the world's population lacks access to essential medicines. In the poorest parts of Africa and Asia this figure rises to half of the population (MSF 2014). Access to affordable medicines continues to be one of the most traumatic concerns of the developing countries. Amongst many factors, the (Trade Related) Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) regime has emerged to be an important structural determinant of health and access to medicines. A number of studies have proved that drug prices have gone up upon introduction of product patents and not only has it stimulated a decline in the health levels of the population in most developing countries, including India, it also is causing irreversible welfare loss. India alone is said to be suffering a loss between \$1.4 billion to \$4.2 billion in a year (CIPR 2002).

The monopolistic regime facilitated by IPR regulations made drugs unaffordable and inaccessible due to exorbitant pricing and delays in market entry of new essential medicines. Even as the 10 largest drugs companies (conveniently called 'Big Pharma'¹), based in the US, Europe and Japan, control over one-third of the drug market, each with sales of more than US\$10 billion a year and profit margins of about 30%, the developing countries rely almost entirely on the generic industries to meet their increasing demand for affordable medicines (MSF 2015).

Through sensible implementation of patent legislation six developing countries (Brazil, Argentina, China, India, Korea and Mexico) could establish a substantially good generic drug² manufacturing capability. India has been on the forefront in reverse engineering, researching, manufacturing and exporting a wide range of essential medicines.³

The Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) rightly called the Indian generic drug industry the 'pharmacy of the world'. The Indian generic industry exported Rs. One Lakh Crore worth of pharmaceutical products in 2014-'15; is globally third in drug sales volume and thirteenth in terms of value, with annual growth rate expected to reach 14% in 2016 (Patnaik 2015). Approximately 60% of its exports are to developing countries which constitute 50% of UNICEF's supply of essential medicines and 80% of medicines distributed by International Dispensary Association. (Ekbal, 2013) The US is the single largest market for our generic drugs and 40% of our exports are consumed there (Unnikrishnan 2014).

The success story of the generic industry has not been free of hurdles and the Big Pharma has continually invoked the stipulations of the IPR regime to restrain and destroy the generic industry. Since the inclusion of the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) under the aegis of the World Trade Organisation, the generic industry has had to effectively overcome three levels of obstacles to survive and sustain their reputation as the most reliable source of affordable medicines. This paper intends to review the survival of the generic industry, especially that of India, through various hurdles with special emphasis on the latest snag being woven to trap India, namely the EU-India FTA. Two recent instances faced by the Indian generic companies are being cited below to shed light into the scenario and the paper shall, in later sections, discuss the three levels of obstacles created by the new IPR regime.

In August this year the European Commission took a decision directing all its member states to suspend national marketing authorisation of about 700 generic drugs tested and approved by an Indian lab GVK BioSciences. The decision was taken rather hastily by the Commission on the basis of a report by European Medicines Agency that the testing data provided by GVK for certain drugs showed discrepancies

and therefore it was not advisable to accept the safety of any drug endorsed by GVK (*The Economic Times* 2015). The agency said there was no evidence the medicines were either harmful or ineffective but nevertheless recommended that drugs tested at GVK Biosciences be suspended from the market, unless their producers had other sources of clinical trial data. While European Union adheres to this decision as a measure to ensure quality and safety of medicines, it could be perceived as a clandestine attempt by the Big Pharma to clamp down on generic entry as part of their smear campaigns against generics. The said decision is believed to impact about 1-1.2 billion dollars in export earnings by Indian pharmaceuticals according to Pharmexil (Samuel 2015).

The fact that Indian generic drugs never faced such a hitch is worth notice but between 2008 and 2010, several countries in Europe seized a total of 17 shipments of generic drugs from India accusing them to be counterfeit. The customs officials were able to seize the cargo on the basis of their border regulations that permitted seizure of any goods suspected of infringement of IPR regardless of whether the goods are intended for import, export, or in transit. The shipments seized at European ports included ARV drugs to be distributed by various NGOs and UN agencies, including Clinton Foundation, WHO, UNITAID etc., in HIV/AIDS afflicted African countries (Pharmabiz 2011).

The detentions were inconsistent with the EU and its Member States' obligations under Articles 41 and 42 of the TRIPS Agreement as these detentions created barriers to legitimate trade, led to abuse of the rights conferred on the owner of a patent, were unfair and inequitable, unnecessarily burdensome and complicated and created unwarranted delays. These detentions were also inconsistent with certain fundamental obligations of the EU under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement read together with the provisions of the Decision of the General Council of August 30, 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health to ensure access to medicines for members of the WTO with insufficient or no capacity in the pharmaceutical sector to enable them to address their public health problems. So when India initiated dispute settlement procedures in the WTO, the European Commission agreed to revise the Regulation 1383/2003 (Pharmabiz 2011).

Such news and events appear in the media occasionally and all those incidents are taken as isolated cases lacking precedents. But read together one can observe that there is enough space for doubts that the generic industry, especially that of India, is being cornered by the Big Pharma. There are other isolated yet threatening obstacles that the industry is challenged with every day, all of which strengthen this fear further. The impact of such occurrences has been catastrophic for millions of

patients suffering from chronic diseases whose only respite is the cheap generic drugs exported by few countries like India. These incidents are part of the third level of hurdles and previous ones have been equally troublesome.

The TRIPS Agreement & the globalisation of IPR

A lot of literature point out the active and persistent role played by transnational pharmaceutical corporations in convincing the member nations of the GATT Agreement to include IPR in the Uruguay Round of negotiations (Raghavan 1990; Drahos 2003; May 2000; Sell 2003 and others). As Prabhat Patnaik (2010) said, “the fact that so many countries, which had no intentions whatsoever to amending their patents regimes that had served them well over the years, were cajoled into doing so through an international process that originally had not even figured in the agenda of world trade negotiations, underscores the remarkable strength that the TNCs have come to employ, of late, in world affairs.” Incorporation of IPR into a predominantly trade related mechanism challenged the traditional perceptions about IPR and distanced it from social welfare commitments. The TRIPS Agreement established the minimum global standards of IPR protection as well as rules on enforcement, and most importantly, brought the domestic IPR regimes of WTO Members under the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement system (Lanoszka 2003).

The implementation of the TRIPS Agreement posed significant institutional and financial challenges for the developing countries and continues to hold tremendous implications for their social development interests, especially public health and access to medicines. Significant to the pharmaceutical sector was the compulsion to introduce pharmaceutical patents, that too for 20 years, and replace the process patent regime with product patents. The TRIPS Agreement further secures and increases the monopolistic control of the drug patent owners by adjoining provisions of trademarks and trade secrets with pharmaceutical products and its data. The impact of the new regime was felt soon as various essential medicines became inaccessible to majority of the population worldwide due to the exorbitant price and non-availability due to delay in market entry of new drugs (May & Sell 2006).

The new IPR regime necessitated drastic modifications in the national IPR legislations. Earlier when only process patent was permitted generic manufacturers in countries like India were able to invent around the basic drugs to produce cost effective formulations through reverse engineering by using alternate processes to produce them, but now the product patent regime would not permit such adaptive research. Since 1995, the Indian Patents Act, 1970 was amended thrice to incorporate the necessary changes. The subsequent impact on the pharmaceutical

sector of the country has been clearly evident. The drug prices have increased disproportionately and above the general inflation rates in the country. Indians have had to set aside more than Rs.22,000 crore for medical costs. The R&D in the pharmaceutical sector began to shift focus to chronic lifestyle diseases and other high profit fetching diseases. Only 13% patent applications have so far been made for drugs to treat common diseases. While the MNCs randomly increased the prices of patented drugs, the availability, especially in rural areas declined due to lack of sufficient distribution. The small-scale pharmaceutical companies that manufactured generic drugs were forced to close down and some of the larger companies were bought by the MNCs (Ekbal 2013).

It was widely observed that while the pharmaceutical industry flourished, the public health sector of the developing countries has had some catastrophic consequences under the new IPR regime. The most affected were the HIV/AIDS patients across the world. The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) is the greatest modern threat to health. More than 30 years after it was first detected, the HIV infection rates have become enormous and continue to escalate in many regions of the world, including South East Asia, Asia Pacific, the Caribbean, Latin America and most alarmingly in Africa. The worst-hit region is Sub-Saharan Africa which has over a third of the 33.3 million people living with HIV in the world today and it is no exaggeration to say that the HIV/AIDS pandemic is having an equivalent effect to the bubonic plague in mediaeval Europe. In some countries more than a third of the adult population is infected. In spite of all efforts to stall the infection, a most conservative projection is that even recently almost 2.5 million people are newly infected with HIV and 3 million people die from AIDS annually (WHO 2014). The HIV/AIDS epidemic has reversed all growth indicators in African countries and the treatment and prevention of the disease is the biggest development concern of these nations. HIV/AIDS treatment involves a combination of Anti-Retro Viral (ARV) drugs, also called 'cocktail therapies,' and such combinations have been available since 1996 but the drugs were generally unavailable in the developing world due to the TRIPS imposed patent system (Said 2010). The catastrophe faced by nations due to other diseases like tuberculosis, malaria, various infectious diseases and non-communicable diseases, including life-style diseases, too is of no less gravity.

At this stage the generic industries were able to evade the obstacle by cashing on the transition period flexibility. The TRIPS agreement offered an 'incentive' to developing countries for a shift to product patent in the form of a 10 years transition period. Based on this administrative relaxation the production of the generic versions of the then-patented medicines could continue, provided that 3 conditions were satisfied: 1) that the generic manufacturer had been producing and marketing the product prior to 1 January 2005; 2) that the manufacturer had made significant

investment for such production and marketing, and 3) that a reasonable royalty was paid to the patent holder. This provision has been variously referred to as a system of “automatic compulsory licences” or “prior use rights” (Musungu & Oh 2005).

The generic industries promptly seized the opportunity and made themselves available to the developing countries to meet their essential medicine requirements. India became a prime destination for manufacture of branded, generic and branded generic medicines with a strong export element. The largest beneficiaries of this opportunity were the HIV/AIDS patients. WHO prequalified three Indian generic manufacturers to produce fixed-dose combinations (FDC) and in 2001 Cipla Ltd offered Triomune (stavudine + lamivudine + nevirapine), its generic equivalent of Trizivir which was patented by Glaxo Wellcome and reduced treatment costs from \$10,000-15,000 to \$350 per patient per year. Now the price has reduced by more than 99% reaching as low as \$67 in 2010 (UNAIDS 2011).

Today about 60 adult FDCs and 30 paediatric ARV tablets are being produced and supplied by Indian generic manufacturers to HIV/AIDS patients across the world after approval from WHO Prequalification Programme. The generic medicines from India almost completely account for all the medicines supplied by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), UNITAID, WHO and also US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and most of it is produced by Indian generic manufacturers (MSF 2015).

In 2005, the India exhausted the transition period flexibility and had to amend the Indian patent Act, 1970, for the third time to make the national IPR legislation TRIPS compliant. This was a phase of anxiety and apprehension for the international community and they began to hastily explore other options to bypass the product patent regime and its enforcement mechanisms (MSF 2014). By this time the Big Pharma had begun to divulge their impatience in the disregard shown by the developing countries to the TRIPS regulations and had filed various cases at the WTO dispute settlement forum. But once again the generic pharmaceuticals succeeded in carving a way out and the opportunity was awarded by the Doha Declaration.

Doha Declaration on Public Health & TRIPS Flexibilities

During the early days of inception of the TRIPS Agreement itself, developing countries and international organisations had voiced their concerns about the adverse effects of the new IPR regime on the development agenda of these countries with specific emphasis on public health and access to medicines. The HIV/AIDS pandemic had rung the alarm and as the situation escalated into an international crisis questioning the human rights dimension of the WTO monitored TRIPS Agreement, the WTO bowed down to international pressure and the Doha

Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health was issued in 2001 (Musungu et al. 2005).

While acknowledging the role of intellectual property protection “for the development of new medicines,” the Declaration specifically recognizes concerns about its effects on prices. A key element of the Declaration is contained in its Paragraph 4, which states that (Doha Declaration 2001):

We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.

Two pieces of texts form the key to the exploitation and practical use of the flexibilities to tackle their public health issues: i) the Doha Declaration (para 4&5a); and ii) the WTO Decision on Paragraph 6 (August Decision). The Doha Declaration also extended the transition period for least developed countries till 1 January 2016 (para 7) (Lalitha 2008). The August decision offered an interim waiver to the Article 31(f) restriction thereby temporarily removing limitations on exports of drugs under compulsory licence to countries lacking manufacturing capabilities (Mathur 2008).

The TRIPS flexibilities include (Musungu et al. 2005):

- Compulsory Licensing;
- Public, non-commercial use of patents (government use)
- Parallel importation
- Exceptions to patent rights (early working exception or ‘Bolar exception’)
- Exemptions from patentability
- Limits on data protection
- Implementation of the August Decision of 2003
- Use of competition law to curb abuses of IP
- Post-grant flexibility afforded to national judiciaries in granting remedies.

Indian pharmaceutical companies have also been using the options to accelerate the introduction of generics into the market by allowing third party testing, manufacturing and export for purposes of meeting regulatory approval requirements and by not extending patent terms on the basis of regulatory delays in registration of medicines; and allowing regulatory agencies to rely on test data provided by the originator of the product to register generics. There are other flexibilities like pre and post grant oppositions, strict disclosure standards, articles 27.3a and 30 (Said 2010).

Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Cameroon, Eritrea, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Mozambique, Ecuador, Brazil, Italy, Canada and Israel, have been using these flexibilities to their advantage (Srinivasan 2011). In 2003, Malaysia became the first Asian country to issue a compulsory licence- to import generic versions of patented HIV antiretrovirals from India. Indonesia used the provision to appoint a local manufacturer to produce the drug. Thailand issued compulsory licence for the drug Plavix under the provision for 'public non-commercial use' under Article 31 of TRIPS and licensed domestic manufacture of the Efavirenx using Section 51 of Thailand's Patent Act of 1979 (Gupta 2010).

Though the Indian patent legislation has been incorporated with provisions for compulsory licensing India has been reluctant to use the compulsory licensing provision. But under mounting pressure from international community to expand the scope of our generic industry in March 2012, India granted its first compulsory license ever. The license was granted to Indian generic drug manufacturer Natco Pharma Ltd for Sorafenib tosylate (Nexavar), a cancer drug patented by Bayer (ICTSD 2012). There are at least a couple of drugs for which a compulsory licence initiated by the Indian government would be of use to the HIV patient community at large- for instance, Raltegravir, Etravirine, Rilpivirine, Maraviroc- all useful in the new types of resistant strains of HIV. So also are pegylated interferon (for chronic hepatitis C), sorafenib tosylate (useful for renal cancer), erlotinib (useful in lung cancer) (South Centre Policy Brief 2011).

In India, the grant of patents for new uses of known substances and for other pharmaceutical products that do not entail a significant increase in therapeutic efficacy has been excluded under section 3 (d) of the Patents Act. This clause was effectively applied in rejecting the patent rights to Novartis for its drug 'Glivec' (Nair, Fernandes & Nair 2014) It is an interesting development that a possible scope of remedial flexibility was offered by the New Delhi High Court in the case of Roche v. Cipla, recognising that a preliminary injunction would have led to a price hike that would have had fatal implications for patients (Said 2010).

When the Doha Declaration opened up avenues for the developing countries to utilise the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement, one cannot say that the Big Pharma has not been successful in devising ways to stall them from effective application of the same. Pascal Lamy, former Director-General of WTO at a symposium in TRIPS & public health said, 'The objective was never to issue lots of CLs as an end in itself. The objective was and remains cheaper medicines for the poor' (WTO 2011). The statement clearly elucidates the mere 'good will' intentions of WTO and the Big Pharma in including the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement.

Successful implementation of the TRIPS flexibilities involves four critical barriers: i) lack of supportive legal frameworks; ii) resource constraints and limited

coordination including bureaucratic red tape; iii) drug registration impediments; and iv) continued unilateral political and TRIPS-Plus pressures (Said 2010). The amount of administrative and legal hurdles to be tackled to issue a compulsory license or initiate parallel imports has in itself been the biggest pull factor in the failure of large scale exploitation of these provisions in spite of the dire need for the same in accelerating access to medicines. Even while providing the flexibility of compulsory licensing it puts restrictive and binding conditions on the use of compulsory licensing. When granting such licenses WTO members must not discriminate between different fields of technology, which works out to be of benefit to the patent owners. In many cases, the most significant barrier to the use of compulsory licensing is the absence of simple, straightforward legislative and administrative procedures and royalty guidelines. Similarly, even when parallel imports are permitted by WTO and kept away from the dispute settlement mechanism, the pharmaceutical IP owners can pressurize their nations to exert pressure on the countries using the provision of parallel imports through free trade agreements. South Africa has been facing such trade pressures from USA. Only a handful of African countries have provision on the international exhaustion of rights in their legislation. Similar was the case with early working exception (Bolar Exception). The percentage of countries integrating this flexibility varied from 0% for LDCs to 93% for high-income countries. With respect to exploiting the August Decision, to date only very few countries have adopted legislation to implement the provision as an exporting country and the Canada-Rwanda case is the only one instance of using the Paragraph 6 system. The fact that it took 27 months of administrative and legal labour to meet the requirements to execute the import is testimony to the pressures against such practices (Correa and Matthews 2011).

Tactics used by developed countries to suppress the use of flexibilities by developing countries include promises of trade concessions (increased market access, quotas and lowered tariffs), technical assistance, and increased foreign aid. Poor developing countries often trade long-term and costly obligations with respect to heightened IPRs for short-term and often illusory advantages. Another reason for the developing countries to show reluctance to using the compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals is the fear of sanctions from the US government. The carrot and stick approach of the North has succeeded in effectively restricting the use of compulsory licensing.

The generic industry has had to struggle and strive to coerce the governments to use TRIPS flexibilities in their favour, including compulsory licensing, and the journey has not been very horizontal. The increasing compulsions from the Big Pharma upon the governments were taking the toll on the generic industry and the variety of generic medicines being supplied was beginning to dwindle.

It is at this stage of distress that a new window of opportunity opened up. The large number of drugs which were patented during the early days of inception of WTO are going off-patent in the US and it presents opportunities for local generic drug makers including Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd, Lupin Ltd, Dr Reddy's Laboratories Ltd and Cipla Ltd among others. To capture the opportunity the companies have begun filing Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDA) to the US Food & Drug Administration seeking approval for generic drugs. Dr. Reddy's Laboratories alone has 68 ANDAs pending for approval (Kesireddy 2015).

Again as the avenue was opening up for sustaining accessibility of affordable medicines, the Big Pharma has resurfaced with some new weapons and that constitute the third and so far the most crucial phase of obstacles for the generic sector. The Big Pharma is strategically intertwining IPR with trade and as against the earlier argument that IPR protection is decisive for promotion of innovation, the new line of reasoning is that stringent national IPR protection norms are an imperative for free flow of trade. These strategies are commonly referred to as TRIPS-Plus standards.

TRIPS-Plus Trend & the Proposed EU-India FTA

In a general sense, TRIPS-plus refers to "commitments which go beyond what is already included or consolidated in the TRIPS Agreement." More precisely, it can be defined as a "concept which refers to the adoption of multilateral, plurilateral, regional and national IP rules and practices which have the effect of reducing the ability of developing countries to protect the public interest" (Musungu & Dutfield 2003).

This new order of regime shifting of intellectual property rights represents the third wave of strategies to corner the generic sector. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), at the regional and bilateral level, are being used effectively by the developed countries, especially the US, to transfer TRIPS-plus obligations into the national legislations of developing countries in lieu of concessions in core trade areas such as agriculture and other market access preferences.

FTAs are permitted under the Article XXIV of GATT, Article V of GATS and the Enabling Clause of WTO. Many FTAs also have own mechanisms for dispute settlement. But the imposition of TRIPS plus standards on developing countries and LDCs through bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements as well as WTO accession agreements, can significantly undermine the existing TRIPS flexibilities. TRIPS-plus obligations that may affect access to medicines include (UNDP 2010):

- Waiving the LDC exception

- extension of patent terms to compensate for delays in the examination of a patent application or in obtaining marketing approval for a drug;
- restrict patent oppositions;
- prevent the marketing approval of generic versions of patented medicines;
- broaden patentability, resulting in ‘evergreening’, ‘me too’ and ‘copycat’ drugs;
- permit patents for second indications of known pharmaceuticals;
- link patent systems to drug regulatory systems;
- periods of exclusivity for test data;
- enhanced enforcement provisions—for instance, in relation to border measures (allowing customs authorities to seize goods on suspicion of infringement of a patent in cases of importation, exportation or transit);
- ratify or accede to a host of WIPO treaties, PCT etc.

The US, EU and Japan are getting more aggressive about infiltrating IPR into FTAs. The US has the most number of such FTAs. A committee, which advises Congress on intellectual property and trade, vets the intellectual property chapter in each trade agreement. The committee’s membership includes Eli Lilly, Merck, Pfizer, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, and the Biotechnology Industry Organization (Henry 2004). These companies have publically stated that they want these stronger IP provisions. The NAFTA contains extensive provisions on intellectual property. Since 2001 the USA has initiated 11 bilateral and regional free trade agreements with 23 countries. Examples of regional arrangements can be found in the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) while examples of bilateral trade agreements include those with Bahrain, Australia, Morocco, Chile, Jordan, Singapore etc (Said 2010).

The EU and Japan are getting more aggressive with free trade agreements. In a recent survey of the role of intellectual property in regional commercial unions, Blakeney has identified different forms of co-operation and convergence on intellectual property law taking place amongst the states of the Central European Free Trade Agreement, the Association of South East Asian Nations, the Mekong River Basin Countries and the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (Said 2010).

The latest entrant into this array of FTAs may be EU-India FTA. Statured as the pharmacy of the poor, proposed TRIPS-Plus provisions limiting India’s flexibility to produce generic medicines for domestic use and export are especially unsettling. The FTA combined with Anti-counterfeiting measures and enforcement provisions will make things worse.

The discussions on the drafting of the EU-India FTA, also called Broad-Based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) began in 2007 and so far there have been 13 rounds of negotiations with the last one in 2012. The deal aims to be a broad-based trade and investment agreement, which will cover over 95% of tariff lines (Dey 2015). Another round of negotiation was to take place in August but the decision by the European Commission to reject over 700 generic drugs due to doubts about the testing standards of GVK BioSciences forced India to call back the negotiations. Early this month the Minister has announced that the talks will resume.

It is evident that the European Commission is pushing for intellectual property provisions that create trade barriers to Indian generic medicines during transit. The Indian government is reluctant to comply with all their demands. Sources say certain damaging provisions such as patent term extensions and data exclusivity have already been removed by EU negotiators or rejected by India's Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) from the proposed deal. Despite Minister Anand Sharma's assurances, some critics still fear that the world's cache of cheap medicine is at risk. "We are marching to call on the Indian government not to trade away our lives," said Loon Gangte, president of the Delhi Network of Positive People (DNP+), a support group for people living with HIV/AIDS.

But the EU has cleverly laid down the trap and the two incidents mentioned early in the paper where the EU vehemently, irrationally and impulsively hindered the transit of Indian generic drugs with the sole intention of alarming the Indian government. The seizure of generic drugs was in many ways not agreeable under TRIPS, because TRIPS only requires border measures apply to "pirated" copyright and counterfeit trademark goods (the latter applying effectively only to deliberate fakes). TRIPS also only requires that border measures be applied to imports, and does not require "ex officio" action (i.e. action on the sole initiative of customs officials, without first receiving an accusation from a rights-holder) (Dey 2015).

India understands the cases of drug seizure and ban as veiled protectionism. Indian officials have described the EU move as a part of an offensive against its \$15 billion generic drugs industry, as well as bad faith by its top trading partner. Yet one cannot deny that the EU seems to have achieved the goal because the recent statement issued by our Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, that we are committed to protecting IPR may be cropping up out of the panic (The Times of India 2015). In line with this statement is the assurance by the Commerce & Industry Minister, Nirmala Sitharaman, that India will very soon have an IPR policy to overcome the holes in India's IPR legislation (Mehra 2015).

The 'Make in India' campaign is a prestigious project of the new government and PM Modi is committed to make it happen. The EU-India agreement would create one of the world's largest free-trade zones by population - covering 1.8

billion, or nearly a quarter of the world's people and the government would not be too keen to lose it out. The PM may have been contemplating the prospects at stake while he promised the European business community that India will do its best to eliminate the loopholes in its patent legislation and will soon announce its first ever IPR policy. In this light, there is reason to fear that India might succumb to the demands of the EC and compromise the generic industry.

The US has also not been any further away in strangling the Indian generic sector. Moves have been made by the US Food and Drug Administration to block imports from several Indian manufacturers in recent years over quality concerns. The US government recently reviewed India's intellectual property system and declared it inadequate placing it on the US 'Special 301 Watch List', which could invite trade sanctions. "After the India-US joint summit where India bent over backwards to agree to set up an IP working group, what it gets in return is the US announcing an out-of-turn review of India's patent laws and stance on IP. India has been on the US Trade Representative's priority watch list for 30 years. So why is there sudden urgency regarding being on the watch list?" asks Amit Sengupta of Jan Swasthya Abhiyan (*The Times of India* 2015).

According to the World Health Organisation's (WHO) economic model, the full effect of the stronger intellectual property (IP) protection required by the United States in all its FTAs will not be felt for more than 15 years. This means that even the Canadians and Mexicans who have the oldest USFTAs with some of these provisions, have not yet experienced the full increase in medicine prices that the WHO model predicts.

Many experts, including the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health are openly concerned about the way that intellectual property and other provisions of FTAs can make medicines unaffordable. A WHO Commission on public health recommends that these types of provisions be avoided.

As if FTAs were not enough, increased scrutiny and import alerts by the global drug regulators on facilities and products of Indian drug makers over the last couple of years, too, have adversely affected exports and profitability of several large medicine manufacturers. The IP enforcement agenda is complex, and emerging in a variety of contexts, including the World Health Organisation, the World Customs Union, Interpol, economic partnership agreements (EPAs), FTAs, EU regulations, and at the national level, for example, in recent East African "anti-counterfeiting" bills (Said 2010).

Similarly, the US government, backed strongly by its pharmaceutical lobby, is not only pressuring India to dilute its patentability standards but has been persistently pushing India to implement a drug regulatory system which essentially links the registration of medicines to their patent status (patent linkage),

and the Indian Ministry of Health appears to be seriously considering such changes (MSF 2015).

Conclusion

Today the notion of global health is a misnomer. The divide between rich industrialised countries and the rest of the world has become great. The burden of disease in the USA is one-fifth of that in Africa. This divide is easily bridged by means of modern transport-but less easily by medicine. Globalisation is inescapable and there may be little benefit in fulminating against it. The new IPR regime and technology order is undeniably contributing to enhancement of medicine and health, but access to medicines is actually quite limited. Gro Harlem Brundtland, former Director-General of WHO rightly said that, "Never have so many had such broad and advanced access to healthcare. But never have so many been denied access to health. Access ... amounts to a moral problem, a political problem and a problem of credibility for the global market system" (Brundtland 2000).

Given the global neo-liberal circumstances of the new world economic order dominated by financial transnational powers the problems of access to medicines are to stay for some time. In spite of widespread criticism and reservations about the consequences of the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, as years pass by, the propagators of this new intellectual property regime has been successful in making it more and more compliant with their requirements. An area most severely affected by the new regime has been public health and access to medicines.

The pharmaceutical industry is rapidly getting cartelized exacerbating the problem of monopolies and high prices. While the patented ARV drugs are affordable in the West due to government subsidies and private health insurance, the majority of the world will continue to depend heavily on the generic drug industries.

The global effort to make available ARV therapy in developing countries has seen a nearly 22-fold increase over the 10 year period from 2001 to 2010, reaching 6.6 million people living with HIV/AIDS. The global generic industry, including those of India, is the sole reason for this achievement. Access to affordable medicines for end users in poor countries remains elusive except with respect to first generation ARV medicines. A pressing concern for the immediate future is the availability of second phase of ARV therapy. The target to put 15 million people on ARV treatment by 2015 has to be amended now because, as pointed out by the All Party Parliamentary Union on AIDS, some national analyses already indicate that beyond 2015 the number of people in need of treatment is expected to grow drastically, with the global figure reaching up to 55 million persons in need by 2030 (UNAIDS 2011).

At this juncture the necessity of an unhindered supply of generic drugs is undoubtedly the biggest fortune that most developing countries would desire, but as the big pharmaceutical industries and the developed countries continue to erect more arduous intellectual property protection measures, the generic companies and their promoters will have to keep a constant vigil and strive harder to weave their way out through the dangerous maze of hurdles created to entrap them.

Developing countries should initiate South-South cooperation and mutually support adoption of robust TRIPS flexibilities like compulsory licensing and exhaustion rights, into national law as a matter of urgency. The IPR legislations have to be sensibly redrafted to retain provisions like scope of patentable subject matter, patentability criteria, remedial flexibility, unfair competition laws etc. most importantly countries should be alert about the infiltration of TRIPS-Plus standards into their national legislations (Said 2010).

The adoption of the TRIPS Agreement was supposed to have caused the generic industries, especially that of India, to perish but they have disproved all predictions and somehow survived the first two phases of hurdles put up by the Big Pharma. Now they are at the threshold of the third hurdle and, if not alert, they may suffer disastrously. The TRIPS-Plus standards inculcated through the FTAs are to be watched cautiously by every word.

India has had a unique experience vis-à-vis intellectual property protection and generic drug industries. While the liberal outlook of the Indian polity and economy could not decline the TRIPS Agreement from being drafted and adopted under WTO, the social and humanitarian commitments forced us to devise ingenious ways around the new IPR regime to help sustain and promote the generic drug industry. It is true that the Indian polity is suffering extreme degrees of compulsions from the global economy to modify our IPR regulations to better suit their interests and it is only through a concerted effort from the generic companies, the national and international human rights and public health advocates, various organisations and beneficiary populations across the developing world can the new hurdle be overcome.

Notes

- 1 *The world's major pharmaceutical corporations such as Merck, Glaxo-SmithKline, Pfizer, and Bristol Myers Squibb, colloquially known as "Big Pharma."*
- 2 *A generic drug is a pharmaceutical product, usually intended to be interchangeable with an innovator product, that is manufactured without a licence from the innovator company and marketed after the expiry date of the patent or other exclusive rights. Generic drugs are marketed under a non-proprietary or approved name rather than a proprietary or brand name. Generic drugs are frequently as effective as, but much cheaper than, brand-name drugs (WHO 2015).*

- 3 *The success of the Indian generic industry is no miracle. It is the result of the combination of factors, namely, the 1979 Drug Price Control Order; encouragement given to public sector and private pharmaceutical companies; restrictions on foreign drug companies in entering the Indian market; and foreign exchange regulations and most importantly, the Indian Patent Act, 1970. (Policy Briefings Series-for Parliamentarians 2009). Some of the core elements of the Indian Patents Act, 1970 that favoured the growth of the generic industry were its discriminatory provisions for certain industrial segments, especially pharmaceuticals, in matter of product versus process patents, period of validity, automatic endorsement of the words 'licences of right' and stipulation of quantum of royalty payable in respect of licences (Nair 1996).*
- 4 *Sections 82 to 94 in Chapter XVI of Patent (Amendment) Act, 2002, deal with compulsory licences. Indian Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 provides for it compulsory licences under Sections 84 (if initiated by a private party), 92 (notification by government that a compulsory licence needs to be issued for public non-commercial use, national emergency or extreme urgency), 92A (compulsory licence for generic exports) and 100 (for government use). (Srinivasan 2011) The grounds to seek compulsory licences have been expanded. The newly inserted Section 92A(1) of the Act extended the scope of issuance of compulsory licences for manufacture and export of patented pharmaceutical products to countries having insufficient manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector, if that country has by notification allowed such importation (Pillai 2005; Policy Briefings Series-for Parliamentarians 2009).*

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Afghanistan after American Drawdown: Implications for India

Vinay Kaura

With the exception of the fundamentalist Taliban regime, independent India has traditionally enjoyed cordial relations with every government in Afghanistan. Pakistan's firm grip over the Taliban regime constituted an insuperable barrier to better relations with Kabul during that time. With the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, India has been the biggest supporter of Afghan government, offering huge technical and financial assistance for rehabilitation of the war ravaged country. But Pakistan continues to meddle into Afghan political affairs through its support to various Islamist terrorist organizations, including the Taliban. For India, Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan is the most dangerous scenario. Therefore, India must lay out a clear, comprehensive plan as to what it wants to achieve in the war-ravaged Afghanistan after the departure of international forces from there.

Introduction

The conditions created by victorious but destabilizing 'Jihad' against the Soviet Union and the ensuing civil war in Afghanistan had paved the way for emergence of the fundamentalist Taliban movement with the backing of Pakistan. Taliban's purist Deobandi tendency and radicalized behaviour proved to be the biggest headache for India during the late 1990s. When the US felt that it could no longer overlook the deadly embrace of al-Qaeda and Taliban, it decided to overthrow the Taliban regime. New Delhi became a dependable and powerful regional ally of Washington. India was eager to rebuild Afghanistan with the belief that it would strengthen the bonds of friendship and mutual trust between them.

In 2002, India opened consulates in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and Jalalabad, in addition to its embassy in Kabul. But they became the cause of consternation to Pakistan. During his Kabul visit in 2003, Pakistani Foreign Minister, Khurshid Kasuri, made several adverse comments on India's role in

Afghanistan. The Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan, Vivek Katju, replied that Pakistan was “no factor” in India’s relations with Afghanistan because India did not “view Afghanistan through the prism of any third country” (Mojumdar 2003). Former Afghan Foreign Minister and now the Chief Executive Officer, Abdullah Abdullah, also echoed at the time the Indian sentiment, saying the activities of the Indian consulates were “in the limits of their duty as consulates in accordance with international norms and principles” (Bhat 2007: 95). But Pakistan had, and still has, other views.

Pakistan’s Anti-India Attitude

Islamabad’s security establishment always trumpets Pakistan’s imaginary encirclement by India as the primary motive of its involvement in Afghanistan. It is the colonial mindset of Islamabad’s military elite to think that Indians have no right to trade with Afghanistan without getting their go-ahead. Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan’s former ambassador to the US, also criticizes the mindset of Pakistan’s strategic planners, and fears “an escalation in India-Pakistan tensions after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan”, because “our state institutions do not seem to agree that the best way for Pakistan to have a friendly government in Afghanistan is by befriending the government in Afghanistan instead of trying to impose one” (Joshuha 2003).

The Taliban and its associates such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizbe Islami have been regularly targeting Indians in Kabul because India is viewed by them as the coordinator of various projects for the economic development of Afghanistan and for the promotion of democracy. Though the Indian-aided projects have little military significance, Pakistan views these projects and the resulting increase in the Indian presence in Afghanistan as detrimental to its interests. The Pakistan army has not given up the idea of gaining ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan against India. The obsessive pursuit of ‘strategic depth’ also motivates the security establishment to maintain ties with the Taliban in Afghanistan and nurturing them as prized strategic assets. According to scholar Vali Nasr, Pakistanis are obsessed with the thought that Afghanistan will become a client state of India, therefore they have become “more interested in counting Indian consulates in Afghanistan than they are in counting terrorist training camps in the tribal areas” (Sanger 2009). A similar view is expressed by Barnett Rubin and Ahmad Rashid. According to them, “Pakistani security establishment believes that it faces both a U.S.-Indian-Afghan alliance and a separate Iranian-Russian alliance, each aimed at undermining Pakistani influence in Afghanistan and even dismembering the Pakistani state. Some (but not all) in the establishment see armed militants within Pakistan as a threat – but they largely consider it one that is ultimately controllable (Rubin and

Rashid 2008: 36-37). Pakistan should realize that ‘controlling the terrorists’ is a great illusion, and “notwithstanding who trained or armed them for what purpose and when”, they have become the greatest threat to Pakistan itself (Joshuha 2003). Abbas Nasir, former editor of Pakistan’s leading English newspaper, *Dawn*, has frankly observed:

Having suffered at the hands of rampant terrorism, Pakistan ought to know better than to try and cherry-pick among terror groups. They are all bad. Eventually they’ll be on the same side no matter which side of what border they currently prosecute their murderous campaigns (Nasir 2015).

It is relevant to repeat what Cameron Munter, the former American ambassador to Pakistan, has put it: “If you grow vipers in your back yard, you’re going to get bitten” (*Economist* 2011). Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI, has been meddling in Afghan affairs through various militant organisations since the days of Afghan jihad. Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, a former Taliban minister and ambassador to Islamabad, has explained the depth of its involvement:

The wolf and sheep may drink water from the same stream, but since the start of the jihad the ISI extended its roots deep into Afghanistan like a cancer puts down roots in the human body; every ruler of Afghanistan complained about it, but none could get rid of it (Zaeef 2010: 123).

The ISI has had a long and troubling history with al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Since his first arrival in Pakistan in 1980, bin Laden had a close operational relationship with the ISI. Without the active cooperation and regular interaction with the ISI, it was virtually impossible for bin Laden to expand his network of Jihadi terror. The ISI played the most crucial role in developing al-Qaeda’s close ties with the Taliban regime when bin Laden returned from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996. *The 9/11 Commission Report* has also held the ISI responsible for setting up the first contacts between bin Laden and Mullah Omar. The ISI is reported to have worked with Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam to set up Lashkar-e-Taiba. This deadly embrace served two purposes: besides providing Kashmiri volunteers to fight in Afghanistan, it has helped organizing attacks in India’s major cities.

There have been several attacks on Indian personnel working for reconstruction projects inside Afghanistan. In November 2005, personnel of India’s Border Roads Organization was abducted and killed by the Taliban (IANS 2005). In April 2006, an India telecom engineer was killed by the Taliban (Sudarshan 2006). The deadliest attack, however, came in July 2008, when a suicide bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul killed more than fifty people, including the Indian defense attaché. The Afghan government officials were quick to analyze the bombing as the handiwork of a “regional intelligence agency”, stopping short of directly blaming the ISI

(Mojumdar 2008). India was more candid and accused the ISI for this attack. India's former National Security Advisor M. K. Narayanan said: "We have no doubt that the ISI is behind this... The ISI is playing evil" (NDTV 2008). Indian embassy in Kabul again came under attack in October 2009 when a suicide car bomb killed many people (Schifirin 2009). The explosion was five times stronger than the one that hit the embassy in July 2008 (Faiez 2009). In August 2013, the Indian consulate in Jalalabad came under attack from three suicide bombers. Lashkar-i-Taiba, which has been active in Afghanistan in recent years, was suspected behind the attack (*Guardian* 2013). Despite these attacks, India has continued to remain actively engaged in Afghanistan, while continuing to refrain from direct military involvement. The fruits of years of cooperation yielded immense goodwill for India.

India's Popularity in Afghanistan

Indian government strongly believes that its relations with Afghanistan are based on "cultural affinities, the shared values of multiethnicity and pluralism" (Government of India 2009). Contrary to Pakistan's permanent policy of gaining 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan, India adopted 'soft power' approach in post-Taliban Afghanistan by taking responsibility for reconstruction and developmental programmes. Following the overthrow of the Taliban, India let the USA to combat the Taliban insurgency and restricted its activities to 'soft power' initiatives. Keeping in view Pakistan's sensitivity to India's direct involvement in Afghanistan, India made it clear that it had no intention of committing its troops to Afghanistan. India rightly felt that Indians in Afghanistan would become sitting ducks for well-trained, battle-hardened and Pakistan-sponsored Taliban (*Times of India* 2006).

This policy of no interference bore rich dividend for India as opinion polls have regularly suggested that Afghans have a very positive perception of India than any other country. Indian help includes all sectors like education, medical services, transport, telecommunications, civil aviation, agriculture, irrigation, power generation, industry, rural development and much more (Government of India 2009). Thousands of Afghans visit India every year for tourism, medical care and education. Even former President Hamid Karzai chose an Indian hospital for the delivery of his third child: his daughter was born in March 2014 at the Fortis Memorial Research Institute in the New Delhi suburb of Gurgaon (*Times of India* 2014b). India has allowed Afghan government telecommunication through Indian satellites. Even the official radio and television network of Afghanistan uses Indian satellite link.

Officially India maintains that the assistance being given to Afghanistan is for infrastructural development and capacity building. But aid is almost never just about aid, it has always been about geopolitics. In pure realpolitik, India has two

major strategic objectives in Afghanistan which it seeks to achieve through aid. First, India does not want the reemergence and reassertion of fundamentalist brand of political Islam in the region. Second, India does not want Pakistan to achieve 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan and exploit its advantage to harm Indian interests.

Afghanistan is a landlocked country which has been dependent on Pakistan's Karachi port for access to the sea. This advantage has given Islamabad considerable influence over Kabul that it has periodically utilized to pressure Afghan governments. But to consternation of Pakistan, this situation changed in 2008 when India-funded construction work of a 135-mile road connecting the connecting Afghanistan's Nimroz province with the Iranian port of Chabahar was completed. This reconstruction project "created a new transport corridor that ends Pakistan's monopoly on seaborne transit trade to Afghanistan" (Barfield 2010: 344). India's most prominent investments in Afghanistan have been in building the road that connects Dilaram in western Afghanistan with Zaranj in Iran and another road linking Kandahar with Spin Boldak. This has created positive perceptions among the local Afghans. India's role in the reconstruction has thus acted as an exertion of its 'soft power' (South Asia Monitor 2008:2). The highway from Zaranj to Delaram was inaugurated by Hamid Karzai and Pranab Mukherjee in January 2009 (Government of India 2009). India's former External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid went to Kandahar in February 2014 to jointly inaugurate the Afghan National Agricultural Sciences and Technology University with former President Karzai. Despite Pakistan's diplomatic reluctance, Afghanistan became the latest member of the South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in New Delhi in 2007 (Raja Mohan 2009: 179). Karzai was always full of praise for India. Not surprisingly, Afghanistan signed its first strategic partnership agreement in 2011 with India.

During his trip to Pakistan in February 2006, Karzai did his best to alleviate Pakistan's suspicions regarding India when he stated that Kabul's "relations with India in no way, no way, no way will impact" on Afghanistan-Pakistan ties (Tarzi 2006). When Afghanistan signed strategic partnership with India in 2011, Karzai stated that "Pakistan is our twin brother, India is a great friend. The agreement we signed with our friend will not affect our brother" (*Indian Express* 2011). Even though Kabul tried to convince Islamabad of its good intentions, the strategic partnership between India and Afghanistan was historical in the sense that it was the first such accord that Afghanistan had signed since the Soviet invasion in 1979, the original trigger for the outbreak of political violence and conflict. It also reflected a change in the strategic calculus of Afghanistan in which maintaining friendly relationship with Pakistan was no longer an overriding priority (Sinha 2013).

Prime Minister Modi acknowledged India's gratitude towards Karzai during new Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's visit to India in April 2015, when he said

The relationship between India and Afghanistan is not just between two countries or governments. It is a timeless link of human hearts. Fourteen years ago, we started a new chapter in our relationship, in a new era for Afghanistan, under the leadership of President Karzai. The partnership has blossomed despite barriers of geography and hurdles of politics.¹

Afghan Embassy in Delhi has also reportedly proposed building sister-city relationship "between Delhi and Kabul, Mumbai and Kandahar, Ajmer Sharif (Rajasthan) and Herat, Hyderabad and Jalalabad, Ahmedabad (Gujrat) and Asadabad (Kunar), as well as the State of Assam and the Province of Helmand" (Haidari 2015: 3). The new Afghan Parliament building in Kabul, which is part of India's \$2-billion aid, is likely to be inaugurated by Modi when he visits Afghanistan in early next year (*Deccan Herald* 2015; *Hindustan Times* 2015)

India enjoys excellent relations with almost all prominent Tajik politicians of Afghanistan. Over the past one decade, India has also invested a lot of political capital in winning over the friendship of Pashtuns, the dominant community. As political situation gets more muddled in Afghanistan, India must continue to "intensify the engagement with all shades of the Pashtun political spectrum" (*Indian Express* 2014).

Risky Reconciliation

The magnitude of the Islamist terrorist threat to Afghanistan and Pakistan, together with the long history of suspicion between them, argues compellingly for a shift in focus. When Ashraf Ghani came to the presidency in 2014, he was sincerely committed to bringing real change to Afghanistan's Pakistan policy and counterterrorism policies. It was undoubtedly a refreshing break from the past. His policy shift appeared to offer great hope for facilitating reconciliation in this otherwise intractable situation. After Ghani's election as president, there have been several high-profile visits of civilian and military leadership of both the countries to each other's capital. After assuming office, he avoided making any adverse comment on the ISI's support to the Taliban and the LeT. Pakistan's Army Chief, Raheel Sharif, and the ISI Chief, Rizwan Akhtar, went to Kabul amid much fanfare. Ghani's visit to the Pakistan army's General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi in November 2014 was what surprised many in Delhi (Haidar 2015a). On the other hand, even before Ghani's appointment, Pakistan began to indicate a sweeping shift in its Afghan policy, full of promise to do justice to the complexities and dilemmas in their bilateral relations. This new policy was said to be based on no interference

and no favourites in Afghanistan's domestic politics (Nadim 2014). Afghanistan's enemies were declared to be Pakistan's enemies.

Moving forward and making a clean break from the past call for self-examination of one's failures. There are, however, compelling reasons to believe that the Afghan policy shift is not adequately matched by similar thinking within Pakistan's security establishment where approaches to national security remain predicated largely on realist approaches of power politics. Although there is a greater awareness of the need to take hard steps toward reducing dependence on jihadist groups, very little consensus can be seen on the practical measures necessary to achieve this. Consequently Ghani has gradually encountered significant limitations on his ability to bring about the result he had promised and that so many had expected. These limitations reflect forces bigger than his inclinations, forces that are obliging him to continue with conventional wisdom he once questioned. For easily understandable reasons, people from across the political spectrum in Afghanistan have started questioning about Islamabad's sincerity in seeking a mutually beneficial relationship with Kabul, particularly "the striking disconnect between Pakistan's highly conciliatory rhetoric and its continued hosting of Afghan insurgent groups" (Weinbaum 2015). What nationalist Afghans dislike most is the colonial-style relationship between Islamabad and Kabul, with the latter at the receiving end. Launching a sharply-worded attack on Pakistan in June 2015, Ghani demanded strong action against the Taliban leadership based in Pakistan and slammed it for waging "an undeclared state of war with us for the past 14 years" (Swami 2015). Again in August 2015, Ghani attacked Pakistan:

Pakistan still remains a venue and ground for gatherings from which mercenaries send us messages of war... [T]he suicide training camps and the bomb making facilities used to target and murder our innocent people still operate, as in the past, in Pakistan. The security of our people and the national interests of Afghanistan lay the basis of our relationship with Pakistan. We can no longer tolerate to see our people bleeding in a war exported and imposed on us from outside... We hoped for peace, but war is declared against us from Pakistani territory; this in fact puts into a display a clear hostility against a neighboring country.²

Ghani's outbursts reflected a deep pessimism and a resignation to the systematic erosion of Afghan state's institutional capacity to defend itself. Moreover, the widely assumed process of convergence between the two countries has seemingly reversed itself.

It is pertinent to mention here that Pakistan army's half-hearted military incursions into the FATA and subsequent peace agreements with jihadi militants had emboldened them, fueling a deadly insurgency. While these setbacks made peace more critical for Pakistan, they also made the extremists even more obdurate.

The Pakistan army has been fighting the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) since mid 2014 with the aim of eliminating “all terrorists and their sanctuaries” in North Waziristan. Perhaps the most telling comment is former president and army chief Musharraf’s, who argued in an interview that “Pakistan is facing the worst situation in its history. The economy is not doing well. Terrorism is in all the provinces. It has never been this bad” (Khan 2015). There is no doubt that if Pakistan does not show determination in eliminating the scourge of terrorism in the north-west, it will soon reach Punjab, from where the terrorist organisations will try to “push the extremists across the Radcliffe Line into India – first ideologically and then physically... India may have to fight the Taliban at the Atari-Wagah border” (Kanwal 2015).

Supporting the jihadi elements against India has produced no enduring strategic advantage to Pakistan, except hardening of postures by India. Pakistan should not “fight a proxy war against India or try to influence events in Afghanistan except as good neighbours. In short, the India-centric policy would have to be abandoned” (Rahman 2011). But Pakistan is yet to overcome the ‘state of denial’ which has been practiced over decades by the government and promoted by religious outfits as well as a section of the media. Former Army Chief General Kayani had spelt out that the “enemy within” was the real threat to Pakistan but “this was however not the establishment’s collective view. It thus managed to prevent operation against outfits such like LeT, the JeM, and the Haqqani Network. This selective approach practically defeated the stated policy of elimination of al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Waziristan because both lived under the protection of the Haqqanis” (Ahmad 2015). In fact, Pakistani establishment has only psychologically rejected the jihadi extremism; the ideological rejection is still to come. This major obstacle has not only prevented the government from formulating a robust response to jihadi terrorism but also overshadowed the army’s modest successes in counter-terrorism efforts to date.

Indian Stance

India’s unwillingness to get directly involved in Afghanistan has been termed “masterly inactivity” by noted Indian strategic analyst C. Raja Mohan. According to Mohan, the Indian security establishment considers no compelling reason for India to become involved in Afghan affairs in the wake of American drawdown, and believes “that opportunities for influence would present themselves even in the worst-case scenario for Afghanistan. The return of the Taliban with the Pakistani army’s support is bound to produce a backlash, and those Afghan groups contesting the Taliban regime will turn inevitably towards Delhi for support” (Raja Mohan 2012). This thinking explains India’s reluctance to fulfill Afghan demand for weapons. Karzai, during his visit to India in May 2013, had handed a “wish list”

to India seeking greater military hardware (*Independent* 2013). Shortly afterward, India's Foreign Minister at the time, Salman Khurshid, was reported to have told that India is "going to help with non-lethal equipment but I don't think we are either in the position to or willing to contribute lethal weapons right now... it is not advisable to go beyond that. It is a fragile area, there are stakeholders, and there are other people. We don't want to become part of the problem" (Bagchi 2013). This vacillation can be interpreted as India's sensitivity to Pakistan's security concerns in Afghanistan.

The much trumpeted peace-talks have produced no tangible results due to a combination of factors. During his visit to Afghanistan in 2014, when former External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid extended India's support to "Afghan-owned, Afghan-led and Afghan-controlled reconciliation process" (*Times of India* 2015b), it was a direct snub to Pakistan's continued interference to hijack the peace-process. Supporting "President Ghani's vision for peace and stability in Afghanistan" during his visit to India in April 2015, Prime Minister Modi made it crystal clear that both countries "have a shared interest in the success of an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned process" which "should be conducted within the framework of the Constitution of Afghanistan, without the shadow of violence."³

Afghan Taliban's dependence on the ISI for provision of safe havens and logistical support in Pakistan territory is no longer a secret; in fact its veracity is so much beyond doubt that questioning it would only demonstrate one's naivety. The Taliban may at present appear to lack the capability to establish a criminal sub-state or control significant segments of the Afghan population, yet they remain a grave insurgent challenge given their relentless attacks against Afghan government forces. The potency of their growing power was only too visible in the brief takeover of Kunduz in the end of September 2015, considered to be the biggest blow to the fragile Afghan regime since the ouster of Taliban in 2001 (Haidar 2015b).

Matters are made further difficult by widespread corruption, deep internal divisions within the national unity government, a perverse tradition of warlords, private and semi-private militias often little influenced by government oversight. As M K Bhadrakumar, former Indian ambassador to Uzbekistan and Turkey has clearly warned:

Ghani has no military record. He commands no militia, either. Besides, he also lacks a political constituency of his own, having been catapulted to power by the Americans on the back of an amorphous coalition of Pashtuns and Uzbek tribes and with the help of Pakistan. In a protracted war, Ghani will be aspiring to command tough wily war horses like Atta and Dostum, who are not known to be amenable to discipline and invariably would have their own private agenda (Bhadrakumar 2015).

Atul Singh, the Editor-in-Chief of *Fair Observer*, and a teacher of political economy at the University of California, is more scathing:

The so-called Afghan national government is not national and certainly not a government. It is a bunch of feuding warlords fighting for scraps of patronage doled out by the US. People, particularly in rural areas, choose the Taliban over foreign troops who do not speak their language and disappear after brief tours of duty to the other side of the world (Singh 2015).

Given the internal divisions within his government as well as pressures from the Taliban and Pakistan, Ghani's claim to Afghan government's centrality in managing security is coming under severe stress. His position at the negotiating table is likely to grow weaker as American forces are planning to draw down in 2016 and Afghan security forces are taking on more of the burden of managing security. The recent spate of attacks and casualties in Afghanistan also indicate that the widely-reported disunity in the Taliban ranks has not made it any less lethal. The Americans must realize that failing to maintain momentum along the counterinsurgency lines of operation could open the door to a full-blown resurgence of Taliban threat.

While the Taliban may appear like 'good guys' in comparison to the self-styled Islamic State, also known as ISIS, ISIL and Daesh, there has been no change in the Taliban's radical ideological inclinations and their obstruction of democratic political processes in Afghanistan (Parthasarathy 2015). The Taliban aspires to acquire political legitimacy without refraining from the practice of senseless violence. It does not take much imagination to realize that the security vacuum left behind by the US military in Afghanistan will be certainly filled by the Taliban. This will have serious security implications for India. But India continues to adopt 'wait and watch' policy regarding disturbing developments in Afghanistan.

In the most immediate practical terms, the accommodation of the unreformed, radicalized Taliban in Afghanistan's political structures would not only consign millions of Afghans to a wretched political future, but also threaten regional peace.

Scenario after American Withdrawal

The combination of Pashtun ambitions in Afghanistan, the uncertainty surrounding the Durand Line and the uncomfortable memories of long military campaigns in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) aggravated Islamabad's anxieties about Afghanistan. A strong military sense of geo-politics among Pakistani military rulers further led to the need to gain indirect control over Afghanistan. But the motivations of Pakistan's Afghan policy cannot be reduced to the Pashtun question alone. Fear of being strategically marginalized by India is also a significant component of Islamabad's policy in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's repeated assertions of having "no favourites in Afghanistan" and following a "policy of non-interference in Afghanistan affairs" (*Hindu* 2013) can not be believed at the face value, as it has continued to follow a policy whereby "Afghanistan remains a stable but subordinate entity deferential to Pakistan's sensitivities on all matters of national security" (Tellis 2012). As a consequence of the rapid deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan has been preparing options in the wake of American drawdown. Once the Americans are gone, Afghanistan will be left to the machinations of Pakistani generals and mullahs. Pakistan would be faced with a political vacuum in Afghanistan that its generals believe it would have to fill to prevent any other regional power from acquiring a predominant influence.

Pakistan's politicians and the army have been extremely inept in their handling of the rising tide of Islamic fanaticism that the Taliban has set in motion. Despite the much trumpeted campaign of its army in the tribal areas, the Haqqani network is still very active. Some critics suspect that Pakistan has not taken sincere action simply because it wants to use the Haqqani network as a future asset to influence post-US Afghanistan. Even the US has, in frustration, made public condemnation of the ISI's relationship with the Haqqanis. During Congressional testimony in September 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, added weight to the widespread belief that Haqqani network "acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency" (Barnes and Rosenberg 2011). Pakistan is clever enough to avoid antagonizing a group whose primary focus remains Afghanistan. Political stabilization and survival of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US troops is a big question mark because the country can lapse into another round of civil war due to interference from Pakistan.

The presence of American combat forces in Afghanistan has played vital role for the survival of the Afghan governments, first led by Hamid Karzai and now Ashraf Ghani. Their presence has ensured that Afghan domestic power game remains within acceptable limits and does not degenerate once more into a bloody civil war. If Western troops finally leave Afghanistan, the position of the Western-backed Afghan government could weaken further. Any hasty withdrawal of Western forces would embolden Pakistan to play dirty game once again.

The brutal and violent deeds committed by the Taliban are unparalleled in terms of motivation and execution. Through the cold, technical precision of their terror attacks executed through the Jihadist infrastructure they have built with Pakistani state connivance, they arouse a horror that has equal in the activities of the IS. The antagonism of the Taliban is a major cause for concern for India. The Taliban regime had displayed a chronic inability to engage constructively with India whose national interests are likely to be undermined with the inclusion

of the Taliban in the national political structures of Afghanistan. During the last one decade, India has felt secured by the overwhelming American presence in Afghanistan. The Obama administration has repeatedly announced complete withdrawal of all American troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2016. The effects of this drawdown will be felt at every echelon, but most of all for India, which has lived more or less under the protection of the USA in Afghanistan.

Ghani is fully aware of this reality that peace and stability in Afghanistan is not possible without either eliminating the threat emanating from or having some sort of understanding with the Pashtun-dominated Taliban. Thus, he believes that negotiations with Taliban are strategic inevitability and the only bone of contention is about the nature and shape of these negotiations. But without Pakistan's support, the talks with the Taliban have no chance of success. Following the brief but shocking Kunduz takeover by the resurgent Taliban in September 2015, Ghani sounded both convincing and intriguing when he asked for people's support by saying "that for fourteen years we have been in an undeclared war with Pakistan and we want to end this war with your help as peace will not come only through foreign negotiations."⁴ Understandably Ghani faces a very delicate position of fighting the Taliban and simultaneously navigating the contentious demands of negotiations. The reason is very simple: as long as his government does not show its determination and credibility to defend the Afghan territory, his position at the negotiating table would remain very fragile.

In present circumstances when Ghani has been unsuccessfully trying to mend fences with Pakistan, India finds itself left out of the political process aimed at reconciliation with the Taliban. There has also been no meaningful participation from India in all major international forums that have sought to chart a roadmap for talks with the Taliban. The fear is not unfounded that the drawdown in Afghanistan may result in an influx of Jihadists into Kashmir, something Pakistan's security establishment will surely encourage, to prevent them from coming to Pakistan instead. This all has given rise to a perception that India will be forced to fend for its security interests while simultaneously performing the most difficult task of not permitting the government in Kabul to fall prey to Taliban, al-Qaeda affiliates and the ISIS.

The ISIS is steadily gaining foothold in Afghanistan and the region is gradually emerging as a hotbed for breeding Islamic extremism (*Independent* 2015). If the recent trends are any indicators of the future, the security situation in Afghanistan is headed to take a complicated turn, with disastrous consequences for India. As developments in Afghanistan will directly impinge on India's security, the Modi government needs to craft a long-term policy and execute it strategically. It is in the interest of not only India but also the entire South Asian and Central Asian region

that the rein of Afghanistan is not usurped by Jihadist radicals once again. India needs to strengthen its engagement with Russia and convince President Putin to take a long-term view of the Taliban threat.

Concluding Remarks

Afghanistan's experience of being abandoned by the US in late 80s has led to the country's skepticism of external assistance. India should avoid being perceived by Afghans as unreliable ally incapable of shouldering responsibility. India must explicitly maintain that the evolution of a stable security order in South Asia depends a great deal on peaceful Afghanistan. In all formal and informal parleys on regional security with the US, India should repeatedly highlight the importance of Afghanistan as a country where any instability has the potential to destabilize the entire region, thereby providing safe havens for Jihadi groups. Pakistan has refrained from discussing Afghan issue with India. It would be ideal if both India and Pakistan forthrightly address each other's apprehensions at the highest level with the aim of working together for peace and stability in the region. For this to happen, Pakistan will have to not only shed its mindset of 'strategic depth' but also extend real help in institutionalizing the peace process in Afghanistan.

India's reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan have earned it the goodwill of ordinary Afghans. There is not doubt that India is willing to go extra mile but locational inconvenience considerably holds back India to provide more assistance to Afghanistan. India has made it clear that it has aspirations to win recognition as a global power. However, this status cannot be achieved without ensuring security in its own neighbourhood. After American forces depart Afghanistan, India cannot afford to tone down its regional ambitions by abandoning its Afghan allies and allowing the Taliban to resume control.

Notes

- 1 Text of PM's statement in the Joint Press Briefing with Afghan President, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, (available at http://pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/text-of-pms-statement-in-the-joint-press-briefing-with-afghan-president-dr-ashraf-ghani/)
- 2 "Translation of Remarks by President Ashraf Ghani at Press Conference", 10 August, 2015 (available at <http://president.gov.af/en/news/translation-of-remarks-by-president-ashraf-ghani-at-press-conference.%20>)
- 3 Text of PM's statement in the Joint Press Briefing with Afghan President, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, (available at http://pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/text-of-pms-statement-in-the-joint-press-briefing-with-afghan-president-dr-ashraf-ghani/)
- 4 "President Ghani: we reach peace with people's help", 26 September, 2015 (available at <http://president.gov.af/en/news/53138>)

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The Fragility of Iraqi State and the Current Crisis

Anish K.

The wars and conflicts are always part and parcel of the history of Iraq. Today the state is passing through a phase of turmoil. The epicentre of this episode is an organisation called the 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria' (ISIS). It is also known by another name called 'Islamic State of Iraq and Levant' (ISIL). It is being described as a Sunni Islamic militant organisation. In fact, the uprising that was started by the ISIS was the result of various other factors. Therefore, the Iraqi society is in a dilemma due to the internal conflicts which began to worsen since the invasion in 2003. The complex scenario confronted by Iraq is due to two factors, which this paper considers as important. The *first* problem is the ambiguity related with the nation-state building initiated by the various regimes. *Second*, the impact of the 'War on Terror' and corresponding US policies.

The contemporary Iraq is profoundly plural in its languages, religions, ethnic groups, cuisines, rituals and ideological orientations, because for centuries it was a region of multiple and autonomous power centres and distinct economic activities, the relative fortunes and interrelations of which fluctuated constantly in relation to administrative initiatives and political events in Istanbul and beyond (Zubaida 1994; King-Irani 2007: 95-96). To look at the demography of Iraq, it can be seen that its population is approximately 60 per cent Shia Arabs, 20 per cent Sunni Kurds, 20 per cent Sunni Arabs, besides small but influential communities of Turkman and Assyrian Christians, as well as a very small minority of Jews (Tripp 2003).

Nation-state building and its ambiguities

Before analysing the problems of the Iraqi state, it is necessary to understand what exactly the nation-state building is. As in the context of decolonisation in the 1950s the term 'nation-building' became prominent in liberal discourse to rationalise a Western-sponsored process of decolonisation that favoured the integration of disparate groups and communities of people into facsimiles of

liberal democracies. In effect, nation building represented a liberal development strategy in the economic and political context of decolonisation, with nation states being promoted as the agents for transforming pre-modern communities into economically liberal and politically stable entities (Geuss 2001; Sørensen 2001: 19-20, 75-80; Hippler 2002). While the concept of nation building focused on political process, the corollary concept of state building focused on structure and functions of government. Similarly, Eurocentric state - building theory has roots in classical liberal theory (Ismael and Ismael 2005: 620-621). The meaning of the two processes is moderately applicable to the experience of Iraq.

As far as the case of Iraq's nation-state building is concerned, the Iraqi nation and state building experiences have different times. In a broad sense it can be divided into Ottoman, Mandate, Republican and finally Ba'ath period. Iraq is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state; hence, the Iraqi society is deeply divided. On the one hand there is the ethnic diversity; Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens, and Assyrians, and religious factions cut across ethnic fragmentation on the other; Shia-Sunni Muslims, Arab-Kurd-Turkmen Muslims and then Christians. Kurds are located in the north, Sunni Arabs are in the centre and Shia Arabs are in the South, yet throughout the country from North to South and East to West, ethnic and religious factions overlap (Bapir 2010: 119-120). Under the Ottoman rule Iraq was not even there as a state, only the colonial intervention of the region made the modern state of Iraq. In this context the experience from Ottoman rule was taken into consideration as a starting point of the long complex journey of the Iraqi nation and state formation attempts.

Before the European conquest of the Arab world, Iraq had been part of Ottoman Empire. During the time of the British occupation in 1917 the territory of present-day Iraq consisted of three independently administrated provinces like Baghdad, Mosul and Basra under the Ottoman Empire. Iraqi elements did not play a central role in the mechanisations of the Ottoman politics. Rather, politically, socially and economically localised congruent provincialism was the social structure, which was derived from segmented agrarian communities. The communities were differentiated by tribal, ethnic, and/or exchange, cooperation and conflict that evolved through socioeconomic and cultural interaction over the millennia (Ismael and Ismael 2005: 610). The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the World War I in fact opened the possibility to enter the Western colonialism in the Arab world. In this way, the British and the French mandates had come into being in the previously Ottoman ruled Arab territories.

The British initiatives of nation and state building, as a colonial project, have had its own weakness and it would go with the then history of Iraq. To substantiate the drawbacks of nation and state building and its European colonial interests Adeed Dawisha pointed out:

The story is as old as the history of the Iraqi state itself, born from the forcible amalgamation of three Ottoman provinces after the collapse of the Istanbul-based multi-national Ottoman Empire in the wake of World War I. This was hardly unique to the case of Iraq; the post-World War I exercise of state-creation in the Middle East reflected the general reorganization of British and French imperial interests in the area (Dawisha 2009: 4-5).

He further argued:

States were thus created not necessarily in response to the national demands of indigenous populations, but to satisfy the political and economic interests of the imperial powers. The resultant artificial creations were faced not only with the task of governing, an already difficult undertaking, but also with fusing multiple, and more often than not conflictual, indigenous identities and interests (Dawisha 2009: 5).

However, the creation of such a state was resisted by various sections in the society. Since it intentionally excluded some sections, specifically Kurds and Shias, from power on the basis of their ethno-religious backgrounds. The resistance formed along these lines gave rise to ever more articulated Kurdish nationalism and a politicised Shiism. The rebellions throughout the 1920s in Southern Iraq can be identified as the reflections of the resistance (Wimmer 2003; Liu 2004). In fact, the kind of resistance from the people forced Britain to end the Mandate System and transferred power to Hashemite monarchy, who brought a parliamentary system with constitutional monarchy to modern Iraqi state (a British model of parliamentary system). It was yet not more than to protect the colonial interests. A descendant of the Prophet from the Hashemite line, Faisal, was brought in as the first king. He represented the constitution of Muslim unity which the Ottoman Caliphate had symbolised, and thus enjoyed a modicum of political legitimacy for an otherwise alien political system (Ismael and Ismael 2005: 611).

The two main social pillars that provided support for the monarchy and who were favoured by its policies were the big landed aristocracy in the countryside and the large mercantile strata in the cities (Batatu 1978: 358-359). In fact Britain was the architect of the modern Iraqi state. However, the system in reality was a façade for a puppet administration that had little room for manoeuvring outside British interests. Because of this, the democracy had failed to institutionalise in Iraq.

The new experience with nation-state building came with the Republican Revolution in 1958. It was a result of the growing socio-economic disparities and political tensions, replaced the constitutional monarchy and its social base of traditional elites in urban and rural settings with a Pan-Arab nationalist republic that emphasised modernist secular values and socialist models of governance. The new government, led by the army officers with very different social and regional origins from the previous monarchical governments, undercut private property

and attempted to assuage the needs of the poor. The Iraqi Communist Party, in which Shias played key roles, attained the height of national power and influenced from 1958 to 1963 (King-Irani 2007: 97-98). The Republican era changed the power structure in the society. On the one side the Jewish merchant communities were replaced by the Shia landed and merchant elites and the other the civil service and the army remained in control of the Sunni Arab minority (Bromley 1994: 138). Though the Republican governments had succeeded in changing the past ruling elites, they failed to nurture a stable political system there.

In 1962, the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party came into power through a coup. The leadership of that government was shifted to Saddam Husain in 1979. In fact, this is the event which politically marked the beginning of a new era in Iraqi history. When reached in Ba'athist era, the Iraqi nation and state formation has shifted to a new way of the experiment. The already powerful Pan-Arabist trend has a very significant to the Ba'athist assertion of power. During their ascent to power, the Pan-Arabist factions became radicalised and took on fascist tints in the thirties and again under the rule of the Ba'ath from 1968 onwards (Wimmer 2003).

In contrast to the British model, the Ba'ath model based its political system on nationalist symbols of legitimacy, and the party apparatus provided the mechanism for inclusion of all social groups in the political process, particularly the urban and rural poor. While the nation-building process was thus more inclusive of social groups than the monarchical system, it attempted to co-opt the already active nationalist groups, or to marginalise them in the event of their opposition or rejection, as was the case with the communists, National Democratic Party and even some factions of the Ba'ath itself. Through the Ba'ath socialist programme many social entitlements, such as health, education, housing, electrification, etc were given to the rural and urban poor. The party apparatus replaced education, the civil service and the military as the system of national integration (Ismael and Ismael 2005: 621).

Two corresponding changes came after Saddam became the sole power centre in the state and society in Iraq. On the one hand, the command economy was quickly transformed into a type of crony capitalism and correspondingly the other was the transformation of the party apparatus into a personality cult. A complex web of national security agencies, formed by the regime, emerged to enforce the new cult of personality based on the paternalistic visage of 'Papa Saddam' (Ismael and Ismael 2005: 621-622). A combination of totalitarianism and kinship resulted in vibrant networks of nepotism, and the creation of a 'thick ruling clan-class' deeply embedded in the social structure (Ismael and Ismael 2005: 621-622). In reality it was not just a small elite group, but rather an entire social layer united by blood, as well as by economic and financial ties. The end result of such a new

equation was the marginalisation of the old social classes and the middle classes of the monarchy. The crony-based economics of Saddam's regime, later intensified under sanctions, initiated a process of socio-economic polarisation of society where the wealthy few contrasted with the pauperised mass of the population (Ismael and Ismael 2005: 621-622).

Even the present crisis can be looked through the lenses of problems of nation-state building. One of the important examples noted is the case of 'Arabisation' which was influenced by the secular Arab nationalism (Wimmer 2003). It was originated during Ottoman rule and passed through various periods from Mandate to Saddam period. As in the Iraqi context, despite its secular ethos, Arab nationalism means that the complete negation of the multi-cultural character of the society that was followed during Ottoman rule had made it into a unique Arab identity which was Sunni Islamic in nature. Therefore, the ruling elites had been tried to construct and remain the Iraqi national identity as Sunni Islamic (Wimmer 2003).

Such an attempt naturally led to a kind of 'otherisation' of the non-Sunni and non-Arab communities. It is very important to note that the most of the time since the country was established, it had been ruled by the Sunni elites. The promotion of multi-ethnic Iraqi nationalism happened only at two times of the entire modern Iraqi history that the firstly under the regime of Bakr Sidqi in 1936/37 and secondly the Republican regime of Abdul Karim Qasim (Wimmer 2003). In a general sense it one can say that the nation-state building in Iraq has always resulted in the marginalisation of some social sections in the society. It is rational to connect the factor of the 'Arab Sunni' identity of Ba'ath regime with the massive expulsion of Shias from party and regime during Saddam period. This sort of marginalisation and the ban of the other political organisations have led to the creation of ethno-sectarian opposition movements in Iraq directed by Shias and Kurds. The result was that both Shias and Kurds were massively killed with the poison gas by the government.

The economic sanctions came after Gulf War clearly crushed the economy and various social security measures of the state. The state survived as a powerful entity in the society, due to the people's continued dependence on it to meet their day to day activities. Considering the long process of nation-state building, the state gradually achieved independence from the society. That is why it has always survived as an entity which controls everything in society. Here the society did not have the capacity to control the state. The economic sanctions completely mutated the ability of the state; it followed a policy of promoting pre-modern primordial identities based on religion, sect, tribe and other peculiarities. In short, it can be said that the nation-state building in fact made some 'structural-functional' weakness to the state of Iraq.

War on terror and its consequences

The US-led invasion and its aftereffects have been identified as the immediate cause of the current crisis. The coalition forces invaded in 2003 and toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein. Although the US was not interested to remain there to ensure a mere regime change, it consciously undermined the entire political institutions and systems available there. They banned the Ba'ath Party, disbanded the Army and other security apparatuses as part of their 'De-Ba'athification' process. Among them was the Iraqi Army, the only state institution having Iraq's plural nature, the pride and symbol of the national unity which was also widely respected in Iraq. It completely destroyed the state in Iraq which would make the condition in favour of insurgency and ethno-sectarian violence.

The newly emerged 'democratic' government had never tried to overcome the structural-functional weakness of the state. It meant that the nature of the state, as an undemocratic and authoritarian in character, still existed as it were in Iraq. The new born democracy in Iraq was none other than the compromises and adjustments between Shias and Kurds. One could easily identify it in the mode of operation of the post-Saddam Iraqi governments. In fact, it is the crux of the present problems in Iraq.

Problems of New Iraq

The US meanwhile tried to impose on Iraq a set of political rules that did not reflect either the dominant culture or the power relations among political forces (Ottaway and Kaysi 2012:1). Furthermore, the democracy here was not a result of the natural political development of the society but rather was being forcefully introduced through a bloody military invasion and occupation. It was based on the interests of the occupied power rather than the domestic pressure. Interestingly, in a general sense the new political elites in Iraq did not have real claims to the political developments in the country. Besides this, the deliberate weakening of the Iraqi state and rule of law has worsened due to the US policies (Ghanim 2011: 5).

Indeed, all these internal attempts and the external intervention of the US made further complications to the post-Saddam politics of Iraq. It can be classified as the ethno-sectarian politics, ethnic separatism, the 'Islamisation' of society, revenge policies of uprooting political opponents, the debasement of women and minorities, politics of victimisation and finally the autocratic nature and course of the government (Ghanim 2011: 2). Further, Mohammed Ali Bapir (2010:119) argued that the two vital challenges before the Iraqi democratisation were the ethnic fragmentation (Arab-Kurd) and the sectarian cleavage (Shia-Sunni) of the society. In a broad sense the problems of the new Iraq are more or less connected to each other.

Problems of Democratisation in a Divided Society

The emergence of the ethno-sectarian nature of the newly emerged Iraqi polity has indisputably been connected to the various past developments associated with the state and society. In a broad sense such developments can be seen as the reaction of the policies initiated by the past regimes specifically that of Saddam; and the US policies since 2003. The surfacing of the ethno-sectarian opposition against the Ba'ath regime can be related to the former. In case of democratisation, the nature, capacity and the ability of the existing state is vitally important. In a successful democratisation, two factors, namely the emergence of strong, dense and vibrant civil societies that work consistently to democratise politics and to hold the state accountable and the existence of a capable and flexible state are very decisive (Grugel 2002: 82).

The poor state capacity is considered as one of the causes of the failures of successful democratisation. Indeed, successful democratisation requires that the states have the capacity to carry out complex functions since all democratic states assume responsibilities and commitments to their citizens and must be flexible enough to respond to the pressures from them (Grugel 2002: 82). As far as the state capacity is concerned, Evelyne Huber (1995: 167) suggested four basic goals such as enforce the rule of law throughout the state's entire territory and population; promote economic growth; elicit the voluntary compliance from the population over which the state claims; and shape the allocation of societal resources. However the policies of the past regimes as well as the US made the state capacity too low.

As a matter of fact, the state capacity does not necessarily lead to democratisation. But it is certainly difficult for democratisation to proceed without it (Grugel 2002: 83). Further Andreas Wimmer (2003) observed two closely related conditions which would have led to the emergence of an ethno-sectarian division among people as a result of the democratisation efforts. According to him:

First, no strong networks of civil society organizations have developed *prior* to democratization and the introduction of the modern nation state. Secondly, weak states cannot guarantee and enforce equality before the law, democratic participation, and protection from arbitrary violence, and access to state services, for *all* the citizens of the state. Elites therefore will discriminate between individuals and groups and build up pyramids of patron-client relationships. They will give preference to members of their own ethnic group, when transethnic civil society organizations are not available. Political support and votes thus will be secured along the channels of ethnicity or other communal solidarities. Ethnicity thus plays a political role homologous to that of modern nationalism.

The observations raised by Wimmer were obviously pertinent to the state of emergence of ethno-sectarian politics in post-Saddam Iraq. Most of the political

parties also based on the same politics. The political parties first surfaced in Iraq during Monarchical period; however they could not be institutionalised due to the superfluous colonial and royal involvements (Dawisha 2009: 14-26). Saddam's expulsion of Shias from the Ba'ath Party as well as from the government had forced them to form their own political organisations to engage with politics, especially to oppose the regime.

The emergence of *Al-Da'wa* and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI and since 2007, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq or ISCI), in 1970s and 1980s respectively can be seen as the political expression of the Iraqi Shias. Simultaneously the formation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) with Kurdish nationalist interests also highlighted the Kurdish engagements with the Iraqi politics. These are the major parties playing substantial roles in the post-Saddam Iraqi polity. In addition to this the ethno-sectarian opposition movements against Saddam regime later became the source of the creation of hundreds of political parties based on ethno-sectarian lines such as Kurds, Shia Arab, Sunni Arab and other small minority groups.

Problems of the party system

The replacement of the Saddam's single party system had led to the emergence of multiparty system once again in Iraq and many of these political parties were the members of the umbrella opposition group-Iraqi National Congress (INC). It consists of a plural set of political organisations ranging from secular to parties belonging to minorities. Yet, they and even INC did not have a position to claim to the representation of all Iraqis. In fact most of these party constituencies were a large part fixed being based on their ethno-sectarian identities. For instance, a supporter of *Al-Da'wa* Party would not become a supporter of KDP. As part of their democratisation the US had encouraged and even provided resources to formulate new political parties. Most of the parties emerged during this period were ethno-sectarian in nature. These newly emerged and old political parties had many drawbacks which were reflected in their engagements with post-Saddam Iraqi polity.

The parties are remaining marginal and, moreover, hundreds of them are contributing to fragmentation of political forces (Ottaway and Kaysi 2012: 6). In addition to this, each party tried to associate more or less with urban nobles, tribal sheiks and rural headmen, and their respective voting blocs (Wimmer 2003). For instance, the two election victories of *Al-Da'wa* Party and ISCI alliance was not based on their own organisation, canvassing, or legitimacy, but by their association with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani (Dodge 2006: 222). In such a milieu the political leaders with ethno-sectarian characters would not be interested in institutionalising

their respective parties and its organisations due to their ambition for permanent power and leadership both within the party and the state. In addition to this, in the election campaigns the parties were trying to get maximum support from their own ethno-sectarian groups and were doggedly intent on subverting intrusive efforts by others into their areas (Dawisha 2009: 253). The leaders did use even the state resources for fulfilling their goals and political loyalty. These clientelist pyramids only rarely will comprise members of other ethnic-religious groups than those of the party leaders (Wimmer 2003). The long term impact of such a tendency is that the Iraqi population would then come to become mere subjects of state rather than citizens.

Emergence of the ethno-sectarianism

As far as the working of the democratic system in Iraq is concerned, it is likely dominated by micro-politics of clientelistic alliance on the one hand, and by the macro-politics of ethno-religious party competition on the other (Wimmer 2003). To look at the individual, he or she is represented in politics by his or her belonging to a specific ethno-sectarian identity. In fact the meta-Iraqi identity of the people missed somewhere in between the regime change and the democratisation. The elections were reflecting the clear preponderance of ethno-sectarian loyalties and identity (Ghanim 2011: 117). Nowadays it is one of the fundamental challenges faced by the post-Saddam Iraqi polity. Furthermore, most of the political leaders are more concerned with their ethno-sectarian mobilisation rather the meta-Iraqi perspective. They constantly try to keep ethno-sectarian division among the people for the endurance of their interests and power.

In the words of Toby Dodge (2012: 155), the advantages of these mobilisations go to the baskets of politicians especially the expatriates without the least local support. In fact it is the only possible way to rally any support of their cause. The overwhelming influences of these loyalties always make problems in the government like the ministers are constantly following the guidelines of their ethno-sectarian leaders rather than undertaking cabinet responsibilities and doing the duties (Dawisha 2009: 250, 265). Additionally, the over ambitious politicians are making the political arena a battle ground for getting more power which sometimes make government unstable.

Problems of the ‘tyranny of majority’

To look at the nature and course of new born democracy of Iraq, Andreas Schedler (2001: 15) elaborated that during the democratisation a political system may contain both democratic and nondemocratic elements. He called such a system ‘electoral democracy’: one manages to hold competitive election; however it fails

to uphold the civil and political freedoms essential for liberal democracy. Here it is also very relevant that a strong correlation exists between the transition of democracy and instability (Byman 2003: 59; Byman 2008: 615). These observations are applicable to the case of Iraq due to the structural-functional weakness of the state and the shortcomings of the US democratisation. The absence of the many of the preconditions of the democratisation, specifically the civil society and the flourished middle class, is restricting democracy only to a procedural level. It has yet to institutionalise the politico-economic-social rights and liberties guaranteed by the democratic constitution. One of the critical problems faced by the Iraqi democracy is the phenomena of *tyranny of majority* (Byman 2003: 52; Byman 2008: 614-615) and the marginalisation of minorities (Bapir 2010:122). Since the foundation of the state of Iraq up to 2003, a phenomena of *tyranny of minority* (Anderson 2008: 188) had been taking place in Iraq during which the elites from the Sunni minority had been ruling and controlling the state and society. One theory of democratic transition put forwards that that the attainment of national unity is a precondition to begin the democratisation process (Rustow 1970). Here the national unity means formation of a single identity of the people irrespective of their differences and also to have developed a strong desiring demand for democracy. Now the Iraqi state is favourable to the ethno-sectarian identities than a plural Iraqi identity.

One potential problem of divided societies along with racial, ethnic or religious lines is that the use of numerically larger group in elections and other legitimate democratic forms to ensure its dominance. Some identities may be 'hardened' by past conflicts and tragedies (Byman 2008: 614). In such a situation democratic election gives birth to undemocratic rule and sharpens the ethno-sectarian divisions (Bapir 2010:122; Anderson 2008: 191). Additionally, liberal democracy, in such circumstances, produces illiberal results (Zakaria 1997: 22-43; Ottaway 2003). Indeed Iraq is a divided society and polity; moreover, yet to achieve a strong and comprehensive national unity and this has reflected in the numerically largest Shia community's unbeaten majorities in elections. It substantiated the voting pattern of the people in the 2005 election. The result of the election cleared that the Iraqis overwhelmingly voted in accordance with their ethno-sectarian identities (Ghanim 2011: 118).

To look specifically into each communities, it can be seen that almost all Kurds probably over 95 per cent voted for the Kurdistan alliance (alliance between KDP and PUK), some 75 per cent of Shias voted for United Iraqi Alliance, the alliance of predominantly Shia political parties, and at least 75 per cent Sunnis opted for the boycott as their sectarian option. Seat share of the parties also reflected this trend as the ethno-sectarian parties performed better than the secular-nationalist

parties (Dawisha 2009: 249). The majoritarian governments seldom consider the legitimate demands of the marginal sections of the society and thus forcing them to practise extra constitutional means to attain their demands. It can easily identify through the case of threat posed by the ISIS. Such an attempt, in the long term, will deteriorate the post-Saddam political systems.

Problems of the ‘politics of victimisation’

The past is always haunting the polity of post-Saddam Iraq. The phenomenon of ‘politicisation of victimhood’ or ‘politics of victimisation’ (Ghanim 2011) obviously stresses this fact. This politics had been used by the Ba’ath regime, on the one hand, to project itself that it was being victimised to a constant international and regional conspiracy and, on the other, to extend this to the whole nation for providing a source of legitimacy for its autocratic rule (Ghanim 2011: 19-21). However, what is to be noted here is that the Ba’ath regime itself victimised segments of the Iraqi society like the Shias and Kurds for historical reasons like opposing the regime.

This condition of Sunni Arab community being the victimiser and Shias and Kurds being the Victims changed since 2003. The Shia-Kurd community got into political power through election. Such a tendency of self victimisation is hardly new among the experiences of Iraq. It can be seen from the victimisation of the former regime that there was an obvious role for the Shia and Kurd elites. Therefore and nevertheless, these communities have legitimate reasons to organise opposition to the regime. Except their initial conflict with colonial state formation efforts, their later opposition and conflicts with regime in a large extent were based only on the interests of their elite leaders where in the case of Kurds, they started fighting against Iraqi government during 1960s due to the newly enforced land reforms (Yapp 1996: 247). Clearly it was not in favour of the economic and political interests of the Kurdish tribal leaders and hence, the conflict was motivated by defending well-entrenched material interests rather than being an ethnic issue (Ghanim 2011: 21).

The religious element is an important dimension in Shia community’s sufferings. The government’s introduction of women rights threatened the absolute power enjoyed by the religious clerics in family and personal affairs. The Shia elite had taken a sectarian approach to this and their closeness with Iran affected the relation with Saddam regime. In addition to this the Shia and Kurd politicians’ attitudes, their favouring Iran during the Iran-Iraq war and subsequently their violent behaviour in the revolt against the state in 1980s and 1990s respectively forced the government react aggressively. The result was mass killings, injuries, displacement and disappearances.

A major portion of the Kurd nationalist and Shia religious movements were wiped out from the state. It is an undeniable fact, which was substantiated by many researches, that Shia-Kurd elites have an obvious role in the sufferings of their communities. The opposition groups had been sheltering into massive violence against state and its functionaries in the north and the south of the country. Many scholars elaborated on the intensity and depth of these massive violence and its impacts (Tripp 2002: 256; Farouk-Sluglett & Sluglett 2003: 289; Jabar 2003: 270; Mackey 2002: 24-26; Makiya 1989: 74, 79).

The nature and course of opposition movements against the regime was not at all democratic as well as peaceful. It was manifested through their violent relationship between each other. Both Shia and Kurd groups had been engaged in violence with their rivalries among the same communities and subsequently this massive violence in the northern and southern parts of the country acquired a level of gaining more power and wealth. In southern Iraq the different Shia militias struggled over supremacy, spoils and even oil smuggling. Similarly in the north the two Kurdish parties engaged in 'fraternal' fight for supremacy, wealth and smuggling (Ghanim 2011: 120). As a result of these conflicts, it left behind thousands as injured or dead, and tens of thousands had been displaced.

The whole events of violence and atrocities over these communities, from the government and the rival groups among them, underline the fact that both the former regime and victims are products of the same culture of violence predominating Iraqi society and political culture (Ghanim 2011: 24). Clearly it is the hard truth and the background setting behind the formation of the 'politics of victimisation' or 'politics of victimhood' thesis of the new regime of Iraq. Moreover it is the way the politics of victimisation that appeared in the public screen of Iraqi politics. It can be said that the institutionalisation of the politics of victimisation was the base of the so called democratisation. The ruling elites, by making it an integral part of politics and governance, used it as justification for claims to power, wealth and legitimacy (Ghanim 2011: 12, 19).

In fact it was based on a false assumption that both Shia and Kurd communities were being victimised by Sunni Arab community during the Saddam regime. So the institutionalisation of the politics of victimisation has been developed through the victimisation of Sunni Arab minorities in Iraq (Bapir 2010: 120). The whole sufferings faced by the victims of Saddam regime was connected to the Sunni Arab community of Iraq. Similarly the elites of the former victim community would clearly use this situation as the justification for the claims of power, wealth and legitimacy forever.

In case of the forged assumption of the Sunni community as the victimiser, this status is not more than a kind of fiction rather than reality. Furthermore this status

does not contain any rational justification. In fact the Sunni Arab community and organisations, specifically Ba'ath Party were being victimised by Saddam during his long rule. In reality the actual power had been enjoyed by Saddam and his family members as well as close associates, predominantly Sunnis of his tribe from Tikrit (Dodge 2005: 33; Visser 2007/2008: 84). It is a fact that the Sunni community had more or less been victimised by the Ba'athist regime (Ghanim 2011: 28; Dawisha 2009: 216; Dawisha 1999: 555; Khafaji 2006).

In a close analysis of the post-Saddam Iraq, a kind of continuation of both the nature and policies of the state can be identified. To elaborate on this further the new regime is also propagating the old international and regional conspiracy thesis of Saddam regime for its legitimacy (Ghanim 2011: 19). The state follows the same policy of producing more victim everyday which manifests that the post-Saddam Iraq was also not different when it comes to the victimisation process.

Attitude of Nuri al Maliki

In a democratisation process the role and the attitude of the leadership are considered as inalienable part of the success of the democratisation. The major portion of the success is dependent on the new leaders' adherence and internalisation of the democratic values. Additionally, the institutionalisation of the democratic system is dependent on to what extent or degree these leaders were committed to these values for fulfilling the aspirations of the people. To analyse the history of democratisation, it can easily draw a conclusion that the failures were more than successes. To go into the details about these failures, at least one of the main causes of this was definitely the failure and unwillingness of the leadership to nurture and institutionalise the democratic system. In many of these cases, the leaders who had been in front of the democratisation had not been ready to transfer power to new leadership. Various instances in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and some other individual cases in other parts of world were provided by Jean Grugel (2002) in his study about democratic transitions.

Transition theorist Dankwart A. Rustow (1970) had the position that the 'habituation of democracy' has to be materialised through the peaceful transfer of power from old to new leadership. He further stressed that this was the particular point when the whole process of democratisation was stuck and sometime the whole process may be abandoned. In fact most of the post-Saddam leaders do have interest only in maintaining their power and specific material benefits rather than adherence to democracy. Thus it can be concluded that Iraq lacks a Charles de Gaulle, a Nelson Mandela, a Jawaharlal Nehru or even a Corazon Aquino who can serve as a symbol of unity for a new democratic government.

Generally speaking, most of the post-invasion politicians are expatriates; they have always been interested in projecting their ethno-sectarian identities than an inclusive Iraqi identity for the monopoly of power and material benefits. An Iraqi professor from Baghdad University bitterly comments: most of them holding passports of foreign countries, such way they have been getting impunity from the corruption and other charges. Besides this they are just interested in money generating in oil sector, contracts and so on rather than the welfare of the people (Interview).

The growth of Maliki from a low profile politician to a powerful prime minister, in the sense to use the available coercive method to sustains in power, has been the result of the some calculated moves. After being appointed as prime minister he set about building a small and cohesive group of functionaries, the 'Malikiyoun'(Dodge 2012: 151), tied directly to him. When faced with a fractured political elite consumed with infighting and self-enrichment, Maliki set about building a network of influence and patronage that would bypass the cabinet and link the prime minister directly to those generals and senior civil servants who were exercising state power below ministerial level, in effect building a shadow state (Dodge 2012: 151).

His attempts to secure power started from the achievement of total control of his party *Al-Dawa*. He successfully expanded the same networks throughout the entire institutions of the state. He also appointed his family members and those close to him in the party to the key posts or he completely relied on such people only. He has better understanding about the shortcoming or instability of the state institution in it such a context to overcome this. Maliki completely focussed his energy on the control of the security forces.

As part of his attempts, he was subverting the formal chain of command, tying senior army commanders, paramilitary units and the intelligence services to him personally. He ensured that these forces could not be used by his rivals against him, thereby politicising and personalising the chain of command, reducing forces' military effectiveness. To gain control over security force, he appointed those close to his interests as well as his party interests. He even sent his security forces to the official residence of the Iraqi Vice-president Tariq al-Hashimi to arrest him. All these made clear that the new Iraqi democratic leadership and the entire system was not in favour of the very idea of democracy.

If a democratic system worked on the base of parochialism, it was quite natural that the marginalised sections would choose extra constitutional means. In the case of Iraq, the minority Sunni Arabs have been marginalised by the democratic regime. It was due to the failure of the democratisation as well as the democratic regime in Iraq. The 'ISIS syndrome' explicates this hard reality. Some regional issues such as Syrian crisis also influenced them to choose such an option to confront with

the Iraqi state. Some reports noted that the former Iraqi soldiers and officials had actively involved with this group. If it was true, the ground situation of Iraq would become more complex in the near future.

Conclusion

There is a rift emerging among the ruling alliance due to Maliki's accusation that a group of terrorists did exist in the Kurdish capital of Erbil. The Kurds responded by boycotting the Cabinet meetings in Baghdad. Apart from this the Kurdish Autonomous Region's (KAR) leadership was preparing for a plebiscite to decide the future of Kurd's relation with Iraq. It also made the condition to materialise their long term ambition to make 'Kurdistan Nation' (Tran 2014). If it happens that would definitely lead to the collapse of the present Iraqi state. It is very important in this context to consider Hamid Dabashi's remarks about the imminent consequences of such a fragmentation of Iraq in the region. He warned that if the disintegration happens that will negatively affect the entire Arab world (Dabashi 2014). To conclude, it can be said that the entire trouble that is faced by the Iraqi state and society are reflections of the structural-functional problem and the external interventions.

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When the Despots are Deposed: Developments, Differences and Difficulties in the Transition of North Africa

Lirar Pulikkalakath

The most desired result of the “Arab Spring”, the popular demonstrations erupted in the streets of Tunisia and spread throughout the Arab World since the end of 2010, was a new beginning through fundamental political change. But the result varied from one country to another throughout the Arab World, from North Africa to West Asia. After the Arab Spring, especially the countries in North African region have offered a mixed political scenario; the re-establishment of political Islam in Tunisia and Egypt although a short period in the latter and bloody civil war in Libya.

The post-Arab Spring scenario saw deposing only four rulers from power. Coincidentally, except in the case of Yemen, three of them belonged to North Africa; Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The entire events which occurred after the overthrow of these rulers in the North African region proved that building a better democracy or achieving the desired transition is a long and difficult task. Re-construction or reforms in the form of charismatic leadership, constitutional reforms, freedom of speech and press, and respect for human rights are necessary in most of the previous political establishments.

One of the most important outcomes is the (re) emergence of Islamic movements or ideologies like the Ennahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. According to some scholars, the “Arab Spring” has given way to an “Islamic Winter,” and that it warns gloomily that the overthrowing of dictators is only empowering a new generation of religious fanatics. But the reality is that, despite repression and tight control over them by the authority, these Islamist movements are well positioned to take advantage of new political openings in the troubled regions. These Islamic movements have credibility as the best-organized and most popular political movements in most Arab countries for decades. No observer of the region could have failed to note the steady growth of Islamic public culture or the

formidable political machines of Muslim Brotherhood-style movements wherever they were allowed to operate. Thus, the Islamists were naturally well positioned to take advantage of the political openings in many Arab states that followed the great protest wave of 2011 (Lynch 2012: 6). This article is an attempt to analyze the social, political and economic impacts of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

Tunisia after the jasmine revolution

If the reasons behind the Arab uprising are almost similar, its outcomes are different. The case of Tunisia requires special emphasis when dealing with the post-Arab Spring scenario since the entire popular demonstrations and political transitions began there. Transition from an existing political scenario to a new is not easy as every transition is characterized by its own complexities, but the Tunisian transition escapes conventional patterns because of the particular kind of revolution it has undergone and the characteristics of the leadership and the actors involved. Again, the specificities of Tunisian revolution would make it more like a peculiar kind of democratic transition than a genuine revolution (Sarsar 2013:2). Here, an enquiry into the modern political history of Tunisia would help in the analysis of the political transition in North Africa.

When analyzing the political history of Tunisia, it must be remembered that it was the first state in the region to adopt a constitution (1861) and the first Muslim state to abolish slavery. Most importantly, it is the first state to have exiled a ruler, Ben Ali, and dissolved a ruling party, the Democratic Constitutional Rally Party (RCD). Thus in more than one ways, Tunisia is the first to have begun the process of changing authoritarian structures instituted over 55 years (Deane 2013:10).

Immediately after the revolution and the expulsion of Ben Ali from power, some promising initial steps were taken towards effecting a democratic transition. The country witnessed its first free and fair elections held in October 2011 leading to the formation of a coalition government comprising the Islamic party Ennahdha, an Islamic party and two centre-left non-Islamist parties. It was the constitutional reform, the first in the series of Political transformation in Tunisia which began in 2011. The institutional reforms began with the higher authority, redistributing the limitless powers of the president to elected public representatives. Tunisia's interim government established committees addressing constitutional considerations such as security and corruption, as well as truth and reconciliation concerns (Deane 2013:10).

**Distribution of Seats in Tunisia's
National Constituent Assembly**

Party	Percentage of Vote	Number of Seats	Percentage of Seats
Ennahda	37.04 %	89	41.01 %
Congress for the Republic (CPR)	8.71 %	29	13.36 %
Popular Petition (Aridha Chaabia)	6.74 %	26	11.98 %
Ettakatol	7.03 %	20	9.22 %
Democratic Progressive Party (PDP)	3.94 %	16	7.37 %
The Initiative (Al Maubadara)	3.19 %	5	2.31 %
Democratic Modernist Pole (PDM/ Al Qutb)	2.79 %	5	2.31 %
Afek Tounes	1.89 %	4	1.84 %
Tunisian Workers Communist Party (Al Badil al Thawri)	1.57%	3	1.38 %
Other	27.1 %	20	9.22 %
Total	100 %	217	100%

Source: (Sarsar 2013:4).

As the result shows Ennahda may have swept elections, but only two years ago it did not even exist in Tunisia and it has faced great challenges in re-establishing itself. After the Arab Spring, the party emerged from decades of complete exclusion from public life to sweep the foundational election and dominate the constitutional assembly (Lynch 2012:7). The victory of Islamist party Ennahda in the constituent assembly elections was widely predicted. This former clandestine movement is

well organized and had the ability to swiftly reactivate and mobilize its supporters. According to some analyses, however, it was not only Ennahda's high levels of efficiency but also its professionalism that gained it the lion share of the vote. It was the reward of the people of Tunisia to Ennahda as a party with no connections to the previous regime. Conversely, parties that were perceived to have had ties with the old regime were punished. It is very much clear in the poor performance of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP)—Ennahda's only real challenger in the run-up to the elections—that the party made it to fifth place, with less than 10% of the vote. Hence, the election result shows that the people of Tunisia gave their votes based on the relations and attitudes of each party towards the previous regime.

On the other hand, the success of Ennahda, an Islamist party, has raised a lot of concerns, particularly from the left-wing and secular parties, about the future role of Islam and the sharia law in Tunisia, and the implications for women's rights and personal freedoms. The Ennahda has been cautiously reassuring Tunisians and foreign players that it will not limit or deny those freedoms. If one looks at the socio economic dimension, there are around 700,000 unemployed, almost half of them graduates. It indicates the urgent need for an economic reform. If the state fails to do so it might lead to further tensions (Chatam House 2011:5- 6).


Following the revolution, the major setback to Ben Ali's Constitutional Democratic Rally (French acronym RCD) party was that it was disbanded, and senior members, who had held office over the past decade, were banned from running or voting in the elections (Watanabe 2013). The Jasmine revolution weakened almost all apparatus of the state and the ironical reality is that Tunisia is still run by the remains of the old establishment, weakening the police who were regarded as the main tool of oppression. But on the political level, the revolution unleashed the power of the moderate Islamists of the formerly banned Ennahdha party, the labour unions, Salafis, and many other secular-left and centre-left parties, which had also been oppressed, though to a lesser degree, under Ben Ali. As a positive sign towards a better political atmosphere, the former constitution and the legal system created by former presidents Bourguiba and Ben Ali—regarded as favourable towards dictatorship—were dismantled. Immediately after the revolution, the first government led by Mohamed Ghannouchi, the last prime minister under Ben Ali, lasted only for one week. His interim government was collapsed due to popular street pressure because it was mainly composed of key figures from the old regime. His second government lasted for six weeks. This time the reason for decline was the lack of trust to lead the political transition process and also because it excluded key political parties like the Ennahdha, the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), and the Tunisian Workers' Communist Party (POCT), and lacked a clear road map for new elections and institutions. The duration of the third government

led by Beji Caid Essebsi was only ten months and left power after the election of a constitutional assembly on 23 October 2011. The third government mainly focused on running state-affairs and ensuring the continuity of the state until the election of a new legitimate government, hence it lacked the force of a legitimate government. It was very soft on security, social, and economic issues. The Essebsi's government focused on day-to-day affairs rather than on reforms. Then the post-October-2011 government in Tunisia mainly is consisted of three political parties: the Ennahda Party, the Ettakatol, and the Congress for the Republic. Together, the three are known as the Troika. But whoever from the political parties influences the country, the major problem faced by the new government is the lack of experience in government affairs and very little managerial skills. The current government excludes individuals associated with the old regime, which in practice means there is a lack of experience and competence among all of the leaders in all aspects of the government (Ben Ayed 2013: 6- 7).

It is very important to look at the situation of security and internal security forces after the revolution. The Tunisian police were as much hated as was Ben Ali himself, and were regarded as the regime's main tool of oppression. So efforts have been made to reform the internal security forces. However, it is also unclear whether they have been simply integrated into the police force, and their files have still not been made public. While police training in human rights has begun, rules of engagement, police custody, and police intelligence practices remain largely unchanged since the Ben Ali era. By contrast, the Tunisian army was respected, both because it was regarded as an institution that served the nation and not an individual leader, and because the army stood with the people or refused the orders of Ben Ali to shoot at protestors during the revolution. Simply it was the army that kept the country together during the first critical days of the revolution. But the army alone has not been able to cope with national security. After the revolution, the critical situation that the country faced on the security matter was the revolution caused by the escape of many criminals from prisons that were left unguarded and subsequently the crime levels rose significantly. Parallel to that, the labour unions and other groups carried multiple strikes and sit-ins. These entire chaotic situations fuelled popular demand for the re-establishment of law enforcement. As a result, a new process for police reform has been introduced and police empowerment has gradually increased and security has been improving steadily since. But the insecurity caused by the rise in general crime, political violence, and repeated strikes and sit-ins had a devastating effect on investment and economic activity in general, with the tourism and mining sectors particularly suffering. Tourism revenues registered in 2011 and 2012 were 30 and 10 percent less respectively than in 2010 (Ben Ayed 2013: 8; Watanabe 2013:3).

On the economic field, many people believe that their standard of living fell after the revolution. Inflation rose from 4.4 percent in 2010 to 5.6 percent in 2012, the budget deficit rose from 2.6 percent in 2010 to 6.6 percent in 2012, foreign currency reserves fell from 140 days of imports in 2010 to 100 days of imports in 2012, and foreign debt/GDP ratio rose from 48.5 percent in 2010 to 53.7 percent in 2012. The rise of food prices, increase in foreign debt and inflation, tarnished the image of the newly elected government by making it impossible to meet expectations of improved standards of living. To tackle this, the government decided to reduce food exports, fix the prices of some key food items, and intensify the fight against food smuggling on the borders. The government also maintained food and fuel prices at existing levels. This resulted in an increase of subsidies from 1.7 billion dinars in 2010 to 4.4 billion dinars in 2012 (Ben Ayed 2013: 10-11). The post revolution Tunisia is also threatened by a lack of improvement in economic growth compared to pre-revolutionary levels and continued high unemployment. Actually, the revolution only added fuel to the already difficult socio-economic situation. In the initial period after the revolution, the country had witnessed a decline in revenue from tourism, with the number of tourists falling by more than 50 per cent, and a drop in foreign direct investment by more than a half (Watanabe 2013: 3).

Compared to conditions during Ben Ali's regime, how often do these occur in Tunisia today?



Source: Mansoor Moaddel (2013).

The chart based on a survey reveals that corruption in Tunisia is lower, people are freer and unlawful arrest is less after the revolution than before, while a much

higher percentage reveals that the difference between the rich and the poor is more than it was before. These attitudes may reflect the deteriorating economic conditions of the country as a result of the decline in security, which has significantly reduced the number of tourists visiting Tunisia after the revolution. However, a majority of respondents believe that the situation in Tunisia is better now than it was before the revolution: specifically, that unlawful arrest and corruption are less common, and freedom to join organizations is more common.

On the political scene, the Ennahdha's dominance has prompted non-Islamist parties to unite against it. Important in this regard is the centre-leftist political party led by Nidaa Tounes, a party created in 2012 by Beji Caid Essebsi, one of the interim prime ministers led the country immediately after the revolution. It brought together leftists, liberals, and former members of Ben Ali's RCD. Nidaa Tounes has formed a union with the other non-Islamist parties and enjoys the support of the powerful Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) labour federation, which resisted co-optation by the previous regime and has the capacity to mobilize across different sectors of society, as well as cross-regionally. The presence of the former RCD members in Nidaa Tounes, as well as of other opposition parties, continues to cause controversy. But, as yet, no wholesale exclusion of former officials from politics has occurred, making them potential players in steering the transition. In this context, it is important to note that the Political stability in Tunisia is threatened by the growing polarization between Islamists and non- Islamists as well as intra-Islamist competition (Watanabe 2013: 2).

In the case of judicial system, corruption still exists. The Supreme Council of Magistrates, which is responsible for appointing, promoting, and penalizing magistrates, remains only partially reformed. As part of reforms, it has dismissed some judges but without any specific reasons, and it is believed that a number of judges have been forced to resign for political reasons. There have been similar inadequacies in the area of transitional justice, which had been intended to address human rights abuses under the former regime. So far, the process has mostly focused on abuses during the revolution than on those occurred under Ben Ali. It has been also appropriated by the state rather than being placed in the hands of civil society (Watanabe 2013: 3).

So, while analyzing the entire developments and changes that have happened in Tunisia since the revolution, there have been some challenges still faced by the country. Important among them are problems in maintaining political stability, the role of religion in politics, the difficulty in reforming some institutions established by the previous government, and of course, the reduction of unemployment through inclusive economic growth. So, a better future for Tunisia depends very much on how it can overcome these challenges. Further, as the first Arab Spring

country on the way to transforming authoritarian social, political and economic state structures, Tunisia has proved that a sudden change is not possible and so the entire processes for transition are highly complex, unstable, and will take long time.

The Political Transition in Egypt: What has gone wrong?

Although the series of popular demonstrations began in Tunisia, Tahrir Square in Egypt was the symbol of the Arab Spring which also deposed Husni Mubarak from power on 11 February 2011. Among the North African countries, which collectively experienced the wave of the Arab Spring since the end of 2011, Egypt deserves much attention in many ways. It is one of the most populated countries in the Arab World and its location is in a strategically important area where the Suez Canal connects Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea, and above all, the country was a major part in the Arab–Israel and it has many agreements with Israel. All the above mentioned factors contribute to Egypt being a country with many peculiar features in the troubled region and whatever political transition happens there will have multifaceted implications throughout the West Asian and North African region.

After the deposing of Husni Mubarak, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) was in charge of the transition and Marshal Tantawi became the *de facto* head of the state. The first political disagreement he had to deal with was regarding the question of a timeline for elections and the writing of a new constitution. After the dissolution of the National Democratic Party, the political party to which Mubarak belongs, the Brotherhood, was the only organized group left in the country, and there was prediction that it would win in any early election. That is why the Muslim Brotherhood stood for an early election before a constitution is written. Other parties like the nationalist-liberal and the Nasserist/leftist parties wanted time to prepare and organize their bases and argued for the need of an agreement on a new constitution before the elections. However, the 18-member SCAF had no experience in running a country and especially its 76 year old head had even less experience in leading a political transition. So, in Egypt during the period under the SCAF's stewardship, things were almost equal or worse than during the period of Mubarak. Because the Egyptian economy declined at a worrisome rate and political unrest continued (Ghanem 2014: 20).

In Egypt, the parliamentary elections were held after the revolution in November 2011 and in January 2012. In the first round of elections, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP)—the iconic and the most potent Islamist movement in the Arab world—received just 36.6 percent of the votes despite its long-standing experience in running election campaigns. (Although the movement had officially been banned for decades, many Brothers ran in elections

as “independent” candidates.) But in the second round, the Muslim Brotherhood received 47 percent and the Salafist Al-Nour got 24 percent of the vote. On May/June 2012, presidential elections were held and Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate won against the former Prime Minister Ahmad Shafiq (Lynch 2012:7, Rozsa 2012: 5 & Al Anani 2012: 13).

Morsi’s one year rule has witnessed collapse in Egyptian economy, increase in corruption, and a non-consensual constitution was passed and the country became more deeply polarized between Islamists and secularists. And of course, the youth, the major force behind the revolution, felt betrayed as their political and economic exclusion continued unchanged in the post-Mubarak era. This led to the rise of the *Tamarod* (or Rebellion), a movement against Morsi in June 2013 which finally led to the deposing of democratically elected Morsi from power. The head of the constitutional court was named as interim president and he in turn appointed an interim government. The new transitional authorities announced a road map for the future that involves writing a new constitution as well as parliamentary and presidential elections. As things happened in the previous process of transitions, Morsi’s overthrow also led to increased political violence and to even more polarization (Ghanem 2014: 14).

But most unfortunately, the military ouster of the elected president Mohamed Morsi clearly marked on July 2013 the failure of Egypt’s two-years attempt to realize a transition to democracy following the popular uprising and subsequent ouster of Husni Mubarak from power in 2011. Actually, the uprising had given hopes to the people in Egypt in particular and the Arab world in general that it might see the forging of a new politics—a politics in which those wielding power would find themselves held accountable by the people acting through regular free elections. But all such hopes lived only until July 2013 (Brown 2013: 46).

According to Nathan J Brown (2013: 56), “Egypt’s transition was not badly designed; it was simply not designed at all. Its original failure lay in a series of shortsighted decisions made by generally well-meaning but myopic actors who found themselves thrust into positions of limited authority in February and March 2011”. He adds, in July 2013, that sudden success came to a sudden end. The Morsi presidency is without doubt one of the most colossal failures in the Brotherhood’s history. The failure of Islamist movements, especially of the Muslim Brotherhood, was a result of their own miscalculations. It is also a result of reaching too quickly for political power or the failure to build coalitions with others that they had vowed they knew enough to avoid. Above all, the Muslim Brotherhood and its regime led by Morsi alienated potential allies, ignored rising discontent, focused more on consolidating their rule than on using the tools that they did have, and used a rhetoric that was tone-deaf at best and threatening at worst (Brown 2013: 58).

During the chaotic and dramatic thirty months in the political history of Egypt between 11 February 2011—when Mubarak was forced to resign—and 3 July 2013—when the military de-posed and detained his elected successor Morsi—with both men being targets of widespread popular demonstrations as well as military action—the Egyptian society was driven farther apart. In the words of Nathan J Brown, “the people in Egypt were called to the polls over and over—for a total of five national elections or referenda, some with multiple rounds—but every vote led to differences being redefined and magnified rather than managed or resolved” (Brown 2013: 46-47).

A new balance of power is emerging in Egypt among the army, which is keen to preserve its security and economic interests; the Islamists (mainly the Muslim Brotherhood); and the more liberal-secular youth. This is a precarious balance, with each group pursuing disparate aims and cultivating different modes of operation. Furthermore, the country is stuck in a struggle between two schools of thoughts: those preferring a religious state (*dawla diniyya*) and those aspiring to a civil state (*dawla madaniyya*). The economy may prove one of the greatest political challenges. High unemployment could provide a fertile breeding ground for political violence. Sectarian conflicts between Muslims and Coptic Orthodox Christians have come out in the open due to the increasing instability, and among Muslims the Sunni-Shia animosity is heating up. Since democracy means majority rule, respecting the rights of these minorities will be an important test for the new Egyptian government (Rozsa 2012: 5-6).

Thus, the situation in Egypt was totally dramatic from its beginning of the Arab Spring itself. The Muslim Brotherhood and new Salafi parties dominated in the first parliamentary elections and the constitutional assembly that followed. But, things went to an unpredicted and unexpected direction. Because the later events proved that all such processes of transition were just temporary or like a short term political arrangements. A big chapter in the episode of political transition was about to come. Finally, when the D’ day came in July 2013, it replaced a democratically elected president with a candidate with military background and backing. Thus, the country witnessed ouster within a period of two years. Now the question is whether the new regime under a military ruler (even though elected) will be able to lead the country in a right direction as the people desired and hoped, for the same they gathered on the streets during the revolution, or whether Egypt will slide back to a Mubarak-like era of suppression of political and civil liberties

Libya in transition: from revolution to civil war

Libya is an Arab county located in between Tunisia and Egypt in North Africa, and of course, it also suddenly became a part of the Arab Spring which has swept

throughout the Arab World since 2011. When the intensity and nature of the entire protest are compared and analyzed, especially its violent nature, Libya was the most badly and bitterly affected country, and still its faith is uncertain. Thus, among other countries affected by the revolution in North Africa, Libya is a special case. It is not because of the violent nature of its revolution, but rather that the country is blessed with natural resources like oil and natural gas. In addition to this, it was in Libya alone that the NATO and external actors directly intervened to topple the ruler. For all these reasons the political developments and difficulties still going on in Libya attract international attention.

In Libya, the mass uprisings began on 15 February 2011 in the city of Benghazi, against human right violations, political corruption and last but not least, to end the despotic rule of Muammar Gaddafi. The National Transitional Council, a coalition body of anti-Gaddafi forces, formed to consolidate resistance efforts nation-wide in a peaceful way. But the nature of the protest suddenly took its violent form when Gaddafi tried to crackdown the protest against him and his regime and ultimately it ended with Gaddafi's brutal death on 20 October 2011 and the NTC's declaration of victory. Then the revolution lost its control and the country is still going through a dangerous civil war that has already claimed thousands of lives and many more displaced (Bhardwaj 2012: 81). So while analyzing the origin, evolution and contemporary scenario of the Arab Spring, it could be seen that it started off peacefully in Tunisia, swept through the streets of Egypt killing some people and reached its most dangerous and disastrous phase when it reached Libya. The country is now struggling and suffering with uncontrolled and unending civil war.

If we analyze the Libyan protests and subsequent civil war, it becomes clear that it is very much rooted in territorial divisions, dividing Libya into rebel-controlled and loyalist-controlled cities. Actually, the uprisings in Libya began and mainly became strong in Benghazi, and NTC control was extended to incorporate other tribal and rural areas. This exploitation of tribal versus Tripoli allowed the NTC to mobilize forces nationwide. While pre-existing tribal divisions were only temporarily subdued under the NTC's anti-Gaddafi platform, the ability to conglomerate different sects based on shared anti-elite grievance strongly expanded the NTC's territorial scope (Bhardwaj 2012: 82).

There are various reasons behind the violence and civil war which erupted shortly after the protests began. First and foremost factor is that many parts of Libyan society—and not only the state apparatus and its security forces—were armed even before the outbreak of Arab Spring. Light weapons like handguns and assault rifles had been widespread among most of the people, and even heavy weapons and rocket launchers were available. These light and heavy weapons had already been used in conflicts within society during the period of Gaddafi,

particularly in conflicts between competing tribes. Above all, Gaddafi's government had even provided weapons to some of the tribal groups to secure their loyalty, to use them against other tribes, and also to use some tribes as border guards. One of the most important and interesting facts is that the Libyan Army was kept relatively small (perhaps 50,000 soldiers) probably to reduce the danger of a military *coup* (Hippler 2013: 19-20).

In a different analysis based on some other realities, the situation in Libya was further complicated not because of a struggle for state power or its transition, but at the same time there is a struggle over the redistribution of power between tribes, regions and cities. This reality of challenges in Libya has roots in the nature of state-institutions and a bureaucracy which existed during the period of Gaddafi. These were not generally well integrated or coordinated governments or formal institutions, or, in other words, the state pillar of governance or the policies and institutions of the state were effectively dominated by informal governance system with his relatives, non-state network of people. Through this, Gaddafi made sure that the statehood remained fragmented, weak and insecure, in order to thwart any potential power alternative or threat to his rule (Hippler 2013: 20-21). According to Ibrahim Dabbashi, Libya's deputy United Nations ambassador, now the country has two rival parliaments in different parts of the country, and two different governments, after the outgoing parliament reconvened and appointed a new prime minister. The divisions are rooted in rivalries between Islamists and non-Islamists, as well as in powerful tribal and regional allegiances (Lennihan 2014). These facts are enough to understand how and why it is difficult to handle the political instability and civil war in Libya.

Conclusion

North African countries like Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were the cradle and crux of Arab Spring. Since the end of 2010, when the Arab countries in West Asia and North Africa started a new wave of popular uprisings, their citizens have unseated a number of dictators, especially from countries like Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, who were in power for long years. People from these countries protested primarily for political freedom, social justice and economic prosperity. But ironically, even after the revolution the major challenges faced by these three countries are political instability, social imbalance and economic crisis. Generally, all the three countries faced some common problems which worked as the main factors which led to the mass demonstrations and subsequent political transformation. The most important problems faced by the people from these countries were both political and social and economical: the lack of political representation and corrupted regime, imbalances, inequalities and injustices, and persistently high unemployment especially among

educated youth and uneven regional development, respectively. But the most important fact is that the people of the region failed to achieve their goal despite their success in toppling the rulers and throwing out regimes. In other words, it was a partially successful revolution or in other words a partially failed one.

Now the North African region faces a kind of political uncertainty by the ramifications of the political transition in the North African region. But, it is not easy to eliminate all the social, political and economic systems and institutions they created within short time. So the question is: how long will it take to achieve the dreams of the majority people in the region. The undisputed outcome of the mass demonstrations throughout the Arab World is the needs and hopes of Arab people united irrespective of boundary.

Of all countries affected by, or experienced the Arab Spring in the region, each shows varieties of outcomes even when there are common effects. Tunisia has been transformed into a comparatively peaceful and stable political situation, Egypt witnessed the sudden rise and fall of Muslim Brotherhood in power and later came under the control of military ruler (through election) and most unfortunately Libya is undergoing an unpredictable civil war and political uncertainty. One of the important implications of the Arab spring is the awakening of various Islamist movements. In Tunisia, the Ennahda received mass support and introduced a new form of political Islam. On the other hand Muslim Brotherhood became the ruling party in Egypt for the first time in its history, but unfortunately it failed to exist there, and Libya is still struggling with various militant groups. The Arab Spring has had given a kind of hope to millions of people across the region rather than just a political change. But the events and developments after the Arab Spring show that such a dream is only a distant possibility.

In Tunisia, the victory of Ennahda party is mainly due to its strong opposition to the previous regime led by Ben Ali and its opposition parties failed to achieve such a reputation. However, the major challenges faced by Tunisia are the restructuring of its economy, reforming of its justice system and more importantly, a stable political system. The events happened so far in Egypt, especially after the Arab Spring, indicate that a new balance of power is emerging there among the army, which is keen to preserve its security and economic interests, the Islamists (mainly the Muslim Brotherhood), and the more liberal-secular youth. This is a precarious balance, with each group pursuing disparate aims and cultivating different modes of operation. Furthermore, the country is stuck in a struggle between two schools of thoughts: those preferring a religious state (*dawla diniyya*) and those aspiring to a civil state (*dawla madaniyya*).

The events since the eruption of the Arab Spring in the streets of Tunisia to its ongoing consequence in the form of civil war in Libya after some dramatic

political situation in Egypt have shown that it is not a united phenomenon with any planned agenda for post-regime change or transformation in the region. While the developments in Tunisia and Egypt are widely considered as comparatively peaceful due to limited violence, Libya's destiny has been the worst since the country has become the land of civil war political instability.

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Genealogy of the Idea of 'Pakistan'

MATHEW JOSEPH C.

Pakistan as a country came into being on 14 August 1947 through the partition of British India. However, as a term and idea, strictly speaking, Pakistan dates back to 1933.¹ To some scholars it even goes back to the reform movement initiated by the great Muslim reformer Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in the 19th century. The Islamists in Pakistan would further extend it till the advent of Islam in India through the Arabs in Sind in the 8th century.

In 1933, a group of Muslim students at Cambridge University under the leadership of Choudhary Rehmat Ali through a pamphlet titled "Now or Never: Are We to live or Perish for Ever?" came out with the term Pakistan for the first time (Allana 1969: 103-110).² In that pamphlet they demanded the creation of a self governing federal Muslim state which comprises the following areas: Punjab, the North West Frontier Province (Afghan regions), Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan. They coined the term Pakistan for this imagined Muslim state keeping in mind that the above mentioned Muslim majority areas could naturally form parts of the proposed Muslim state. This carefully created word was given the meaning as 'the land of the pure' later. Over a period of time in discourse on Muslim nationalism Pakistan is mentioned as the land of the pure. In this pamphlet, Chaudhary Rahhmat Ali argued that the Hindus and Muslims are separate people in many ways though they share the same geographic space and it would be impossible to have peaceful co-existence between these two religious communities. The seventh paragraph of the above mentioned pamphlet clearly illustrates this point as follows:

In the five Northern Provinces of India, out of a total population of about forty millions, we, the Muslims, constitute about thirty millions. Our religion and culture, our history and tradition, our social code and economic system, our laws of inheritance, succession and marriage are fundamentally different from those of most peoples living in the rest of India. The ideals which move our people to make the highest sacrifices are essentially different from those which inspire the Hindus

to do the same. These differences are not confined to broad, basic principles. Far from it, they extend to the minutest details of our lives. We do not inter-dine; we do not inter-marry. Our national customs and calendars, even our diet and dress are different (Ibid).

These words clearly show that the difference between Hindus and Muslims were articulated by Chaudhary Rahmat Ali much before Muhammad Ali Jinnah. In fact one can find many similarities between Chaudhary Rahmat Ali's arguments for Pakistan in the formulations of Jinnah. In 1944, in a conversation with a British journalist, Jinnah stated the following:

You must remember that Islam is not merely a religious doctrine but a realistic and practical code of conduct. I am thinking in terms of life, of everything important in life. I am thinking in terms of our history, our heroes, our art, our architecture, our music, our laws, our jurisprudence.... In all these things our outlook is not only fundamentally different but often radically antagonistic to the Hindus. We are different beings. There is nothing in life which links us together. Our names, our clothes, our foods – they are all different; our economic life, our educational ideas, our treatment of women, our attitude to animals...we challenge each other at every point of the compass (Cited in Burki 2004: 54).

A comparison of both these utterances of Chaudhary Rahmat Ali and Jinnah will give an idea of how the Muslim mind thought about their future in the context of decolonization. However, the tendency among historians is to project that the achievement of Pakistan is the victory of one person i.e. Jinnah. The similarity in the statements of both Rahmat Ali and Jinnah separated by a gap of 11 years also suggest that the idea of a separate state for the Muslims in British India has a history of its own.

The failure of the 1857 uprising and the resultant repression of the Muslim masses by the British created a unique historical condition which later paved the way for one of the important reform movements among the Muslims. This reform movement was led by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), who represented the dilemma of the Indian Muslim mind at that time. This was not peculiar to India. The Muslim masses in the colonial regions from North Africa to South East Asia faced this dilemma. The reform movement initiated by Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935) in Egypt was of the same kind (Esposito 1998: 63-67).

Syed Ahmad Khan and his multi-dimensional activities formed what we now describe as the 'Aligarh Movement' of which the nucleus was the establishment of Muhammedan Anglo-Oriental College in 1875, which later became Aligarh Muslim University in 1920.³ The 'Aligarh Movement' along with Muslim aristocratic elite under the leadership of the Nawab of Dacca played a major role in the formation of

the All India Muslim League (AIML) in 1906. Though the Muslim League was born at Dacca, it mainly articulated the grievances and fears of the Muslim aristocracy of the erstwhile United Province of the British India.

The Muslim League officially talked about a separate state for Muslims in British India only in 1930, when Muhammad Iqbal, the then President of the Muslim League in his presidential address to the annual conference held at Allahabad demanded for a separate Muslim state in the North-West of British India (Mir 2006: 138). He articulated it in the following way:

I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India (Ibid).

When Chaudhary Rahmat Ali demanded for Pakistan he was very clear about the difference in his and that of Iqbal's conception. According to Chaudhary Rahmat Ali, his idea of Pakistan is differed from that of Iqbal's North-West Indian Muslim state in two ways: Iqbal talked about a single centralized state and he avoided Kashmir as part of that state though his ancestors came from there.⁴ It is interesting to note that in both these conceptions of a Muslim state in India, another significant Muslim majority province of Bengal was avoided.

The imagination of both Muhammad Iqbal and Chaudhary Rahmat Ali remained largely as ideas for the creation a Muslim state in India. Their imaginations were mainly the opinion of elites of the Muslim majority areas. Incidentally both hailed from Punjab – a Muslim majority area in the North-West of India.

It was Jinnah and the Muslim elite of the United Province who moved the idea of Pakistan beyond the calculations of the leaders of the Indian National Congress. The minority complex of the Muslim elite in the United Province and the fears of the Muslim *salariat* coincided with the interests of the Muslim landed classes in the Muslim majority areas. The Muslim elite in the North-West areas of British India was not with the Muslim League till the last phase of the colonial rule. They joined with the Muslim League due to the fear of the discourse of land reforms and other programmes initiated by the Indian National Congress.

The above mentioned reasons were not sufficient for the creation of Pakistan. The role played by the colonial administration in precipitating differences between the Congress and the Muslim League was also very important. The introduction of the religion based census in the late 19th century and the provision for separate electoral constituencies for Muslims as part of the Minto-Morley reforms in 1905 created the background for the minority feeling among the Muslim elite of the Muslim minority provinces (Pande 2011: 6). The *Shudhi* Movement and the

movement for separating Hindi from Urdu in the late 19th century also created suspicion among the Muslim elite in the United Province and its surroundings (Ibid: 5).

The Hindu symbols lavishly employed by the Indian National Congress under Mahatma Gandhi accentuated the Muslim fears. The consolidation of Hindu right wing through the formation of both the Hindu Mahasabha in 1914 and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in 1925 (Jafferelot 1993: 33) reinforced the Muslim fears. The Muslim fears were fanned by the colonial authorities when they started showing inclination to leave power with the leaders of the national movement in India. For the Muslim elite staying in a Hindu dominated India seems to be very difficult. The emerging bourgeoisie among the Muslims in India realized that they have to remain subservient to the dominant Hindu bourgeoisie in the context of a Hindu dominated India. This was not acceptable to them.

The Communist Party of India (CPI) at that time supported the demand for Pakistan due to this reason. The CPI towards the last phase of the freedom struggle raised the question of oppressed nationalities in India and argued for their self-determination.⁵ The Muslim question, according to the CPI leaders like Dr. G. Adhikari, was nothing but a struggle for national self-determination. Due to this the CPI initially supported the demand for Pakistan though later it changed its position. The support extended by the CPI was a great thing as far as the Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan were concerned.

The Islamists led by the *Jamaat-i-Islami* had vehemently opposed to the idea of Pakistan on the basis of two reasons: Muslim nationalism which is the driving force of the movement for Pakistan is theologically not sanctioned and the people who are leading the Pakistan Movement are not true Muslims (Nasr 1994). The founder leader and ideologue of the *Jamaat-i-Islami*, Maulana Abul Ala Maududi even though staunchly opposed the Movement for Pakistan, when it got realized left for Pakistan. He then advanced the idea that it is easy to Islamize a Muslim majority country than a Muslim minority country. Since then the one point agenda of the Islamists in Pakistan is Islamization of the country by all possible means.

The Islamists had to construct a new discourse regarding the idea of Pakistan to legitimize their position and activities in Pakistan. They now explain 'Pakistan' was in the making since the advent of the Arabs to the shores of Sind in the eighth century (Ahmad 1998: 79). For them the period before the Arab advent to Sind became really problematic. They do not want to own the rich pre-Islamic past of the territorial space of Pakistan. In their conception, the establishment of the Sultanate in Delhi, the Mughal Empire and even the movement for Pakistan in the last century were pre-determined by the God almighty. This linear narration of the evolution of Pakistan allows them to carry forward their activities in the direction of Islamization of the country.

From the above discussion one can arrive at a conclusion that a single narrative of the evolution of the idea of Pakistan is not sufficient to include the plethora of view points regarding the origin of that. The dominant narrative on the origin of the idea of Pakistan tries to link the reform movement of Syed Ahmad Khan with All India Muslim League, Muhammad Iqbal, Choudhary Rahmat Ali and Jinnah. This narrative has many inherent tensions due the subtle difference between the positions of these people. And moreover, one can not agree the argument that the Pakistan movement was the direct outcome of the reform movement initiated by Syed Ahmad Khan. His reform movement had many dimensions and one can not fully say that there is a straight connection between that and the Pakistan movement. This is a clear case of the phenomenon of backward projection of history. Both the supporters and opponents of Muslim nationalism indulge in the backward projection of history. The Islamists are prisoners of this problem as well as the selective inclusion of the past. The genealogy of the idea of Pakistan is not a straight line. It is full of ruptures and disjuncture. Any attempt to create a straight/liner narrative in this regard will submerge the diversity people and processes in the formation of the idea of Pakistan and the consequent achievement of its statehood.

Notes

1. For the first time the term *Pakistan* was coined by Choudhary Rehmat Ali and his friends in 1933 at Cambridge University.
2. For the text of the Pamphlet see G. Allana, *Pakistan Movement Historical Documents* Karachi: Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, nd [1969] 103-110, cited in http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/ooislamlinks/txt_rahmatali_1933.html.
3. See Hamza Alavi, "Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology," available at <http://our-world.compuserve.com/homepages/sangat/pakistan.htm>.
4. See the 13th paragraph of the pamphlet 'Now or Never: Are We to Live or Perish for Ever?', available at http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/ooislamlinks/txt_rahmatali_1933.html.
5. The famous thesis on national question put forth by G. Adhikari in support of the struggles of the oppressed nationalities in India was the Communist line on nationalities at that point.

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Colonial Integration and Post-Colonial Disintegration: A Study of Assam in Conflicts

BITASTA DAS

Assam, one of the north eastern states of India, is a vibrant terrain to understand the implications of colonial organization of boundaries and its subsequent adoption by the Indian nation. This terrain has hardly been studied in detail in this light. The consistent tensions within the state, so also in the other states in the north-eastern region, insinuate the need to contextualize the discord and understand it more historically—one that elucidates the relationship between integration of territories and social assimilation of its people. Assam exemplifies an instance of ambiguity between the two. The host of dissidence fishes out the urgency to probe into the backdrop in which the state had been incorporated in the Indian nation. The outcome of which reveals a daunting picture of the consequences of accepting colonial parameters in the process of independent nation building.

Assam under British rule

Assam is surrounded by Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, and Manipur in the east; Mizoram and Meghalaya in the south; and Tripura in the west. Assam shares international boundaries with Bhutan in the northwest and with Bangladesh in the southwest. Except for a narrow corridor running through the foothills of the Himalayas connecting the state with West Bengal, Assam is almost entirely isolated from rest of India. Assam was called Pragiyotispura in the ancient times. It is believed that in the Indian epic *Mahabharata* as well as in some principal Puranas, like the *Kalika Purana*, the region that is mentioned as Pragiyotispura is (undivided) Assam. In other inscriptional and scriptural ancient documents the province has been referred to as Lauhitya and Kamrupa. Some scholars believe that the present name 'Assam' is the Anglicised rendering of the word 'Asom', borrowed from Sanskrit and meant peerless or unparalleled (for details see Das 2014:17-20). According to another strand of beliefs, this word originates and describes the might

of the Ahom dynasty which ruled Assam for six hundred years in the medieval period. Assam became a part of British India in 1826 with the signing of the Treaty of Yandaboo with the Burmese. The Burmese had invaded Assam in the early 19th century. The British defeated them in three subsequent battles between 1824 to 1826 and were finally able to establish its domination in Assam, Manipur, Rakhine (Arakan) and Taninthayi (Tenasserim). The unit Assam consisted of a much larger area than it is today. Present day Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland were under British Assam.

Scholars have pointed out that the British government had not invested in historical or cultural continuity in drawing the borders of the administrative unit of Assam after its annexation in 1826 (Baruah 1999; Kar 2009; Misra 2000). Instead, the goal was to attain an inexpensive and effective way of administration. Assam was considered to be a land frontier of Bengal and was placed under Bengal Presidency till 1874. In 1874 it was made into a Chief Commissioner's province; yet the idea that Assam was but an appendage to Bengal remained and the Bengali dominated district of Sylhet was added to this new province from East Bengal. The continuous treatment of Assam as a land frontier of Bengal and colonial policy makers encouraging immigration from densely populated Bengal to scarcely populated Assam (Baruah 1999) set in motion a tussle among the people of Assam and the Bengali speakers. The economic transformation that took place due to introduction of 'modern' industrial agencies- tea plantation, petroleum drilling, setting up of the railways etc initiated an economic force that gave further impetus to immigration. The migration that took place during the British period created competition for new political and economic opportunities, thrown open for the public. The people of Assam became highly apprehensive about the 'educated Hindu Bengalis,' the 'hardworking Bengali Muslims' and 'the enterprising Marwaris' (Srikant 2000:4-5). Also during 1826-1874 when Assam was made a new division of Bengal Presidency, the lower rung of this order of administration almost wholly comprised of Bengali Hindus imported mainly from Sylhet. It was then that the colonial rulers established Bengali as the official language of Assam.¹ The Assamese intellectuals vociferously demanded that Assamese should be reinstated as the official language in the administration and education of Assam. This was finally conceded in 1873. The boundary altercation between the states of Bengal and Assam continued till the independence. But the most significant corollary of this experiment with the boundary has been, it created the binary category of indigenous and immigrants that till the contemporary times has vexed the socio-political health of Assam.

Another category divide that equally overwhelms Assam is the tribal/non-tribal binary. This divide further leads to the sprint to establish autochthony and thus the rightful claim over the land. As Baruah had alluded, institution of

the line system and segregation of the hills detached the historic interaction and assimilation among the hill dwellers and the plain dwellers. Baruah refers to colonial author Leo Rose and says that the British policy was generally based upon the general principle that all independent hill principalities should be deprived of whatever plain areas they controlled at the foot of the hills. This further accentuates the British idea of overlapping natural boundary with the administrative boundary. The British considered the foothills the natural boundary between 'India' and the hill principalities and that all plains areas belonged by right to whoever ruled northern India. This was also to impede the plain dwellers from providing revenue to the hill rulers, thus making these rulers weak and dependent on the British. Sanjib Baruah (1999) in his book *India against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality* analyses this as follows:

The logic of British attitudes towards the hills of Assam was the same; however, they considered most of the peoples living in these hills as "primitive tribes." Even in the narrow confines of the hills, there was therefore no pretension of recognizing their independence. They were kept in reservation—like territories called "backward" or "excluded" tracts. The experience of colonial rule in these areas, to say the least, was profoundly different from that of the regular administered parts of British India (Baruah 1999:28).

A number of discrete laws governed the administration of these marked areas: the Scheduled Districts Act of 1874 and the Frontier Tract Regulation Act of 1880 enabled the government to exclude these areas from regulations like the operation of the codes of civil and criminal procedures, the rules on property registration and transfer etc. The chieftains and customary authorities were restored with the power to try petty civil and criminal cases without the intervention of the modern legal system. The law that concretized the colonial idea of administration was the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation of 1873 which empowered the colonial government to prescribe an 'Inner Line'. The line was drawn along the foothills. The peoples living beyond the line were supposedly 'left to manage their own affairs with only such interference from the part of the frontier officers in their political capacity as may be considered advisable with the view to establishing a personal influence for good among the chiefs and the tribes' (Baruah 1999: 28-29).

Before the British had annexed Assam, upper Assam was ruled by the Ahom dynasty and the Koch kingdom ruled the western Assam and parts of present North Bengal. Among other dynasties, the Chutiyas ruled north-eastern Assam and parts of present Arunachal Pradesh and the Kacharis ruled from Dikhow River to central and southern Assam. With expansion of Ahom kingdom, by 1520 the Chutiya areas were annexed and since 1536 Kacharis remained only in Cachar and North Cachar more as an Ahom ally than a competing force. Despite numerous invasions, mostly

by the Muslim rulers, no western power could successfully conquer Assam. When Assam became part of British India, only the area that was ruled by the Ahom was called Assam. But as the British expanded their domain the entire area that was under the Chief Commissionership including the Surma valley, hill districts and Manipur came to be known as Assam (Baruah 1999: 28).

As mentioned before, the two key aspects of the colonial political geography of Assam, which profoundly affected its cultural dynamics were: the segregation of plain and the hills, and the notion that Assam is an extension of Bengal. Together with these Assam's late nineteenth century economic revolution (what economic historian Amalendu Guha calls 'a big push without takeoff') brought an inflow of people to Assam from various parts of the country to meet the newly emerged demand of labourers. Colonial officials actively encouraged immigration into Assam. Labourers in a large scale were brought in from present day Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh to work in the gardens and fields. This economic transformation brought in a sea change in the demography of Assam. Together with this, the radical policies introduced were a sharp break from the past. At one hand the interconnection between the people of the hills and of the plains or valleys were curtailed and at the same time a new category of people, the 'immigrants', was created. This juncture hence saw the emergence of the binary opposite categories: the indigenous and the immigrants; the plain people and the hill people; the tribal and the non-tribal and the hill tribal and the plain tribal. These categories have existed and dominate the social, political and economic life of Assam till date.

Bernard Cohn's *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge* (1996) brings to the fore that colonialism was much more than a temporary overpowering of the home administration. But its appendages grow much deeper and the power it acquires is through the knowledge it generates about the colonized people. Knowledge about the people provides the colonial machineries the power to rule them. Nicholas B. Dirks in the opening remarks of Cohn's book describes the cultural project of control by the British in India as follows:

Colonial conquest was not just the result of the power of superior arms, military organization, political power, or economic wealth—as important as these things were.... Colonialism was itself a cultural project of control. Colonial knowledge both enabled conquest and was produced by it; in certain important ways, knowledge was what colonialism was all about. Cultural forms in societies newly classified as “traditional” were reconstructed and transformed by and through this knowledge, which created new categories and oppositions between colonizers and colonized, Europeans and Asian, modern and traditional, West and East. Ruling India through delineation and reconstitution of systematic grammars for vernacular languages,

representing India through the mastery and display of archaeological memories and religious texts, Britain set in motion transformations every bit as powerful as the better-known consequences of military and economic imperialism (Cohn 1996: ix).

Cohn's work deals extensively with the 'Investigative modality' of the British policy makers. 'Investigative modalities,' in Cohn's usage, were made official through the production of usable knowledge in the form of published reports, statistical returns, official proceedings, administrative histories, and legal codes. All of these Cohn treats as 'texts' that can be deconstructed in relation to the way in which they were written as part of specific colonial projects. In his outline, Cohn lists the following types of modalities: historiography, observation and travel, survey, enumeration, museology, and surveillance.

The colonial state in India in the late nineteenth century began to introduce some of the major instruments of control of populations and resources tried out in Europe, with modification for colonial adaptation. Simultaneously the colonial administrations inducted cognitive and statistical projects of modern rule. The three crucial ways in which the people of Assam were made the subjects of British colonial knowledge were through: Census and Cartography, Anthropological Surveys and Administrative Policies and Acts. These processes that were initiated in the colonial period consolidated into creating a knowledge base which formed the basis of control and power of the British over the colonized masses. This created a discourse turning the masses into subjects of the knowledge and objectified their identity. This objectification led to the emergence of a discourse—the ethnic discourse which then permeated the socio-political milieu of the region making it difficult for any other form of identity to emerge.

Assam in Independent India

The discourse of ethnicity that emerged from the macro facet of British colonial discourse had a pervading impact in the way that it colours the imagination about the region even on the present day. The popular, official and intellectual approaches towards the north eastern part of India are loaded with the British colonial perspective about the land and its people. A cursory look at the writings- official, academic or popular of the post-colonial times exudes the continuation of the approach. The unchanged fragmentary understanding about the region underlined by ethnic diversity has provided the precursor for the assertions in the region to take ethnic route. Writers belonging from and outside Assam, writing about the region, echo similar ideas about the ethnic divisions. Publications from Assam's premier literary organization *Assam Sahitya Sabha* has been buttressing the similar ideologue about the people and the land that Assam is a region crisscrossed by ethnic diversity.

The Negritos came to India in the pre-historic time and moved as far as Assam. There are a few specimens of the aboriginal Negritos amongst the Nagas of Assam and the races and tribes living in the jungles of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and South India. The Negritos discovered the use of bows and arrows. They collected their food and did not produce food themselves. A mode of tree worship practised by them was subsequently adopted by other races. Secondly, the Austric race also collected food like the Negritos but the latter discovered the method of cultivation by means of pointed instruments like hoes and spades. Another of the racial characteristics was their rearing of the elephants. The Khasi-Jaintias belong to the Mongoloid race though they speak Austric languages. The influence of the culture and civilization of the Austrians, described as *Nisada* and *savara* in the old Sanskrit literature is widespread in the hills and plains of Assam. Matriarchal system of society and the worship of Mother Goddess Kamakhya are also two of the contribution of the Austric race. Afterwards, the Mongoloid who conquered the Austrians may have adopted many of their customs and manners. The speakers of the Santali, Savara, Munda, Khasi and Kol languages are the surviving specimens of the Austrians. Banikanta Kakati and Birinchi Kumar Barua have discussed about the contribution of the Austric race.

The Mongoloid or Kirata race came to Assam at different times and through different routes. The Mongoloids were for sometime the ruling race in Assam, Manipur and Tripura and North Bengal and were the patrons of learning, religion, language, literature and culture of ancient Assam. The ruling princes of the Barman, Salastamba Pal, Ahom, Kachari, Chutia, Koch, Khasi, Jaintia, Manipuri, Tripuri and Nepalis are the crowning glory of the Kirata race. The various contributions of the Kiratas in the field of dance and song language, literature and culture are well marked. W.C. Smith has observed thirteen characteristics of the Kirata race. Of these, chewing of betel-nuts, freedom in marriage, use of the handloom and cultivation in the old methods will always point out to a cultural fusion of the Kirata under-current in the development of the Assamese race. The Ahom rule and the Ahom contribution to Assamese culture are also some of the manifold contributions of the Mongoloid or the Kirata race. We have already discussed their influences on the Assamese language.

The cultural remains discovered in Harappa and Mohenjodaro amply prove the existence of a high order of civilization and culture owned by the Dravidians, a Mediterranean race that lived in India in the pre-Aryan times. It may not be possible to present a descriptive chronological account of the Dravidian habitation in Assam. But the Dravidian influences are clearly observable in many of its place-names. Scholars are of opinion that the institution of Siva worship is a Dravidian contribution. On the other hand the Kiratas were the adherents of the Saiva sect. it

may so, that the Kiratas took over their Siva worship from the Dravidian. Worship of the Goddess Marai is also a religious institution of the Aryan Hindu fold. No wonder, the Dravidian worship of the serpent Goddess, Manchama, may have cast some influence in the *Marai* worship. Banikanta Kakati found some influence of the Dravidian religion of worship on the vaishnava cult of Assam.

The Western race known as Bracycephls has come to India from the region of the Dinaric Alps, Armenia etc, prior to the Nordic Aryans and lost themselves in the Aryan society at a subsequent age. The Nordic Aryans, who lived in the Indus valley had come to Assam sufficiently early and lived in her fertile land. Their language came in contact with speakers of the Tibeto-Chinese (Tibeto-Burman and Tai-Ahom) and the Austric language there and developing under such environment, they evolved the Assamese language of the Pragjyotish-Kamrupi people which is Prakrit-Apabhramsa of the Aryan Sanskrit. Assam's language, literature, culture and national consciousness are growing under the leadership of the Aryan Hindus. Yet, the active co-operation of the Austric, Kirata and Dravidian races cannot be lost sight of (Shastri and Bhattacharya 1958).

Writers outside Assam propound the same views about the ethnic difference among the people:

The racial history of this easternmost portion of India is extremely complicated. A great number of races have invaded it from all directions. And there was an almost continuous migration of the tribes and people within the area which has not yet come to an end in present times. The first inhabitants appear to have been Negrito race. The occurrence of curly or even kinky hair, in connection with a short stature and strikingly Papuan profile suggests, in the opinion of J.H. Hutton, the survival of some submerged Negrito strain. Next came the Khasi and Sytengs (or Pnars), the Wars, Bhois or Lyngnams, tribes that now inhabit the recently formed state of Meghalaya. They numbered 314,161 in 1961. Linguistically these tribes belong to the Austro-Asiatic or Mon-Khmer group. The origin can thus be traced back to southern China. Through their language they form a link between the Munda tribes further west and the tribes in Indo-China. They also resemble them culturally; they have, for instance, stone monuments to their dead ancestors like the Mundas and Hos of Chota Nagpur and, on the other side, like the tribes of Indonesia. The Khasi and Sytengs are remarkable for their strong muscular development, especially of the leg. They are rather fair, often of ruddy complexion, but have flat round faces and epicanthic fold. Linguistically, the aborigines of Nicobar Islands (13,993 in 1961), near the coast of Burma also belong to the Mon Khmer group. Needless to say, there are also tribes of Mon Khmer linguistic group in Burma, such as the Palaungs and the Was in upper Burma, as also the Mons or Talaings of Pegu. The Khasi and Sytengs are now separated from their tribal cousins in north-eastern central India through the Aryan speaking Hindu castes, mostly Bengalis but also people from northern India., who entered Assam in the beginning of the Christian era from the west and ever since

continued to infiltrate and take possession of the fertile lowlands and river valleys. They brought Hindu culture and social organization (Fuchs 1973).

Colonial ethnic discourse that emerged as a micro discourse from the macro discourse of British colonialism has gone about colouring the imagination of the region. The colonial period was a moment when all aspects of the life of the colonized masses were objectified turning them into subjects of the colonial power – knowledge combine. We argue that it is the continuation of the discursive colonial knowledge in the form of narrative, interpersonal relationship and political and governmental policies that incite the particular trajectory of the assertions. Wide range of tensions have been clamped together under the rubric of ethnic problem and focuses on Assam in order to answer the question as to why the ethnic politics. It sustains: a) Assam is a region distinguished by its ethnic diversity and b) the demands raised by various quarters at different points of time had a single commonality amongst them—all rallied upon their ethnic exclusivity while placing their demands. The argument is that it has been an unwavering practice to imagine Assam, so also the entire north eastern India, as a region crisscrossed by wide ranging ethnic diversity, which are different not only from rest of the country but also amongst themselves.

All the narrative about the region—governmental, sociological, political, anthropological, as also the literary and romantic description about the region stresses on the variance amongst the people. In such an academic and social context where categorization and their consequent politicization are regarded as self explanatory, it is pertinent to ask as to what constitutes these categories. Study of the existing literature on Assam reveals that there is a gap between the presumption that the ethnic diversity as pre-given and ethnicity as the most important tool of political mobilization in Assam. It is working on in this gap the paper seeks to understand critically the underpinnings that empower ethnicity as the defining feature of socio-cultural and political expression in Assam. We recognize that the diversity amongst the population is figuratively placed in order to express lack of homogeneity and naturalize hostility. It is our contention that the predicament lies not in the presence of diversity but in its discursive narration and representation. We maintain that the ethnic discourse in its present form had emerged during the colonial period as enabled by documenting and cataloguing of the population. In other words, the discursively constructed identity of the colonial times is a quandary that surfaces time and again in the post colonial situations.

Post-Colonial Disintegration: Re-Visiting the ULFA Stir

Assam in the recent years, so also the entire north eastern region, has seen the rise of socio-cultural groups which most of the times have corresponding political

counterparts. But what has been most overwhelming within the social life of Assam is the rapid emergence of insurgent organization. The South Asia Terrorism Portal marks as many as thirty five identity specific extremist groups active in Assam. The insolent eruption and existence of identity based groups manifests the socio-political processes that Assam has been undergoing. The most significant among them probably has been the ULFA—the United Liberation Front of Assam. ULFA vehemently invaded the socio-political scene of Assam in the early 1980s. It is today a banned extremist outfit. The ULFA, as it is commonly known, has been successful in acclaiming itself to be the most intimidating form of military nationalism that continues to spur terror even to the present day. The idea it adheres to is that Assam as a territory, people and culture has never been a part of India. Furthermore, the colonial pattern of exploitation of the resources of Assam without paying dues to the development and progress of the region and its people nullifies the Indian State's authority to govern over the region. In its official website ULFA states that, 'To liberate Assam, (a land of 78,529 square K.M.), through armed national liberation struggle from the clutches of the illegal occupation of India and to establish a sovereign independent Assam'² as its objective and goal. In the same website ULFA validates its choice for violence as a measure to counter the 'colonial occupation' of the Indian state in Assam.

Assam was never a part of India at any point of time in history. The fact is independent Assam has been occupied by India, and deploying occupation forces they are oppressing our peoples and persecuting them. ULFA itself and all freedom fighters of Assam are neither planning nor conspiring to break up India! We are not conducting any armed operation inside India. Freedom fighters of Assam are only trying to overthrow Indian colonial occupation from Assam. (<http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Congress/7434/ulfa.htm>)

The ULFA since its inception has been responsible for innumerable deaths, bomb blasts, kidnapping and extortion. The key issues that it earmarked were control over the natural resources of the region, the rate and pattern of development, demographic changes and the question of preserving the traditional culture from being contaminated. It is believed that ULFA does not possess the lethality that other insurgent groups in India do. Its armed activities are, in general, more in the nature of selective assassinations and acts of sabotage against State-owned economic assets like the oil pipeline, rather than aimless terror tactics. The Indian intelligence agency reports reveal that it possesses thrice the number of weapons suitable for guerrilla activities. However, the importance of ULFA lies not on its terror activities but in the all pervasive effect on the society of Assam. The support and sympathy it received from the masses during the initial phase of its inception has been phenomenal. In those years, criticizing the ULFA was an assured means

of earning unpopularity in Assam. For M.S. Prabhakara (1990), 'ULFA is a state of mind in Assam.'

ULFA's demand for secession was fostered by its ability to repudiate Assam's political and cultural history with that of India. By articulating a distinctive disjuncture, it elucidated that ULFA was not a mindless terrorist organization but was an outcome of the gross malevolence that was being meted out to the people of Assam since a very long time. Its goal was to achieve the apostle of dignity of a people- 'freedom'. An important terrain that can be marked that has enabled the ULFA to formulate its idea of separate peoplehood for the people of Assam is the general feeling of exclusion that Assam. The attitude of the Indian 'mainlanders' conform to the view that Assam together with the other north eastern states as a geographical and cultural entity is distant from mainland India. India, in this paper, is not just an 'ideological apparatus of state power;' neither is it nostalgia for a national culture. It is more Bhabha's sense of a nation that is narrated and Assam is at least one of its ambivalent margins.³

ULFA responded to the larger sentiment of marginalization and exclusion within the nation by delineating an idea of separate peoplehood; exclusive of the nation. The idea of a people within a nation, adorning the triple attributes of—people as a sovereign entity, which exercises power by means of democratic procedure; the people as citizens of a state, holding equal rights before the law; and the people as an ethnic community undifferentiated by distinctions of honour and prestige, but held together by common political destiny and shared cultural features, was fragmented by ULFA's formulation of identity. For the ULFA, the people of Assam were not sovereign or citizen subjects of India but were complete nationals belonging to a territory unfairly occupied by the Indian forces.⁴ SS.Khaplang, self-proclaimed president of the Government of the People's Republic of Nagaland (GPRN) which is a confederation of ultras of north eastern India, and has sheltered in eastern Nagaland several rebel outfits during Indian and Bhutanese military operations against them, in an interview published in *The Week* restated that the north eastern India was never a part India. He claims that groups like the ULFA, United National Liberation Front, People's Liberation Army and few other organizations from the region have been working in close collaboration; 'If we work together, it would be easier to achieve independence, sovereignty and recognition in international fora. A united front would benefit us, in terms of sharing information and operational coordination.'⁵

While on one hand the 'mainland' has substantially undermined the social integration of the north eastern region in the national folds which was already struggling with underdevelopment and economic wretchedness, ULFA overturned the sense of marginalization to articulate an identity of the people of Assam that completely negates correlation with the 'mainlanders.'

ULFA: United Liberation Front of Assam: A Political Analysis (1994) by Samir Kumar Das is one of the rare academic monographs on the ULFA. The author here covers the political presence of the outfit during the period from 1979 to 1991. This work proposes that ULFA has brought to the fore a serious political critique which its adversaries (the Indian State) will find it difficult to ignore or erase it away by force. In his analysis of the ULFA, he locates the problem in the seamless and totalizing nationalism that Indian State subscribes to. According to him this form of nationalism is 'inappropriate' in two complementary ways; on the one hand, this is what enables the state to ascend to the much-vaunted hegemonic position. On the other hand and almost in the same vein, the hegemonic state, in the name of ostensibly advancing universality and rationality, actually helps in disorienting the smaller cultural identity- groups and ethnic minorities. The interlocutor that we have marked earlier 'The Narrative of Exclusion', based on which the ULFA has formulated its demand for secession, sides with Das' views that it is the State's inability or withdrawal to constitute itself into a nation that has insulated various sections of the population, to assert themselves for dismembering from the State. However, Das' perception that ULFA is an 'ethnic' uprising needs further analysis. Does ULFA represent the angst of a group that can be 'ethnically' distinguished, if yes then whose cause does it represent? If no then what are the contextual inadequacies that hinders it from being called to represent any other political objective? The inability of the State to find a solution of the critiques posed by the ULFA and the ULFA's vehement rejection to find a solution within the Constitution of India and demand for complete sovereignty to retract its grievances of exploitation, exclusion and territorial subjugation forefronts the need to understand the distance of the region from the Indian nation. The instance of ULFA foregrounds that the organization emerged and accrued large mass support by capitalizing on the popular feeling of neglect and exclusion amidst the inhabitants of the region. ULFA in framing of the 'national' identity of the people of north east India adopted the available discursive perception about their identity and origin. The idea that the people of the region are distinct and different from rest of the country has been the rallying point of the ULFA for the demand of secession. This idea stems from the fact that the region is perceived as 'exotic' and the people 'alien' even till the present times by the rest of the country.

The paper reckons that the British colonial administration's practice of drawing and redrawing boundaries and the alongside narrative about the inhabitants established an identity discourse of the people. This discourse permeates into every aspect of life. The ideas propounded by this colonial discourse still colours the imagination about this region. Time and again groups seeking redress to a variety of issues garner on this already existing discordant discourse. Unless the outlook of the post-colonial nation towards the region is substituted by a sense of

belongingness and inclusion, it will be difficult to contain identity based assertions banking upon this feeling of exclusion.

Notes

1. This was done, as the Assamese saw it, under the influence of the Bengali petty officials of the East India Company who argued that Assamese was not an independent language but only a dialect of Bengali.
2. <http://web.archive.org/web/20091027113256/http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Congress/7434/ulfa.htm>
3. The marginal or 'minority' is not the space of a celebratory, or Utopian, self marginalization. It is a much more substantial intervention into those justifications of modernity — progress, homogeneity, cultural organicism, the deep nation, the long past — that rationalize the authoritarian, 'normalizing' tendencies within cultures in the name of the national interest or the ethnic prerogative. In this sense, then, the ambivalent, antagonistic perspective of nation as narration will establish the cultural boundaries of the nation so that they may be acknowledged as 'containing' thresholds of meaning that must be crossed, erased, and translated in the process of cultural production (Bhabha 1990:4).
4. Assam was unfortunately annexed to India because of the trickery and conspiracy of the Congress, the British sponsored association of the "Indian elite." The exploitation, oppression and the looting of wealth remain undeterred today as before. The only difference is that, previously the colonial exploitation was manipulated by the British imperialists directly but now Assam comes under direct Indian exploitation and on the other hand under the indirect international monopolistic entrepreneurs as an alliance of Indian big business. The identity of the indigenous peoples of Assam is now threatened because of these double layered exploitations. On the other hand, the Indian government has arranged to form the powerless Assam government with the help of some puppets under the Indian constitution having a governor directly appointed by New Delhi. Elimination of all the basic rights with the help of the direct governing system of Delhi, the Indian government has made their way clear. At the time of power transfer to the loyal Congress leadership by the British, the Congress leadership took the chair of ruler without changing anything of the Indian constitution which was drafted on the model of the British system. The Indian constitution has failed to open any route to the development of other nation-tribes providing self-determination right to them and to eradicate its eccentric character which is amended 85 times up till now. However, it makes a new social base loyal to the colonial India crushing the demographic structure of the nation-tribes. It is the manifestation of the previous social base established by the British. This servant or sycophant class is helping the caretaker government of India stationed at Gauhati making a favorable environment for administration and exploitation by the slogans like "united India", "India is our mainstream", "we are all Indians" who are totally unsympathetic to the rights, honour and the identity of the indigenous peoples of Assam. This puppet class is creating the environment of hatred, differences and conflicts among the indigenous nation-tribes. This class is more brutal than the British in suppressing the legitimate struggle of the indigenous peoples, the democratic non-violent movement organized with the hope of emancipation of the peoples of Assam who have been pauperised and deprived of their basic rights in their own Motherland. Therefore, the indigenous peoples of Assam under 51 years of Indian colonial rule have been tasting the bitter experiences of brutal repression upon unarmed movement. Now Assam and the whole of so-called North-Eastern region is subjected to the colonial

system of Indian ruling class through their repressive administration behind the veil of fake democracy. They are conducting their cultural, economic and political repression under the cover of Indian constitution. With these rules and systems, the Indian government has closed all the doors to the solution of "Nation Problem of Assam" establishing the right of self-determination of the indigenous peoples of Assam. That means - 1. the right of national self-determination is not recognized in the Indian constitution. 2. the Indian constitution and the other state systems are founded on the idea of "one nation state" other than the character of "Multi-nation State". 3. It does not empower any nation to adopt any eco-social and cultural planing or program in its own motherland. 4. It does not entrust any power to the national peoples to determine the demarcation of the area where a specific nation lives unaccompanied. 5. The constitution provides for a powerful centralised system (clause 352, 353, 365, 360) to crush any movement organized by the national peoples to solve their problem by imposing "emergency" without any consent of the people's representatives. 6. In Delhi, the President of India and the Governor in Assam is supreme in power; the people's power is neglected. 7. In Assam, they are enforcing different laws and acts, those are discriminatory comparing with the rest of India. (IMDT Act, AFSPA 1958 Assam, Manipur etc.). In addition, in 1962 the Government of India all handed over Assam to China. On 21-11-1962 all the Indian soldiers left Assam. Jawaharlal Nehru said farewell to Assam (by his famous speech "My heart goes out to the people of Assam"). Even, at that time the "conductive pipes" of Burma Oil Company were lifted away to West Bengali, Bihari and Marwari peoples from Assam. Moreover, the indigenous peoples of Assam stayed here contemplating their destiny. After that, is there any legal right of India to rule Assam? However, shamelessly India again established their colonial rule after China declared unilateral ceasefire without encroaching on Assam. India once again re-established its colonial rule in Assam and resumed their colonial economic exploitation of Assam. And till today, the act of looting, and plundering of wealth of Assam is going on. (<http://www.oocities.org/capitolhill/Congress/7434/history.htm>).

5. http://week.manoramaonline.com/Cgi-bin/MMOnline.dll/portal/ep/theWeekContent.do?contentId=11534616&programId=1073755753&tabId=13&BV_ID=@@&categoryId=-176321

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