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Brexit: A Workers' Response to Oligarchs, Bankers, Flunkies and Scabs

James Petras

The European Union is controlled by an oligarchy, which dictates socio-economic and political decisions according to the interests of bankers and multinational business. The central organs of power, the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have systematically imposed austerity programs that have degraded working conditions, welfare programs, and wages and salaries. EU policies demanding the free immigration of non-unionized workers to compete with native workers have undermined wage and workplace protections, union membership and class solidarity. EU financial policies have enhanced the power of finance capital and eroded public ownership of strategic economic sectors.

The European Union has imposed fiscal policies set by non-elected oligarchs over and against the will and interests of the democratic electorate. As a result of EU dictates, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland have suffered double-digit unemployment rates, as well as massive reductions of pensions, health and educational budgets. A huge transfer of wealth and concentration of decision-making has occurred in Europe. Rule by EU fiat is the epitome of oligarchical rule. Despite the EU's reactionary structure and policies, it is supported by Conservatives, Liberals, Social Democrats, Greens and numerous Leftist academics, who back elite interests in exchange for marginal economic rewards.

Arguments for the EU and their Critics

The pro-EU power elite base their arguments on concrete socio-economic interests, thinly disguised by fraudulent ideological claims. The ideological arguments backing the EU follow several lines of deception. They claim that 'countries' benefit because of large-scale transfers of EU payments. They omit mentioning that the EU elite secures the privatization and denationalization of strategic industries, banks, mass media and other lucrative national assets. They

further omit to mention that the EU elite gains control of domestic markets and low wage labour.

The EU argues that it provides 'free movements' of capital, technology and labour - omitting the fact that the flows and returns of capital exclusively benefit the powerful imperial centres to the detriment of less advanced countries and that technology is controlled and designed by the dominant elites which also monopolize the profits. Furthermore, the 'free flow of labour' prejudices skilled productive sectors in less developed countries while reducing salaries, wages and benefits among skilled workers in the imperial centres.

The EU: A Self-Elected Dictatorship of Empire Builders

'Integration into the EU' is not a union of democratic participants; the decision-making structure is tightly controlled by non-elected elites who pursue policies that maximize profits, by relocating enterprises in low tax, low wage, non-unionized regions. European integration is an integral part of 'globalization', which is a euphemism for the unimpeded acquisition of wealth, assets and financial resources by the top 1%, shared, in part, with their supporters among the top 25%. The EU promotes the concentration of capital through the merger and acquisition of multi-national firms which bankrupt local and national, medium and small scale industries.

Political and Academic Satraps of the EU Elites

The European Union's oligarchy has organized a small army of highly paid politicians, functionaries, advisers, experts and researchers who support the European Union in a manner not unlike NGO workers in the developing world - answerable only to their 'foreign' paymasters. Numerous Social Democrats draw stipends, travel expenses, lucrative fees and salaries as members of commissions and serve on impotent 'legislative' assemblies. Academics advise, consent —and draw duplicate salaries from membership in the EU bureaucracy. Journalists and academics 'front' for the EU oligarchy by playing a leading propaganda role. For example, they have been busy slandering British pro-democracy, anti-EU voters by (1) calling for a new referendum and (2) questioning the right of the working class electorate to vote on issues like the recent EU referendum.

The leading financial press adopts a demagogic pose accusing the pro-democracy voters of being 'racists', 'nativists,' or worse, for 'opposing Eastern European immigration'. In fact, the vast majority of workers do not oppose immigrants in general, but especially those who have taken once-unionized jobs at wages far below the going rates for established workers, on terms dictated by employers and with no ties or commitment to the community and society. For decades British workers accepted immigrant labour from Ireland because they

joined unions at wage rates negotiated by union leaders, won by long workers struggle and voted with the majority of English workers. Under the EU, Britain was flooded with Eastern European workers who acted as 'scabs' displacing skilled British workers who were told it was 'progress'. This acted to destroy the prospects of their own children entering a stable, skilled labour market.

The financial press's lurid descriptions of the British workers' anti-EU 'racism' against Polish immigrant labor ignores the long history of Warsaw's virulent hostility to immigrants—namely the refugees from the wars in the Middle East. The Polish government and population exhibit the most furious opposition to sheltering the thousands of Middle East and African war refugees, while claiming that they are not 'Christians' or might pose cultural or even terrorist threats against the ethnically pure Polish population.

Some of the British workers' hostility toward Polish workers has a recognized historical basis. They have not forgotten that Polish strike breakers took the side of 'Iron Lady' Thatcher's militarized assault against unionized UK miners during the great coal strikes and even offered to export coal to aid the Conservative government in breaking the strike. As such, EU-Polish immigrant workers are not likely to integrate into the militant British working class culture.

The Polish regime's aggressive promotion of the economic sanctions against Russia has further undermined English jobs linked to that large and growing market. The financial press ignores the fact that Polish immigrants 'scab' on unionized British workers in the construction industry, undercutting long-established UK plumbers, electrical workers, carpenters and labourers - who have multiple generational ties to their communities and work. The EU elites use the importation of Polish workers to strengthen the reactionary labour policies of the employers

After the fall of Communism, Polish workers backed a succession of right-wing regimes in Warsaw, which privatized and denationalized industries and eroded their welfare system leading to their own impoverishment. Poles, instead of fighting against these neo-liberal regimes at home, headed for England and have been helping the British bosses ever since in their own anti-labour campaigns to reduce wages and decrease worker access to decent, affordable housing, public services, education and medical care.

The Eastern Europeans became the willing recruits of the EU reserve army of labour to raise profits for industrial and finance capital thus further concentrating wealth and power into the hands of the British oligarchs. To label British workers' antipathy to these EU policies over the free entry of cheap immigrant labour, as 'racist', is a blatant case of blaming workers for opposing naked capitalist profiteering. It is not hard to imagine how the Poles would react if skilled Syrian

electricians were taking their jobs! The pro-EU prostitute press claims that the pro-democracy voters are 'anti-globalization' and a threat to England's living standards and financial stability.

In fact, labour votes in favour of trade but against the relocation of English industry overseas. Labour votes for greater investment in the UK and greater regional diversity of productive, job-creating sectors, as opposed to the concentration of capital and wealth in the parasitic finance, insurance and real estate sectors concentrated in the City of London.

The EU-City of London-financial oligarchy have priced labour out of the housing market by promoting the massive construction of high-end luxury condos for 'their kind of immigrant', i.e. the millionaire and billionaire Chinese, Russian, Indian, Eastern European and US plutocrats who flock to London's famous tax-evasion and money-laundering expertise. The scribes of the EU-City oligarchy who claim that exit from the EU will lead to a cataclysmic breakdown are blatantly scaremongering. In fact, the stock and bond market, which declined for less than a week, rebounded sharply, as trade, production and demand were scarcely affected by the vote. The hysteria-peddlers among the financial press resounded . . . in the minds and pockets of the City of London speculators. They rightly feared that their own lucrative financial operations could relocate overseas.

Conclusion

If and when the EU - City end their oligarchical control over the British economy, workers will gain an opportunity to debate and elect freely their own representatives and have a say in their own government. Leaving the EU is just the first step. The next move will be to change the rules for immigrant labour to accord with the standards of wages and conditions set by UK trade union organizations.

The following steps would include subordinating the banks to the needs of industry, investment in public housing for workers and the development of local technology for domestic producers. The cleavage between productive labour and the EU parasites and their political hangers-on requires a new political leadership with a democratic foreign policy, which precludes overseas wars and imperial alliances. The break with the EU logically and persuasively argues for a break with NATO and an opening toward free trade with Russia, China and the new dynamic global markets. The end of the EU can help weaken the strategic partnership between the European and City of London oligarchs. No doubt, the latter will not go without a class war of unprecedented ferocity, involving financial lockouts, manufactured fiscal crises, street mobs and parliamentary coups at the top of their agenda.

Only if the democratic electoral majority becomes a cohesive and combative class movement, in and out of Parliament, can they convert the referendum from

a temporary electoral win to a stable basis for structural transformation. Only a democratic majority can implement a fair and equitable immigration policy that strengthens labour and welfare policies and which would be based on the traditional values of British trade unionism and not on some criteria parroted by the 'house servants' for the lords of the EU-London 'Downton Abbey.'

(c) James Petras

Finance Capital and the Nature of Capitalism in India Today

C.P. Chandrasekhar

A distinctive feature of the current phase of capitalism is the growing role of finance capital as an instrument to establish capitalist hegemony and facilitate the appropriation of surplus. In the developed countries this transition towards financial hegemony was the result of the inflationary crisis and stagnation that affected the OECD countries after the late 1960s. The contractionary fiscal and monetary policy response to inflation intensified the deceleration in real growth. This together with the low real interest rates on bank deposits adversely affected banking business and profits. These developments triggered a process of deregulation and liberalisation in the financial sector, ostensibly to allow banks the freedom to reduce losses and find new means to profit.

The deregulation led to an expansion and diversification of the financial sector. With the burgeoning of finance, involving the emergence of new markets and transformation of old ones, creation of new non-bank financial institutions, and the ‘manufacture’ of new financial products the financial sector was able to increase the volume of its surplus. Securitisation, by making credit assets tradable, allowing for the transfer of risk, and freeing the creators of credit of the underlying risk encouraged a massive expansion in the volume of credit provided. The required expansion of the universe of borrowers, who being driven to borrow, often became willing victims of the drive to transfer surpluses from their incomes directly to financial firms.

Available figures do point to galloping growth in the global operations of financial firms. One obvious form this has taken since the international lending boom of the late 1970s is the expansion of operations of international banks in less developed countries, especially the so-called “emerging markets”. At the time of the East Asian crisis (mid-1997), the international asset position of banks resident in 23 countries reporting to the Bank of International Settlements stood

at \$9.95 trillion, involving \$8.6 trillion in external assets after adjusting for local assets in international currencies. By June 2007, before the global financial crisis that precipitated the Great Recession, when 40 countries were reporting, this had risen to \$33.71 trillion, with external assets totalling \$29.98 trillion. This trend characterised countries that reported on both dates as well. For example, the international assets of UK-based banks had increased from \$1.5 trillion to \$6.1 trillion, and that of US banks from \$0.74 trillion to \$2.8 trillion.

One consequence of the post-1970s expansion of liquidity in the international financial system was the need on the part of international finance capital to find new avenues to lend and invest. Having to keep money moving to earn returns, and running out of options within the developed world, private international finance that had excluded most developing countries from its ambit because they were perceived to be too risky both economically and politically, chose to target some developing countries that were soon identified as emerging markets. Suddenly, flows of private financial capital to developing countries, which till then had access to foreign capital only in the form of limited flows of foreign direct investment and ‘aid’ from the bilateral and multilateral development aid network, became a possibility, with an implicit message that this was available on demand.

To exploit this option, developing countries needed to dilute controls that had been imposed on flows of foreign capital, especially foreign financial capital wanting to enter their equity, debt and insurance markets. With hindsight we know that almost all developing countries chose to exploit this option at different points of time starting in the 1970s in the Southern Cone countries of Latin America. The reasons differed across countries. To fathom the explanation for those differences, we need to turn to the dissimilar developmental strategies that were adopted by developing countries in the aftermath of the period that saw two World Wars, an agricultural depression, the Great Depression, and decolonisation. In some countries the wars and the movement against colonialism led to the institution of governments led by socialist forces that opted for development within the framework of central planning. But most countries, including India, came under governments that opted for a capitalist path of development, starting from a situation where their societies were characterised by substantial semi-feudal remnants.

Among those that opted for a capitalist path, most countries, on the basis of their experience with being predominantly agricultural producers and exporters of primary products, chose to adopt a strategy of import substituting industrialisation. Pursuing import-substituting industrialisation required the strengthening of indigenous industry, not just with protection, but by control and regulation that restricted the role of large and predatory foreign capital and disciplined domestic business to behave in ways that served national development. The degree to

which this was done varied across countries. For historical reasons, though the Indian State represented an alliance of the domestic bourgeoisie and landlords, the Indian government adopted a development strategy that involved substantial state intervention. This included, besides controls on cross-border flows of capital and domestic regulation of capacity creation, production and prices, wide public ownership and an emphasis on “planning” for successful economic development, along lines being pursued at that time in the Soviet Union.

Thus, even among underdeveloped countries launching on development after World War II, India was in many senses unique. In terms of choice of the mix in terms of emphasis on industrialisation based on the domestic market and that driven or facilitated by exports it was focused almost wholly on an internally oriented growth strategy. This did seem warranted for a number of reasons. At independence in 1947, India was a country that showed much promise as a potential candidate for successful industrial development. It already had considerable experience with factory production, with the first successful factory established within the country dated to 1854. In the event, after the Second World War, India was among the more industrialised of the underdeveloped countries, especially those that had just come out of colonial domination. This historical legacy did favour India when the development experiments of the post-War, decolonisation years began.

Further, despite the low level of its per capita income in India at that time, the sheer size of the country as defined by its geographical area and its population meant that it had a reasonably large sized market for manufactures. Moreover, the substantially unequal distribution of income ensured that there existed a significant number of people with income levels that implied a rather diversified demand for manufactures. Even though this section was proportionately small, the large size of the population made their numbers significant. These factors provided the foundation for a reasonably large and diversified domestic market.

However, growth based on the domestic or home market was not easy to realise and had been achieved in practice by very few countries since the Industrial Revolution. A prerequisite for sustained growth was the growth of the mass market for manufactures. This required land reform that broke down semi-feudal relations in the agricultural sector, so as to accelerate productivity and output growth by providing the actual cultivators—whether tenants or peasants—with the means and incentive to invest and by distributing more equally the benefits of that growth so that those benefits could translate into demand for manufactured goods that have a mass market that can support industrialisation.

Ensuring these prerequisites was an extremely difficult proposition, given the alliance between the capitalists and landlords. Not surprisingly, many countries, often after initial attempts at import substituting industrialisation, soon turned to

the export market as a potential alternative stimulus to growth. A few sought to do this on the basis of investment by indigenous capitalists (Republic of Korea and Taiwan) supported by developed country governments, while others attempted it by attracting foreign investment that would use local labour reserves and establish capacities aimed at production for the international market. Among these the only underdeveloped country of reasonable size among the delayed late-industrialisers that managed to achieve developed country status was South Korea. Some, like the newly industrialising countries of Southeast Asia in the 1980s and after, experienced rapid growth for significantly long periods and registered a rise in the share of manufacturing production and in per capita incomes. But those years of 'miracle growth' did not last beyond the 1990s and were unable to deliver a South Korea-type transition.

All countries that adopted export-led strategies, despite their different growth trajectories and degrees of success, remained dependent upon and subordinate to foreign capital. In the case of those that had experienced export success, this was partly because they were under pressure to open their financial borders as a quid pro quo for continued access to markets in the developed capitalist countries on which they were dependent. In others, dependence on foreign capital with control over international markets was needed for export success. As a result, in course of time those choosing export-oriented strategies had to open their international economic borders by diluting or dismantling capital controls to allow for inflows of foreign investors seeking new investment avenues in the Age of Finance.

Thus, development that strengthened the political independence gained by countries after World War II by ensuring independence from predatory foreign capital was only possible in countries that ensure successful growth based on the domestic market. So it was significant that at independence India saw the accession to power of a government that had the social sanction needed to formulate and implement a domestic market-oriented national development strategy. Its emergence out of a national movement against colonial rule gave it that sanction.

However, assessed merely in terms of rates of growth, the success of India's post-independence development strategy is partial at best. The initial dynamism, especially of industry, displayed during the decade and a half after 1951, gave way to a period of secular stagnation that stretched between 1965 and the late 1970s. The most obvious indicators of poor economic performance are the inadequate diversification of India's production structure away from agriculture to manufacturing, and the rather premature and rapid diversification into services that has occurred in recent decades. The share of manufacturing in GDP did rise from around 9 per cent in 1950-51 to 13 per cent in 1966-67. But it did not cross the 14 per cent mark for a little more than a decade after that, and touched 16.4 per

cent at its peak in 1996-97. The contribution of manufacturing to employment was even more dismal.

India's experience was in fact worse than that in other similarly placed developing countries. In 1960, industry contributed 37 per cent of GDP in Brazil, 45 per cent in China, 19 per cent in India, 19 per cent in Indonesia, around 25 per cent in South Korea, 19 per cent in Malaysia and 19 per cent in Thailand. By 1985, the figures were 45 per cent in Brazil, 43 per cent in China, 26 per cent in India, 36 per cent in Indonesia, 39 per cent in South Korea, 39 per cent in Malaysia, and 32 per cent in Thailand. Thus, the 1960 to 1985 period was one in which in most developing countries rapid diversification in favour of manufacturing was occurring, but India had not shown the same tendency. The long-term, slow growth and subsequent near-stagnation of the share of industry in GDP in India was more the exception than the rule among developing countries.

Overall, a number of features of India's post independence growth strategy structurally limited the potential of the system. To start with, despite talk of land reform, of providing "land-to-the-tiller" and of curbing the concentration of economic power, little was done to attack and redress rural asset and income inequality. And while the worst forms of monopolistic practices were curbed, asset concentration in the industrial sector was never really challenged. Rather, India's big business groups were able to use state intervention as a device to consolidate and expand their monopolistic positions. One consequence of the persistence of asset and income inequality was that there were definite limits to the expansion of the market for mass consumption goods in the country. The large mass of peasantry, faced with insecure conditions of tenure and often obtaining a small share in the outputs they produced, had neither the means nor the incentive to invest. The prospect of increasing productivity and incomes in rural India, which was home to the majority of its population, in order to stimulate domestic demand was therefore limited.

Under these circumstances, a continuous growth in state spending was essential for the growth of the market. In the event, the stimulus to growth during the early post-independence years came from the state itself. It provided domestic capitalists with a large once-for-all market for manufactures by widening and intensifying protection and displacing imported goods from the domestic market. It sought to expand that market through its current and capital expenditures and it supported the domestic capitalist class by investing in crucial infrastructural sectors. This strategy did pay dividends during the decade-and-a-half immediately following independence when rates of industrial growth were creditable by international standards and India built up a diversified industrial base, and the public sector expanded rapidly to provide crucial infrastructural services, industrial

raw materials and capital goods to sustain industrial growth even when the foreign exchange available to import these commodities was limited.

This growth was stalled because of the second of the contradictions characterising the process of development. The State within the post-independence economic policy regime had to simultaneously fulfil two different roles that were incompatible in the long-run. On the one hand it had to maintain growing expenditures, in particular investment expenditure, in order to keep the domestic market expanding. At the same time, however, the State was being exploited as an instrument for the “primary accumulation of capital”. Through tax avoidance and evasion, subsidies and transfers, and through State-contracts, private fortunes were being built up at the expense of the State exchequer. By the mid-1960s, not only was the once-for-all stimulus offered by import substitution exhausted, but the ability of the State to continue to provide the stimulus to growth was also undermined. In the event growth decelerated leading to the “secular stagnation” of the late-1960s and 1970s. Rather than reversing this by undertaking the absent structural and fiscal initiatives that were responsible for the secular stagnation, Indian big business and the State began to look for an opportunity to exit from this strategy and shift to one in which exports would provide the stimulus to growth.

The easy way to pursue that alternative was to imitate the East Asian, second tier industrialisers and attract foreign investment that used the country concerned as a location for production for the world market. But since such investment was dependent on the decisions made by foreign investors, a strategic adoption of export led development had to be supported also by measures to restructure the capacities of domestic agents and make them internationally competitive. This required substantial liberalisation of trade and foreign investment policies, that would immediately lead to an increase in imports, not least because potential exporters would choose to import the technology, capital goods, intermediates and components needed for export production. In practice, a policy of trade liberalisation was adopted on the grounds that the competition it would unleash would help restructure domestic economic activity, render firms and other economic agents in India internationally competitive, and put the country on an outward-oriented, export -led growth trajectory. Even if this does prove to be the “ultimate” result of such trade liberalisation (which it normally is not), this cannot be its immediate fall-out. Restructuring domestic capacity takes time as does the process of finding customers and building ‘goodwill’ in global markets.

On the other hand, post-liberalisation, the pent-up demand, especially of the rich, for imported goods that had thus far been curbed with protection would be immediately released. This would lead to a widening of the trade and current account deficit in the balance of payments of the liberalising economy, with foreign

exchange expenditures rising much faster than foreign exchange earnings. So access to foreign capital to finance that deficit is a prerequisite for “successful” liberalisation that is not aborted by a balance of payments crisis.

Thus, the transition to a liberalised, open economic regime could be stalled by the actual and potential balance of payments difficulties associated with that experiment. It was in this context that the access to foreign capital ensured by the rise to dominance of finance was seen as an opportunity. Ensuring access to foreign capital flows resulting from the accumulated liquidity in the international market required in the first instance relaxation of controls on capital inflows, including inflows of purely financial capital into debt and equity markets. But attracting such inflows also requires attracting the carriers of such capital, viz., large financial firms such as banks, institutional investors, pension funds and insurance companies. This required relaxation of the terms of entry into and operation in domestic markets of such firms. It also required changing the regulatory framework in keeping with international norms and guidelines, such as those formulated by the Basel Committee. A shift from the ‘structural regulation’ of the financial sector and financial institutions, to market mediated regulation was the result.

The transformation brought about by the new financial framework had many features. To start with, banks extended their activity beyond conventional commercial banking into merchant banking and insurance. Second, within banking, there was a gradual shift in focus from generating incomes from net interest margins (or the difference between deposit and lending rates) to obtaining them in the form of fees and commissions charged for various financial services. Third, related to this was a change in the focus of banking activity as well. While banks did provide credit and create assets that promised a stream of incomes into the future, they did not hold those assets till maturity any more, as they used in the past in the so-called “originate-and-hold” model. Rather they bundled them into pools, attached those bundles to particular securities eligible for the stream of incomes due from the underlying assets, and sold these securities for a fee to institutional investors and portfolio managers.

Banks transferred the risk for a fee, and those who bought into the risk looked to the returns they would earn in the long term. This was the “originate and distribute” model of banking. It meant that those who originated the credit assets tended to understate or discount the risks associated with them. Moreover, since many of the securities created on the basis of these credit assets were complex derivatives, the risk associated with them was difficult to assess. The role of assessing risk was given to private rating agencies, which were paid to grade these instruments according to their level of risk and monitor them regularly for changes in risk profile. Fourth, the ability of the banking system to “produce” credit assets or

financial products meant that the ultimate limit to credit was the state of liquidity in the system and the willingness of those with access to that liquidity to buy these assets off the banks. Within a structure of this kind periods of easy money and low interest rates increased the pressure to create credit assets and proliferate risk. Finally, financial liberalisation increased the number of layers in an increasingly universalised financial system, with the extent of regulation varying across the layers. Where regulation was light, as in the case of investment banks, hedge funds and private equity firms, financial companies could borrow huge amounts based on a small amount of own capital and undertake leveraged investments to create complex products that were often traded over the counter rather than through exchanges. Credit risk transfer neither meant that the risk disappeared nor that some segments were absolved from exposure to such risk.

These changes made the financial sector an important site for profit appropriation. There are a number of stylised facts that support that argument. The first is the sheer size of the financial sector and the growing importance of finance in the growth of national income. The second is evidence of financial over-development with the ratio of financial assets to GDP and of financial assets to real wealth rising sharply. And a third is the rising share of financial profits in total corporate profits. All these are indicators of an accelerated expansion of financial activity as the principal site for surplus appropriation.

There have been other significant consequences associated with the rise of finance. One is a change in the mode of appropriation of surplus by finance itself. In the past finance acquired a share of the surplus generated in the sphere of production of goods and services. Through investments in or loans provided to these activities, finance received a dividend, a capital gain when it exited from ownership and interest on credit provided, which after taking out of its costs determined its net profit. In fact, a lot of financial 'investment' was in equity that afforded it control or influence over corporations engaged in production and/or service provision. Dividend incomes rather than capital gains were the main source of return to financial interests that wanted to retain control of profitable real assets. Matters have changed in recent decades.

Further, an expansion in the volume of financial transactions allows for periods or episodes of asset price inflation, which when 'marked to market' (or valued at prevailing market prices) in their books seem to deliver profits and enhance wealth. Not being the result of the sharing or direct appropriation of surpluses generated in the sectors producing commodities and services, this profit and the wealth increase is, at one level, notional. But so long as financial assets are liquid in the sense that they can be easily encashed and the value of money is protected, this wealth amounts to purchasing power and a means of command over real resources.

A second consequence is a tendency for economic activity outside the financial sector to be shaped by finance. Which sectors turn out to be the sunrise sectors in the economy, which firms flourish and which survive and grow, which shut down or are merged or amalgamated with others, and which 'technologies' tend to get showcased are shaped, often unbeknownst to us, by finance. One illustration of this is the growing importance of 'start-ups' in India's 'new' capitalism. Certain firms experimenting with certain technologies are chosen as the target for financial bets. Few of these survive, even if they are extremely well funded with venture capital in their early years. The international experience shows that even those that survive and deliver huge returns to shareholders and generate fortunes for their promoters, like Netscape, AOL and Yahoo did, fade away, unlike a few others like Google and Apple, which survived and became leading firms. Many others of varying sizes merge or are the subject of takeover. But the gains made from the few successes are more than enough to wipe out the losses associated with the many failures.

A third consequence is our perception of technology itself has changed. Technology in the era prior to the Age of Finance was largely a combination of 'hardware' and 'software' that used a certain set of specified capital goods, intermediates and components to undertake a planned production routine to yield a product with a specific design, technical characteristics and use value within a defined organisational framework, like the factory. This allowed us to breakdown technology into segments such as materials technology, manufacturing technology, design technology, and managerial technology. The last was clearly far less of a technology than the others.

But technological change could involve improvements in any of these. A feature of technology in recent years is the growing importance of "software" elements and managerial technology in the spectrum. Today's 'technology' majors include the likes of Google (a search engine), Facebook (a social media platform) and Uber (an aggregator). This allows for both the widening of the scope of innovation and an increase in the pace of obsolescence of technologies, providing a constant source of 'new, new things' on which finance can place its bets.

Fourth, the period of the rise of finance has seen a substantial expansion of the service economy and the GDP generated by services. This is because of the specific way in which finance has moulded the use of information technology, allowing it to transform industries delivering products such as goods, media and music, and access to traditional services like commercial taxi services. One often noted feature of contemporary Indian capitalism, is that recent growth in national income has become overwhelmingly dominated by the services sector, and that too by activities that in themselves do not promise much for future growth increases. What needs

to be noted is that this is not the result of the observed diversification of national economic activity in the direction of services that occurs at relatively high levels of per capita income after a period of diversification away from agriculture to manufacturing.

Finally, the rise of finance changes the dynamics of capitalism itself. Some economies still remain exporters, others are the destination for imported profits from foreign investment, and yet others grow on the basis of internal stimuli, in which tax and debt financed public expenditure is replaced with debt financed private expenditure as the principal 'exogenous' stimulus to growth. One cause for this is that for a host of reasons, ranging from its fear that excess borrowing would spur Inflation that would erode the value of the assets or the command over real resources of those holding financial wealth to its desire to rein in States pursuing proactive fiscal policies based on borrowing, which legitimises the State and delegitimises the market to the detriment of finance, capital opposes debt financed spending by governments. As the presence and power of finance increases, therefore, fiscal conservatism becomes the norm and austerity a recurrent policy recommendation.

All of this suggests that the growing dependence on foreign finance capital has distorted India's growth. India's failure, visible from the mid-1960s, to make an expanding and technologically dynamic industrial sector an important, let alone the principal, driver of growth has only worsened in the age of finance. As per the new series on national accounts with 2011-12 as base, over the entire four-year period starting 2012-13, services of various kinds accounted for as much as 68.7 per cent of total GDP growth. Manufacturing provided for only around 18 per cent, slightly less than the service activities comprising trade, repair, hotels and restaurants. What is more startling is that some of the biggest contributions to GDP growth came from finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE - 30.9 per cent) and public administration and defence (12.5 per cent). Indeed, these two sectors together accounted for 43 per cent – or nearly half – of all estimated increases in economic activity in the past four financial years. Over 2015-16, this FIRE sector accounted for a huge 21.6 per cent of total GDP (or Gross Value Added at Basic Prices, as the new series describes it). This is problematic, because expansion in these sectors is not suggestive of a good foundation for future stable growth.

Accompanying this is the evidence from the demand side that indicates that the combination of financial liberalisation and the large financial inflows that followed did create a new regime of accumulation in India. The inflow of foreign capital had as its counterpart an increase in the overhang of liquidity in the domestic economy. Based on that overhang, a liberalised banking system has been creating new credit assets at a rapid rate. The ratio of bank credit outstanding to GDP, which had

remained at around 22 per cent for a decade starting 1989-90, began to rise after 1999-2000, doubled by 2005-06 and is currently well above 50 per cent. India has been witnessing a credit boom during its high growth years.

There were also significant changes in the sectoral distribution of credit. Overall there were two sets of sectors that gained in share. The first comprised of retail advances, covering housing loans, loans for automobile and consumer durable purchases, educational loans, and the like. The share of personal loans increased from slightly more than 9 per cent of total outstanding commercial bank credit at the end of March 1996 to close to a quarter of the total more recently. The second area of change was the distribution of credit going to industry, which at around 40 per cent of total bank credit outstanding was still substantial. The share of infrastructural lending in the total advances of scheduled commercial banks to the industrial sector rose sharply, from less than 2 per cent at the end of March 1998 to 16.4 per cent at the end of March 2004 and as much as 35 per cent at the end of March 2015. That is, even as the volume (though not share) of lending to industry in the total advances of the banking system has risen, the importance of lending to infrastructure within industry has increased hugely. Sectors like power, roads and ports, and telecommunications have been the most important beneficiaries. For commercial banks, which are known to prefer lending for short term purposes, this turn to lending to infrastructure was a high risk strategy.

These changes initially spurred growth because of the demand increases it financed. But soon it was clear that this trajectory was one that involved driving growth at the expense of financial stability, since many of these projects and loans were not viable and turned non-performing. According to the end-June 2016 edition of the Reserve Bank of India's (RBI's) biannual Financial Stability Report, gross non-performing assets (GNPAs) of the scheduled commercial banks (SCBs) rose sharply from 5.1 per cent of gross advances at the end of March 2015 and to 7.6 per cent at the end of March 2016. Thus, the problem is not just the volume of bad assets, but the rapid growth in such assets. According to answers to two questions (Nos. 1759 and 2526 of August 2016) in the upper house of the Indian parliament, while the total GNPAs of public sector banks stood at Rs. 4,768 billion at the end of March 2016, the non-performing assets that were reported by them in the second half of financial year 2015-16 alone amounted to Rs. 2,770 billion. Figures obtained by Reuters through a Right to Information application indicate that stressed assets on the books of the banks had risen from Rs. 8060 billion at the end of December 2015 to Rs. 9220 billion at the end of June 2016. That would suggest that the value of loans that could turn bad is still on the rise.

Even ignoring this trend, the rise in non-performing assets due to reclassification is not without implications for the health of India's predominantly

public banking system. Once assets are recorded as non-performing, banks need to write off loss assets. They must also provide for the implicit decline in the value of doubtful and sub-standard assets. That adversely affects the profitability of banks. Even though much less than the RBI mandated 70 per cent of NPAs have on average been provided for by Indian SCBs, the return on assets (RoA) and the return on equity (RoE) of the group fell between end-March 2015 and end-March 2016, from 0.8 to 0.4 per cent in the case of the former and from 9.3 to 4.8 per cent in the case of the latter. Underlying this profit squeeze was an 86 per cent year-on-year growth of risk provisions and a 27.3 per cent increase in write-offs, which together contributed to a 43 per cent fall in profits after tax. Given the uneven distribution of this hit across banks, 21 SCBs accounting for 37 per cent of the total assets of all SCBs recorded negative RoA values over financial year 2015-16.

The question that arises, therefore, is the manner in which the government, the RBI and the banks are aiming to address this problem. One option would be for the banks to treat the write-offs as merely “technical” and then try and recover as much of the value of these assets as possible, to strengthen their financial position. However, the experience here has been disappointing. Not only has total NPA reduction been flat between 2014-15 (Rs. 1,270 billion) and 2015-16 (Rs. 1,280 billion) when the sum of declared NPAs was rising, but much of this reduction has been the result of compromises or write-offs, which yield the bank little or nothing. NPA reduction is reported under three heads (actual recoveries, ‘upgradation’ or transformation of NPAs into paying assets, and compromises/write-offs). Write-offs involve a complete loss for the banks. According to Finance Ministry figures the share of write-offs in the NPA reduction of the public sector banks rose from an already high 41 per cent in 2014-15 to 46 per cent in 2015-16.

This is also a cause for concern since NPAs are often a reflection of wilful default. In the fourth round of what has become a periodic exercise, the All India Bank Employees Association (AIBEA), the “oldest and largest” trade union in the industry, has released a list of 5,610 wilful defaulters on debt they owe commercial banks. The official listing of suit-filed accounts of wilful defaulters disseminated through the Credit Information Bureau (India) Ltd, reports 6,081 cases involving loans totalling Rs. 59,518 crore as of March 31, 2016.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) defines a wilful defaulter as one who has diverted bank loans to activities other than the one for which they were originally taken, siphoned funds out with no corresponding assets of any kind to show in the books of the company or who has not repaid loans despite having adequate resources to meet commitments. Thus, the crucial issue here is not default per se, but default that is intentional, deliberate and calculated. This makes wilful default a criminal offence. A default that results from a wrong investment decision, sheer

mismanagement or unexpected changes in the business environment of a firm that does not have the liquidity to meet payments commitments would not fall in the “wilful” category.

Despite this restricted definition, wilful defaults are large. The total default in the 5,610 accounts revealed by the AIBEA adds up to Rs. 58,792 crore. This amounts to around 11 per cent of total non-performing assets in the banking system at the end of March 2016. As many as 4,738 of these accounts accounting for Rs. 47,351 crore of wilfully defaulted loans are with the public sector banks (including the State Bank of India group). In an answer to a Parliamentary question in the Lok Sabha in December 2015, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley reported that in the case of loans of Rs.25 lakh and above from public sector banks alone, the number of cases of wilful default had risen by 44 per cent from 4929 at the end of March 2013 to 7265 at the end of September 2015, and the sum involved by a huge 150 per cent from Rs. 25,804 crore to Rs. 64,335 crore. Clearly, the credit boom during the years after 2004 has been exploited by a set of unscrupulous borrowers, who could avoid scrutiny because of the relaxation in scrutiny that is associated with a post-liberalisation debt spiral.

What is noteworthy about the numbers released by the AIBEA is that the top 106 borrowers (1.9 per cent of the total) responsible for wilful default on loans equal to or exceeding Rs. 100 crore each, together accounted for Rs. 23,093 crore or close to two-fifths (39.3 per cent) of the total sum in default as per this list. Clearly, the NPAs in the books of banks and the manner in which they are being addressed points a new form of primitive accumulation in India in the Age of Finance.

All of this points to the almost moribund nature of the new capitalism being shaped in India because of increased dependence on foreign finance. In the 1950s, there was near unanimity that winning a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis foreign capital was a prerequisite for consolidating India’s political freedom. Today, many see recognition by foreign capital as a favoured investment destination as a measure of the country’s economic success. But turning moribund and losing sovereignty at the expense of the working people seems to be the real consequence of the accumulated presence of foreign (especially financial) capital in the country since liberalisation.

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'New Historicism' and International Relations Theory: Diaspora and Representation of Life-Worlds

K.M. Seethi

New Historicism (NH) emerged in the 1980s as an intellectual enterprise questioning/ subverting the established notions and categories in the disciplines of humanities and social sciences such as philosophy, history, art, literature, politics, anthropology etc. Many would argue that NH does not offer a single tradition or coalition of traditions, but rather it represents an intellectual trend which many would like to share and be comfortable within. Postmodernism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, feminism, cultural materialism etc. have many identifiable features to share with NH, notwithstanding differences and contradictions. Aram Veesser calls it a "phrase without an adequate referent" (Veesser 1989: x). He wrote that critics worried that NH might "incapacitate the scholarly armature of proof and evidence," even as "others on the left distrust the culturalism and textualism" that NH seeks to nourish. Veesser offers the following key assumptions of New Historicism:

1.that every expressive act is embedded in a network of material practices. 2. that every act of unmasking, critique, and opposition uses methods it condemns and risks falling prey to the practice it exposes. 3.that literary and non-literary 'texts' circulate inseparably. 4.that no discourse, imaginative or archival, gives access to unchanging truths nor expresses inalterable human nature. 5.finally, a critical method and a language adequate to describe culture under capitalism participate in the economy they describe" (Ibid: xi).

NH became prominent in the United States way back in the 1980s—basically as a challenge to 'New Criticism' and 'Yale School Deconstruction.' New Criticism represented a school of Anglo-American literary critical theory that asserted the intrinsic value of a work of art and focused attention on the individual work alone as an autonomous unit of meaning. It challenged the critical practice of bringing historical or biographical data to bear on the interpretation of a work. The basic strategy employed in the New Critical approach is close, analytic reading of 'text.'

Likewise, Yale School Deconstruction asserted that language refers only to itself rather than to an extra-textual reality. NH challenged all this and argued that an appropriate framework for interpreting literature (text) is to place it in its historical context. It is assumed that all cultural activities are equally important texts for historical analysis.

Louis Montrose (1990) argued that NH deals with the “textuality of history and the historicity of texts.” While “historicity of texts” refers to the “cultural specificity and social embedment of all modes of writing,” the rootedness of a text in the social-historical, political and cultural ambiance of its production, “textuality of history” refers to the fictionality and constructedness of history. Foucault (1992) himself explicates this, saying that old historians erase and even out all inconsistencies, contradictions and discontinuities of actual history and develop a coherent and consistent historical narrative, complying with the dominant ideology of the state. The notion of objective history is rejected here, because history is basically seen as a narrative, which, like language, is brought out in a context and is negotiated and governed by the social, economic and political interests of the dominant groups/institutions. This notion of NH is similar to Derrida’s (1981) analysis which underlines that reality is textualised, like Foucault’s (1992) conceptualisation of social structures as continually negotiated by dominant discursive practices. Thus, New Historicists seek to analyse the work through its historical context and to understand cultural and intellectual history through literature.

In the discipline of International Relations (IR), NH holds significance with the emergence of post-positivist interventions—challenging mainstream theories focussing on macro level realities. Here human life-world experiences seldom appear as a critical domain of investigation, though such sites are before us like in locations of diaspora. Scholars, by and large, tend to ignore the stark realities of migratory spaces in international relations, even as new discourses on ‘Diaspora’ capture myriad events and practices beyond nation and territories. While postcolonial and post-structural theories focus on questions of citizenship, rights, identity, marginality etc as sites of engagements, the mainstream IR scholars do not reckon the ontological trajectory of new social and cultural spaces. An attempt is made here to bridge the gap between ‘facts’ (realist artifact) and ‘fiction’ (cultural artifact) by deploying strategies of reading ‘texts’ of ‘fiction’ and context of ‘facts’ – as an interrelated/inter-con(textual) activity.

Plausibly, ‘text’ as a new Level of Analysis in IR would open up immense possibilities of situating critical questions of life-world (such as identity, marginalisation, discrimination, exploitation and alienation) in the context of understanding migratory spaces. The emergence of these theoretical constructs obviously provides a green pasture of a new IR studies. It assumes that there can

be no 'unbiased' or 'objective' study of IR and the reality of the past/present is always constructed from the accessible 'texts' we construe in line with particular historical concerns, and that all histories should be foregrounded, and non-literary texts produced from different orders of 'textuality' are part of the 'inter-texts' for discussions of history and IR. *Culture* here is inevitably *textual* and political and all cultural artifacts are equally the products of *discursive* practices. Thus the linkages between 'history' and 'text' are critical in that it never privileges *historicity* or *textuality* to the exclusion of either.

New Historicism and the Question of Representation

The issues raised by cultural artifacts are now reinterpreted in the light of Foucauldian discourses, practices and individual subjectivities. The writings of New Historicists like Stephen Greenblatt, Catherine Gallagher and Louis A. Montrose contributed to an understanding that the production, categorization and analysis of literary texts are determined by forces of history which, in turn, would shape the cultural work itself. They demonstrate how a text could be explored and exploded, and the hidden discourses lying buried within it brought to light. Here the New Historicists deploy the procedures of deconstruction and post-structuralism in the realm of literary texts. The political and cultural turn that this method gave to the interpretation of literature refuelled literary studies to reestablish a link with the political and social world that gave rise to it. In the process of problematizing the underlying link between literary discourse and other master narratives, New Historicism has made the relation between text and society its main concern. By exposing the strongly economic, political and social forces propelling a literary text, New Historicism has tried to challenge the deeply entrenched hegemony of new formalism, new critical thinking and historical positivism.

The social and historical conditions that paved the way for New Historicism have been discussed by many scholars in their essays and books. Foremost amongst them are by Stephen Greenblatt (1982; 1983; 1990a; 1990b), Catherine Gallagher (1985; 1989), John Bannigan (1998), Edward Pechter (1987), Brook Thomas (1991), Louis Adrian Montrose (1992). The way Greenblatt puts across four "enabling presumptions" of New Historicism is a source of locating 'text' and 'context.' First, literature has a historical base and literary works are not the products of a single consciousness but many social and cultural forces. In order to understand literature, one has to take recourse to both culture and society that gave rise to it in the first place. Secondly, literature is not a distinctive human activity hitherto believed, but another vision of history. This has obvious implications for both literary theory and the study of literary texts. Thirdly, since literature and human beings are both shaped by social and political forces, it is not possible to

talk of an intrinsic human nature that can transcend history. And since history is not a continuous series of events but ruptures, there is no link between one age and another or between men belonging to different ages. And lastly, caught in her/his own historicity, a historian cannot escape the social or ideological constraints of her/his own formation. And, therefore, she/he cannot fully understand the past objectively on its own terms (Greenblatt 1990).

These presumptions basically point out that New Historicism does not seek to retrieve the original meaning of a 'text' but locates the original context that gave rise to the 'text', which the 'text' represents within the boundaries of culture and sometimes beyond it. The New Historicists claim that since they see the texts as another artifact of the culture of a given age, they can go directly to the instruments that constructed the text unmasking their hegemony. And in claiming this, New Historicists advance two assumptions of post-structuralism: firstly, that a text can only be understood if we lay claims to the ideology of the age and not the intention of the writer; and secondly, the doctrine of textuality (that a literary work is another historical document or a 'text' rooted in the 'context') is the only means to understand the contextual meaning.

'Representation' and Resistance

It was Michel Foucault who provided a new turn to the question of representation. He did not see representation simply as the production of meaning within a given culture, but the production of knowledge itself. Foucault sought to analyse how human beings understood themselves culturally, how social knowledge was produced and how meanings were shared amongst people in different ages. During his investigation, he uncovered specific ways by which meaning was produced; and these ways were coded in specific statements and regulated discourse. A discourse dealt with the ways knowledge was produced, legitimated and perpetuated through the medium of language. Most of the things that happened in society and in the lives of people took place within the larger framework of discourse, according to Foucault. Language carries within itself a distinctive social character, which is more or less free from any intrinsic meaning that things might possess or people might ascribe in the act of speaking or writing. Discourses, representation and knowledge acquire the force of truth only within distinct historical context, and possess no logical continuity from one historical context to another (Foucault 1977; 1980; 1992).

The New Historicists like Gallagher (1989), Greenblatt (1990) and Montrose (1983; 1992) embrace Foucault's episteme, representation, discourse and discursive formations in order to relocate the literary text in its context or historical moment. They visualize literary works as cultural artifacts and agents of discourses/knowledge production. They see literature as mediating rather than

imitating human action; and in that sense literature shapes rather than reflects an age. A dialectical relationship begins to exist between history and literary texts as production and producer. New Historicists see history not as blind scholarship but a process, an ideology that completes itself upon the completion of a work of art. Historical events are now understood as stories of human agents and not as scientific narratives to represent reality. Ricoeur, Barthes, Gadamer, Arthur Danto, Habermas, Foucault and others revived interest in narrative techniques and the function of time. The postcolonial studies also bring into focus such questions of representation and resistance in a wide variety of contexts. Homi K. Bhabha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak have done considerable work on such themes.

In *Location of Culture*, Bhabha brings to light critical questions concerning those who live on the margins of different nations, in-between contrary homelands. For him, living at the border, at the edge, calls for a new 'art of the present.' This requires some sort of commitment to a contra-logic of the border, making it inevitable to rethink the dominant modes of representing history, identity and culture. For Bhabha, the border is the site where traditional modes of thinking are disturbed and disrupted by the possibility of 'crossing.' Here comes new, shifting complex forms of representation that deny conventional binary construction. So the argument has it that *imaginative* border crossings are as much a fall out of migration as *physical* crossings of borders. Bhabha thus opens up the possibility of such *imaginative crossings* against the received notions of identity and subjectivity which depend upon fixed, binary definitions such as native/foreigner, master/slave, inside/outside, citizen/stranger etc.

The role of literature is significant here. Bhabha would suggest that the literature related to "migrants, the colonized or political refugees" could deconstruct received ways of thinking about the world - thereby rediscovering the complexities of culture and identity that exist within. However, these complexities and differences are often displaced, making it difficult for representation. Calling this as 'incommensurable', Bhabha tells us that there exists something that cannot be properly explained or measured by the prevailing system of language. Cultural differences are often made out as unrepresented. According to Bhabha,

As literary creatures and political animals, we ought to concern ourselves with the understanding of human action and the social world as a moment when *something is beyond control, but it is not beyond accommodation*. This act of writing the world, of taking the measure of its dwelling, is magically caught in Morrison's description of her house of fiction – art as 'the fully realised presence of a hunting' of history. Read as an image that describes the relation of art to social reality, my translation of Morrison's phrase becomes a statement on the political responsibility of the critic. For the critic must attempt to fully realize, and take responsibility for, the unspoken, unrepresented pasts that haunt the historical present (Bhabha 1994: 12).

Bhabha writes that the task would be “to show how historical agency is transformed through the signifying process; how the historical event is represented in a discourse that is *somehow beyond control*. He says that this discourse conforms to what Hannah Arendt suggested that “the author of social action may be the initiator of its unique meaning, but as agent he or she cannot control its outcome. It is not simply what the house of fiction contains or ‘controls’ *as content*” (Ibid: 12-13). Bhabha further draws our attention to Elizabeth Fox-Genovese’s *Within the Plantation Household* which unfolds “forms of slave resistance” through “murder, self-mutilation and infanticide...the core psychological dynamic of all resistance.” Her view holds that, as Bhabha writes, “these forms captured the essence of the slave women’s self-definition.” We thus come across “how this tragic and intimate act of violence is performed in a struggle to push back the boundaries of the slave world” (Ibid: 16-17). The writings of Bhabha, Spivak and many others in the postcolonial tradition thus take us to a new possible domain of knowledge production that transcends the traditional mode of understanding. Nowhere else is this becoming increasingly relevant today than in the literature of/on migratory spaces (Diaspora).

NH has also come under criticism because it tends to have many identifiable connections to postmodernism. Terry Eagleton says: “It is a historiography appropriate for a postmodern age in which the very notions of historical truth, causality, pattern, purpose and directions were increasingly under fire” (Eagleton 2000:197). It is sceptical about the “assured historical truths” and “grand narratives.” NH, however, brought in new critical subjects for study in social sciences and humanities such as sexuality, gender, ecology, ethnic and postcolonial questions, marginality, etc. It challenged certain established notions about history as propounded by modern historiography. However, its rejection of macro-historical schemes led to criticisms as that of Eagleton who sees it as having led to a “conservative thought” because of its contempt for historical structures and long-term trends. Yet, he acknowledged that NH “has produced some critical commentary of rare boldness and brilliance, and challenged many an historiographical shibboleth...” (Ibid: 198).

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Re-imagining Nationalism: Ethnic and Religious Movements in Pakistan

Sudheep M. S.

National question has long been a persistent political question in Pakistan. Even after six decades since the state of Pakistan came into existence, it is a nation still in search of an identity. The identity crisis, both at micro and macro levels, caused the mushrooming of sub-national movements in Pakistan. The ethnic and sectarian conflicts are the common phenomena in Pakistan's politics during the last decades of the twentieth century. There are tensions at different stages between political identities which have never been resolved, though those in power have tended to look upon sub-national movements as a 'threat' to the nation and 'subversive' of national unity (Alavi 1989: 1527).

The ethnic and sectarian movements in Pakistan emerged mainly in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. A number of factors have contributed to the emergence of these identity groups throughout the country. The unequal distribution of power between the various ethnic communities, poor economic conditions, rising poverty, lack of stable democracy, the state-sponsored Islamisation process etc. generated a good deal of dissatisfaction among the people (Ahmed 1996: 3051). Furthermore, the changing political atmosphere of international arena such as the political changes in Iran, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the advent of the neoliberal world order led by the US all affected the political structure of Pakistan (Zaidi 2002: 4539- 40).

Globalisation has, undoubtedly, thrown open new challenges all over the world, consequent upon the revolution in technology, capital markets and communications. All this caused a massive retribalisation of the world, particularly in the Global South. Ethnic, religious and sectarian conflicts are the common phenomena during this period. The revivalist movements within this broad framework caused to rethink the identity among the people. All this resulted in the identity conflicts between regional, cultural and religious groups (Waseem 2002: 4536-537). Pakistan is one such country which has been witnessing one of the most

serious ethnic and sectarian conflicts in its history. This raises new challenges to its nationalism and nation-building process (Ahmed 1996: 3090).

In the eyes of the articulate leadership of sub-national groups, the Pakistan nation has been appropriated by Punjabis who dominated the ruling bureaucracy and the military that have effectively been in power since its inception. In partnership, they might say, until the mid-1970s Mohajirs were relatively well represented in the Punjabi dominated state apparatus. Members of the underprivileged regions have tended to see themselves as subject people who have not been given their rightful place in the nation. In their eyes, with a subtle inflection of meaning, the 'nation' is transmuted into 'country.' They exist within its boundaries and are subject to its laws and institutions. But the concept of 'country' is not evocative like that of the 'nation.' It does not draw upon deeply embedded sense of identification, nor does it have the same emotive and legitimising charge and give quite the same sense of belonging and commitment as that of the nation. The people of Pakistan have not yet fused into a single community. The story of the Bengal movement, culminating in the liberation of Bangladesh is a manifest example of this (Alavi 1989: 1529).

Secession of Bangladesh

The secession of Bangladesh in 1971 was an example of how the question of national identity of Pakistan created new contradictions within the state. Of all the provinces which constituted Pakistan, it was Bengal which gave the most solid support to Mohammed Ali Jinnah in his struggle for the establishment of a separate Muslim state in the sub-continent (Chowdhary 1972: 242). While religion played a dominant role for the creation of Pakistan in 1947, it was a uniting factor of the people in a Hindu majority India for the demand for a separate state for Muslims. But, within a short period of time after independence, the state of Pakistan was divided into two. Here religion did not play any role in the disintegration of Pakistan, but it thoroughly failed to accommodate the people on a common platform. Language played an important role in the rise of Bengali sub-national movement within Pakistan. Furthermore, the political, economic, cultural and sociological factors highly influenced the rise of Bengali sub-nationalism in Pakistan (Bhuiyan 1982: 77-78).

Soon after the formation of a separate state for Muslims in the Indian subcontinent, the Bengalis were treated as second class citizens within Pakistan. They were underrepresented in all machineries of the government. The Bengali representation in the army and civil bureaucracy was very low compared with the West Pakistan. Although they were the majority group in Pakistan, they suffered deep-rooted fear and domination from the minority group of West Pakistan. In a democracy, the majority should not have any fear of domination, nor should

they have to ask for safeguards, such as regional autonomy, reservation of places in the civil services and the army and guarantees that the economic development of their region would not be neglected nor their culture threatened. But, for two decades after independence, the majority Bengali group did feel obliged. To seek those guarantees, and when they were not granted, Bengali sub-nationalism began to gather momentum, until ultimately, it became a national movement for the creation of a separate state (Choudhury 1972: 243)

The core of Pakistan as a nation was defined by religion. But the moment the state became a reality, 'internal colonialism' began to prevail in the East Pakistan within the hands of the West Pakistan (Oldenburg 1985: 715). Religion was not a factor, but other identity tools played a crucial role in mobilising the people of both wings of Pakistan, such as language, region, culture etc. In the 1950s and 1960s, it is argued that the 'colonial exploitation' of East Pakistan by West Pakistan gave rise to a nationalist movement in Bengal that inevitably led to Bengali secession (Ibid.: 716). The 'internal colonialism' was manifest in the unequal exchange via foreign trade mechanisms of primary products for manufactured goods. West Pakistanis controlled industry and commerce in both wings. It meant discrimination against Bengalis in the upper levels of the bureaucracy and the military, the organisations that had ruled Pakistan for most of this period, buttressed by stereotypes of Bengalis as 'weak' and 'cowardly.' And it included an effort to impose an 'alien' state language Urdu (Bhuiyan 1982: 98).

The political order as set up by Ayub Khan in his 1962 Constitution gave hardly any scope to the Bengalis for effective and equal participation in national affairs. They had no share in the decision making process. In any vital national issue they could only react; they could never act (Chowdhary 1972: 244). These treatments by the West Pakistanis deeply hurt the East Pakistanis. There was hardly any scope for the Bengalis to develop common national feelings with the West Pakistanis apart from the religious bond of Islam. But, as in many other parts of the world, they became more and more conscious of region rather than religion. The Islamic ideology, on which Jinnah had based Pakistan, began to peter away, and regional feeling grew fast in East Bengal. Regionalism was the *raison d'être* for the emergence of Bangladesh (Rahman 1997:833-834).

The economic and sociological factors badly affected the existence of East Pakistan. The Bengali's most serious complaint was the economic exploitation of East Pakistan by the West Pakistan rulers and military regimes sadly avoided the Eastern wings' economic development. While Pakistan's major agricultural production was in East Pakistan, all factories and industries located at West Pakistan. These primary products were exported to the factories of the West Pakistan and imported to East Pakistan as new products. The internal colonialism

thus totally undermined East Pakistan's economy (Islam 1981: 60-61). At the time of independence, gigantic efforts were made to speed up economic growth. But the rate of economic growth in the development plans was much slower in the East than in the West Pakistan. The bulk of the country's revenue was spent in West Pakistan because the federal capital was there. Moreover, a high percentage of the budget was spent on defence, which was all concentrated in West Pakistan. Much larger share of development expenditure as well as of foreign aid and loans went to the West. East Pakistan earned most of the country's foreign exchange; but most of the foreign exchange was spent on the industrialisation of West Pakistan (Ibid). The increasing economic disparities between East and the West Pakistan affected the nationality feeling of the East Pakistanis.

The most important factor of the creation of Bangladesh was the language issue between the West and East Pakistan. Soon after the formation of Pakistan, the Muslim elites from West Pakistan, particularly the Mohajirs tried to implement Urdu as the national language of Pakistan. Qauid-i-Azam Jinnah was also one of the strong supporters of this argument. The Urdu lobbies argued that it is closest to Arabic and Persian, it embodied the best that was in Islamic culture and Muslim tradition and in nearest to the language used in other Islamic countries. During the controversial period of the language issue, at a public meeting on 21 March 1948, Jinnah said Urdu should be acceptable precisely because it was not the language of any province of Pakistan (Oldenburg 1985: 717).

During the initial stage after independence, the Bengali and Punjabi were the highest number of speaking provisional language but their literacy rate was very low, even though the Urdu speaking Muhajiris literacy rate was satisfied compared with other provisional language; they were the strong representatives in the bureaucratic and administrative level. Though the Urdu people tried to impose their language as the national language, it was resisted in East Pakistan. Obviously it was clear that Urdu was not the mother tongue of all of the Muslims of India. The secession of Bangladesh was a great example of this argument.

Pukhtun Movement

The North West Frontier Province (NWFP), the historic gateway to South Asia, which runs for over 1,100 kilometres along the border with Afghanistan, has long been the site of a political struggle. Conservative in social outlook and traditional policy, Puktuns have a distinctive cultural identity. Pukhtun ethnic nationalism, *Khudai Khidmatgar* (servants of god) emerged way back in 1929, and it had many interesting features. It was an uncompromisingly anti-colonial ethnic movement that was opposed to the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan. It was a secular movement that originated in one of the most religious regions of India. After

the creation of Pakistan, the new managers of the state treated it as the most potent internal threat to the state. The Pukhtuns become the Third most powerful partner in the Punjabi-Mohajir dominated civil and military bureaucracy of Pakistan within three decades (Khan 2005:82). The rise of Pukhtun nationalism can be explained as a result of the centralised agro-illiterate semi-tribal system of control. After the creation of Pakistan the Pukhtun nationalists declared the demand for an autonomous province within Pakistan. But the leaders of the mainstream political parties of Pakistan were not willing to trust Pukhtun nationalists. One of the first acts of the Pakistan authorities was to dismiss the elected government in the NWFP (Ibid: 98). This was the beginning of a highly centralised and authoritarian rule in Pakistan, which had no room for any demands for provincial autonomy and regional self-assertion. There were two reasons for the dismissal of the NWFP government by the Pakistan authority; (i) to build a strong central government and a distaste for a difference of opinion, and (ii) the early leaders sense of insecurity regarding the future of a country that was turned 'unnatural' by its authorities. But the most objectionable part of the dismissal of the government in NWFP was to restore a Muslim League government at the province. The demand for an autonomous Pukhtun province continued after independence under the leadership of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Phadnis 1984: 187-188). Pakistan's response to his activities was even worse than that of the colonial rulers. Soon after partition, his party paper, *Pukhtun* was suspended and within a year he and his associates and followers were put in prison. In 1956, Ghaffar Khan's property was confiscated in lieu of fine, whereas prison terms and house arrests continued till his death in 1988 (Rahman 1997: 837-38). The Pukhtun ethnic nationalists strongly opposed the Punjabi-Mohajir dominated Pakistan. During the period of General Ayub Khan, the Pukhtuns gained moderate representation in the state machinery, particularly in the military. By the end of the decade, the Pukhtuns became the second largest (19.5 per cent) ethnic community after Punjab (Khan 2005: 100-101). The integration policy adopted by the Ayub regime obviously influenced the Pukhtun ethnic nationalists to tie up with Pakistan government.

As a result of these developments, when the first free elections were held in 1970, the NWFP actively participated. While the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) with its seven seats emerged as a main winner, the nationalist party, National Awami Party, won only three seats. It showed that the national integration policy influenced the Pukhtun region. By this time, the Pukhtuns faced major threats from other ethnic communities of Pakistan. Their representation in the state machinery was on the decline and no political party gave any attention to this region. As a result, the region became the centre of several radical religious and fundamentalist groups. Certain other developments also helped the region to witness the fundamentalist

activities such as the changed political climate in Iran and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. By the end of the twentieth century, the Pukhtun region became totally alienated from the other provinces of Pakistan. This tended to affect the Pukhtun identity and it continues to be one of the most turbulent areas of Pakistan.

Baloch Movement

Balochistan is the least industrialised region of Pakistan with the lowest level of literacy. It is the largest province of Pakistan with lowest number of people. Ethnically and linguistically, it is the most diverse province (Rahman 1997: 837). The Baloch are the largest ethnic group in their province but do not constitute a majority. They are closely followed by Pukhtuns. Baloch nationalism emerged in a tribal setting well before the partition of India, and was opposed to Balochistan's accession to Pakistan

Baloch nationalism emerged as a response to the intervention of the state. After the independence of Pakistan, the Baloch nationalists declared the independence of Kalat, with an offer to Pakistan for special relations in the areas of defence, foreign affairs and communication. Pakistan rejected the offer and, after a nine-month tug of war, Kalat was forcibly on Pakistan. Pakistan's interest and treatment of the region was not very different from the colonialists. In fact, Pakistan's treatment was worse than that of the colonial regime because the new nation state was more interventionist than its predecessor (Ahmed 1996_a: 3053). It took twenty three years after its creation to grant Balochistan the status of a province in 1970. The same year, the National Awami Party (NAP) won the largest single block of seats in the Provincial Assembly. It was considered as the response against the Punjabi and other non-Balochi domination in the region (Hewitt 1977: 154-55). The newly emerged Provincial Assembly argued for autonomy but the central government refused its demand and it recognised only one form of nationalism as legitimate and that is the nationalism of the state itself. When the tribal tiring and unrest erupted in various parts of the province, settlers were attacked and government officials kidnapped. The central government faced the Balochi response with an iron hand. The civil war broke out in Pakistan between Balochi ethnic nationalists and the Pakistani military (Khan 2005: 120-21). This civil war drew international attention also but it continued to be one of the burning issues of Pakistani politics.

Sindhi Nationalism

Sindh is one of the most developed provinces in Pakistan, while its indigenous people are, after the Baloch, the most marginalised. In no other region of Pakistan is the divide between urban prosperity and rural deprivation as wide as it is in Sindh. It has been a hotbed of various kinds of nationalist perspectives and movements

ranging from separatist intellectuals and left-wing peasant groups (Mumtaz 2002: 107-108). It is the most industrialised province, yet, this caused large scale migration from different parts of the country. During the partition most of the Mohajirs had migrated to the urban centres of Sindh. The large scale migration caused the socio-economic disparity between the indigenous people and others.

In the 1940s, there were two political forces that had a presence throughout India, the Congress and the Muslim League. The Sindhi elite class did not prefer the former because the Congress party was seen to have been dedicated to the anti-imperialist policy, land reforms etc. And the Hindu domination in Congress was also viewed to have influenced the Sindhi Muslim landlords to choose Muslim League (Alavi 1989: 1530-531). The Muslim League easily mobilised the Sindhi people in favour of their demand for Pakistan. But, soon after partition, many Sindhis realised that the creation of Pakistan did not mean independence for them, rather, the beginning of domination. Sindhis had to face Punjabi bureaucracy and military as well as the mindset of Muslim settlers, the Mohajirs. Since the creation of Pakistan Sindh was thus to lose its regional identity. The most visible aspect of this transformation was the replacement of the regional language Sindhi by Urdu. Urdu was not used in Sindh even during the colonial rule. Consequently, the Sindhi ethnic nationalists felt that the most repressive form of colonialism started after the creation of Pakistan (Rahman 1997: 836-37).

Following partition, Sindh experienced the influx of refugees from different parts of India. The large scale migration generated huge socio-economic and political unrest among the indigenous Sindhi people. These unrests became a major challenge to Pakistan's nationalism and nation-building process. One of the major measures of the Pakistan government to undermine such regional tendencies of various ethnic groups was the imposition of the 'one-unit' scheme on the four provinces of West Pakistan. Sindhi reaction to the plan was resounding and unequivocal and the people saw it as an attempt to establish Punjabi domination over the smaller provinces and negate their regional autonomy and ethnic identity (Khan 2002: 202-21). Punjab was the only province to benefit from the new arrangement at the expense of the smaller provinces. Sindh was to bear the heaviest brunt. There was severe opposition in different parts of Pakistan against the 'one-unit' scheme and, as a result, the 'one-unit' scheme was abandoned in 1970. The termination of the 'one-unit' scheme was, for Sindhis, only a partial recognition of their distinctive regional and ethnic identity.

During the period of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1972-1977), most of the Sindhi demands were accepted by the central government. The regulations of the quota systems helped the Sindhis to enter civil and administrative structures, both at the centre and provincial levels. But, during the period of General Zia ul-Haq,

the channel through which the Sindhi's were to undergo another cycle of crisis. All those individuals employed during Bhutto's rule were expelled from the government jobs. This caused large scale Sindhi opposition against the Zia regime. In 1983, the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) called for a countrywide protest against the military rule. Response to MRD's call in the rest of the provinces was lukewarm, but, in Sindh, it turned out to be a massive popular agitation. But the MRD failed to replace the Zia regime (Burki 1988: 1097). The post-Zia period also witnessed the political uncertainty in the Sindh province as well as at the centre. Though a popular government came to power under the leadership of Benazir Bhutto in December 1988, it was dismissed in 1990. It was replaced by the right-wing Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) under Nawaz Sharif. In 1993 the PPP was once again voted to power at the national level but it was again dismissed in 1996 following the huge violence in the urban Sindh. And Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League succeeded it in 1997. Since then Sindh remained a problem province in Pakistan.

In sum, Pakistan's Sindhi ethnic nationalism has been a response to the modern state system, one that was introduced by the colonisers and became more interventionist after the creation of Pakistan. Under colonialism Sindh was relegated to the status of agricultural hinterland where its resources were exploited, but the service sector was neglected. After partition, the province was turned into a refugee centre, and its land was given away to outsiders. Its resources channelled to serve the centre and Punjab. Moreover, provincial autonomy was violated when the 'one-unit' scheme was introduced. This led to the undermining of the regional identity and the native language was displaced. Under these circumstances the ethnic sub-national movement turned Sindh into a troubled province.

Mohajir Movement

The Urdu-speaking Indian migrants, the Mohajirs, who had migrated from the Muslim minority provinces of India to Pakistan after the partition of India, were the most ardent supporters of the state nationalism of Pakistan until 1970s (Haq 1995: 991-92). In the late 1970s, however, Mohajirs began to think their separate ethnic identity and, in 1984, they formed their own political party, the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) to assert that identity. By the end of the 1980s, the MQM not only succeeded in winning the overwhelming support of the Mohajirs, but also became an increasingly organised and violent political group in the major towns of Sindh province. The Indian Muslim migrants belonged to various ethnic groups like Punjabis, Gujarati, Memons etc. It was the Urdu-speaking migrants from North India, especially the United Provinces and Bihar, who came to be known as Mohajirs (Malik 1994: 483). Till 1970, the Mohajirs highlighted their Muslim and Pakistani identity and looked down upon ethnic identity as provincial

and parochial. They were the supporters of either Muslim League or the Jamaat-i-Islami. The Sudden and rapid growth of MQM in Pakistani politics was a result of the ethnic unrest in its provinces. The Mohajirs as a group have been relatively privileged people, especially in comparison to Sindhis. In fact, it was only when they started to lose some of their privileges, during the 1970s and early 1980s, that they began to assert their ethnic identity. During General Yahya Khan's martial law regime (1969-71), a new formula based on a ratio of 60:40 representation of rural and urban Sindh respectively was introduced to the under-represented Sindhis who were predominantly rural. This was a major shift from the previous urban biased allocation, which neatly delineated the share of Karachi city, but cobbled together the smaller provinces under all other (except East Bengal and West Punjab) provinces and princely states of West Pakistan. Under the 1973 constitution, the Bhutto government abolished the special status of Karachi and brought down the percentage of merit seats from 20 to 10. After over 25 years of privilege, Mohajirs were, for the first time, confronted with the spectre of representation based on population rather than special status (Khan 2005: 172).

Bhutto's reform of the civil services was yet another blow to Mohajirs who, after Punjabis, had a dominant position in the bureaucracy. Mohajirs held almost half the senior positions in the public enterprises, their share in private business enterprises was even greater. After the secession of Bangladesh, the Mohajirs were less than 8 per cent of the total population. But their share of the higher position in the civil services was as high as 33.5 per cent (Haq 1995: 992). By the decade of 1980s, the Mohajir representation in the public and private sector had declined. In March 1984, a group of young Mohajirs, led by Altaf Hussain, converted the All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organisation (APMSO), which they had formed in 1978, into the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM). Suddenly it became a major political force at the provincial and national levels. It demanded for an equitable distribution of power among all sections of the society. MQM strongly demanded for a constitutional declaration of Mohajirs as the fifth nationality in Pakistan, and to declare Karachi as a separate province. But the constitution of Pakistan did not recognise any nationality other than 'Pakistani.' (Khan 2005: 180). Mohajir struggle continued to be a confrontation between one of the most privileged and one of the most marginalised groups in Pakistan. Indeed, the MQM is the only ethnic group in Pakistan that has never been able to gain the sympathies of other ethnic groups. It is perhaps this realisation that has led to a significant change in the MQM's rhetoric and nomenclature. In 1998, it changed its name from Mohajir Quami Movement to Mutahida Quami Movement (United National Movement).

Mohajirs may have been the most privileged ethnic group in Pakistan for decades, but a large number of them live in shanty towns and slums with almost no basic amenities. Also, as an urban based group, they are among the best educated,

but many of them are unemployed. The emergence of the MQM may have been caused by the Mohajir elite's frustration at losing their privileged positions, but its phenomenal popularity has more to do with the pain that the Mohajirs have to suffer in their day-to-day life rather than its ideological antics.

Politicisation of Ethnicity

The high politicisation of Pakistani ethnic groups helped the ruling elites to strengthen their authority. Emergence of ethnic groups was a product of these power elites. As Hamsa Alavi pointed out, in the case of sub-national movements for regional autonomy ambitious politicians were also drawn into the game of ethnic politics. Where they had little hope of gaining power at the centre an alternative was to profit from possibilities of acquiring influential public device at local or provincial level. They continued to have a stake in the goal of greater provincial autonomy which would put greater power and more resources at their disposal. They resorted to chauvinistic rhetoric as a powerful means of mobilising support when they had little else to offer to the common people (Alavi 1989: 1528).

Sectarianism in Pakistan's context emerged in relation to organised and militant religio-political activism whose specific aim is to safeguard and promote the socio-political interests of the particular Muslim sectarian communities, Shias or Sunnis. Its discourse of power promises empowerment to that community. The goals are to be achieved through mobilisation of the identity in question and the marginalisation of the rival sectarian community largely through prolific use of violence (Nasr 2000: 171).

The greater prominence of sectarianism in Pakistan's politics can be seen as a new phase in Islamist ideology and politics, especially among its Sunnis—one that is more militant and combines the demand for an Islamic state with a drive to marginalise religious minorities, especially the Shias. The particular mix of Islamism and ethnic posturing that underpins sectarianism has found political relevance because it so effectively relates regional power alignments to specific political constituencies in Pakistan. It transformed Iran and Arab Saudi competitions of power, on the one hand, and tension born of the Afghan war, on the other, into Shia-Sunni struggles for domination. Thus sectarian conflicts in Pakistan highlight the importance of interplay of international and domestic political factors in giving rise to entrenching and even radicalising identity cleavages. The high politics of international relations has shaped the low politics of Pakistan (Nasr 2000: 173).

Sectarian conflict in Pakistan began soon after independence but it can be traced to the intensification of regional politics after the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the start of the Afghan war in 1980. The Pakistani state failed to prevent the political forces they unleashed from influencing its domestic politics. The Iranian revolution of 1979 had a profound impact on the balance of relations between Shias

and Sunni communities in Pakistan and, therefore, on the country's politics as well. The Iranian revolution set in motion first a struggle for domination between the Pakistani state and the Sunni population and, later, a competition for influence and power in Pakistan between Saudi and Iran, on the other, an extension of the Persian Gulf conflicts into South Asia. Both of these struggles for power helped mobilise and radicalise sectarian identities.

The Iranian revolution changed the character of both Sunni and Shia politics in Pakistan. Its impact on Shias was, however, more direct and, in turn, influenced the politics of Sunni activism as well. The ideological force of revolution combined with the fact that the first successful Islamic revolution had been carried out by the Shias, embedded the Shia community and politicised its identity (Ahmed 1996, : 377-78). Soon after the success of the revolution in Tehran zealous emissaries of the revolutionary regime actively organised Pakistan's Shia, which led to the rise of TJP and its various offshoots. Iran was, no doubt, eager to export its revolution to Pakistan. The leaders of the revolution were unhappy with the Zia's regime in Pakistan. In addition, after the Soviet action in Afghanistan in 1979, General Zia's government became closely allied with the United States, with which Iran was increasingly at loggerheads. More importantly, General Zia's regime was, then, in the midst of an ambitious Islamisation project that sought to transform state institution, laws and policy making in accordance with Islamic precepts. The Islamisation package that General Zia unveiled in 1979, despite its claim of Islamic universalism was, in essence, based on narrow Sunni interpretations of Islamic law and was, therefore, viewed by Shias as interference with their religious conduct and a threat to their socio-political interests. In fact, the Islamisation package produced a siege among Shias that has since animated their militancy. Under these pressures the Shias militancy became stronger and spread across the country by the end of 1980s. The Shia activities, particularly the functioning of TJP and its militant students wing, interpreted the strategic problem of Pakistan because these groups received support from Iran (Nasr 2000: 175-176).

The Islamisation of Pakistani society during the period of General Zia ul-Haq had been widely regarded as the 'Sunnification' of Pakistan. Zia regime was deeply attached with radical Sunni organisations. Madrasas became the strong centres of the decision-making authorities in Pakistan. These fundamental groups argued that Pakistan was a Sunni state and that its minorities had to live according to the norms and laws of the state. They also denied the legitimacy of Shia mobilisation by arguing that Sunnism was Islam and, by implication, Shiism was outside the pale of Islam (Haleem 2003: 470-71). This naturally affected the will of not only the Shia community but also other minority groups in Pakistan. This also caused a large-scale opposition in Pakistan against the Zia regime. The growing organisational

process and the influence of TJP in Pakistani society became strong due to the anti-Shia policy of Zia and the Sunni community. In 1983 the TJP joined the multi-party Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) led by Benazir Bhutto and opposed the military's domination in politics. The inclusion of TJP into MRD gave a new significance in Pakistani politics. The military regime misinterpreted the TJP's inclusion into the MRD against the movement of the Sunnis; it marked the development of Sunni militancy in Pakistan.

The Sunni militancy began to work in Pakistan in the early years of 1980s, as a response against the minority sects particularly the Shias. Unlike other sectarian movements, the Sunnis got wide range support from the authorities in Pakistan. The Zia regime promoted Sunni militancy for his political interest by strengthening Sunni institutions and seminaries. It gave much attention to begin Madrasas and Darul Ulum's (Islamic seminaries) across Pakistan mainly where the Sunni minority areas to check the Shia activities (Nasr 2000_p: 140). The decade 1980s witnessed the mushrooming of Sunni militant organisations in Pakistan. The Sunni militancy suddenly spread all over the country with the support of domestic as well as international forces. The state's effort to contain Shia resurgence was complimented by those of Saudi Arabia and Iraq who were also concerned about Shia activism in Pakistan and what they saw as Iran's growing influence there (Ahmed 1996_p: 377-78). Afghanistan was another important factor for the rise of Sunni militancy in Pakistan. During the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan the United States and other western powers (as well as the Muslim world) fruitfully used Pakistan to check the Soviet action in Afghanistan. Huge amount of capital flowed from these countries to Pakistan to promote the anti-Soviet militancy in Pakistan. The decade-long Soviet military presence in Afghanistan flooded Pakistan with weapons of all kinds and spread militancy in its political culture, especially among Islamist groups. And after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, Afghanistan witnessed the ascendance of the fundamentalist Islamist group named Taliban to the throne. This marked a strong base for rise of Sunni militancy in Pakistan (Dorronsoro 2002: 256-257). The Sunni militancy in Pakistan brought about fundamental changes in religious education as well as the role of Ulama in society and politics. These changes occurred in the context of the Zia regime's Islamisation initiative and the increasing tension between Shias and Sunnis led to widespread violence in Pakistani society. These religious sectarian conflicts represented a very narrow outlook, not in the sense of the people in one nationality, but the people of respective groups (Ibid.: 258).

Religion had always been effectively used by the elite class before and after the independence of Pakistan. Successive governments in Pakistan gave undue importance to religious symbols and practices, and the present sectarian conflicts

are the ultimate result of the appeasement policy propagated by the ruling class. The path of capitalist development only widened the gap between the haves and have-nots which accentuated the sectarian phenomena within the country as the increasing amount of capital flowed into the hands of these groups who went on mobilising and propagating the fundamentalist ideologies.

Since 1988, the military, Islamist forces, and the democratic parties have cooperated and competed with one another, jockeying for power and position in defining the rules of the game. The complexity of interactions between the three actors during the decade of civilian rule (1988-99) precluded the institutionalisation of democracy and facilitated of the military to come to power in 1999. The events of September 11 had a deep impact on Pakistan too. General Musharraf and the military became instrumental in the US war against the Taliban and also in the hunt for al-Qaida in the Afghanistan-Pakistan corridor. This meant clamping down on the militant Jihadi groups that the military had used as strategic assets to control Afghanistan and manage the conflict in Kashmir. It also meant serving the military's last remaining overt tie with Islamism (Sau 2002: 1720-721). Pakistan's close tie up with the United States against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan caused huge internal dissatisfaction among the Islamic groups. The military was not able to compensate for the estrangement of Islamists by appealing to the modern middle class, because they too were opposed to US policies and more importantly, objected to martial rule-even in the name of moderation and economic development (Haleem 2003: 469).

Under these circumstances, the Musharraf regime came to the fore in the national elections of 2002. The PML and PPP were greatly disadvantaged in these elections. Their leaders were barred from the country and the parties were broken into different factions by the military. In addition, in the name of improving the quality of parliamentary representatives, the military decreed that those getting into parliament must hold higher education degrees eliminating many political veterans from the race and that certificates issued by Madrasas (ijazahs) would be accepted as higher education degrees. This, in fact, benefited Islamist parties (Nasr 2004: 202). The Islamist parties (JUI, Jama'at, JUP as well as smaller Ulama and Shias parties) formed an electoral alliance: Muttahida Majlis Amal (United Action Front, MMA) (Zaidi 2002: 4539). This alliance reflected the Islamic parties' frustration with the Musharraf regime, with the fall of the Taliban, and the 'war on terror.' It also reflected the Islamic parties' responses against the PML and PPP because they suffered a lot under their prominence in the 1990s. The Musharraf regime gave tacit support to MMA, to defend the threat coming from PPP and PML. This led to his soft corner towards the Islamic forces. In the provincial elections, the MMA did well. In the NWFP they were the well represented, and in

the rest of provinces they became an unavoidable force. They also formed a city government in Karachi (Nasr 2004: 205). The high influence of MMA in Pakistani politics generated dissatisfaction among various ethnic groups. The Pathans were the majority in the MMA and this caused the Talibanisation of Pathan politics in Pakistan. It also meant Islamisation of Pathan nationalism. The MMA was the only viable civilian partner for the military. The MMA posed a lot of pressure on the Musharraf's regime regarding Pakistan's alliance with the US in its 'war on terror' and his policy against Taliban. Because of these internal pressures Musharraf faced challenges. Yet, he continued the alliance with MMA because the PML and PPP were the greater threat to his regime. But the high influence of these religious groups continued to be an irritant factor to the military regime.

During 2001-02, General Musharraf banned five predominantly Deobandi-Wahabi-oriented sectarian groups under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 followed by his repeated claims that he had curbed sectarian groups. The action by the Musharraf government against sectarian and other militant groups had support of some other groups (Gregori and Reville 2008: 48). However, it was widely accepted that most groups remained at large; many re-labelled themselves and maintained their original infrastructure and membership. This was the beginning of the gap between religious fundamentalists and the Musharraf regime. The Lal Masjid incident further widened the gap between the two. The roots of the tension started way back in 2004, when a Fatwa was issued by clerics associated with the Lal Masjid who condemned by decreeing that Pakistan army soldiers who died fighting tribal Militants were not martyrs. Tensions heightened in 2007, when the Pakistani forces surrounded the Lal Masjid in Islamabad and a bloody confrontation ensued (Ibid.: 49). After the incident, the religious sectarian groups and other ethnic political forces completely alienated the military regime.

Conclusion

Islam was widely used by General Zia ul-Haq during his decade-long rule since 1977. Since then the civilian and military governments sought the support of the people by propagating an ideology which integrally linked Islam and the destiny of Pakistan to the continuity of the authority. The original formulations of Pakistan's ideology as articulated by Islamic parties emphasised the essential relationship between Islam and the nation i.e., Pakistan came into being in the name of Islam and it could only exist in the name of Islam. General Zia ul-Haq added another element to this formulation by maintaining that the existing political establishment (military) was equally vital for the preservation of Islam and Pakistan. Thus Islam and the military regime became united in an indivisible alliance. This new formulation of Pakistan's ideology postulated that Islam was not

only the ideological basis of the state but was also fundamental to the nation's very existence. Therefore, if the state were to be organised on the basis of any other ideology or political system, it would not only lose its identity but would disintegrate and perish as an independent nation. Furthermore according to this formulation the promotion of any ideology other than Islam – be it secularism, socialism, or communism or even western liberal democracy would not only be considered religiously objectionable but also treason against the state (Ahmed 1996, 382). The ruling elite in Pakistan emphasised the binding relationship between the ideological basis of the state and the ideological orientation of the government from time to time. It was clear during the period of General Zia ul-Haq. For example, he addressed a conference in Multan in 1980 where he declared that Pakistan was achieved in the name of Islam and Islam alone could provide the basis to run the government of the country and sustain its integrity (Ibid). Islam was not only used to legitimise the regime and delegitimise the secular political forces, it was also used to seek political and moral support from the religious political parties and to create a broad constituency of support among the religiously- oriented, traditional lower middle classes of the society. Most of all, ruling authorities followed religious appeasement policy to legitimise their regime at the centre. This obviously led to the rapid growth of religious extremism in the society. It ultimately resulted in the division of people on the basis of narrow fundamentalist framework. The emotional feelings were frequently manipulated by the ruling classes with the help of religion. However, the religious sectarian conflicts point to the follies of the concept of religious nationalism.

Shias project Sunnis as a major threat to their community and vice versa. The Ahmadiyas were being persecuted as a 'non-Muslim' community. Punjabis project Sindhis, Balochis, Pukhtuns and Mohajirs as threats and these ethnic communities are frequently targeted at different levels. All these identity-based movements which were originated during the last decades of the twentieth century underwent drastic changes over years. Consequently successive governments, whether military or civilian, began to consider these groups as playing a major role in the politics of the state. It shows how nation- building project of Pakistan under a monolithic religion-based nationalism has come to a passé today.

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Social and Economic Upliftment of Women through MGNREGA programme: Lessons from Kerala

C. Vinodan & Rajeev MM

Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee (MGNREG) Act is undoubtedly one of the revolutionary steps taken by the Government of India in the post-independence period, towards legal enforcement of the Right to Work with a view to enhancing 'livelihood security.' The year 2015 marks the 10th anniversary of the Act. Though seemingly limited in its scope (100 days per household per year), the Act emerged as a powerful tool of empowerment for the rural population of India. It provided vast opportunities for the rural poor not only to escape from the decades-old poverty and miseries of social stratification, but also to organize and fight for similar rights like the "right to social security." It also helped to empower woman by guaranteeing them relatively autonomous income-generating employment schemes.

This scheme observed, women, having once experienced the value of bringing home a money wage from their own labour, have developed a sense of confidence and capacity to take up challenges in other diverse areas of their social domain. The enactment of NREGA is therefore viewed as a "grand victory of Indian democracy." As Jean Dreze remarked, the Act underlines the fact the Indian political system can no longer remain elitist and the underprivileged majority can no longer remain marginalised. The Act is therefore an assurance that the demands of the underprivileged will prevail over the privileged. It is a deepening process of democratisation and empowerment of the poor and underprivileged.

This study is an impact assessment, attempts to evaluate MGNREGS in Kollam district of Kerala with a focus on socio economic empowerment of woman. The methodology employed in the study is analytical, based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative data generated through purposive sampling techniques as well as through Focus Groups Discussions and interactions with stakeholders. The main objective of purposive sampling is to focus on particular characteristics and viewpoints of a population that are of interest, which will best enable to

answer research questions. Purposeful sampling is extensively used in qualitative research for the identification and selection of information-rich cases for the most effective use of resources. This involves identifying and selecting individuals or groups of individuals that are especially knowledgeable about or experienced with a phenomenon of interest. In addition to knowledge and experience, some scholars underline the importance of availability and willingness to participate, and the ability to communicate experiences and opinions in an articulate, expressive, and reflective manner. Whether the methodology employed is quantitative or qualitative, sampling methods are intended to maximize efficiency and validity. Nevertheless, sampling must be consistent with the aims and assumptions inherent in the use of either method. Qualitative methods are, for the most part, intended to achieve depth of understanding while quantitative methods are intended to achieve breadth of understanding.

In impact assessment studies, quantitative and qualitative methods often play important roles, either simultaneously or sequentially, for the purpose of answering some questions through (a) convergence of results from different sources, (b) answering related questions in a complementary fashion, (c) using one set of methods to expand or explain the results obtained from use of the other set of methods, (d) using one set of methods to develop schedules/questionnaires or conceptual models that inform the use of the other set, or (e) using one set of methods to identify the sample for analysis using the other set of methods. Particularly useful in the context of evaluation research and policy analysis, this strategy involves identifying who the major stakeholders are who are involved in designing, giving, receiving, or administering the programme or service being evaluated, and who might otherwise be affected by it.


Likewise, the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) is a rapid assessment, semi-structured data gathering method in which a purposively selected set of participants gather to discuss issues and concerns based on a list of key themes drawn up by the researcher. This qualitative research technique has been developed to give researchers a better understanding of the data from quantitative surveys. As an indispensable tool for social research, the Focus Group Discussion has become extremely important because it provides an effective way to learn from the target audience. A district level Workshop consisting of all stakeholder of the Scheme is also a part of this investigation. The present study thus combines both qualitative and quantitative tools to bring in concrete results. A pre-tested interview schedule is used to gather information and data from both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

Review of Literature

Hirway and Batabyal (2012) argue that MGNREGA has added to women's time burden and drudgery by analyzing the impact of MGNREGA on women in a village

of Gujarat though much remains to be done in empowering women to become active participants as well as real beneficiaries of MGNREGA. Hirway and Batabyal (2012) argue that MGNREGA has added to women’s time burden and drudgery by analyzing the impact of MGNREGA on women in a village of Gujarat though much remains to be done in empowering women to become active participants as well as real beneficiaries of MGNREGA.

Implementation of MGNREGA has contributed to very high levels of women empowerment, particularly in the following aspects that as the work is organized by women’s groups, the gender perspective gets built in automatically, for the first time equal wages are really paid and this has boosted the earnings of women. As the Bank deposits are increasing, the intra-household status of the woman has also been improving commensurately as she controls substantial cash resources and withdrawal can be only on her decision. There are wide variations across states, within states and across districts in the share of work days going to women. In national scenario the participation of women is concern it increase significantly from 40.65 percent in 2006-07 to 47.72 percent in 2010-11. The Figure 1 shows the participation of women in major states during 2010-11.



Source: www.nregs.in

The states like Kerala (90.39) followed by Tamilnadu (82.59), Pondicherry (82), Rajasthan (68.34) is marked high percent of women participation with lowest participation of states like Assam (26.4), Bihar (28.5), Arunachal Pradesh (33), Punjab (33), West Bengal (33), Mizoram (33) during financial year 2010-11. Participation of women has increased significantly. In several states participation of women has surpassed men’s participation. Women perceived that MGNREGA is giving them a sense of independence and security. Wages earned under MGNREGA

has helped women in several ways. It helped them to pay the debt and retrieve the pawned gold; helped them in taking care of children's education; enabled them to meet the day-to-day household expenses and facilitated them to save money (Sudha Narayan 2008).

There are various explanations for the varying participation of women workers under the MGNREGS. Factors that have encouraged women workers' participation include the nature of the job not requiring special knowledge and skill (Krishnaraj et al 2004 in the context of MEGS); outmigration of male family members (Bhatty 2006; Mehrotra 2008; Talukdar 2008); the employment opportunity being available at the doorstep (Bhatty 2006; Khera and Nayak 2009); a tradition of rural women working in others' fields (Narayanan 2008); the provision of equal, non-discriminatory wages (Sudarshan 2008; Khera and Nayak 2009); and innovative experiments in implementation like the female mate system in Rajasthan (Khera 2008), synergisation of NREGS with Kudumbashree in Kerala (Vijayakumar and Thomas 2008), and in Bihar, gender differential tasks for uniform (minimum) wages (Pankaj 2009).

A study undertaken by the Kerala State Planning Board (2011) indicated that women workers have dominated in the number of days of employment provided due to the positive role played by Kudumbasree and the Self Help Groups in Kerala. It says that the greater involvement of women can be explained in terms of gender parity. Unlike in most other works where there are large gender wage gaps, MGNREGA promises equal wages to men and women. However, a problem indicated by the study is relevant in that the poorest workers often require daily payment of wages, which leads them to other activities even at lower wage rates. The Planning Board recommended that MGNREGS employment of 100 days to one family in a year should be modified to 100 days of work for each worker in a year, to enable them to make their livelihood in a financial year.

Most remarkable feature of NREGA is that it pays women the same as men, something that was virtually unimaginable in rural India. However, some States have registered high percentage of women workers getting enrolled in the scheme whereas others have registered a very low percentage of women availing benefit under MGNREGA. MGNREGA plays a significant role to meet the practical as well as strategic needs of

Women's participation. It has become a beacon of light in the empowerment of the rural women and contributed substantially for the increased living and economic conditions by creating equal wages to male and female workers. The role of MGNREGA on women's participation can be examined through the following parameters:

Income-Consumption Effects: By income-consumption effects we mean an increase in income of women workers and as a result, their ability to choose

their consumption baskets. MGNREGA empowers women by giving them a scope of independent earning and spend some amount for their own needs. Intra-Household Effects: Women play a major role in raising the economic resources for their family but their contribution remains uncounted because of they perform a significant amount of unpaid work. In rural areas, the dominance of males in intra-household decisions has been seen. MGNREGA has significant impact in converting some unpaid work into paid work and widen the scope of decision making role of women in household matters.

Community-Level Effects: Women's participation at the local and district level of governance process is low in spite of 73rd Amendments of the Constitution. But women participation has increased after the implementation of MGNREGA in many areas. A large number of women workers attended the Gram Sabha meeting held in connection with MGNREGA. Community level empowerment of women is one of the great achievements of this Act. Dr. Spandita Kar, Orissa Modernising Economy, Government and Administration (OMEGA) (Supported by UK DFID and GoO).

Various research studies and government reports have focused on the impact of MGNREGA in terms of women perspective, particularly on socio-economic improvements and challenges faced by women. The study by Institute of Applied Manpower Research (2008) found that NREGS helps to improve the income level and enhance the standard of living of the rural people particularly the vulnerable section of the society such as women, SC/STs, minorities and so on. Reethika Khera et al., (2009) observed that the MGNREGA facilitate a lot to attain the socio-economic empowerment of the women workers. It is also said that two-third of the women come out of poverty and attained food security. Vinita Arora et al., (2013) study found that MGNREGA enhances decision making power in social and economic wellbeing of women. Asha Sharma (2012) identified that distress seasonal migration was almost stopped with the advent of the MGNREGA. The reason is that MGNREGA provided regular work in their native place and the flow of income was steady and reliable. The study conducted by S.M Jawed Akthar and N.P. Abdul Azeez (2012) on MGNREGA reveals that the long term investment of MGNREGA wage income was built for the capacity of the families for their upward mobility.

Ratna. M. Sudarshan (2010) study focused that improved women participation in MGNREGA is enhanced from active participation of NGOs and better wage payment of scheme which is above the prevalent market wage. The study by Sudha Narayanan (2008) pointed out that the provision of shade, food and other basic amenities for young. Sudarshan (2011), while examining women's participation in MGNREGS in selected areas in Kerala, Himachal and Rajasthan, has found that the scheme has succeeded in bringing together large numbers of

women into paid work, many of them for the first time. The studies mentioned above represent only a cross section of a vast array of the literature on different aspects of the MGNREGS.

Materials and Methods

The methodology employed in the study is analytical, based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative data generated through purposive sampling techniques as well as through Focus Groups Discussions and interactions with stakeholders. The main objective of purposive sampling is to focus on particular characteristics and viewpoints of a population that are of interest, which will best enable to answer research questions. Purposeful sampling is extensively used in qualitative research for the identification and selection of information-rich cases for the most effective use of resources. This involves identifying and selecting individuals or groups of individuals that are especially knowledgeable about or experienced with a phenomenon of interest. Using the participation in MGNREGS and census data the researcher selected respondents from 20 panchayats in Kollam district. The total population was covered in this study was 655 women respondents.

Objectives of the Study


1. To study about the impact of MGNREGS on social empowerment of women in the rural areas.
2. To find out the economic impact of MGNREGA on rural woman.
3. To find out the major challenges of MGNREGA programme experienced by the women in the rural areas.
4. To study about the possibility of intervention on other significant sectors under the MGNREG scheme.

Data Analysis and Findings

The collected data from the respondents were tabulated and interpreted in the below;

The diagram (1) shows that the block wise distribution of the respondents. A total 11 blocks of the Kollam district were included in the study. The total population covered in this study are comes 655. The majority of the respondents are form the block such as Chavara, Anchal and the less participation of samples are form the blocks like Pathanapuram and Vettikkavila.

Diagram 1 – Category wise distribution of the respondents: The category-wise details of the beneficiaries covered under the present study are given below;



Diagrammatic presentation of Category wise distribution of respondents

Table No: 1 -Monthly Income of the Respondents

The monthly income wise categorization of the beneficiaries covered under the sample is given in the below table;

Income Range (Rs.)	Frequency (N)	Percent (%)
Below 1000	514	78.6
1001 – 3000	114	17.4
3001 – 5000	12	1.8
Above 5000	15	2.1
Total	655	100.0

The average monthly income of the respondents is given in the above table. Majority of the respondents (78.6%) reported their salary to be below rupees 1000/-. And the respondents comes under the above Rs 5000/month is very low, just 2.1 % only. Thus through this samples, it is evident that, ultimately the current scheme is focused to the overall development of the people those who under very poor and they really required support like this income oriented activity to sustain their livelihood and life. This is again underlined the fact that MGNREGS in the district could bring a large part of the very poor people under the umbrella of economic empowerment.

Table No.2. Comparison of the mean income of men and women before and after the implementation of MGNREGS

Item	Implementation Status	Mean Score (N=655)	't' value	'p' value
Daily income of men	After	624.35	32.991	<0.001
	Before	452.48		
Daily income of women	After	517.42	37.847	<0.001
	Before	350.75		

Table No: 2 gives the details of the pre and post difference in the mean income of men and women after the implementation of the MGNREGS programme. The study focused on the socio- economic empowerment of women, but the income status of men also taken during the study.

The mean daily income of men was Rs. 452/- before the initiation of the programme. After the programme it rose to Rs. 624/-. There was a significant difference ($t = 32.9, p < 0.001$) in the mean income before and after the implementation of the programme.

Similarly, the mean daily income of women was Rs. 350/- before the initiation of the programme. After the programme it rose to Rs. 517/-. There was a significant difference ($t = 37.8, p < 0.001$) in the mean income before and after the implementation of the programme.

Table No: 3. Opinion on the level of income increment

Level of Increment	Frequency (N)	Percent (%)
High	288	44
Medium	220	33.6
Low	121	18.4
Nil	26	4.0
Total	655	100

According to 44% respondents there was a high level of increment in the income after the initiation of MGNREGS programme. Another 33.6% reported the increment level as 'medium'.

Table No: 4. Small Scale Enterprises

Item	Response	Frequency	Percent	Total
Initiated small scale business	Yes	9	1.4	100
	No	646	98.6	
Sale of finished products	Yes	6	.9	100
	No	649	99.1	

Table No: (4) shows that MGNREGS had only very meagre role in initiating small scale business and in sale of finished products. Only 1.4% reported that they had initiated some small scale business.

Table No:5 - Item wise list of the small scale business involved by the respondents

Item	Response	Response	Percent
Bakery/Sweets	No	648	98.9
	Yes	7	1.1
Rice Powder/Curry Powder making	No	655	100.0
	Yes	0	0.0
Tailoring	No	654	99.8
	Yes	1	0.2
Craft making	No	655	100.0
	Yes	0	0.0
Weaving	No	653	99.7
	Yes	2	0.3

Table No: (5) indicate that the above said item wise small scale business activities are not yet initiated (for the namesake only) under the scheme. The MGNREGA workers are engaged in the agriculture, assets creation, irrigation and other set of activities, no all concentrated or make efforts to initiate small scale micro- enterprises. So this can be one of the unattended parts of this programme which needs to be directed in the future in the possible areas through effective planning and intervention.

Social Status of Women

The study reports the level of increment in the social status of women due to their involvement in the MGNREGS programme. The vast majority (92.6%) of the respondents were opinioned that the social status of the women is increased substantially after the involvement in the MGNREGS programme. This can

be assessed through the specific question asked through the schedule and also collected through the focus group discussions.

Table No: 6 - Opinion on Social Usefulness of MGNREGS programme

Item	Opinion	Frequency	Percent
Is MGNREGS socially relevant and useful?	Yes	642	98.0
	No	13	2.0
	Total	655	100

To the question, “Is MGNREGS socially relevant and useful”, almost all (98%) gave the response “Yes”. The social awareness and leadership development is one of the important elements of the MGNREGS programme.

Other significant findings are given below;

- Women have made immense change and upliftment financially and socially. Social harmony and unity among people are another major achievement behind the scheme. There is no difference between have’s and have-nots. The scheme could decrease the gender disparity among men and women, as it gives the freedom for both men and women to do the job equally.
- The number of men working under the scheme is very few. So the women workers always request to bring skilled workers training to them. The scheme has also made a drastic change in the agriculture sector.
- The scheme ensures environmental hygiene to both individual life and social life. The scheme irradiates poverty in the poor rural family. The governmental machinery must maintain the scheme for future generations. The MGNREG Scheme is functioning in a way of chain system.
- The scheme is helpful for the unemployed women and widows, as it provided financial upliftment for them. If the government tries to leave the scheme it may affect the life of every poor village families. It should not exclude the agriculture sector under the scheme as it may affect the rural poor working in the sector.
- MGNREG Scheme has provided social change to the downtrodden people. These people had been in a poor economic and social condition, but the scheme provided an opportunity for an awakening.
- The scheme has made an immense change in the social life of women. Existing laws regarding the MGNREGS must be changed.

- The awareness programmes and sanitation schemes in the MGNREG Scheme must implement adequate wage for the labourers.
- It is a good decision to include traditional agriculture under the scheme. The MGNREG could increase the living standard of people. People could open bank accounts and do transactions.

Suggestions and Conclusion

- The MGNREGS highlighted the process of women empowerment. It ensures social security rather than economic security for the marginalized sections including poor rural women folk.
- In the Panchayat group farming has done by self-help groups, and is a successful model in the productive sector. The work is organized through the Kudumbashree system and the poor have a stake in the work right from the beginning.
- FGD suggested the amendment of the MGNREGS Act to introduce small scale income generation activities such as stitching unit, pickle and food processing units and value added products units.

In conclusion, the study reveals that this programme helped the women member's leads to the certain extent of empowerment both social and economic aspects. Some of the women leaders have already emerged as political leaders and many of them were actively engaged in the civic activities. The nature of work under the Mahatma Gandhi NREGS has helped the beneficiaries to develop leadership qualities, improve physical and mental health and also the social relations. There is a lot of improvement needs to be done in attaining the social and economic empowerment of women in the rural areas. Appropriate changes in the planning, implementation and policy level can be helpful to the women in engaging in the task under the largest rural development programme in the country.

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International Refugee Protection Regime and the Refugee Policy of India: A Case Study of Rohingyas

Lirar Pulikkalakath and Aswin Rajan Varghese

Population movements are frequent in human history. In this process, we can see different categories of people with different purposes moving from one place to another. In the case of nomads, settlement and resettlement are the very foundation of their way of life. However, for others, it was different; some moved willingly - to escape from poverty, disease, disaster or to pursue wealth; others unwillingly-fleeing because of civil war, political instability or foreign intervention or insecurity feeling. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “a refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group”. Most likely, they cannot return home or are afraid to do so. This definition clearly portrays the gravity of the global refugee crisis, one of the major challenges against humanity in the modern world.

Two World Wars, colonization, decolonization, the disintegration of USSR and series of political crisis and external intervention in various parts of Asia and Africa together contributed in the displacement of millions people. Now the 21st century witnesses the highest rate of human displacement in the world history. UNHCR’s annual Global Trends report published in June 2017 says, the total displaced population seeking safety across international borders as refugees topped 22.5 million, seen the highest number of refugee flow since UNHCR was founded in 1950 in the aftermath of the Second World War (Edwards 2017). This shows that the number of refugees around the globe is increasing day by day.

The refugee crisis is one of the serious challenges before humanity and which requires special attention and responses from the international community. During the period of independence, India has witnessed the largest movement of people or the partition induced displacement. The country became a state which gave shelter to thousands of people despite all its inefficiencies. Later, during the Bangladeshi

war, India opened its doors to the Bangladeshi refugees and many other refugee groups came and settled in India. Despite this entire legacy, India lacks a legal policy to deal with the refugees. The present study is a modest attempt to analyze the refugee policy of India by taking the case study of Rohingya. They are deprived of basic human rights and lives in a heartbreaking condition.

India's Experience with Refugees: An Overview

Colonial rule in India came to an end in the year 1947 and by 1950 India became a republic. During that time onwards India upholds the legacy of accommodating refugees. The period between 1947 and 1950 and the years of Bangladeshi Liberation war witnessed the massive influx of partition refugees and war refugees to India. Later India became paramount to many other refugee communities in and around its South Asian neighbourhood. The Afghan Refugees, the Tibetan lamas, the Chakmas of Bangladesh, the Tamils from Sri Lanka and the latest in that episode was the Rohingya Muslims of Myanmar. Thus the post-independence India is the home of refugees belonging to all religions and sects.

As well as those from neighbouring countries, the country has received refugees from distant countries like Ethiopia, Iraq, Iran, Liberia, Somalia, Myanmar, and Sudan (Saxena 2007: 247). There are also reports about Syrian refugees finding their way of life in India.

According to UNHCR, at present India hosts 207,070 people of concern, which includes refugees, stateless persons and other people who are like refugees. Though the country has a history of accommodating large number of refugees especially from its neighbouring countries, it does not have a proper refugee policy. The way the government treats each refugee group or asylum seekers is different in India. When the Tibetans are enjoying privileges similar to citizenship in India the Sri Lankan Tamils are sheltered in camps and other refugee settlements. The case of of Rohinyans are entirely different

The Recent Wave of Rohingya Refugees

Who are the Rohingyas? What are the reasons behind their displacement and plight? How do they live in their host countries? These questions are pretty much relevant in the current global scenario when more than 65 million people are displaced globally. They are located along Myanmar's western coastline on the Bay of Bengal, Arakan state borders Bangladesh at its northern tip. The population of Rohingyas, one of several Muslim groups in the region of Arakan, is estimated to be at least 1.4 million among the total population of approximately 3-3.5 million of the region in 1994. They are ethnically and culturally unlike Myanmar's majority Burman ethnic group and the majority of Arakanese. They speak Bengali, rather than either Burmese or the Rakhine language, which is a dialect of Burmese.

Regarding their religion they are Muslims, unlike the majority of Burma's populace and unlike most Arakanese, who belong to Theravada Buddhists. Therefore, the Rohingyas are an ethnic, religious, and linguistic minority both within their country and within their own province (Ragland 1994: 304-305).

For decades the Rohingya Muslims of Myanmar have suffered legal and social discrimination. There have been long-standing tensions with the Buddhist Rakhine community over land and resources. As a result, they have been denied the right to citizenship and even the right to self-identify (European Commission 2015). Tensions between these communities in Myanmar continue with regular occurrences of violent incidents.

Since the ethnic tensions between the Rohingya Muslims and the Buddhist Burmese population, is complex in nature and difficult to solve, their life in Myanmar is uncertain and fearful. One of the reasons of their tragic life is rooted in the enactment of 1982 Burma Citizenship law which did not count them among the 135 "national races" thus does not treat them as citizens. Since then, they are one of the Rohingya refugees hold the status as the "most vulnerable and persecuted minorities" and "stateless" persons in the world. This is because of their inclusion into multiple classifications of forced migration. The Rohingyas are refugees who are stateless, internally displaced and a forced displaced community in the world.

In the fear of persecution in Myanmar, the Rohingyas are fleeing to various countries nearby and abroad. The majority of them have left for South East Asian nations by sea and Bangladesh by river, thousands of them have also come to India and finding their shelter. Recently, they are moving out of Myanmar and seeking asylum in the neighboring countries, especially in India and Bangladesh. In India, there are more than forty-five thousand Rohingyas seeking asylum.

Mapping of Rohingyas in India

According to the UNHCR authorities, the Rohingyas are mainly camped in few states of India. Generally, they came to the State of West Bengal, Tripura, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Delhi, Telangana, Kerala and Tamil Nadu.

168,500 Rohingya refugees have fled Myanmar since 2012 and 44,000 was in 2016 alone. Thousands of them were also believed to have reached India overland via Bangladesh in 2016, including 1,000 who have already registered with UNHCR. Hundreds more who are expected to register with UNHCR in India in 2017 are likely to have also arrived in 2016. Their arrival into India in 2016 continued a steady low in recent years. Now at least 13,000 Rohingya have entered the country, virtually all via Bangladesh since 2012 (UNHCR Regional Office for South-East Asia 2017). According to UNHCR Report titled 'Mixed Movements in South-East Asia 2016',

Unlike the previous maritime route across the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea, in which at least 1,800 refugees and migrants are believed to have died at sea from smuggler abuse and deprivation, the primary protection concern of Rohingya travelling to India was the risk of being detained for illegal entry to India. Abuse by smugglers was not common, as most Rohingya in India had engaged only a loose network of people smugglers and only at border-crossing points, in contrast to the professional and multinational smuggling networks that operated the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea route (UNHCR Regional Office for South-East Asia 2017).

“Looking at the declining arrival numbers in India, it is safe to assume that this overland route has not replaced the maritime one,” said Keane Shum of UNHCR’s Regional Mixed Movements Monitoring Unit. “Compared to those who went to Malaysia by sea, the Rohingya in India travelled in larger family units and chose the route as it was cheaper and safer.” (Tan, 2015).

There are over 7,800 Rohingya refugees from Myanmar in Hyderabad but their uncertified presence and unmonitored activities have become a major security concern for the Hyderabad police. Faced with persecution at home, Rohingyas have been coming to the city since 2011. But most have entered Hyderabad without a refugee certificate and so are termed as illegal by the authorities. Illiterate or semi-literate and engaged in daily wage labour, the Rohingyas stay in the old city either in camps at Balapur or in rented accommodation in the Chandrayangutta area. According to the Confederation of Voluntary Associations (COVA), a Charminar-based NGO associated with the UNHCR, 1,806 Myanmarese refugees are registered with them in Hyderabad. Police officials peg the number at 1,725 after a recent physical verification. While 461 of the refugees have a registered UNHCR card, others are still being screened. Some, though, have managed to get Indian voter ID cards, Aadhaar cards, SIM cards and cell phones. As the process of issuing refugee cards by the UNHCR is a time-consuming one, the Hyderabad police have decided to take the help of COVA to register the Rohingya families with local police stations. Separate registers would be maintained for people in the camps.

In Delhi, there is a community of approximately six to seven hundred, living primarily in pockets of Kalindi Kunj, Shaheen Bagh, JJ Colony, Bodola Goung and Hastall. These people were directly monitored by the UNHCR office. They have been given ‘Blue Cards’ of UNHCR. They are living in slum like situation and there are few Muslim welfare foundations helping them in finding a stability in life.

In Kelambakkam, Chennai 94 Rohingyas — young and old, men and women — live in a decrepit building close to the sea, safe but uprooted from their traditional way of life, learning to adjust to an alien culture. This little-known corner of the Kelambakkam-Vandalur road, close to a corporate hospital, hosts 19 families including 52 children. The open space surrounding the building is crowded with ramshackle sheds of wood, plastic and cloth. Fifteen refugees stay in these

sheds, with one corner serving as a community kitchen for the whole group. Most Rohingya residents use basic Hindi for communication through the children and a few adults have picked up a smattering of Tamil. Rohingya, their mother tongue, does not have a script.

For almost two years now, the refugees have lived in the 35-year-old building in Chennai. The young men collect and recycle waste for a living. Other men in the camp work at odd jobs in the many eateries that line the road or with butchers. The women in the camp do not go out for work. The Rohingya people we met during our visit to their settlement in Kellambakkam, said that their journey to India was full of unexpected events with fearful memories. 45 years old Afsar Kamal told that they were trapped and taken to Chennai. He and his four member family came to Chennai as the first batch of Rohingyas in 2012. According to him, they were initially moved to Bangladesh and from there with the help of an agent they managed to cross the Indian border and reached Kolkata of West Bengal. While crossing the Indian border, many of them get caught by the border security force and local police and then usually have a detention. This person was telling that his agent bribed them and managed his family to reach Kolkata. From there, the agent sends them to Chennai, saying that their men will arrange job and shelter in Chennai. But once they reach Chennai, they will realise that they were trapped. Because there will not be anybody to receive them, nor any job or shelter. On the day of their arrival to Chennai, they managed to stay in the railway station. Later, railway police handed over to the local police and were interrogated. While examining the travel documents and identity cards, the local police will identify them as illegal migrants. On this point, if somebody informs the authorities related to the illegal migrants, they are taken to a temporary shelter and from there they are moved to camps.

The life of the Rohingyas in Chennai was miserable by all means. As mentioned above, there are 94 people living in a small building, which was earlier a municipal office. The building may have a maximum of 3000 square feet area. In this building, these 19 families with 54 children are living in total chaos. They used to maintain houses for each family by separating one with the other by using old clothes and rucksacks. This congested arrangement of accommodation is creating the place more unhygienic and which causes serious illnesses. The surroundings of the building are not maintained properly and there are wastes dumped all over. The settlement lacks proper sanitation and drinking water facilities. The local government authorities are completely neglecting the community. The children over here are affected by malnutrition. Few of them go to the nearby public school for primary education. But most of the children are not interested in going to schools. Even though they are living in very poor and pathetic conditions, their

birth rates are alarming. It is necessary that the government of India should extend its full support to the Rohingya refugees to have a decent life here in India.

India and the International Refugee Protection Regime

It is striking that none of the countries in South Asia are signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the two international legal response to refugee management. In addition, none of the countries in the region have their national legislation in place (Saxena 2007: 246-247). Though India has not ratified these international legal frameworks relating to refugees, it has acceded to various Human Rights treaties and conventions that contain provisions relating to the protection of refugees. As a party to these treaties, India has under a legal obligation to protect the human rights of refugees. The Government of India has followed a fairly liberal policy of granting refuge to various groups of refugees though some groups have been recognised and some other groups have not been, often keeping in view the security concerns of the nation. However, the emerging trend of past refugee experiences bears testimony to the fact that entry into India for most refugee groups is in keeping with international principles of protection and non-refoulement.

The long tradition of humanitarian assistance in the country is extended by the international obligations chosen by the country. India is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 14 of which is the fountainhead for subsuming refugee protection in human rights. India also voted to adopt the UN Declaration of Territorial Asylum in 1967 (Saxena 2007: 249).

Indian Legal Apparatuses Dealing With Refugees

The presences of armed militants among the refugees and acts of violence performed by them have created problems of security in the host countries. So the states are viewing the refugees as a serious threat to their internal security. So to eliminate this threats and also to ensure welfare to the refugees' host countries should have legitimate legal frameworks. But none of the South Asian countries are signatories to the 1951 UN refugee convention, nor have they ratified the 1967 protocol. At the same time, they lack a national legislation for the protection of refugees seeking asylum in their country.

India has had an age old tradition of humanitarian protection to refugees and asylum seekers. It has followed a very liberal refugee policy. However, the absence of a refugee specific legislation can be attributed to India's volatile situation in South Asian politics and the threat of terrorism faced by it. Even in the absence of a specific law, India has addressed the needs of refugees who have fled from their home country into its territory.

There are a few Articles of the Indian Constitution which are equally applicable to refugees on the Indian soil in the same way as they are applicable to the Indian Citizens. In India, refugees are considered under the ambit of the term 'alien'. The word alien appears in the Constitution of India (Article 22). The Constitution of India guarantees certain Fundamental Rights to refugees. Namely, right to equality (Article 14), right to life and personal liberty (Article 21), right to protection from arbitrary arrest (Article 22), right to protect in respect of conviction of offences (Article 20), freedom of religion (Article 25), right to approach Supreme Court for enforcement of Fundamental Rights (Article 32), are as much available to non-citizens, including refugees, as they are to citizens. The constitutional rights protect the human rights of the refugee to live with dignity. The liberal interpretation that Article 21 has received now includes right against solitary confinement, right against custodial violence, right to medical assistance and shelter.

There is no concept of work permits in India, although refugees who are granted residence permits do find employment in the informal sector, without facing any objection from the administration. In fact, Tibetan refugees have been granted loans and other facilities for self-employment. Similarly, most Sri Lankan Tamils have been granted freedom of movement within the camp areas, enabling work facilities for them as casual labour. Similarly, Chakma and Afghan refugees have also been engaging in gainful, even if it is in minor forms of employment.

Although there is no definition given to the term 'refugee' in any of the Indian statute, it has been loosely used in administrative correspondence and decisions. The positive rights available to refugees are the same as those for foreigners as the refugees have not been recognized as a sub set of aliens requiring a special standard of treatment due to their peculiar and tragic circumstances (Saxena 2007: 250).

The legal status of refugees in India is governed mainly by the Foreigners Act 1946 and the Citizenship Act 1955. These Acts do not distinguish refugees fleeing persecution from other foreigners; they apply to all non-citizens equally. Under the Acts it is a criminal offence to be without valid travel or residence documents. These provisions render refugees liable to deportation and detention (Human Rights Law Network 2007).

Generally, refugees are allowed freedom concerning their movement, practice of religion and residence. In the case of refugees whose entry into India is either legal or is subsequently legalised, there is limited interference by the administration regarding these basic freedoms. However, those refugees who enter India illegally or overstay beyond permissible limits, have strict restrictions imposed upon them in accordance with the statutes governing refugees in India i.e., The Foreigners Act, 1946, Foreigners Order, Passport Act etc. From the moment of entry of a refugee into the Indian Territory, the laws of India would apply to him/her. Therefore, enforcement and security personnel who have to deal with refugees cannot overlook the legal requirements which have to be adhered to by them.

There are a few Articles of the Indian Constitution which are equally applicable to refugees on the Indian soil in the same way as they are applicable to the Indian Citizens (The Constitution of India- Articles, 14, 20 and 21). The absence of a special legal regime on the status of refugees does not, however, mean that no protection and assistance is offered to refugees. The judiciary and allied institutions like the NHRC have tried to respond to the refugee question with innovative judicial interpretation to establish several procedural rights. In many cases, have prevented forced deportation. However, such interventions have been limited to specific cases and the judicial pronouncements have not been implemented across a wide spectrum. This has been occasioned due to the absence of a definite refugee law. This absence has certainly meant that arbitrary executive action and acts of discrimination are not easily remedied.

Although, India has not signed the convention but, providing protection to the refugees. "However, consistency in the procedure for determining refugees is still lacking." Since India has no uniform code for determining refugee status, there is no central body that deals with the refugees. After so many years also, there are various gaps that exist in the mechanism for dealing with refugees' policy. This is because the government has not enacted a law for refugees. Due to the several problems faced by the refugees and no proper legislation has not been passed, the legal status of the refugees is miserable.

Indian Attitude towards Rohingyas

The Rohingya populations who are very few in numbers in India are deprived of basic human dignity in life. On my visit to Kelambakkam, Chennai the ground level realities of their living conditions explain the unequal treatment of the Indian state. In Rohingya camp, they do not have good accommodation which is a violation of right to shelter. They lack proper drinking water and sanitation facilities. It is also a violation of their basic human rights. Many of them lack regular jobs, so their life becomes more miserable. It is basically because of the absence of proper identity cards and other documents. During our visit, people with a serious case of depression could be seen. They were happy in regards to the fact that they are still alive, but were not at all happy with their living conditions. Though their children here in Chennai go to government schools and get free books and other study materials, they lack proper food. Most of the children seen there are going to school just to benefit from the midday meal scheme. The children and women at the refugee camp looked malnutrition because of

the lack of quality food provided to them. Twelve years old Fathima from the camp told us that they lack proper food in the camp. She also expressed her desire to study, which will not be materialized. Even though they are in a miserable condition, she had a pleasant smile on her face. This shows her hope. This is the ground level

reality of Rohingya refugee camps in India. To uplift these communities from this situation, the Government has to have strong policy framework. The Indian Government is trying to repatriate them back to Myanmar. The major argument kept for this action is the notion of threat. In keeping these poor people's life in uncertainty their religious identity does play a major role.

Indian Government is terming the Rohingyas as "illegal" migrants and accusing them that, they followed "infiltration" routes to enter India. They often cross borders after travelling great distances, not to seek a "better life" but to escape degradation or certain death. The current government has embarked on a controversial course to deport the hapless Rohingyas and push them across the border to likely depredation and violence. It will be unwise for India to view the Rohingya Muslims on its territory as a security threat or even as a threat to its major societal values. Likewise, an explanation that the Rohingyas are an economic burden does not hold well because their numbers are minimal.

Recently the government of India passed legislation regarding the status of refugees from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tibet and Nepal. In that legislation also a clear distinction is made between these refugee groups and the others. Among the various refugee groups who immigrated and settled in India in different occasions, the government has favored refugees is belonging to the community of Sikh, Hindu or Buddhist, whereas refugees belong to Muslims including Rohingyas were excluded. There is a general notion prevailing that refugees or people belong to Islam are a danger to the rest of the communities. This false consciousness basically erupts on the lime light of terrorist outfits and their attacks happening all over the world. Here in India the same Islamophobia or such stereotypes works especially regarding the issues of Rohingya refugees.

Conclusion

Now the world's system for protecting refugees is broken or inefficient- from global to local level. The crisis becomes complex when 75% of the total refugees are trapped in protracted situations. Whenever there is massive exodus of population due to conflict, widespread persecution or distress, a common pattern for most people is to become IDPs, for a substantial number will look for refuge in a neighbouring country or countries, and for a smaller number to seek asylum in countries further afield, perhaps in other continents. As UNHCR observes some of those in neighbouring countries of first asylum may later be resettled further afield, joining those who have gone there directly.

India is native to a culturally diverse population and the cradle of various religions. One would expect a warm welcome on this land because of its diversity in culture and religion. But for refugees this is not the reality, they are not accepted by society. The question is not about the micro level adjustments, which India

government is arranged to its asylum seekers. It's about a legitimate legal framework for the refugees took refuge in India. It should be noted that India is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on refugees and the 1967 UN Refugee Protocol. Being a member of the executive committee of the UNHCR, India has not allowed the UN body of refugees to operate fully in India. This shows the double standard of India in the refugee question. One of the reasons behind its negative attitude towards the refugee protection is that if India became a part of any international refugee protection treaties or conventions, then it will result in high number of refugee and illegal migrant inflow from its neighbours. But this notion cannot be claimed as a reason for the absence of a national refugee or asylum law in India. Considering these valid arguments India should frame a domestic law or at least a policy with regards to refugees.

The absence of a special law on protection, rights and entitlements of refugees has resulted in the denial of basic protection to a large number of refugees. This denial runs against the spirit of India's human rights commitment under the international law and its own Constitution. If India has a definite law regarding refugees, then, there will not be any kind of ill-treatment occur in the border or anywhere in India. It is not only the security officials or the police treating these people as infiltrators to India, the mainstream law makers and bureaucrats are also unaware of the difference between a refugee and an infiltrator.

Indian attitudes towards various refugee groups, especially from neighbouring countries, are different. When the country managed to accommodate the partition refugees, the Tibetan refugees, as well refugees from East Pakistan and Sri Lanka, none of the other refugee groups in India have this opportunity to live a life with utmost dignity. The Rohingyas who seek asylum in India live in a very pathetic condition compared to other refugees who reside in the country. The dissimilarities and inequalities in treating refugees seeking asylum in India do exist basically because of the absence of a national law for refugees and asylum seekers. As a developing country and world's largest democracy, it is imperative to work on a legitimate legal framework for the refugees and other asylum seekers in India. When thousands of Rohingyas fled Myanmar to escape from institutionalized murder, torture, and rape, and when they are in search of a safe land, it is the responsibility of all human beings and the countries believe in such moral values to protect them.

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Medicalization of Alcoholism: The Case of De-addiction Centres in Kerala

Manoj N.Y.

This paper examines the recent mushrooming of de-addiction centres in Kerala and situates them within the larger discourse of medicalization of deviance. The most potent form of transformation, of late, is identified to be the surge in medical jurisdiction, which subsumes non-medical problems in to the jurisdiction of medical imperium. In the backdrop of this medical jurisdiction, the study explores inconsistencies in the discourse of medicalization of alcoholism in general and the particular thriving non-professional de-addiction practices in Kerala. The tension between the medical and non-medical affinities related to the process of de-addiction is unravelled through an ethnographic analysis.

With increasing consumption of alcohol over the years, Kerala recently witnessed a huge proliferation of de-addiction centres. Thriving business of these de-addiction clinics can be said to have become the antithesis of Kerala State Beverages Corporation which sells liquor. The de-addiction processes have become a recondite field over time in which both professional and non-professional forms of expertise function in parallel, ranging from witchcraft, sorcery to obsolete behavioural therapies and inhuman medical practices. Apart from medicines, treatments for alcoholism allow room for counselling practises which are often considered to be more effective. The contemporary situation in Kerala provides a possibility for anyone to become a counsellor; as being an ex-alcoholic is the criterion presently in vogue. In the campaign against alcohol which invests enormous sums of public money, such a development becomes extremely consequential.

The political economy associated with the medicalization of alcoholism contains several unhealthy practices which are prevalent in Kerala society. Gradual accretion in the money spent on de-addiction by the state and central governments engendered an unhealthy competition among de-addiction centres to tap in to these allocated funds¹. The controversy surrounding the allotment of 1 crore by the Beverages Corporation fund for 9 unlicensed de-addiction centres is a case in point

(Rajagopal 2015).² According to the secretary of Kerala Mental Health Authority, the licensing of de-addiction centres started in 2002 and was widely implemented by 2012.³ The government has minimal power in determining the cost of treatment, especially in case of private de-addiction centres. This unregulated scenario provided a conducive political and social environment for de-addiction centres to flourish, turning in to profitable avenues within the fold of social work.

The campaign against alcohol has become a specialized domain for various non-governmental organisations at the level of propaganda and awareness programmes. Thus, campaigning against alcohol appears to be as murky as its trade because it involves many political and business interests. It has created an economy characterized by fierce competition among non-governmental organizations to avail governmental and non-governmental finances allotted for anti-alcohol projects. The funds which attract de-addiction and awareness programmes unfold the other side of Kerala's political economy which thrives on liquor. As the revenue from alcohol sets new records, there has been a proportionate increase in the money spent on de-addiction and awareness programmes. *Subodham* project⁴ was implemented as part of Punarjani 2030, intends to free 1 lakh people from alcohol and drug addiction every year. The financial budget of *Subodham* for 2015-16 is 7880 lakhs, out of which a considerable amount is being spent on harm reduction which includes the operation of de-addiction and rehabilitation centres.⁵ This sudden surge in finance allocated for awareness and de-addiction programmes from the state exchequer created fierce competition among de-addiction and rehabilitation centres to avail projects under the anti-alcohol campaign initiated by the state. It has fostered the formation of brokers (intermediaries) who help interested parties in clinching these projects.⁶ Amid struggles involved in availing funds and thriving therapy sales, an analysis of this new social phenomenon of de-addiction and rehabilitation centres sheds light on certain unethical, obsolete and inhuman clinical practices prevalent in Kerala.

Exploring the muddled arena of de-addiction in contemporary Kerala, this study focuses on the various kinds of networks and relations generated out of different clinical practices. The focus is on the singular node in which de-addiction therapy morphs into a thriving business. The onus is laid on three different forms of de-addiction clinics functioning in Kerala namely commercialized private and government run de-addiction clinics, Alcoholic Anonymous – a worldwide network challenging the medical system and Punarjani – an experimental clinic located in Thrissur. Although these clinical models are fundamentally based on the thesis of medicalization of alcoholism, Alcoholic Anonymous and the experimental clinic offer certain nuanced noncompliance with the medical model at different levels. In the critical exploration of this muddled medical field, this paper deals with the

tension that exists between the medical and non-medical approaches apropos the functioning of de-addiction clinics and argues that this tension can be located in the discourse of medicalization of alcoholism. Thus, the discursive analysis of medicalization of alcoholism becomes an imperative in the analysis of both medical and non-medical affinities exhibited by clinical institutions in the field of de-addiction.

Alcoholism: Medicalization of Deviance

The discursive world of medicalization of alcoholism could be largely located in the framework of medicalization of deviance. Various studies on medicalization of contemporary society argue that there has been a significant rise in the medicalization of general life problems (Conrad 1975, 1992; Freidson 1970; Kittrie 1971; Pitts 1968; Zola 1972). The idea was not to adjudicate the validity of medicalization but to explore the social context and implications of this “medical imperialism” (Illich 1976). The surge in medical jurisdiction through which non-medical entities are transformed into medical problems and become characterized in terms of illnesses and disorders is identified as “one of the most potent transformations of the first half of the twentieth century in the West” (Clarke et al. 2003: 161). Irving Zola raises the issue of expansion of medical jurisdiction very cogently: “My contention is that if anything can be shown in some way to effect the inner workings of the body and to a lesser extent the mind, then it can be labelled an ‘illness’ or jurisdictionally a medical problem” (Zola 1972:488). Apart from medicalization, there are cases of de-medicalization regarding the treatment of masturbation, disability and homosexuality which necessitated treatments in the past as per medical opinion. Deviant behaviour in society is later medicalized and considered an illness; thus necessitating a medical remedy. Conrad and Schneider argue that this medicalization has a concomitant effect of social control through its intervention as it “seeks to limit, modify, regulate, isolate or eliminate deviant behaviour with medical means and in the name of health” (Conrad and Schneider 1992: 28). The medicalization of alcoholism should be posited in the context of new medical imperium as it is a huge part of the medicalization of deviance.

In the case of alcoholism, this process of medicalization is not warranted on the basis of medical problems that it raises, but on the inevitability of them to be defined as medical cases. The persisting confusion regarding the “disease status” of alcoholism has been admitted by many medical professionals in the field (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Freidson 1970; Levine 1978; Reinerman 2005; Room 1983; Spector and Kitsuse 1977). Evermore, medicalization of alcoholism is not a well-accepted phenomenon among the general public, given that most people situate the problematic of alcoholism within the domains of individual

will, morality, and ethics. The medicalization of alcoholism was connected to social movements against alcohol like the Temperance Movement in the West.⁷ In the context of medicalization of alcoholism, morally tainted and comic figure of the alcoholic, the local drunkard is absorbed into the medical realm and labelled sick. The inconsistency in controlling the functioning of de-addictions centres is based on the ambiguity that exists in the process of medicalization of alcoholism itself.

The specific drinking behaviour which hitherto had been ascribed a non-normative status was “labelled first a sin and then a crime” (Schneider 1978: 361) by religious authorities. In medical discourse, it was deemed as a sickness (Ibid). The medical framework did not consider punishment as a viable mode of disciplining the drunkard, given that the drunken behaviour was not considered to be a wilful activity. It proclaims the death of a retributive disciplinary system and marks the birth of the therapeutic state. Increased medicalization was possible in the backdrop of the diminishing role of religion and an “abiding faith in science, rationality and progress; the increased prestige and power of the medical profession” (Conrad 2007: 8). In the religious model, the drunkard was responsible for alcoholism, but the medicalization removed the responsibility from the individual and attached it to a label of sickness which provided him with special considerations. The medical realm functions as an agency of restitution, a position which was held by religion and the state. Although not liberated from moral devaluation, the concept of sickness laid the foundation for the shift from the treatment of alcoholism as an issue of social control imposed by the church and the state to another dominant form of control: science and medicine.

The concept of alcoholism as a disease provided the Temperance Movement its strongest weapon to demonize inebriety and even question moderate drinking. Schneider argues that it offered the movement “an evil more pervasive than sin itself” (Ibid). Moreover, “Rush’s prescription of abstinence” was posited as a blanket solution to any problem associated with drinking (ibid.). Construction of alcoholism as a disease was received as a moral statement but was not being scientifically explored or validated. After the repeal, when the moral battle against alcohol was replaced by the scientific framework, there arose a different conceptualization. The laboratory of applied physiology at the Yale Research Centre, the Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol, and the multi-disciplinary Yale Research Centre for Alcohol Studies became the centre of alcohol studies in America during post prohibition. The conception of alcoholism as a disease was firmly established to intervene in the alcohol policies of the state and alter common thinking about alcoholism. This paved the way for the formation of National Council on Alcoholism which focused on an educational campaign that incorporated the disease concept of alcoholism (Chafetz and Harold W. Demone 1962). This finally led to the recognition of alcoholism as

a public health problem, thereby positing the task of bringing alcoholics back to “normal life” as a public responsibility.

Alcoholism: Medicalization and Its Uncertainties

Benjamin Rush conducted a detailed study of the effects of alcohol in the human body and explicated the systematic clinical details of intoxication for the first time in his publication titled *An Inquiry of the effects of Ardent Spirits Upon the Human Body and Mind* (Levine 1978: 499). The category of “will” was posited as crucial in rationalising the repeated consumption of alcohol – explained as the submission of the “will” to a hedonistic approach to life and as an important component in the clinical explanation of alcoholism in which inebriety was defined as a “disease of the will” (Schneider 1978: 363). The connection between the drink and the drinker was referred to as “addiction to the distilled liquors” by Benjamin Rush (Ibid:363). Benjamin’s analysis provided an alternative to the traditional religious-moral approach of the Church on excessive drinking, even though its scientificity was never proven (Ibid). The Jellinek model was the first one to raise the question of addiction in the explication of the disease concept of alcoholism (Jellinek 1946, 1952, 1960). This model clarified the distinction between problem-drinking and the drinking symptomatic of the disease, each of which elicit different approaches. When drinking is symptomatic of disease, it merely requires medical treatment. Whereas problem-drinking or the non-disease form of alcoholism should be dealt within the domain of moral principles. The diseased mode of drinking is characterized by the loss of control which is an important category in the Jellinek model. The “habitual drunkenness puzzle” was not successfully explained by the medical discourse, often being merely written off as an unknown natural disease.

Even though contentious and stigmatised figure of the alcoholic is freed from the moral crusade with the medical jurisdiction, the etiologic dimension of alcoholism could not be satisfactorily explained because of its disaggregated, rather than discrete nature (Room 1983). Biological research also failed to come up with an exact etiological explanation of the specific biological reason or the identification of an organ as the locus of this disease (Reinarman 2005: 308). The Common Pathway hypothesis put forward by neuro-pharmacological research (Nestler and Malenka 2004) is applicable for both drugs and non-drugs which can induce adrenaline production, including activities such as “gambling, acts of cooperation, trust and generosity, maternal support, talk therapy and even looking at beautiful faces” (Reinarman 2005: 309). Habitual drinking was not considered as being pathological by the discipline of psychiatry in the latter half of the nineteenth century (Reinarman 2005: 311). Alcoholism cannot be completely attributed to the pharmacological properties of this psychoactive substance as all the consumers of

these drugs do not turn into addicts (Reinarman 2005: 308). Thus Harry Levine (1978) defined it as a person-specific disease.

There were inconsistencies in defining the problem of addiction throughout as it was articulated and re-articulated in different ways by various scientific bodies. The term “inebriety”, popularized by the British Society for the Scientific Study on Inebriety, was in vogue in the second half of 19th century but was later replaced by “addiction” (ibid.) In 1950, World Health Organization considered addiction as “a state of chronic or periodic intoxication” and saw it as being result of continued and compulsive use of drugs that create psychic and physical dependence (ibid.). In due course, this was redefined as “drug habituation” and “drug dependence,” in which the criterion of compulsive use was dropped (Ibid). In 1981, the notion of “drug habituation” was again loosely re-interpreted as a syndrome (Shaffer and Jones 1989: 42). Similarly, in a later definition given by the American Psychiatric Association, addiction was interpreted as “abuse,” understood as the non-medical use of drugs that leads to inappropriate or harmful conduct according to norms and statutes. Later, the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* redefined it as “dependence” and laid out a list of criteria for assessing it. The definitions and subsequent formulations of addiction do not rely heavily on the repeated usage of drugs, but on the sociological and psychological variants within the phenomenon of drug use.

The scientific basis for looking at alcoholism as a disease was questioned even by scholars involved in drug research. To quote JR Seeley: “The statement that alcoholism is a disease is most misleading, since it conceals that a step in public policy is being recommended, not a scientific discovery announced” (Seeley 1962: 587). Thus, the medical discourse of constructing alcoholism as a disease is severely criticised as “masquerading of science” and is perceived to be dependent on various social and psychological variables. The epidemiological status of alcoholism is still uncertain as it relies entirely on the definition of alcoholism and an elaboration of the concept of disease. In fact, the epidemiology of alcoholism was mainly based on the binaries of the alcoholic and the non-alcoholic until the publication of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-III by the American Psychiatry Association in 1980. The DSM-III definitions and classificatory charts further complicated the definition by differentiating alcohol abuse from alcohol dependence, the latter being identical with alcoholism. In this purview, the alcohol abuser is explained in terms of pathological use of alcohol and the resultant social devaluation. The pathological use of alcohol is further explicated as compulsive consumption of alcohol irrespective of medical complications and bodily repercussions, whereas the impairment of social functioning is expounded in terms of loss of jobs, involvement in domestic or other forms of violence and legal problems associated with drunken behaviour (Hill 1985: 194).

On the other hand, an alcohol-dependant is defined as a person who manifests symptoms of this dependence either in terms of high alcohol tolerance, or the presence of withdrawal symptoms upon the non-availability of it. The common clinical procedure for the diagnosis of disease resembles the scientific method where the observed data is evaluated against different hypotheses emergent through both inductive and deductive reasoning. The “clinical method is an orderly process which proceeds almost invariably from symptom to sign, to syndrome and to disease” (Hill 1985: 197). Apart from physiological symptoms such as “liver disorders, shakes, seizures, hallucinations, delirium tremens, and black-outs”, symptoms significant in the identification of the pathology of alcoholism often incorporate the personal, religious and cultural dimensions. The loss of control or excessive drinking is varyingly defined in different cultures and religious. The lesser presence of signs in comparison to that of symptoms as far as alcoholism is concerned puts the disease concept of alcoholism in an ambiguous position within the clinical model. The framework of addiction was possible only during the time of the Temperance Movement with the emergence of the new concept of “personal self-control” (Room 2004: 221). This suggests that looking at habitual drunkenness from the vantage point of addiction is a more recent phenomenon. While the classification of alcoholism as a disease is culturally specific, the concept of addiction is used to homogenize the possible cultural variations in conceptualizing drunkenness in different societies.

The disease model of alcoholism freed the contentious and stigmatised figure of the alcoholic from the moral crusade which denigrated the alcoholic figure to that of a sinner. The intervention from non-medical or quasi-medical structures such as support groups, psychotherapists and spiritual groups like Alcoholics Anonymous made possible the entry of non-professionalized forms of expertise into the process of de-addiction and rehabilitation. In comparison to any other medical field, the medicalization of deviant drinking did not offer a successful paradigm which could devise complete resolution of the affliction via a clinical method. The involvement of a scattered group of common folk from clergy, spiritual sects to former alcoholics further complicates the already muddled and quasi-scientific status ascribed to de-addiction treatment. Thus, it is not just the involvement of non-medical players but the medical model itself that should be subjected to close scrutiny which could potentially expose some of the obsolete medical practices prevalent.

The medicalization of alcoholism brings another important aspect of state’s intervention in the problem which becomes portrayed as a threat to the wellbeing of society. It opens up possibilities of conducting awareness and rehabilitation programmes with the participation of non-governmental organisations that are financially supported by the government. In Kerala, the wider acceptance of

disease concept of alcoholism brought certain changes in the state policy including provisions for allocating funds for awareness and rehabilitation centres. The awareness campaigns and rehabilitation programmes venture into a competitive world of therapy business opened up partially by the state's intervention and also because of the mushrooming of private clinics in the context of increasing alcohol consumption in Kerala.

Medicalization of Alcoholism: The Kerala Scenario

Ambiguity in the larger discursive world of medicalization of alcoholism has a direct impact on clinical practices as well. In Kerala, it paved the way for a competitive market of de-addiction centres which offer short and long term de-addiction programmes. With changes in government policy, family counselling centres in which de-addiction and rehabilitation were not central concerns were converted into de-addiction centres. The arena of de-addiction treatment⁸ in India is generally accepted by the medical world as "still developing and undergoing refinement."⁹ The emerging political economy of de-addiction clinics which sell therapy contributes to a depraved clinical atmosphere in which the health concerns of addicts is not a top priority. To quote an organizer of the Integrated Rehabilitation Centre for Addicts: "De-addiction centres have become a business now. It is a serious threat to the organizations which function under government funds. The private players come up with an alluring offer of treating the addicts within a week. The clinics are primarily for profit where 15 days de-addiction treatment is offered for 20000 rupees. These false offers by the private clinics have created a great problem in the field of de-addiction treatment".¹⁰ The close micro-ethnography done on three private clinics exemplifies certain unscrupulous practices prevalent in the medical treatment of addiction.

Apart from disciplinary systems that are adopted in the clinics, the medical treatments offered also highlight certain problems. The use of obsolete medical practises like Electro Convulsive Therapy and administration of high doses of Antabuse drugs are prevalent in many of the de-addiction centres including Integrated Rehabilitation Centres and private clinics. The sedatives provided to alcoholics upon admission mostly consist of "psychiatric medicines which has a longer effect and destroys the body."¹¹ During the first three days, the patient is under sedatives which bring him to a normal condition. Electro Convulsive Therapy is given to the person on the third, fifth and seventh day following admission if everything is in compliance with the vested financial interests of the management. It is worthwhile to quote Suresh, one of the trustee members of a non-governmental organisation, who explains: "In fact we don't need any doctors here for the treatment. The medicines that can be given to the alcoholics are all known

to us. It is just a matter of giving it to them. It does not need any sort of expertise.”¹² This comment made by the trust member of a de-addiction centre demystifies the medical aura which has been attributed to treatment centres. The staff requirement for these institutions is often compromised at the functioning level in most cases. The inhabitants of the clinic also vindicate the mitigated situation at the clinic in which the doctor’s visit is reduced to twice a week, the care of single nurse during the office hours and night time care of the gatekeeper.

One significant feature of these de-addiction clinics is its similitude to that of a prison’s model of design. The moral architecture of de-addiction centres points to the construction of subjectivity of alcoholics who has to undergo disciplinary practices and panoptical gazes. The alcoholics are considered equivalent to those who are mentally ill and are to be confined. The inhuman aspect of the treatment is narrated by Sreejith who underwent de-addiction treatment in two different centres functioning under the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment:

The environment in that hospital is very strict. For the most part, it functions like a prison. You will be put in a dormitory which has a door and a grilled gate locked by the security officers. One can only come out of it at pre-ordained timings. The grill door will be open only after four in the evening. No outsiders are allowed inside during the time. You will be given injections and will be asleep during most of the time. Only the wife is allowed inside the dormitory to clean the bed sheet and change it as one will be defecating and urinating without their knowledge. Time will be allotted to watch television and we are allowed only to watch moral lessons and teachings in Shalom TV.¹³ In the morning and evening, forty five minutes will be allocated to listen to devotional songs. Apart from all these, one is allowed to get out of the grill-like structure for one and a half hours in the evening to do gardening for the hospital premises. This is nothing short of imprisonment and one becomes useless after this treatment. One feels that one has become a *‘pachakari*.¹⁴

The mode of imprisonment is cruel in certain hospitals where the alcoholics are put in a larger hall that has prison-like gates. In this medical model, alcoholics are conceived as psychopaths and are subjected to inhuman medical treatment. The conception of the alcoholic as mentally unstable or as someone who is weak and tries to overcome their problems through artificial means like alcohol consumption runs strongly within the medical discourse. To quote a psychiatrist: “It is quite evident that alcoholism is part of madness itself. The acute psychological behaviour of alcoholic is clear evidence for this claim. So it is quite natural to treat an alcoholic akin to the way a mentally-ill person is treated. He is quite close to a madman.”¹⁵ The confinement is part of the mainstream de-addiction treatment followed in Kerala and is justified in terms of this medical construct of an alcoholic as a mentally-ill person. The disciplinary systems that are employed by these clinics include varying degrees of physical imprisonment, detrimental to the creation of a healthy de-addiction programme.

This section unravels the unethical practices prevalent in the field of de-addiction in the contemporary Kerala. The ethical foundations of medical practices are often compromised for the financial gain. The distinction between the 'for-profit' (private clinics) and non-profit (functions with government aid) has become undistinguishable. Ambiguity about the nature of the disease and inconsistencies in the epidemiological explanation of alcoholism can be cited as the main reasons for the abidance of these obsolete medical practices. This ethical cleft that could be identified in de-addiction practices is symptomatic of the growing commercialisation of the medical field. The experimental clinic titled Punarjani and Alcoholic Anonymous are the other two nodes in which non-medical approaches are privileged, even though they retain the disease concept of alcoholism.

AA and Punarjani Clinic: An Anti-Medical Discourse?

The functioning of Alcoholic Anonymous (AA) and Punarjani, an experimental clinic located in the district of Thrissur, Kerala are explored in this section as they evince the mitigation of medical and non-medical affinities among de-addiction clinics. These two have an ambiguous position as neither of them meet the requirements or standards of de-addiction centres as put forth by the Central Ministry of Social Justice. In the case of Punarjani, though their focus on the disease concept of alcoholism prompts us to categorize it under the clinical category, it is conceived as "a corrective force or as reaction against the clinical model prevalent in Kerala." The ambiguous position held by Punarjani by conceiving the disease concept of alcoholism and thereby subscribing to the larger medical discourse while being a reactionary force against the prevalent clinical model of de-addiction; offers a serious challenge. But this ambiguity can be located in the larger discourse of medicalization of alcoholism.

AA is a space in which non-professionalized forms of expertise challenge medical and clinical ideas of addiction. In this non-professionalized form of de-addiction, one can identify both the amplification and condensation of medical gazes (Valverde 1998: 121). The first and foremost criterion for membership in AA is the recognition of oneself as an alcoholic and the willingness to give up drinking.¹⁶ Thus, it becomes a fellowship solely for alcoholics where the distinction between the non-alcoholic and alcoholic is more ontological in nature (ibid). Even though AA partakes the disease model put forward by medical sciences, it has never joined the medical crusade against alcohol. In AA, the disease aspect of alcoholism is defined not in terms of clinical criterion or quantity of alcohol intake but in terms of "subjective experience of lack of control" (ibid: 24). Even though the successful reinstatement of alcoholic can be far from complete, but the new role of repentant alcoholic replaces the convicting label of alcoholic, thus falling into the category of repentant deviant (Gusfield 1967).

The non-medical nature of alcoholism is exemplified in the usage of two terms, self-control and recovery which pertinently recur throughout the sessions of AA. In the discourse of AA, the moral and spiritual dimension of 'self-control' take prominence over the psychiatric component. The invocation of a higher power in maintaining self-control over temptations can be cited as the proof for this privileging but the medical potential of locating pathology is not entirely rejected (Valverde 1998: 125). Recovery is the other term which is ambivalent in its usage in the discourse of AA. The dictum of AA: "once an alcoholic, always an alcoholic"¹⁷ points to the distant possibility of complete recovery against the medical conception of curing the disease. The term "recovery" has been chosen from the lexicon of medical practice but was posed against it by problematizing the relation between cure and recovery. The recovery in AA's parlance is not a complete cure but "being happy without being normal" and fully aware of the potential of becoming an alcoholic again (ibid: 126). However, there have been attempts from scholars to look at the "internalized gaze of AA as a hybrid one" which appropriates the clinical approach to a level of quasi-clinical method which can further the rationale of self-control which is largely spiritual (Ibid: 124). The static "all time" alcoholic identity that is attached to a one-time drunkard points to the transient nature of recovery. AA conceives the process of recovery from alcoholism as a "daily refrainment achieved through sticking on to the path of spirituality."¹⁸ Thus, the possibility of complete withdrawal from alcoholism is ruled out, whereas, perpetual recovery is accepted with constant spiritual modification of the self. The claim of the AA method as a "way of life" rather than a "method of de-addiction or recovery"¹⁹ can be justified in this context of continual refinement of the self.

The acceptance of disease concept of alcoholism becomes the fundamental criterion that links the functioning of AA with other clinical practices in the process of de-addiction at the discursive level. The focus on sharing by creating a communion of alcoholics makes this approach a slightly different one. The powerlessness of the individual is contrasted to a "Higher Power," God, to which the will of the individual is to be surrendered for retrieving sanity in life. The powerlessness of the individual is not a pathological condition for AA, but a normal condition of an individual's self which could potentially be made manageable with the help of a collective. AA conceives the process of recovery from alcoholism as a "daily refrainment achieved through sticking on to the path of spirituality."²⁰ Thus, the possibility of complete withdrawal from alcoholism is ruled out, whereas, perpetual recovery is accepted with constant spiritual modification of the self. But AA doesn't offer any criticism on the existing medical paradigm, rather it becomes an extension of this medical practice. The sharing without inhibitions promulgated by AA is based on the principle that "an alcoholic can only understand another

alcoholic". These broad ideas of sharing and the importance of the experiential knowledge of being an alcoholic is combined and reformulated in a different cultural context by a supposedly 'new experiment'²¹ in the field of de-addiction as claimed by the founders of 'Punarjani'.

Among various de-addiction centres functioning in Kerala, Punarjani which is founded in 2004 is noteworthy from an anthropological perspective for several reasons. In their approach, focus expands from the alcoholic to his family and the pathology is redefined in the cultural context of family and sharing. This clinical experiment is also claimed to be a reparative force against obsolete medical practices prevalent among de-addiction clinics. To quote Johnson, an ex-alcoholic who runs Punarjani clinic: "Alcoholism is a *disease* and anybody can recover from it without *medicine* and *imprisonment*" (my emphasis).²² The concepts of disease, medicine and imprisonment point to the critique of the existing system of de-addiction which is predominantly clinical. The normal clinical approach to alcoholism entails medical treatment in which the "diseased" person is forced to go through medication process and confinement that normal clinical atmosphere offers. At Punarjani, the patients are freed from these constraints and share their experiences with other inmates of the rehabilitation centre. The pathology is located in the family. The conception of alcohol as a social disease and the focus on family in treatment constitutes a departure from other clinical programmes which primarily focus on medication. All these factors form an anthropological matrix within which this ambiguous clinical procedure can be located.

At the helm of this experimental clinic is an ex-alcoholic, Johnson K Mangalam who authored an autobiography titled *Kudiyante Kumbasaram (The Confessions of a Drunkard)*. The idea of an alcoholic understanding another alcoholic is not a novel idea as it echoes a significant assumption behind the functioning of AA. But this fraternity of alcoholics is not conditioned by the concept of anonymity as in AA. However, Johnson argues that anonymity is not considered as the panacea for social stigma associated with alcoholics but the labelling of an alcoholic as a sick person, and acceptance of the disease concept of alcoholism bring privileges to the contested figure of the alcoholic who is considered as a deviant or a mentally-ill person in society. Apart from decriminalizing the alcoholic or containing the deviance, rapport between the healer and the sick person is of paramount significance for effective communication among them. For Johnson, the relationship between an ex-alcoholic and an alcoholic is an ideal one, as it can possibly mitigate the hierarchy, if any that exists between a sick person and a healer. To quote Johnson: "The wounded healer is no more a counsellor, but also a role model for the alcoholics." The constructive relationship between the healer and the sick person is fashioned in terms of a specific habitus characteristic of

drunkards. The habitus referred to includes the dialect and phrases in the lexicon of drunkards which are familiar to alcoholics. The invoking of these phrases and dialects is intended to mitigate hierarchy and dominance that otherwise operate in the counselling sessions functioning through body language, performance and language. Johnson argues that the polished and cultured language of the healer is futile in this exercise as it has no influence on the addict. Effective communication among them is possible in the habitus generated by alcoholics, ex-alcoholics and their families; but the crucial difference is the change in the field.

In the symptomatology put forward by the Punarjani clinic, sick body of an addict becomes a symptom of social disease. The alcoholic becomes symptomatic of social disease. However, this new semiology still retains the sick role advocated by medical discourse. This new symptomatology does not focus on the medical explanation of alcoholism, but concentrates on the ways in which the figure of an alcoholic is constructed through behavioural characteristics. The symptoms are not mere bodily responses but the behavioural characteristics of the alcoholic. The absence of self-control, impetus to violate rules, false egoism and the inability to stick to one's promises are the symptoms through which the disease is presented. At the same time, bodily reactions such as withdrawal symptoms, problems of tolerance levels, hallucinations and delusions are also recognised as pathological conditions that require medical treatment. The emphasis is more on the visible, pathological social behaviour of the alcoholic which is "the first transaction of the invisible nature of disease" (Foucault 1973: 90). The invisible nature of disease is manifested through the interpretation of the disease in its cultural context. As Foucault argues, it is through this interpretation of disease that the "symptoms abandons its passivity as a natural phenomenon and becomes a signifier of disease" (Ibid: 92). The psychosomatic nature of alcoholism is explained in terms of sociological factors, because of which alcoholism is considered a social disease.

In this clinical approach, the family as an anthropological unit becomes significant in pathological explanation of alcoholism. The mandatory presence of the family during treatment is one of the foremost conditions of clinical treatment and has also been cited as one of its limitations. The significance of family in the de-addiction process of alcoholism is explained in the psychoanalytical perspective even though the problematic is conceived anthropologically. The familial aspect of alcoholism is identified in the oedipal world characterised by impotency of the alcoholic figure in the family, rectified in the twenty one day clinical treatment with bodily supplements.²³ The move from the clinical space to the social in its attempt to lay out a symptomatology is appreciable but it turns to be very simplistic and profoundly sexist. The role of family is not limited to the pathological realm alone but it can also act as the site for reparation. Punarjani creates an atmosphere

of displaced domesticity in which the habitus of the alcoholic and his family undergo significant changes. It is described as an attempt to attain self-recognition for an alcoholic, which can only be facilitated by the presence of family and also by interacting with other inhabitants of the clinic. Various stages in the life of an alcoholic are reinterpreted in terms of different phases of alcoholism.

Self-realization of oneself as an alcoholic, the subsequent realisation of alcoholism as a disease and the ontological deliberation of his life on the basis of this revelation and realizing the damage done to one's family are the effects at the onto-epistemic level. The recognition is not just for the alcoholic alone but for the whole family. The family's recognition of the individual as an alcoholic is very important as this enables the family to function as a support system for the affected. The substitution of clinical expertise with non-professional expertise can be identified in both AA and Punarjani. The importance given to the therapeutic effect of sharing experiences rather than employing medication is another significant similarity between the two. It could be argued that AA only functions as a platform for the gathering of alcoholics to maintain sobriety on a daily basis whereas Punarjani marks a qualitative difference by offering a displaced domesticity at place.

Conclusion

The diverse clinical practices analyzed in this chapter are all genealogically located in the discourse of medicalization of alcohol which is the outcome of a larger process of medicalization of deviance. The conjecture at which the family counselling centres are morphed to de-addiction and rehabilitation centres was a medical response to the phenomenon of massive alcohol consumption. This social scenario created an appalling situation with the transformation of rehab centres into a thriving business. Apart from rampant commercialization, prevalence of obsolete clinical practices is noteworthy. In fact, the medical model simulates a disciplinary paradigm akin to the prison structure where addicts were equivalent to psychopaths and imprisoned, subjected to heavy medication. The inconsistencies in epidemiological definition of alcoholism can be cited as the reason for the prevalence of this sort of obsolete medical practices. The functioning of private clinics in Kerala presents a situation where commercial interests endanger the ethical foundation of clinical spaces by creating conflicts of interest that undermine public trust in health care.

The tension between professional and non-professional clinical practices is evident in the functioning of AA and the experimental clinic, Punarjani. The success of Alcoholics Anonymous as a global network challenges the medical framework, but it is also fundamentally rooted in the thesis of medicalization of alcoholism. Moreover, AA functions as an extension of the medical model, as a collective which

can keep the addict from falling in to the trap of becoming an alcoholic again. At the same time, it should be admitted that AA emerges as a non-medical form of de-addiction practice which could challenge the medical and clinical ideas of addiction. The problematic is further extended to the domain of self refinement and spiritual wellbeing. This hybrid approach of AA could appropriate the clinical approach to the level of a quasi-clinical approach where the rationale of continual self refinement becomes pertinent.

Even though the experimental clinic, Punarjani, overlaps most of the concerns of AA in its operation, it marks significant differences also. The concept of fraternity among alcoholics, the proposition of an alcoholic understanding another alcoholic better and the concept of sharing are taken up by the experimental clinic while they dropped the concept of anonymity which is central to AA. The fraternity among alcoholics is reformulated by Punarjani, the experimental clinic to create a displaced domesticity which sort of simulates joint family system. The fraternity is bound together by the habitus the alcoholics share. With such a clinical model, the family emerges as both the site of pathology and recuperation. It should be noted that the identification of familial aspect of alcoholism in the oedipal world cannot be accepted uncritically. Though this clinical experiment attempts to overcome the shortcomings of existing frameworks of de-addiction 'without medication and imprisonment', it does not offer any difference at the archaeological level as it is also based on the disease concept of alcoholism. The field of de-addiction becomes a battlefield of contestations among religious institutions (church), the state and the scientific bodies.

Notes

- 1 These projects include Campaign against Alcohol (2011), handouts for teachers to spread awareness about alcohol misuse (*Athijeevanam*), a social media campaign titled Addicted to Life (2014), Punarjani 2030, and as part of it, *Subodham*.
- 2 The lists of these de-addiction centres were prepared by a district level committee headed by the District collector, Deputy Commissioner of Excise, District Social Welfare Officer and a social worker. The Kerala State Excise department requires only the registration details of these de-addiction centres given that the license details have not been furnished.
- 3 This information is culled from a newspaper report on the issuing of funds for unlicensed de-addiction centres. In the report carried by *The Hindu*, 14 August 2015, the secretary of Kerala State Mental Health Authority, D. Raju, concedes to the fact that the licensing system for de-addiction centres in Kerala is of recent origins.
- 4 *Subodham* is a recent project initiated by the government of Kerala under the larger project Punarjani 2030. This project is envisaged as "special administrative mechanism to coordinate all the activities of Punarjani 2030, which aims to realise the dream of addiction-free Kerala by 2030". Quoted from the Government Order (Ms) No. 171/2015/TD dated Thiruvananthapuram 25/9/2015.

- 5 This money is collected from 5% cess imposed on sales tax for Indian-made Foreign Liquor sold through Kerala State Beverages Corporation.
- 6 Various people working in this field shared this concern. They hinted at the partiality in allocating funds as most of the projects and fund allocations are predetermined.
- 7 Temperance Movement was a social movement that originated in the West against the consumption of alcohol for the legal prohibition of alcohol. It started in the early 19th century and began fading in the 20th century.
- 8 The term “substance-use disorder treatment” put forward by the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) is used instead of “de-addiction” in the minimum standards of care for government de-addiction centres. The two terms are used interchangeably.
- 9 See page 5 of Minimum Standards of Care for the Government De-addiction Centres published by All India Institute of Medical Sciences in 2009. This document was accessed from one of the clinics in the Kollam District in 2014.
- 10 This point was made by the counsellor of one of the oldest de-addiction centres, ADART, Pala. This was a formal interview as there were certain restrictions to visit the clinic.
- 11 According to the staff-nurses of the private de-addiction centre, IS injections are administered to patients who are violent which will immediately put them to sleep. Along with it, two ampules of Lorazepam and one ampule of Seranace are given for a longer sedation period. The effect of IS injection only lasts for twenty minutes whereas the other two injections last longer.
- 12 Among the trust members of this rehabilitation centre, Suresh (false name) is given the charge of daily functioning of the clinic. In this friendly conversation, he started ridiculing the alcoholics and claimed that there is no other option than undergoing a medical treatment which even doesn't require the presence of a doctor.
- 13 Shalom Television is the name of Malayalam religious channel run by Christian religious authorities. The programmes range from the live telecast of meditation and religious healing practices, moral and religious teaching to devotional songs.
- 14 The quoted passage is from an informal conversation with Sreejith in November 2013. I met Sreejith for the first time at Punarjani, the experimental clinic located at Thrissur, Kerala. The term *pachakari* used in this conversation is explained as 'being of no use'. It is to denote the general passive state of the de-addicted person after the treatment.
- 15 This meeting with the psychiatrist who worked in one of the private hospitals in Kollam took place on July, 2013. I was directed to this doctor by Vigilal, a person who underwent de-addiction treatment. The doctor insisted on withholding his name given that what he said could be deemed to be politically incorrect.
- 16 This came up in a discussion with an Alcoholics Anonymous group dated 8 December 2013. The names of the participants have been kept confidential for the sake of privacy.
- 17 This dictum was repeated throughout the sharing sessions and informal discussions with the members of AA. The permanent nature of the disease and the high potential for a relapse emphasized by one of the members of AA hints at the necessity of a moral and spiritual war against the weakness of the self.
- 18 The quotation is from an open discussion with one of the fellows of AA on 4 October 2013.
- 19 This quotation is from an informal discussion with another AA fellow on 11 December 2013.
- 20 The quotation is from an open discussion with one of the fellows of AA on 4 October 2013.

- 21 This new clinical practice is addressed as new experiment by the authorities of Punarjani Clinic.
- 22 In a discussion with Johnson, the director of the Punarjani dated 15 July 2013.
- 23 This turn to oedipal world is not elaborated or discussed in this paper.

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Transforming socio-cultural spaces and Mappila Muslims of Kerala

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A social counter-revolution is a silent process that often evades the societal eye. When it reaches a mature phase, everybody would be in a rush to identify it with more fashionable and market-friendly terms like religious extremism and terrorism. This is the case of *Mappila* counter social revolution in northern Kerala.¹ With the occurrence of some suspected Islamic State related disappearances in recent past, both the community and the public are eager to connect the stray incidents with a terrorist phase of fundamentalism, which has been in talks for some time. Here it is intended to understand the historical transition of some dominant sections of the *Mappila Muslim socio- cultural spaces*, which has gradually become a battlefield of confronting ideologies and assuming the characteristic features conducive to a social counter-revolution.

Soon after the Eid celebrations of 2016, came the news about the disappearance of about 21 people including women and infants from the northern part of Kerala named Padanna in Kasargode district (Johny 2016). The news of their disappearance was reported by their own families when they received a telegram app message sent by the disappeared through new media, claiming that they have reached the Islamic State. They did not use the term ISIS. Therefore, doubts remained, whether it is the ISIS owned territory where they have reached or Dhamage, a place in Yemen where extreme *Salafism* is being in practise (Kadakkal 2016). The apparent adherence of the disappeared to extreme *salafism* gave credit to this argument. Later on, a whatsapp message received by the family of the disappeared shattered this hope as the message was sent from Tora Bora in Afghanistan where ISIS has a growing presence. on 17th July 2016 Reporter TV ,a private Malayalam news channel ,aired another audio clip in which the disappeared were heard reaffirming their strong resolve to fight for the religion. _Meanwhile NIA had arrested a few Muslim youths from Kanakamala in Kannur district in relation with ISS related activities (Johny 2016). Later on central agencies also confirmed the ISS links of the disappeared 21.

Shortly before these incidents un-ravelled, another case of equal concern had also been reported from Kozhikode and Malappuram, the Muslim dominated districts of northern Kerala. It was the outbreak of diphtheria, an acute and highly contagious disease that can be largely curbed by immunisation (Rajeev2016). Two deaths have already been reported and a large number of infected were admitted in Kozhikode Medical College. Interestingly all of them were *Mappila* Muslims and cases were reported in Muslim dominated neighbourhoods. After the initial shock, the authorities sprang into action and found that the rate of vaccination in Malappuram district (84%) stands below the state average (85%), which is one of the highest in the country. Malappuram district is a predominantly Muslim populated one, where as in Kozhikode it comes near to half of the total population. In Kozhikode, the immunisation rate is better.

The erstwhile Malabar district of British India or the today's northern Kerala region was socially and economically backward at the time of independence. But, soon after the formation of the Kerala state in 1956, the region was given special care and *Mappila* schools were established in Muslim dominated localities to address the social backwardness of the *Mappila* Muslims. Various governments, which ruled the state then, had given special attention and allocated special packages to the region. By the time *Mappila* reform movements pioneered by Makti Tangal and Vakkom Abdul Khader Moulavi also had an impact in the life of *Mappila* Muslims. Indian Union Muslim League, a religion based political party one like the Christian Conservatives of Germany also played a major role in this process by holding key portfolios in various ruling coalitions in the state since 1956.² Gulf boom of 1970s paved a strong economic platform in this modernisation process by making at least one member in each *Mappila* family in the region an expatriate labourer in the Middle East. All these factors caused the arrival of a highly equipped modern mappila Muslim youth in all spheres of Kerala society and polity from the last decade of the last century. It was exactly at this time when the bourgeoisie social revolution ruled in full swing in the community that the counter social revolution had its beginning.

Deterritorialized Identity Formation and Internal Schisms

When the modern educated mappila youth emerged in the main stream of Kerala's socio-political life with relatively affluent middle class background, globalization also had a socio-cultural and political impact in the community. The Barbary Masjid demolition and pursuing communal violence started from Bombay riot to Gujarat pogrom had a deep impact on the modern *Mappila* Muslims in 1990s. Cable TV revolution had made all these incidents a living experience in *Mappila* households. By that time, television density had witnessed a sharp increase with the

economic reforms of 1990s. Gulf war also had a similar impact. Then Iraq president Saddam Hussain had become a household name as the champion of Islam against imperialist anti-Muslim powers. Some sections of the *Mappila* psyche Muslims started to re-define their socio cultural identity, which was once strongly rooted in the Islamicate socio-cultural milieu with the global Muslim community (*umma*) (Hodgson, 1974).³ The perceived feeling of Muslim victimhood was the nucleus of this transformation. It was at this time *Islamic Sevak Sangh*, a semi fascist Muslim organisation, was founded by Abdul Nazar Madani who is an accused of Bangalore blast case now. Though he was charge sheeted in Coimbatore blast as well, he was later on exonerated by the court. But, in 1990s his party had posed a strong threat against the statusquoist Muslim League.⁴

The counter-revolution that had its roots in this post Babari Masjid era achieved gradual momentum.⁵ One of the important visible change was the adoption of *pardha* (*burqa*) by the *Mappila* Muslim ladies of Kerala against their traditional attires like *Saree*, *kachimundu* etc.⁶ These changes had its beginning in the followers of *Salafi* and *Maudoodian* ideologies. The traditionalists who were vigorously fighting against both the above-mentioned ideologies also jumped to this bandwagon of Arabianization. It shows that irrespective of the sectarian rivalries, *salafism* had its influence in the many sections of the *Mappila* Muslim community by 2000. It was this time anti vaccination campaign also had the beginning as a fight against imperialism. Vaccination was seen as western conspiracy to make the Muslims infertile (Rajeev 2016). Though both *Jamaat-e-Islami* and the *Salafi* follower's disclaim this stand today, their conferences hosted sessions of strong proponents of the anti-vaccination movement in the state until recently. Most of these proponents were naturalists who had a greater reach. Such an acceptance of anti-vaccination propagandists was unimaginable in the past when the community was less educated, and the leaders were preaching for vaccination.

The new identity formation mechanism got sharpened by the schism that took place in the *salafi* movement popularly known as the *Mujahids*. The *Mujahids* were in the forefront of the *Mappila* Muslim reform movements. As the followers of Vakkom Abdul Khader Moulavi, they were considered as the pioneers of Muslim reform movement in Kerala. By the end of 1990s, the *Mujahid* movement started developing an internal schism. It was related to funding. Sharing very close ideological inclinations, the *Mujahids* were receiving huge contributions from the abode of *Wahabism*, Saudi Arabia. In 1990s the donors asked KNM (Kerala Naduvatul Mujahideen), the parent organisation of Kerala *Salafi* movement to be strict on Islamisation process in line with Saudi Arabia. A dominant group led by Hussain Madavoor, having seen the dangerous implication of the advice, and left the parent body. Ever since, the parent body witnessed several splits and some

of them resorted to the extreme form of *Salafism*. Some of the splinter groups even portrayed vaccination as un-Islamic as it contains microbes, chemicals, and animal derived products. There is a widely shared video clip in which a religious figure talks about the potential harm of vaccines in a programme organised for Muslim girls by a Muslim organisation (Rajeev 2016). The split in the *Mujahid* movement surfaced in 2002 and the most diphtheria infected are in the 0-16 age group, which clearly shows correlation between the arrival of the extreme form of Puritanism and anti vaccination propaganda. According to health officials, there is 1, 30,000 children of the age group are to be vaccinated in Malappuram district (Rajeev 2016). One of such *Salafi* splinter groups even urged their followers to abandon modern life in order to recreate the life of the prophet of 7th century. They under the leadership of one Zubair Mankada, who led the official *Mujahid* wing during the first split, even started a Salafi commune at Nilambur in Malappuram district to replicate the life of Dammage *Salafis*. It underlines the text fetishism of the hard-line *Salafis*. The disappeared had close links with such groups and were in touch with similar mysterious sects in Sri Lanka, which they selected as their transit point to the final destination. Moreover those arrested from Knakamala is reported to have confirmed to the police that Salafism is the common thread which united them.⁷

Religiosity and Terrorism

The growing cult of religiosity could not be taken as indicator of terror link. But, a possible orientation towards that direction can't be overruled. Hand chopping case of Professor Joseph manifests this fact.⁸ In this case various sections in the community believed that the professor did something wrong, but they never sought vengeance in the manner of teeth for teeth. Instead, they resorted to police and judicial intervention against the professor. When he was attacked most of the organisations representing the community condemned the action. Still the problem is that the occurrence of the terror related incidents in the state starting from the pipe bomb cases in 1990s to recent IS related arrests in Kanakamala, Kannur district.⁹ It shows there is some deviation from some of the post Babari Masjid Mappila youth towards terrorism. As pointed out before they are the product of post globalisation era where various national and international incidents affirmed the feeling of universal Muslim victimhood through cable TV and new media. It was in this time banned SIMI (Student Islamic Movement of India) had a growing presence among a section of the Mappila youth who are at that time associated with Jamaat-e-Islami. In places like Malappuram they came with posters preaching negation of the nation states and re establishment of the khilafat in 1990s. Though Arabianistion and the growing cult of religiosity had an impact on them as well, the

elders from the community across the political spectrum were in the forefront to build a firewall against these aberrations.

Though they had succeeded in preventing the community from becoming terror sympathisers, they failed to stop the section of the youth who are often goes wild. It shows pan Islamism and growing cult of religiosity had different impact on various sections and generations. The elders who do not have much economic interest in the west Asia or equally concerned about the homeland representing the leadership of the community only internalised pan Islamism. However, there were a section of the youngsters who were often exposed to the new media and cable TV networks and ignorant about the rich secular tradition of the *Mappilas* had much more socio- economic interest in the west Asia . Hence, they had no hesitation to cross the threshold to empathise themselves with the perceived feeling of global Muslim victim hood. This feeling of victimhood had a deeper penetration in the community, but majority of them only sympathise with them. It is assumed that section of the youth had taken the sympathy for granted without knowing that it's just sympathy for the sufferings, not for the terror outfits. The community even within its changing facades wanted to keep the statuesque socially. The lasting impact of composite and cosmopolitan Mappila history and tradition along with certain economic interest could be the reasons behind it (Miller 1992). The community is one of the most affluent one in Kerala now. Their main source income is trade and commerce where they traditionally had an upper hand and made great leaps with the gulf boom. Therefore, any change in the existing socio economic equilibrium will have disastrous impact in the fortune of the community. The elders know it well where as the section of the post globalization era youth cannot be deterred by this kind of material interests as they are influenced by text fetishism and lives in an imaginary *umma* sponsored by internet preaching.

Conclusion

Kerala has about ten million Muslims which constitutes about 26 percent of state's population. Most of them are politically aligned to Muslim League, Indian National Congress, Communist Party of India (Marxist) or Janada Dal (U). Newer parties like Welfare Party of Jamaat-e-Islami or Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI) of Popular Front had no impact in the results of the last assembly election held in May 2016. The performance of SDPI, strongest among the hardliners, was not impressive with meagre the 0.6% percent vote share. It shows the secular traditionalist mind set of the Mappilas which is strongly rooted in the Islamicate socio-cultural milieu which has not completely given up to the newly forged virtual pan Islamic identity. At the same time there appeared establishment of new avenues of negotiations with the traditional Mappila identity with pan Islamism. The characteristic feature of this discourse is the social counter revolution. However,

the electoral arithmetic here is not exactly reflective about the real strength of the party as they often resort to cross voting in favour of the two major secular coalitions to spoil BJP's possibilities. Moreover, their achievement in forming units in every major Muslim neighbourhood within years of their inception can't be underestimated. Since the possibilities for them to win a single seat in the state assembly is remote due to the strong secular coalition political binaries existing in the state. The new shifts and turns are more visible in the socio-cultural life than in the political sphere, where even extreme form of Salafi ideas like *Al-wala' wal-bara'* found acceptance in a respectable section in the community.¹⁰ There are residential schools run by hardline salafis which give lessons about conversion to primary students.¹¹

What if not a politically surcharged hard-line, the characteristic feature of these post Babari Masjid post globalised era developments is the social counter-revolution. The phenomenon is very evident in the demand to lower the marriageable age of girls in order to protect them from falling in love with non-Muslims during college days. Showing various reasons, most of the prominent *Mappila* Muslim organisations endorsed the regressive demand. Even Muslim League, irrespective of their progressive outlook, supported the demand and was not ready to field single female candidates in the 24 assembly seats they contested. Unlike the past, parents prefer Muslim management self-financing schools to the legendary government schools, which were considered as the cradle of secularism in modern Kerala. Gulf boom imparted economic mobility also marked a sharp rise in the construction of huge mosques. Many small towns in northern Kerala have mosques of various groups built in every nook and corner parted only by a few metres. These mosques owned by rival groups organize Islamic sermon series many times in a year, especially in the time of Ramzan fast. It has become a show of religiosity after 1990s. Like anywhere else in the Muslim world, *pardha* has been accepted as the dress code of *Mappila* Muslim women in Kerala within a period of two decades. Online learning of Islam has also become a fashion. Its dangerous implications are evident in the growth of the numbers of the followers of the controversial *Salafi* preacher Zakir Naik among the *Mappila* youth across sectarian divides today. If we take all these factors as markers of the changing socio-cultural identity of *Mappila* Muslims, the social counter-revolution has the potential to bring more shocking outcomes. Fortunately none appeared to defend the disappeared and even the anti-vaccination propagandist disowned the stand they formerly endorsed. Growing sense of religiosity can't be seen as symptom fondness for terror. But, it certainly marks a departure from the past. Still, the threat is at large as nobody in the community except M.E.S (Muslim Educational Society) seems to address the reality of the ongoing social counter-revolution or understand the transformations

taking place in some dominant sections of *Mappila* Muslim socio- cultural spaces seriously. Moreover, some of the ladies who were among the disappeared are new converts from upper caste Hindu and elite Christian backgrounds.¹² One of them was converted while studying in Muslim Management College in northern Kerala and the other one by a love affair. The disappearance then gave a rebirth to the love jihad propaganda once unleashed by the hindutwavadis and has already started damaging the celebrated secular fabric of the state. The threat is as real now as BJP could win a seat (first time in the history of the party in Kerala) and registered a double-digit vote share in the recently concluded state assembly elections. Nowhere counter social revolutions finished without political manifestations.

Notes

- 1 The term *Mappila* denotes native Muslims in the northern part of Kerala. In south central Kerala the same word is used to identify native Christians, where Muslims were called as *Methas* a derivative of *Mlechas*.
- 2 Makti Tangal and Moulavi were the pioneers of social reform movements among the *Mappila* Muslims. Later on Moulavi's adherence organised in the name of *Mulsim Aikya Sangam*(Organisation for Muslim Unity) in 1922 which gradually become *Kerala Naduvathul Mujahideen* (KNM) in 1950, the fountain head of the Kerala Salafi reform movement.
- 3 '*Islamicate would refer not directly to the religion, Islam, itself, but to the social and cultural complex historically associated with Islam and Muslims, both among Muslim themselves and even when found among non-Muslims.*' Hodgson, Marshal, GS (1974) , *The Venture of Islam, Conscience and History in a World Civilization, Volume One: The Classical Age of Islam*, Chicago.
- 4 When he compromised the hard line and took opportunist stands in various elections Muslim League survived him.
- 5 Osellas calls these changes as post 1980 revivalism.
- 6 *Kachimundu*, a green lined white dhoti with a blouse called *Kuppayam* was the traditional dress of *Mappila* Muslim ladies. The *salafis* replaced it with sari and full sleeve blouse in the first half of the 20th century. But, their influence was negligible as the traditional Sunny sect remained powerful. As an influence of Gulf migration all sects started promoting *pardha*(*burqa*) to emulate the Arabian way of life. Though the *Sunni* sect was not interested in accepting *pardha* in the beginning later on overwhelmingly supported it.
- 7 The Hindu, 22/10/2016, p.1.
- 8 In 2010 a Malayalam professor called Joseph from the Newman College, Thoodupuzha in Central Kerala prepared a question paper for an Internal examination for the under graduate students which contain some derogatory references against the Prophet. Once the error was noticed the Christian management of the college had suspended the professor and he was arrested .When he was released a group of Youngsters affiliated to SDPI attacked and chop his hand for insulting prophet.
- 9 Soon after the demolition of the Babari Musjid pipe bombs had been found out from various part of Malabar.

- 10 This is the title of a work by the Saudi Salafi ideologue Sheikh Salih Fousan. The translation of the title is loyalty and disavowal. He preaches Muslims to cut off all socio – cultural relationships with all other religions even in multi cultural societies. Al-quida and ISIS often resort to his teachings to get legitimacy for their doing. In Kerala, a Salafi preacher called Shamsudheen Palat was behind the introduction Fousan’s teaching who had wide reach through the new media among the Salafi youngsters. Recently he was arrested for making speeches, which harm communal harmony.
- 11 Peace international school in Kochi, a ‘secular’ school runs by Salafi ideologues were under police scanner for including highly objectionable religious teachings like promising the students of paradise for fighting for in case of Islam. This school is now closed due to government intervention. *The Hindu*, 9/10/2016, p.1, and 12/10/2016,p 1,6 and 12.
- 12 Muslim Educational Society founded in 1964nal Society (Founded in 1964) is an organization working for the upliftment of the *Mappila* Muslims through modern education for the last five decades. It has taken measures in colleges and schools run by it to curb the growing trend of Arabianisation

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India and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): How significant is MTCR membership to Space Programmes ?

Girish Kumar R

1. Introduction

Technology is one of the major determinants that shape relations among the states and contributes to the scientific, technological and industrial leadership and competitiveness of a nation. Beginning from the Cold War that symbolized confrontation between two ideologically divergent blocs, the impact of Space activities and its technology on International Relations is huge and are used as tools for political and military dominance (Space Foundation: 2013). Due to the dual-use characteristics of space technology, the use of space technologies for defence rather than commerce remains in the forefront (Mineiro 2012). In a globalized world, the diffusion, dissemination and flow of knowledge and technology that promoted technology transfer and innovation systems across the world did not reach the space innovation system, as technology here is perceived as a handmaid of power politics. Three factors contributed to the restrictive transfer of space technology: the cold war and the technological oligopoly reinforced by the US leadership, discriminatory international regimes like MTCR that forbid space technology transfer, and the huge investment required for space sector necessitating government support creating lesser number of buoyant and innovative private sector capable of developing cutting-edge technologies. These factors restricted space technology transfer to India too as innovation in space technology calls for global networks and involves complex interplay of states, spaces and transnational technological systems. For instance, NASA, though regarded as an American initiative to compete with the Soviet Union, has actively involved in international collaboration including USSR even during 'the darkest days of the Cold War'. The development of the International Space Station (ISS) testifies the necessity of global partnership in space technology. NASA is a large technoscientific undertaking situated in 'transnational or

global frameworks, in recognition of the interdependence and interconnectivity of the modern state' Krige, et.al. (2013). Indian space innovation system cannot function in seclusion. For decades, relations between India and the United States have been fraught with misunderstandings, but the time seems ripe for closer bilateral relations between the two as both are concerned about the rise of an aggressive, militarized, and expansionist China. In this article, we would be discussing the Indian experience with the MTCR regime and its effects on India's space programme.

Since getting a waiver at the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) in 2008, India intensified efforts at gaining membership of the MTCR, the Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement as membership in these regimes would help India trade more effectively in critical high tech areas. India joined MTCR in June 2016. India's maiden attempt, however, for an entry into MTCR in October 2015 failed, due to its diplomatic standoff with Italy, a member of MTCR, over the prolonged trial of two of its marines in India. Because of dual use nature these technologies, major suppliers subscribe to these regimes and forbid the spread of sensitive technology. However, Membership in these groups are important to India for facilitating trading in advanced technology that would enable India to buy high-end missile technology, to modernize its space sector, and also to enhance its joint ventures with Russia. The core limitation imposed by the MTCR is on proliferation of high propulsion ballistic missiles, complete rocket systems, unmanned air vehicles and related technology for those systems capable of carrying a 500 kilogramme payload for at least 300 kilometres, as well as systems intended for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). India needs to join the MTCR, which would enable to buy high-end missile technology and strengthen India's quest for building a robust space technology system. India's entry into 48-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continues to be stonewalled by China, despite strong US support in the post cold war world. But China is yet to become a member of MTCR. Since the September 11 attacks, there is global mood among the advanced liberal world to strengthen the multilateral weapon and technology export control regimes that include the Australia Group (AG), the Zangger Committee, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Technologies to counter terrorist measures (Anthony 2002). The Nuclear Suppliers Group seeks to limit the spread of nuclear weapons; the Australia Group, limits chemical weapons; and the Wassenaar Arrangement, a group of 41 states, limits the use of conventional weapons.

2. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal and voluntary partnership among 35 countries established in April 1987 by the G7 nations – a

group of advanced capitalist nations. It was set up in April 1987 by seven countries - the United States, France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan. Its purview of the Regime was expanded in 1992, by including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) that can deliver Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)¹ The regime sets certain 'Guidelines' that aims to prevent the proliferation of missile and unmanned aerial vehicle technology, which are capable of carrying above 500 kg payload for more than 300 km. Until 1987 its scope was limited to the delivery of nuclear weapons, but was expanded in 1992 to all weapons of mass destruction. Thus MTCR, set in the form of guidelines, "limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), by controlling transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons". It further intends "to limit the risk of controlled items and their technology falling into the hands of terrorist groups and individuals". Nevertheless, the regime also asserts that it would not "impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction". Thus the MTCR forms "the basis for controlling transfers to any destination beyond the Government's jurisdiction or control of all delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and of equipment and technology relevant to missiles whose performance in terms of payload and range exceeds stated parameters".

Items, which are restrained from transfer, are outlined in the MTCR Equipment, Software, and Technology Annex. The Annex contains two categories – Category I and Category II. Signatory need to follow diligently before exporting such items to other nations. There will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers of Category I items of greatest sensitivity, and if transfer is initiated, regardless of their purpose particular restraint need to be exercised. Particular restraint need to be exercised in the transfers of any items or of any missiles even if they are not in the Annex, if the Government judges that they are intended for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction.² The following factors need to be taken into account (Paragraph 3 MTCR):

- A. Concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- B. The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient state;
- C. The significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for weapons of mass destruction;
- D. The assessment of the end use of the transfers, including the relevant assurances of the recipient states referred to in sub paragraphs 5.A and 5.B below³;

- E. The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements.
- F. The risk of controlled items falling into the hands of terrorist groups and individuals.

MTCR in the interest of international peace and security further welcomes all states to adhere to MTCR Guidelines. The thrust is to prevent the proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering WMD. Accordingly, members are required to coordinate national export licensing efforts through their export policy. Through national legislation they should restrict exports of ballistic and cruise missiles with range greater than 300 km and payload greater than 500 kg, major subsystems such as engines, guidance sets, etc. space launch vehicles, sounding rockets, and unmanned aerial vehicles outlined in Category I. They should also prevent trade in items to construct selected systems contained in Category II. Thus through national implementation of Guidelines and control lists for exports among 34 like-minded supplier countries, MTCR attempted to contribute to the non-proliferation of WMD and delivery systems. It sets global norms that limit the ability of proliferators to 'shop' items and technology in countries that do not have export control systems in place.

The significance of the regime shot up with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopting a Resolution 1540 (on 28 April 2004) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter making a global effort to prevent the proliferation of WMD by non-state actors.⁴ The resolution, *inter alia*, obliges states to refrain from supporting non-state actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems. Paragraph 3 of 1540 resolution reads:

"[A]ll States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:

- (a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;
- (b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;
- (c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;
- (d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate

laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations...” (UNSC 2004)

The Resolution imposes binding obligations on all States to adopt legislation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery, and establish appropriate domestic controls over related materials to prevent their illicit trafficking. It also encourages enhanced international cooperation on such efforts. The resolution affirms support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or prevent the proliferation of WMDs and the importance for all States to implement them fully; it reiterates that none of the obligations in resolution 1540 (2004) shall conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, or the Biological Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the IAEA and OPCW” (UN 2004). The Resolution assumed institutional dimension with the constitution of ‘1540 committee’ with a tenure of two-years. The tenure of the Committee was extended in 2006 (Resolution 1810), 2008 (for three years vide Resolution 1810), and in 2011 (for ten years vide Resolution 1977). The 1977 Resolution reaffirmed that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery constituted a threat to international peace and security. Hence full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by all States is a long-term task, which requires continuous efforts at national, regional and international levels. A Group of Experts was also created to support the 1540 Committee, which the Security Council), which was enlarged to nine (9) experts on 29 June 2012 vide Resolution 2055.

Hague Code of Conduct

The MTCR was added by the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC), also known as the Hague Code of Conduct in 2002. The Hague Code is more accommodative having 138 members, and less specific restrictions and calls for restraining the spread of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering WMD. India joined on 1 June 2016. The Hague Code among many does have the following principles vis-à-vis space programmes:

- (e) Confirmation of their commitment to the United Nations Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States taking into particular Account

the Needs of Developing Countries, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (Resolution 51/122 of 13 December 1996);

- (f) Recognition that states should not be excluded from utilising the benefits of space for peaceful purposes, but that, in reaping such benefits and in conducting related cooperation, they must not contribute to the proliferation of Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction;
- (g) Recognition that Space Launch Vehicle programmes should not be used to conceal Ballistic Missile programmes;
- (h) Recognition of the necessity of appropriate transparency measures on Ballistic Missile programmes and Space Launch Vehicle programmes in order to increase confidence and to promote non-proliferation of Ballistic Missiles and Ballistic Missile technology...”

The Code also attempts to stop proliferation of WMD through Space Launch vehicle programmes by ensuring transparency. This is made possible through “annual declaration providing an outline of member’s Space Launch Vehicle policies and land (test-) launch sites; providing annual information on the number and generic class of Space Launch Vehicles launched during the preceding year, as declared in conformity with the pre-launch notification mechanism...[and]... consider, on a voluntary basis (including on the degree of access permitted), inviting international observers to their land (test-) launch sites” (Hague Code, 2002).

Did MTCR succeed in stopping proliferation?

The literature suggests that the impact of MTCR on the technology development programmes in the ‘target’ countries could be the four-fold: (a) slow down or delay the programmes; (b) increase the cost of the programmes; (c) force states to abandon the programmes; or (d) may not affect the programmes significantly (Baskaran 2000). We may add that depending on the stages of a nation’s technological level of development the impact may vary. Considerable numbers of works during the formative stage of MTCR focused on the kind of impact the MTCR could have on the potential proliferators (e.g., Bailey and Rudney (ed), 1993; Jones, 1992; Stanford University, 1991; Anthony (ed), 1991; 1989; Karp, 1986 and 1988). They discuss how the restrictions imposed by the MTCR on transfer of dual-use goods and technologies would affect the ‘target’ countries in different ways. Most of them expect that the MTCR could only limit and slow down the spread of missile technologies in the developing world. They expect it to “stretch out the development cycle, increasing development costs and impeding qualitative improvements” of the technology development programmes in a ‘target’ country thereby forcing the country to abandon them (Stanford University, 1991). Arnett,

et al., quoting a US policy maker stated that “[w]ith something as complicated as missiles, where basically ten nations control the technology, those ten countries can increase the time, the cost, the unreliability... associated with the programs of missile proliferators, and by increasing all of those factors, you of necessity force any government to ask whether this program is worth the price” (quoted in Baskaran 2000). MTCR succeeded in creating special restraint and conditions on transfers and retransfer of certain Equipment, Software, and Technology by outlining them in the Annex to check their proliferation and incorporating the same in the national legislations of the countries that are capable to produce them, thereby setting the international standards vis-à-vis exports of sensitive items. The regime has been reasonably successful in setting norms among the Group of Seven (G-7) and other advanced nations vis-à-vis export of technology and components required for ballistic missiles.

MTCR set guidelines to limit the proliferation of missiles from the MTCR members to non-members, but did not impose restrictions on such transfer among the first generation MTCR members. The regime erred on two counts: “First, these restrictions did not apply to transfers within the MTCR membership, evident in the U.S. supply of Polaris and Trident ballistic missiles to the United Kingdom. Second, in the early 1980s, there was concern that nuclear-capable ballistic missiles or technology supplied by one G-7 country might be used by the recipient against another G-7 country. This worry was highlighted indirectly by Argentina’s use of French Exocet missiles to sink the British destroyer *HMS Sheffield* and support ship *Atlantic Conveyor* during the 1982 Falkland Islands War”. Similarly, “the creation of the MTCR in 1987 was greeted by a series of dramatic missile tests by Israel (the Jericho II in 1987, 1988, and 1989), India (the Prithvi in 1988 and the Agni in 1989), Pakistan (the Hatf II in 1989), and North Korea (the Nodong in 1993), and China’s shipment of CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia (1988) and M-11 and M-9 missiles to Pakistan (early 1990s). Some scholars argue that the MTCR failed to significantly slow down the missile programs of India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan (Sidhu 2007). But the experience of India shows the other way. The stymied Indo-Russian deal delayed cryogenic technological development for nearly 20 years!

MTCR and Space Launch vehicles

Given the large size of the nation, huge population and more than fifty-year spacefaring history, India is a strong aspirant to continue with its space programmes, however stiffer is the opposition. Nevertheless, to launch space launchers a nation needs to have self-sufficiency or it may be able to obtain foreign technology without any hindrance. The prime obstacle that hinders technology transfer is MTCR as almost all the space-haves are members of the regime, barring China. China, nevertheless, has declared that it would abide by MTCR Guidelines.

Given the space security dilemma, which China has with India, India cannot shop for requisite technology from China. The changed global politics post Cold War scuttled Indian chances for obtaining the same from Russia, which has also become an MTCR member in 1995. As technical assistance might not be forthcoming and indigenous development is prohibitively expensive, better option currently being left with is a membership in MTCR (Chow 1993).

US leadership in MTCR

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is established by the US and allies in the late Cold War period. It is a global international regime and is an example of neorealist institutionalism. Politically, MTCR institutionalizes the unequal international system, legitimizes the national security and threat perception of the US, and are imposed on the global order. These rules created by the powerful perpetuate technological oligopoly in the world by banning transfer of space technologies from technological haves to have-nots. The US scuttled the 1991 India-Russia deal saying it could enable India to make ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) and hence would violate MTCR Guidelines. 'Ballistic' means surface to surface guided ballistic missiles. Surface- to surface unguided ballistic missiles are referred as 'rockets'. Space launch vehicles are "actually ballistic missiles used in a surface-to-space mode to send payloads from the surface to earth orbit. The three ways to obtain ballistic missiles are – direct procurement from foreign suppliers, for example the purchase of Scud missiles from USSR. But with the inclusion of majority of suppliers, except North Korea, in MTCR, this seems difficult at the moment. The second route is indigenous development that requires foreign technical assistance, which is forbidden by MTCR again. The final option is a corollary to the second one – indigenous ballistic missile development – but obtained through a space launch programme. Though the first two are limited by MTCR, MTCR further states that the "Guidelines are designed not to impede national space programs or international co-operation in such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to nuclear weapons delivery systems". So the direct connection between ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles make technology transfer a cautious one as the possibility of developing space launch program first and its subsequent conversion to missile appear more strategic. A sequential strategy – development of space launch vehicle first followed by ballistic missile development – is adopted by states. As MTCR does not impose restrictions on transfer of technology among member nations and indigenous technology development is costly and economically not viable, the world witnesses a growing support for MTCR. Otherwise, to insist on indigenous development a nation should have better prospects of commercialization in the long run, at least. Many a time poor economics and the lesser direct economic benefits from launch business desist

a nation from pursuing indigenous technology development. The initial thrust may be to develop satellite – capability, like the communication satellites, for which the foreign technology is easily available (Chow 1993).

3. India, the MTCR Regime and us: The Chinese Menace and Indian Membership

Other than its own development needs, there are two factors that propelled Indian motives to strengthen its GSLV initiatives – commerce and security. Commercialisation of space activities helps India in ensuring economic sustainability and makes its space programme economically viable. “Commercialization” implies the transfer of technology from a research and development (R&D) and/or government supported operations stage to a for-profit stage, which is not an easy option in space technology. “Access to launches, launch assurances, availability of support facilities, and the cost of space transportation may all be influenced by non- business considerations such as changes in an administration’s space policy, national security constraints, or fluctuations in congressional and public support. If the necessary space facilities are not available when needed, the resulting costly delays could be fatal to a new commercial program”. Public interests like national security, international economic competition dominate a supplier’s decision of technology transfer. “The price/quality dominance of U.S. manufacturers has been the most important competitive factor in both the U.S. domestic market and in INTELSAT contracts. Even the strong dollar has not hampered their recent successes. Other competitive factors helping U.S. firms are their well- known experience and the operational reliability of their satellites” (USOTA 1982).

Presence of two proliferators of missile technology- China and Pakistan - at its borders made Indian security vulnerable and necessitated a shift in its space programmes from human security to military security (Kumar 2014). These factors compelled India to procure high-end technology from the advanced nations, who are guided more by the cold war political compulsions than. Technology was transferred to nations, who toed to the US line or should never put a threat to US commercial interests in space trade. The U.S. experts, Michael Krepon and Samuel Black estimated that revenue from the space industry worth \$123 billion in 2007. Of this, the revenue accrued from Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment alone was to the tune of \$56 billion. The global space revenues increased to an amount between \$144 billion and \$175 billion within one year (Krepon and Black 2009).

Growing communication requirements necessitated India to develop INSAT series of satellites. In 1986-87 India initiated the development of INSAT series of

satellites. This was relatively heavier and had much more capability and capacity in terms of putting the payloads into GTO (Geostationary Transfer Orbit) or higher orbits. In order to meet the growing communication demand, India initiated the GSLV. For achieving this, acquisition of next generation technology was required. In 1986, India initiated the cryogenic programme following the Chinese acquiring the technology in 1984. India rejected the offers for cryogenic technology from the USA and France due to the high cost, low value addition and absence of transfer of technology clause in the deal. Instead India accepted the offer by Soviet (later Russia) space agency Glavkosmos because the cost was on an average one-third of what the other powers offered, and the offer had a provision of transfer of technology too. But the victory of the US in the Cold War left the US as the sole superpower and restricted Indian access to space technology even more. The scuttled cryogenic technology transfer between India and Russia should be viewed against this backdrop. The Indo-Russian cryogenic deal saw US tightening export controls on high-technology items. In May 1992 US imposed sanctions on ISRO citing violation of MTCR, and prohibited the transfer of advanced US space, nuclear and missile technologies to Indian companies. The text released by State Department deputy spokesman Richard Boucher on May 11, 1992 read:

“For some time the United States and other member countries of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) have been involved in discussions -- first with the former Soviet government and now with the Russian government -- about the serious concerns we have with the transfer of rocket engine technology from Glavkosmos to the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). We have also been discussing our concerns directly with the Indian government.

The MTCR guidelines provide the international standard for such matters. The MTCR partners all have concluded that the Glavkosmos-ISRO deal is inconsistent with the MTCR guidelines. That is why they have urged that this deal not go through.

For its part, the United States in its own discussions with Russia and India has also made clear that U.S. law requires sanctions against entities engaged in activities inconsistent with MTCR guidelines. Since the facts are clear and since the parties to the transaction have declined to terminate these activities, the United States has imposed sanctions in accordance with our law. The sanctions are:

- A two-year ban on all U.S. licensed exports to these entities (i.e., Glavkosmos and ISRO);
- A two-year ban on all imports into the United States from these entities; and
- A two-year ban on U.S. government contracts with these entities. We are continuing to pursue discussion of this issue with both governments. We have explained to both governments that termination of the Glavkosmos-ISRO deal could permit us to consider a waiver of these sanctions.

Our principal objective -- and it is one that is shared by all of our partners in the MTCR -- is to obtain the broadest possible international cooperation in curbing the dangerous proliferation of missile technology. We want to work with all countries in this effort. We

want Russia and India to be important contributors to this effort. And we are going to continue to work along those lines with them and to urge that they respond to international concern by halting the Glavkosmos-ISRO deal.”(US Press release, 1992)

This has not only waylaid the transfer of technology but also retracted the progress of India in terms of space technology, which took India more than two decades to overcome. The acquisition of cryogenic technology would have significantly enhanced the payload capability of India’s space launch and increased commercial revenue from space launching services. The Indo-US relations deteriorated further after India’s nuclear tests in 1998, when the Clinton administration enforced a unilateral embargo on ISRO thwarting inward flow of technology.

During the same time, the nearly two-decade (1979-98) US-China space cooperation came to a halt following the Congressional Cox committee conclusions on Chinese spying against US nuclear and missile sector. But China’s first human spaceflight in 2003 and its subsequent emergence as a military space power facilitated India forging strategic partnerships with US and changed Washington’s dystopian view of Indian space technology use. Since then India has shown greater interest in joining major export control regimes, which is sinew to reverse the denial of technology from the technological haves. Further, China’s excessive strength prompts states like India to increase their arms and pool their efforts against the dominant state (Waltz 1988). The utility of space in military was proved in the Gulf War (1990-91), also the first space war (Desert Storm), in which the US and its allies against Iraq effectively used space systems. The operational commanders integrated the space technology well into their daily decision-making processes. Lieutenant General Donald L. Cromer, the Commander of Space Systems Division (SSD) said that “Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm will be a water shed for recognizing that space is as much a part of the Air Force and military infrastructure as the airplanes, tanks and the ships. . . All future wars will be planned and executed with that in mind.”⁵(Gopalaswamy 2015)⁶

In 2004 Indo-US civilian space programmes were made part of the India-US Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) agreement. The joint statement released on July 18, 2005 by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh contained promised for high technology and space:

- Sign a Science and Technology Framework Agreement, building on the U.S.-India High-Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), to provide for joint research and training, and the establishment of public-private partnerships.
- Build closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and in the commercial space arena through mechanisms such as the U.S.-India

Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation.

- Building on the strengthened nonproliferation commitments undertaken in the NSSP, to remove certain Indian organizations from the Department of Commerce's Entity List.

The Prime Minister Manmohan Singh further conveyed "India would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. These responsibilities and practices consist of identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and filing a declaration regarding its civilians facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities; continuing India's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty; refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread; and ensuring that the necessary steps have been taken to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines" (Joint Statement 2005).

In the light of an assertive China breaking an informal international moratorium between US and USSR (later Russia) vis-à-vis anti-satellite (ASAT) test in 2007, the space race in Asia deepened, even making some scholars think that India should develop ASAT due to its significant deterrent value (Lele, 2012). In fact, the growing militarization of outer space by China has made India to redraw the contours of its space policy creating repercussions in the organization structure of Indian defence set-up as well. As outlined by Sarabhai, one of the founding fathers of India's space programme, Indian thrust was on the application of advanced space technologies to the 'real problems of man and society'. Consequently, the evolving thrust was on human security rather than military security. Only at a later stage, 'India's technology transfer moved from the civilian side to the military side' – quite unusual to other nations, where military concerns precede, and predominate the contours of space policy (Moltz, 2012).⁷ Initially, the Indian space program focused on mainly experimental, low capability projects that allowed Indian scientists to gain experience in the construction and operation of satellites and launch vehicles. Subsequently, from the mid-1980s, India focused on more capable, mission-specific systems' (Lele 2011:). In 2010 India announced the formation of an Integrated Space Cell under the Ministry of Defence for more effective utilization of the na-

tion's space-based assets for military purposes of the ministry of defence. India's former Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik while delivering the Air Chief Marshal LM Katre memorial lecture at the HAL Convention Centre took serious note of China's growing defence capabilities, particularly its anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon system. He sought the development of India's own missile system that can annihilate enemy satellites. "Our satellites are vulnerable to ASAT weapon systems because our neighbourhood possesses one." Naik was referring to the vulnerability of a series of communication, weather and remote-sensing satellites of the ISRO, which are in orbit (Kerur 2010). "Given India's extensive commitments to space activities, its concerns regarding a demonstrated Chinese ASAT capability may be legitimate and justifiable. However, it is important to assess whether a response to an ASAT in kind is suitable". (Gopalswamy 2015)⁸. Militarised China's existence at its border put Indian security and its policy of peaceful use of outer space in peril. India re-drew the contours of its space policy by moving from 'human' to 'military' security (Kumar 2014). Citing the Union of Concerned Scientists' satellite database, Samson (2015) states that India has 30 operational satellites, most of them being launched by ISRO, and two being launched by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Of these 30 satellites, 11 are communications satellites (some with secondary missions); eight are remote sensing satellites; and the rest have designated missions of earth observation, navigation, meteorology, surveillance, technology development, and scientific research. Of India's operational satellites, 16 are in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), and 14 are in geostationary orbit (GEO). Two more satellites are LEO earth observation satellites that are jointly owned with France (Samson 2015).

Increased Chinese assertiveness and its efforts to militarise space has strengthened the Indo-US strategic ties, however. Indian mission of 2008, the *Chandrayan 1*, included equipment, experiments and 'technical assistance' from NASA. The political and geostrategic pressure of civil space dynamics forced ISRO to move into human spaceflight, and it shows concern of rising China, a concern India shares with the US. In 2011 when ESA proposed China a partner in ISS, the US mentioned India a possible member (Moltz, 2012). India has also strengthened strategic co-operation with the US. A bilateral Joint Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation strengthened joint activities in space, that included OCM2, INSAT3D collaboration, cooperation on Mars mission; international space station; global navigation satellite systems, etc.

Indian Membership in MTCR

The Union Minister of State (Independent Charge) Dr Jitendra Singh in a reply to an unstarred question in Rajya Sabha in July 2016 stated:

India joining MTCR would benefit our space development programme in:-

- (i) Strengthening our international cooperation activities in high technology areas with other space faring nations.
- (ii) Easing the procurements & supplies of export controlled high/ advanced technology items, components, materials, and equipment from other countries, especially MTCR partner states.
- (iii) Enhancing our commercial ventures in terms of export of sub-systems, satellites and commercial launch services etc.

India as a major space faring nation and as a partner state in MTCR could play critical roles in various international fora such as UNCOPUOS, UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) and other space related international fora in major policy decisions relating to space applications, space security topics. India, as a Partner State of MTCR, can take part in the decision making process in ensuring non-proliferation of sensitive space technology related items, which are controlled through a list (called Technical Annex) and reviewed & revised annually through Technical Experts Meetings.

The prime beneficiary of Indian MTCR membership is ISRO, whose cryogenic deal with Glavkomos was scuttled in 1992 due to US sanctions citing violations of MTCR.

The Minister of State for the External Affairs Gen. Dr. V. K. Singh (Retd.) in reply to a question in Lok Sabha on July 20, 2016 echoed similar views and went a step further: “MTCR membership is expected to ease the access to high technology for India’s space programme. It will help us to move up the technology value chain by facilitating tie-ups for Make in India including in the defence sector...Government has taken steps to streamline the process for grant of No Objection Certificates (NOCs) for export of indigenous weapon systems including permissible missile systems...A Strategy for Defence Exports has already been put out in public domain”. Minister’s speech categorically stated the benefits from MTCR membership to India’s space programmes and its linkage to defence and the future Strategy for Defence Exports to export ‘indigenous weapon systems including permissible missile systems’ after meeting.

The presence of Pakistan’s ‘India-centric missile inventory’ and China’s superior ballistice missile technology at its borders put Indian space security in peril. To effectively counter these threats at its borders, India needs a robust Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system with cutting-edge technological inputs. “Unfortunately, at present, India does not possess missiles capable of carrying out any massive retaliatory strikes in the Chinese heartland. Admittedly, the Agni V missile with a range of 5000 kilometres has been tested successfully the second time but it will take considerable time to be operationalized and serial-produced, notwithstanding the optimism shared by the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) officials... The seriousness of the situation is enhanced by

the fact that there exists no credible missile defence shield that can effectively neutralize the threat posed by Chinese ballistic missiles to the Indian heartland” (Probal Kumar Ghosh 2015).⁹

Conclusion

In a globalized world, the diffusion, dissemination and flow of knowledge and technology that promoted technology transfer and innovation systems across the world did not reach the space innovation system, as technology here is perceived as a handmaid of power politics. One of the major factors that restricted the transfer of space technology is the technological oligopoly reinforced by the US leadership, through the discriminatory international regimes MTCR. Twenty-four years ago, on May 11 1992, the US announced the imposing of sanctions against the Russian space organization Glavkosmos and the Indian Space Research Organization because of the transfer of rocket engine technology was inconsistent with Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines. On 27th June 2016 India joined the MTCR as its 35th member and the membership at MTCR “is expected to ease the access to high technology for India’s space programme.” This will be a significant step to strengthen India’s space launch capability, which was hitherto relying on indigenous development and was delayed for nearly two decades due to US sanctions.

Notes

1. For documents related to the MTCR are available at www.mtrc.info. Particular attention may be paid to read its MTCR’s Annex along with its Guidelines. It may be noted that the MTCR addresses not ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and space launch vehicles.

Endnotes

- 1 The present members and their year of joining are Argentina (1993), Australia (1990), Austria (1991), Belgium (1990), Brazil (1995), Bulgaria (2004), Canada (1987), Czech Republic (1998), Denmark (1990), Finland (1991), France (1987), Germany (1987), Greece (1992), Hungary (1993), Iceland (1993), Ireland (1992), Italy (1987), Japan (1987), Luxembourg (1990), Netherlands (1990), New Zealand (1991), Norway (1990), Poland (1998), Portugal (1992), Republic of Korea (2001), Russian Federation (1995), South Africa (1995), Spain (1990), Sweden (1991), Switzerland (1992), Turkey (1997), Ukraine (1998), United Kingdom (1987), and the United States (1987). India joined in 2016.
- 2 Particular restraint will also be exercised in the consideration of transfers of any items in the Annex, or of any missiles (whether or not in the Annex), if the Government judges, on the basis of all available, persuasive information, evaluated according to factors including those in paragraph 3, that they are intended to be used for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction, and there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers. Until further notice, the transfer of Category I production facilities will not be authorised. The transfer of other Category I items will be authorised only on rare occasions and where the Government (A) obtains binding government-to-government

- undertakings embodying the assurances from the recipient government called for in paragraph 5 of these Guidelines and (B) assumes responsibility for taking all steps necessary to ensure that the item is put only to its stated end-use. It is understood that the decision to transfer remains the sole and sovereign judgement of the Government.
- 3 MTCR Article 5. Where the transfer could contribute to a delivery system for weapons of mass destruction, the Government will authorize transfers of items in the Annex only on receipt of appropriate assurances from the government of the recipient state that:
 - A. The items will be used only for the purpose stated and that such use will not be modified nor the items modified or replicated without the prior consent of the Government;
 - B. Neither the items nor replicas nor derivatives thereof will be re transferred without the consent of the Government.
 - 4 Despite the unanimity of the vote it is worth noting in the UNSC, members expressed reserves were apprehensive of the Resolution as they opined that a 15 member Council could not legislate for the whole world. Pakistan was specifically vehement in its criticism given its security predicament and hence its zealotness to maintain a credible deterrence against India. India echoed similar views as recourse to Chapter VII measures could disrupt the power balance between the UNSC and a more representative General Assembly.
 - 5 General Cromer on Operations Desert Storm and the utility of space assets, Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC; available at http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/smc_hist/SMCHOV15.HTM.
 - 6 Rajesh Basrur and Bharath Gopalswamy, *India's Military Modernization: Strategic Technologies and Weapons Systems*. Oxford: OUP, 2015
 - 7 Most countries develop the large rocket programme for military needs. The other notable exception is Japan.
 - 8 Rajesh Basrur and Bharath Gopalswamy, [India's Military Modernization: Strategic Technologies and Weapons Systems](#). Oxford: OUP, 2015
 - 9 Probal Kumar Ghosh "Indian Options for an Effective Ballistic Missile Defence System" in Rajesh Basrur and Bharath Gopalswamy, *India's Military Modernization: Strategic Technologies and Weapons Systems*. Oxford: OUP, 2015

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