

Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations

IJPAIR



Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations

Vol. 16 No. 1 2023

Vice Chancellor

Sabu Thomas

Editor

C. Vinodan

Associate Editors

M.V. Bijulal

Lirar P.

Mathew A. Varghese

Mary Senterla P.S.

Aparna Easwaran

Jojin V. John

International Board of Editors

Kanti Bajpai (National University of Singapore)

T.V. Paul (Mcgill University)

Yong-Soo Eun (Hanyang University)

Harsh V. Pant (King's College London)

Shibashis Chatterjee (Jadavpur University)

Prabhat Patnaik (Jawaharlal Nehru University)

Francis Boyle (University of Illinois College of Law)

Sabina Lautensach (University of Auckland)

Neera Chandhoke (Delhi University)

Rajen Harshe (South Asian University)

Alexander Lautensach (University of Northern British Columbia)

Jayadeva Uyangoda (University of Colombo)

Valerian Rodrigues (Jawaharlal Nehru University)

Editorial Office

School of International Relations and Politics

Mahatma Gandhi University

Priyadarshini Hills P.O.,

Kottayam, Kerala

India PIN- 686560

e-mail: vinodan.c@gmail.com

Printed in India at Alen layout, Kottayam, Kerala, India

Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations

Vol. 16 No. 1

2023

Contents

Economic Development Partnership and Human Rights Situation in Africa <i>M. Venkataraman</i>	5
Peace Process for Mitigating Border Conflict Between India and Pakistan: an Analytical Perspective <i>Raveena Kousar, Subhasis Bhadra and Rajeev M.M.</i>	20
Globalisation and Investment: India's Economic Footprint In Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka <i>Akriti Khajuria and Shreesh Kumar Pathak</i>	31
Alluding Alliance: The Indo-U.S. Trajectory in the New Decade <i>Anwesha Dasgupta</i>	54
Inclusive Policies and Development of Women <i>Tulika Chakravorty</i>	67
Assessing India's Use of Soft Power as an Instrument of Foreign Policy <i>Mohammad Reyaz</i>	81
Exploring the Prospects of Global Partnerships of Teachers in Achieving Sustainable Development Goals in Education <i>Muhammed. K.V.</i>	100
India's G20 Presidency and Global South <i>Jonathan Kithi Alexander and C. Vinodan</i>	108
Growing Significance of SCO: Options for India <i>Kamala Kumari</i>	125
The Plight of Afghan Refugees in South Asia <i>Lirar Pulikkalakath and Vinny Davis</i>	139
India and UN Peacekeeping <i>Munmun Majumdar and T.T. Haokip</i>	148
India's G20 Presidency: Prospects for Global South <i>Parimita Bhuyan and Jayanta Krishna Sarmah</i>	161
India and Thailand: An Evaluation of Bilateral Ties Through the Soft Power Lens <i>P.C. Prasanna Kumar and Manisha Devi. A</i>	174

Interstate Migrant Workers and Healthcare System in Kerala, India: Critical Examination of Social and Institutional Inclusiveness <i>Navas M. Khadar and Bijulal M.V.</i>	184
India's G20 Presidency and the Role of Soft Power <i>Priyanka Singh</i>	199
Beyond Globalisation, Indianisation and Market Welfarism: Kerala a Hub for Critical Knowledge and Critical Entrepreneurship? <i>Pramod C.R. and Ajith E.A.</i>	218
Tibet: Perceptions on the Strategic and Security Concerns of India and People's Republic of China <i>Rakhee Viswambharan</i>	230
Mapping Health Governance: The Encephalitis Containment Programme in Eastern Uttar Pradesh <i>Siddhartha Mukerji</i>	240
The Security Implications of Indo-Israel Space Cooperation in the Context of South Asia <i>Sivakumar M.V. and Rakhil K.</i>	257
Baloch Nationalism and Peace Interval, 1977-1988: The Role of Internal and External Factors <i>Vasundra Raje</i>	269
Caste and Cognition: State of the Art and Reflections from Cultural-Historical Perspective in Psychology <i>Vijith Kuniyil</i>	287
The Concept of Human Rights: Expansion and Changing Dimensions <i>Sijo K. Manuel</i>	303
India's Green Energy Transition: Economy and Geo-Politics <i>Vishnu Aravind</i>	318
About the Authors	330

Economic Development Partnership and Human Rights Situation in Africa

M. Venkataraman

Abstract

The measures adopted to 'develop' have been phenomenally appalling and contradictory if one looks at the impact it has produced on human rights to those sections of society that has been a neglected lot for decades. This is largely true in the context of Africa which has been caught amidst the extensive debate that it has failed miserably in living up to certain human rights standards. The basic argument of this article is therefore that economic development efforts should be holistic and inclusive in nature taking into account the protection of basic human rights. As African countries have embarked on the path to development by taking steps to partner with external actors and seeking economic and political support, yet, in the issue of protection of human rights most of them have been subjected to controversies as well. The question hence is whether the steps taken by African countries so far to partner with external actors have proved useful in both realizing their developmental aspirations and fulfilment of human rights or not? This article aims at analyzing the nexus between development partnership and human rights issues using predominantly secondary sources and personal observations in a descriptive and analytical manner.

Keywords: Development, Human Rights, Partnership, Cooperation, Promotion

Introduction

Africa has long been a marginalized continent and subjected to prolonged exploitation. Starting from the slave trade that Africa was subjugated for long one can identify several phases of its evolution. The famous Berlin conference of 1884-1885 produced the 'scramble for Africa' by the European powers and with that came the entry of European powers and division of Africa and colonization by them. And since independence too Africa has not been left alone with periodic interference from outside powers predominantly with an eye to exploit its vast and rich natural resources. In the process of this different turmoil that African countries had to

undergo, it has been left with underdeveloped status as compared to the rest of the world. As a result, Africa today has been the least economically developed continent and faced with several inter-related challenges of conflict, poverty, hunger, and underdevelopment and human rights abuses. The measures adopted to 'develop' have been phenomenally appalling and contradictory if one looks at the impact it has produced on human rights to those sections of society that has been a neglected lot for decades.

Africa therefore has been caught in the extensive debate of failing miserably to live up to certain human rights standards. As African countries have embarked on the path to development by taking steps to partner with external actors to garner their economic and political support, sadly however, most of such partnership programmes have been subjected to controversies largely owing to negligence that such economic support programmes would have on human rights. The question hence is whether the steps taken by African countries have proved useful in realizing their developmental aspirations and fulfilment of human rights? The aim of this article is to analyze the nexus between development partnership and human rights issues. It proceeds with the understanding that there are gaps in the human rights record and therefore takes only a generalist view of the continent of Africa without delving into depth of each country individually. There is better human rights record of some countries like that of South Africa which is not the case in others like Central African Republic or Democratic Republic of Congo. The article proceeds with a conceptual clarification on basic concepts that runs through the article and then brings out the background situation of Africa in a generalist outlook. Thereafter the article deals with the development endeavours that Africa has embarked upon and then analyzes the issues and challenges faced by such partnership in the context of promotion of human rights.

The Concept

Development partnership is a fairly recent concept that became popular with the declaration at the United Nations General Assembly and adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with the last goal emphasizing "to develop a global partnership for development"¹. However, the concept of development as such is not very new since nations have been aspiring to develop and progress right from the start of the nation-state system itself. What is however new is the kind of ideological orientation, which the concept of development has embraced into itself due to changes, enforced by the prevailing international system upon the understanding of the concept of development itself. Hence it would be useful to first understand the concept and then proceed to talk about development partnership.

What is development then? To many in the field of development it would mean economic development and hence focussed on accumulation of wealth and resources. However, of late, several definitions of the term have been provided by scholars and practitioners. Not only economic development is necessary but any meaningful development should also include political and social too. One such very useful definition is by Gunnar Myrdal, (1974) the Swedish economist and sociologist who was given Nobel Prize for his outstanding work titled *Asian Drama*. Development according to him is “the movement upward of the entire social system” which encompasses not only the economic factors but also all non-economic factors such as “consumption provided collectively; educational and health facilities and levels; the distribution of power in society; and more generally economic, social and political stratification”²

The above definition of Gunnar Myrdal, although provided in the 1970s is quite applicable even this day as the definition is an all inclusive one. Of importance to note is the stress on the upward movement of the entire social system, which in effect means inclusion of all aspects that deal with the day to day affairs of human beings. In other words it emphasizes “human development”³. The focus on human development is something that has become vital today and stressed upon by all development practitioners. So, development is not just about economics alone; rather it’s all round human development. This all round development is stressed to ensure protection of human rights, which are rights that are inherent to all human beings. The concept of rights is both natural and legal and is achieved when accountability to people by the governments is ensured. It is legal because only then it ensures compliance. In that sense a right is a valid claim to something that a human being is entitled for (Renteln, 1988). This concept is a fairly recent one and evolved after the Second World War in the aftermath of which nations of the world brought about universal standards as exemplified at the United Nations General Assembly resolution in 1948 called the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)⁴. Today this has become a standard reference to certain universal acceptance of rights of human beings to be accepted by all nations. Although not binding, yet, this has been the first such universal level acceptance and embraced by all countries including Africa, which brought about African Charter of Human Rights, which was adopted in 1981 and came into force in 1986. The Africa Charter is called the Banjul Charter on Human and People’s Rights⁵.

The concept in other words, involves, promoting social justice and recognizing that equality matters and linking poor people’s perspectives to that of national and international policy processes. The aim therefore is to empower poor people and engage them in the decision-making processes which affect their lives. Hence, any meaningful development should achieve human rights and consider people’s social,

economic, political, civil and cultural in all aspects of the development process. The 'right to development' has now become a standard upon which many countries across the world are relying on. This right has been adopted in 1986 at the UN General Assembly resolution (A/RES/41/128)⁶ and sought to protect all rights of human beings and adopting a human rights approach to development.

Along this line it is equally important to mention the rights based approaches to development that subsequently became prominent in human rights discourse. This framework was extensively pronounced by the United Nations which defined it as a "process of human development that is normatively based on international human rights standards and operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights".⁷ It is evident from the definition that the core of development issues involves inequalities that need to be addressed in order to rectify discriminatory practices and unfair power distributions that hinder progress and frequently lead to certain groups being marginalized. Given the fragility of Africa, as brought out in the next section, this situation turning into conflict cannot be ruled out. Before we turn to discuss the development endeavours taken by Africa and its implications on human rights it would be helpful to provide a brief overview of the African political and economic context.

The African Context: A Brief Overview

Africa's fifty-four states, as they appear today, are results of their colonial history. Chazen (1988: 303) puts Africa as product of 'conquest and separation, amalgamation and continuity, carved out by the imperial powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries'. These "new" states, with only a few exceptions, such as Ethiopia, Egypt and Liberia, achieved independence in the 1960s, were also old societies with pre-colonial history of their own (Tordoff, 1993). And their pre-colonial history is rich with some of the ancient civilizational importance such as the Nile Valley civilization. Trade with the outside world flourished as far as countries like India and China. Consequently, the advent of European powers into Africa changed the dynamics very much starting with the famous Scramble for Africa in 1884-1885 as part of the Berlin Conference with Germany, Britain, France, Portugal and Belgium taking control and dividing them as part of their colonies⁸.

During the colonial era, African countries had limited economic and political visibility in a global arena dominated by colonial powers. Africa is a vast and diverse continent, characterized by heterogeneity. Interestingly, it is also the richest continent in terms of the vast and unexploited natural resources. It has been blessed with abundant reserves of valuable resources and minerals that are unparalleled by any other continent. It possesses everything necessary for material human

development, ranging from oil, natural gas, to diamonds and various minerals. Africa is home to hundreds of ethnic groups and tribes, each with its own indigenous languages, customs, and traditions. This diversity is not only evident in terms of language, culture and ethnicity but also in economic development. The continent exhibits a wide spectrum of economic conditions, including some of the fastest-growing economies such as Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Benin, and Rwanda as well as some of the poorest nations in the world such as Chad and Namibia (Table 1 below).

Anyhow, these developments shaped the destiny of the African continent and its relations not only with Europe, but also its place in today's global and economic and political structures. As pointed out by William (2005), colonialism produced distortion, disarticulation and under development of African economies. Other notable side-effects were that their traditional societal structures were deformed and dominant class were sidelined as in the case of Rwanda and also their cultural forms got affected⁹.

One can notice several common characteristics and problems of Africa at the time of their independence. First, they were ex-colonial, subject to rule by one or another of the colonial powers. Second, they were searching for new identity as nation states. Third, these states were mostly poor, predominantly rural and over dependent on the vagaries of the world market. And fourth, most were characterized by unsettled political culture (Ibid). These characteristic features, as mentioned above, are results of colonialism and have impacted the African states' relations with the outside world. Their dependence on the outside world influences their relations within and with the rest of the world. Ali Mazrui (1977) sees Africa's relations as a struggle against dependency, a situation imposed upon the continent by its historic experience, a situation from which they are now attempting to come out.

Another notable factor of Africa is that their international relations are also influenced by the type of regime ruling it. African countries were ruled by different regimes: Military dictators, civilian governments, democratic, authoritarian, revolutionary and populist administrations (Chazan, 1988). And foreign policy as well as relations with other countries was usually dictated by the type of regime exercising rule over a country. According to Samir Amin (1989), whenever a government is changed in an African country, it is bound to affect its international relations. Its former allies are alarmed by the change and they view the new government with suspicion and disfavour. A good example of this is the case of Ethiopia as well where the death of its Prime Minister Meles Zenawi brought about drastic change in leadership.

African foreign policies also share common objectives. The priorities or "core-values" of national interests of African states are the defense of countries' or states'

sovereignty or national independence, state or regime security (Laz, 2012). African states, like other countries in the world, allocate resources and compete with one another to secure these interests (Chazan, 1988).

Development Endeavours of Africa

In an effort to achieve development countries of the world adopt several policy frameworks some of which are externally driven. For poor countries of Africa there is a need for external support to help facilitate realization of the development imperatives through forging ties with external actors. The external actors' include countries and institutions that enter into partnership aimed at alleviating the challenges of development. Some are global and multilateral such as the UN and its agencies, international financial institutions like IMF and World Bank, the EU and African Development Bank while others are bilateral including the US, China, India, Korea, Japan etc., which African countries have engaged for their developmental endeavours. These partners have been extending support in a wide-range of areas like foreign direct investments, financial and technical assistance, capacity building and infrastructural development, agriculture and industrialization and defence and security as well.

In this regard, the pursuit of African foreign policies is challenged by their capability. As noted by Laz (2012), their capability to exert influence declines when one goes from local to continental and global issues. This is evident from the impact of the end of cold-war in which African states' capacity to exert influence beyond their borders has further declined requiring them to redefine and refine their foreign policies. This is so because foreign policy concerns, nowadays, have shifted from political arena to economic arena as a result of the new global developments; and the economic globalization trends within the international economy have altered the character of North-South economic relationship providing a more complex and uneven environment than that envisioned even at the start of the 1990s (Ibid).

Several characteristic features have defined Africa during the initial period of post independent years. Firstly, Africa was a marginalized player in the global economy (Ibid). Secondly, the Post World War II situation gave leverage to the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to impose Western democratic models and pursuing the liberal economic path (Wiseman, 1995). The impact of this was not impressive as Africa became even more vulnerable since the debt reduction through structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) as economic measures emphasized by the IFIs to overcome their economic crisis not only significantly impacted the African "traditional" notions of sovereignty and limiting their independent policy making process but also did not yield the desired results as was

expected then¹⁰ (Wright, 2002). Of course the negative impact should also be attributed to governance failure as well since, as noted elsewhere, most of the African governments were ruled by undemocratic regimes, which cast a long shadow on their human rights as well as in their economic performances. During this period one can note several Sub-Saharan African countries caught in conflicts as a result thereby depriving or sapping further their economic growth.

However, one can note changes in post 1990 era. This is partly attributed to changes in governance structure as the third wave of spread of democracy and democratization spread to Africa and many countries started embracing democratic governance. Controversies do surround on the extent to which democratic governance was sustainable in Africa as there are various views on it.¹¹ Nevertheless, as far as economic development is concerned, there exists broad commonality among African countries as compared over the past decades. For example, the African Economic Development Bank (AFDB) has projected a growth rate of 4% for 2023-2024 as compared to 3.8 % in 2022 even if it was lesser than what was projected to be the actual growth rate.¹²

In fact, some of the much talked about economically growing countries like Ethiopia in East African region have slowed down of late owing to internal strife and is recovering. Furthermore the IMF has cautioned that ongoing geo-political tensions due to Russia-Ukraine conflict could have significant economic repercussions in terms of disrupted global supply chains and increase in costs of imports and exports particularly fertilizer products, which will have adverse economic effects on sub-Saharan Africa.¹³ Besides, poverty and inequality levels in Africa have been persistently high and have accelerated of late owing to the Covid-19 Pandemic. This region holds some 23 of the world's 28 poor nations of which 54.8 % is from Central Africa; 45.1% from Southern Africa and West and East Africa holds 36.8% and 33.8% respectively.¹⁴

Table: 1 Economic status of select sub-Saharan countries and Human rights rule and rule of law index, 2022

Countries	Projections			Human rights and rule of law index, 2022
	2021	2022	2023	
Angola	0.7	3.0	3.3	6.1
Benin	6.6	5.9	6.1	5.2
Botswana	12.5	4.3	4.2	4.9
Burkina Faso	6.9	4.7	5.0	6.5
Burundi	2.4	3.6	4.6	8.9
Cape Verde	6.9	5.2	5.8	2.6

Cameroon	3.5	4.3	4.9	7.6
Chad	-1.1	3.3	3.5	8.3
DRC	5.7	6.4	6.9	9.3
Equatorial Guinea	-3.5	6.1	-2.9	8.1
Eritrea	2.9	4.7	3.6	9.0
Ethiopia	6.3	3.8	5.7	8.7
Ghana	4.2	5.2	5.1	4.1
Guinea	4.2	4.8	5.8	7.0
Kenya	7.2	5.7	5.3	4.8
Lesotho	2.1	3.1	1.6	7.2
Mali	3.1	2.0	5.3	2.3
Namibia	0.9	2.8	3.7	8.4
Nigeria	3.6	3.4	3.1	6.1
Rwanda	10.2	6.4	7.4	4.5
Senegal	6.1	5.0	9.2	4.3
Seychelles	8.0	4.6	5.6	4.5
South Africa	4.9	1.9	1.4	7.1
Uganda	5.1	4.9	6.5	7.2
Zambia	4.3	3.1	3.6	8.1
Zimbabwe	6.3	3.5	3.0	6.1

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database: 2022 <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2022/04/28/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-april-2022> and https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/human_rights_rule_law_index/Africa/ accessed 27th May 2023

From the above table one can note that for Uganda, the economic development projection for 2023 is rated high at 6.5%, and the human rights and rule of law index score is also relatively high at 7.2. The higher the score the lesser is the record of human rights. This suggests that there may be less correlation between economic development and human rights in the case of Uganda. On the other hand, for Kenya, the economic indicator shows a relatively high projection at 5.3% for 2023, while the human rights and rule of law index score is lower at 4.8. Similarly, for Botswana, the economic indicator shows a relatively high projection at 4.2% for 2023, while the human rights and rule of law index score is lower at 4.9. This indicates a reverse relationship between economic development and human rights records in these countries. It's important to remember that these numbers represent a snapshot of economic projections and human rights index scores, and the relationship between economic development and human rights is complex and multifaceted. It is to be underlined here that various factors, including governance, political stability, social dynamics, and specific policies and practices, can influence both economic development and the protection of human rights in a given country.

Nonetheless, one can agree that economic progress has been possible because of greater economic and political integration and regional cooperation that Africa has been able to achieve. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD),¹⁵ an implementation agency under the new African Union that African leaders have initiated to bring socio-economic development by way of integrating African economies within themselves and with external actors is one such earnest endeavor. NEPAD is a comprehensive action plan that Africa has developed in its aspiration to bring about all round development. At the multilateral level the UN and EU have also rendered substantial economic support to African countries. The UN for example has entered into a strategic partner agreement with African Union in 2017 to address challenges of peace and security and human rights. Conflict in Africa has been a perennial issue hampering not only economic development but also human rights and therefore partnership with UN has enabled substantial financial assistance for peace keeping operations by the UN to African Union. Similarly, the European Union signed Joint Africa – EU Strategy (JAES) at the Lisbon summit meeting with African Union in 2007 focussing on sustainable development besides supporting Africa in achieving peace and security efforts. Notably, promoting democracy and human rights were earmarked as priority areas that the partnership aims to achieve.¹⁶

Be that as it may, the impact of partnerships with other actors should also be noted. In this the role of India and China are noteworthy where one can see significant positive impact. There are significant trade ties that have been happening between them as both countries have been engaging in competing with Africa to capture Africa's vast market. The Confederation of Indian Industry notes that trade increased five times in the ten year period between 2006 and 2016 touching \$ 52 billion in 2016-17.¹⁷ Even if these figures are subject to debate, the point to note is the renewed vigor with which relationships are being built in all areas – capacity building, infrastructure, telecommunication, education, technology and security sector - under the incumbent regime in New Delhi under the platform of India – Africa Forum Summit.¹⁸ Indian private sector is said to play tremendous role in augmenting trade and investments in different countries of Africa. These have produced positive results lifting up the development path of Africa.

Another external partner of Africa is that of China whose role looms large as it has overtaken any other country. Besides the politics of it with China claiming to be a reliable developing partner with Africa with regular summit meetings as that of Forum on China – Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), it is the economic cooperation that has brought criticisms from several quarters. In the 2021 FOCAC meeting China pledged USD 40 billion for Africa's infrastructure projects as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).¹⁹ It is China's economic engagement with Africa that has drawn much controversy in recent times in terms of increasing competition in

internal markets, displacing domestic producers due to cheap Chinese products, dumping of goods and the like. China is now Africa's largest trading partner and statistics tell us significant increase in bilateral trade but impacting Africa in various ways and sectors²⁰ such as manufacturing, industry, agriculture, textiles etc. Actually the impact could vary according to the very diverse size and economic structures and quality of governance and institutions in African economies. It has been observed that China's impact is probably greatest on resource rich economies who benefit from China's demand for raw materials, and probably smallest on the more diverse African economies. For example, countries that export primarily oil (e.g. Angola, Gabon, Sudan and new oil producing countries such as Chad, Uganda and Equatorial Guinea) benefit from Chinese demand without facing competition from Chinese exports in global markets. On the other hand, African countries that export manufactures, such as tobacco products (Benin), refined oil products (Algeria, Egypt and Kenya), manufactured wood products (Cameroon) and processed food (Mauritius) face Chinese competition on the global market but little demand from China (Schiere, 2011).²¹

Issues and Challenges for African H.R

Significant as they are the big question that the development partnership endeavors of Africa raises is the extent to which such measures have helped promote or achieve human rights. A random check on the ranking status of different African countries as per the 2018 United Nations Human Development Index reveals that most of them fall towards the last 50 category of the 189 listed countries. Sadly the bottom most five countries listed is Burundi with (0.426), Chad (0.394), South Sudan (0.385), the Central African Republic (0.404) and Niger with a rating of (0.400).²² What does this tell us despite the overall growth in economic development? How have the partnership worked to realize human rights? There are several issue areas and challenges noted in Africa's development partnership. Understandably not all problems of Africa could be achieved in a short span of time. But in so far as the external actors have engaged themselves to co-opt with Africa it has not yielded big benefits at least when seen in terms of protecting human rights. Most important of all it is evident that there is a lack of inclusive economic and human development in Africa. This is, according to the 2016 African Human Development Report, due to gender inequality that has jeopardized such inclusive growth.²³ The participation of African women in the economic, social and political spheres is limited despite measures to achieve economic progress through external partnerships. In other words the progress is noted but insufficient as of now in terms of actualizing human development and achieving human rights.

Another issue is the unevenness of development with some regions or countries such as South Sudan, Senegal, Malawi and Equatorial Guinea remain neglected or

at least not achieving the results that their fellow African partners have been able to achieve. South Sudan, for example, which came out of its long drawn out civil war with the Sudan, underwent another phase of internal crisis soon after proclamation of independence. And the same goes with regard to its neighboring country Ethiopia, which soon after the takeover of power by Abiy Ahmed and the corresponding change in the nomenclature of the political party from EPRDF to the current Prosperity Party the rift between the TPLF and the ruling party started and escalated to a full-fledged civil war that was later joined by other ethnic factions and along with it is the massive Human Rights abuses.²⁴ And now the challenge of overcoming poverty, illiteracy, malnourishment, equality, peace-building and development in these several countries is enormous. In Equatorial Guinea dependence on oil as the major source of export revenue did not augur well owing to fluctuating price of oil at the international market. And China has emerged as the major partner of this country but yet the challenge of all round development remains.²⁵

The slow progress in poverty eradication – according to reports by Human Rights Watch report and Amnesty International - across many African countries along with rising food insecurity and mal nourishment are other challenges facing Africa today. Besides, Africa lacks the needed infrastructural facilities that could help augment economic development. Here, China and India have been engaged in soliciting projects to build infrastructure in several countries. As an example, according to the Institute of Developing Economies, China has bagged infrastructural projects in some 35 African countries such as in Nigeria, Sudan, Kenya and many more.²⁶ Similarly, India has also been extending support for infrastructural development in Africa in countries like Benin, Burkina Faso, D.R. Congo, Ghana, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Malawi, Zambia etc.,²⁷ How far these would turn out to help achieve growth and realize human rights is yet to be seen. Yet another major challenge is the nexus between ruling elites and development partners that has produced unfavorable results in Africa's development. In this the partnership with China has raised eyebrows as China has vigorously pursued penetrating African market through its Belt and Road initiative and other lending means and methods. Controversies have erupted in the manner in which the Chinese have captured the African markets and accusations have also been leveled against China as a neo-colonial power.²⁸

Conclusion

The above analysis provides a grim picture of development partnership impacting human rights. There is indeed a strong link between development and human rights as both are mutually dependent. It is in this context that the above analysis tried to conceptually link development with human rights. It could be said

that Africa has taken commendable efforts to forge partnership with external actors to help bring about development. But the focus by the development partners – both multilateral and bilateral - has been over economic, scientific, technological and infrastructural issues but without a human centered approach that could translate such advances into realizing their rights. Even if notable strides have been made due to the efforts of European Union the success rate is far from complete as is evident from both the sluggish pace of economic development happening in Africa and when it comes to human rights Africa is invariably pushed to the last place by any international standards. Again, bilateral partnerships are guided by national interests without due consideration to human rights. This applies largely to the case of China, which does not care for political systems or governance issues when it comes to bilateral relationships. Although this is rationalized in terms of China's foreign policy principle of non-interference in internal affairs, yet, for Africa and its few ruling autocratic regimes China is a savior or best alternative. Social institutions, norms and value systems seemed to have been neglected in the attempt to forge economic partnerships thereby creating a gap in the achievement of human rights. To conclude, Africa has encountered tremendous challenges in its long path to development to the extent that it is now the cynosure of all countries as they have sought to undo the negative effects of historical anomalies by forging partnerships. Undoubtedly, economic progress has indeed been registered, but human rights continue to be a cause of concern. What has been achieved so far is not enough since any meaningful development should adhere to human rights values and hence the international community should do more to not merely take into account of their respective national interests but devise measures to appropriately include Africa, integrate Africa and ensure that any development endeavors take into account the realization of basic human rights that ordinary African citizens are entitled for.

Endnotes

1. See, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sdgooverview/mdg_goals/mdg8/ accessed 25th November 2018. See also, UN General Assembly Resolution (UNGA), 55th Session, 18 September 2000
2. Myrdal, Gunnar, What is Development?, Journal of Economic Issues, vol. 8, no. 4, December 1974, London, Taylor and Francis, p. 729
3. See, <http://www.globalization101.org/introduction-what-is-development-2/> accessed 27th November 2018
4. For example see A Short History of Human Rights, <http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-1/short-history.htm> accessed 2nd November 2018
5. See African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People's Rights, http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/achpr/banjul_charter.pdf accessed 2nd November 2018.
6. See <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/41/a41r128.htm> accessed 12th December 2018

7. <https://unsdg.un.org/2030-agenda/universal-values/human-rights-based-approach#:~:text=The%20human%20rights%2Dbased%20approach,promoting%20and%20protecting%20human%20rights> accessed 30th May 2023
8. See for a good analysis on the impact of scramble for Africa, Stelios Michalopoulos[†], Elias Papaioannou, “The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa”, *American Economic Review*, vol. 106, no.7, 2011, pp.1-56
9. See for a good understanding on this, Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London, Bogle L Ouverture Publications, 1972.
10. See also, Ponte, Stefano. “The World Bank and ‘Adjustment in Africa’.” *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 22, no. 66, 1995, pp. 539–558. *JSTOR*, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4006298 accessed 16th December 2018
11. For a different perspective as opposed to this view see, Salih Nur, “Third Wave Democratization in post-cold war Africa: The rise of Illiberal Democracy in Comparative Perspective” *CEU Political Science Journal*, vol.10, issue 1-2, February – April 2015, pp.51-83
12. See <https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/africas-average-gdp-growth-stabilize-2023-2024-despite-recent-headwinds-african-development-bank-new-report-59428> accessed 30th May 2023
13. Qianqian Zhang and Ivanova Reyes, “Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa could permanently decline if geo-political tensions escalate”, <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2023/04/27/cf-economic-growth-in-ssa-could-permanently-decline-if-geopolitical-tensions-escalate> accessed 28th May 2023
14. Enoch Randy Aikins and Jacobus Du Toit Mclachlan, “Africa is losing the battle against extreme poverty”, July 2022, ISS, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africa-is-losing-the-battle-against-extreme-poverty#:~:text=Within%20Africa%2C%20most%20poverty%20is,rate%20below%203%25%20in%202019> accessed 27th May 2023
15. NEPAD was a product of several rounds of negotiations between leaders of African Union. The plan emerged successfully at the Durban summit meeting of AU leaders in 2002 where all agreed to launch NEPAD as an implantation agency to oversee and administer all development programmes including sustainable development of Africa and the newly formed Agenda 2063. See for more details on this and the various developmental projects and programmes taken up by NEPAD, <http://www.nepad.org>. See also, Agbu, Osita. “NEPAD: Origin, Challenges and Prospects.” *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 64, no. 1/2, 2003, pp. 97–115. *JSTOR*, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/41855772.
16. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/continental-cooperation/joint-africa-eu-strategy_en accessed 16th December 2018
17. India Africa Trade and Investment Relations, <https://www.ciiblog.in/india-africa-trade-and-investment-relations/> accessed 13th December 2018
18. India – Africa Forum Summit was launched in 2008 and four such summits have so far been held. See for details, <https://idsa.in/event/india-africa-strategic-dialogue-2018> accessed 13th December 2018
19. Virusha Subban, “Africa: China’s trade ties with the continent continue to strengthen”, <https://www.globalcompliancencews.com/2022/06/14/africa-chinas-trade-ties-with-the-continent-continue-to-strengthen-31052022/> accessed 27th May 2023. See for more discussion on BRI and its impact James MacBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative”, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative> accessed 27th May 2023.

20. China Africa trade has grown from USD 126.9 billion in 2010 to USD 201.1 billion in 2014. See "China-Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Starts a New Chapter", Chinese Ministry of Commerce" http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zt_businessreview/news/201503/20150300908034.shtml accessed 9th January 2016
21. For an excellent discussion the role of China see, Venkataraman, M., & Vignesh, R. (2022). The China Factor in Africa's Path to Liberal Democracy, *Africa Review*, 15(1), 43-61. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1163/09744061-tat00011>
22. See, Human Development Indices and Indicators - 2022 Statistical Update, <http://report.hdr.undp.org/> accessed 27th May 2023
23. Africa Human Development Report 2016, <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hdr/2016-africa-human-development-report.html> accessed 13th December 2018
24. See for more details on this "Crimes against Humanity and Ethnic cleansing in Ethiopia's Western Tigray Zone", <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/06/crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-ethiopias-western-tigray-zone> accessed 12th May 2022
25. Esteban, Mario. "The Chinese Amigo: Implications for the Development of Equatorial Guinea." *The China Quarterly*, no. 199, 2009, pp. 667–685. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27756496.
23. See for details https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/cia_10.html accessed 14th May 2022
24. See Ministry of External Affairs, https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/arebic/lu1557_00.pdf accessed 12th May 2022
25. See Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, "Revisiting the Resurrected Debate About Chinese Neocolonialism" <https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/revisiting-the-resurrected-debate-about-chinese-neocolonialism/> accessed 14th May 2022
26. See for details https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Africa_file/Manualreport/cia_10.html accessed 14th May 2022
27. See Ministry of External Affairs, https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/arebic/lu1557_00.pdf accessed 12th May 2022
28. See Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, "Revisiting the Resurrected Debate About Chinese Neocolonialism" <https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/revisiting-the-resurrected-debate-about-chinese-neocolonialism/> <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2022/04/28/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-april-2022> and https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/human_rights_rule_law_index/Africa/ accessed 27th May 2023

References

- Ali, Sadiq Shanti, (1987). *India and Africa Though the Ages*, New Delhi: National Book Trust.
- Chazen, Naomi and Rothchild, Donald, (1988). *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*, Boulder, West View Press.
- Etemike, Laz, (2012). "Globalization, Sustainable Development and Formulating Foreign Policy in Africa", *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, vol14, no.8, Pennsylvania, Clarion University, pp. 154-162
- Holsti, K. J., (1977). *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 3rd and 7th edition, New Jersey: Prentice –Hall Inc.

- Henderson, Conway W, (1998). *International Relations: Conflict and Cooperation at the Turn of the 21st Century*, South Carolina – Sparanbur: McGraw Hill companies
- Mathews, K., (2007). "India- Ethiopia Ties on Upward spirals," *Africa Quarterly*, February-April, 2007, 47(1):12-20.
- Mazrui, Ali, (1977). *African International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change* Colorado, Westview.
- Muthanna, I.M, (1961). *Indo-Ethiopian Relations for Centuries*, Addis Ababa: Artistic Printing Press.
- Samir Amin, (1989), *Eurocentrism*, New York, Monthly Review Press
- Strange, Susan, (1994). *States and Markets* (2nd ed), London, Praeger Publishers
- Richard Schiere, (2011), *China and Africa: An Emerging Partnership for Development? –An overview of issues*, Africa Development Bank Group, Working Paper Series.
- Tordoff, William, (1993), *Government and Politics in Africa*, 4th ed., Palgrave, Macmillan Press.
- Wiseman, J.A., (1996). *The New Struggle for Democracy in Africa*, Avebury, Aldershot, UK.
- Wright, Handel K, (2002). "Editorial: Notes on the (Im) possibilities of Articulating Continental African Identity" *Critical Arts, A Journal of South-North Cultural & Media Studies*, vol.16, 2, pp. 2-14
- Renteln, Allison Dundes, (2018). "The Concept of Human Rights", *Anthropos*, vol. 83, no 4/6, 1988, pp. 343-364 Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40463371> accessed 2nd December 2018.
- http://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indian-Ethiopia_Relations.pdf accessed 31st July 2014
- Embassy of India at <http://www.indianembassy.gov.et> accessed 15th November 2014
- <http://www.thehindu.com/business/Economy/india-to-become-third-largest-economy-by-2030-pwc/article6180722.ece> accessed 17th November 2014
- http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1325:a-subtle-engagement-ethiopia-and-india&catid=58:asia-dimension-discussion-papers&Itemid=264 accessed 20th November 2014
- Trade between India and Ethiopia is rising: Genet Zewdie, (2014). <http://www.indiaafricaconnect.in/index.php?param=news/2744/in-conversation/116> accessed 19th November 2014
- William Lyakurwa, (2005). Sub-Saharan African Countries' Development Strategies: The Role of The Bretton Woods Institutions, in <http://www.fondad.org/uploaded/Helping%20the%20Poor/Fondad-HelpingPoor-Chapter8.pdf> accessed 18th November 2014

Peace Process for Mitigating Border Conflict Between India and Pakistan: an Analytical Perspective

Raveena Kousar, Subhasis Bhadra and Rajeev M.M.

Abstract

Armed conflict has numerous long-term and short-term effects on development, as well as on human and environmental well-being. Conflict devastates human lives, livestock, livelihood, psychological trauma, and socio-economic infrastructure. Conflict could not lead to any development as it creates destruction, havoc, miseries and alienation. Peace is the only measure to end conflict and utilise the resources for the development of society. The peace process has been initiated by political leaders, activists, and international institutions like United Nations to combat interstate or intrastate conflicts. Subsequently, International laws, policies, treaties, and agreements have been formulated between the parties to entangle conflicts. Even after having such well-framed internationally bounded legislations, conflicts like situations prevail in different parts of the world. Jammu and Kashmir is one of them which is experiencing border conflict since the partition of India into two sovereign states (India and Pakistan). Uncertain firing, the continuous threat to life, unsettled life, and restricted living conditions affects the quality of life of the common people living in villages near the disputed international border. Moreover, the restricted living conditions affect the quality of life. Both nations have taken certain actions to resolve the border conflict. This study focused on the peace process which has been initiated to mitigate the border conflict between India and Pakistan.

Keywords: Border Conflict, Peace Process, Line of Control, Conflict Mitigation

Introduction

The world has witnessed ravaging wars irrespective of the outcome, who wins and who loses. One common aspect affects them all, i.e., the devastation of human lives, livestock, livelihood, psychological trauma, and physical as well as social and economic infrastructure (Betancourt & Khan, 2008; The Secretary-General, 2020). Conflict could not lead to any development in the disputed territories and the adjoining areas. Be it World War I (1914-18), World War II (1939-45), India-China

(1962), India-Pakistan (1948, 1971, 1999), and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, it caused tensions, suffering, and losses (Khudaykulova, 2022; Trzcinsk, 2022; Kyte, 1946; Cardozo, 2000; Champion & Young, 2009). Eventually, it has created colossal destruction, havoc, miseries, and alienation. The ultimate solution to overcome conflicts is the resolution of disputes through the building of sustainable peace measures. It is essential to minimise the destruction and utilise the resources for the development and well-being of society. Conflict mitigation encompasses actions and processes to address the causes of conflict and reduce tensions. Conflict mitigation approaches are utilised for conflict prevention and intervention during and post-conflict. Humanitarian recovery and development initiatives are reviewed in the conflict context and their impact on sustaining and stability of peace (Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies, 2022).

In this context, many political leaders have initiated peace-building efforts on several occasions of war or conflict. Subsequently, many international laws, policies, and institutions have been made to act as mediators between countries' entangled conflicts. Even after having such well-framed internationally bounded legislations, conflicts like situations prevail in different parts of the world. Amongst all those regions and areas, Jammu and Kashmir always remain lime-lighted due to the very peculiar nature of their conflict (Bhat, 2019). Since 1947, the region has been marked as a conflict zone as the situation mostly remains chaotic. Due to territorial disagreements between India and Pakistan, the Kashmir conflict has become more complex. The territorial dispute of Jammu and Kashmir due to *“various political demands by religious, linguistic, regional, and ethnic groups in both parts of the divided Kashmir are continuing with the number of unresolved issues. These range from seeking affirmative discrimination, a separate political status within the state, to outright secession”* (Behera, 2016). Uncertain firing, the continuous threat to life, unsettled life, and restricted living conditions affects the quality of life of the common people living in villages near the disputed international border. Over generations, the communities have suffered severe consequences of the border conflict like loss of lives, property, and serious challenges for a safe, healthy, nurturing environment for the children to grow as responsible citizens (Kousar & Bhadra, 2019; Kousar & Bhadra, 2021; Jacob, 2019). Many children become orphans, many wives become widows, and many people become disabled, in addition to the indiscriminate loss of property, cattle and livelihood. The unending border became the miserable fate of the people residing on both sides of India and Pakistan. Although many efforts have been made to overcome the same through various peace dialogues, ceasefire agreements and flag march of the army for peace, the matter is still unresolved. This study focused on the peace process initiated between India and Pakistan since the independence of both nations, i.e., 1947, and focused on the more

significant concerns of India.

Historical perspective of the dispute

When Britain decided to leave the Indian subcontinent, the British Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act of 1947, which created the two new Dominions of India and Pakistan along with 562 princely Indian States from the British Crown. Jammu and Kashmir was princely state during India's independence (1947). J&K was free to join either India or Pakistan. But the then Maharaja was in the opinion to have an independent status for J&K by making standstill agreements with both the Dominions (India and Pakistan), ensuring the maintenance of the status quo (Abdullah, 1965). Armed tribesmen and soldiers from Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province infiltrated Kashmir in 1947 with the goal of capturing Srinagar (the summer Capital of J&K). On October 26, 1947, then Maharajah Hari Singh signed an Instrument of Accession with the newly established Indian government to deal with the invasion. As a result, J&K became an Indian state, but it became disputed land as the government of Pakistan did not accept J&K as a sovereign state of India.

The Prime Minister of India wrote a letter to the PM of Pakistan to withdraw raiders, but the Pakistani government didn't issue a formal statement on it. In January 1948, India brought the issue before the UN Security Council (UNSC) under Article 35 of the Charter, drawing the Security Council's attention to the raiders' invasion of Kashmir (Mohan, 1992; Anand, 2001). On December 31, 1948, the United Nations Security Council assisted in negotiating a cease-fire line between India and Pakistan, and both countries agreed on it (Anand, 2001; Jacob, 2017; Mohan, 1992). The ceasefire line was redesigned as the Line of Control (LoC) by India and Pakistan after the Bangladesh war of Independence (1972) (Jacob, 2017).

In 2003, a ceasefire was announced by the then Prime Minister of Pakistan. Despite this, incidences of ceasefire violations have been reported. often the intensity increases and seriously jeopardises the lives of common people at the border. Table 1 indicates the incidences of ceasefire violations from 2018 to 2021. In 2020, the incidences of ceasefire violations had increased significantly (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2021). In February 2021, India and Pakistan issued a joint statement agreeing to strictly observe all ceasefire agreements along the border (Haidar & Peri, 2021).

Table 1 Incidences of Ceasefire Violations

Year	No. of Incidences
2018	2140
2019	3479
2020	5133

2021	664
------	-----

(Ministry of Home Affairs, 2021)

Further, this study analysed the peace process at the global level and at the regional level.

Role of United Nations for maintaining peace in border conflict areas of Jammu and Kashmir

In 1947, the division of Hindustan/ Bharat (India) on a communal line led to the creation of two different states i.e. India and Pakistan (Bal & Sinha-Kerkhoff, 2008). The Indian Independence Act of 1947 (Abdullah, 1965) established a partition plan that allowed J&K to join either India or Pakistan. At the initial stage, leaders from both countries reached out to the then Maharaja of J&K to accede, but he denied joining any of them. Its accession to India was a source of contention between the two countries, and war erupted later in 1947(Date) reference. In January 1948, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was formed by Resolution 39 of the UN Security Council to look into and mediate the conflict. Further resolution 47 was adopted in April 1948, and the involvement of observers to end the dispute was approved by both countries based on the proposal of UNCIP. The Secretary-General established the Military Advisers(check) to assure the ground level check on the eruption of conflicts. In order to monitor the ceasefire between India and Pakistan, the first group of unarmed military observers headed by a military advisor visited the mission area in January 1949. This event formed the basis for the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). The observers' key responsibilities were obtaining and gathering accurate data regarding ceasefire violations and losses and reporting to the Security Council through UNCIPs. Through Karachi Agreement (July 27, 1949), a ceasefire line between the countries was drawn. UN military observers supervised that. The Karachi Agreement stated that local commanders on both sides would jointly check the ceasefire line on the ground with the assistance of UN military observers, and UNCIP would send observers where it deemed necessary. Conflicts were to be brought to the UNCIP Military Adviser's notice, who would make the final decision. In Resolution 91, the Security Council decided that UNMOGIP would continue to supervise the ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir when UNCIP expired on March 30, 1951. UNMOGIP's responsibilities included investigating accusations of ceasefire violations and reporting its findings to the parties (India and Pakistan) and the UN Secretary-General (1971 issue).

In 1971, further armed conflict between India and Pakistan erupted, and both the countries aggressively invaded each other's land, disobeying the ceasefire line

agreed through the Karachi agreement in 1949. Subsequently, on the 17th of December 1971, a ceasefire was declared. On December 12, the Security Council met, and on December 21, it adopted Resolution 307 (1971), that both the countries should maintain their position according to the ceasefire line (agreed) through Karachi Agreement, 1949) and must move all military forces to their assigned posts and territories. But both the countries denied following the ceasefire line agreed in the Karachi agreement. In bilateral discussions with Pakistan on the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1972, India followed a non-recognition policy toward outside parties. Pakistani military officials have kept reporting UNMOGIP ceasefire violations. Since January 1972, the Indian military authorities have not reported to UN observers (UNMOGIP, 2016).

Peace process at the national and regional level

Prior to the partition, India and Pakistan were one nation, and several bus and train connectivity were there. After the partition, transport connectivity was terminated. The two countries signed the Tashkent declaration in 1966. Under the declaration, both countries agreed to “*exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter*” reasserted “*their obligation ... not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means relations between two countries based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. Further, both countries agreed to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations, communications, as well as cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan, and to take measures to implement the existing agreements between India and Pakistan*” (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1966).

Thereafter, both countries signed the Shimla Agreement in 1972 to end the antagonism and disagreement that had previously strained their relations and to cooperate in developing a long-lasting friendship and working relationship. The Shimla Agreement outlines a set of guiding principles that India and Pakistan mutually agreed upon and would both abide by while handling bilateral ties. These place a strong emphasis on the following principles: “respect for one another’s geographical integrity and sovereignty; non-interference in one another’s internal affairs; respect for one another’s unity and political independence; sovereign equality; and rejection of hostile propaganda” (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1972). After the Shimla agreement, the train service (Samjhauta Express) began on July 1976, and ran between Amritsar (India) and Lahore (Pakistan), but the services have been frequently suspended in a number of incidences (Goyal, 2019; Krishnan, 2019).

In 1974, two countries signed a Protocol on visits to Religious Shrines to make

it easier for citizens to visit shrines and holy sites in other countries (Ministry of External Affairs, 1974). Similarly, the Cultural Cooperation Agreement was signed between India and Pakistan to promote linkages in art, culture, mass media, archaeology, and sports in 1988. It also facilitates the exchange of artists, poets, writers, and musicians. For the further need to strengthen mutual understanding in cooperation and culture, a Memorandum of Understanding on cultural cooperation was signed in 2012 between the two countries (Minister of External Affairs, 2012). Subsequently, in order to acknowledge the necessity for reciprocal collaboration in problems relating to the application and enforcement of customs laws, agreements on cooperation and mutual aid in custom affairs between the two nations in 2012 (Minister of External Affairs, 2012).

The peace initiatives that started in the late 1990s resulted in the opening of cross-LoC roads. Peace Bus service (530 Kms) from Delhi to Lahore was initiated as one of the most significant developments in 1999 by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the then Prime Minister of India (Bidwai, 1999). Vajpayee arrived at the Minar-e-Pakistan, a symbol of Pakistan's independence fight, to address Pakistan's sense of insecurity and existential risk from India, emphasising that India benefits from a stable, safe, and wealthy Pakistan. During the visit, the Lahore Declaration was signed, emphasised that *"a climate of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides, and that the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is essential for this purpose."* In May 1999, three months after the bus service started, the Kargil War broke out. Thus, Vajpayee's moderation policy was questioned (Mahapatra, 2019).

The Indian government agreed to normalise relations with Pakistan's military ruler, Pervez Musharraf, and Vajpayee sent Musharraf an invitation for discussions in May 2001. He penned, *"There is no other way for the welfare of our people than to find a way of reconciliation."* Despite the uncertainty in bilateral relations, Vajpayee's approach implied that Pakistan, as a neighbour and a player in the Kashmir conflict, cannot be ignored. As a result, it necessitates participation. In October 2003, India offered several initiatives to improve mutual trust with Pakistan. The primary objectives of the initiatives were to enhance land transportation (buses and trains) and water transportation (ships) between the two nations. After a month, both countries declared a cease-fire in Kashmir in November 2003. For the first time, both sides agreed to a formal border ceasefire.

A cross-LoC Road connecting Srinagar on the Indian side of the LoC and Muzaffarabad on the Pakistani side of the LoC opened in 2005, easing travel across the LoC. Another cross-LoC Road opened in 2006, connecting Poonch on the Indian side of the border with Rawalkot on the Pakistani side. With the opening of the roads for travel, negotiations for trade began. In 2008, India and Pakistan started to trade

and provided 92,000 jobs to labourers in the Uri sector (Naqushbandi, 2021). In 2019, India and Pakistan agreed to allow Indian pilgrims to visit Darbar Kartarpur Sahib, one of Sikhism's holiest shrines in Pakistan, without a visa (Kermani, 2018).

Efforts have been made to restore peace between the two countries. Yet the steps could not restrain peace for a longer time. The bus service was suspended following the attack on the parliament in 2001 (BBC NEWS, 2001). India accused Pakistan-backed militants attacked on Parliament and breaking off diplomatic and transport links (BBC NEWS, 2001). Subsequently, trade activities were also stopped whenever there was any controversy or issue in either country (News 18, 2014). When the situation normalised, trade and other services were resumed. It caused a massive loss to the people who were dependent on border trade to make their livelihood. Following the Pulwama terror attack in February 2019, India has suspended the weekly "peace bus" service and border trade between India and Pakistan (Hindustan Times News, 2019). Infiltration of militants and terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir is an important reason often quoted by India as the major factor that hindrance of the peace process (Mukherjee, 2007). In August 2019, the process of engagement and defrosting of tensions was abruptly put to an end after India repealed Articles 370 and 35A and obliterated the special status of Jammu and Kashmir. As a result, tension rose among the countries and observed the highest ceasefire violation in the year 2020 (Bhalla & Aroor, 2021; Ghosh, 2020). In February 2021, both countries agreed to observe a ceasefire "*in the interest of achieving mutually beneficial and sustainable peace along the borders*" (Bhalla & Aroor, 2021). After this, decline in the incidences of ceasefire violations were reported (The Week, 2022).

Conclusion

The border conflict between India and Pakistan is long-standing. People residing near the border are experiencing uncertain firing and frequent displacement. Children are the silent survivors of this conflict. They are deprived of basic rights like a safe environment, education, and the right to life. As seen, the peace process has been initiated at the global and national levels but could not sustain for a longer time. Ceasefire agreements have been signed between the two countries but failed to maintain peace for an extended period. A commitment and political will are required to sustain peace in these regions. A sustainable peace process is required to maintain peace for longer period. Peace is the only way to sustain prosperity and development in the region. Already, three wars have been fought between India and Pakistan. Now the two countries are equipped with nuclear weapons. If the threat

continues as this may be in future, we will see an atomic war in these countries. Thus, the need to maintain sustainable peace between the two countries.

References

- Abdullah, M. (1965). Kashmir, India and Pakistan. *Foreign Affairs*, 43(3), 528-535.
- Anand, A. S. (2001). Accession of Jammu and Kashmir state-Historical & legal Perspective. *Journal of the Indian Law Institute*, 43(4), 455-468.
- Bal, E., & Sinha-Kerkhoff, K. (2008). Religious Identity, Territory, and Partition: India. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 14(2), 155-188. doi:10.1080/13537110801984891
- BBC NEWS. (2001). *Bus trips signal India-Pakistan thaw*. Retrieved June 12, 2022, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3056159.stm
- Behera, N. C. (2016). The Kashmir Conflict: Multiple Fault Lines. *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs*, 3(1), 41-63. doi:10.1177/2347797015626045
- Betancourt, T. S., & Khan, K. T. (2008). The mental health of children affected by armed conflict: Protective processes and pathways to resilience. *International review of psychiatry*, 20(3), 317-328. doi:10.1080/09540260802090363
- Bhalla, A., & Aroor, S. (2021). *To keep peace on LoC, India and Pakistan to abide by ceasefire agreement*. Retrieved from India Today: <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-pakistan-abide-ceasefire-agreement-dgmo-loc-1772917-2021-02-25>
- Bhat, S. A. (2019). The Kashmir conflict and human rights. *Race & Class*, 61(1), 77-86. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396819850988>
- Bidwai, P. (1999, February 19). *INDIA-PAKISTAN: Bus Diplomacy Welcome, Despite Limits*. Retrieved June 12, 2022, from Inter Press Service: <https://www.ipsnews.net/1999/02/india-pakistan-bus-diplomacy-welcome-despite-limits/>
- Cappelaere, G. (2019). *Attack in Afrin, Syria, kills three children and causes significant damage to school*. UNICEF. Retrieved May 23, 2020, from <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/attack-afrin-syria-kills-three-children-and-causes-significant-damage-school>
- Cardozo, B. L., Vergara, A., Agani, F., & Gotway, C. A. (2000). Mental Health, Social Functioning, and Attitudes of Kosovar Albanians Following the War in Kosovo. *JAMA*, 284(5), 569-577. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.284.5.569>
- Champion, H. R., Holcomb, J. B., & Young, L. A. (2009). Injuries From Explosions: Physics, Biophysics, Pathology, and Required Research Focus. *The Journal of Trauma: Injury, Infection, and Critical Care*, 66(5), 1468-1477. doi:10.1097/ta.0b013e3181a27e7f
- Dimitry, L. (2012). A systematic review on the mental health of children and adolescents in areas of armed conflict in the Middle East. *Child: care, health and development*, 32(2), 153-161. doi:10.1111/j.1365-2214.2011.01246.x
- Fazel, M., & Stein, A. (2002). The mental health of refugee children. *Archives of disease in childhood*, 366-370.
- Ghosh, N. (2020). *J&K: Highest number of ceasefire violations by Pak in 2020 since 2003 truce*. Retrieved from Hindustan Times: <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/j-k-highest-number-of-ceasefire-violations-by-pak-in-2020-since-2003-truce/story-TJ7teyXb88dheysDqEgWCN.html>
- Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack. (2018). *Education Under Attack*. New York: Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack. Retrieved from https://protectingeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/documents_eua_2018_full.

pdf

- Gorst-Unsworth, C., & Goldenberg, E. (1998). Psychological sequelae of torture and organised violence suffered by Refugees from Iraq. *British Journal of Psychiatry*, 90-94.
- Goyal, S. (2019). Samjhauta Express: Facts at a Glance. Delhi, India. Retrieved May 2, 2022, from <https://www.jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/samjhauta-express-facts-at-a-glance-1565266798-1>
- Haidar, S., & Peri, D. (2021). India, Pakistan agree to observe 2003 ceasefire. New Delhi: The Hindu. Retrieved March 29, 2022, from <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-pakistan-agree-to-ceasefire-along-border/article61746932.ece>
- Harad, K.H., Soleman, S. R., Ang, J. S., & Trzcinsk, A. P. (2022). Conflict-related environmental damages on health: lessons learned from the past wars and ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. *Environmental Health and Preventive Medicine*, 27, 35-39. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1265/ehpm.22-00122>
- Hindustan Times News. (2019). *LoC 'Peace bus', trade between India and Pakistan suspended over Pulwama attack*. Retrieved June 12, 2022, from <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/loc-peace-bus-trade-between-india-and-pakistan-suspended-over-pulwama-attack/story-MtSrhjMKt86CoGs3M93vFL.html>
- Human Right Watch. (2013). *Safe No More Students and Schools under Attack in Syria*. Human Right Watch.
- Humanity & Inclusion. (2014). *Hidden victims of the Syrian crisis: disabled, injured and older refugees*. Humanity & Inclusion. Retrieved from <https://humanity-inclusion.org.uk/en/news/hidden-victims-radical-change-needed-for-older-disabled-and-injured-syrian-refugees>
- IDMC. (2021). *Global Report on Internal Displacement 2021*. Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Retrieved February 9, 2022, from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2021/>
- Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies. (2022). *Conflict Mitigation*. Retrieved from Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE): <https://inee.org/eie-glossary/conflict-mitigation#:~:text=Conflict%20mitigation%20includes%20all%20actions%20and%20processes%20that,that%20those%20involved%20act%20and%20perceive%20the%20issues.>
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (2019). *Armed Conflict Survey*. IISS.
- Jacob, H. (2017). *Ceasefire Violations in Jammu and Kashmir: A line on fire*. . United State Institute of peace.
- Jacob, H. (2019). *Line on Fire: Ceasefire Violations and India-Pakistan Escalation Dynamics*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Kermani, S. (2018). *Kartarpur corridor: A road to peace between India and Pakistan?* Retrieved May 2, 2022, from BBC: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-46382657>
- Khudaykulova, M., Yuanqiong, H., & Khudaykulov, A. (2022). Economic Consequences and Implications of the Ukraine-Russia War. *International Journal of Management Science*, 8(4), 44-52. doi: 10.18775/ijmsba.1849-5664-5419.2014.84.1005
- Kousar, R., & Bhadra, S. (2019). Assessing the Right to Education in the context of Indigenous understanding of Child rights. In U. K. Popli, & A. K. Singh, *Indigenising Social Work Practice in India* (pp. 100-122). New Delhi: Bloomsbury.
- Kousar, R., & Bhadra, S. (2021). Border conflict: understanding the impact on the education of the children in Jammu region. *Journal of Peace Education*, 18(1), 48-71. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1080/17400201.2021.1873756>

- Krishnan, S. (2019). *Samjhauta Express: Indian Railways cancels Samjhauta Express, after Pakistan permanently suspended its service*. Retrieved from Jagran Josh: <https://www.jagranjosh.com/current-affairs/pakistan-permanently-stops-samjhauta-express-services-1565257824-1#:~:text=The%20Samjhauta%20Express%20train%20services%20were%20suspended%20for,2001.%20The%20suspension%20was%20lifted%20in%20January%202004.>
- Kyte, G. W. (1946). War Damage and Problems of Reconstruction in France, 1940-1945. *Pacific Historical Review*, 15(4), 417-426.
- Mahapatra, D. A. (2019). Peace Process, Cross-border Opening and the Engagement. In *Conflict Management in Kashmir: State-People Relations and Peace* (pp. 64-86). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108539135.005
- Minister of External Affairs. (2012). *Agreement between India and Pakistan on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Customs matters*. Retrieved from <https://mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/PA12Bo214.pdf>
- Minister of External Affairs. (2012). *Joint Statement issued by India and Pakistan during the visit of External Affairs Minister to Pakistan*. Retrieved March 2, 2022, from <https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/20530/joint+statement+issued+by+india+and+pakistan+during+the+visit+of+external+affairs+minister+to+pakistan>
- Ministry of External Affairs. (1974). *Protocol Constituting an agreement between India and Pakistan on Visits to Religious Shrines*. Retrieved from <https://www.mea.gov.in/TreatyDetail.htm?1681>
- Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (1966). *Tashkent Declaration*. Retrieved March 12, 2022, from <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5993/Tashkent+Declaration>
- Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (1972). *Simla Agreement*. Retrieved March 12, 2022, from <https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?19005/Simla+Agreement+July+2+1972>
- Ministry of Home Affairs. (2021). *Ceasefire Violations*. Retrieved March 29, 2022, from <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1741907>
- Mohan, A. (1992). The Historical Roots of the Kashmir Conflict. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 15(4), 283-308. doi: 10.1080/10576109208435908
- Mukherjee, A. (2007). A Brand New Day or Back to the Future? The Dynamics of India-Pakistan Relations. *India Review*, 8(4), 404-445. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480903324990>
- Naqushbandi, U. (2021). *Resume India-Pakistan Trade, Bus Service, Border Villagers Demand After LoC Ceasefire*. Retrieved May 2, 2022, from News 18: <https://www.news18.com/news/india/resume-india-pakistan-trade-bus-service-border-villagers-demand-after-loc-ceasefire-3533471.html>
- News 18. (2014). *Pakistan refuses entry to peace bus from India*. Retrieved June 12, 2022, from <https://www.news18.com/news/india/pakistan-refuses-entry-to-peace-bus-from-india-664584.html>
- Save the Children. (2013). *Comprehensive Outreach to Syrians in Ghor and Irbid on Educational Needs*. Amman: Save the Children and the United Nations Children's Fund.
- Save the Children. (2015). *The cost of war Calculating the impact of the collapse of Syria's education system on the country's future*. London: AIR, American Institutes for Research, Save the Children, CFBT Education Trust, Berkshire. Retrieved from https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/node/13960/pdf/the_cost_of_war.pdf
- The Secretary-General. (2020). *Children and armed conflict*. United Nations General

- Assembly Security Council. Retrieved from https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2020_525_E.pdf
- The Week. (2022). *Pak violates ceasefire along International Border in Jammu*. Retrieved from <https://www.theweek.in/wire-updates/national/2022/09/06/del19-jk-ceasefire-violation.html#:~:text=PTI%20Updated%3A%20September%2006%2C%202022%2012%3A03%20IST%20Jammu%2C,Border%20in%20Jammu%20and%20Kashmir%2C%20an%20official%20said.>
- UN Security Council. (2018). *Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict*. Retrieved March 29, 2020, from https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2019/509&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Sustainable Development. (2017, December 12). *Violence against children*. Retrieved from <https://sdgs.un.org/topics/violence-against-children#:~:text=One%20billion%20children%20globally%20experience%20some%20form%20of,against%20children%20often%20remains%20hidden%20and%20socially%20condoned.>
- UNMOGIP. (2016). *Background*. Retrieved March 12, 2022, from The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP): <https://unmogip.unmissions.org/background>

Globalisation and Investment: India's Economic Footprint In Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka

Akriti Khajuria and Shreesh Kumar Pathak

Abstract

China's assertive economic policies in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) in the form of infrastructure projects, concessional loans, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflow through its Belt and Road Initiative demonstrates China's intent to expand its influence in the IOR. The world today is interdependent and globalised. The assertiveness of China and the increased dependence of island nations on China pose a threat to all nations in IOR, especially India since it hampers regional stability and undermines geopolitical dynamics. Therefore, understanding India's engagement in the region becomes crucial. Despite India's increased economic engagements in the IOR, there remains a significant gap in comprehending India's economic footprint in small island nations. This paper examines India's investment landscape in Mauritius, Seychelles, and Sri Lanka by focusing on three crucial factors vis-à-vis FDI, Line of Credit Statistics, and Export-Import Trade Statistics. India's investment in these nations is comparatively analysed to bring out the variations in India's approach and its reception as well. This study employs a mixed methods approach by utilising both qualitative and quantitative methods to highlight synergies and divergencies in economic patterns. The study seeks to offer India's dynamic approach to investment in these nations and explores India's evolving role in IOR.

Keywords: Globalisation, India, Indian Ocean Region, Investment, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sri Lanka

Introduction

While to other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is the vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in that area. Her future is dependent on the freedom of the vast water surface (Panikkar, 1951; 85).

As articulated by Panikkar (1951), India's future is intricately linked to the freedom of this expansive water surface. This profound reliance on the Indian Ocean

underscores the centrality of this maritime expanse to India's geopolitical and strategic considerations. Situated in South Asia, India occupies a prominent position within the vast reaches of the Indian Ocean. The initiation of 'Mission Sagar' in response to the COVID-19 epidemic marked a pivotal juncture in India's engagement with the Indian Ocean Island states, highlighting a distinctive commitment to the region. This endeavour aligns with India's strategic perspective on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), emphasising increased outreach and substantial efforts in areas such as marine security, maritime domain awareness, connectivity, blue economy, and infrastructure.

The Indian Ocean ranked as the world's third-largest ocean, plays a critical role in shaping global geopolitics, trade dynamics, and maritime security. Along its coastlines reside 2.6 billion people, representing a diverse array of political, cultural, and economic variations. India's geographical positioning places it at the epicentre of this crucial maritime domain, with an extensive coastline along its southern and western borders providing direct access to this vital waterway. Historically, the Indian Ocean has served as a conduit connecting India with Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and beyond, contributing significantly to the rich tapestry of Indian civilisations (Malik and Nunes, 2017).

The growing presence of major powers such as the US and China in the waters surrounding India has compelled the nation to elevate its naval diplomacy and focus on maritime cooperation. Additionally, the presence of these powers has positioned smaller nations at the very centre of major power rivalries in the region. As a result, the IOR has evolved into a contested space wherein major powers are directing their funds and resources towards island nations which are strategically and advantageously placed. It is important to note that the IOR as it stands today is not just a geographical construct but rather an important theatre of geopolitical dynamics of the region.

Conceptual Framework

This paper analyses India's economic footprint in the Indian Ocean Islands of Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka by analysing FDI, Trade and Credit lines. The conceptual framework of this study is based on the interaction between globalisation, economic interdependence between nations and the dynamics of regional security. Stiglitz (2002) defined globalisation as the 'removal of barriers for free trade and the closer integration of national economies.' He claimed that although globalisation is largely a desirable phenomenon, the way it has been imposed on developing countries has to be reconsidered (ibid.). According to Bhagwati (2004), globalisation refers to a process by which national economies are integrated into world economies through trade, FDI flows, flow of technology and human capital. With context to

India's increased footprint in the IOR, globalisation surely has had a role to play post the LPG reforms of the 1990s¹. In addition to this, India's economic footprint is also characterised by interdependence between nations. Keohane and Nye (1989) elucidated the difference between interdependence and dependence wherein interdependence meant 'mutual dependence' which is characterised by 'reciprocal effects' and dependence alone meant a situation where any nation is significantly impacted by external forces. Although interdependence facilitates cooperation it can also lead to vulnerabilities especially when major powers are involved.

This paper is based on assessing India's economic footprint in the IOR and therefore three nations vis-à-vis Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka have been meticulously selected. This selection can be traced to the primary overseas visit undertaken by PM Modi when he assumed office in 2014. It was during this tour that India unveiled its vision for the region which is reflected in 'Security and Growth for All in the Region' (SAGAR)². The significance accorded to these nations shows India's proactive involvement in the region and this is reiterated by the presence of Sri Lankan President Ranil Wickremesinghe, Mauritius Prime Minister Pravind Kumar Jugnauth and Vice-President of Seychelles Ahmed Afif at the PM Modi's oath ceremony after his third consecutive win in June 2024 (The Hindu Bureau 2024). The then External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar during his visit to Seychelles in 2020 articulated that even though Seychelles was India's 'neighbour across waters', it still was a 'part of India's Neighbourhood First Policy³ too' (MEA, 2020d).

Methodology

This research paper utilises a mixed-methods approach to examine India's economic footprint in Mauritius, Seychelles, and Sri Lanka. It aims to provide a comprehensive analysis by using both quantitative and qualitative research methods. The quantitative data collection primarily constitutes FDI data which is collected from Investment Climate Statements Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs in Department Reports and Publications released by the U.S. Department of State; Line of Credit Statistics which is collected from Export-Import Bank of India, Government of India; and Export-Import data collected from Export-Import Data Bank, Department of Commerce, Government of India. This data will then be analysed qualitatively and be summed as findings towards the end of this paper. Both primary sources such as policy documents, government reports, etc, and secondary sources such as journal articles, books, web articles, etc have been utilised. Additionally, this paper also contains inputs from experts which has enabled a thorough analysis of India's investment landscape in the region.

This paper is structured into three major sections. First, discusses India's bilateral relations with all three island nations which shall serve as the foundation

for the rest of the study. The subsequent section comprehensively explores three key factors – FDI, trade statistics, and Line of Credit. This comparative analysis will provide an in-depth analysis of India's approach to engaging in the economic dynamics of these nations. The paper concludes with key findings that highlight convergences and divergences in India's investment patterns and strategic recommendations for enhancing economic ties and addressing challenges with all three nations.

Case Study 1: India and Mauritius

India and Mauritius have a strong and enduring relationship which is defined by close historical, demographic, and cultural ties. The longstanding ties between both nations are apparent from the fact that almost 1.2 billion or 70% of the population of Mauritius is of Indian origin. Significantly, Mauritius holds the distinction of being one of the few nations with which India established diplomatic relations back in 1948, predating Mauritius' attainment of independence. This relationship is not merely historical but also fortified by continuous high-level political engagement, fostering a high degree of mutual trust and understanding between the leaders of both nations which has paved the way for robust collaboration in various domains, including capacity-building, development partnerships, maritime security, and the provision of bilateral technical support. For instance, the transfer of Indian experts to the Government of Mauritius to enhance bilateral cooperation between both nations (High Commission of India, Mauritius 2023).

As the first Prime Minister and Father of the Mauritian Nation, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, emphasised the importance of India in Mauritius' foreign policy. The robust ties between both nations were established when Mauritius attained independence on March 12, 1968, and subsequent leaders have strengthened this relationship by continuing on the same lines. The relationship between both nations extends beyond geography as a result of which India has evolved as a leading trading partner of Mauritius (MEA 2016). The strong collaboration between the nations can be observed in India's steadfast support at times of crisis. During the Wakashio Oil-Spill Crisis India emerged as the 'first responder' to Mauritius' call for assistance. During the COVID-19 pandemic in April-May 2020, India provided considerable aid by supplying 13 tonnes of essential medications which included 10 tonnes of Ayurvedic medicines and 0.5 million HCQ tablets. India also dispatched a Rapid Response Medical Team to support Mauritius' medical operations. India was the first nation to provide COVID-19 vaccines to Mauritius and it was on January 22, 2021, that India gifted 1 lakh doses of Covishield vaccines (High Commission of India, Mauritius 2021). India extended its assistance by supplying an additional 1

lakh doses of Covishield and 2 lakh COVAXIN tablets commercially. The partnership between both nations during the pandemic extended beyond just healthcare as it also constituted the exchange of experts in the form of a ten-member Indian medical team to tackle shared challenges. This effort was reciprocated during the second wave of COVID-19 by Mauritius in 2021 wherein Mauritius donated 200 oxygen concentrators to support India in its efforts against the pandemic. These instances serve as fundamental to this enduring relationship between both countries (High Commission of India, Mauritius 2023).

A significant milestone in this relationship was in February 2021 when the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership (CECPA) was formally signed during the visit of Dr S Jaishankar, the then Minister of External Affairs after nearly fifteen years of complex negotiations. This not only marked the start of a new chapter in bilateral relations between India and Mauritius but also a significant accomplishment as the first trade deal ever signed by India with an African country. This economic collaboration was further strengthened in August 2022 by incorporating a new chapter on General Economic Cooperation (GEC). In addition to this, Auto-Trigger Safeguard Mechanism (ATSM) provisions were introduced which highlighted the determination and intention to ensure the sustainable and fair practice of economic interactions between the two nations (High Commission of India, Mauritius, 2023). The significance of Mauritius to India's diplomatic and development initiatives is apparent through various instances. Particularly, Mauritius was given a special invitation to attend the G20 in September 2023 (MEA, 2023b). Additionally, India has also undertaken historic infrastructure projects with grant aid. A few examples include the new Supreme Court building in Port Louis which was inaugurated on July 30, 2020, and projects such as Phase I of the Metro Express Project and the new ENT hospital project (MEA, 2020b). Under a special economic package announced in October 2019, these projects exemplify the tangible outcomes of strong bilateral ties. The ongoing and future phases of the Metro Express Project, extending urban mobility, and the recent launch of Phase III on January 22, 2023, solidify the enduring friendship between India and Mauritius, showcasing a shared vision for progress and growth through collaborative developmental assistance.

During President Kovind's visit in 2018 to the ApravasiGhat World Heritage Site and venerated Ganga Talao, he emphasised the role of Mauritius as a gateway to both Africa and the Indian Ocean Region. He reiterated its potential as a hub for Indian businesses looking to expand into Africa and acknowledged India and Mauritius as natural partners with Mauritius acquiring the moniker of 'Star and Key' of the Indian Ocean (MEA, 2018).

Case Study 2: India and Seychelles

India's relationship with Seychelles dates back to the 1770s when the first inhabitants of the islands vis-a-vis five Indians arrived as plantation workers along with seven African slaves and fifteen French Colonists. During the British colonial period, Seychelles was governed by the Bombay Presidency which promoted strong maritime linkages and the exchange of goods and necessary items with India. It was in 1976 when Seychelles attained independence that the diplomatic relations between both nations were established and this marked the start of bilateral relations characterised by shared historical ties (MEA, 2023g).

The historic visit to Seychelles by PM Modi in 2015 was India's first Prime Ministerial-level visit in 34 years. This visit laid the groundwork for a series of agreements and MoUs that have strengthened the cooperation between the nations over the years. Some notable agreements include those of Air Service (1981), Tourism (1996) and Trade (2000). Furthermore, strategic cooperation has been established via MoUs on Defence Cooperation and Science and Technology in 2003 and Cultural exchange in 2003-05. Post-PM Modi's visit in March 2015, the momentum of collaboration continued with the signing of several impactful agreements, such as those related to Renewable Energy Cooperation, Cooperation in the field of Hydrography, and the Protocol on Sale of Navigational Charts/Electronic Navigational Charts. A significant Agreement on the Development of Facilities on Assumption Island further solidified the strategic partnership. During the first State Visit of then President Danny Faure in June 2018, six agreements/MoUs were signed, including the White Shipping Data Agreement, MOU on Cybersecurity, MOU on Small Development Projects, and the Cultural Exchange Program for the years 2018-2022. A notable Twinning Agreement was also established between the Corporation of the City of Panaji (Municipal Corporation) and the City of Victoria of the Republic of Seychelles (MEA Annual Report, 2022). In more recent developments, both countries signed a MoU for reciprocal recognition of COVID-19 Vaccination Certificates in 2022, demonstrating collaborative efforts in addressing the global pandemic. Additionally, in 2023, a MoU for Cooperation in the field of Electoral Management and Administration was inked, reflecting the commitment to democratic processes and governance. These agreements collectively underscore the multifaceted and dynamic nature of the evolving partnership between India and Seychelles (MEA, 2023g).

India and Seychelles have strong bilateral ties which are underpinned by PM Modi's vision of 'SAGAR' and India's commitment to 'Neighbourhood First' Policy (MEA, 2023f). For instance, the MoU for High Impact Community Projects (HICDPs), supply of essential medicines, joint military exercise Ex-LAMITYE in 2022, the visit of the Chief of Naval Staff, and the participation of INS Kolkata in

Seychelles' National Day Parade signify a burgeoning partnership between the two nations. India's contributions demonstrate India's commitment beyond defence collaboration to Seychelles' socio-economic development, and humanitarian efforts which reflect India's holistic approach to bilateral relations (MEA Annual Report 2022).

Case Study 3: India and Sri Lanka

The relations between India and Sri Lanka date as back as 2500 years (MEA 2021b). Sri Lanka's significance to India is underscored by its strategic position in the Indian Ocean, positioned near one of the globe's busiest sea trade routes. India's historical ties with Sri Lanka trace back to the 3rd century BCE, with references in the Ramayana highlighting the connection between the two nations (Raina, 2022). During this period, Sri Lanka was ruled by Yaksha King Kubera, and the mention of Rama's bridge further solidified the mythological link between India and Sri Lanka. Subsequently, the introduction and spread of Buddhism by Arahant Mahinda, the son of King Ashoka, underscored the enduring cultural and religious bonds shared by both countries. The Sinhalese population embraced Buddhism, while the Tamils continued to adhere to Hinduism. However, the post-independence era witnessed a widening gap between India and Sri Lanka, exacerbated by discriminatory policies such as the official recognition of Sinhala as the sole language. This linguistic divide strained relations, particularly with the Tamil-speaking population. The most challenging period in bilateral relations occurred during the civil war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan government. India intervened through the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) mission, but the deployment faced complexities and eventually led to the recall of troops. The culmination of the conflict came in 2009 when the Sri Lankan government successfully eradicated the LTTE (Raina, 2022).

In the recent decade, a noticeable shift has occurred as Sri Lanka increasingly aligns itself with China, especially after India's intervention through IPKF. This tilt is particularly evident in the formal ceding of control over the Hambantota port to China through a 99-year lease agreement (PTI, 2021). In a noteworthy extension of their economic collaboration, Sri Lanka has taken additional steps to strengthen ties with China. A significant development is the decision to establish a Special Economic Zone around the Colombo port city. This move is indicative of Sri Lanka's commitment to fostering economic cooperation and attracting investments, with China playing a pivotal role in the financial backing of this ambitious endeavour. In addition, Sri Lanka's establishment of a new economic commission, funded by China, demonstrates the growing significance of economic ties between both nations (Rajasimhan and Kumar, 2021).

In 2019 Sri Lanka found itself embroiled in the most severe drop in its economic history since independence. The Sri Lankan government attributes this crisis to a combination of factors *vis-à-vis* the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic which impacted the country's tourism industry and a series of bomb attacks in 2019. The critics point out that the situation was further exacerbated due to Mr. Rajapaksa's policies such as catering to the domestic market rather than promoting international trade which resulted in a lopsided balance with excessive imports and minimal exports. Furthermore, the implementation of tax cuts in 2019 resulted in a substantial drop in revenues which further strained the country's economic health. The repercussions were felt acutely, reaching a point where the shortage became so dire that the import of chemical fertilisers was banned, precipitating widespread crop failures. Collectively, these factors have propelled Sri Lanka into a precarious economic tailspin, underscoring the multifaceted challenges and policy decisions that have contributed to the current state of economic distress. As per the findings of the United Nations Development Programme Survey conducted in 2022 and 2023, a substantial 55.7% of Sri Lanka's population exhibited vulnerability across multiple dimensions (Srinivasan, 2023).

As of the conclusion of 2021, the distribution of outstanding loans as a proportion of foreign debt revealed a breakdown: 20% from China, 15% from the Asian Development Bank, 10% from the World Bank, 36% from International Sovereign Bonds, 9% from Japan, 2% from India, and miscellaneous contributions from other sources (Moramudali and Panduwala, 2022). In response to the economic crisis, India has undertaken substantial efforts. Beyond extending significant credit lines, especially for fuel, India's assistance had already reached 270,000 metric tons by April 2022. The support from India has been comprehensive, encompassing humanitarian supplies, financial aid, and various other forms of assistance (Firstpost, 2022). An instance of India's assistance to Sri Lanka amid its economic challenges materialised with the presentation of a Dornier Maritime Reconnaissance aircraft on 15th August 2022. This generous gesture was aimed at bolstering Sri Lanka's maritime security. In a testament to collaborative efforts, naval and air force personnel from Sri Lanka underwent a comprehensive four-month training program in India to adeptly operate the aircraft (MEA, 2022).

Indeed, Minister of State for External Affairs and Parliamentary Affairs, Shri V. Muraleedharan, actively took part in the commemorative events associated with the 75th Independence Day of Sri Lanka on February 4, 2023 (MEA, 2023). The year 2023 has been a pivotal period for both nations, marked by significant collaborations. A remarkable development during this time was the exchange of Letters of Exchange and Acceptance, signalling the initiation of Phase 4 of the flagship Indian Housing project. This phase involves the construction of 10,000 houses in the plantation

areas. Additionally, both nations concurred on injecting additional funds into nine ongoing High Impact Community Development projects, underscoring their commitment to enhancing socio-economic development. Adding to this development, a ferry service began between Nagapattinam in India and Kankesanthurai in Jaffna, Sri Lanka. The governments of both nations have pledged to support and extend ferry services to other ports including the historic route between Rameshwaram, India to Talaimannar, Sri Lanka (MEA, 2023d).

Over the past year, India has shown continued commitment to support Sri Lanka in resolving its economic challenges. Sri Lanka holds a significant position in India's SAGAR vision and 'India's Neighbourhood First Policy'. The comprehensive and multi-pronged support extended by India to Sri Lanka not only reinforces diplomatic ties but also exemplifies a shared commitment to regional prosperity and stability.

Comparative assessment of the investment landscape

To compare and comprehensively understand the investment landscape of all three nations, three factors are taken into consideration, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from and to India from respective countries, Line of Credit statistics, and Export-Import Trade Statistics.

FDI Statistics

FDI plays an important role in the development of an efficient global economic framework. It involves transferring funds from one country to another usually with a long-term investment or 'lasting interest' in mind. The term 'lasting interest' is defined by the direct investor holding a minimum of 10% of the voting power in the enterprise receiving the direct investment. This type of investment not only promotes economic interdependence but also demonstrates a continuous commitment by foreign entities to influence the invested enterprise's decision-making process (OECD, 2023). FDI has far-reaching consequences for developing nations like Mauritius, Seychelles, and Sri Lanka as it serves as a catalyst for augmenting investible resources and fostering capital formation. More critically, it serves as a conduit for the transfer of production technology, skills, innovative capabilities, and organisational and managerial practices across borders. This transfer not only enriches local economies but also facilitates integration into international marketing networks (Mallampally and Sauvant 1999). For countries like Mauritius, Seychelles, and Sri Lanka, the inflow of FDI holds the promise of significant economic development. The enduring benefits encompass not only the immediate economic gains but also the elevation of their strategic geopolitical importance over the long term.

Table 1a: FDI Data, Mauritius: Investment Climate Statements 2019-2023 (U.S. Department of State)


FDI Data, Mauritius (US Dollars, Millions) Investment Climate Statements 2019-2023 (U.S. Department of State)				
Years	Inward Direct Investment from India		Outward Direct Investment to India	
2023	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2022	\$24,324	7%	\$121,255	42%
2021	\$25,006	8%	\$120,513	44%
2020	\$25,598	8%	\$125,951	44%
2019	\$23,724	7%	\$99,798	37%

Note. Adapted from 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023 Investment Climate Statements: Mauritius, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs in Department Reports and Publications released by the U.S. Department of State. Compiled by the author

Table 1b: FDI Data, Sri Lanka: Investment Climate Statements 2019-2023 (U.S. Department of State)


FDI Data, Sri Lanka (US Dollars, Millions) Investment Climate Statements 2019-2023 (U.S. Department of State)				
Years	Inward Direct Investment from India		Outward Direct Investment to India	
2023	\$2,227	12.4%	\$206	13.5%
2022	\$1,810	13%	\$205	14%
2021	\$1688	13%	\$205	14%
2020	\$1737	13%	\$205	14%
2019	\$1239	11%	\$206	18%

Note. Adapted from 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023 Investment Climate Statements: Sri Lanka, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs in Department Reports and Publications released by the U.S. Department of State. Compiled by the author



Source: Compiled by author

For the three nations, though data for Seychelles is lacking, the examinations of trends of India's investments in Mauritius and Sri Lanka and vice versa indicate dynamic patterns of economic engagement. The available data, State's Investment Climate Statements over the past five years, sheds light on the FDI landscape. In the case of India and Mauritius, a notable reciprocity is evident. While India contributes 7-8% of its FDI to Mauritius, Mauritius, in turn, allocates more than 40% of its FDI to India. This reciprocal relationship underscores Mauritius' substantial role as one of the leading foreign investors in India (Table 1a). Notably, in the fiscal year 2023, Mauritius emerged as the second-highest FDI contributor to India, trailing only the United States (Das 2023).



Source: Compiled by author

Conversely, India's FDI investments in Sri Lanka constitute 12-13%, a percentage mirrored by Sri Lanka's reciprocal investment in India. Despite this proportionality, the monetary disparity is striking, with Sri Lanka investing approximately USD 206 million in 2023, compared to India's substantial FDI contribution of USD 2,227 million (Table 1b). This discrepancy highlights the vast difference in economic scale and capacity between the two nations. While FDI data for Seychelles is unavailable, it is essential to note that India does not rank among the top five investors in this island nation. This underscores the diverse FDI landscape across different partner countries, with each exhibiting unique patterns of economic engagement with India (US Department of State, 2023a). FDI, in this context, becomes a pivotal driver in fortifying infrastructure development and enhancing maritime security capabilities. The infusion of foreign capital not only addresses immediate economic needs but also lays the foundation for sustainable growth and increased resilience on the global stage.

Line of Credit Statistics

The Line of Credit (LOC) extends a financial facility to developing countries in the form of a 'soft loan,' featuring concessional interest rates and repayment

obligations. It is crucial to emphasise that the LOC is not a grant but rather a financial instrument that necessitates repayment. A distinctive feature of LOCs is their role in fostering the export of Indian goods and services, with a requirement that 75% of the contract's value be sourced from India. This not only supports the economic interests of India but also enhances bilateral trade relations. Furthermore, LOCs are instrumental in facilitating diverse developmental projects across sectors such as Agriculture, Infrastructure, Telecom, Railway, Transmission/Power, Renewable Energy, and more. This underscores the versatile and comprehensive impact of LOCs, contributing to the socio-economic advancement of recipient countries (MEA 2015a).

Table 2a: Line of Credit Statistics for Mauritius from the Government of India

Govt. of India – Line of Credit Statistics for Mauritius			
Year of Approval	Borrower	Amount of Credit (in USD Million)	Purpose
2022-2023	SBM (Mauritius) Infrastructure Development Co. Ltd	300	For the implementation of Mauritius Metro Express Project Phase-IV from Reduit to St. Pierre and Cote d'Or Region
2021-2022	SBM (Mauritius) Infrastructure Development Co. Ltd	465	Equity Participation for financing various Infrastructure Projects
2020-2021	Govt. of Mauritius	100	For procurement of defence items from India
Total (2000 – till date)		1,029.8	

Note. Collected from Export-Import Bank of India Statistics, Government of India. Compiled by the author

Table 2b: Line of Credit Statistics for Seychelles from the Government of India

Govt. of India – Line of Credit Statistics for Seychelles Source - Export-Import Bank of India Statistics			
Year of Approval	Borrower	Amount of Credit (in USD Million)	Purpose
2015-2016	Govt. of Seychelles	10	Procurement of goods and projects as per the specified needs of the Government of Seychelles

2013-2014	Govt. of Seychelles	4.05	Implementation of Integrated Health Information System
2006-2007	Govt. of Seychelles	3.95	Purchase of Essential Commodities from India
Total (2000 – till date)		18	


Note. Collected from Export-Import Bank of India Statistics, Government of India. Compiled by the author

Table 2c: Line of Credit Statistics for Sri Lanka from the Government of India

Govt. of India – Line of Credit Statistics for Sri Lanka			
Year of Approval	Borrower	Amount of Credit (in USD Million)	Purpose
2022-2023	Govt. of Sri Lanka	55	For Procurement of Urea Fertiliser
2021-2022	Govt. of Sri Lanka	500	For the purchase of Petroleum Products
2020-2021	Govt. of Sri Lanka	100	For Projects in the Solar Energy Sector
Total (2000 – till date)		2234.43	

Note. Collected from Export-Import Bank of India Statistics, Government of India. Compiled by the author

In the fiscal year 2022-2023, India demonstrated its commitment to bolstering the infrastructure and economic stability of its neighbouring countries through strategic financial initiatives. Notably, a Line of Credit (LOC) amounting to USD 300 million was extended to SBM Infrastructure Development Co. Ltd. in Mauritius. This substantial financial support specifically targeted Phase-IV of the Mauritius Metro Express Project, underlining India's dedication to fostering crucial infrastructure development in Mauritius (refer to Table 2b for details). Similarly, recognising the economic challenges faced by Sri Lanka, India took proactive measures to address essential needs. A credit line of USD 55 million was extended to facilitate the procurement of Urea fertiliser, followed by a credit infusion of USD 500 million for the procurement of petroleum products. This strategic financial support not only addresses Sri Lanka's immediate requirements but also reflects India's commitment to aiding its neighbour during a period of economic crisis (refer to Table 2c for details). These initiatives underscore India's role as a reliable partner in promoting regional economic development and stability.



Source: Compiled by author

The disparity in the Line of Credit (LOC) extended to Mauritius and Seychelles, as revealed by the Export-Import Bank of Indian Statistics, Government of India, is notable. The data, outlined in Tables 2a and 2b, illustrates a substantial difference in the financial support provided to these smaller nations. Since the year 2000, the Government of Seychelles has received a total credit of USD 18 million, whereas Mauritius has benefited significantly with a total credit of USD 1029.8 million (refer Tables 2a and 2b for detailed figures). In addition to the credit provided to different nations, it is also worth noting the objectives for which these credits are provided. In the instance of Mauritius, the funds are generally provided for financing infrastructure projects and the purchase of defence equipment. In contrast, Seychelles secured a line of credit for infra projects and the establishment of an Integrated Health Information System. Meanwhile, the financial assistance given to Sri Lanka was to address immediate needs, which included the purchase of petroleum goods and urea fertiliser. This nuanced approach in designing the Lines of Credit based on the circumstances of individual nations demonstrates India's versatility and commitment to supporting the development of neighbouring countries and a stable neighbourhood means a peaceful and prosperous India (refer to Tables 2a and 2b for specific details). Lastly, it helps to enhance international cooperation, facilitate infrastructure projects and contribute to overall socio-economic growth.

Trade Statistics

The balance between imports and exports has a significant impact on critical economic indicators such as the Gross Domestic Product, Exchange Rates, Inflation rates and Interest rates. A trade surplus wherein the exports of a nation exceed its imports indicates its robust economy and a trade deficit indicates an economy which is facing prospective challenges. The relationship between trade balance and

exchange rates is critical since the value of domestic currency influences both export competitiveness and import costs (Congressional Research Service, 2020). Comprehending India's trade statistics with these island nation-states will help in assessing performance to formulate trade policies.

Table 3a: Export-Import Data between Indian and Mauritius

India – Mauritius: Export-Import Data (US Dollars, Millions)				
Years	India's Export to Mauritius	Share%	India's Import from Mauritius	Share%
2022-2023	462.69	0.10%	91.50	0.0128%
2021-2022	714.85	0.16%	71.87	0.117%
2020-2021	422.91	0.14%	42.61	0.01%
2019-2020	662.13	0.21%	27.89	0.0059%
2018-2019	1,160.78	0.35%	71.59	0.0139%

Note: Collected data from Export-Import Data Bank, Department of Commerce, Govt. of India. Compiled by the author

Table 3b: Export-Import Data between Indian and Seychelles

India – Seychelles: Export-Import Data (US Dollars, Millions)				
Years	India's Export to Seychelles	Share%	India's Import from Seychelles	Share%
2022-2023	64.88	0.014%	8.96	0.001%
2021-2022	44.92	0.106%	3.92	0.0006%
2020-2021	55.08	0.018%	3.64	0.0009%
2019-2020	66.64	0.021%	4.71	0.001%
2018-2019	84.49	0.025%	5.27	0.001%


Note: Collected data from Export-Import Data Bank, Department of Commerce, Govt. of India. Compiled by the author

Table 3c: Export-Import Data between Indian and Sri Lanka

India – Sri Lanka: Export-Import Data (US Dollars, Millions)				
Years	India's Export to Sri Lanka	Share%	India's Import from Sri Lanka	Share%
2022-2023	5,111.59	1.13%	1,078.14	0.15%
2021-2022	5,802.18	1.37%	1,009.97	0.16%

2020-2021	3,498.23	1.19%	642.94	0.16%
2019-2020	3,800.91	1.21%	903.69	0.19%
2018-2019	4,710.21	1.42%	1,488.40	0.28%


Note: Collected data from Export-Import Data Bank, Department of Commerce, Govt. of India. Compiled by the author



Source: Compiled by author

In terms of India-Mauritius trade, India's exports to Mauritius have consistently declined dropping from USD 1,160.78 million in 2018-2019 to USD 462.69 million in 2022-2023. This drop indicates shifts in either the demand dynamics or changing economic situations. This decrease is accompanied by a constant level of Mauritius imports. The trade

deficit wherein India consistently exports more than it imports underlines India's importance as a major exporter to Mauritius.



Source: Compiled by author

On a similar line, India's exports to Seychelles have varied over the years but have remained very modest. India's exports to Sri Lanka have decreased from 84.49 million in 2018-2019 to USD 64.88 million in 2022-2023. Additionally, India's constant trade surplus with Seychelles demonstrates India's economic strength and its capacity to meet

Seychelles' demands for goods and services. In terms of trade between India and Sri Lanka, India's exports to Sri Lanka increased in the last two years and reached USD 5,111.59 million and USD 5,802.18 million in 2022-2023 from 3,498.23 million in 2020-2021. The percentage of India's exports has remained relatively stable except for the pandemic years. India's role in meeting the import demands of Sri Lanka is highlighted as India maintains a trade surplus with Sri Lanka.

To summarise, these trends highlight India's diversified responsibilities in meeting the requirements of these island nations. While Indian exports see a drop

in Mauritius, Seychelles sees growth and India maintains a trade surplus with Sri Lanka. The analysis of FDI, Line of Credit figures and trade demonstrates nuanced and intricate economic ties between India and the three island nations of Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka. While FDI trends show variations in investment flows, the Line of Credit data highlights India's commitment to infrastructure development and addressing economic challenges in these island nations. India consistently maintains a trade surplus consolidating its position as a major exporter to these nations. The fluctuations in trade volumes and investment patterns highlight the significance of continuous monitoring and adaptable economic measures to foster mutually advantageous partnerships in the constantly evolving global landscape.

Key Findings and Conclusion

India's economic engagement with the island nations of Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka has substantial repercussions for regional and global economic developments. The strengthening of trade partnerships and strategic investments in infrastructure projects not only boosts India's regional standing but also has greater implications for the region's stability and fosters economic cooperation and collaboration with multilateral institutions within the region. It can also be interpreted as a significant shift in the global perception of the Indian Ocean's rising importance in the global economic landscape. India's financial support for Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka is a testament to its steadfast commitment to strengthen bilateral relations. From a strategic perspective, India's increased engagement with these island nations considerably impacts India's regional influence in the Indian Ocean. Despite the extensive influence exerted by major powers such as the US and China in the region, the dependence of these island nations on India for economic assistance and security highlights India's role in the strategic considerations of these nations.

India's consistent investment in Mauritius indicates its commitment to the region's stability and prosperity. Whilst the outbound direct investment from Mauritius to India has declined over the years, the overall trend implies stability. Since Mauritius is strategically situated in the Indian Ocean, it is an important nation to consolidate its position as a regional security provider, especially considering China's increasing economic presence in the region. Although India's commitment to promoting Mauritius' development is imperative, long-term efforts are crucial to efficiently counter China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean. India's investment in Sri Lanka has primarily focused on alleviating the economic crisis and promoting solar energy projects which align with the sustainable development goals of both nations. Out of the three island nations of Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka, India's investment decisions in Sri Lanka are impacted by historical linkages and

its proximity to India's geographical boundary and investments are made with a focus on long-term stability. India's investment in Seychelles although relatively modest reveals consistency in India's commitment to sustainability as investments in Seychelles span across infrastructure, health and defence. By building critical infrastructure, India not only enables the economic growth of these island nations but also fortifies its strategic position in the Indian Ocean by countering the influence of major powers, especially China.

It is important to note that India's investments are not bound by trade and infrastructure, rather it extends to human resource development and capacity-building initiatives. India has made significant contributions to the skill development and education of the workforce in all three nations. India is committed to promoting long-term economic resilience and regional stability. In addition to this globalisation plays a crucial role in shaping India's engagements with island nations. Policies such as liberalisation, technological advancements and market integration have simplified trade and investments but simultaneously there are drawbacks too. Globalisation has made nations susceptible to heightened competition and changes in the world economy. Therefore, India should make the best of this opportunity by protecting its strategic interests and capitalising on economic opportunities.

Some of the recommendations for India's investment in these island nations are as follows. First, India should strengthen its bilateral relations through bilateral dialogues and regular high-level visits as this would help India effectively comprehend the needs and priorities of these nations and ensure that India's investments are aligned with the development objectives of respective nations. Second, India should increase its financial aid for developmental projects in healthcare, renewable energy and technology as it can strengthen its soft power and foster a favourable environment for its strategic objectives in the region. Third, India should promote private-sector investments in manufacturing, tourism etc. as it can result in sustainable economic growth by maximising the efficiency of the private sector and the resources of the government. Lastly, since all three nations are part of the Indian Ocean region, therefore, India should strengthen its security and maritime cooperation through joint naval exercises and capacity-building initiatives etc. This can help India safeguard its interests against Chinese assertions in the region and ensure stability by improving its security infrastructure.

These recommendations aim to further strengthen India's investment portfolio in the region while fostering economic resilience and mutual growth. Additionally, implementing risk mitigation strategies, facilitating stakeholder dialogues, and initiating corporate social responsibility initiatives can ensure that prospective investments align with the evolving dynamics of the region. Overall, India's investment strategy for the future underscores a holistic and forward-looking

approach, aligning with the broader goal of nurturing resilient and sustainable economies in the Indian Ocean region.

Notes

1. LPG reforms – liberalisation, privatisation and globalisations reforms were initiated in India in 1991. Its aim was to liberalise the economy, privatise the public sector enterprises and integrate the economy with the global economy.
2. SAGAR – Security and growth for all in the region. It is a maritime initiative that prioritises the Indian Ocean Region to ensure India's peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indian Ocean Region.
3. India's Neighbourhood First Policy prioritises strengthening relations with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The focus is on enhancing connectivity, trade, and people-to-people ties, making it a key institutional priority for managing relations and policies with the neighbouring countries.

References

- Bhagwati, Jagdish (2004). *In Defense of Globalisation*, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Bratton, Patrick (2023). "India and Freedom of Navigation Maritime Power and Control of the Sea", *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs* Vol.6, No. 1, January - February 2023.
- Buzan, Barry (2003). "Security architecture in Asia: the interplay of regional and global levels". *The Pacific Review*, 16(2), 143–173.
- Congressional Research Service (2020, December 9). "The Dollar and the U.S. Trade Deficit," *CRS Reports*, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11430/3>
- Consulate General of India Jaffna, Sri Lanka (n.a.). "India - Sri Lanka Development Partnerships", <https://www.cgijaffna.gov.in/page/display/76>
- Das, Basudha. (2023). "US tops India's FDI sources in FY23, Mauritius, UK next in line: RBI census data," *Business Today*, 13 September at <https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/economy/story/us-tops-indias-fdi-sources-in-fy23-mauritius-uk-next-in-line-rbi-census-data-398151-2023-09-13>
- "Colombo Port City Economic Commission Act breeds Economic and Geostrategic Concerns," *Financial Express*, 2 June 2021 at <https://www.financialexpress.com/world-news/colombo-port-city-economic-commission-act-breeds-economic-and-geostrategic-concerns/2263439/>
- "From food to allowing flights to land, how India has gone out of its way for Sri Lanka". *Firstpost*, 14 July 2022 at <https://www.firstpost.com/india/from-food-to-allowing-flights-to-land-how-india-has-gone-out-of-its-way-for-sri-lanka-10910141.html>
- "Foreign Direct Investment Statistics Explanatory Notes," at <https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/FDI-statistics-explanatory-notes.pdf>
- High Commission of India Colombo, Sri Lanka (2020). "Ongoing Projects in Sri Lanka by Government of India under Development Cooperation (Value in LKR)," https://hccolombo.gov.in/ongoing_projects
- High Commission of India Port Louis, Mauritius (2020). "India Mauritius Bilateral Brief," at <https://hcmauritius.gov.in/pages?id=9avme&subid=yb8md&nnextid=RdG7d>
- High Commission of India Port Louis, Mauritius (2021). "Gift of 100,000 doses of Made-in-India Covid 19 vaccines to Mauritius," at <https://hcmauritius.gov.in/press?id=e7pwa>

- India Exim Bank (2023). "Government of India - Lines of Credit Statistics", Financial Products, at <https://www.eximbankindia.in/lines-of-credit-GOILOC.aspx>
- International Monetary Fund (2023). Direction of Trade Statistics, at <https://data.imf.org/?sk=9d6028d4-f14a-464c-a2f259b2cd424b85&sid=1515619375491>
- Keohane, O. Robert and Nye, S. Joseph (2011). *Power and Interdependence*. Fourth Edition. Longman, Pearson, London.
- Malik A.K. and Nunes W. (2017). "Revisiting maritime security in the Indian Ocean- A note on current scenario", in Bimal N. Patel, Aruna Kumar Malik and William Nunes (eds.) *Indian Ocean and Maritime Security: Competition, Cooperation and Threat*, Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group.
- Mallampally Padma and Sauvant P.Karl (1999). "Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries," *Finance and Development*, Vol 36 No.1, March 1999, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/03/mallampa.htm>
- Ministry of External Affairs (2015). "Prime Minister's Remarks at the Commissioning of Offshore Patrol Vessel OPV Barracuda in Mauritius," at <https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/24912/prime+ministers+remarks+at+the+commissioning+of+offshore+patrol+vessel+opv+barracuda+in+mauritius+march+12+2015>
- Ministry of External Affairs (2015a). "Visit of Prime Minister to Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/24883/Visit_of_Prime_Minister_to_Seychelles_Mauritius_and_Sri_Lanka_March_1014_2015
- Ministry of External Affairs (2016). "India-Mauritius Relations," at https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Mauritius_08_01_2016.pdf
- Ministry of External Affairs (2017). "Gift of Medicines worth Rupees Three crore to Seychelles," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/27925/Medicines_worth_Rupees_Three_Crore_gifted_to_Seychelles
- Ministry of External Affairs (2018). "President of India leads Delegation-Level talks, witnesses exchange of Agreements /MOUs; meets top Leadership of Mauritius on second day of visit," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29610/President_of_India_Leads_DelegationLevel_Talks_Witnesses_Exchange_of_Agreements_MoUs_Meets_Top_Leadership_of_Mauritius_on_Second_Day_of_Visit_March_12
- Ministry of External Affairs (2018a). "Visit of External Affairs Minister to Mauritius," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29946/Visit_of_External_Affairs_Minister_to_Mauritius_June_0203_2018
- Ministry of External Affairs (2019). "Joint inauguration of Metro Express and ENT hospital in Mauritius," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31900/Joint_inauguration_of_Metro_Express_and_ENT_in_Mauritius
- Ministry of External Affairs (2019a). "Prime Minister's meeting with Prime Minister of Mauritius," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/31402/Prime_Ministers_meeting_with_Prime_Minister_of_Mauritius
- Ministry of External Affairs (2019b). "Visit of Prime Minister of Republic of Mauritius to India as Chief Guest at 15th PravasiBharatiya Divas," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/30935/Visit_of_Prime_Minister_of_Republic_of_Mauritius_to_India_as_Chief_Guest_at_15th_Pravasi_Bharatiya_Divas
- Ministry of External Affairs (2020). "Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister of Mauritius Pravin Jugnauth jointly inaugurate and launch India assisted development projects in Mauritius," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/34764/Prime_Minister_Narendra_Modi_and_Prime_Minister_of_Mauritius_Pravind

- Jugnauth jointly inaugurate and launch India assisted development projects in Mau
- Ministry of External Affairs (2020a). "Telephone conversation between Prime Minister and Prime Minister of Mauritius," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32702/Telephone_conversation_between_Prime_Minister_and_Prime_Minister_of_Mauritius
- Ministry of External Affairs (2020b). "Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Prime Minister of Mauritius Pravind Jugnauth to jointly inaugurate the new Supreme Court Building of Mauritius," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32856/Prime_Minister_Narendra_Modi_and_Prime_Minister_of_Mauritius_Pravind_Jugnauth_to_jointly_inaugurate_the_new_Supreme_Court_Building_of_Mauritius
- Ministry of External Affairs (2020c). "Indian assistance to Mauritius to deal with the environmental crisis due to oil spill," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32896/Indian_assistance_to_Mauritius_to_deal_with_the_environmental_crisis_due_to_oil_spill
- Ministry of External Affairs (2020d). "Visit of External Affairs Minister to Republic of Seychelles," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/33246/Visit_of_External_Affairs_Minister_to_Republic_of_Seychelles_November_2728_2020
- Ministry of External Affairs (2021). "India-Seychelles High Level Virtual Event," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/33775/IndiaSeychelles_High_Level_Virtual_Event_April_8_2021
- Ministry of External Affairs (2021a). "Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi and President of the Republic of Seychelles H.E. Wavel Ramkalawan jointly inaugurate a range of Development Assistance Projects at India-Seychelles High Level Virtual Event," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/33784/Prime_Minister_Shri_Narendra_Modi_and_President_of_the_Republic_of_Seychelles_HE_Wavel_Ramkalawan_jointly_inaugurate_a_range_of_Development_Assistanc
- Ministry of External Affairs (2021b). "Brief on India – Sri Lanka Relations," at https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Brief_on_India_for_website.pdf
- Ministry of External Affairs (2022). "Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report 2022," at https://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/36286_MEA_Annual_Report_2022_English_web.pdf
- Ministry of External Affairs (2022). "India gifts Dornier aircraft to strengthen maritime security of Sri Lanka," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/35636/India_gifts_Dornier_aircraft_to_strengthen_maritime_security_of_Sri_Lanka
- Ministry of External Affairs (2023). "Visit of Minister of State for External Affairs, Shri V. Muraleedharan to Sri Lanka," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/36172/Visit_of_Minister_of_State_for_External_Affairs_Shri_V_Muraleedharan_to_Sri_Lanka_February_34_2023
- Ministry of External Affairs (2023a). "President of Sri Lanka calls on the President," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/36873/President_of_Sri_Lanka_Calls_on_the_President
- Ministry of External Affairs (2023b). "Prime Minister meets H.E. Pravind Kumar Jugnauth, Prime Minister of Mauritius," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/37076/Prime_Minister_meets_HE_Pravind_Kumar_Jugnauth_Prime_Minister_of_Mauritius
- Ministry of External Affairs (2023c). "Visit of External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar to Sri Lanka," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/37186/Visit_of_External_Affairs_Minister_Dr_S_Jaishankar_to_Sri_Lanka_October_1011_2023

- Ministry of External Affairs (2023d). "Commencement of passenger ferry service between India and Sri Lanka- A new landmark in regional connectivity," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/37188/Commencement_of_passenger_ferry_service_between_India_and_Sri_Lanka_A_new_landmark_in_regional_connectivity
- Ministry of External Affairs (2023e). "Visit of MOS Shri. V. Muraleedharan to Mauritius," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/37217/Visit_of_MoS_Shri_V_Muraleedharan_to_Mauritius_November_0102_2023
- Ministry of External Affairs (2023f). "Visit of H.E. Mr. Sylvestre Radegonde, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Tourism of the Republic of Seychelles to India," at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/37289/Visit_of_HE_Mr_Sylvestre_Radegonde_Minister_of_Foreign_Affairs_and_Tourism_of_the_Republic_of_Seychelles_to_India__November_2224_2023
- Ministry of External Affairs (2023g). "India - Seychelles Bilateral Relations," at https://fsi.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/UBB-_updated__1_.pdf
- Moramudali, Umesh and Panduwawala, Thilina (2022). "From project financing to debt restructuring: China's role in Sri Lanka's debt situation," *Sri Lanka Brief*. <https://srilankabrief.org/from-project-financing-to-debt-restructuring-chinas-role-in-sri-lankas-debt-situation/>
- Panikkar, M.Kavalam (1951). *India and the Indian Ocean*, London: William Brothers & Co. Ltd. Pp85.
- Patel, N. Bimal et.al. (2017). *Indian Ocean and Maritime Security: Competition, Cooperation and Threat*, Routledge
- Press Information Bureau (2015). "Line of Credit," at <https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=133835>
- Raina, V. (2022). "India-Sri Lanka relations in wake of Sri Lankan Economic Crisis: Analysis and Way Forward." *Centre for Land Warfare Studies*. https://www.claws.in/static/IB-366_India-Sri-Lanka-Relations-in-Wake-of-Sri-Lankan-Economic-Crisis-Analysis-and-Way-Forward-1.pdf
- Rajasimhan T. and Kumar V.S. (2021). "China-backed Colombo Port City Project creates ripples," *Business Line*, 13 June at <https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/logistics/china-backed-colombo-port-city-project-creates-ripples/article34805245.ece>
- Scott, David (2021). "Small Strategies in the Indo-Pacific by Large Powers", *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* Vol.8 No. 1, pp. 66-85
- Srinivasan, Meera (2023). "Sri Lanka's economic crisis revealed: Over half the population 'multi-dimensionally vulnerable,' says UNDP survey," *Business Line*, 2 September at <https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/world/sri-lankas-economic-crisis-revealed-over-half-the-population-multidimensionally-vulnerable-says-undp-survey/article67263119.ece>
- Stiglitz, Joseph (2002). *Globalisation and its Discontents*, W.W. Norton & Company, New York
- PTI (2021). "Sri Lanka formally hands over strategic Hambantota port on 99-year lease to China in \$1.1 billion deal," *The Hindu*. 1 December at <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/sri-lanka-formally-hands-over-hambantota-port-on-99-year-lease-to-china/article61847422.ece>
- The Hindu Bureau (2024). "Modi oath-taking ceremony highlights: Narendra Modi takes oath for third consecutive term as PM," *The Hindu*. 10 June at <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/modi-oath-taking-ceremony-highlights-narendra-modi-takes-oath-for-third-consecutive-term-as-pm/article67263119.ece>

- com/elections/lok-sabha/india-election-results-2024-updates-june-9-2024/article68268845.ece
- U.S. Department of State (2019). “2019 Investment Climate Statements: Sri Lanka,” at <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-investment-climate-statements/sri-lanka/>
- U.S. Department of State (2020). “2020 Investment Climate Statements: Sri Lanka,” at [https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-investment-climate-statements/sri-lanka/#:~:text=FDI%2C%20including%20loans%2C%20into%20Sri,Republic%20of%20China%20\(PRC\)](https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-investment-climate-statements/sri-lanka/#:~:text=FDI%2C%20including%20loans%2C%20into%20Sri,Republic%20of%20China%20(PRC))
- U.S. Department of State (2021). “2021 Investment Climate Statements: Mauritius,” at <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-investment-climate-statements/mauritius/>
- U.S. Department of State (2022). “2022 Investment Climate Statements: Mauritius,” at <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-investment-climate-statements/mauritius/>
- U.S. Department of State (2023). “2023 Investment Climate Statements: Sri Lanka,” at [https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-investment-climate-statements/sri-lanka/#:~:text=Foreign%20direct%20investments%20\(FDI\)%20stood,witness%20net%20outflows%20in%202021](https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-investment-climate-statements/sri-lanka/#:~:text=Foreign%20direct%20investments%20(FDI)%20stood,witness%20net%20outflows%20in%202021)
- U.S. Department of State (2023a). “2023 Investment Climate Statements: Seychelles,” at <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-investment-climate-statements/seychelles/>

Alluding Alliance: The Indo-U.S. Trajectory in the New Decade

Anwesha Dasgupta

Abstract

The Indo-U.S relation has transformed into an increasingly close strategic partnership over the years. Symbolic terms like 'Natural Allies'¹ or 'Defining partnership of the 21st century'² were used to illuminate the growing bonhomie and also made many wonder over the possibility of an alliance in the near future if situation so arise. With turn of another decade the international system is confronted with impending threats in the form of Russian aggression in Ukraine, consistent Chinese border incursions and expansion in Central and South Asia or the Taliban upsurge in Afghanistan. Such threats pose serious concern to maintenance of security, stability and other global and regional strategic interests of both U.S and India. This article will try to understand that after several years of building a pronounced strategic partnership to cooperate over common interests and mitigate threats to those; why are we not witnessing any sign of formal alliance between India and U.S. This article will argue that despite emergence of mutual threats like the rise of Islamic fundamentalism through resurgence Taliban or Chinese regional aggression; formation of formal Indo-U.S alliance has not occurred in light of fundamental difference over long term strategic perspectives given one being a superpower and the other a rising power, variance in strategic thinking, divergence over the means and outcomes of common interests and the specific international system they seek to uphold.

Keywords: Alliance, Flexibility, Indo-U. S, Strategic Interests, Threats

Introduction

Strategic ramifications and new security challenges have solidified the bilateral relations between U.S and India into a global strategic partnership. The American administrations have been showcasing their positive support for India's rise as a global power (Rice, 2005). The India-U.S. bilateral cooperation at present is broad-based and multi-sectorial, covering trade and investment, defense and security, education, science and technology, cyber security, high-technology, civil nuclear

energy, space technology and applications, clean energy, environment, agriculture and health. They have specifically stressed on the common objective of promoting and preserving stability and security in Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean region (Panetta, 2012). Rise of potent security threats will further promote invigorated efforts on both sides to counter those disruptions and challenges and might even present the situation to form an alliance. If such a sustained ever expanding strategic partnership seeks to retain flexible alignments even when confronted with mutual threats then we must understand that there remain substantial lingering differences in strategy and outlook beneath the overarching structure of the partnership. The following section will try to define the concept of alliance and then outline the developments of Indo- U.S partnership. The next section will highlight the upcoming security challenges which are of concern to both and argue that inspite of emergence of such threats why we won't be witnessing the formation of an Indo-U.S alliance.

The concept of alliance

Alliances have been an integral component of international politics since ages. Alliance can be described as a formal agreement between two or more states for mutual support mainly to deter a common adversary (Hugland, 2019). Alliances and its varied forms play a fundamental role in the theory and practice of international relations. They are a 'universal component of relations between political units, irrespective of time and place (Holsti et al., 1973:2). As Arnold Wolfers puts it 'wherever in recorded history a system of multiple sovereignty has existed, some of the sovereign units when uninvolved in conflicts with others have entered into alliances' (Wolfers, 1968:269). There remains substantial conceptual ambiguity over the definition of alliance. Alliances differ in many ways: the circumstances under which they became operative, the type of commitment, the degree of cooperation and their scope (Dwivedi, 2012).

Walt defines alliance as 'a formal or informal relationship of security co-operation between two or more sovereign states' (Walt, 1987:6). According to Wolfers, 'in technical language of statesmen and scholars the term alliance signifies a promise of mutual military assistance between two or more sovereign states' the term connotes that 'peculiarly far reaching commitment contained in military pacts by which a nation formally promises to join another in fighting a common enemy' (Wolfers, 1968:268-269). Thus for Wolfers (1968) the outstanding asset of an alliance is the military assistance expected in case of need and its deterrent effect on enemy. Bruce M. Russett defines an alliance as 'a formal agreement among a limited number of countries concerning the conditions under which they will or will not employ military force' (Russett, 1971:262). On similar lines Glenn H. Snyder points out the main elements of alliances as 'formal agreements; they are concluded

by states; they involve collaboration in military matters; and they have other orientation' aiming at 'states outside their own membership'.¹² This differs from Walt's definition in its exclusion of informal or implicit relations and from Wolfers as this does not account for a prior identification of a 'common enemy'. Alliances fall into different categories related to different objectives. These could be bilateral or multilateral, defensive or offensive in nature. The tendency to align has had one key underlying determinant: perceived common interest against a common enemy. This common interest may stem from fear, a desire to expand or a need to deter the enemy from acting or pre-empt it from acting by joining hands with a likeminded ally (Hussain, 1979).

Alliances, therefore is a form of coalition between states with a formal military commitment. The element of military assistance is the binding factor in any alliance. During cold war both the superpowers engaged in several alliances to preserve and protect their spheres of influence, the end of cold war also witnesses several alliances of the sole superpower with regional actors with formal security commitments. It is pertinent to mention here that such alliances between a major power and minor powers are referred as asymmetric alliances. Morrow (1991) posits that asymmetric alliances provide different benefits to the parties involved—autonomy to the great power and security to the minor power (Morrow, 1991:903). The difference in power capabilities often creates a difference in their perception of threat but side payments or trade-offs act as positive incentives for both sides to continue with the alliance (Kabir, 2019:165). Thus, alliances of any form are compact formal agreement between parties where military and security commitments should be the prime components.

Contours of INDO- U.S Strategic partnership

South Asia as region has not been in the central concern for United States during cold war to the exception of U.S USSR embroilment in Afghanistan, 'South Asia was either marginalized or ignored by the American government (Rubinoff, 2006:39-51). However with the end of cold war, renewed attention was given and a separate bureau was finally created, South Asia was included as a part of Near east in the State Department. This tendency towards neglect of India and South Asia created indifference, hostility, resentment and disdain in U.S policy towards South Asia (Glazer, 1990:24). The end of cold war and the removal of superpower scuffle, new issues emerged that necessitated engagements at the regional level. Within South Asia India showcased a robust economic growth and together with its stable democracy became difficult to be ignored. "In this emerging world, India stands out, along with China and perhaps South Korea, Brazil, and some of the European states, for its balanced power. Like a versatile computer, India does nothing best but does

many things reasonably well. Unlike Korea, any European state, Iraq, Brazil or China, India is dominant within its own geographical region...” (Cohen, 2001:138).

India was confronted with new strategic situation of an international system dominated by United States in which the Soviet Union was no longer available as a political, economic and security anchor. Bereft of an ally coupled with acute economic crisis India needed pristine ideas and strategies to tide over the predicaments and also seize the moment freed from the cold war constraints to think where it wants to see itself within this new system and how would it operate. The sequence of adaptation, innovation and transformation was the key to achieve a desired status in the international system. The new system could no longer be identified by a single overarching criterion as the cold war, it is diverse, complex and extremely interwoven and hence India realized that engagements and enmeshments are the key to sustain and rise in this system.

The Clinton administration’s policy of engagement and enlargement with its stress on democracy resonated with India eager to forge new relations within the altered international system. The end of the cold war brought out a change of perception and U.S stopped looking at India through a soviet lens, together with India’s economic reforms and a growing market necessitated a further deepening of ties. Even the discord following India’s nuclear test resulted a new course of negotiations in the form of Talbott- Singh dialogue. There was a significant change in the way U.S diplomats addressed India on media stressing on the point that despite India’s nuclear explosions, India was a ‘friend’ possessing ‘huge potential for global leadership’(Talbott, 2004). Despite global nonproliferation being one of America’s vital interests, the Clinton foreign policy team showcased some genuine sensitivity towards India’s legitimate national security interests after May 1998. (Talbott, 2004). The novelty of the Clinton administration’s policy towards India rested on the understanding that engagement was priority and cannot be disrupted for the sake of individual conflicting interest, a continued effort should be introduced to not only to prioritize reconciliation but also to bypass the stalemate and identify other converging interests.

The joint statement ‘A vision for 21st century’ revealed such conciliatory and constructive attitude on both sides whereby they agreed that they differ on the means to achieve their common goal of reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons but highlighted their intention of cooperating on other common interests like ‘complementary responsibility for ensuring regional and international security’, ‘stability and growth of global economy’, ‘common efforts to fight infectious diseases’. (Joint Statement, 2001). The Bush administration periodwitnessed the development of mature and structural bilateral relations between the two states even finding a common ground on the contentious issue of nuclear material. The post September

2001 Security issues emerged as the prime objective of American foreign policy along with the aim of fighting Al-Qaeda to the end. With Afghanistan reassuming its position as the area of conflict United States attention centered around South Asia, while it deepened its cooperation with India in its fight against terrorism as India offered unconditional support but it also opened up new avenues for Pakistan becoming a frontline state due to its geostrategic position. Easing Indian concern of being sidelined by a renewed U.S Pakistan bond, the Bush administration efficiently formalized a policy of de-hyphenation and showcased its will to pursue a differentiated policy towards the region centered on 'decoupling of India and Pakistan in United States calculation' (Tellis, 2008). While de-hyphenation was indeed a major policy but what stood out was the administration's repeated recognition of India having the capability to contribute and influence the global affairs. By these the administration addressed India's two most crucial strategic needs, one being in an independent bilateral relationship with U.S and the other being recognized as a potential major power by the dominant power in the international system. The particular attention of the administration on status related matter and the readiness to promote, project and acknowledge India as a rising power marks its distinction from any other previous administrations. By 2002, the strategic convergence between India and United States, the official statement from Washington reasserted 'a growing world power with which we have common strategic interest' (Clinton, 2011). The Bush administration extended its positive attitude towards recognizing India's potentialities by stressing on its intention to "help India become a major power in the twenty-first century." (U.S Department of State, 2005).

By 2005 Washington announced the most wide-ranging partnership in the history of their bilateral relations, covering the economy, energy security, democracy promotion, defense cooperation, and high technology and space cooperation. In line with such promises they signed the Next step in Strategic Partnership, the New Framework of Defense Relationship and finally the historic Indo- U.S Civilian Nuclear Deal (U.S State Department, 2005). During the Obama presidency a new thrust was given towards regional cooperation. While endorsing and acknowledging India's rise President Obama harped on certain region or areas where U.S expects India to play an active and effective role, the foremost importance was given to the Asia Pacific region. With Secretary of state Hilary Clinton's visit to India to initiate the Security Partnership of 21st century with stress on 'shared Interest in Asia', followed by the U.S India Strategic Dialogue on Asia Pacific Region and later in the year indicated the new avenue of cooperation.

The launch of 'Pivot to Asia' policy further highlighted the partnership with India, "the Obama administration has expanded our bilateral partnership; actively supported India's Look East efforts, including through a new trilateral dialogue with

India and Japan; and outlined a new vision for a more economically integrated and politically stable South and Central Asia, with India as a linchpin.” (Clinton, 2011) As a linchpin to the strategy apart from the regular strategic dialogue and cooperation in the regional institutions the bilateral cooperation was strengthened in the defense field. In August 2016, after years of prolonged negotiations and consultations and a new BJP government in New Delhi, they signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum Agreement (LEMOA). A tweaked version of the original Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), LEMOA was supposed to give access to both countries to designated military facilities on either side for the purpose of refueling and replenishment but requirements was agreed to be applicable on a case-by-case basis.

Despite such commendable improvements India and United States cannot be termed as alliance partners. Hagerty(2006) points out that Indo- U.S partnership cannot be seen as an alliance as they do not fulfill the basic criteria of having a formal agreement on military cooperation ‘under which they will or will not employ military force’ (Russett, 1971). In spite of sharing the common interest of maintaining stability and peace in Asia pacific their engagements are loosely defined and lacks definite military commitments. Secondly, as Wolfers (1968) points out that identification of a common enemy is necessary in alliances, India and United States have not zeroed down or publicly identified a single common enemy which needs to be deterred. However, Hagerty thereby argues that emergence of more compelling mutual security threats like emergence of fundamentalist Islamic regime in Pakistan or Chinese regional aggression might lead India and the United States to upgrade their partnership in to an alliance (Hagerty, 2006:16).

The current international scenario is plagued with emergent compelling threats in the form of resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan, Chinese assertiveness and Russian attacks on Ukraine which have definite effects on United States’ and India’s strategic policies. The resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan after two decades of serious commitment to democratize and restructure the Afghan state not only presents a major setback to U.S policy of maintaining stability and a bigger threat arising for India in view of the new opportunities for rise of Islamic fundamentalism easily percolated from Afghanistan to Pakistan. The Chinese border incursions and increased regional assertiveness jeopardizes Indo-U.S commitment to maintain stability and security in Asia Pacific. Finally the Russian attack on Ukraine resulting in a war has further complicated the interdependent structure of international system. Despite the rise of such potent immediate common threats the Indo-U.S responses have remained informal and flexible with no signs of upgrading into a formal alliance. Their asymmetry in power and strategic perspectives limit their chances to consider a threat with same magnitude and security.

I argue that inspite of rise of compelling threats we are not witnessing an Indo-U.S alliance is due to the entrenched fundamental difference in strategic worldview of a superpower and a rising power, their incompatible objectives and the divergences in their viewpoint over the future international system they wish to uphold. Their coming together to form an alliance to deter immediate threats is thwarted by the deep-rooted differences in power asymmetry which further informs their core strategic considerations and their engagements.

The fundamental difference in strategic worldview

The idea of exceptionalism has been embedded in the strategic thinking of United States from the very beginning and the disintegration of Soviet Union truly presented it as the predominant power. In the Post Cold war scenario, the United States' main strategy was that U.S should undertake all efforts to retain its position as the undisputed preeminent power in the international system and to promote its values among others and to shape the international environment so as to reflect its values (Huntington, 1999). The protection and preservation of American preeminence can be noted as the common prime objective of all the contending grand strategy theories even when they differ over the means to achieve those.

Closely following the first objective is to preserve U.S. supremacy by politically, economically, and militarily outdistancing any global challenger (Posen & Ross, 1997). Prevention of the rise of a competitor at the global or regional level that can or may have the potential to threaten U.S primacy globally or in a region is considered a priority. U.S needs to promote universality of an international order based on international law, democratic traditions, free market economies which will not only solidify its global interests but also prevent the emergence of niche regional orders with regional hegemons. The regional dimension of the strategy is consistent with the global dimension: the aspirations of regional as well as global hegemons are to be thwarted.

A constructive American strategy to forward its interests and to address any sort of non conformity or challenges is to work through multilateral cooperation or alliance system. Advocates of Selective engagement and liberal internationalism stress on multilateral cooperation and alliance building as the suitable means to achieve its goals. India's strategic thinking on the other hand has been informed by its perception of the international system as a hegemonic one imposing its will and norms on a developing state and India's instinct was to protect itself against the shifts and conflicts of the major powers. The core of India's strategic worldview is the enduring and deep-rooted aspiration of achieving the status of major power within the international system. Closely following its desire for a major power status is India's stress on maintaining independence in its foreign policy.(Hoffmann

2002:229; Bajpai and Sahni, 2008). India's objective of attaining a major power status is largely based on its inclination in retaining the independence over strategic choices and policies so as to create a niche foreign policy as an alternative to following the overarching international structure maintained by a single or handful of powerful states and being reduced to the satellite status in world politics. India's engagements in bilateral or multilateral forms are focused on identifying areas of agreement to avoid confrontations and to forward its distinct interests while maintaining its autonomy in strategic thinking.

India's penchant for recognition and status as a new major power runs in contrast to United States' prime objective of maintaining unrivalled primacy and prevention of the rise of new power at any part of the world. However, it can be noticed since the Bush Presidency U.S has showcased its support for India's rise and also proclaimed so in official statements like "to help India become a major world power in 21st century" (U.S Department of State, 2005). It can be understood in a way that U.S have maintained its policy of working through alliances where the allies remain committed to U.S led international structures and in similar lines it perceives that nurturing a strategic partnership with rising India will be conducive to U.S interests in the region and larger global platform. But India's strive for a major power status is strongly rooted in its quest for 'redistribution and recognition' on its own terms which will essentially ensure its independent decision making in accordance with its distinct needs and interests that may or may not coincide with the structures and norms maintained by the dominant state (Nell, 2010:956). Hence, being a confirmative ally or a satellite state is non-consistent with India's core strategic objective.

The divergent perception of international system

The United States being the dominant power of the international system since the end of cold war have carefully constructed the structures and norms of the current international system to serve its interest, hence, it stresses on the preservation of the same and seeks statusquo. An international system with American preponderance continues to be the main prerogative. U.S founded the liberal international order based on global system of alliances, institutions and norms to further and maintain U.S primacy. The key to this order is to be able to pursue its interests in part by creating and maintaining a web of institutions, norms and rules which constructs a framework that shapes much of international politics. United States provide security guarantees to allies to restrain regional initiatives and competition binding all through an interdependent economic structure. It became an order as its rules and norms have gradually assumed a degree of independent influence (Lind & Wohlforth, 2019:71)

India being an emerging power eager for status and recognition has always advocated an international system with multiple centers of power. The strategic thinking on this includes concepts covering international power structures that India thinks will be preferable to its rise. India prefers a world with diffused centers of power, It sees itself acquiring its desired status and taken more seriously within such a system. A polycentric or multipolar world will not only be more conducive towards absorbing a new power but it will also be conducive towards acknowledging it with more flexible terms of operation. This would provide greater strategic flexibility and the concerned efforts for integration and interconnectedness will be much more indigenous and freer from a specific structure forced by a hegemonic state. "From Indian perspective, the ideal world will consist of many great powers, each dominant in its own region, and pledged to avoid interference across regions".³⁰ In consonance with its preference of a multipolar world India voice its concern over biases in international order and also invests in being part of indigenous regional initiatives thus, India can be said to espouse prominent changes in the present international order. India in its strive to bring about alteration in the established order acts through two distinct ways,

- It tries inducing changes in norms and rules by working within the established institutions through negotiations or by building sub-forums with other like-minded developing states.
- To construct and participate in indigenous regional attempts to form new organizations or institutions that can provide alternative approaches to address the concerns.

India strives to alter the distribution of the benefits generated by the global economy more in favour of developing countries. It rely on its predominant regional and emerging global stature to try and shape the international economic environment to bring it closer to what it perceives to be optimal conditions for the domestic and global advancement of the developing world in its individual capacity, but also through collective measures. Within WTO India vociferously advocates for a fairer distribution of the benefits of trade and the removal of non-tariff obstacles obstructing access to markets in developing countries, increased development-focused capital flows and others. India has been promoting its distributive approach to international negotiations and voicing against the indifference towards the concerns of developing countries through its active participation within the New QUAD to alter the decision-making processes in WTO, with other developing countries through G20 and G77. India is a part of the Heiligendamm Process which is the semi-institutionalized dialogue between the group of industrialized countries and the emerging economies of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa, and the G20, whose summits are replacing those of the G8 as the primary coordination

venue in the global economy (Hurrell, 2007). India together with South Africa, Brazil and China has emerged as some of the most vocal opponent to developing countries being saddled with quantified emission-abatement targets in the post Kyoto negotiation processes of UNFCCC. (Ayres, 2017)

India is an enthusiastic participant in various indigenous regional organizations in its immediate and extended neighbourhood to Central Asia and Africa. It identifies with the self-reliant efforts of the regional actors to address questions of economy, trade, security etc. in contrast to the established norms. India has established links with diverse organisations ranging from ASEAN, BRICS, IBSA to organizations with extended neighbourhood including BIMSTEC, Mekong-Ganga Initiative. For instance, BRICS has constituted New Development Bank which has started giving loans subtracting the conditions of structural adjustment programmes often levied by global organizations like World Bank (Ayres, 2017). These Initiatives appreciate what is distinct and valuable to these regional actors which are often neglected by the established system. Such regional endeavours works toward institutionalizing policy co-ordination on a range of fronts between regional powers across regions, encouraging bilateral and multilateral trade, reciprocal investment by developing infrastructural links between member countries, negotiating strategies in areas as diverse as multilateral trade talks, climate and environmental issues, financial and technology regulation and management. According to Hurrell India can be differentiated from other second tier states by the virtue of it being outside of an alliance system with the United States and has historically espoused the conception of a different international order (Hurrell, 2007)

Altered Approaches to Areas of Congruence

Given such differences in strategic worldviews and perceptions of international system the identified areas of convergence or common goals are marked by divergent approaches and the outcomes or agreements are often very specific or modified versions to suit both U.S and India. I will cite their negotiations to bridge through the distinct concerns regarding the logistics agreement while agreeing on the benefits of having such an agreement in place. They have engaged heavily in defense cooperation, joint military exercises involving all military branches, military training and unit exchanges over the years but when it came to agreeing on the terms of the logistics agreement we saw how they negotiated to find a distinct altered version to satisfy both ends. U.S has no template for a close defense relationship outside the obligations inherent in a formal alliance structure which necessitates signing of the foundational agreements (Ayres, 2017). For India a large scale domestic opposition to signing of LEMOA was witnessed based on the perception that signing such an agreement will make India equivalent with U.S allies and will drag India into

America's conflicts and policies, especially in West Asia and East Asia. (Rajagopalan, 2016) While understanding the benefits of having a logistics agreement with U.S, India was cautious over making extensive commitments in line of formal alliance and over-ride its cherished ideal of maintaining autonomy.

The LEMOA signed in 2016 highlighted how an India specific version of the original Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) was put to effect to address the concerns of both sides. While U.S signs three agreements — Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA) are referred to as the foundational agreements with countries with which it has close military ties and wanted to extend the same to India but the Indian side raised concern regarding issues of national security and being entangled in American security structure. LEMOA was signed which permits the US and India to use each other's facilities and provides for easier access to supplies and services for the military forces of the two countries when they are engaged in specific types of activities. The agreement primarily covers four areas — port calls, joint exercises, training and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. Any other requirement has to be agreed upon by both sides on a case-by-case basis.

LEMOA is much more flexible and limited in scope than LSA but it satisfied the U.S interest of having a logistics agreement in place and also addressed India's concern of entering into a formal binding agreement related to security (Hindu, 2016). On similar lines The LEMOA was followed by the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), which was signed on 6 September 2018 being a tweaked version of the original the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA). This was only an instance to show how their difference in strategic thinking informs their terms of engagement. Even when an area of convergence has been identified there needs to be committed efforts to tide over the difference in viewpoint and reaching a middle ground.

Conclusion

Indo – U.S strategic partnership has developed into a multifaceted process with both sides exhibiting constructive efforts to identify areas of congruence and to negotiate their way through the divergences in order to avoid long term disengagement. Identification of common goals do not necessarily materialize into common approaches. From proliferation to economy and even on climate change they differ over strategies and means. Washington's imperative in indulging into an alliance has mainly depended on having an agreeable ally committed to support U.S policies and strategies under all circumstances. India's policy has been informed by

its indelible allegiance to its autonomy in decision making and has for the very reason cautious of the binding commitments of an alliance. Thus, their initiatives of cooperation remain quite informal, loosely defined and flexible in nature to accommodate their divergences in their distinct long term vision and interests. Trade-offs or positive incentives might accelerate or strengthen their cooperation but formally acknowledging to support each other across issues remains a distant idea. A formal binding alliance will continue to allude India and the United States as long as their difference in entrenched strategic thinking, power asymmetry will continue.

References

- Ayres A. (2017). Will India Start Acting Like a Global Power?, *Foreign Affairs*, 88(2).
- Bajpai, K, Sahni V. (2008). 'Hegemony and Strategic Choice', in Chandra Chari (Ed.), *War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World: The Changing Balance of Power in the Twenty-first Century*. London: Routledge , 93–108
- Clinton H., "America's Pacific Century" *Foreign Policy*, 2011, available at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/>
- Cohen S.P. (2001). *India: Emerging Power*, Brookings Institution Press.
- .Defining Partnership of 21st Century'<https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/168999.pdf>
- Dwivedi S. (2012) Alliances in International Relations Theory. *Journal of Social Sciences and Interdisciplinary Research*. Available at <http://www.indianresearchjournals.com/pdf/IJSSIR/2012/August/20.pdf>
- Glazer N., Glazer S. (1990). *Conflicting Images: India and the United States*, Riverdale.
- Hagerty T.D (2006). "Are We Present at the Creation?" in Sumit Ganguly and Brian Shoup (Ed.) *U.S Indian Strategic Cooperation in the 21st Century*, Routledge.
- Haglund, David G.. "alliance". *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 12 Nov. 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/alliance-politics>
- Holsti O., Hopmann and Sullivan J.D (1973). *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies*, New York: Wiley.
- Huntington S.P (1999). "Lonely Superpower" *Foreign Affairs*, 78(2).
- Hurrell A. (2007). *On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society*, OUP.
- Hussain M. (1979). "Alliances in International Politics", *Strategic Studies*, 2(3), 1979.
- Kabir M. (2019). "The Role of Side Payments in the Formation of Asymmetric Alliances: Forging the U.S Pakistan Alliance", *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs*, 6,(2).
- Lind J., Wohlforth W. (2019). "The Future of Liberal Order is Conservative" *Foreign Affairs*, 98(2).
- Rajagopal N.S (2016). Logistics Pact with U.S, ORF commentaries, available at <https://www.orfonline.org/research/logistics-pact-with-us-why-lemoa-is-significant-for-india/>
- What is LEMOA? (2016). Hindu, available at <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/What-is-LEMOA/article15604647.ece>

- Morrow, "Alliances and asymmetry: An alternative capability aggression model of alliances", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol 35, no. 4, 1991: 903
- 'Natural Allies' <https://asiasociety.org/address-shri-atal-bihari-vajpayee>
- Nell P. (2010). "Redistribution and recognition: what emerging regional powers want" *Review of International Studies*, 36(4).
- Panetta L.E (2012), "Partners in the 21st Century," Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, June 6, 2012 <http://www.idsa.in/keyspeeches/LeonEPanettaonPartnersinthe21stcentury.>)
- Posen B.R., Ross A.L (1997), "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy", *International Security*, 21(3).
- Rice C. (2005), available at <http://usinfo.state.gov>
- Russett B.M. (1971), "An Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances", *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 15(2). Hagerty T.D (2006), "Are We Present at the Creation?" in Sumit Ganguly and Brian Shoup (Ed.) *U.S Indian Strategic Cooperation in the 21st Century*, Routledge.
- Snyder G.H. (1990), "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut", *Journal of International Affairs*, 44(1). Hagerty T.D (2006), "Are We Present at the Creation?" in Sumit Ganguly and Brian Shoup (Ed.) *U.S Indian Strategic Cooperation in the 21st Century*, Routledge.
- Talbott S. (2004), *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb*, Brookings Institution Press.
- Tellis A. (2008). Merits of Dehyphenation: Explaining U.S success in engaging India and Pakistan. *Washington Quarterly*, 38(1)
- The joint statement 'A vision for 21st century' available at https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/democracy/fs_000321_us_india.html
- U.S Department of State, "Background briefing by Administration Officials on U.S-South Asia Relations," March 25, 2005
- U.S Department of State, "Background briefing by Administration Officials on U.S-South Asia Relations," March 25, 2005
- United States - India Joint Statement on Next Steps in Strategic Partnership. Available at <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36290.htm>
- Walt S. (1987). *The Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Wolfer A. (1968). "Alliances", in *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, David L. Sills (Ed.), New York: Macmillan.

Inclusive Policies and Development of Women

Tulika Chakravorty

The best thermometer to the progress of a nation is its treatment of its women. The great Aryans, Buddha among the rest, have always put woman in an equal position with man. For them sex in religion did not exist. In the Vedas and Upanishads, women taught the highest truths and received the same veneration as men. – Swami Vivekananda

Abstract

The broad objective of the development programme is to improve the quality of life of the people. But the development can only be sustained when the people will build their own capacity to solve the problems and take decision in the management of their own resources. In a society people are managing their own resources according to their norm. But unless this management is not conducted in a planned sustainable manner, the scarcity of the resources will become an issue. For sustainable development two things are important – one is the systematic utilization of natural resources and the other is the systematic utilization of human resources. The present article focuses on the International and National inclusive policies implemented for the development of the women in the various interrelated course of life.

Keywords: Women, Development, Empowerment, Capacity Building, Inclusive Policies

Introduction

Development is a universal phenomenon; it is a worldwide concept which means about freedom of thought and speech, freedom to participate in decision – making, and freedom to work without social bondage. The Brandt Commission rightly observed ‘Development never will be, and never can be, defined to universal satisfaction.’ For some, development means increase in national economy, for others, it implies social development, for still others, it is another name of modernization.

However, development is a multi – dimensional process involving changes in structures, attitudes, and institutions as well as it also demands equality of opportunity, that is, equal access to economic, social, political, and cultural opportunities to all citizens. It is different from the conventional economic model

of equating progress and development with per capita income or growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). While income and economic growth are necessary conditions, for improving the quality of people's lives, they are not always sufficient. It is also important to focus on the condition of women and their share of equity vis a vis men (Sen, Kalyani Menon and Shiva Kumar, 2001); as well as acceleration of economic growth, reduction of inequality and eradication of poverty.

The broad objective of the development programme is to improve the quality of life of the people. But the development can only be sustained when the people will build their own capacity to solve the problems and take decision in the management of their own resources. In a society people are managing their own resources according to their norm. But unless this management is not conducted in a planned sustainable manner, the scarcity of the resources will become an issue. For sustainable development two things are important – one is the systematic utilization of natural resources and the other is the systematic utilization of human resources.

In Simple words, development means improving the conditions of life. In development, all the modern advances in science, technology, democracy, values, ethics, and social organisation fit into the single humanitarian project of producing a far better world. In its strong sense, development means using the productive resources of society to improve the living conditions of the poorest people. Development means more of everything for everyone in the context of a lot more for a few.

Development can be understood in terms of empowerment. Empowerment can be understood by “recognizing the capacities of such groups (the marginalized and oppressed) to take action and to play an active role in development initiatives” (Siwal, 2010). Oakley identifies five key uses of the term empowerment in development studies. These are: empowerment as participation, empowerment as democratization, empowerment as capacity building, empowerment as capacity building, empowerment through economic improvement and empowerment at the individual level.

Naila Kabeer refers empowerment as the “process by which those who have been denied the ability to make strategic life choices acquire such ability” (Kabeer, 1999). This definition makes clear that only those previously denied such abilities can be considered to be empowered and also that the choices in question are strategic. Kabeer defines strategic choices as ones “which are critical for people to live the lives they want (such as choice of livelihood, whether and who to marry, whether to have children etc)” as opposed to “less consequential choices which may be important for the quality of one's life but do not constitute its defining parameters”. Naila Kabeer (1994) subscribes not so much to ‘power over’ but to ‘power within’ that needs to be strengthened; power within needs recognition by experience and analysis of the

subordination of women. According to Kabeer, such power cannot be given; it has to be self-generated and taken. Empowerment is a process where women are able to change from a state of powerlessness ('I cannot') to a state of collective self-confidence ('we can') (Siwal, 2010). Development of women, safeguarding their interest is to ensure that they are brought into the mainstream to take advantage of the general development activities. The various efforts and activities for the development of women are based on the empowerment strategy and policy making.

Women and Development

The right to lead a long and healthy life irrespective of gender is fundamental to the idea of human development. The denial of access to productive resources, basic education, health care facilities to the women, is in effect, is the denial of the basic freedom to build a better future. Since 1995, UNDP has been measuring the gender disparities in human development to identify the extent of its variation across various regions, social groups and communities. In fact, while studying the level of development of a region, it is essential that one takes into account the fact that the development outcomes should spread evenly across all sections of the society. It is almost a well accepted notion that nowhere in the world do women enjoys equal opportunities compared to men. However, along with the progress of socio-economic development in some spheres and in many countries significant progress has been made towards achieving gender equality in development. Still, it is often observed that women, particularly, lag behind their male counterparts in many aspects.

The latest Human Development Index (HDI) 2015 report themed on how access to work in a digital era labour market can improve lives termed India's National Rural Employment Guarantee act a 'milestone' that has ensured 'greater social protection'. Despite the progress, India's 2014 HDI score was 0.609, which is below the average of the medium development nations (0.630), according to the report published by the Human Development Report office of the United Nations Development Programme. Although India, the world's ninth richest country, look to be scaling up the rankings rather quickly, the picture is not all rosy. When adjusted for equality, the country's actual improvement is just one rank since last year.

This means that development has been highly skewed, and causes an overall human development 'loss' of 28.6% under scoring the need for policies that will enable wider, more secure and sustainable employment. The findings show gender inequality is a growing risk. For every 1000, live births, 190 women die from pregnancy-related causes every year in India. The figure for Bangladesh and Pakistan is lower at 170. Only 27% of adult women reach at least a secondary level of education in contrast to 56.6% of their male counterparts in India. In India, the world's largest democracy by size and population, 12.2% seats in Parliament are held

by women, while 20% parliamentary seats are held by women in Pakistan. The maternal mortality ratio of women in war torn Syria is better at 49 than India. Iraq too, despite a lower rank, tops India on maternal deaths (67 per 1000 births against India's 190).

The HDI report calls upon countries to increase access to employment in a labour market transformed by digital technology and globalization. Indian farmers and fisher folk who compare wholesale prices and track weather on mobile phones increased profits 8%. Better internet access will enable more people to work from home increasing living standards. Given globalization and technological changes, employment terms tend to be skewed against workers, 46% of them are vulnerable in India. The HDI report says newer forms of trade unionism and worker organizations, such as India's Self Employed Women's Association of India, widely known as SEWA, strengthen social protection and need to be supported (Haq, 2015). According to the Gender Development Index (GDI) 2014, female HDI value for India is 0.525 in contrast to 0.660 for males and Gender inequality Index (GII) value is 0.563.

Inclusive Policies for Women

Policy making for women involves the usual formal or informal channels of planning, as in the case of other areas of national development, which concern government. The formal channels are the legislative, the executive, both political and bureaucratic, and the Planning Commission (now NITI Aayog). The informal and very influential groups of policy making are the political parties and non – governmental organizations. In the case of policy for women, the voluntary organisations for women, eminent women in different walks of life and women activists do play a very important role in policy formation (Seth, 2001). Although women have been given rights under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, for inheriting an equal share of their husband's property along with their mother – in – law and children. They also inherit an equal share of their fathers' property as also their sons'. In fact, there is no country in the world which gives women better inheritance legislation. Under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a woman has the right to monogamous marriage and to divorce. The National Commission for Women Act, 1991, sets up a statutory body to act as an advocate of women's interests. Finally, the 73rd Constitutional Amendment, 1993, provides for reservation of seats for women in Panchayat Raj institutions.

Constitution of India and Women's rights

The Constitution of India, which came into force on 26 January 1950, is amongst the most comprehensive constitutions in the world. It contains 447 Articles divided

into 26 parts and 12 schedules. The Preamble, Part III of the Constitution consisting of Fundamental Rights, Part IV (A) containing Fundamental Duties, constitute the human rights framework in our constitution. The Constitution granted equality to women and empowering the state to adopt measures of affirmative discrimination in favour of women.

The Constitution of India guarantees to all Indian women:

- a. Equality before the law. Article 14
- b. No discrimination by the state on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of these. Article 15(1)
- c. Special provisions to be made by the State in favour of women and children. Article 15(3)
- d. Equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the state. Article 16
- e. State policy to be directed to securing for men and women equally, the right to an adequate means of livelihood. Article 39(a)
- f. Equal pay for equal work for both men and women. Article 39 (d)
- g. Provisions to be made by the state for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief. Article 42
- h. To promote harmony and to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women. Article 51(A) (e) (Sen and Kumar, 2001).

Drawing the strength from the constitutional commitments, the Government of India has been engaged in the continuous endeavour of concretely translating all the rights, commitments and safeguards incorporated in the Indian Constitution for women.

Evolution in the Approach of Five Year Plans for development of Women

The approach on women development changed from viewing women as beneficiaries of social services to contributors of social and economic development process in nation building. Development approach has attempted to address not only women's immediate needs but also their strategic gender interests addressing inequalities in employment, political participation and cultural and legal status. In the last few decades a significant shift has been apparent in the planning process of country. Approaches towards empowering women which was started with 'welfare' in the fifties, shifted to 'development' in the seventies and has been successfully continued under different Five Year Plans. A review of Five Year Plans will reflect that by framing different approaches and strategies, the Government has tried to create an enabling environment with various affirmative developmental policies and

programmes for women empowerment, besides providing them easy and equal access to all the basic minimum services.

From the Fifth Five Year Plan (1974 – 79) there was a marked shift from welfare to development, recognising women as participants in the process of development. In the Sixth Five Year Plan (1980 – 85) a multi – disciplinary approach, with a special thrust on three core sectors – health, education and employment had been affected. The Seventh Five Year Plan (1985-90) stated, for the first time, that confidence building and awareness of their rights among women must be accelerated so that women realize their own potential for development and their rights to a share from this process. It also spoke, for the first time, of the need for initiating integrated development projects for women covering health, education, nutrition, application of technology and science and creation of employment (Seth, 2001).

In the Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-97) the emphasis was on training and skill development programmes to make women economically independent and self – reliant. Empowerment of women was recognized and accepted as a distinct strategy. In the Ninth Plan, which runs from 1997 to 2002, the empowerment of women is one of its nine primary objectives. Also, the Plan attempted convergence of services available in both women – specific and women – related sectors. This was the first plan which involved women's groups from around the country in a consultative process. However, the Ninth Five Year Plan refrained from making any commitment for achieving any specific goal or target. This was overcome to some extent in the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2007), which emphasized on empowerment of women and also views development of children as the most desirable societal investment with a rights – based approach to their development (Raju, 2006). The Eleventh Plan (2007-12) has also laid great emphasis on removing gender disparities by ensuring access to basic physical infrastructure as well as health and education services to all. It has recognized gender as a crosscutting theme across all sectors and commit to respect and promote the rights of the common people (Somasekhar, 2014).

The National Commission for Women

Owing to the overwhelmingly patriarchal structure of Indian society, women have been relegated to a secondary status and have been subject to various legal and social discriminations. The framers of the Constitution recognized the need to remove such inequalities, and made special provisions to redress the same. The need was felt for a structure to uphold the rights and implement the provisions of beneficial legislations in an organized and institutionalized manner. The National Commission for Women (NCW) is a statutorily constituted body under the National Commission for Women Act, 1990. The Commission highlighted the problems and position of

disadvantaged groups like Scheduled Castes and Tribes, widows, prostitutes and women living in slum areas (National Commission for Women, 1996).

Measures for Improving Health Standard

Sustainable socio – economic development is possible only if the health and education are given top priority in the process of planning. The issue of health and the right to health is considered in all developing countries and developed countries as an issue of fundamental importance. As per the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) everyone has the right to adequate health and well being. The article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) encapsulated the ‘Right to Health’ in the following words:

1. ‘Everyone has a right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and of his family including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Viewing women in a much larger role, there has to be a swing back to planning and policies. Also, preventive, curative, and promotional health services have to converge. More importantly, women’s health has to be seen as a social issue closely interlinked with other spheres of their existence framed by patriarchal structures.

. In the case of the many developing nations, the basic indicators of health are found to be unsatisfactory. People live below the standards expected to maintain good health. When the target was fixed as the ‘Health for all by 2000 AD’, all nations planned to achieve it as targeted.. Of the three areas of health, the promotive, the preventive and curative, the promotive aspect was given the priority (Nalini and Elango, 2005).

Promotion of health would assure a high quality life, active participation, good habits, and high input of work, healthy mind, sound thought and happy interpersonal relationship leading to a healthysociety. To work on health promotion, education of the masses and spreading of health information among them is very much essential. Health information could be disseminated in the community fast with the help of media. But this is feasible in the case of developed nation where the educational and economic statuses are high. But the situation in the traditional/ developing societies is different. These societies require active participation of human resources than the application of mechanical media. Interpersonal contacts, awareness campaigns, persuasion through persistent contact only will help in disproving the existing traditional mode of health practices.

Health is one of the central elements of human security because it refers to the welfare of individuals and present at the core of their survival. Women's health is the foundation of a healthy nation. A healthy woman as Martha Nussbaum's Capability Approach, who is able to lead a complete healthy life in healthy circumstances till the end of life (Williams et al., 2014). A woman's sociological, economic and health implications are affected by the malnourishment and long working hours. Government of India has taken various steps for improving the condition of women's health, especially for the women who belong to the marginalized communities of the society. Some of them are –

National Health Policies

National Health Policy which was adopted in 1983 was to attain the goal of Health for All by the year 2000 by establishing an effective and efficient health care system for all citizens, in particular vulnerable groups like women, children and underprivileged. Other major priority areas were: close coordination of health-related services and activities like drinking water supply, sanitation, and nutrition, the active involvement and participation of voluntary organizations and provision of essential drugs and vaccines. The target was attained more or less in all states. In the year 2002, a new National Health Policy was again formulated. The major concerns were the determinants of health- water, food, sanitation, and environment. There are 137,271 sub-centres functioning in the country of which the Centre finances 97,757 and the states the balance. The Public Health Centre (PHC) is the first contact point between the village community and the medical officer, and there are 22,975 PHCs operational in the country. The PHC, as the name suggest, has facilities mainly for primary out – patient care with minimal arrangements for in – patients, while the Community Health Centre (CHC) has facilities for secondary care, with specialists and in – patients beds. There are 2935 functioning CHCs (Nanda and Almas, 2006).

These developments imply major challenges for the reproductive health agenda. The following issues need to be addressed: 1) affordable cost and access to services, 2) decentralization and devolution to panchayat raj institutions (PRIs), 3) community need based planning, 4) sustainability of infrastructure and workforce, and 5) improved quality of services. There is growing consensus in the country over the need to acknowledge the rights to and needs of adolescents, girls and boys, married and unmarried, to education, health, empowerment, livelihood, and social mobilization.

National Urban Health Mission (NHUM)

National Urban Health Mission (NHUM) encourages the participation of the community in the planning and management of the health care services. It would

promote an urban poor settlement (USHA) (one USHA for 1000 – 2500 urban poor population covering about 200 to 500 households), ensure the participation by creation of community-based institutions like Mahila Arogya Samiti (20 -1000 Households) and Rogi Kalyan Samitis. It would proactively reach out to urban poor settlements by way of regular outreach sessions and monthly health and nutrition day. It mandates special attention for reaching out to other vulnerable sections like construction workers, rag pickers, sex workers, brick kin workers, rickshaw pullers, boat man communities, fishing communities, etc.

The NHUM would promote community health risk. Health insurance, as measures for protecting the poor from impoverishing effect of out of the pocket expenditures. For promoting community risk pooling mechanism slum women would be organised into Mahila Arogya Samiti. The members of the MAS would be encouraged to save money on monthly basis for meeting the health emergencies. The group members themselves would decide the lending norms and rate of interest. The NHUM would provide seed money of Rs. 2500 to the MAS (@ Rs. 25/- per household represented by the MAS). The NHUM also proposes incentives to the group on the basis of the targets achieved for strengthening the savings. The NUHM would promote an urban health insurance model which provides for the cost of accessing health care for surgery and hospitalisation needs for the urban population at reasonable cost and assured quality, while subsidizing the insurance premium for the urban slum and vulnerable population. The mission recognizes that state specific, community oriented innovative and flexible insurance policies need to be developed.

The Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana (IGMSY)

This is a maternity benefit programme introduced in 2010 by the Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India. This is a conditional cash transfer programme for pregnant and lactating women of 19 years of age or above for first two live births. In 2013, the scheme has been brought under National Food Security Act, 2013, for implementing the provision of cash maternity benefit of Rs. 6000. Presently 200 'high burden districts' are under consideration for this scheme.

Measures for improving the Education level especially of Women

Education, especially women's education, is generally considered a key factor to development. It is related to demographic parameters and other indicators of health and socio – economic conditions of a population, or a nation as a whole. It not only helps in the development of half of the human resources, but in improving the quality of life at home and outside. Educated women not only tend to promote education of their girl education, but also can provide better guidance to all their

children. Moreover, educated women can also help in the reduction of infant mortality rate and growth of the population (Khongsdier, 2005). Moreover, maternal education is related to child health because it reduces the cost of public health programmes relating to information on health technology, increases household income and productivity of health inputs. So it is necessary to increase investment in formal education of female, for the best health development agenda.

An International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, held in 1994, has strongly recommended that all countries should take immediate steps to achieve the goal of universal primary education before the year 2015, and to ensure that girls and women should get the widest and earliest possible access to secondary and higher levels of education. It is envisaged that only education empowering poor backward women and thus they will be able to participate fully in social, economic and political process, which affect their lives and be able to take control of them.

According to the World Population Report (1990), 'A mother's education is the single most important factor in keeping her family small and her children alive. Education is the first line of defense for women faced with the life threatening situation that traditional life styles perpetuate. It encourages the sense of control over personal destiny. It opens the door to choices that are not beyond bound by tradition. With an education, the women's status steps beyond the confines of motherhood. Further, the quality of life in the family of educated women becomes a priority' (Sadik, 1990).

The Government of India for the first time accepted the concept of 'investment' in education in its 1968 Policy and quantitatively fixed a target of six percent of national income to be invested on education from the public exchequer by 1986. Some efforts have been initiated in recent years towards mobilization of non – governmental resources, mainly for secondary and higher education. The measures include introduction of cost recovery measures, introduction and revitalization of student loan programmes in higher education, and mobilization of community resources for primary education. These are in addition to measures being taken towards privatization of education and thus again marginalized sections of the society are lagging behind in the process of development through education. Though several measures were being taken for improving the education level of women; still the country yet to realize its goal in this section. Some of the measures are:

Education Guarantee Scheme (EGS)

A novel scheme called Education Guarantee Scheme has been viewed as an effective answer to the problem of physical access to schools. This is an important initiative that the government has taken at the national level in 1999 – 2000. The purpose of this

programme was to provide an opportunity to the rural poor, especially those belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other backward classes to secure education for their children. The scheme is meant for those areas where no school currently exists within a radius of 1 km. These areas could be the areas where the poorest of the poor live. The EGS envisages the poor local community to a) come forward, expressing demand for a school, b) specifically provide the premises required for a school, c) provide for a local part time teacher and d) maintain the school at least for two years with the gram panchayat mobilizing contributions in cash and kind from the local community. Now it has been made a part of the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan (Tilak, 2006).

Operation Blackboard

The government of India has initiated the Operation Blackboard programme, as a follow – up of the National Policy on Education 1986 to improve the infrastructure facilities, and quality of primary education. The scheme was started in 1987 – 88 and aimed at substantial improvement in basic facilities in all primary schools run by government and local bodies. It consists of three different components: a) a building comprising at least two reasonably large all weather rooms with a deep verandah and separate toilet facilities for boys and girls, b) at least two teachers in every school, as far as possible one of them a woman and a third teacher if the enrolment in a school is above 100, and c) essential teaching learning material including blackboards, maps, charts, toys and equipment for work experience including teacher's material and miscellaneous facilities (water facilities), etc. The Revised National Policy on Education (1992) suggested an expansion of the scope of Operation Blackboard to provide three reasonably large rooms and three teachers in every primary school, and to extend the scheme to upper primary level.

Free Elementary Education

To reduce the households direct costs of schooling of children, like many other countries had resolved long ago to provide free elementary education- specifically tuition fee free. The Government of India has also recommended in the Programme of Action, expansion of the existing schemes more intensively to the target population groups. For example, it suggested the provision of two sets of free uniforms, free text books and stationery, and attendance incentives to the girls of all families below the poverty line, and provision of free transport in state roadways buses and local trains to children attending elementary schools, etc. In fact, the Government of India has promised, in the Programme of Action, that 'a comprehensive system of incentives and support services will be provided for girls and children of the economically weaker sections of society'.

Decentralization of Education

An important development of the 1990s refers to significant efforts of the government to decentralize educational planning and administration and the involvement of the community at various levels (like School Committee, Panchayat Education Committee, Municipal Education Committee, District Education Committee with two boards, one at the district level called District Education Board and state level board called State Advisory Board for School Education) in planning, administration, financing, monitoring, and supervision of the working of the school system. Following the Constitutional Amendment in favour of Panchayati raj institutions and also the launching of externally aided projects in primary education, village education committees at various levels have been set up. Local, more specifically district primary educational plans are being formulated at decentralized levels. Their performance with respect to education development is well known. But there may not necessarily be a one to one relationship between decentralization (Tilak, 2006).

Encouragement to Private Schools

With respect to private schools, the present tendencies indicate that government favours in the name of 'building partnerships', the growth of private schools – both schools that are financially supported by the State as well as self – financing private schools. But the number of government aided school is decreasing. With the growth of such schools, the government might not feel the need for opening new government schools and as a result, the access of the poor to schools would be seriously affected. The Private schools promote dualism in education – an expensive system for the rich and a poor quality one for the poor. There is a strong need for the governments to substantially increase their spending on education with a strong political will (Dreze and Sen, 1995).

Beti Bachao Beti Padhao Yojana

The Census (2011) data showed a significant declining trend in the Child Sex Ratio (CSR), calculated as number of girls for every 1000 boys between age group of 0-6 years, with an all time low of 918 in 2011 from 976 in 1961. This is an alarming indicator for women disempowerment. It reflects both pre birth discrimination manifested through gender biased sex selection, and post birth discrimination against girls. Alarm by the sharp decline of girl child, *Beti Bachao Beti Padhao Yojana* (save daughter, educate daughter) has been launched which is a scheme of Government of India, introduced by the Honorable Prime Minister in January 2015 for saving and empowering the girl child. In the scheme it has been announced that the village

which has balanced sex ratio, will be awarded Rs. 1 crore. The scheme has focused on 100 Districts of the country which have low Child Sex Ratio to ensure survival, protection and education of the girl child (GoI, 2015).

In spite of the forceful intervention by a bastion of female privilege, feminist critics, constitutional guarantees, protecting laws and sincere efforts by the state governments and central government through various schemes and programmes over the last 66 years and above all, the United Nation's enormous pressure with regard to the uplift of the plight of women in terms education is still in the state of an enigma in India. The 2011 census report indicates that literacy among women as only 54 percent it is virtually disheartening to observe that the literacy rate of women India is even much lower to national average, i.e. 65.38. The growth of women's education in rural areas and urban slums (including Jelepura) is very slow. This obviously means that still large women folk of our country are illiterate, the weak, backward and exploited. Moreover, education is also not available to all equally. Gender inequality is reinforced in education which is proved by the fact that the literacy rate for the women is only 54% against 76% of men as per 2011 Census (Naik and Aravinda Kumar, 2014).

Conclusion

Gender equality in society implies a society in which women and men enjoy the same opportunities, outcomes, rights and obligations in all spheres of life. Despite many developmental efforts, women are still much more likely to be poor and illiterate than men. They usually have less access to medical care, property ownership, credit, and training and in employment. They are far less likely to be politically active and far more likely to be victims of domestic violence compared to men. The discourse of development is incomplete without the overall development of women in all fields including healthcare, economic independence and education. There are several measures for addressing the problems of marginalized sections of the society especially for women at international, national and local levels but still there are lacunae in the policies and their implementation for the women. For institutionalizing the issues, it is essential that both men and women are aware of their rights and responsibilities. Only the government orders cannot bridge this lack of awareness, leaving open the possibility that the gender roles can become a controversial issue, which affects the sustenance of the total programme. A comprehensive campaign is therefore, required to overcome this lack of awareness. Here, Non – Government Organisations can play an important role by organising workshops and seminars to make people, especially women, aware of their potentialities and catalyse them in taking greater role jointly in development work so that development can be of the people, for the people and by the people (Tyagi and Chatterjee, 2005).

References

- Dreze, J., and A.K. Sen (1995). 'Basic Education as a Political Issue', *Journal of Educational Planning and Administration*, vol. 9, no. 1, January, 1-26.
- Government of India (2015). 'Beti Bachao Beti Padhao', Ministry of Women and Child Development.
- Haq, Zia (2015). 00.09 IST, 'India at 130 among 188 countries in human development, up 5 slots', *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi.
- Kabeer (1999). 'Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women's Empowerment' in *Development and Change*, Vol. 30, 437.
- Khongsdier, R. (2005). 'Maternal Education in Relation to the Indicators of Health and Development in Northeast India', in V. Narayana Reddy, S. Vijaya Kumar, and B. Nalini eds *Women in Development Challenges and Achievements*, Serials Publications, New Delhi.
- Kiran Das Naik, E. and M. Aravinda Kumar (2014). 'Education and Women Empowerment in India' in Nagaraju Battu et al eds *Empowerment of Women in India New Strategies*, Regal Publications, New Delhi.
- Nalini, B. And S. Elango (2005). in Narayana Reddy, V. et.al eds *Women in Development Challenges and Achievements*, Serial Publications, New Delhi, 231.
- Nanda A.R. and Almas Ali (2006). 'Health Sector Issues and Challenges', in *India Social Development Report*, Council for Social Development, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 26.
- National Commission for Women (1996). *Annual Report, 1992 – 93 to 1996*, National Commission for Women, New Delhi.
- Raju, Saraswati (2006). 'Locating Women in Social Development', in *India Social Development Report*, Council for Social Development, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 80.
- Sadik, Nafis (1990). *State of World Population 1990*, United Nations Fund for Population Activities, New York.
- Sen, Kalyani Menon and Ak Shiva Kumar (2001). 'Women in India How Free? How Equal?,' Mensa Computers Pvt. Ltd., 7.
- Seth, Mira (2001). *Women and Development The Indian Experience*, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 52.
- Siwal, B.R. (2010). 'Empowerment of Women: Conceptual Framework' in Archana Sinha ed *Sustaining Communities Strategies for Sustainable Community Development*, Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, 214.
- Somasekhar, K. (2014). 'Empowerment of Women Need for New Initiatives', in Nagaraju Battu (ed) *Empowerment of Women in India New Strategies*, Regal Publications, New Delhi, 64-65.
- South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre (2006). *Introducing Human Rights An Overview Including Issues of Gender Justice, Environmental, and Consumer Law*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 66-145.
- Tilak, Jandhyala B.G. (2006). 'Education A Saga of Spectacular Achievements and Conspicuous Failures' in Council for Social Development's *India Social Development Report*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
- Tyagi and Chatterjee (2005). 'Women in Development', in Narayana Reddy, V. et.al eds *Women in Development Challenges and Achievements*, Serial Publications, New Delhi, 42-43.
- Williams, M.J., S.B. Williams and P.S. Choo (2014). 'From Women in Fisheries to gender and fisheries' in *SPC Women in Fisheries Information Bulletin*, 24 – July 2014, 6-9.

Assessing India's Use of Soft Power as an Instrument of Foreign Policy

Mohammad Reyaz

Abstract

The term soft power, introduced by Joseph Nye, has become a catch-all-phrase for public and cultural diplomacy. India has several historical and cultural advantages when it comes to its influence in foreign countries. While India and Indians enjoy goodwill in most countries, it cannot be denied that the sudden interests in India among the policymakers, businesses, and politicians were mainly after the 1992 economic liberalisation, which opened the Indian market for foreign investments. New Delhi too, employed soft power instruments in countries it deemed to have more significant interests, from traditional allies like Bhutan to Afghanistan in the last two decades, besides the nation-branding exercises globally. But how successful has India been in exploiting its cultural linkages and using its soft power in the nation's branding? This question becomes pertinent as, in recent years, India has often received negative press coverage in international media; and on several freedom/democratic indices, its rankings have gone down. As India celebrates the 75 years of independence as Azadi ka Mahotsav (grand celebration of independence), this paper assesses the scope of soft power as a foreign policy instrument, points out its shortcomings, and recommends the possibilities.

Keywords: Azadi ka Mahotsav, Bollywood, Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, India, Public Diplomacy, Soft Power.

Introduction

India has had several historical and cultural advantages when it comes to its influence in foreign countries. Buddhism had entered Tibet and China through present Afghanistan and Central Asian countries, and there remain several ruins of the glorious past of the historic Silk Route. Consequently, India's cultural linkages, and hence soft power assets, are strongest amongst its neighbours, although there are also some frictions owing to political and historical reasons (Reyaz, 2015a). India's unique syncretic culture and Indian Islam have historical linkages with Turkic-Persian culture. Among countries on its west, from Pakistan to Morocco, as

well as in Europe and America, India generally enjoys immense goodwill (Reyaz, 2015b).

India assiduously invested in its soft power as an instrument of foreign policy, even before the term came in vogue in international relations. India's branding as land with diversity, pluralism, and tolerance began even before independence. Mahatma Gandhi's emphasis on *ahimsa*, or leading a principled non-violent freedom struggle, inspired several such movements worldwide. As the father of the nation, his teachings became the nation's guiding force, particularly in the early years of the Congress government. India was thus projected as a *Vishva Guru* (world's leader), "a civilization that could usher in moral values and ethical standards into international relations" (Kugiel 2016). Within its limited resources, India has succeeded in projecting itself as the "land of the better story" (Tharoor, 2007).

While India and Indians enjoyed goodwill in most countries, it cannot be denied that the sudden interests in India among the policymakers, businesses, and politicians were mainly after the 1992 economic liberalisation. It opened the Indian market for foreign investments and provided a huge market, besides cheap labour, for their goods. In terms of nominal GDP, it is the fifth-largest economy globally and is slated to become the third-largest by 2050, after the USA and China (*Hindustan Times*, 2020). Besides the large pool of skilled labour, particularly in the IT sector, the advantage of English helped India in the emergence of the BPO (business process outsourcing) sector in the 1990s and 2000s, helped boost the urban economy, particularly in IT hubs like Bangalore, Hyderabad, Gurgaon, among others.

No doubt, India succeeded in turning itself *attractive*, but did those investments in soft-power yield any result in its favour as well? How successful has India been in exploiting its cultural linkages, Indian diaspora, cinema, and other tools of soft-power in branding the nation? More significantly, soft power is of little help when not combined with the optimum use of other means, including hard power. Nye termed this as "smart power" (Nye, 2009). Could India supplement its soft power with hard power when needed? These questions have become significant as in recent years, India has often received negative media-coverage in international press for apparent persecution of minorities, and throttling of democratic spaces and press freedom. More importantly, there have been occasions when hashtags on Twitter and other social media platforms have trended criticising India's actions, often pushed by some international celebrities, and many social media influencers in Arab countries in particular. As India celebrates the completion of 75 years of independence as *Azadi ka Mahotsav* (grand celebration of independence), this paper assesses its soft power as an instrument of foreign policy to examine its scope and achievements critically and explore the challenges points to opportunities to further strengthen those initiatives.

Theoretical Underpinnings

Politics – whether domestic or international – is intertwined with the concept of power. Max Weber termed power as “sociologically amorphous” and defined it as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Weber, 1978). For Robert Dahl (1957), power is the ability to force someone to do something he would otherwise not do. This power or ability to influence someone to do something is generally seen as a form of coercion, ‘hard power’ such as military and economic resources. “Power over opinion is the third form of power,” according to Carr (2016), and is “not less essential for political purposes than military and economic power, and has always been closely associated with them.” Put simply, the “ability to force someone to do something” does not always have to be coercive and can be an attractive power that influences someone to do certain things. Thus the “proof of power lies not in resources but in the ability to change the behaviour of states” (Nye, 1990). Morgenthau’s interpretation of cultural imperialism and what he termed the “policy of prestige” thus echoes the soft-power concept defined by Nye (Morgenthau, 1997). He noted, “A policy of prestige attains its very triumph when it gives the nation pursuing it such a reputation of power as to enable it to forgo the actual employment of the instrument of power” (Morgenthau, 1997).

Nye defines soft power as a state’s “ability to get preferred outcomes through the co-optive means of agenda-setting, persuasion, and attraction,” as distinct from hard power, which relies on coercion and economic inducements (Nye, 2011a). According to Nye, “If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow” (Nye, 1990). Consequently, if “soft power is pull, hard power is push” (Nye, 2011b). Nye’s soft power builds upon the “three-dimensional power” of Lukes (1974), and the idea of “structural power” of Jeffery Isaac (Gallarotti, 2011) as well as the “policy of prestige” of Morgenthau (1997). According to Nye, the three primary soft power resources are political values, culture, and foreign policies. He points out that universal and shared values are likely to attract more while “narrow values and parochial cultures are less likely to produce soft power” (Nye, 2004). Hence if a country is serious about its image abroad, it will have to work towards improving the potential of soft power at home before it can truly aspire to exploit its soft power in international relations. Stressing on the “role of image and identity in international relations,” Simon Anholt argues that the nation’s brand can be “enhanced through strategy, substance and symbolic actions” (Anholt, 2013).

The common soft power instruments used for nation-branding include economic diplomacy, foreign development assistance, diaspora, public diplomacy, scholarships, academic exchanges, religious tourism, sports, cultural promotion, cinema, media broadcasting, and now increasingly, social media. Cultural contacts through exchange programs, educational scholarships, and fellowships are also essential tools for promoting soft power. They create a feeling of goodwill about host countries, and thus help curb negative stereotypes and adverse opinions (Nye, 2004). According to Mette Lending, “cultural exchange is not only ‘art’ and ‘culture’ but also communicating a country’s thinking, research, journalism, and national debate” (Melissen 2005).

Consequently, soft power is about “the world’s perceptions of what that country is all about. The associations and attitudes conjured up in the global imagination by the mere mention of a country’s name is often a more accurate gauge of its soft power than a dispassionate analysis of its foreign policies,” according to Shashi Tharoor, author, former diplomat, and ex-minister (Tharoor, 2012). Hence, it is critical for a country to invest in public diplomacy and nation-branding. Public diplomacy has emerged as an essential instrument of soft power for this nation’s branding. According to Chitty, “Public diplomacy is engagement variously between governments and publics...through use of media (including social media), mobility or cultural production...for purposes of building sustainable and mutually beneficial relationships and generating mutual goodwill”(Chitty, 2017a). Unlike traditional diplomacy, which is between governments and involves a small section of ruling elites, soft power processes often operate outside of the government. Public diplomacy is all about engaging with the larger public. This has opened new challenges for embassies worldwide, where diplomats are required to inculcate goodwill, not just among a handful of elites, but with the larger public through the host country’s civil society.

Cultural centres, often attached to embassies and consulates, play a significant role in organizing language courses, seminars, films, or cultural festivals. Special programs aimed at skill development and development aids distributed through NGOs and other civil society groups have gained more currency in recent decades. These, however, also become causes of worry among the ruling elites of the host countries, particularly in the least developed countries, as they see these as attempts at instigating a coup against the government in the name of installing democracies. Rawnsley, however, cautions from reducing the soft power into an “empty catch-all term that means everything and therefore nothing” (Rawnsley, 2016). Its critics stress that “the trouble with soft power is that it’s, well, soft” (Ferguson 2003). Further, “soft power is sometimes seen as a moral or idealistic policy, whereas, in reality, soft power does not necessitate morality” (Kugiel, 2016). Moreover, a country

may enjoy goodwill, but if it lacks the military prowess and economic resources or practices non-interventionist policy, “the goodwill generated is of little use in a pure realist sense of foreign policies” (Reyaz & Ahamed, 2022). More importantly, although military might and economic power are not parts of the soft power, they certainly play an important role in building awe and aura for the foreign power (Nye, 2004). Jacob puts it aptly, “Soft power is not restricted to the power to pull; it also includes the power to awe, to inspire confidence, trust, and faith among global audiences” (Jacob, 2017). Nye too has, elsewhere, termed it the “second face of power” (Nye, 2011a). In other words, “soft power does not exist in the nature of certain resources but rather it has to be nurtured through a soft use of power” (Li, 2009). Hence, there needs to be a fine balance and a golden mean between complex power resources and soft power, which Nye has termed as the “smart power” (Nye, 2009).

Evolution of India's Soft Power and its Usage as a Foreign Policy Tool

It is said that foreign relations are a reflection of domestic politics. Consequently, which party is in power or the people managing the affairs at the top shape, to a large degree, not just domestic politics but also manifested in its international relations. In different eras, as the domestic policies and, more importantly, the larger meta-narrative within the country changed, these also impacted India's foreign policies, more significantly how cultural diplomacy was dealt with – and what comprises Indian culture. Rohan Mukherjee and David Malone notes, “India's journey from 1947 to the present day, in terms of both foreign policy and domestic politics, can be seen as a transition from idealism under Nehru, through a period of ‘hard realism’ (or *realpolitik*) lasting roughly from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s (coinciding with the dominance of the Indian political scene by Indira Gandhi), to economically driven pragmatism today” (Mukherjee & Malone, 2011). 2014 was another critical turning point in India's contemporary history when for the first time, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – that professes Hindutva to be its main ideology - won a thumping majority, making then Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi the prime minister (Reyaz, 2019). The BJP also led a coalition government from 1998 to 2004 under AB Vajpayee, but 2014 was significantly different as this was also a National Democratic Alliance government, but BJP won the majority on its own. Former diplomat and Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar consequently divided the broader foreign policy into six phases: The first phase was from 1946 to 1962, marked by “optimistic nonalignment” that ended with a jolt with the 1962 conflict with China. From 1962-to 1971 was the phase of “realism and recovery” when India made “pragmatic choices on security and political challenges while addressing the paucity of resources.” From 1971 to 1991, the third phase was of “greater Indian regional assertion.” The fourth phase began in 1991 and lasted till the end of the last

millennium. It was characterised by “the dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of the unipolar world.” In the fifth phase, India’s “relevance to the world increased, as did its ability to shape outcomes” as reflected in the India-US Nuclear deal and regional organisations like BRICS. The sixth phase, according to Jaishankar, began in 2014 that is still continuing and is a phase marked by “a world of convergences and issue-based arrangements” (Jaishankar, 2020).

There are “four competing visions” of India regarding its foreign relations and its position in the world (Sagar 2009). These are: “*Moralists* wish for India to serve as an exemplar of principled action; *Hindu nationalists* want Indians to act as muscular defenders of Hindu civilization; *strategists* advocate cultivating state power by developing strategic capabilities, and *liberals* seek prosperity and peace through increasing trade and interdependence” (Sagar, 2009). On the other hand, Kanti Bajpai (2013) divides India’s foreign relations principles as *Nehruvians*, *Neoliberals*, and *Hyperrealists*. Consequently, we can say that in the foreign policies of India, “pragmatism, realism, and idealism exist side by side” (Cohen, 2004). There are also elements of “moralising tone” and “exceptionalism in Indian diplomacy” (Sullivan, 2014).

At the time of independence, India was a poor country with limited military and economic resources. Hence, it relied on its rich history, heritage, diverse culture, pluralism, etc., in realising its global ambitions. Accordingly, it “pursued a foreign policy agenda backed by the power of moral arguments rather than arguments of power...(and) used soft power to compensate for its hard power deficiencies” (Kugiel, 2016). Consequently, India could play a far more critical role as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at the height of the Cold War. In 1971, India signed the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement with the USSR. India was thus projected as a *Vishva Guru* (world’s leader), “a civilization that could usher in moral values and ethical standards into international relations” (Kugiel, 2016). As a former British colony, it took a principled stand against any form of imperialism and colonialism and sought to play a more significant role in establishing peace. It did help India in the international arena, as by and large, India was seen as a non-interfering country, with practically no territorial ambitions beyond what it claimed to be its borders. Hence, it is perceived very positively by most countries, except some of its neighbours with whom it has border disputes as legacies of colonialism.

After the liberalisation of its economy, interests in India grew manifold due to its potential as a huge market, coupled with a functioning democratic setup. Interests in India and its culture have attracted foreigners for ages, but the emergence of India as a vast market after globalisation, has given new impetus. Indian IT professionals, a huge Diaspora population and the Indian film industry in general, and Bollywood, in particular, have emerged as new sources of India’s soft power. Several Indian companies are giving tough competition to international majors the world over.

There were combinations of reasons that necessitated the extra impetus on Soft Power in the 1990s in India's foreign policy, the foremost being Nye's seminal work emphasising soft power in the post-cold war period in international relations. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India realised that it needed to realign its relations with the West in general and the United States in particular. However, it did not get as welcoming a reception due to its advocacy of NAM, closer ties with the USSR, and, more importantly, a mixed economic system heavily relying on socialism (Indira Gandhi, for example, had nationalised private banks and airlines). Further, the liberalisation and privatisation of the economy required attracting foreign investments. The demolition of the Babri Masjid on 6 December 1992 dented India's pluralistic image globally, besides the ongoing crisis in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. India realised that it needed to counter Pakistan and Chinese propaganda on international forums. The Pokhran II Nuclear tests further attracted many international sanctions. In short, India was in desperate need of what Simon Anholt called the "nation branding".

While the disintegration of the USSR naturally jump-started the realignment in foreign relations, the PV Narasimha Rao government remained more focused on preparing the ground and economic conditions. As far as the present study is concerned, many see this period as the end of the soft power diplomacy to give way to the muscular realism under Vajpayee, as the Kargil war a year later manifested. Hymans writes, "India pursued such a revolutionary soft power strategy under Gandhi and Nehru, until turning away from it under Indira Gandhi, and then definitely abandoning it under Atal Behari Vajpayee" (Hymans, 2009). That may have been true for a brief period, when "after testing nuclear weapons, India achieved its maximum hard power, while its soft power reached a new low" (Kugiel, 2016). But the nuclear tests immediately put India in the elite club of those possessing nuclear weapons and forced countries from the United States to Europe and China to take New Delhi more seriously. Many commentators, hence mark 1998 – when India conducted the nuclear tests – as a "turning point" in India's foreign relations, not just because of "ideological or idealistic reasons" but pure "pragmatic necessity" (Kugiel, 2016). The Indo-US nuclear deal of 2009 was an acknowledgment of India's rising prestige and power, which was not just the result of its hard power as one of the fastest-growing economies, the biggest importer of arms, besides being a nuclear power, but it was also a victory of India's public diplomacy and its soft power potentials.

Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy has become an essential instrument of nation-branding and soft power, helping build favourable narrative in the short run and reputation and goodwill in the long run. In 2006, a separate Public Diplomacy Division within MEA

was created. The External Affairs Ministry also established a full-fledged Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) to “influence public attitudes in a manner that they become supportive of its foreign policy and national interests” (MEA, n.d.). The PDD aimed to cater to the growing demands of a “coherent public diplomacy strategy that functions as a vital part of foreign policy and nation branding” to focus on helping build a positive image mainly (Suri, 2011). Maintaining active social media accounts on different platforms has become critical in this age of new media. The old External Publicity Division continued to do the traditional tasks of issuing statements and managing media. The PDD increased the activities of diplomatic outreach to media, researchers, and policymakers in particular but was merged in 2014 with the old External Publicity Division after the new government of NDA came to power.

The joint division, now renamed External and Public Diplomacy Division, tackles the entire ambit of public diplomacy and media outreach, from organizing special lectures and conferences, producing documentaries and articles, and managing media and social media presence. It also publishes *The India Perspectives*, the flagship magazine of the MEA, published in 17 languages and distributed in at least 160 countries through diplomatic missions. Created in 1939, All India Radio also has External Services that are broadcast in 27 languages in more than a hundred countries (Kugiel 2016). India still does not have a state-affiliated international TV channel, although a private media conglomerate Zee Media Network, which is considered close to the ruling BJP, has launched the WION (World is One News) TV channel in 2016 to ‘give a global view of the world with a South Asian lens’ (PTI, 2016).

Established in 1943, the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) serves as an essential think-tank on foreign policy matters. Besides conducting regular research, seminars, and special lectures on crucial foreign policy matters by national and international policymakers and statesmen from various countries, it also commissions research projects, publications of books, and conferences. In collaboration with Sage publication, it brings out a crucial *journal India Quarterly*. It also has MoUs and collaborations with think tanks from various countries. The Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) is a similar semi-autonomous think-tank of the MEA. Although the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) is part of the Defence Ministry, it is another valuable autonomous think-tank of the government, focusing on foreign relations though mainly from a security point of view. Among the private think tanks of the country, the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and its annual multilateral conference, the Raisina Dialogue being, held since 2016 along the lines of Singapore’s Shangri-La Dialogue, has grabbed people’s attention. Centre for Policy Research (CPR), and Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), are also important besides the International Studies

departments of reputed universities, most significantly being the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

Culture, Films and Diaspora

Legacies of Hinduism and Buddhism bind India with its neighbours like Nepal, China, Bhutan, Tibet, countries in East Asia, and so on even today. According to DayaThussu (2013), "Buddhism was the biggest project of dissemination of Indian ideas." In fact, "Buddhism is a sizeable soft power asset that has expanded India's influences to the distant parts of Asia in the past" (Kugiel, 2016). Yoga has become a global phenomenon, and several Indian swamis and Yoga gurus have a vast following in the West, not just among the Indian diaspora but also among the western population. The current NDA regime has particularly put emphasis on Yoga as an "invaluable gift of India's ancient tradition," promoting a healthy and spiritual lifestyle. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi advocated at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2014 to declare 21 June, the day of the summer solstice, as the International Yoga Day, which was unanimously approved by the end of the year (UNIC, 2014). Since then, every year, Indian embassies and counsels worldwide organise annual events besides promoting yoga training throughout the year. On the occasion of the fourth International Yoga Day, PM Modi said, "The world has embraced Yoga and glimpses of this can be seen in the manner in which International Day of Yoga has been marked every year...From Dehradun to Dublin, Shanghai to Chicago, Jakarta to Johannesburg, Yoga has become a positive influence in the lives of millions" (India Today, 2018).

Classic Indian music and dance forms like *Bharatnatyam* and *Kathak*, always enchanted the audience, but in the age of globalization, even they got a new audience. Pandit Bhimsen Joshi, Pandit Ravishankar, Ustad Akbar Ali Khan, Zakir Hussain, Amjad Ali Khan, and Ustad Bismillah Khan, among others, earned fame globally. Similarly, painters and artists like Raja Ravi Verma, M.F. Hussain, Syed Haider Raza, Tyeb Mehta, FN Souza, among others, became famous for their unique works globally. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has declared 38 World Heritage sites in India as of 2020, placing India in the sixth position in terms of most declared heritage sites (UNESCO, n.d.). 30 of these are cultural heritage sites, It should be pointed here, that at least 42 other cultural heritage, national parks, etc. are in the "tentative list," over 30 of which are also cultural sites.

Indian films, in general and Hindi-Bollywood, in particular, have been a great source of India's cultural diplomacy. Indian films have had huge followings from Afghanistan to Azerbaijan and Malaysia to Morocco, China, Europe, and America, not just among the Indian diaspora. Besides Tamil, Bengali, Telugu, and other language films also have their niche audience. According to Kugiel (2016), "Bollywood

movies are deeply rooted in India's cultural ethos; thus, they are prime agents of educating and familiarising foreign audiences with distinctive traditions, value systems, and aesthetics." In 2008, then Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh acknowledged in his address to the probationary officers of the Foreign Service, "The soft power of India in some ways can be a very important instrument of foreign policy. Cultural relations, India's film industry, Bollywood I find wherever I go in Middle-East, in Africa - people talk about Indian films. So that is a new way of influencing of the world about the growing importance of India. Soft power is equally important in the new world of diplomacy" (Singh, 2008).

Films have emerged as a significant window to the outsiders, giving them a sneak peek into the Indian lifestyle, fashion, festivals, culture, and food. Fusion Indian dresses have developed a niche market and are quite popular, particularly among women. According to Thussu (2013), "One reason for the popularity of Indian films among other developing countries is the combination of larger-than-life characters, escapist melodramatic narrative style, and song and dance sequences." The 1990s was when Bollywood made Hindi films truly global and helped a great deal in creating goodwill for India. The 'Incredible India' campaign launched in 2002 by the Tourism Ministry has been one of the most successful campaigns of nation-branding that helped increase tourism manifold.

People of Indian origin who migrated recently to western countries or in the Persian Gulf countries, as well as the powerful diaspora population in several former colonies of Britain like Mauritius, Surinam, West Indies, Fiji, South Africa, and Kenya, have emerged as a strategic asset for India's soft power. Skilled Indian workers, particularly in the information technology fields, are in massive demand in Silicon Valley. India's one advantage was the English language which helped them connect to the outside world. In recognition of their significance, in 2002, India rolled out the Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) card that helped them travel to their country of origin without any hassles. Since 2015, they have been recognised as Overseas Citizens of India cardholders with practically all rights equivalent to that of Indian citizens except the right of voting (Tharoor, 2007). In 2004, a separate Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs was created to reach out to the Indian diaspora and exploit their potential. However, in 2014, it was merged with the External Affairs Ministry.

More than the number or distribution of the diaspora population, their value as an instrument of soft power lies in "the positions, roles and prestige they acquired in their respective countries" (Kugiel, 2016). Indian diaspora have done reasonably well both in the West and in former colonies where they were settled as indentured labourers often occupying important positions in academia, health sector, businesses, law, as well as in political positions.

Cultural Diplomacy

The cultural diplomacy of India is managed both by the MEA and the Ministry of Culture. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), is an autonomous body that works towards fostering and strengthening “cultural relations and mutual understanding between India and other countries; to promote cultural exchanges with other countries and people, and to develop relations with nations” (ICCR, n.d.). It was established in 1950 by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India's first education minister. One of the flagship schemes of the ICCR is giving scholarships to international students studying in Indian universities. Besides, it organises regular visitor programs, unique cultural and academic events, and sponsors research. As of 2020, ICCR annually disburses: “3940 scholarships under 26 different schemes to foreign students from about 140 countries... (out of which) six are funded by ICCR from its grant and others are administered on behalf of MEA and Ministry of Ayush” (ICCR, n.d.).

According to the website of the ICCR, every year, over 6000 international students enrolled in different universities and institutes at UG, PG, and research programs are hosted by them, besides several thousand students who come to study funding their education or through other schemes. International students from developing countries who graduate from Indian universities and return to their native countries serve as the goodwill ambassadors of India in their country. When some of them reach important positions (or would reach in the future), they help serve India's interests. ICCR has also run several cultural centres in different countries, often attached to its embassies, besides Chairs of Indian Studies in universities or educational institutions abroad. According to its website, as of 2020, 38 such cultural centres and 69 Chairs of Indian Studies are being run by ICCR.

On his foreign visits, PM Modi likes to develop personal charisma with the leaders of host countries whether it was the USA under President Barack Obama or later President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, or Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman. On his first visit to the United Arab Emirates in 2015, he visited the famous and the world's third-largest mosque Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque in Abu Dhabi (PTI, 2015). Similarly, when Jordanian King Abdullah II visited new Delhi in 2018, him he attended “Islamic Heritage: Promoting Understanding and Moderation” at the India Islamic Cultural Centre in the national capital. PM Modi emphasised in his address, “Pluralism is what makes India. Our diversity strengthens us. This is the land where people of various faiths and beliefs happily coexist, guided by universal values of harmony and togetherness” (Reyaz, 2018).

Economic Diplomacy

It is a fact that “soft power depends not only on cultural attractions, political values, and a legitimate foreign policy but also on the appeal of a country’s political and economic record” (Mullen, 2015). As India grew economically more robust, it slowly began to exploit its potential to realise its aspirations of emerging as a regional power by indulging in economic diplomacy, mainly through foreign assistance programmes. The major hurdle that India faces in its neighbourhood is that some countries see it as the “big brother,” besides its hostility with Pakistan and China. One major challenge that Indian diplomats face in these countries is convincing them that “India is an opportunity, not a threat” (Kugiel, 2016).

MEA has established the Development Partnership Administration that coordinates and handles the financial assistance given to friendly countries like Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives, Afghanistan, etc. Although the amount of foreign aid that India offers as a “development partnership” is tiny compared to many western countries, Japan or China, what distinguishes India’s assistance is that often it comes without any strings attached; that is, India does not do it at the cost of bringing democracy or demanding regime change, and thus these are not seen with hostility by the ruling regime in those countries. The Ministry makes it clear:

India’s approach to development is mainly human-centric and is marked by Respect, Diversity, Care for the future, and Sustainable development. For India, the most fundamental principle in cooperation is respecting development partners and being guided by their development priorities. India’s development cooperation does not come with any conditions. (MEA, n.d.)

Former Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai noted in 2013: “Our engagement is demand-driven and responds to the developmental priorities of our partner countries. We do not attach conditionalities, we do not predictive policies and we do not challenge national sovereignty” (Mathai, 2013). However, that does not mean that there is no strategic planning into it. On the contrary, “India’s foreign assistance program is a strategic tool to showcase India’s technical strengths and achievements and to harness and promote India’s political and economic interests in the world” (Sikri 2009). India’s largest economic aid goes to Bhutan, followed by Mauritius, Maldives, and Nepal (Statista, n.d.). Till 2021, Afghanistan too received a significant chunk, though not among the highest, but got disproportionately high media coverage, understandably for strategic gains. But the events of August 2021 that brought the Taliban back to power exposed the shortcomings of over-reliance on soft power without adequate strategic thinking (Reyaz & Ahamed, 2022).

Mixed Image

After the initial euphoria in academic and diplomatic circles over the scope and potential of the Soft Power in public diplomacy in the last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the current century, it has largely been accepted now that if a country hopes to achieve any fruitful outcome, then what it needs is the perfect balance of both hard and soft power, what Nye himself later termed as “smart power” (Nye, 2009). India is the best example of the same. India has mixed image abroad where the country and its people generally enjoy much goodwill among foreigners. However, when it comes to exploiting them to their advantage, New Delhi has still not been successful in reaping the desired strategic outcomes beyond sweet talks appreciating its rich heritage, culture, films, spiritualism, Yoga, etc. India does not yet figure in *The Soft Power 30*, “a global ranking of soft power,” jointly published by Portland Communications and the USC Centre on Public Diplomacy from 2015 onwards. In the 2019 edition, countries from Asia that make it to the list include Japan (8), South Korea (19), Singapore (21), China (27), and Turkey (29). The same report also has “the Asia Soft Power 10,” where India is eighth-placed, above Indonesia and the Philippines. The lone consolation it can drive home is that India is the only South Asian country to be figuring in the list. In the 9th edition of the IfG Monocle Soft Power Index “Soft Power Survey 2018/19,” India ranked 24 out of 25 countries.

In the Global Soft Power Index (2020), published by Brand Finance, India ranked 27 in 2020 but fell nine steps to 36 in 2021 and has made some improvements in 2022 with 29 rankings, although it is still lower than 2020. The 2020 report of the Global Soft Power Index noted, “India is leading the charge amongst its South Asian neighbours in the soft power stakes, but underperforms relative to other leading nations, given the size of its population, economy, and its rich heritage... Nevertheless, India is to be commended for the way in which it has invested in cultural diplomacy and for the major investments in global tourism spend.” The 2022 edition of the report notes: “From being the world’s largest democracy to its spectrum of cultural and linguistic diversity to its moral doctrine of nonviolence of Mahatma Gandhi, to its biggest non-monetised global export of Yoga, Spiritualism, to its Classical Music and Dance, to the millions who come to India every year for its Holistic healthcare, to its delicious and flexible cuisines enjoyed globally as curries and to its loud Bollywood known over the world.”* It further acknowledges the role of the IT sector, the largely non-interfering nature of international politics,

In the 1.4 version of the Good Country Index (2022) that “measures what countries contribute to the world outside their borders, and what they take away,”

* ‘Global Soft Power Index 2020,’ Brand Finance (2022) [<https://brandirectory.com/softpower/report>, accessed 8 May 2022].

India is overall placed at 52nd position. In this Index, China ranks 60th while Pakistan is at 98th position. However, in the *Freedom in the World 2021* report, India “dropped from Free to Partly Free status.” In the 2020 Democracy Index, it slipped two positions to 53rd and was categorised as “Flawed Democracy,” while the Sweden-based V-Dem Institute’s Democracy Report 2021 Noted that the “world’s largest democracy turned into an electoral autocracy.”

Conclusion: Gaps Between Ambitions and Executions

India has succeeded in projecting itself as the “land of the better story” within its limited resources (Tharoor 2007). India promotes its soft-power, historical and cultural linkages, cricket, and Indian films, not just Bollywood Hindi films, but also Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, Bengali, etc. – to its advantages abroad. In *Communicating India’s Soft Power: Buddha to Bollywood*, Thussu writes, “This rare combination of a civilisation which has strong Hindu-Buddhist foundations, centuries of Islamic influence, and integration with European institutions, and ideas, gives India unparalleled cultural resources to deal with the diverse, globalised, and complex realities of the twenty-first century”. Although institutions like ICCR and the External and Public Diplomacy Division of the MEA have done commendable jobs in nation-branding, there seem to be some gaps between India’s ambitions of emerging as *Vishva Guru* (world leader) in the 21st century and its actions on the ground. Besides, many of the initiatives suffer from a half-hearted attitude, red-tapism, and undue delay in project implementations leading to several extensions. Politicians and policymakers may often use the term soft power sweepingly. However, Indian foreign policy is still primarily dominated by security and trade concerns, and so far, they did not have any concrete policy on soft power (Kugiel 2012). Its use of soft power in foreign policy largely remains “indirect and inconsistent,” hence difficult to ascertain. Many argue that “Indian soft power has fallen far short of expectations... (due to its) inability to capitalize on its soft power resources is the result of three factors” (Mukherjee 2014). Nonetheless, Foreign Minister Jaishankar believes that by underlining its “greater capabilities and confidence”, India can help build ‘unique brand as generous power’. He stresses, “India has surely but steadily assisted in underwriting the global commons when that has come under stress”. There were reports that the Narendra Modi government is working towards developing a “soft power matrix...to help foster better diplomatic traction in India’s immediate neighbourhood and beyond”. Besides promoting Yoga and Hindi abroad, PM Modi emphasises civilisational links with the countries he visited. However, these too, appear to have been overstretched and appear predictable.

Nye pointed out that the universal and shared values are likely to attract more while “narrow values and parochial cultures are less likely to produce soft power”.

Despite efforts by the government and pro-government civil society groups, India often ends up making international headlines for reasons which raise questions on the application of its constitutional values in practice. For example, anti-corruption protests led by Anna Hazare and Arvind Kejriwal in 2011, the Delhi gang rape of a college girl in 2012, or, more recently, anti-Dalit and anti-minorities violence, anti-CAA-NP-NRC protests, or farmers' protests grab more international headlines, making the government of the day "worried India rating may turn junk," impacting its international branding and image. Significantly, in the wake of the anti-CAA protests and following the Delhi riots in 2020, and later during farmers' agitations, social media had gone abuzz with the criticisms of the Indian government and its policies, often by activists and celebrities from other countries, putting a "dent in India's soft power image" (Krishnan, 2021). There is no denying that "the over-zealot Hindutva leaders and trolls are denting India's image of tolerance and secularism, particularly in the Muslim world, forcing the foreign office and the diplomats in the gulf capitals to scramble for a concrete response". The government has routinely blamed several anti-government protests as 'anti-national' activities of 'Tukde-Tukde (divisive) gang, Islamists and Leftists' funded by "foreign elements". The government of the day – and their ideologues – see these as signs of "the effort for Resurgence of the idea of Bharat" that will truly make it the *Vishva Guru*. According to one RSS ideologue, the current period is important since:

For the first time in our history after Shivaji's glorious period, the incipient nationalist movements of this country are gradually gathering steam to reverse the impacts of the setbacks suffered in the past, which saw waves of conquests and slavery that weakened the enshrined cultural concepts which our civilisation upheld. (Nandakumar 2020)

But to emerge as *Vishva Guru*, India must work hard to address and resolve the ideological challenges saddling its domestic politics. Otherwise, its investments in soft power assets and nation-building may remain insufficient and not yield the desired outcomes in the long run.

Acknowledgement: The author would like to acknowledge the generous support of the Indian Council of Social Science Research, Govt. of India to study the stake of soft power of India. The author also appreciates the support of research assistants Zeba Khan and Abul Barkat Jilani who worked on this project. The guidance of author's PhD Supervisor Prof. Rashmi Doraiswamy in the early stage of research was very helpful.

Funding: This work was supported by the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) under IMPRESS, and initiative of Govt. of India, under Grant IMPRESS/P1411/0171/2018-19/ICSSR.

Conflict of Interest: I declare that we do not have any conflict of interest with the publisher.

References

- Anholt, Simon (2013). "Beyond the Nation Brand: The Role of Image and Identity in International Relations," *Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy*, 2(1): 1-12. <https://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=exchange>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Bajpai, Kanti (2013). "On Three Key Fronts – Relations with Pakistan, China, and the US – the Neoliberal School is in the Ascendant," *Global Brief*, winter. <https://globalbrief.ca/2013/03/india-does-go-grand-strategy/>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Blarel, Nicolas (2012). "India: the Next Superpower?: India's Soft Power: from Potential to Reality?" IDEAS reports - special reports, Kitchen, Nicholas (ed.) SR010. LSE IDEAS, London: London School of Economics and Political Science. <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/43445>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Carr, E.H. (2016). *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*. Reissued with a new preface from Michael Cox (ed.), London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Chitty, Naren (2017). "Soft Power, Civic Virtue and World Politics (Section Overview)," in Naren Chitty, Li Ji, Gary D. Rawnsley, and Craig Hayden (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power* (pp. 9-36), Oxon: Routledge.
- Cohen, Stephen P. (2004). *India's Emerging Power*, Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
- Dahl, Robert (1957[2007]). "The Concept of Power," in *Behavioral Science*, 2(3): 201-215. <https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830020303>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Democracy Index (2020). The Economist Intelligence Unit, at <https://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/democracy-index-2020.pdf>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Democracy Report (2021). V-Dem Institute, at https://v-dem.net/static/website/files/dr/dr_2021.pdf, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- DNA (2021): "Revealed: Foreign Powers Plotting to Defame India in Name of Farmers' Protest," *Daily News and Analysis (DNA)*, 5 February. <https://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-revealed-foreign-powers-plotting-to-defame-india-in-name-of-farmers-protest-2873251>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Dutta, Anisha (2022). "Exclusive: Worried India Rating May Turn Junk, Govt Pushed 'Narrative Management' Strategy," *The Indian Express* (online), 10 May. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/worried-india-rating-may-turn-junk-govt-pushed-narrative-management-strategy-7907161/>, accessed on 11 May 2022.
- Ferguson, Niall (2013). "Power," *Foreign Policy*, 134: 18-24. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3183518>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Freedom in the World (2021). Freedom House, at https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/FIW2021_World_02252021_FINAL-web-upload.pdf, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Gallarotti, Giulio M. (2011). "Soft Power: What it is, Why it's Important, and the Conditions for its Effective Use," *Journal of Political Power*, 4(1): 25-47. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379x.2011.557886>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Global Soft Power Index (2020). Brand Finance, at <https://brandirectory.com/softpower/report>, accessed 8 May 2022.
- Hindustan Times (2020). "India to be Third-Largest Economy in World by 2050, Says Study," *Hindustan Times*, 11 October 2020. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/business-news/india-to-be-third-largest-economy-in-world-by-2050-says-study/story-UxHwMR8cGrWUbTDO2bXhrK.html>, accessed on 8 May 2022.

- Hymans, Jacques E. C. (2009). "India's Soft Power and Vulnerability," *India Review*, 8(3): 234-265. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14736480903116784>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- ICCR (n.d.): "About ICCR," The Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), at <https://www.iccr.gov.in/about-us>, accessed on 30 December 2020.
- India Today* (2018). "International Yoga Day: 8 Powerful Quotes by PM Modi that would Motivate You to Get up and Exercise," *India Today*, 21 June. <https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/gk-current-affairs/story/international-yoga-day-2018-pm-modi-1265907-2018-06-21>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Jacob, Jacob Udo-Udo (2017). "Cultural Overview to Soft Power (Section Overview)," in Naren Chitty, Li Ji, Gary D. Rawnsley, and Craig Hayden (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power* (pp. 137-143), Oxon: Routledge.
- Jaishankar, S. (2020). *The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World*, New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India.
- Krishnan, Revathi (2021). "Not just Rihanna — farmer protests drew support from global stars Lilly Singh, Hasan Minhaj too," *The Print*, 4 February. <https://theprint.in/world/not-just-rihanna-farmer-protests-drew-support-from-global-stars-lilly-singh-hasan-minhaj-too/598622/>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Kugiel, Patryk (2012). "India's Soft Power in South Asia," *International Studies*, 49(3-4): 351-376. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020881714534033>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Kugiel, Patryk (2016). *India's Soft Power: A New Foreign Strategy*, New Delhi: KW Publishers.
- Li, Mingjiang (2009). "Soft Power: Nurture not Nature," in Mingjiang Li (ed.), *Soft Power: China's Emerging Strategy in International Politics* (pp. 1-18), Plymouth: Lexington Books.
- Lukes, Steven (1974[2005]). *Power: A Radical View* (2nd ed.), New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mathai, Ranjan (2013). "Development Without Strings Attached," *The Hindu*, 18 April 2013. <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/development-without-strings-attached/article4627666.ece>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- MEA (n.d.): "Overview of India's Development Partnership," Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Government of India, at <https://mea.gov.in/Overview-of-India-Development-Partnership.htm>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Melissen, Jan (2005). "The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice," in J. Melissen (ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy* (pp. 3-27), London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1997). *Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson - 6th international ed., Beijing: Peking University Press.
- Mukherjee, Rohan (2014). "The False Promise of India's Soft Power," *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations*, 6(1): 46-62. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26804932>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Mukherjee, Rohan, and Malone, David M. (2011). "Indian Foreign Policy and Contemporary Security Challenges," *International Affairs*, 87(1), January: 87-104. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00961.x>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Mullen, Rani D. (2015). "India's Soft Power," in David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy* (pp. 584-624), New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Nandakumar, J. (2020). "Resurgent India, 1947 to 2020," *The Sunday Guardian*, 22 August. <https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/resurgent-india-1947-2020>, accessed on 8 May 2022.

- Nye, Joseph S. (1990). "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*, 80: 153-171 <https://doi.org/10.2307/1148580>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Nye, J. S. 2004 (2012). *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New Delhi: KW Publishers.
- Nye, Joseph S. (2009). "Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power," *Foreign Affairs*, 88(4): 160-163. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20699631>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Nye, Joseph S. (2011a). *The Future of Power*, New York: Public Affairs.
- Nye, Joseph S. (2011b). "Power and Foreign Policy," *Journal of Political Power*, 4(1): 9-24. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2011.555960>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Ohri, Raghav (2020). "Anti-CAA protests Work of 'Enemy Foreign Nations,' says Delhi Police," *The Economic Times*, 25 June. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/anti-cao-protests-work-of-enemy-foreign-nations-says-delhi-police/articleshow/76632853.cms>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- PTI (2015). "PM Narendra Modi Visits Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque in UAE," *Economic Times*, 17 August. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/pm-narendra-modi-visits-sheikh-zayed-grand-mosque-in-uae/articleshow/48504407.cms>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- PTI (2016). "Zee Media Corporation's Global English News Channel Named WION," *Economic Times*, 15 March. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/media/entertainment/media/zee-media-corporations-global-english-news-channel-named-wion/articleshow/51413447.cms>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Rawnsley, Gary D. (2016). "Reflections of a Soft Power Agnostic," in Xiaoling Zhang, Herman Wasserman, and Winston Mano (eds.), *China's Media and Soft Power in Africa* (pp. 19-31), New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Reyaz, M. (2015a). "Will Modi put Hindutva prejudices of Central Asian invasions of India to rest?" *DailyO*, 7 July. <https://www.dailyo.in/politics/narendra-modi-central-asian-republics-pakistan-saarc-muslims-buddhism-soft-power-persia/story/1/4830.html>, accessed 8 May 2022.
- Reyaz, M (2015b). "Why PM Modi is Wrong in Saying that Indians Felt Ashamed Before 2014?" *TwoCircles.net*, 20 May 2015. <http://web.archive.org/web/20180708065714/http://twocircles.net/2015may20/1432100213.html>, accessed 8 May 2022.
- Reyaz, M. (2018). "Does PM Modi Really Believe in What He Said About 'Islamic Heritage' of India?" *DailyO*, 2 March 2018. <https://www.dailyo.in/politics/narendra-modi-islamic-culture-prophet-muhammad-pluralism-communalism-yoga/story/1/22630.html>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Reyaz, Mohammad (2019). "Hindutva's Reach Out to Muslims in the 2014 Elections: A Historical Analysis," in Irfan Ahmad and Pralay Kanungo (eds.), *The Algebra of Warfare-Welfare: A Long View of India's 2014 Election* (pp. 242-270), New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Reyaz, M. (2020). "Are Hindutva Zealots Harming India's Goodwill in Muslim World?" *Beyond Headlines*, 24 April. <https://beyondheadlines.in/2020/04/are-hindutva-zealots-harming-indias-goodwill-in-the-muslim-world/>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Reyaz, Mohammad, and Ahamed, Sabir (2022). "Scope and Limitations of Soft Power Diplomacy: A Quantitative Analysis of Afghans' Perceptions about India," *Journal of Liberty and International Affairs*, 8(2), 21-48.
- Sagar, Rahul (2009). "State of Mind: What Kind of Power Will India Become?" *International Affairs*, 85(4), July: 801-816. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00828.x>, accessed on 8 May 2022.

- Sasi, Anil (2018). "On Modi Government Drawing Board: Tool to Hardsell Soft Power in Diplomacy," *The Indian Express* (online), 14 February. <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/modi-diplomacy-strategic-partnership-soft-power-hard-state-india-5063098/>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Sikri, Rajiv (2009). *Challenge and Strategy: Rethinking India's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Singh, Manmohan (2008). "PM's Address to IFS Probationary Officers. Prime Minister Office," Archive PMO (online), 11 June, at <https://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details.php?nodeid=666>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Soft Power Survey 2018/19 (2018). IfG-Monocle Soft Power Index, 21 December, at <https://monocle.com/film/affairs/soft-power-survey-2018-19/>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Statista (n.d.). "Countries that Receive the Largest Foreign Aid from India in FY 2020," Statista, at <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1060959/foreign-aid-outflow-india-by-recipient-country/>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Sullivan, Kate (2014). "Exceptionalism in Indian Diplomacy: The Origins of India's Moral Leadership Aspirations," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, 37(4): 640-655. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2014.939738>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Suri, Navdeep (2011). "Public Diplomacy in India's Foreign Policy," *Strategic Analysis*, 35(2): 297-303. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2011.542927>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Tharoor, Shashi (2007). "The Land of the Better Story: India and Soft Power," *Global Asia*, 2(1), April: 70-76. https://www.globalasia.org/v2n01/feature/the-land-of-the-better-story-india-and-soft-power_shashi-tharoor, accessed 8 May 2022.
- Tharoor, Shashi (2012). *Pax Indica: India and the world of the 21st Century*, New Delhi: Penguin Books.
- The Good Country Index (2022). at <https://index.goodcountry.org/>, accessed 8 May 2022.
- The Soft Power 30 (2019). Portland Communications and the USC Centre on Public Diplomacy, at <https://softpower30.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/The-Soft-Power-30-Report-2019-1.pdf>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Thussu, Daya K. (2013[2016]). *Communicating India's Soft Power: Buddha to Bollywood*, New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- UNESCO (n.d.). "Properties Inscribed on the World Heritage List (38)," United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), at <http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/IN>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- UNIC (2014). "United Nations Declares 21 June as International Day of Yoga," United Nations Information Centre for India and Bhutan, 12 December, at <https://unic.org.in/international-day-of-yoga/>, accessed on 8 May 2022.
- Weber, Max (1978). *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*. G. Roth and C. Wittich (eds.), Berkeley: University of California Press.

Exploring the Prospects of Global Partnerships of Teachers in Achieving Sustainable Development Goals in Education

Muhammed. K.V.

Abstract

Global Partnership of Teachers is an international collaboration in the field of education that involves joint initiatives among teachers from various countries and regions to exchange expertise, resources, and effective strategies with the aim of improving educational outcomes on a worldwide level. These collaborations bring together teachers from different cultural backgrounds to tackle shared obstacles, share insights, and create inventive approaches to enhance the standard of education globally. This study investigates the impact of global partnerships among teachers on achieving the United Nations Organization's Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) in education. SDG 4 emphasizes the importance of education as a fundamental human right and a critical driver of sustainable development, and it highlights the role of global partnerships in promoting quality education. This study emphasises the role of educators in shaping future generations to tackle global challenges through knowledge and skills. By analyzing literature and case studies, the research explores the benefits, challenges, and opportunities of collaboration among teachers worldwide. It highlights how such global partnerships can promote knowledge exchange, capacity-building, innovative teaching methods, and global citizenship education. Moreover, it discusses the implications of teacher collaboration for enhancing educational equity, inclusivity, and quality in diverse socio-cultural settings. Through empirical evidence and theoretical frameworks, the study provides insights into how global teacher partnerships can contribute effectively to Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) in education, offering recommendations for policymakers, educational institutions, and stakeholders to maximize this potential.

Introduction

In today's interconnected world, education is a fundamental driver of progress, influencing social, economic, and environmental development. Teachers, as dedicated professionals, hold the significant responsibility of shaping the minds and futures of the next generation (Wals, 2012). In the face of complex global challenges

such as poverty, inequality, climate change, and conflict, the importance of education in promoting global citizenship, sustainable development, and inclusive growth cannot be overstated (Hanachor & Wordu, 2021). The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set forth by the United Nations provide a comprehensive framework for realizing humanity's shared vision of a better and more sustainable future. SDG 4: Quality Education, in particular, serves as a guiding light, advocating for inclusive, equitable, and high-quality education for all, along with opportunities for lifelong learning (Horner, 2020). However, meeting the ambitious targets outlined in SDG 4 necessitates more than just political commitment and financial resources (Hanachor & Wordu, 2021). It requires a collaborative effort from all stakeholders, with teachers at the forefront as catalysts for change and innovation. Recognizing the interconnected nature of education with broader societal and environmental issues, the concept of global partnerships among educators has emerged as a promising approach to advancing the educational related SDGs (Avelar et al., 2023)

Need and Significance of the Study

The study explores the numerous challenges facing education systems worldwide. These challenges include issues like unequal access to quality education, insufficient teacher training, and the changing educational landscape in the midst of sustainable development efforts. By investigating the possibilities of international collaborations among educators, the study aims to shed light on ways to promote collaboration that transcends geographical, cultural, and systemic barriers. Such collaboration is essential for sharing best practices, pooling resources, and adopting innovative teaching methods. Moreover, understanding the connection between global teacher partnerships and Sustainable Development Goal 4, which emphasizes the need for inclusive, equitable, and high-quality education for all, is vital for advancing sustainable development (Kioupi & Voulvoulis, 2022). Through sharing knowledge, learning from peers, and exposure to diverse teaching approaches, global partnerships among teachers provide opportunities for enhancing professional growth, equipping educators with the skills needed to navigate the changing educational landscape in the context of sustainable development. Additionally, collaboration among teachers from different cultural backgrounds promotes the development of cultural competence, which is essential for creating sustainable learning environments and fostering intercultural understanding among students. The importance of this research extends to informing policy-making and educational practices at various levels, empowering teachers to actively participate in global partnerships, instilling global citizenship values in students, encouraging further research, and promoting equity and inclusion in education to ensure that all educators have equal opportunities to contribute to the advancement of sustainable development goals.

Methodology

This study employs a mixed-methods research approach to investigate the impact of global partnerships among teachers on achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in education, with a particular focus on SDG 4. The study utilises both literature review and case study analysis to comprehensively explore the benefits, challenges, and opportunities of collaboration among teachers worldwide. The literature review involves a systematic examination of existing scholarly works, policy documents, and reports pertaining to global teacher partnerships, sustainable development goals, and educational outcomes. This provides a theoretical framework for understanding the underlying mechanisms and potential impacts of teacher collaboration within the context of SDG implementation. Apart from this, a series of case studies are conducted to gain deeper insights into real-world examples of successful teacher partnerships, their strategies, and their outcomes in diverse socio-cultural settings. Through thematic analysis, patterns, themes, and key findings from the literature review and case studies are identified and synthesized. The study employs a triangulation approach to validate findings and ensure the reliability and validity of the research outcomes. Finally, based on the synthesized findings, the study offers recommendations for policymakers, educational institutions, and stakeholders to leverage the potential of global teacher partnerships in advancing sustainable development goals in education effectively.

Results

The study provides valuable insights into the significant impact of global teacher partnerships on the achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in education, particularly in relation to SDG 4. By conducting a thorough analysis of literature, case studies, and empirical evidence, the following conclusions were made.

Impact of Global Partnership on promoting inclusive, equitable, and quality education

The study found that global partnerships among teachers positively influence the achievement of SDG4 in education, particularly in promoting inclusive, equitable, and quality education by fostering collaboration, sharing best practices, and leveraging resources across borders and cultural divides. Through collaborative initiatives, teachers gain access to diverse teaching methodologies, innovative pedagogical approaches, and professional development opportunities, ultimately enhancing the quality of education. Global partnerships contribute to promoting

inclusivity by creating culturally responsive learning environments and addressing the needs of marginalized communities. Furthermore, the study identified challenges such as logistical barriers and cultural differences that impact the effectiveness of global partnerships but highlighted opportunities for capacity-building and collaborative problem-solving. Overall, the findings indicate that global partnerships among teachers play a significant role in advancing SDG4 objectives by promoting inclusive, equitable, and quality education on a global scale.

Benefits and Opportunities

The study reveals the benefits and opportunities associated with collaboration among teachers from diverse cultural backgrounds within the context of global partnership in advancing educational outcomes. It is noted that the collaborations facilitate the exchange of diverse perspectives, teaching methodologies, and pedagogical approaches, enriching the educational experience for both educators and students. Global Partnership promotes cultural competence among teachers, fostering an inclusive learning environment that respects and celebrates cultural diversity. The collaborative efforts enable the pooling of resources and expertise, leading to innovative solutions to common educational challenges, and opportunities abound for capacity-building, professional development, and mutual learning through collaboration. By leveraging technology, establishing clear communication channels, providing training in intercultural competence, and fostering trust and mutual respect, these opportunities can be maximized. Ultimately, the effectiveness of collaborative efforts in advancing educational outcomes depends on the ability of teachers to navigate these challenges, capitalize on opportunities, and cultivate a culture of collaboration, inclusivity, and shared learning.

Mechanisms for Enhancing Educational Quality and Relevance

Global partnerships among teachers contribute to enhancing educational quality and relevance across diverse socio-cultural settings through various mechanisms. They are

- **Knowledge Exchange:** Global partnerships facilitate the exchange of best practices, innovative teaching methods, and educational resources among teachers from different cultural backgrounds. This exchange enables educators to learn from each other's experiences and adapt successful practices to their own contexts, thereby enhancing the quality of teaching and learning.
- **Capacity Building:** Collaborative initiatives provide opportunities for professional development and capacity-building among teachers. By

participating in workshops, training programs, and collaborative projects, educators can develop new skills, deepen their subject knowledge, and enhance their teaching effectiveness, ultimately improving educational quality.

- **Cultural Sensitivity and Inclusivity:** Global partnerships promote cultural sensitivity and inclusivity by exposing teachers to diverse perspectives, experiences, and cultural practices. This exposure helps educators better understand and accommodate the needs of students from different cultural backgrounds, leading to more inclusive and culturally responsive teaching practices.
- **Innovation and Creativity:** Collaboration among teachers from diverse socio-cultural settings fosters innovation and creativity in education. By working together to address common challenges and develop new approaches to teaching and learning, educators can create more engaging, relevant, and effective educational experiences for their students.
- **Global Perspective:** Global partnerships provide teachers with a broader global perspective on education and society. By collaborating with colleagues from around the world, educators gain insights into global issues, trends, and challenges, which they can incorporate into their teaching to make it more relevant and impactful for students.

Overall, global partnerships among teachers contribute to enhancing educational quality and relevance across diverse socio-cultural settings by fostering knowledge exchange, capacity-building, cultural sensitivity, innovation, and a global perspective in education.

Barriers to the Implications of Global Teacher Collaboration

Several barriers hinder the effective implementation and realization of the implications of teacher collaboration within global partnerships in education. Notable barriers are;

- Language barriers hinder communication among teachers of varying proficiency levels, impacting collaborative efforts.
- Cultural differences pose challenges in aligning teaching practices across diverse backgrounds within global partnerships.
- Logistical challenges, such as distance and limited technology access, hamper real-time collaboration among teachers.
- Resource disparities limit teachers' engagement in collaborative activities and hinder project implementation.

- Institutional policies and bureaucratic processes create barriers to teacher collaboration within global partnerships.
- Resistance to change impedes the adoption of collaborative approaches and innovative teaching methods.
- Socio-political tensions in certain regions disrupt teacher collaboration within global partnerships.
- Lack of trust and collaboration skills among teachers from diverse backgrounds hinders effective partnerships.
- Limited funding and support for global partnership initiatives jeopardize their effectiveness and sustainability.
- Evaluation challenges make it difficult to measure the impact of teacher collaboration within global partnerships accurately. (Horner, 2020., Mofield, 2020.)

How to overcome the barriers?

Policymakers, educational institutions, and stakeholders can optimize the potential of global teacher partnerships to maximize their contribution to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in education through several strategies and initiatives. They are

- **Establish Clear Goals and Objectives:** Define clear goals and objectives for global teacher partnerships aligned with SDGs in education, providing a framework for collaborative efforts.
- **Provide Funding and Resources:** Allocate sufficient funding and resources to support global teacher partnership initiatives, ensuring the sustainability and scalability of collaborative projects.
- **Foster Collaboration Platforms:** Create online platforms or networks to facilitate communication, knowledge sharing, and collaboration among teachers from different countries and regions.
- **Offer Professional Development:** Provide professional development opportunities for teachers to enhance their collaboration skills, intercultural competence, and knowledge of sustainable development principles.
- **Promote Policy Alignment:** Ensure alignment of educational policies and regulations with the objectives of global teacher partnerships and SDGs, removing barriers and creating an enabling environment for collaboration.
- **Encourage Institutional Support:** Foster institutional support for global teacher partnerships within educational institutions, promoting collaboration as a valued aspect of professional development.

- **Facilitate Cross-Cultural Understanding:** Implement initiatives to promote cross-cultural understanding and empathy among teachers, fostering a supportive and inclusive environment for collaboration.
- **Address Language and Communication Barriers:** Offer language training and translation services to overcome language barriers and facilitate effective communication among teachers from diverse linguistic backgrounds.
- **Enhance Technology Infrastructure:** Invest in technology infrastructure to improve access to digital platforms and tools for collaboration, overcoming logistical challenges and promoting real-time communication.
- **Evaluate and Monitor Progress:** Develop mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the impact of global teacher partnerships on SDGs in education, providing feedback for continuous improvement and accountability. (Horner, R.,2020., Wals, 2012.)

Conclusion

In conclusion, this study underscores the role of global teacher partnerships in advancing Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in education, particularly in achieving SDG 4: Quality Education. It is evident that these partnerships positively impact the promotion of inclusive, equitable, and quality education by fostering collaboration, sharing best practices, and leveraging resources across borders and cultural divides. However, several barriers, such as language barriers, cultural differences, and logistical challenges hinder the effective implementation of these partnerships. To overcome these barriers, policymakers, educational institutions, and stakeholders must prioritize establishing clear goals and objectives, providing adequate funding and resources, fostering collaboration platforms, offering professional development opportunities, promoting policy alignment, encouraging institutional support, facilitating cross-cultural understanding, addressing language and communication barriers, enhancing technology infrastructure, and evaluating progress. By implementing these strategies and initiatives, stakeholders can optimize the potential of global teacher partnerships to maximize their contribution to SDGs in education, ultimately advancing the vision of a better and more sustainable future for all.

References

- Avelar, A.B.A., da Silva Oliveira, K.D. & Farina, M.C. (2023). The integration of the Sustainable Development Goals into curricula, research and partnerships in higher education. *Int Rev Educ* **69**, 299–325. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-023-10013-1>

- Hanachor, M. E., & Wordu, E. N. (2021). Achieving Sustainable Development Goal 4 in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects (SSRN Scholarly Paper 3799448). <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3799448>
- Horner, R. (2020). Towards a new paradigm of global development? Beyond the limits of international development. *Progress in Human Geography*, 44(3), 415-436. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132519836158>
- Kioupi, V., & Voulvoulis, N. (2022). Education for Sustainable Development as the Catalyst for Local Transitions Toward the Sustainable Development Goals. *Frontiers in Sustainability*, 3. <https://doi.org/10.3389/frsus.2022.889904>
- Mofield, E. L. (2020). Benefits and Barriers to Collaboration and Co-Teaching: Examining Perspectives of Gifted Education Teachers and General Education Teachers. *Gifted Child Today*, 43(1), 20-33. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1076217519880588>
- Wals, A. E. (2012). Shaping the education of tomorrow: full length report on the UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development.

India's G20 Presidency and Global South

Jonathan Kithi Alexander and C. Vinodan

Abstract

India's G20 Presidency marks a significant milestone as a global leader, reflecting its strategic interests and commitment to addressing global challenges. This research paper investigates the multifaceted role of India's G20 Presidency, particularly its impact on the Global South. The study explores key themes such as green development, sustainable finance, digital transformation, and inclusive development. The research delves into India's strategic engagements within multilateral forums like BRICS and its comparative stance alongside other rising powers such as China, utilising a comprehensive literature review and case study analysis. Methodologically, the paper employs a qualitative approach, drawing on various academic sources, policy documents, and expert opinions to construct a nuanced understanding of India's G20 strategies. The analysis highlights India's initiatives in fostering South-South cooperation, with specific case studies on its development projects in Africa, and assesses the challenges and opportunities that arise from its leadership role. Key findings indicate that India's G20 Presidency has significantly bolstered its position in global governance, promoting sustainable and inclusive development. However, the research also identifies institutional and organisational challenges that must be addressed to optimise India's contributions to global governance. The paper concludes with strategic policy recommendations to enhance India's role in the G20 and suggests future research directions to explore further the implications of its leadership on the Global South. This study underscores the importance of India's proactive engagement in global governance and its potential to drive transformative changes in the Global South, reinforcing the interconnectedness of global and regional development agendas.

Keywords: G20 Presidency, Global Governance, South-South Cooperation, India's Initiatives, International Institutions, Sustainable Development.

Introduction

India's G20 Presidency represents a pivotal moment in the nation's ascent as a key player in global governance. The Group of Twenty (G20) is an international forum comprising the world's largest economies, both developed and developing,

collectively accounting for about 85% of global GDP and 75% of international trade. Established in 1999, the G20 aims to address significant issues related to global economic stability, financial regulation, and sustainable development. India's assumption of the G20 Presidency is a testament to its growing economic clout and its strategic positioning as a bridge between the Global North and South. India's Presidency comes at a critical juncture when the world grapples with multiple crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, geopolitical tensions, and economic uncertainties. These challenges underscore the need for robust global governance mechanisms that foster cooperation and resilience. India's role in the G20 is particularly significant given its unique perspective and experiences as a developing country with ambitions to lead on global issues such as sustainable development, digital transformation, and inclusive growth.

India's G20 Presidency is significant for several reasons. Firstly, it provides a platform for India to influence the global economic agenda and advocate for the interests of developing nations, thereby promoting a more inclusive and equitable international order. Secondly, it allows India to showcase its leadership in areas like green development, digital innovation, and social inclusion, aligning with its domestic priorities and international commitments. Lastly, the Presidency enables India to strengthen its diplomatic ties and strategic partnerships, enhancing its geopolitical influence and fostering South-South cooperation. India's leadership in the G20 also reflects its broader foreign policy strategy, which emphasises multilateralism, regional cooperation, and global governance reforms. By steering the G20 agenda, India can address systemic issues in the global economic system, advocate for sustainable and inclusive development, and promote policies that benefit its national interests and the wider Global South.

This research paper aims to comprehensively analyse India's G20 Presidency, focusing on its strategic objectives, key initiatives, and impact on the Global South. The primary objectives of the study are to examine the historical context and theoretical frameworks underpinning India's role in the G20, analyse India's strategic interests and multilateral engagements within the G20 framework, explore the key themes of India's G20 Presidency, including green development, digital transformation, and inclusive development; assess the impact of India's G20 leadership on the Global South, mainly through South-South cooperation initiatives; and identify the challenges and opportunities associated with India's G20 Presidency and provide strategic policy recommendations. The key research questions guiding this study are: What are the historical and theoretical foundations of India's engagement in the G20? How do India's strategic interests and foreign policy objectives shape its role in the G20? What are the significant themes and initiatives of India's G20 Presidency, and how do they align with its domestic and international

priorities? How does India's G20 Presidency impact the Global South, particularly regarding development cooperation and sustainable growth? What are India's key challenges and opportunities in leading the G20, and what policy recommendations can enhance its effectiveness in this role?

The paper is structured into six comprehensive chapters, each addressing different aspects of India's G20 Presidency. The first chapter, "Historical Context and Theoretical Framework," provides an overview of the G20's evolution and theoretical perspectives on global governance, situating India's role. The second chapter, "India's Strategic Interests and Multilateral Engagements," explores India's foreign policy strategy and engagement in multilateral forums like the BRICS and the G20. The third chapter, "Key Themes of India's G20 Presidency," delves into the major themes of India's G20 agenda, including green development, digital transformation, and inclusive development. The fourth chapter, "Impact on the Global South," assesses how India's G20 Presidency influences South-South cooperation and development initiatives in the Global South with specific case studies. The fifth chapter, "Challenges and Opportunities," identifies India's institutional and organisational challenges in its G20 leadership role and discusses the opportunities for enhancing global governance. The sixth and final chapter, "Policy Recommendations," offers strategic policy recommendations to strengthen India's role in the G20 and suggests areas for future research. By examining these aspects, the paper aims to provide a nuanced understanding of India's G20 Presidency and its implications for global governance and the Global South. Through this analysis, the study underscores the importance of India's proactive engagement in global governance and its potential to drive transformative changes in the Global South, reinforcing the interconnectedness of global and regional development agendas.

Historical Context and Theoretical Framework Formation and Evolution of the G20

The Group of Twenty (G20) was established in 1999 after the Asian financial crisis to bring together major advanced and emerging economies to discuss global economic issues. Initially, it was an informal forum for finance ministers and central bank governors from 19 countries and the European Union. The inaugural meeting in Berlin set the stage for regular dialogues to foster international financial stability and promote sustainable economic growth (Alexandroff & Cooper, 2010). Over the years, the G20's mandate expanded to include heads of state and government, reflecting its growing significance in global economic governance. The 2008 global financial crisis marked a turning point for the G20, as it was elevated to the premier forum for international economic cooperation. The G20 played a crucial role in

coordinating responses to the crisis, including implementing stimulus measures and reforming financial regulations (Bird, 1996). The subsequent summits focused on broader issues, such as trade, climate change, and sustainable development, highlighting the G20's evolving role in addressing multifaceted global challenges (Weiss & Thakur, 2010).

Theoretical Underpinnings of Global Governance

Global governance refers to the collective efforts of international institutions, states, and non-state actors to address transnational issues and ensure global stability. Theoretical perspectives on global governance include liberal institutionalism, which emphasises the role of international institutions in fostering cooperation, and constructivism, which focuses on the influence of ideas, norms, and identities in shaping global interactions (Newman et al., 2006). Liberal institutionalism posits that international organisations, like the G20, facilitate cooperation by providing a platform for dialogue, reducing transaction costs, and ensuring compliance through monitoring and enforcement mechanisms (Weiss & Thakur, 2010). Constructivism, on the other hand, suggests that the G20's effectiveness depends on its members' shared norms and values, which influence their willingness to cooperate and adhere to collective decisions (Rasche, 2020). These theoretical lenses can explain India's engagement with global governance structures. As a proponent of multilateralism, India has actively participated in international organisations, advocating for reforms to make them more inclusive and representative of developing countries' interests (Kumar, 2022). This approach aligns with liberal institutionalism, highlighting India's belief in the importance of robust global institutions for addressing everyday challenges.

India's Historical Engagement with Global Governance Structures

India's engagement with global governance structures dates back to its independence in 1947. As a founding member of the United Nations, India has strongly advocated for decolonisation, disarmament, and development. Over the decades, India has contributed to various UN peacekeeping missions, reflecting its commitment to maintaining international peace and security (Choedon, 2014). In economic governance, India has actively participated in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, advocating for more excellent representation of developing countries in these institutions (Bird, 1996). India's role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) further underscores its pursuit of an independent foreign policy and its emphasis on South-South cooperation (Gray & Gills, 2016). This historical engagement laid the foundation for India's active participation in newer multilateral forums like BRICS and the G20. India's involvement in the G20 has

been characterised by its efforts to represent the interests of the Global South. As a major emerging economy, India has emphasised the need for inclusive growth, sustainable development, and equitable global governance. During its G20 Presidency, India aims to address pressing issues such as climate change, digital transformation, and social inclusion, leveraging its domestic experiences and international partnerships (Bhattacharya, 2023).

The theoretical underpinnings of India's engagement with global governance structures are evident in its G20 Presidency. By advocating for reforms and promoting inclusive development, India aligns with the principles of liberal institutionalism, which emphasizes the role of international institutions in fostering cooperation and ensuring stability (Newman, Thakur, & Triman, 2006). Additionally, India's focus on normative issues such as sustainable development and social justice reflects a constructivist approach, highlighting the importance of shared values and collective action in global governance (Rasche, 2020). In conclusion, the formation and evolution of the G20, the theoretical frameworks of global governance, and India's historical engagement with global governance structures provide a comprehensive backdrop for understanding India's G20 Presidency. Through its leadership, India seeks to enhance the effectiveness of the G20 in addressing global challenges, promoting sustainable development, and fostering inclusive growth, thereby reinforcing its role as a key player in global governance.

India's Strategic Interests and Multilateral Engagements

India's Foreign Policy and Strategic Interests in Multilateral Forums

India's foreign policy has historically been driven by non-alignment, strategic autonomy, and a commitment to multilateralism. These principles have guided India's engagement with international institutions and pursuit of a multipolar world order. The foundation of India's foreign policy is its emphasis on fostering peace, security, and development both regionally and globally. Over the years, India's strategic interests have evolved to include economic growth, sustainable development, and technological advancement, reflecting the changing dynamics of global politics and economics (Kumar, 2022). In multilateral forums, India's strategic interests are geared towards enhancing its global influence, securing its economic interests, and addressing global challenges such as climate change, terrorism, and economic inequality. India's active participation in the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) underscores its commitment to multilateralism and its belief in the importance of global governance structures (Bird, 1996). Through these platforms, India advocates for reforms that would make these institutions more representative and responsive to the needs of developing countries. India's foreign policy also emphasises South-

South cooperation, evident in its initiatives to foster closer ties with other developing nations through platforms such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program. These efforts promote sustainable development and economic growth in the Global South, creating a more balanced and equitable international order (Gray & Gills, 2016).

India's Role in BRICS and Its Impact on Its G20 Strategies

The BRICS grouping, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, is a significant platform for India to advance its strategic interests and promote South-South cooperation. Established in 2009, BRICS aims to enhance cooperation among its member countries in economic development, trade, investment, and sustainable development. For India, BRICS represents an opportunity to collaborate with other emerging economies to address common challenges and to exert more significant influence on global economic governance (Chaturvedi & Saha, 2017). India's role in BRICS has profoundly impacted its strategies within the G20. Through BRICS, India has been able to amplify its voice on issues such as reforming international financial institutions, promoting sustainable development, and enhancing global trade and investment flows. The BRICS New Development Bank (NDB), established in 2014, exemplifies India's commitment to creating alternative financial mechanisms that cater to the development needs of emerging economies (De Coning, Mandrup, & Odgaard, 2014). India's engagement in BRICS also complements its G20 strategies by promoting inclusive and equitable growth. At the G20, India advocates for policies that support economic resilience, sustainable development, and financial stability. The experiences and consensus built within BRICS provide India with a strong foundation to push for reforms and initiatives at the G20 that align with the interests of the Global South (Cooper & Farooq, 2016).

Comparing and Contrasting India's Approach with Other Emerging Powers like China

India's approach to multilateral engagements and global governance is often compared and contrasted with that of China, another significant emerging power. Both countries share similar aspirations to play a more significant role in global affairs and promote developing countries' interests. However, their strategies and methods differ significantly, reflecting their unique historical, political, and economic contexts (Cooper, 2021). China's approach to global governance is characterised by its assertive and expansive strategies, often through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and significant investments in global infrastructure projects. China's foreign policy emphasises strategic partnerships and economic diplomacy, leveraging its economic clout to expand its influence (Cooper & Farooq, 2016). In

contrast, India's approach is more collaborative and inclusive, building consensus and fostering cooperation through multilateral forums. India's emphasis on democratic values and its advocacy for a rules-based international order distinguish its engagement from China's state-centric and infrastructure-driven strategies (Miller & Sullivan de Estrada, 2017). In the context of the G20, both India and China advocate for reforms that enhance the representation of developing countries. However, China's economic policies and initiatives often prioritise its strategic interests, whereas India emphasises equitable development and sustainability. For instance, India's G20 agenda promotes digital transformation, inclusive growth, and green development, reflecting its domestic priorities and commitment to global sustainability (Bhattacharya, 2023).

Moreover, India's role in BRICS and its impact on the G20 strategies highlight its focus on fostering South-South cooperation and creating development opportunities for the Global South. China's engagement in BRICS, while also significant, is often viewed through the lens of its broader geopolitical ambitions. This difference in approach underscores the distinct paths that India and China take in their pursuit of global leadership (Chaturvedi & Saha, 2017). In conclusion, India's strategic interests and foreign policy in multilateral forums are driven by its commitment to multilateralism, South-South cooperation, and sustainable development. India has influenced the G20 agenda through its active participation in BRICS, advocating for inclusive and equitable growth. While there are similarities in the aspirations of India and China as emerging powers, their approaches to global governance reflect their unique contexts and priorities. India's collaborative and inclusive strategies contrast China's assertive and expansive methods, highlighting the diverse ways emerging powers engage with the world.

Key Themes of India's G20 Presidency

India's G20 Presidency centres on several major themes: green development, sustainable finance, and technological transformation. These themes reflect India's domestic priorities and vision for a sustainable and inclusive global economy. This chapter delves deeper into these themes, highlighting India's initiatives and policies and their implications for global governance.

Green Development

Green development is a cornerstone of India's G20 agenda, emphasising environmental sustainability, reducing carbon emissions, and promoting renewable energy. This focus aligns with India's ambitious renewable energy targets, including achieving 175 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2022 and 450 GW by 2030. The

International Solar Alliance (ISA), co-founded by India, is a significant initiative that exemplifies India's leadership in promoting solar energy. The ISA aims to facilitate cooperation among solar-rich countries, harness renewable energy for sustainable development, and address energy poverty by making solar power more accessible and affordable (Bhattacharya, 2023). In the context of the G20, India advocates for collective action to combat climate change, emphasising the need for developed countries to fulfil their commitments to climate finance and technology transfer. This includes urging developed nations to meet their pledge of mobilising \$100 billion annually for climate action in developing countries. India's leadership in green development also extends to promoting sustainable agriculture, which involves adopting climate-smart agricultural practices to enhance food security and resilience to climate change. Additionally, India focuses on water resource management and biodiversity conservation, aligning these efforts with its National Action Plan on Climate Change (Das & Ansari, 2021). India's initiatives in green development also include implementing the National Clean Energy Fund (NCEF), which finances clean energy projects and research. The fund supports innovative projects aimed at reducing carbon intensity and promoting the use of cleaner technologies. Furthermore, India has launched various programs to promote energy efficiency, such as the Perform, Achieve, and Trade (PAT) scheme, which incentivises industries to adopt energy-efficient practices.

Sustainable Finance

Sustainable finance is another key theme of India's G20 Presidency. This involves creating financial systems and markets that support sustainable development goals (SDGs). India is strongly proponent of integrating environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria into financial decision-making processes. By incorporating ESG factors, India aims to ensure that investments generate financial returns and contribute to environmental sustainability and social well-being (Pulicherla et al., 2022). India's approach to sustainable finance includes enhancing financial inclusion, which involves providing access to financial services for all segments of the population, particularly the underserved and marginalised communities. The Jan Dhan Yojana, one of the world's most significant financial inclusion initiatives, aims to give every household access to banking services, ensuring economic growth benefits all citizens. In the G20, India advocates for policies that promote sustainable investments and mobilise private sector finance for sustainable development. This includes encouraging multinational development banks to prioritise sustainable projects and fostering international cooperation to develop common standards for sustainable finance. India's support for developing green bonds, which fund projects with environmental benefits, is a testament to its commitment to sustainable finance.

Green bonds have been instrumental in financing renewable energy projects, energy efficiency initiatives, and sustainable infrastructure development (Bhattacharya, 2023). India also emphasises the importance of social impact investing, which aims to generate positive social outcomes alongside financial returns. India seeks to address critical social challenges such as poverty, education, and healthcare by promoting social impact bonds and other innovative financial instruments.

Technological Transformation

Technological transformation is a critical theme of India's G20 agenda, reflecting the country's emphasis on digital innovation and technology-driven growth. India has made significant strides in digital technology, as evidenced by its large-scale digital infrastructure projects like Aadhaar and the Digital India initiative. Aadhaar, the world's most extensive biometric identification system, aims to enhance digital connectivity, improve government services, and promote financial inclusion. The Digital India initiative seeks to transform India into a digitally empowered society and knowledge economy by ensuring digital access, inclusion, and empowerment (Bajpai & Wadhwa, 2021). In the G20, India highlights the importance of leveraging technology to drive economic growth, improve public services, and address global challenges such as health crises and climate change. India's initiatives include promoting digital literacy through programs like the Pradhan Mantri Gramin Digital Saksharta Abhiyan (PMGDISHA), which aims to make six crore rural households digitally literate. By enhancing digital skills, India seeks to bridge the digital divide and ensure that all citizens can benefit from the digital revolution.

India also supports innovation ecosystems by fostering startups and promoting research and development (R&D). The Startup India initiative provides funding, mentorship, and regulatory support to entrepreneurs, encouraging innovation and entrepreneurship. Additionally, the Atal Innovation Mission (AIM) promotes a culture of innovation and entrepreneurship through various programs, including the establishment of Atal Tinkering Labs in schools and Atal Incubation Centers across the country. Enhancing cybersecurity is another critical aspect of India's technological transformation agenda. As digital infrastructure expands, so do the risks associated with cyber threats. India is committed to strengthening its cybersecurity framework to protect digital infrastructure and ensure the safety and security of digital transactions. This includes implementing robust data protection regulations, promoting public-private partnerships in cybersecurity, and enhancing international cooperation to combat cybercrime. The focus on technological transformation also involves advocating for international cooperation to ensure technological advancements benefit all countries, particularly those in the Global South. India supports initiatives to promote technology transfer and capacity

building, enabling developing countries to harness the potential of digital technologies for sustainable development (Surana et al., 2020).

Impact on the Global South

India's G20 Presidency holds significant implications for the Global South, primarily through its emphasis on South-South cooperation and inclusive development. This chapter explores India's initiatives in South-South cooperation, presents case studies of development projects in the Global South, and discusses the broader implications for developing countries.

South-South Cooperation

India's leadership in the G20 reinforces its commitment to South-South cooperation, which involves collaboration among developing countries to address common challenges and promote mutual development. South-South cooperation is based on principles of solidarity, mutual benefit, and shared development experiences. Through its G20 agenda, India seeks to highlight the needs and perspectives of developing countries, advocating for policies that promote equitable growth and development (Gray & Gills, 2016). India's initiatives in South-South cooperation include capacity-building programs, technical assistance, and development projects across various sectors such as agriculture, health, and education. These efforts aim to share India's development experiences and expertise with other developing countries, fostering a spirit of solidarity and mutual support. For example, India's Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program offers training and capacity-building support to professionals from developing countries, enhancing their skills and knowledge in various fields (Paulo, 2021). Additionally, India has established partnerships with regional organisations such as the African Union to promote development cooperation. These partnerships focus on areas like infrastructure development, trade and investment, and capacity building, aligning with the development priorities of partner countries. Through these initiatives, India aims to create a network of cooperation that enhances the collective development of the Global South.

Case Studies of Development Projects

Pan-African e-Network Project

One notable example of India's development projects in the Global South is its involvement in Africa. India has launched several initiatives to support economic development in African countries, leveraging its technological expertise and development experience. The Pan-African e-Network project is a flagship initiative

that aims to provide tele-education and telemedicine services across the African continent. This project leverages India's technological expertise to enhance access to education and healthcare in remote areas. Through the e-network, African students can participate in online courses offered by Indian universities, and patients can receive medical consultations from Indian doctors. This initiative improves access to essential services and strengthens participating countries' educational and healthcare infrastructure (Jha, 2021).

India-Africa Institute of Agriculture and Rural Development (IAIARD)

Another example is India's contribution to agricultural development through the India-Africa Institute of Agriculture and Rural Development (IAIARD). This institute aims to provide training and capacity-building programs for African farmers and agricultural professionals, promoting sustainable agricultural practices and improving food security. By sharing India's expertise in agriculture, the IAIARD helps enhance the productivity and sustainability of agricultural practices in African countries, contributing to their overall economic development (Das & Ansari, 2021).

Development Partnerships in Healthcare

India has also partnered with several African countries to enhance healthcare systems. For instance, establishing the India-Tanzania Centre of Excellence in ICT focuses on improving healthcare through telemedicine and health information systems. This partnership provides a platform for medical professionals to collaborate, share knowledge, and improve healthcare delivery in Tanzania. These case studies highlight India's proactive approach to development cooperation, emphasizing capacity building, knowledge sharing, and sustainable development. Through these projects, India aims to positively impact the socio-economic development of partner countries, fostering long-term growth and stability.

Broader Implications for Developing Countries Reforms in International Financial Institutions

India's G20 Presidency has broader implications for developing countries by promoting a more inclusive and equitable global economic order. By advocating for reforms in international financial institutions and pushing for greater representation of developing countries in global decision-making processes, India aims to create a more balanced global governance system that addresses the needs of the Global South (Chaturvedi & Saha, 2017).

One of India's key priorities is advocating for reforms in international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. India

argues that these institutions should be more representative and inclusive of developing countries, ensuring their voices are heard in global economic governance. By pushing for reforms, India aims to create a fairer and more equitable financial system that supports the development needs of the Global South (Bird, 1996).

Promoting Sustainable Development

India's emphasis on sustainable development provides a model for other developing countries to follow. India's initiatives in green development, such as the promotion of renewable energy and sustainable agriculture, demonstrate the benefits of adopting environmentally sustainable practices. For example, India's large-scale solar energy projects, such as the world's largest solar park in Karnataka, showcase the potential of renewable energy sources. By showcasing successful examples of green development, India offers a pathway for sustainable growth that can be replicated in other parts of the Global South (Bhattacharya, 2023).

Technological Innovation and Digital Transformation

India's focus on technological innovation and digital transformation has significant implications for developing countries. By promoting digital literacy, enhancing digital infrastructure, and supporting innovation ecosystems, India aims to bridge the digital divide and ensure that the benefits of digital technologies are accessible to all. For example, India's Digital India initiative, which aims to transform India into a digitally empowered society and knowledge economy, serves as a blueprint for other countries seeking to leverage digital technologies for economic growth and social development (Bajpai & Wadhwa, 2021).

Strengthening Health Systems

The COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the importance of robust health systems. India's efforts to enhance healthcare infrastructure through telemedicine, digital health records, and capacity building can serve as valuable lessons for other developing countries. For instance, India's eSanjeevani telemedicine service has provided millions of consultations during the pandemic, demonstrating the potential of digital health solutions. By sharing its experiences and best practices, India strengthens global health security and resilience (Collins et al., 2021).

Policy Recommendations

India's G20 Presidency provides a strategic platform to influence global governance and advocate for the interests of developing countries. To maximise this

opportunity, India should focus on several key policy recommendations to strengthen its role in global governance and promote sustainable and inclusive development.

1. Reform International Institutions

India should advocate for comprehensive reforms in international financial institutions and multilateral organisations to ensure that they are more inclusive and representative of the interests of developing countries. This includes pushing for greater voting rights and representation for developing nations in institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. By advocating for these reforms, India can help create a more equitable global financial system that better addresses the needs of the Global South (Bird, 1996).

Actions:

- Form alliances with other developing countries to build a strong coalition advocating for institutional reforms.
- Propose specific changes to the governance structures of international financial institutions to increase the representation of developing countries.
- Engage in diplomatic efforts to garner support from developed nations for these reforms.

2. Promote Green Development

India should lead global efforts to promote green development by investing in renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, and climate-resilient infrastructure. This involves setting ambitious national targets for renewable energy capacity, adopting policies that support the transition to a low-carbon economy, and encouraging other G20 members to commit to similar initiatives. By positioning itself as a leader in green development, India can drive global action on climate change and sustainable development (Bhattacharya, 2023).

Actions:

- Increase investments in renewable energy projects such as solar, wind, and bioenergy.
- Promote sustainable agricultural practices through initiatives like climate-smart agriculture.
- Develop and implement policies that incentivise adopting green technologies and infrastructure.
- Collaborate with other G20 members to create a global framework for green development.

3. Enhance Digital Infrastructure

Investing in digital infrastructure and promoting policies that support digital inclusion and innovation is crucial for driving economic growth and development. India should focus on expanding digital connectivity, improving access to digital services, and fostering innovation ecosystems. Additionally, India should encourage the development of global standards for digital governance and cybersecurity to ensure a secure and inclusive digital economy (Bajpai & Wadhwa, 2021).

Actions:

- Expand broadband connectivity to rural and underserved areas to ensure universal access to digital services.
- Promote digital literacy programs to equip citizens with the skills needed to participate in the digital economy.
- Support the development of innovation hubs and tech startups through funding, mentorship, and regulatory support.
- Advocate for international cooperation on digital governance and cybersecurity standards.

4. Foster Economic Resilience

India should advocate for policies that enhance economic resilience, focusing on social protection programs, robust healthcare systems, and support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Strengthening economic resilience is essential for mitigating the impact of global economic shocks and ensuring sustainable development (Collins et al., 2021).

Actions:

- Implement comprehensive social protection programs that provide safety nets for vulnerable populations.
- Invest in healthcare infrastructure and ensure equitable access to healthcare services.
- Support SMEs through financial assistance, capacity-building programs, and market access.
- Advocate for international policies that promote economic resilience and inclusive growth.

5. Strengthen Strategic Partnerships

Building strategic partnerships with other emerging economies and regional organisations is vital for enhancing cooperation on common challenges and

promoting shared interests. India should focus on fostering closer ties with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and engaging with regional organisations such as the African Union and ASEAN (Gray & Gills, 2016).

Actions:

- Enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation with key emerging economies through trade agreements, joint ventures, and development projects.
- Participate actively in regional organisations and contribute to their initiatives on economic development, security, and sustainability.
- Promote cultural and educational exchanges to strengthen people-to-people ties and mutual understanding.

Conclusion

India's G20 Presidency represents a significant opportunity to influence global governance and promote the interests of the Global South. India can drive positive change and foster a more inclusive and equitable global economic order by focusing on key themes such as green development, sustainable finance, and technological transformation. The impact of India's G20 leadership extends beyond its national borders, with significant implications for developing countries through enhanced South-South cooperation and sustainable development initiatives. However, India must navigate various challenges, including balancing national and global priorities and managing geopolitical tensions.

To maximise the benefits of its G20 Presidency, India should:

- **Promote Inclusive Growth:** Advocate for policies that ensure economic development benefits all segments of society, particularly the most vulnerable.
- **Strengthen Multilateralism:** Continue to push for reforms in international institutions to enhance their representativeness and effectiveness.
- **Leverage Technology for Development:** Promote digital transformation and technological innovation as key drivers of sustainable development.
- **Address Climate Change:** Lead global efforts in ambitious climate action and support the transition to a low-carbon economy.

These efforts will enhance India's role in global governance and provide a model for other developing countries to follow, contributing to a more sustainable and prosperous world.

Future Research

Future research should explore the long-term impacts of India's G20 initiatives on global governance and the Global South. This includes examining how these efforts can be sustained and expanded to address emerging challenges and opportunities in the international arena. Additionally, research should focus on the effectiveness of India's policy recommendations and their implementation at both national and global levels.

References

- Alexandroff, A. S., & Cooper, A. F. (Eds.). (2010). *Rising states, rising institutions: Challenges for global governance*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Bajpai, N., & Wadhwa, M. (2021). India's Experience with ICT in the Health Sector: Lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa (No. 51). ICT India Working Paper.
- Bhattacharya, M. P. (2023). India and G20: Ensuring Green Development and Sustainable Finance. In *G20: Global Finance & Business Strategies* (pp. 107).
- Bird, G. (1996). The International Monetary Fund and developing countries: a review of the evidence and policy options. *International Organization*, 50(3), 477-511.
- Chaturvedi, S., & Saha, S. (2017). Competing imperatives of global governance and national interests within BRICS: An Indian perspective. *Rising Powers Quarterly*, 2(3), 167-183.
- Choedon, Y. (2014). India's UN peacekeeping operations involvement in Africa: Change in nature of participation and driving factors. *International Studies*, 51(1-4), 16-34.
- Collins, T., Tello, J., Van Hilten, M., Mahy, L., Banatvala, N., Fones, G., ... & Willumsen, J. (2021). Addressing the double burden of the COVID-19 and noncommunicable disease pandemics: a new global governance challenge. *International Journal of Health Governance*, 26(2), 199-212.
- Cooper, A. F. (2021). China, India and the G20/BRICS engagement pattern: differentiated ambivalence between 'rising power status and solidarity with the Global South. *Third World Quarterly*, 42(9), 1945-1962.
- Cooper, A. F. (2021). China, India and the pattern of G20/BRICS engagement: differentiated ambivalence between 'rising power status and solidarity with the Global South. *Third World Quarterly*, 42(9), 1945-1962.
- Cooper, A. F., & Farooq, A. B. (2016). The role of China and India in the G20 and BRICS: Commonalities or competitive behaviour? *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 45(3), 73-106.
- Das, U., & Ansari, M. A. (2021). The nexus of climate change, sustainable agriculture and farm livelihood: contextualising climate smart agriculture. *Climate Research*, 84, 23-40.
- De Coning, C., Mandrup, T., & Odgaard, L. (Eds.). (2014). *The BRICS and coexistence: An alternative vision of world order*. Routledge.
- De Coning, C., Mandrup, T., & Odgaard, L. (Eds.). (2014). *The BRICS and Coexistence: An alternative vision of world order*. Routledge.
- Gray, K., & Gills, B. K. (2016). South-South cooperation and the Rise of the Global South. *Third World Quarterly*, 37(4), 557-574.

- Jha, V. (2021). *India's Moment in the Sun: Inside the Making of the International Solar Alliance*. Stanford University.
- Kumar, R. (2022). India's multilateral foreign policy strategy: Phases of its evolution. *The Round Table*, 111(3), 426–439.
- Miller, M. C., & Sullivan de Estrada, K. (2017). Pragmatism in Indian foreign policy: How ideas constrain Modi. *International Affairs*, 93(1), 27–49.
- Newman, E., Thakur, R., & Triman, J. (2006). *Multilateralism under challenge: Power, international order, and structural change*. Academic Foundation.
- Paulo, S. (2021). India as a partner in triangular development cooperation. In *The Palgrave Handbook of Development Cooperation for Achieving the 2030 Agenda* (pp. 625).
- Paulo, S. (2021). India as a partner in triangular development cooperation. In *The Palgrave Handbook of Development Cooperation for Achieving the 2030 Agenda* (pp. 625).
- Pulicherla, K. K., Adapa, V., Ghosh, M., & Ingle, P. (2022). Current efforts on sustainable green growth in the manufacturing sector complement “Make in India” for making a “self-reliant India”. *Environmental Research*, 206, 112263.
- Rasche, A. (2020). The United Nations Global Compact and the Sustainable Development Goals. In *Research Handbook of responsible management* (pp. 228).
- Surana, K., Singh, A., & Sagar, A. D. (2020). Strengthening science, technology, and innovation-based incubators to help achieve Sustainable Development Goals: Lessons from India. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 157, 120057.
- Weiss, T. G., & Thakur, R. (2010). *Global governance and the UN: An unfinished journey*. Indiana University Press.

Growing Significance of SCO: Options for India

Kamala Kumari

Abstract

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a unique regional grouping, which was established in 1996, as a multilateral association to ensure security and maintain stability across the vast Eurasian region. Since then it is constantly evolving, and in the process established itself as a multilateral regional organisation consisting of Eurasian and neighbouring states. In fact, SCO has emerged as an influential regional organisation in the Eurasian space. Initially, it was called Shanghai Five with Russia, China, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as its members. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined the grouping and thereafter, it is called the SCO. Over the years SCO has been expanding, and so is the attention from the rest of the world. Given the size of the SCO and the economic and political potential there is an attempt on the part of member states towards greater economic engagement. And noting India's growing role in the regional and global affairs this paper would try to delineate the options and prospects for India in the SCO region apart from looking at the growing significance of SCO in this vast region and beyond.

Keywords: SCO, India, SCO Member Countries, Significance, Challenges, Potential


Introduction

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has attracted attention since its inception particularly, from the West. Reason being the first of its kind in Eurasia; a grouping where, Russia was one of its founding members etc. The SCO has expanded since it was established in 2001, and is one of the most rapidly developing centres of the multipolar world, covering an enormous landmass including Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan. The SCO has some Observer States- Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia. The SCO also has some Dialogue Partner States and some countries and organisation are invited

as guest to participate in the SCO Annual Summit. Presently, this Eurasian organisation is the world's largest regional organisation in terms of geographic scope and population. Today, it is covering approximately 60% of the area of Eurasia and 30% of the world; comprises of 40 per cent of the global population and 30% of global GDP.

The main goals and tasks which SCO strives to achieve are highlighted in Article 1 of the SCO Charter. And all member countries have signed the SCO charter and have agreed broadly to upgrade cooperation in areas related to trade, economy, politics, education and technology, transportation, finance and environment protection. They also agreed to combat together any form of terrorism, separatism, and extremism within the region. The structure of SCO (Image:1) is important to understand the working and the objective and goals of the organisation. To implement the goals and objectives of the SCO Charter, the bodies as in Image:1 operates within the Organisation. The most important is the Council of Heads of State followed by Council of Heads of Government (Prime Minister).

Image: 1 – The Structure of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation



Source: Kamala Kumari, 2017

The SCO Heads of State Council is the supreme SCO body. It determines priorities and defines major areas of activities of the Organisation including its interaction with other States and international organisations, as well as considers most topical international issues. The Council holds its regular meetings once a year

and is chaired by the head of State organising the meeting for that year. The venue of a regular meeting of the Council is generally determined by names of the SCO member states in the Russian alphabetic order. The SCO Council of Heads of Government approves the budget of the Organisation, considers and decides upon major issues related to spheres of interaction within the Organisation particularly related to economic sphere. The venue of a regular meeting of the Council is also determined by prior agreement among heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the member states.

The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is also of great importance. The Council generally meet one month prior to the meeting of the Council of Heads of State. The Council is chaired by the minister of foreign affairs of the member state who holds the presidency for that year and period starts from the date of the last ordinary meeting of the Heads of State Council to the date of the next ordinary meeting of the Heads of State Council. The venue of a regular or extraordinary meeting of the Council is determined by mutual agreement. The Council plays very important role vis-à-vis issues related to day-to-day activities of the Organisation, like for example makes preparations for meetings of the Heads of State Council; holds consultations meetings on international problems within the Organisation; the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs represents the Organisation in its external contacts, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Council; the Council may, as desired, make statements on behalf of SCO and if required extraordinary meetings of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is convened on the initiative of at least two member states and upon consent of ministers of foreign affairs of all other member states (<http://eng.sectesco.org/structure/>) and likewise, other Meetings of Heads of Ministries and/or Agencies take place.

The Organisation has two permanent bodies- the Secretariat in Beijing and The Executive Committee of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent. SCO Secretary General and RATS Executive Committee Director are appointed by the Heads of State Council (HSC) for a period of three years. The Secretary-General is appointed from the SCO member states on a rotating basis in Russian alphabetical order. Deputy Secretaries-General are nominated by the Council of National Coordinators and approved by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Officials of the Secretariat are hired from among citizens of the SCO member states on the basis of quotas. The present SCO Secretary-General is Mr. Zhang Ming and SCO Deputy Secretary General is Logvinov Grigory.

The SCO Secretariat promotes mutual assistance and team spirit among staff and coordinates the activity of the SCO and provides informational, analytical, legal, organisational and technical support. The Secretariat also coordinates the

organisation's cooperation with observer states and dialogue partners in line with SCO regulatory and legal documents, works with states and international organisations and non-governmental organisations within the SCO framework on issues related to the organisation's activity, and conclude agreements with the consent of the member states. In addition, it organises and coordinates the activity of the SCO Observer Mission in presidential and/or parliamentary elections, as well as referendums. And the main role of SCO RATS is to combat terrorism, separatism and extremism (<http://eng.sectesco.org/structure/>).

The functions and working procedures for the SCO bodies, other than the RATS, is governed by appropriate provisions adopted by the Heads of State Council. The Heads of State Council may decide to establish other SCO bodies. New bodies shall be established by the adoption of additional protocols to the SCO Charter as in Article 21 of the SCO Charter. With expansion of the grouping and India on board, the organisation has become broad based and importantly the multilateral mechanism is in place. In fact, the admission of India as a new member has injected a new impetus into SCO's all-ranging cooperation. As several analysts are of the opinion that with expansion, the SCO provide a platform for broader economic and security cooperation within the Eurasian region.

The SCO's space is of vital interest to India as the Central Asia is part of its extended/strategic neighbourhood. Indian interest lies in stable, secure and modern states in its common neighbourhood. It offers India a regional platform to enhance its presence in all spheres in the region. Particularly, useful is the ability to exchange information on issues of terrorism and drug trafficking which affects the regional security architecture; as well as participate in joint counter and anti-terror exercises.

Significance of SCO in the Region

The SCO has emerged as an influential regional organisation in the Eurasian space. It is the only regional organisation endowed with resources and capability to deal with destabilising forces in Eurasia. Over the years the cooperation mechanism has been enriched and its areas of cooperation have constantly expanded. The SCO has made considerable progress in terms of coordinating regional efforts to address security challenges in the region. The significance of SCO is ever expanding, from Shanghai Five to SCO with four Central Asian countries plus two South Asian countries, and now Iran a new member and many more in waiting to join the SCO speaks volume. With growing number of member, observer countries and Dialogue partner countries the SCO's activities have expanded beyond its initial focus on security and stability to economic cooperation and broader cooperation with the UN and other groupings such as the G20, BRICS, NATO and ASEAN. The SCO mechanism plays an important role in its multilateral cooperation's and is an

important driving force for its multilateral cooperation vision like for example the SCO dialogue partner status allows the concerned countries to take part in specialised intra-SCO events at the invitation of the member states.

Since its inception in 2001, the SCO has focused on regional security issues, its fight against regional terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism. Though, its priorities also include regional development. “The SCO has been an observer in the UN General Assembly since 2005. The UN and SCO Secretariats signed a Joint Declaration on Cooperation in April 2010. SCO Secretariat has also established partnerships with the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in addition to its ongoing cooperation with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and the UN Office on Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT). The United Nations Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), maintain regular contacts with the SCO officials. The cooperation activities focus on security developments in the region and key issues related to counterterrorism and prevention of violent extremism. Since, 2017 DPPA has deployed a Liaison Officer to the SCO in Beijing” (<https://dppa.un.org/en/shanghai-cooperation-organization>). Also it engages with CICA, CAREC and others.

As the world undergoes a major geopolitical shift, it is perceived that the SCO provides Eurasia a new strategic dimension, while building a new security order. And it is expected that with the expansion of the organisation and cooperation amongst member countries, SCO will also realise its full potential. The growing relevance of SCO especially against the backdrop of aggravated distrust and antagonistic moods in the world, there is, now, “mutual understanding and a spirit of cooperation in Eurasia” (Nayanima Basu, 2022). Also, the expanding nature of SCO in terms of activities and interactions with other agencies and processes, today SCO or its role in Eurasia is one of the most talked about issue in most summits and forum discussions.

In fact, SCO’s role and influence in recent years, has grown as an interregional cooperation of countries with different histories, civilization patterns, cultures, political systems, levels of economic development. And as its external relationship is also growing, the SCO, to some extent, is has become one of the rapidly developing centers of the multipolar world. (Sergey, 2022).

The SCO Secretary General Zhang Ming, attended the ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on 11 November, 2022, and met with ASEAN Secretary-General Lim Jock Hoi and his deputy Michael Tene, where both sides underlined the feasibility of developing new forms of interaction, further intensifying ties between

the secretariats as well as enhancing coordination and exchanges between the SCO and ASEAN member states in the political, economic and humanitarian fields in order to maintain regional security and stability (<http://eng.sectSCO.org/politics/20221115/923711/SCO-and-ASEAN-Secretaries-General-meet.html>).

The discussions at the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) on 6 September 2022 revolved around the increasing economic cooperation between the SCO and ASEAN. “Grigory Logvinov, the SCO’s deputy secretary general, stressed how the economic, political and scientific potential has not been fully harvested yet. And Kirill Barsky, from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, explained how the SCO is actually the model of multipolarity and identifies the SCO as ‘the core Eurasian structure, forming the agenda of Greater Eurasia within a network of partnership organizations’. The economic agenda in the Eurasian integration progress, with Eurasia Economic Union (EAEU) configured as the SCO’s most important partner. With the developments in Afghanistan in last two years, the stabilising role of the SCO cannot be overstated enough. A “roundtable on the ‘Gateway to a Multipolar World’ expanded on the SCO role, outlining how most Asian nations are either ‘friendly’ or ‘benevolently neutral’ when it comes to Russia after the start of the Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine” (Pepe, 2022).

SCO possesses a great capacity and new possibilities for successful cooperation. In particular, with the beginning of a new stage in the SCO development in the enlarged composition, several possibilities are available (Ruslan, 2019). And as the Uzbek Ambassador to India Dilshod Akhatov, rightly said, “with rapid shifts in the foreign policies of member countries, the SCO is more than ever in demand now. Reason being, all the member states want this particular multilateral platform to focus on the implementation of an open, pragmatic, broad-based, and mutually beneficial cooperation. The SCO has an enormous transport and transit potential that awaits its practical implementation. In the context of the diversification of global supply chains, the creation of new international rail and road corridors in Eurasia, along the East-West and North-South directions, is acquiring a strategic dimension. Uzbekistan is interested in fully tapping the potential of the organisation in the new conditions of its evolution, first of all, by increasing the practical cooperation in promising areas that meet the vital interests of all participating countries” (Nayanima, 2022). Connectivity is just one such area and the prospects for the implementation of multilateral economic projects could also be explored. And India along with other members including Uzbekistan could pave way for integrating the region further. In fact, the SCO members have developed an intergovernmental agreement on facilitating international road transport with assistance from the Asian Development Bank and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (<https://aric.adb.org/initiative/shanghai-cooperation->

organization). The inclusion of Iran in the SCO has increased the substantial value of the organisation, as experts suggest that SCO now has all the necessary players it requires to solve regional challenges.

SCO and India

India's admission to the SCO was a strategic decision and at a very opportune time. The SCO had by then achieved stability, security, and sustained economic development in a world riddled with revolutions, chaos, crises, and economic downturn. Also the changes in the regional dynamics especially vis-à-vis Afghanistan post 2014, there was a paradigm shift in the regional security scenario in this vast landscape. And few member countries were looking towards India as respite. India's P M Modi and Russian President Putin discussed India's accession to SCO, where President Putin said, "I am looking forward to developing the cooperation" (Free Press Journal, 2015). The Central Asian countries were also very supportive of India's inclusion into the SCO. They viewed India as a soft balancer against the two leading powers, as it would strengthen their multi vector foreign policies. During February 2002 visit to India President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, in the joint declaration stated that India's membership in SCO 'would add to the strength of the organisation'. The long term security interests of India will be diversified by deepening the ties between all those interested in the development and stability of CAS and Afghanistan (Ajay, 2004).

Many experts believed India could make a significant contribution to the organisation and the region as it could help Central Asian countries diversify their external economic relations. Also, India's admission could help in the balance of power within the organisation and at the same time would significantly increase SCO's political weight and economic attractiveness among developing countries (Kamala, 2017).

However, India did not get membership right at the beginning. In 2005 India got an observer status. Then it took ten years for India to traverse the path from Observer status to full membership. India was invited and offered the status of an Observer country at the Astana Summit in 2005. India accepted the offer and was represented by former foreign minister Mr. Natwar Singh. He stuck a positive note when he spoke about the need to build linkages across the vast continent... and highlighted the initiative taken by the SCO in the area of fighting extremism and terrorism. Mr Singh also stated that, if India is offered full membership it would bring its rich experience of multilateral diplomacy into the SCO due to the productive role India played in the Non Aligned Movement. Similarly Indian experience in combating religious extremism and terrorism can be a valuable input for the SCO. India is already cooperating with Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in sharing experience and intelligence (MEA Docs, 2006).

India showed its keen interest on becoming a full member and had been very forthcoming in its approach towards SCO right from the beginning so as to contribute effectively to the issues of common concerns and support SCO objectives, ensuring stability in the region; support its initiatives in the energy sphere and to enhance regional economic cooperation and combat terrorism. (The Hindu, 2005). In his acceptance speech at the Ufa Summit in 2015, P M Modi said "...our membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is the natural extension of the relationships that India has with member countries and mirror's the region's place in India's future...it will promote peace and prosperity in this vast region that has often been called the 'pivot of history' (PTI, 2015).

The SCO can promote a positive discourse on regional cooperation and as a forum could provide a unique opportunity to discuss new areas of economic, security and developmental cooperation. From the Indian perspective it is better to be a member and contribute to the peace and stability of the region. This was very well articulated by India's External Affairs Minister during the SCO summit in 2011, as to how India wants to cooperate within the framework. He said that, "SCO members and observers could cooperate more in the future on regional and global issues like threats arising out of climate change; environmental security; food security; energy security; particularly non-conventional sources of energy, and other emerging issues which require a joint response for sustainable development. India stands ready to make a constructive contribution in these areas" (Statement by EAM at the SCO Heads of States Summit, 2011).

The SCO also provides India with an opportunity to initiate multilateral and regional initiatives on counter-terrorism and deal with the illicit drug trade. Besides, there is potential in the area connectivity projects as well, four member countries of Central Asia are landlocked and looking for an opening in the Indian ocean and India could provide the best option through Chabahar and INSTC. And Chabahar is the best option for the landlocked Central Asian countries. The Chabahar is linked to Afghanistan's Garland Highway and could connect with Mazar-e-sharif. From Mazar-e-sharif, a rail link connects with Hairaton in Uzbekistan and Uzbekistan being centrally located, is well connected with other republics (Joshi and Kumari, 2019).

And the INSTC is vital new route and fast emerging as a gigantic enterprise, which links South, West and Central Asia and could be a great option to replace the Suez Canal as the INSTC link will reduce the transportation time to about 20 days initially and subsequently to 14 days, instead of about 40 days through the already existing route. Also, the INSTC route is estimated to be 30 per cent cheaper (Kamala, 2022). Also it is very vital transport corridor in the region as compliments the existing connectivity infrastructure project in the region without any conflict with other

projects, including Russia's integration project in the region, and also contributes to economic cooperation between the countries of the "SCO family" (Rashid, 2018).

And the importance of INSTC and Chabahar has been stressed by diplomats in all forums. The Russian President Vladimir Putin also, has strongly pushed the INSTC as the key connectivity link, between Russia and India via Iran and described it as 'truly ambitious' as the INSTC aims to connect Caspian Sea region countries, including Kazakhstan. He said that, INSTC connects India with Russia within the shortest possible time, describing it a "transport artery from St Petersburg to ports in Iran and India" (Chaudhury, 2022). Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali said, the need to speed up the completion of infrastructure and the North-South corridor as an alternative to the route through the Suez Canal has become clear and more important than ever (Aneja, 2021). In 2021, India and Iran celebrated Chabahar day, where Minister of External Affairs (MEA) S. Jaishankar proposed the integration of the Chabahar Port with the INSTC and said that, "I am hopeful that during the INSTC Coordination Council meeting, member-states would agree to the expansion of the INSTC route to include the Chabahar Port and also agree on expanding the membership of this project (PTI, 2021). During his conversation with Lavrov foreign Minister of Russia, MEA Jaishankar "discussed connectivity including the INSTC and the necessity of developing the Vladivostok to Chennai maritime corridor to enhance trade with the resource-rich Russian Far East region" (Press Release, 2021).

So the possibilities for expanding cooperation across Eurasia remain practically unlimited and the complementarity of economies factors in it. Despite, several western scholars being critical of India being member of SCO, there are experts, who believe that India is at a right place at the right time. Rajan Kumar, Professor at the School of International studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, remarked how India does not see the SCO as an alliance, but committed to the development and political stability of Eurasia. Gen. B. K. Sharma from the United Service Institution of India stated, India now has multiple strategies, from connecting to Central Asia to the 'Act East' policy, overall, it's an outreach to Eurasia and India takes SCO very seriously (Escobar, 2022).

Besides, Prof Rajan thinks, the SCO is indispensable to India's interests in Eurasia, The SCO takes decisions on several geopolitical and security frameworks which are vital for India (Kumar, 2019). The SCO provides a platform to India where it can enhance and explore economic cooperation and at the same time India seeks to increase its trade investment with the SCO countries to diversify its economic partnerships (ANI 19 May, 2023). India sees its SCO membership as a means to increase engagements with the Eurasian region. though, India's participation has some limitations as well. (Marjani, 2023).

Issues and Challenges

The SCO over time, bringing together large countries, with often rival geostrategic agendas, means it is bound to face some challenges as well. And like in any other organisation, SCO with its development and expansion of cooperation's also faces challenges and developmental difficulties. The SCO right now also faces some structural challenges as well like for example the intensification of great power game in the region; the weakening sense of community between its member states; and the transformation of cooperation pattern after expansion. Language is another issue. Right now only Russian and Chinese are official Language, and since new members have joined, it is likely that English could also be added as official language. Prof. Alexander Lukin while talking in an International conference in Delhi, mentioned that the process of making English also part of SCO language for communication amongst its members have begun and soon, it may be finalised (Lukin, 2023).

Also there are other issues as well, for example the SCO budget, issues of terrorism, extremism and radicalism; Drug trafficking and related issues. Though, the SCO since 2010 has been working with other regional agencies to tackle drug and narcotics menace however, have not been fully successful. Also on the terrorism issue SCO's fight remains questionable, as China- the leading member's reluctance to publicly articulate its views on Pakistan's use of terror as an instrument of policy does pose a serious challenge to the SCO.

Way Forward

The SCO as a regional organisation is currently in a new phase which is quite complex as fundamental shifts are taking shape in the geopolitical landscape of Eurasia including the SCO space as well. However, the potential prospects and growing significance of the organisation provides momentum for future course of action. And irrespective of what critics think of the SCO, it remains a crucial forum for India, and its importance will grow further in the coming years. The SCO has great potential and has been working towards achieving them, for example the prospect for economic, humanitarian, trade, labour, migration, and environmental cooperation, apart from its core concerns with regard to security and defence. Despite certain challenges, the SCO has nevertheless broadened its mandate in recent years to include joint security and economic development programmes and energy cooperation. SCO has a number of obvious advantages, which allow its members to significantly increase the rate of economic interaction. And with Iran becoming a member India could also benefit as Iran's geographical position is crucial for SCO. Besides connecting at least four major regions- Central Asia, South Asia, West Asia and the Caucasus, the INSTC, has its pathway via Iran. A study conducted by the

'Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations in India (FFFAI) in terms of cost, found INSTC is more economical and profitable than the traditional route via the Suez Canal. The operation of the INSTC is now more significant than ever for Iran, as it is pushing for upgrading a preferential trade agreement previously reached with the EAEU to a free trade agreement. Also, Iran has assured member states of providing safe, reliable and stable routes on the North-South Corridor, alongside supplying infrastructure to its southern port of Chabahar. Moreover, Chabahar Port connects India with the Central Asian region and Europe. The development and utilisation of the port's capacity and infrastructure can boost trade in the region, especially through the INSTC. Tehran is also keen to develop the Iran-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan corridor, connecting cities like Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat directly to the Chabahar port.

Besides, there is possibility of a practical cooperation within the SCO framework at this stage with focus on the implementation of the major projects, which meet the interests of most member states particularly in the areas such as energy, infrastructure construction, telecommunications and food security. There is also room for both observers and dialogue partners to participate and cooperate. Recently, the CAREC conducted a meet regarding the SCO Programme for the SCO Forum on Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development. Today, SCO encompasses the key ports in the East, South and North of Eurasia however, now the focus should be on Central Asia, an important region in the centre of the continent. This is would be in India's interest as SCO could become a bridge for expanding India's footprints in Central Asia. And in this regard a Special Working Group to promote collaboration in the field of transportation has been formed among member states of the SCO. The Road Transport and Highways Minister Nitin Gadkari said, this group will facilitate meetings to share knowledge and best practices related to reducing carbon emissions in transportation, promoting digital transformation, and implementing innovative technologies for more sustainable and efficient transport.

All this will help the SCO members countries benefit immensely and may help in further expansion of the organisation in terms of its role and relevance. However, there are also few things/issues which need attention: Language is one, amendment is needed so as to accommodate English, which would enable India and Pakistan and other new member to function efficiently. In terms of legal obligations from previous SCO treaties signed without consultation with India- could these treaties be amended?; what is the procedure?; Would there be structural changes in terms of security and political considerations?; Also, diverging perspectives on issues of common interests such as security, foreign policy strategies, economic development etc. are some other aspect that needs to be looked into.

Conclusion

The SCO as a regional organisation is currently in a new phase which is quite complex as fundamental shifts are taking shape in the geopolitical landscape of Eurasia including the SCO space as well. And as the world undergoes a major geopolitical shift, it is perceived that the SCO provides Eurasia a new strategic dimension and it is expected that with the expansion of the organisation and cooperation amongst member countries, SCO will also realise its 'full potential', as it is playing quite meaningful role, though not up to the expectation yet. The SCO has been working towards exploring the prospects for example the prospect for economic, humanitarian, trade, labour, migration, and environmental cooperation. Despite certain challenges, the SCO has nevertheless broadened its mandate in recent years to include joint security and economic development programmes and energy cooperation. The SCO is indispensable to India's interests in Eurasia as the organisation takes decisions on several geopolitical and security frameworks which are vital for India. The SCO provides a platform to India where it can enhance and explore economic cooperation and diversify its trade and economic partnerships, particularly with regard to connectivity, transport and energy sector. The INSTC and Chabahar could be a most advantageous; no wonder most member countries are supporting it. The potential prospects and growing significance of the organisation provides momentum for future course of action. And irrespective of what critics think of the SCO, it remains a crucial forum for India, and its importance will grow further in the coming years.

References

- Alimov, Rashid (2018). "The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Its role and place in the development of Eurasia", *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, Volume 9, Issue 2, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1016/j.euras.2018.08.001>
- Atul Aneja (2021). <https://www.indianarrative.com/world-news/suez-canal-disruption-opens-door-for-india-backed-north-south-corridor-as-alternative-78630.html>
- ANI (2023). "Why Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has importance for India?", <https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/why-shanghai-cooperation-organisation-has-importance-for-india20230519231751/>
- ANI (2022). <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/sco-summit-to-commence-today-member-countries-to-hold-several-bilateral-meetings/articleshow/94213982.cms>
- Basu, Nayanima (2022). <https://theprint.in/diplomacy/sco-summit-will-give-eurasia-a-new-strategic-dimension-says-uzbek-envoy-akhmatov/1115558/>
- Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy (2022). "Putin pushes INSTC to connect India; describes it as a 'truly ambitious project'", July 01, 2022, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/putin-pushes-instc-to-connect-india-describes-it-as-a-truly-ambitious-project/articleshow/92582524.cms>

- Escobar, Pepe (2022). "Asia's future takes shape in Vladivostok, the Russian Pacific", September 08 2022, <https://thecradle.co/article-view/15396/asias-future-takes-shape-in-vladivostok-the-russian-pacific>
- ET Bureau (2023). <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/renewables/special-working-group-formed-to-promote-transport-collaboration-among-sco-countries/articleshow/99837882.cms>
- Fallahi, Ebrahim (2022). "INSTC: A sanction-proof route with great economic prospects", July 15, 2022, <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/474677/INSTC-A-sanction-proof-route-with-great-economic-prospects>,
- Free Press Journal (2015). "Modi and Putin discuss India's accession to SCO", 09 July, 2015, <http://www.freepressjournal.in/modi-and-putin-discuss-indias-accession-to-sco/620373>
- Press Release (2021). <https://indianembassy-moscow.gov.in/Visit%20of%20Minister%20of%20Foreign%20Affairs%20of%20the%20Russian%20Federation%20to%20India-6-april-2021.php>
- <https://aric.adb.org/initiative/shanghai-cooperation-organization>
- <http://eng.sectesco.org/politics/20230506/942021/-New-SCO-dialogue-partners.html>
- <https://dppa.un.org/en/shanghai-cooperation-organization>
- https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=1&ls_id=9122&did=5926
- Izimov, Ruslan. Yussupzhanovich, Zamira Muratalieva Tulkunovna (2019). "Role of SCO in the Eurasian Continent", *India Quarterly* 75(1) 43–55, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), p.50–51
- Joshi, Nirmala, Kamala Kumari (2019). "Understanding Central Asia's Security and Economic Interests", *India Quarterly*, Volume 75, Issue 1, pp. 29–42, p-39
- Khan, Aamna (2022). "What does Iran's membership in the SCO mean for the region?", *The Diplomat*, 20 September, <https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/what-does-irans-membership-in-the-sco-mean-for-the-region/>
- Kumar, Rajan (2019). <https://www.financialexpress.com/business/defence/shanghai-cooperation-organisation-summit-the-sco-is-indispensable-to-indias-interests-in-eurasia/1605169/>
- Kumari, Kamala (2022). "India and The Indo-Pacific Amidst Covid-19: Decoding Opportunity", in Anju Lis Kurian, C. Vinodan, eds., *Covid-19: India And The World*, Scholars' Press, 2022, Pp. 83-106, p-95
- Kumari, Kamala (2017). "India and the SCO: Issues and Challenges" in G J Reddy, ed. *Multilateral Cooperation: Emerging Global Scenarios*, UGC Centre for Southeast Asian & Pacific Studies, Sri Venkateswara University, 2017, p.45-68
- Lukin, Alexander, International Seminar, on "Understanding Central Asian Perspectives on Eurasia", in the session themed, "Eurasia in the mirror of Central Asia", organised by the India Central Asia Foundation (ICAF), Delhi, at India International Centre at the IIC Annexe on 11-13 April 2023
- Marjani, Niranjana (2023). "What Does India Gain From the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?", <https://thediplomat.com/2023/05/what-does-india-gain-from-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization/>
- Marochkin, Sergey, Yury Bezborodov ed. (2022). "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Exploring New Horizons", London, Routledge, P-3

- MEA Docs (2006). [http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/2647/Address+by+ External+Affairs+Minister+Shri+Natwar+Singh+at+Shanghai+Cooperation+Organisation+Summit](http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/2647/Address+by+External+Affairs+Minister+Shri+Natwar+Singh+at+Shanghai+Cooperation+Organisation+Summit)
- Patnaik Ajay (2004) "Central Asia and India: The Post- Taliban Prospects", in Mahavir Singh, International Terrorism and Religious Extremism: Challenges to Central and South Asia, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata, pp- 121- 138, p-135
- PTI (2015) "India Inducted as Full Member of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation", <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-inducted-as-full-member-of-shanghai-cooperation-organisation-780222>
- PTI (2021). "India has proposed inclusion of Chabahar Port in INSTC trade route, says Jaishankar", 4 March, 2021, <https://theprint.in/diplomacy/india-has-proposed-inclusion-of-chabahar-port-in-instc-trade-route-says-jaishankar/615750/>
- "Programme for Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Forum on Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development", May 28, 2023, <https://www.carecprogram.org/?s=SCO>.
- Statement by EAM at the SCO Heads of States Summit", June 15, 2011, <http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/373/Statement+by+EAM+at+the+SCO+Heads+of+States+Summit>
- The Hindu (2005). <http://www.hindu.com/2005/10/27/stories/2005102718141600.htm>, accessed 6 Jan 2016

The Plight of Afghan Refugees in South Asia

Lirar Pulikkalakath and Vinny Davis

Introduction

Colonisation by Europeans, the Two World Wars, the disintegration of several empires, and the formation of new nation-states have contributed to unending political crises and human catastrophes globally. Since World War II, different parts of the world, especially the global south, started witnessing external interventions for various reasons that have led to the displacement of millions of people worldwide. Now the 21st century witnesses the highest rate of human displacement in the history of human beings. The massive exodus of Afghans seeking better havens, mainly due to the invasion of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) from 1979-89 and subsequent political instability, eventually forced them to relocate to different locations in South Asia. The American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the second turn of the Taliban in the country is set to be a defining moment in the geopolitics of South Asia. External powers like Russia and China are keenly watching over this power vacuum and power transition to promote their individual and shared interests. Fears over the increase in terrorist and extremist activities across the region are a cause of worry as the South Asia nations have already been facing geo-political and economic challenges in recent times. The mass movement of Afghans from their homeland seeking protection for their life and liberty has eventually displaced them within their homeland. It has reduced them to stateless persons in neighbouring countries. The article attempts to critically analyse the plight of Afghan refugees* whose lives are torn between domestic political instability, regional security crises and external interests.

Unfolding the Afghan Crisis over the Years

In order to understand the intricacies of the problem of Afghan refugees, one needs to analyse the historical/background reasons that resulted in a political and

* a person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; is unable or unwilling to avail him— or herself of the protection of that country, or unable to return there, for fear of persecution (UN convention, 1951).

humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, located *en route* between Iran, Central Asia, and India, has historically been termed the “graveyard of empires”. For the past four decades, Afghanistan has been in a state of unending turmoil. The nation witnessed power struggles between diverse interest groups and political factions within and outside ruling apparatuses. Furthermore, the unwarranted penetrations of external powers to serve their regional interests have significantly contributed to the crisis. The overlapping interests of multiple stakeholders have complicated the situation. Thus, imminent political stability may not be easy in the near future.

Afghanistan has been experiencing the presence of external military interventions – first led by the Soviets and later by the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces. For a brief period in the 90s, the nation fell into the hands of the Taliban, a Pashtun-led militia organisation with the support of Pakistan. Post 9/11, the US and its allies intervened in Afghanistan with the “war on terrorism”. However, with Taliban forces retreating briefly and the US-led NATO forces continuing their early phase of the intervention, the Hamid Karzai-led interim government came to the helm in Afghanistan. From post-2002 onwards, US attention was more towards post-war reconstruction in Afghanistan. However, the military, financial and human costs of this presence were so much so that the US and even the NATO forces were contemplating withdrawal since the Lisbon summit in 2010. The intention was to give Afghan security forces control over security in the country. Despite doubts over the Afghan government’s capacity to ensure security, US President Obama decides to withdraw by 2014 and then later by 2016. Amidst these developments, the Taliban arose in prominence, so much so that by 2019 they were at the helm of peace talks in Doha with the US. Discussions and deliberations continued over the years, and President Joe Biden announced US troops’ withdrawal by September 11, 2021, with a statement that “it is time to end America’s longest war” (Biden, 2021).

What is to be noted here is that the withdrawal was made without proper governance arrangements, and even without offering resistance, the Afghan forces fell. The swift pace with which the Taliban captured the nation shocked the international community. With the Taliban back to power in Afghanistan for the second time, the immediate response of the Afghan population was to flee for their life. This is because they were victims of the horrors committed by the regime way back in 1996 when they first captured power. The world witnessed with shock at the sight of thousands crowding in the Kabul international airport. The visuals of people falling off US airplanes and families walking on foot braving the Taliban opposition revealed the desperate life of Afghans. Unfortunately, no one cared for the hapless Afghan populace. A year has passed by after the takeover, and the Afghans are struggling for a safe life.

Impending Refugee Crisis

According to Filippo Grandi, the current United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) chief, “refugees can be defined as persons who have fled persecution, violence or conflict and have crossed an international border to find safety in another country” (UNHCR). The year 2022 will be noted in history as the first year in which the refugee population exceeded 100 million globally (UNHCR, 2022). The report noted that food insecurity, climate crises, the war in Ukraine, instabilities from Africa to Afghanistan, and human rights violations were the major causative factors of this plight. In addition, concerns over the status of asylum seekers (fleeing populace that seeks protection, but no country has recognised their status as a refugee), who are characterised as stateless in a host country, are critical. Often, many return to their home country and join alongside the rest of the Internally Displaced Population (IDPs)*.

It has been over forty years since the first Afghan person was forced to leave their country. Having experienced decades of instability, Afghans leaving their homeland in search of a better life is a sad reality. Unfortunately, they continue as one of the most protracted refugees** in recent world history. This explains why almost 3.5 million (UNHCR, 2022) were internally displaced in Afghanistan alone. In fact, prior to the Taliban takeover itself, about 2,073,809 (UNHCR, 2022) registered Afghan refugees were living in neighbouring countries (Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan). The UN Refugee Agency also notes that there have been about 5.3 million returnees in Afghanistan in phases since 2002 (UNHCR, 2022). But owing to the recent developments, these trends are likely to witness a decline. Reports show that in the early months of 2021 itself, roughly 546,000 people (OCHA, 2021) left their homes on account of poverty and increasing violence and were displaced within the country.

Almost a year after the Taliban takeover and the Afghan population continues to be displaced due to ongoing conflicts and natural disasters. Needless to say, the Afghan humanitarian crisis has worsened. It is believed that about 30.3 thousand are internally displaced due to the conflicting situation, as per the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports (OCHA, 2022). Out of these, 58% are children under the age of 18, while 21% constitute adult men and women, respectively. In fact, nearly 80% of the displaced are women, and children are the most vulnerable and are forced to flee without even the basic necessities. As per the

* IDP refers to someone who has not crossed a border but who shares many characteristics with refugees.

** Those displaced in a “long-lasting and intractable state of limbo”. According to the UNHCR, Protracted refugees are “populations of 25,000 persons or more who have been in exile for five or more years in developing countries”. See The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (2014) and UNHCR (2004) for more details.

latest (UNHCR, 2022) report, about 528.1 thousand returnees were from Iran (43% adult male and children under 18 respectively and 14% adult female), while 54.8 thousand returned from Pakistan (54% children under the age of 18 and 20% and 26% adult male and female respectively). A small number out of the total 582.9 thousand have returned from European countries as well. These figures reveal the enormity of the Afghan humanitarian crisis regionally and globally. Analysing the regional consequences of the crisis in the context of recent geo-political and economic issues facing South Asia is the need of the hour.

Responses towards Afghan Refugee Crisis – A South Asian Perspective

Across South Asian countries, all major categories of the fleeing population can be seen, refugees, asylum seekers*, IDPs, and migrants in the form of Afghans, Sri Lankan Tamils, Rohingyas, Chin, Hajong, Chakma, and Tibetans. They are seen living in camps or are found dispersed throughout host countries and in their own countries. The troubled political situation in Afghanistan presents unprecedented challenges before the South Asian neighbours. The issues affecting the refugee population continue to present themselves as a daunting challenge, mainly because the South Asian states are not signatories of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol which governs how nations should treat refugees.

If nations recognise the definition of a refugee given by the 1951 UN convention, then refugees are granted rights not to be expelled, except under certain, strictly defined conditions. It also includes the right not to be punished for illegal entry into the territory of a contracting State, besides providing the rights to work, housing, education, public relief and assistance, freedom of religion, access to courts, and freedom of movement within the territory. Furthermore, the convention guarantees the right to be issued identity and travel documents and the right to be protected from refoulement applicable to all refugees.

Furthermore, the South Asian states are also facing severe political and economic problems nationally, which may lead to more inward-looking policies by the governments, leaving the Afghan refugee crisis in a quandary. Afghan political instability thus poses an external security concern for most of them. However, concerns over the fears of Afghanistan turning into a hotbed of terrorism and its cross-border consequences are a cause of worry. A case study of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal will help to understand how these nations have dealt with the Afghan refugee crisis over the years.

* An asylum seeker refers to one who is seeking protection, but no country has 'determined' whether or not the person meets the definition of a refugee; they have the right to be recognized as a bona fide refugee and to receive legal and material assistance.

India is one of the few liberal democracies that have not ratified these conventions, yet it houses a large number of refugees in its territory. Varied refugee groups have been hosted for decades in India. With UNHCR support, the Government of India assists refugees across 11 states and works closely with wide-ranging stakeholders, community groups, and Non-Governmental Organisations. More than 46,000 refugees and asylum-seekers are registered with the UN Refugee Agency in India (UNHCR India, 2022). They are mainly from Myanmar and Afghanistan, and refugees and asylum-seekers in India largely live in urban settings alongside host communities. 46% of the refugees are women and girls, and 36% are children (UNHCR India, 2022).

Alongside the security concerns and porous borders of the country, the consequence of the mass movement of people into India is posing a challenge to the infrastructure, resources, and demographic of the nation seems to worry the decision-makers. In addition to the above, there seems to be some amount of cynicism too as to how UNHCR mandates would be once India ratifies the convention and its successive protocol. The internal security concerns may be under question, and repatriation will be even more challenging once India adheres to the convention. Though the official stance may be aligned along these aspects, India continues to provide humanitarian support to the masses who face persecution in their homeland. In the United Nations forums, too, India has highlighted its humanitarian responses to refugee issues. In addition, India also partners with United Nations Relief Works Agency in human development and delivery of humanitarian services.

Due to its larger size and economy, India has significantly supported the cause of refugees from small neighbouring countries. Over the years, it has housed the Tibetans, Sri Lankan Tamils, Pakistani Hindus, and Chakmas from Bangladesh, Afghans, and Rohingyas, besides a small number from Africa and West Asian countries as refugees. However, being a non-signatory to the Refugee Convention, the condition of the asylum seekers in India who are awaiting Refugee status is not so promising. In the context of Afghans, about 11,000 registered Afghans in India are awaiting Refugee status. Thus, their condition is far from worse in the absence of legal status. Though the Government of India responded with a provision for emergency E-visas last year after the Taliban takeover, this short-term measure with six-month validity does question the long-term prospects of the Afghans in the country. Those who arrived in India years ago are still awaiting the refugee status that can enable them to apply for long-term visas. When the UNHCR delays in issuing support letters that can be verified by embassies to issue refugee cards, their condition worsens further (The Wire, 2021). This forces the Afghan diaspora to look for odd jobs to make a living. The condition is bound to worsen in the absence of a proper asylum policy. Nevertheless, there is also a bright side as the UNHCR and like-minded NGOs (Access) successfully coordinated with Afghan refugees and asylum seekers in India to set up mini catering services (Mehta, 2016) supplying Afghan

delicacies (Firmi and Mutton) and restaurants (Green Leaf restaurant and others based in Saket and Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi). The fact that Afghans blend well with the locals has enabled their assimilation to be easier. Most of them have taken up small jobs, while others have set up small businesses (Khanna, 2016). This does not, however, mean to say that they do not experience livelihood challenges here. Eventually, the majority of them dream of resettling in European lands, which would provide better opportunities.

Pakistan has housed a vast majority of Afghan nationals after Iran. Pakistan first hosted about 3 million Afghan refugees in 1979, and within decades, the numbers rose exponentially. Though many of them returned, as per UNHCR Global Appeals 2012-2013 report, about 4.5 million undocumented refugees across the border and 3.7 registered refugees were repatriated back to their homeland in 2002. Though it supports humanitarian efforts across the border, in recent times, it has also refused to take in more people. This is primarily because the nation faced issues like population increase, uneven distribution of social and economic resources, and terrorism as it hosted documented and undocumented Afghan refugees. As per the latest (UNHCR, 2022) figures, Pakistan hosts 1,282,901 Afghan refugees in their territory. Sharing a land boundary with Afghanistan, Pakistan gives protection to refugees as per its Islamic precedents and human rights instruments. Yet, being a non-signatory to the Refugee Convention means that Afghan asylum seekers are dealt with by ad-hoc discretionary policies of successive governments. Many are worried that they will be forcefully repatriated back to their homeland. Like India, it has also been unable to devise national legislation to protect refugees or procedures from determining whether someone falls into refugee status. Recently, in collaboration with UNHCR, Pakistan has instituted new smart identity cards for Afghan refugees. These cards give them faster and safer access to health and education facilities and to banking services. Titled DRIVE, this documentation renewal and information verification exercise aims to provide the refugees an opportunity to highlight any specific protection needs or vulnerabilities and has completed data verification of about 1.4 million Afghan refugees (UN, 2022).

The Sri Lankan government has signed a 2005 memorandum of understanding and 2006 terms of reference with the UNHCR, and it has collaborated with civil society groups and religious groups to arrange a temporary stay for Afghan refugees in the country. The NGOs in the country have urged the government to provide visas for the fleeing Afghans in the wake of the Taliban takeover. However, reeling under a severe economic crisis, it partners with the UNHCR in aiding the miniscule number of Afghans in the country.

Nepal Despite having no shared borders, the political instability in Afghanistan has had its repercussions in Nepal due to the refugee influx into the country. Nepal has not granted refugee status to Afghans in their territory. However, they do not forcefully

oust the Afghans who left their homeland to secure their life. A minimal number present here survive in difficult conditions as undocumented workers. The primary aim of the fleeing Afghans is to seek asylum status here. Even though Afghanistan has experienced political instability over the years, Nepalese workers deem it as their preferred destination. About 8000 Nepalese workers have got work permits in Afghanistan, and a large number of undocumented Nepalese workers are working here (Giri, 2022). The Nepal government evacuated its nationals in the wake of the Taliban takeover.

Thus, while assessing the general situation of the fleeing Afghan population, it could be seen that being a non-signatory to the refugee conventions and protocols affected the status of those who were awaiting refugee status in South Asian countries, and this predicament forced them to take up odd jobs for a living. Most of these nations are embroiled in their domestic political and economic crises. Economic indicators in countries like India, Nepal, and Bangladesh have not been on the brighter side in the years preceding or following the COVID-19 pandemic. Pakistan's economic and political situation is precarious indeed as the nation seems to move from one political tension to another. Myanmar and its military junta's subversion of democratic processes in the nation is another concern for the region. Sri Lankan political system is paying for the mistake of concentrating too much power in the hands of one family and is corrupted beyond redemption. It is also paying the price for its non-transparent dealings with China's regional economic power. Amidst all these, the Afghans have been suffering over the past few decades due to overlapping interests of multiple stakeholders, and political stability is a distant dream in the long run. The refugee influx from Afghanistan is bound to increase in the coming years, adding to more pressure on neighbouring host nations.

The Way Forward

It is believed that “when refugees have access to land, the labour market, and livelihood opportunities and enjoy the freedom of movement, they can have positive economic impacts by creating jobs, services, and facilities, or by contributing to agricultural production and the local economy” (UNHCR, 2011). For instance, in Canada, refugees have a higher rate of income and employment and are the highest taxpayers in the country. Under more open policies, refugees can become an economic asset to the host countries (Beth, 2014). When Afghans first migrated to India, their intention was to escape from a terrorised homeland. Gradually as they began to live in a comparatively more liberal and secular country than theirs, they began to develop their own market hubs in Delhi's Lajpat Nagar. It is true that the natives of the area were also able to experience cultural diversity. Such instances of assimilation can reach greater heights in the realm of education too.

Education and skills will enable greater collaboration amongst the host community and will positively contribute to the economic growth of the host nation. Thus when refugees are given a chance for integration into the host society, social cohesion is bound to improve in the society. In fact, it has been accepted that “the presence of refugee and their pursuit of livelihoods can increase human security because economic activities help to recreate social and economic interdependence within and between communities” (Jacobsen, 2002). Thus inclusive policies will pave a greater role in reducing the aid dependencies on the host country and its economy. In the present times, when it comes to the issues of refugees, most host nations are facing pressures in terms of security and stability.

From the above-mentioned contexts, the need of the hour is implementing a solid legal framework that lays down the refugee registration process and the including the rights and duties of the refugees and asylum seekers. (UNHCR, 2019), in its partnership strategy, has devised the following areas to create protection outcomes and nurture solutions: access to adequate housing and education; support to peacebuilding, self-reliance, and sustainable reintegration through regional initiatives; increased outreach via an all-inclusive area based approach; engagements with development actors based approach keeping along the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and all these ably sustained by the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, to which Afghanistan declared its official obligation in 2018.

As a responsible power in the South Asian region, India can play a positive role in this context. It is uncertain whether India will sign the Refugee Convention in the near future after not doing so for the last 70 years. This delay should not deter India from arriving at dedicated legislation that outlines the rights, obligations, and registration process of refugees and asylum seekers. Such a constructive approach can be emulated by other South Asian countries too. The ongoing Afghan refugee crisis presents the right opportunity before nations/decision makers to understand these issues and devise a cohesive framework rather than leaving them at the mercy of ad-hoc policies of successive governments. As a major power in the South Asian region, such an initiative will positively affect refugees and asylum seekers of other nationalities. It can also be a model worthy to be emulated by other smaller South Asian neighbours.

References

- Betts, A., Bloom, L., Kaplan, J. D., & Omata, N. (2014). *Refugee economies: Rethinking popular assumptions*. University of Oxford, Refugee Studies Centre.
- Giri, Anil (2021). *Nepal to wrap up evacuation of its citizens from Afghanistan*. Kathmandu Post. <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2021/09/17/nepal-to-wrap-up-evacuation-of-its-citizens-from-afghanistan-on-september-18>

- Jacobsen, K. (2002). Livelihoods in conflict: the pursuit of livelihoods by refugees and the impact on the human security of host communities. *International migration*, 40(5), 95-123.
- Jain, Nikita (2021). *Asking for our rights: Afghans in India protest outside UNHCR office*. The Wire. <https://thewire.in/rights/asking-for-our-rights-afghans-in-india-protest-outside-unhcr-office-demand-refugee-status>
- Khanna, Mallika (2016). *Afghan refugees in India: A case study in Refugee Entrepreneurship*. Borgen Project. <https://borgenproject.org/afghan-refugees-in-india/>
- Mehta, Shuchita (2016). *Catering start-up empowers Afghan refugee women in Delhi*. UNHCR. <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/3/56dd8b216/catering-start-up-empowers-afghan-refugee-women-delhi.html>
- Milner, James (2014). Protracted Refugee Situations. In Qasmiyeh, E.F, Et al. (Eds). *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*. Oxford: OUP.
- OCHA (2022.a). Afghanistan Snapshot of Population Movement(January-August 2021). https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/afg_population_movement_snapshot_20210822.pdf
- OCHA (2022.b). Afghanistan-Snapshot of Population Movements. <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ocha-afg-populationmovementssnapshot.pdf>
- The White House (2021). Remarks by President Biden on Way Forward in Afghanistan. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/remarks-by-president-biden-on-way-forward/in-afghanistan/>
- UNHCR, Executive Committee (EXCOM) (2004). 'Protracted Refugee Situations'. Standing Committee, 30th Meeting, EC/54/SC/CRP.14, 10 June.
- UNHCR, Executive Committee (EXCOM) (1989). 'Implementation of 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. EC/SCIP, 07 July. <https://www.unhcr.org/excom/scip/3ae68cbe4/implementation-1951-convention-1967-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html>
- UNHCR (2013.). Global Appeals 2012-13. <https://www.unhcr.org/4ec231040.pdf>
- UNHCR (2019.a). Figures at a Glance.<https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html>
- UNHCR (2019.b) Afghanistan Multi-Year Protection and Solutions Strategy, 2019-2021. 6. UNHCR Afghanistan Multi-Year Protection and Solutions Strategy 2019-2021 (2).pdf
- UNHCR (2022.a). Afghanistan Situation. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/afghanistan>
- UNHCR (2022.b). Afghanistan Crisis Update- Women and Girls in Displacement. Afghanistan crisis update - Women and Girls in displacement UNHCR-UNWomen September 2022 (1).pdf
- UNHCR (2022.c). India. <https://www.unhcr.org/india.html>
- UN News (2022.a). More than 100 billion forcibly displaced: UNHCR Report. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/06/1120542>
- UN News (2022.b). Pakistan: Smartcard registration drive for Afghan refugee ends. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1109062>

India and UN Peacekeeping

Munmun Majumdar and T.T. Haokip

Abstract

Peacekeeping has advanced from traditional to multidimensional complex operations. Addressing the use of technology in peacekeeping has become a concern for the UN. Can India with its vast experience, in peace keeping contribute to new thinking about the use of technology in peacekeeping and the complex challenges peacekeepers face? This article argues that India is in many ways comfortably situated to go beyond deploying troops as part of UN peacekeeping and utilize its experience to bring about the use of technology in defining a new approach in peacekeeping.

Keywords: Peacekeeping, India, Technology, UN, Peacekeeping Troops “And he shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people: and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore”
Isaiah 2:4

The above verse of Isaiah find resonance in history, suggesting the desire for a peaceful world where political differences are resolved by engaging in a dialogue and not by physical conflict. This vision of using negotiation and peaceful means instead of force to prevent disputes from escalating into war was one of the reasons behind the founding of the League of Nations. Likewise, the founding of the United Nations in 1945 was to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war ... (UN Charter: Preamble). The provision for UN peacekeeping is an important major modus operandi for the UN in assisting the maintaining of peace and security and integral to the principle of collective security. (Krishnaswami 2010). It was in response to the Suez Crisis in 1956 (Hatto, 2014). UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and the President of the UN General Assembly, Lester Pearson defined the basic UN peacekeeping principles as “an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, established by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. (UN The Blue Helmets 1996). Each mission has its own mandate that come under three basic categories i.e., chapter

six, seven and eight. Therefore, UN peace keeping operations is a tool that is authorized by the security council to fulfil the tasks and goals that are assigned to the peacekeepers where fighting has come to a pause and help in executing the agreements that have been accomplished by peacemakers.

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)¹ authorized in May 1948 was the first UN peacekeeping mission that deployed a team of unarmed military observers to West Asia. It had to monitor, report and build confidence. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from observing ceasefires, the separation of forces in the context of inter-state warring factions to address intra-state disputes as well. The military, police and civilians were incorporated to assist in the establishment of sustainable peace (Castellan, 2000). As mentioned earlier the UN is a legally authorized body to take measures and design peacekeeping operations, however in doing so it has to abide by the three basic principles-consent, impartiality, and use of force only for self-defence.

According to the University of Bradford Peace Research Report No 31 of February 1993, UN peacekeeping activities fall under four broad categories: peace-making, peace-building, peace-enforcement and peace-keeping. (Fetherston, 1993) And are equipped with political, military and humanitarian dimensions. (Sandler, 2017). The UN peacekeepers include women and men, civilians, military and police, who serve under the UN flag to implement the mandate of the mission. The Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretariat and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (Morrison, S Park & Zoe, 1999) are the principal organs responsible and involved in planning, mounting and supporting of the peacekeeping mission. The regular program budget finances the activities of UN peacekeeping while the special account of the UN looks after the individual operations. (Osmanczyk, 2003) Therefore, UN peacekeeping is a distinctive global cooperation where the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretariat, troop and police contributors and the host governments work together and provide valuable resources and measures to establish peace. Its strength lies in the legitimacy of the UN Charter.

The foremost challenge facing the UN peacekeeping is the inconsistencies in the position between the countries of the Global North and South. In March 2018, Secretary-General António Guterres took a major step with the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative to strengthen peacekeeping operations and resolve the conflicting issues. In 2018, the United Nations celebrated the 70th anniversary of UN peacekeeping. The General Assembly adopted a resolution 57/129, and designated 29 May as the International Day of United Nations Peacekeepers, to be observed annually. This was to mark the day to pay tribute to the men and women who served and continue to serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations, as well as, to honor the memory of those who have lost their lives in the cause of

peace. Even though these missions face physical and political fragility of conflict situations they have been able to achieve success and have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. However, their accomplishments have also raised expectations from UN peacekeeping sometimes even beyond their capacity to deliver.²

The report of the High-Level Panel on U.N. Peace Operations known as the Brahimi Report, published in 2000, identified consent from the parties to the conflict as one of the guiding principles in U.N. peacekeeping. Consequently, peacekeeping missions can be deployed only with the consent of the host-state government and the other parties to a conflict. The Brahimi Report also advised peacekeeping missions to be ready to “deal effectively” with spoilers, with “robust rules of engagement,” as well as the use of force to defend the mandate in situations of limited consent.³ Another attempt at codifying the conduct of the UN peace keeping, is the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, (the Capstone Doctrine) published in 2008 by the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. It also reiterated consent as covering “acceptance of a peacekeeping operation” and “commitment by the parties to a political process” that the mission is mandated to carry out.⁴ In their absence it noted that “a United Nations peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conflict; and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its intrinsic role of keeping the peace.”⁵ These efforts at placing consent, an implementing partner, an underlying political process are essentially to make sure that peacekeeping missions are not drawn into long and expensive deployments. The 1990s had ushered in the deployment of multidimensional peacekeeping missions marking a transition from traditional to multidimensional complex operations in volatile, intrastate conflicts leading to the expansion of the non-military components of peacekeeping operations. The shift in peacekeeping in complex operations such as Mali has highlighted the importance of technology⁶ and the importance of recognizing the gender concerns.⁷

Another area of growing concern is the rise in attack and casualties among the peacekeepers on the ground. The Central African Republic is an instance of fluctuations in host-state consent that has witnessed attack on the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)⁸ Mr El-Ghassim Wane, the Special Representative of the Secretary General and Head of MINUSMA, condemned the act and said “this incident is a sad reminder of the permanent danger that hangs over our peacekeepers and of the sacrifices made for peace in Mali.”⁹ UN peacekeepers are not mandated to take on counter-terrorism. MINUSMA has evolved in the context of the global war on terror (Charbonneau) but it is not equipped to deal with organized armed terrorist. This makes them vulnerable and an easy prey. According to UN Official statistics, 255 MINUSMA peacekeepers have been killed in Mali as on 31 August 2021.¹⁰ The

high level of insecurity created as a result has impacted on how peacekeepers perceive and interact with both the local population and one another. This raises a very important question as to why peace keepers are targeted frequently and the need to explore ways in which it can be prevented. In the words of Jean Pierre Lacroix: “One peacekeeper lost continues to be one too many”, and that “attacks against peacekeepers can constitute war crimes; are a huge impediment to the pursuit of peace; and an added constraint for the effective implementation of UN Security Council mandates.”¹¹ During India’s UNSC Presidency in August 2021, it initiated an effort in this direction and organized a debate titled “Protecting the Protectors.”

India and UN Peacekeeping

At the dawn of the twenty first century the UN found itself faced with an upsurge in global peace keeping. In the last seven decades, UN Peacekeeping Operations have aided in managing conflict. The UN relies heavily on member states’ contribution of troops, defence and security personnel for peacekeeping international mission. Amongst all the resource requirements, mobilization of military personnel is one of the most essential requirements. Contributing troops is referred to as the backbone of peacekeeping (Wiharta, Melvin, Avezov 2012) particularly during the immediate post-cold war era when the need for UN peacekeeping missions increased. (Bellamy& Williams 2010). Therefore, it is important to understand the important role India has been playing as one of the largest troop-contributing countries (TCC) to numerous UN peacekeeping missions over the years.¹² The value (Vira 2012) of India’s commitment became even more apparent when many countries were unwilling to partake in UN peace Keeping operations (Bures, 2006).

India has been at the forefront in deploying Indian peacekeepers and have been a part some of the most challenging missions. It has been deeply involved in UN peacekeeping and is amongst the top three troop contributing countries, with over 5,579 personnel deployed in active peacekeeping missions.¹³ It has made immense contributions to peace keeping and in ensuring the political transition to peace. It has made a great difference in protecting civilians caught in intra-state conflicts missions and has also demonstrated its leadership role.¹⁴ Additionally, India has provided Military Advisers, Civilian Police Advisers, Force Commanders and several Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General to a number of missions. India has also contributed medical, veterinary and engineering services, in such missions. Furthermore, for meeting contingencies, India has also offered one brigade of troops to the UN Standby Arrangements.

Indian UN peacekeepers’ humanitarian role has been recognised widely. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix had said: UN peacekeeping operates in increasingly complex environments and we are

grateful for steadfast partners like India, who have risen to new challenges and continue to participate meaningfully in our efforts to protect vulnerable civilians.¹⁵ India's history of deploying women on UN peacekeeping missions' dates back to 1960, when women serving in the Indian Armed Forces Medical Services were sent to the Republic of Congo. It was the first country to contribute a Female Formed Police Unit (FFPU) to UN Mission in Liberia (Henry, 2013) Then the deployment of a Female Engagement Team as part of a Rapidly Deployable Battalion in the UN Mission MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of Congo) and the deployment of all-female police unit from 2007-2015, shows how India made substantial contribution and stands out prominently given the low participation of civilian and women peacekeepers.

In 2000, UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 led to the creation of the United Nations Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. This resolution recognised the impact of conflict on women and recognised their role in conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations. The resolution encourages greater female presence in UN peacekeeping operations as military observers and civilian police. After SCR 1325, the Security Council adopted nine more resolutions on the WPS agenda. They were focused on two main issues. First, such as the UN SCR 1325 were related to women's participation in peacekeeping and peacebuilding: 1889 (2009), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015) and 2493 (2019). Second, to address the conflict-related sexual violence: 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2467 (2019).¹⁴ These resolutions have helped in ushering a gendered perspective of peace and security by the United Nations. This is particularly true with regard to India's involvement in UNPKOs in the African continent. It deployed an all-women police battalion for the United Nation Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) from 2007 to 2016 for the first time in UN peacekeeping history. India achieved another milestone in 2019, when it deployed 22 women drawn from the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), a Central Armed Police Force, as a first Indian Female Engagement Team (FET) with the United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo India and UN Peacekeeping in Africa 465 (MONUSCO).

Apart from enhancing participation of women peacekeepers in UN missions, and providing pre-deployment training to peacekeepers from troop-contributing countries, India provides training to female military officers from around the world through a specialised course on peacekeeping that also covers training on gender-sensitive issues, particularly CRSV, at its Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK) at New Delhi. The establishment of the training Centre in Delhi under the Centre for UN Peacekeeping in September 2000, was another important development. Apart from overseeing training of contingents for peacekeeping operations, it has imparted training courses to sub-unit commanders, military

observers, officers on deputation as staff appointments, police personnel. Courses on conflict-related sexual violence and leadership course are offered to female military officers from different troop-contributing countries.¹⁶ The Department of Peacekeeping Operations at UN HQ has formally endorsed these courses. Likewise, India has been calling for reforms for peacekeeping, training of peacekeepers, together with a sound exit policy for peacekeepers etc.

India took part in the Annual Debate of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, on 14 February 2022. In a Statement by Ambassador R. Ravindra, Deputy Permanent Representative, pointed out the need for anchoring peacekeeping on sound technology, that a deliverable mandate can be effectively designed only in consultation with TCCs and other stakeholders, the need for time bound exit strategies, that caution must be exercised in the new doctrinal approaches, ensuring accountability for crimes against peacekeepers and reiterated that India has always voiced its support for adoption of “No National Caveats Policy” at UN peacekeeping deployments.¹⁷ India’s involvement on the subject of peacekeeping in the Security Council as well as in the General assembly are also noteworthy. It’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations in varying capacities even to the extent of accepting casualties to personnel, are manifestations of its intention to uphold the objectives of the UN Charter.

India’s Presidency at the UNSC in August 2021

The UNSC Resolution 2589, “Accountability of Crimes against UN Peacekeepers”, drafted by India was a first of its kind. It was co-sponsored and adopted by all 15 members of the UNSC as well as 80 Member States of the UN.¹⁸ The Resolution 2589 called on members states to slam crimes against peacekeepers as war crimes, and said “...hosting or having hosted United Nations operations to take all appropriate measures, in accordance with their national law, and international law, as applicable, to bring to justice perpetrators of the killing of, and all acts of violence against United Nations personnel, including, but not limited to, their detention and abduction....”¹⁹ India hoped that the implementation of the resolution will facilitate in deterring impunity and crimes against peacekeepers.

Another achievement was India’s Presidential Statement on “Technology for Peacekeeping”, the first such UN Security Council document on this subject.²⁰ Highlighting the “complex political and security environments and asymmetric threats” for example terrorism, India emphasized the necessity to attend to the technological requirements of peacekeepers. India called for the need to leverage technology, and particularly digital technology. It asserted the requisite technical expertise/tool be made available for the effective implementation of the UNSC

mandate on peacekeeping. Earlier the Brahimi Report proposed that peacekeeping be brought into the information age. (Brahimi Report, 2000)

The June 2014 an Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping was commissioned to examine how technology and innovation could strengthen peacekeeping missions. In its report it recognized the importance of deploying digital peacekeepers against the backdrop of complex peacekeeping mandates and precarious security environment. Consequently, it argued for a wider deployment of advanced technologies, including greater use of ground and airborne sensors and other technical sources of data, advanced data analytics and information fusion to assist in data integration. Situated in the context of the 21st century there is no doubt that the challenges faced by peacekeepers requires staying updated on technology, to be able to realistically respond to the changing dimensions of conflict. In many ways therefore, peacekeeping is being revised with the emergence of digital peacekeepers with access to information as a political resource.

As peacekeeping mission bases have regularly come under direct attack in recent years, there has been a systematic push to deploy many of the recommended technologies. The United Nations Peacekeeping operations have been employing geospatial technology, high-resolution satellite imagery and geographic information systems (GIS), to further the cause of peace and security. A recent example, in Mali, demonstrates the use of most sophisticated digital technologies such as IED forensic technologies and the Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise. In 2017, the UN mission in Mali acknowledged that its “sense and warn” radar alert system detected rockets and mortar attacks and saved the lives of many peacekeepers.²¹ Since India has lost many peacekeepers than any other troop contributing country it makes sense for India to lay emphasis on providing technology to peacekeeping operations. It is no wonder that India has been at the forefront of transforming the traditional peacekeepers into digital peacekeepers. India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar stressed that “21st-century peacekeeping must be anchored in a strong ecosystem of technology and innovation”. (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2021).

The convening of the ministerial-level open debate on technology and peacekeeping during its UNSC presidency in August 2021, is a pointer in this direction. During the debate, India proposed employing operationally proven, cost-effective, widely available, environment-friendly, reliable and field serviceable technologies. India stressed the urgent need for sound information and intelligence foundation to ensure early warning as well as mobilizing of early response. It called for technological improvements together with imparting training and capacity building of peacekeepers in the area of technology. (Ministry of External Affairs, 2021). India’s position is in line with the Security Council’s

recognition that technology has the potential to enhance performance, save resources, simplify work processes, and allow peacekeeping missions to have a deeper understanding of the environments they operate in, through improved collection, analysis and dissemination of data. Also, that existing and new technologies can support the safety and security of peacekeepers and the protection of civilians, by enabling effective and timely decision-making including early warning and response.

The UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres further underlined that digital technology “represents one of the greatest opportunities, but also one of the greatest challenges, of our time. The Security Council acknowledged technologies’ “potential as a force multiplier” and urged for “exploring available and future technologies and best practices that can contribute towards the safety and security of peacekeepers and protection of civilians, and allow for safer and more effective peacekeeping missions.” (Hansen and Miyashita, 2021) The Secretary General Antonio Guterres “Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping”²² They underlined the significance of maximizing the potential of new technologies to augment the capability of missions to implement their mandates effectively and in making use of technology to detect, analyze and address threats against civilians, peacekeepers and humanitarian missions. And in ensuring the responsible application of digital technologies.²³

India achieved yet another mile stone with the launch of the situational awareness technology platform UNITE AWARE. This is a technology platform developed by India in collaboration with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Operational Support. India spent US\$ 1.64 million towards its development. The UNITE AWARE platform aims to gather data sets from missions and structure them into a shared database to enable situational awareness and decision making. It seeks to ensure the security and safety of the UN peacekeepers by providing terrain-related information to them. India is a signatory to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the UNC41SR (UN Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Academy for Peace Operations (UNCAP), which reiterated support for the “Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping” initiative.

Even though the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) has a Satellite Centre – UNOSAT, for making satellite-based solutions and geographical information easily available for the UN, the organization does not have its own satellites. So, it primarily relies on freely available satellite data or purchases from private firms. India with its low-cost satellite technology and its space agency, ISRO can come in and collaborate with the UN for developing a dedicated constellation of Small Satellites (SmSats) for peacekeeping missions (Rajesh Kumar 2021). The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and

UN has signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to advance the use of host-country generated renewable energy in peacekeeping missions,²⁴ yet many a time they have to bank on diesel generators. Here again India can contribute to the energy security of peacekeeping missions by leveraging its solar power credentials in meeting the energy needs.

Since the nature of peacekeeping missions and their attendant threats have become more complex, the capabilities to secure the peacekeepers has become critical. India recognizes that applying new technology in peacekeeping operations can help peacekeepers to be better equipped to protect civilians and uniformed personnel and take faster and more informed decisions. Therefore, India has been consistent in drawing attention to situational awareness technology platform, UNITE Aware.²⁵ These developments uphold the fact that India is taking an active part in ensuring innovative ways and means together with technologies that can secure the peacekeepers and empower the implementation of UN global peacekeeping operations.

Conclusion

UN peacekeeping have in many instances proven to be effective in assisting host countries to navigate the course from conflict to accomplishing peace. India's engagement in UN peacekeeping operations finds a special mention in bringing about innovative ways to address complex conflicts. As digital technologies are key enablers to address the challenges faced by peacekeepers, India has been taking steps to leverage diverse skills of different Indian Units and in putting ideas and programs to inform efficacious multidimensional engagement in conflicts. India is aware that technology cannot step into the shoes of the need for human presence. Keeping that in mind, India has forcefully placed the use of modern technology as an essential foundation in helping peacekeeping missions deploy and manage complex crises. In these ways New Delhi has demonstrated all the way that it is not solely a large troop contributor to UN Peace missions, where more than 200,000 Indian troops have served so far, but that it has also introduced novel strategies that can ensure UN peacekeeping remains effective and dynamic tool to help conflict ridden countries transition to peace.

Endnotes

1. See <https://www.un.org/en/site-search?query=+peacekeeping>
2. See For information on the "traditional" and "multidimensional" operations refer to the UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines - "Capstone Doctrine", Part I, Chapter 2 (2.3 and 2.4).
3. Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (known as the Brahimi Report), A/55/305, S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, para. 55.

4. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and U.N. Department of Field Support, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (known as the Capstone Doctrine), 2008, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng. Also see Ian Johnstone, "Managing Consent in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations", *International Peacekeeping* 18, no. 2 (2011): 168-182.
5. Capstone Doctrine, p. 32.
6. Performance Peacekeeping Final Report to the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/performance-peacekeeping_expert-panel-on-technology-and-innovation_report_2015.pdf
7. Innovation in UN Peacekeeping https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/performance-peacekeeping_expert-panel-on-technology-and-innovation_report_2015.pdf
8. "UN Security Council Press Statement on 2 April Attack against United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)".
9. "Press Release – A Peacekeeper Dies in Tessalit After an IED Explosion", United Nations Peacekeeping–MINUSMA, 2 October 2021.
10. "Data-Fatalities", United Nations Peacekeeping.
11. "One blue helmet lost is 'one too many': UN peacekeeping chief", <https://www.un.org/en/delegate/one-blue-helmet-lost-%E2%80%98one-too-many%E2%80%99-un-peacekeeping-chief>
12. Some of these peacekeeping missions where India has played a constructive role are MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo and UNMISS in South Sudan. UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, UNTAC in Cambodia, ONUSAL in El Salvador, ONUMOZ in Mozambique, UNOSOM in Somalia, UNAVEM in Angola, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, UNMEE in Ethiopia-Eritrea, UNMIT in East Timor etc.
13. 'Uniformed Personnel Contributing Countries by Ranking', United Nations Peacekeeping, 31 December 2021, available at https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/o2_country_ranking_45_dec_2021.pdf, accessed on 25 February 2022
14. Some of these peacekeeping missions where India has played a constructive role are MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo and UNMISS in South Sudan. UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, UNTAC in Cambodia, ONUSAL in El Salvador, ONUMOZ in Mozambique, UNOSOM in Somalia, UNAVEM in Angola, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, UNMEE in Ethiopia-Eritrea, UNMIT in East Timor etc.
15. Devdiscourse News Desk, 'UN Praises India's Contribution to its Peacekeeping Mission', Devdiscourse, 6 August 2018, available at <https://www.devdiscourse.com/article/other/102165-un-praises-indiascontribution-to-its-peacekeeping-mission>, accessed on 29 July 2022.
16. Rineeta Naik, "Special Technical Course for Female Military Officers." *Asiapacific.unwomen.org*. 2015. <<http://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/news-and-events/stories/2015/03/special-technical-course-for-female-military-officers>>
17. "Statement by Ambassador R. Ravindra, Deputy Permanent Representative, Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations", Permanent Mission of India to the UN, 14 February 2022 (Accessed 9 May 2022).
18. "Under India's Presidency, UN Security Council unanimously adopts two outcome documents on peacekeeping", *The Times of India*, August 18, 2021.

19. "Resolution 2589", United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/RES/2589 (2021), August 18, 2021, pp. 1-4.
20. "Statement by the President of the Security Council", United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/PRST/2021/17, August 18, 2021, p. 2.
21. "Advanced Technology saved Lives in Attack on Kidal, Mali", UN Permanent Missions, 29 June 2017.
22. "Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping", United Nations Peacekeeping, 15 August 2021.
23. "Secretary-General Outlines Elements of Digital Transformation Strategy for Peacekeeping, at High-Level Security Council Debate", United Nations, 18 August 2021.
24. "United Nations, International Renewable Energy agency agrees to Advance Green, Host Country-Generated solutions in Peacekeeping Operations", United Nations, 15 June 2021.
25. The Strategy for Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping seeks to advance the use of technology across the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) themes, including performance, safety and security, politics, protection and peacebuilding.

References

- Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (2010). *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Annika S. Hansen (2021). Naomi Miyashita, "UN Peacekeeping Embraces the Digital World", Centre for International Peace Organizations.
- Bruno Charbonneau (2017). "Intervention in Mali: Building Peace between Peacekeeping and Counterterrorism." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 35, no. 4, pp. 415–31.
- Carvajal, Doreen (2010). "A Female Approach to Peacekeeping", *The New York Times*.
- Castellan, P. M. (2010). Human rights and peacekeeping, Suite: Peace Operation Training Institute. E. Osmancausoglu, "Challenges to United Nations peacekeeping operations in the post-cold war era", *Journal International Affairs*, 4(4), 2000, pp.3-6.
- Fetherston, (1993). A. B. Peace Research Report, Report No 31 (1993). "Towards a theory of United Nations peacekeeping", University of Bradford, West Yorkshire, UK, p.1.
- For information on the "traditional" and "multidimensional" operations refer to the UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines - "Capstone Doctrine", Part I, Chapter 2 (2.3 and 2.4).
- 'Hailed as 'role models,' all-female Indian police unit departs UN mission in Liberia', UN News Centre, Press Release, 12 February 2016.
- Hatto, R. (2014). "From peacekeeping to peacebuilding: the evolution of the role of the United Nations in peace operations", *International Review of the Red Cross*, 95(891/892), pp 495-515.
- Henry, Marsha (2013). "Peace exploitation? Interrogating Labor Hierarchies and Global Sisterhood among Indian and Uruguayan Female Peacekeepers", in Paul Amar(Ed.), *Global South to the Rescue: Emerging Humanitarian Superpowers and Globalizing Rescue Industry*, Oxon: Routledge.
- Innovation in UN Peacekeeping https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/performance-peacekeeping_expert-panel-on-technology-and-innovation_report_2015.pdf

- Kabilan Krishnasamy (2010). "A Case for India's 'Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping,'" *International Studies*, 47, 2-4, pp. 225-247.
- Lesley Pruitt, J. (2013). "All-Female Police Contingents: Feminism and the Discourse of Armed Protection." *International Peacekeeping* 20, no. 1, pp. 67-79.
- Morrison, A., Cumner, S., Park, H & Zoe, K.A. (1999). "Peacekeeping", in L. Kurtz. (ed). *Encyclopedia of violence, peace, and conflict*, London: Academic Press, pp.735-753.
- Narendra Modi, speaking at the September 2015 Leaders' Summit in New York on UN Peacekeeping said: "The foundations of the United Nations were laid by the brave soldiers on the battlefields of the Second World War. By 1945, they included 2.5 million men of the Indian Army, the largest volunteer force in history."
- Oldrich Bures (2006). "Regional Peacekeeping Operations: Complementing or Undermining the United Nations Security Council", *Global Change, Peace & Development* 18, no. 2, pp. 83-99.
- "One blue helmet lost is 'one too many': UN peacekeeping chief", <https://www.un.org/en/department/dpa/one-blue-helmet-lost-%E2%80%98one-too-many%E2%80%99-un-peacekeeping-chief>
- Osmanczyk, E. J. (2003). *Encyclopedia of the United Nations and international agreements*, London: Routledge Publications, 2003, p.1779.
- Panel on U.N. Peace Operations (2000). Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (known as the Brahimi Report), A/55/305, S/2000/809, para. 55.
- Performance Peacekeeping Final Report to the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/performance-peacekeeping_expert-panel-on-technology-and-innovation_report_2015.pdf
- "Press Release – A Peacekeeper Dies in Tessalit After an IED Explosion", United Nations Peacekeeping–MINUSMA, 2 October 2021.
- Pruitt, Lesley J (2016). *The Women in Blue Helmets*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Rajeesh kumar (2021). "Technology and Peacekeeping: Can India become a Technology-Contributing Country", IDSA Comment.
- Rineeta Naik (2015). "Special Technical Course for Female Military Officers." *Asiapacific.unwomen.org*. <<http://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/news-and-events/stories/2015/03/special-technical-course-for-female-military-officers>>
- Sahana Dharmapuri (2013). "Not Just a Numbers Game: Increasing Women's Participation in UN Peacekeeping." *Providing for Peacekeeping Paper No. 4*, International Peace Institute, July 2013. New York.
- Sandler, T. (2017). "International peacekeeping operations: burden sharing and effectiveness", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 61(9), pp. 1875-1897.
- Sharon Wiharta, Neil Melvin, and Xenia Avezov (2012). *The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations: Mapping the Emerging Landscape*, Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
- "Statement by Ambassador R. Ravindra, Deputy Permanent Representative, Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations", Permanent Mission of India to the UN, 14 February 2022 (Accessed 9 May 2022).
- Stiehm, Judith Hicks (1999). "United Nations Peacekeeping: Men's and Women's Work." In Mary K. Meyer and Elisabeth Prugl (Ed.), *Gender Politics in Global Governance*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, pp.41-57.

- “Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping”, United Nations Peacekeeping, 15 August 2021.
- “Secretary-General Outlines Elements of Digital Transformation Strategy for Peacekeeping, at High-Level Security Council Debate”, United Nations, 18 August 2021.
- The Strategy for Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping seeks to advance the use of technology across the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) themes, including performance, safety and security, politics, protection and peacebuilding.
- U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and U.N. Department of Field Support, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (known as the Capstone Doctrine), 2008, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng. Also see Ian Johnstone, “Managing Consent in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations”, *International Peacekeeping* 18, no. 2 (2011): 168-182.
- United Nations (1996). *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*. (3rd edi.). New York: United Nations, p. 3.
- “United Nations (2021). International Renewable Energy agency agree to Advance Green, Host Country-Generated solutions in Peacekeeping Operations”, United Nations.
- United Nations Charter: Preamble, Purposes and Principles Signed in San Francisco, California on June 26, 1945 <https://www.un.org/en/site-search?query=preamble+of+the+charter>
- “UN Security Council Press Statement on 2 April Attack against United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)”.
- Varun Vira (2012). “India and UN Peacekeeping: Declining Interest with Grave Implications”, *Small Wars Journal*, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/12949>.

India's G20 Presidency: Prospects for Global South

Parimita Bhuyan and Jayanta Krishna Sarmah

Abstract

The embracing of Group of 20 (G20) Presidency by India has created possibilities for India to envision itself and thereby, to emerge as the leader in the Global South. This paper is an attempt to analyze the possibility of India's leadership for the Global South and it examines India's capability to assume leadership role in the Global South with reference to historical legacy and current influence of India in the global situation. With this analysis, the paper focuses on The Voice of the Global South Summit which has been convened as part of G20 deliberations under India's leadership. On a final note, the paper highlights on the emerging possibilities and challenges that will impact on India's leadership in the Global South in the near future.

Keywords: G20, Global South, India, India's Leadership, India's Presidency, Capacity Building.

India's G20 Presidency: Prospects for Global South

The embracing of Group of 20 (G20) Presidency by India, in 2023, has opened up new avenues for the Global South in the upcoming years. The term Global South bears not only geographic connotation but also embraces historical, economic and political undertones. The international forums and academia makes usage of the term Global South to refer to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America who share the historical experiences of colonialism; gears up from their underdeveloped or developing economic condition after freedom from colonialism and finally, gains the confidence to establish their national governments. These criterions of Global South fit well to India for its location in the Asian continent; its historical experience of being a British colony; its legacy of freedom struggle leading to its independence and establishment of national governments and finally, its transition from a low growth economy towards an emerging economy. The growing consciousness of the Global South to represent itself in the international forum, particularly since 1970s, led to the establishment of platforms as New International Economic Order (NIEO);

India Brazil South Africa (IBSA); and so on. Significantly, India is a prominent member and active participant in most of these forums since their establishment. The G20 is a platform to accommodate both developed and emerging economies and therefore, countries of Global South as Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia and South Korea are given the status of equal membership as that of the developed countries. Besides, G20 is an influential forum that holds 85 per cent of world GDP, 75 per cent of international trade and two-thirds of the world's population. Therefore, G20 has economic, financial, trade-related, social, political and other influences over the non-member countries of the Global South. The embracing of G20 Presidency by India has two significations in the context of Global South:

1. The Global South is gaining prominence in the Global scenario.
2. There is a scope for India to envision itself as a leader of the Global South.

It is worth mentioning that the *leadership* that has been envisioned for India in this context is devoid of any negative connotation involving aggression or dominance. The leadership that has been envisioned with reference to G20 is positive both explicitly and implicitly. This leadership is based on the notion of opening up of new opportunities for the Global South; assisting the Global South to solve its economic and social issues and ultimately aimed at uplift of the Global South in order to bridge the gap between the Global North and the Global South.

The paper is an attempt to analyse the possibility of India's leadership for the Global South in forthcoming years. The paper proceeds in the following direction-

- An explanation of the nature of India's Leadership that has been envisioned.
- As assessment of India's Capability to shoulder leadership of the Global South
- India's G20 Presidency and *The Voice of Global South Summit*
- Challenges before India in shouldering leadership of the Global South

Nature of India's Leadership that has been envisioned:

It would be an exaggeration to comment that G20 Presidency will automatically ordain India a leadership position in the Global South. The G20 Presidency for India will at best serve as a catalyst to establish itself as a leader of the Global South; nevertheless, this needs to be supported by a strong foundation of diplomatic expertise; economic abundance and political stability. The kind of leadership that India suggests in the past and in the present globalised world order is to be understood with reference to some textual and oral evidence. Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, Indian Aerospace Scientist and Statesman who served as 11th President of India, pointed out his three visions for India- the first one is FREEDOM which is achieved

in 1947 with gaining independence; the second one is DEVELOPMENT and the third one is that India must stand up to the world [Outlook, 2022 (Excerpted from Wings of Fire by Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam)]. Kalam believed that India's capability to become a spiritual leader is to be accompanied by its material abundance in the terms of military competence and economic prosperity. Elaborating on the stages of development of a nation, Kalam made reference to Dr. Wayne W. Dyer's book *Manifest Your Destiny* where Dyer has categorised four different stages that a man is to pass through and these are- athlete stage, warrior stage, statesperson stage and spirit stage (Kalam, 2022). Kalam extended Dyer's classification to describe a nation's transition and describes the first stage of a nation as athlete stage where a nation being independent embarks on an energetic pursuit of performance (Kalam, 2022). As pointed out by him, in the second stage which is warrior stage a nation finds ways to demonstrate its superiority over others (Kalam, 2022).

In the third stage, which Kalam termed as big brother stage a nation shifts its awareness to what is important to other nations (Kalam, 2022). Finally, in the stage of self-realization, which according to Kalam is the final stage, a nation recognises its truest essence and realises that the earth is no single nation's inheritance but of all (Kalam, 2022). Kalam believed that India has the potential to achieve the final stage of self-realization (Kalam, 2002). Recognising India's potential to guide humanity, Swami Vivekananda expressed that all the soul-elevating ideas and various branches of knowledge have their roots in India. The National Education Policy 2020 (NEP, 2020) in Para 11.1 has mentioned the long tradition of holistic and multidisciplinary learning in Ancient Indian Universities as Takshashila and Nalanda (NEP, 2020) and this expresses India's longstanding hold in education and learning.

Based on these expressions, it may be suggested that India's aspiration to assume leadership role is based on its intent of benefitting the entire humanity. India is aware of the fact that the Eurocentric focus of world politics has given a peripheral status to the voice of the Global South. Besides, the glaring economic inequality between the developed Global North and developing/underdeveloped Global South is taken into account by India in various global economic platforms. In this context, India has aspired to become a leader of the Global South in order to advocate its demands in the global/international forums. The ultimate aim is to create an environment that works for the benefit of the Global South and will facilitate to bridge the gap between the Global North and Global South. India's historical legacy, its current economic growth, its influence in international forum and finally, its acceptance of G20 Presidency is to help India emerge as the voice of the Global South, which will mainstream the issues and demands of the Global South in international forums. The above analysis, clarifies that the envisioning of India's leadership for the Global South is based on certain principles:

- India's solidarity with the Global South;
- India to act as a VOICE of the Global South;
- India to act within the bounds of humanitarianism and to provide assistance for the uplift of Global South
- Absence of aggressive tendencies on the part of India to curb upon the sovereign equality of countries of Global South.

Assessing India's Capacity to assume leadership in the Global South

The understanding of the nature of *India's leadership* (that has been envisioned) is to be followed by an assessment of India's capability to shoulder leadership of the Global South.

- **Historical Legacy:** India's geo-strategic location and its historical legacy of being a democracy in ancient times are indicators of India's capability to provide leadership to the Global South. India's cultural connectivity with East and Southeast Asia as well as Middle and Central Asia is well documented by various scholars and it has been highlighted that this connectivity underscores India's centuries old role as the font of various religions and culture (Pant, 2019). There has been enough historical evidence to suggest that there is the existence of proto forms of democracy and republicanism in ancient India. As suggested by historical evidences, during the Vedic era in India the Rajan (Raja) had limited powers and the institution of kingship is controlled by three other institutions named *Sabha* (legislative body) *Samiti* (most powerful body) and *Vidhatha* (dispute settlement body). There has been evidence to suggest that women are participants in *Vidhatha* and *Sabha*, thereby, showcasing the democratic spirits of ancient Indian society and polity (Bhat, 1954). Apart from textual evidences, the inscriptions in the wall of Sundaravarada Perumal Temple near Kanchipuram confirm the practise of democracy in Uttaramerur village of South India about 1000 years ago (Subramanian, 2010). The inscription suggests the existence of written constitution; the prevalence of election to village assemblies; also describes mode of election, disqualification of candidates, tenure of elected candidates, even right to recall elected members if they fail to discharge their duties properly. Based on these evidences, Prime Minister Modi declares in the floor of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that India is the mother of all democracies (The Hindu, 2021). The cultural interconnectedness as well as prevalence of democratic institutions in ancient India (though dispersed) manifests the Indian spirit of working for the benefit of the greater humanity which is rooted in tolerance and co-operation.

- **Humanitarian Outlook:** The assuming of leadership position in the Global South by India requires a strong humanitarian outlook and in this regard mention may be made of the “Vaccine Maitri Campaign”, 2021- under which India has been supplying COVID-19 vaccines to countries across the globe. In this connection India is often hailed as “Pharmacy of the World” – by PM Modi in the inauguration of the first Global Innovation Summit of the Pharmaceuticals Sector (PIB, 2021); by Union Finance and Corporate Affairs Minister Nirmala Sitharaman (Economic Times, 2022). It has been commented that this campaign sets a great example for India's future engagement with the world where avoiding the geo-political ripples that otherwise rupture global initiatives (Chauda, 2021).

In the course of this Vaccine initiative, India's then Union Minister for Health and Family Welfare Dr. Mansukh Mandaviya interacted with ambassadors of Latin America and Caribbean nations (the GRULAC formation), in November, 2021, thereby building humanitarian ties with the countries of the Global South. During the deliberations with these countries Dr. Mandaviya stated that India is driven by the philosophy of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” and that this has inspired India to gift COVID-19 vaccines, HCQs and other medical necessities to various countries- starting from its neighbourhood and then extending to beyond Asia (PIB, 2021). The supply of vaccines beyond Asia (to countries as Egypt, South Africa, Brazil, Algeria) is a way “to establish India's regional supremacy in the global south” (Ariyawardana, 2022) and thereby, clarifying India's goodwill and strength to work for the benefit of the Global South.

- **Digitization of Indian Economy creating opportunities for the Global South:** The progress made by India in the sphere of digitization has ushered the growth of a digital economy as well as has generated reforms in the field of governance by making it efficient and transparent. These positive changes not only exhibit India's progress in the field of technology, innovation and governance; but also open up new opportunities before the countries of Global South to collaborate with India in order to empower themselves. The countries of the Global South may assume India as a role model in this regard and may strive for accessing these technologies in an affordable manner.

The adoption of the Digital India Campaign in 2015 and subsequently, the expansion of digital public goods may be considered as one significant indicator of India's capability in the field of technology and innovation. The mission of Digital India aims to work at three critical areas: digital infrastructure as a utility to every citizen; governance and services on demand and finally, digital empowerment of citizens (Lok Sabha Secretariat, 2017). The thrust areas or pillars of Digital India

programme are identified as: broadband highways for all rural, all urban and National Information Infrastructure; universal access to mobile connectivity; public internet service programme; e-Kranti; IT for Jobs; Early Harvest Programme and so on (Lok Sabha Secretariat, 2017). The Digital Revolution in India is marked by achievements as: Aadhar; Digi Locker; My Gov; Bharat Net; Smart Cities; Common Service Centres; Digitization of Post offices and many others. The increasing digitization in various sectors of Indian economy has given rise to the concept of Digital Economy in India.

The ensuring of digital connectivity to rural areas and the establishment of Common Service Centres in Panchayats has led to the concept of Digi Gaons or digital villages. The growth of digital health care services; the provision for digital education; the popularity of e-commerce and Consumer Internet Sector; FINTECH sector and others constitute significant components of India's digital economy. The digital services are exhibited and conceptualised as steps for promoting good governance (Tiwari, 2018; and others): MYGOV app giving opportunity to citizens to express their opinions; SWAYAM portal for Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs); Bharat Interface for Money (BHIM) app using UPI enabling instant payments; Aarogya Setu App to provide updates regarding COVID pandemic and so on.

The digitization of the Indian economy and the reforms in governance has encouraged Indian Prime Minister to envision in 2019 that India would become a five trillion-dollar economy by 2024-25. In the same line, India's Economic Advisor (CEA) V. Anantha Nageswaran in 2023 has remarked that India has the potential to grow at 6.5-7 per cent and will become a USD 5 trillion by 2025-26 and USD 7 trillion by 2030 depending on exchange rate fluctuation (Economic Times, 2023). According to IMF projections, India has managed to overtake United Kingdom to become the world's fifth largest economy and it is now only behind United States, China, Japan and Germany. The trajectory of economic growth in India proves its capability to become a leader of Global South.

Precisely, India has gained the capacity to project itself as a significant power in the field of technology and innovation in the Global South. The countries of the Global South may utilise India's achievements as an opportunity to empower themselves digitally and this claim may be supported by instances where India has shared its technology for the benefit of LDCs and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). The International Solar Alliance (ISA), for instance, which is a joint effort by India and France, aims at development and deployment of "cost-effective and transformational energy solutions supported by the sun to help member countries develop low-carbon growth trajectories", with particular focus on delivering impact in LDCs and SIDS. The progress of India in the field of digital technology along with its approach of cordiality and assistance to countries of the Global South reaffirms India's capability to become a leader of the Global South.

Voice of Global South Summit: Issues and Concerns

The conceptualisation of India's leadership for the Global South in the context of G20 invites an analysis of the Voice of the Global South Summit which India has hosted virtually with 123 countries of the Global South. The rationale behind the analysis of the summit is based on the following points:

1. Even though the Summit ensured the participation of large number of countries outside the G20 ambit, it has been considered as first big leadership-level G20 event (The Hindu, 2023), as it was held by India during its continuation of the G20 Presidency.
2. The holding of G20 Presidency provided India the required stimulus to bring the countries of the Global South into one platform for the first time.
3. It has been reiterated by the Government of India that consultation with members of the Global South (along with G20 countries) is required in order to shape a positive G20 agenda (Press Information Bureau, Delhi, 13 January 2023). The Voice of Global South Summit is one of a kind to provide a platform for the countries of the Global South to come together and to grab international attention towards the "priorities, perspectives and concerns of the developing world" (High Commission of India, 2023). With exchange of ideas among countries of Global South, this Summit sensitized India to incorporate the concerns of the Global South in deliberations of G20 for the year 2023.

Precisely, an understanding of India's leadership for the Global South in the context of India's G20 Presidency invites a study on the Voice of Global South Summit as the summit is a significant event held during India's G20 Presidency to bring forward the voice of the Global South. The paper would like to point out how the Voice of Global South Summit has worked towards the promotion of India's leadership for the Global South:

- **A Platform for Countries outside the G20 ambit:** The Voice of Global South Summit ensured the participation of those countries of the Global South which are not members of G20 as Bangladesh, Cambodia, Mongolia, Thailand, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Chad, Sudan, Algeria and many others. India has given them an opportunity to come together to share their concerns and priorities before India as well as assured them that India will incorporate these concerns within the agenda of the G20 during its Presidency. The Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina, for instance, stressed on six priority areas in the Voice of Global South Summit which are directed towards dealing with the vulnerability of Least Developed Nations (LDCs). There has been stress on developing a new paradigm to

address inequalities in line with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); a call for special financial support for LDCs and climate vulnerable countries; an urge for binding the digital divide to ensure equal opportunities for all and so on (DD News, 2023). Out of the total ten sessions, in seven sessions of Ministers' (Ministers' Sessions on Finance, Energy, Environment, Foreign Affairs, Education, Health and Commerce/Trade) the countries of the Global South exchanged ideas on the concerns of the Global South and in the Foreign Ministers' Session on G20, India's External Affairs Minister assured that the valuable inputs in the Global South summit will receive "due cognizance globally, including in G20" (High Commission of India, 2023). The Global South Summit invited exchange of ideas to understand the vulnerability of the Global South and with this India promised to place the concerns of the Global South before the international community.

- **Human Centric Globalisation and Reforms in International Institutions in the interest of Global South:** The PM of India, during the inaugural session of the Voice of Global South Summit, themed "Voice of the Global South for Human-centric Globalisation", overtly projected India's goal of amplifying the voice of the Global South (PIB, 2023). As stated by PM Modi, the solution to the problems of the Global South requires Human-centric Globalisation or Human-centric Development where the Global South is endowed with the capacity to shape the emerging order (PIB, 2023). In this context, Indian PM suggested reforms in the international institutions, including United Nations Organisation and Bretton Woods System and thereby, urged to make them relevant to the interest of the Global South (PIB, 2023). The need for institutional reforms to represent the voice of the Global South is further extended by India's EAM through the use of vocabularies as "More Multi Polarity" and "Reformed Multilateralism" - in the Foreign Minister's Session on G20, of the summit (MEA, 2023). The emphasis laid by India on shaping of the world order in the interest of the Global South through institutional reforms-reflects India's engagement with the problems, perspectives and experiences of the Global South. The nature of multilateralism conceptualised in the Voice of Global South Summit is based on the following considerations:
- **Well-being of Human Family, with critical focus on the Vulnerable:** The new globalisation paradigm that has been envisioned during the course of the summit aims at well-being of the entire humankind with critical focus on vulnerable population (MEA, 2023). This philosophy has been reaffirmed in the concluding session of the Voice of Global South Summit that has been themed as "Unity of Voice, and Unity of Purpose":

thereby, inviting collective endeavours to deal with the problems of humankind as a whole and developing countries in particular.

- **Common But Differentiated Responsibilities:** The principle of Common but differentiated responsibilities received a new impetus in the inaugural session of the Voice of Global South Summit where PM Modi stated that this principle applies to all global challenges (PIB, 2023). The principle was again been mentioned in the Environment Ministers' Session of the summit (MEA, 2023) where it has been reaffirmed that climate action involves a common concern of the humankind; however, the developed countries responsibility is prominent in the context of historical reasons.
- **Diversification and Localization:** The Voice of Global South Summit aimed at overcoming the dangers of over centralised globalisation and unreliable supply chains through greater "diversification and localisation of capabilities" (MEA, 2023).
- **International Cooperation:** The emphasis on concerted collective action and international cooperation for achieving SDGs, food and energy security along with addressing terrorism (MEA, 2023) are significant pointers in the conceptualism of multilateralism as proposed in the Voice of Global South Summit. At the same session emphasis is laid on international cooperation and multi stakeholder approach for data related activities, innovation and technology- specifically in the interest of the Global South (MEA, 2023).
- **Green Development Model:** The Reformed Multilateralism as proposed in the Voice of the Global South summit envisions green development all over the world through investment in sustainable lifestyles, leveraging green hydrogen for climate action and accelerating progress in SDGs (MEA, 2023). Precisely, the proposed reform multilateralism stands for unified action for the benefit of the entire humanity; nevertheless aims at evolving institutional mechanisms to specifically address the issues of the Global South. This reformed multilateralism believes that in order to make globalisation beneficial for all, special attention need to be given to the concerns of the LDCs, Environmentally Vulnerable Countries and Heavily Indebted Countries. The hosting of the summit by India reflects India's endeavours to serve as a bridge between the developed and developing/underdeveloped/Least Developed countries: so as to endorse their voice in international.
- **Sharing India's Expertise and Capacity Building of countries of Global South:** The Voice of the Global South Summit provided an opportunity for India to express its willingness to make technology and

innovation affordable and accessible for all. The Finance Minister's Session, themed "Financing People Centric Development" and led by India's Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, reaffirmed that "India's Development Cooperation projects are becoming role models for knowledge sharing and capacity building for countries of the Global South" (MEA, 2023). With reference to the problems affecting the development of Global South, the Finance Minister emphasised on building "common understanding" on common issues of Global South through this summit and to incorporate them in relevant G20 discussions (MEA, 2023). In the same line of thinking, India's EAM, in the Foreign Ministers' Session of the summit, emphasised on "Global South led innovations for societal transformation" as well as on "development cooperation": that India's achievements in technology and development should be utilised to benefit the entire Global South (MEA, 2023). Similarly, collaboration with the countries of the Global South in the field of knowledge sharing and education is emphasised in the deliberations of the Global Voice of the South Summit. In this connection reference may be made to the Education Ministers' Session, themed "Human Resource Development and Capacity Building", where emphasis is placed on Educational Exchange Programmes and establishing Joint Working Groups with partner countries of India (EAM, 2023).

The realisation that joint initiatives among countries of Global South are indispensable to forward the voice of the Global South- inspired India's PM to announce a number of new initiatives in the Concluding Leaders' Session of the summit. Reference may be made to New Aarogya Maitri that aims at supply of essential medical products to any developing country affected by natural disaster or humanitarian crisis; Global South Centres of Excellence that will undertake research centred on Global South; Global South Young Diplomats Forum to connect youthful officers to our foreign ministries; Global South Scholarship to students of developing countries so that they may pursue higher education in India and so on (Sansad TV, 2023). Precisely, India has fully utilised the platform of the summit to project its expertise in multiple fields- digitization, innovation, healthcare, education, financial inclusion, good governance and so on- and thereby, expresses its willingness to share its expertise for capability building of the countries of the Global South. The summit provided India an opportunity to not only project itself as a key stakeholder in Global South Affairs; but also the one who has always forwarded the voice of the Global South before the developed nations.

Challenges before India in shouldering leadership of the Global South

The holding of G20 Presidency by India is a catalyst to establish its leadership for the Global South; nevertheless, India has faced various constraints in the way of establishing its leadership:

- India's lack of permanent membership in the Security Council stands as an impediment to establish its leadership in the Global South.
- The non-participation of Pakistan signals that the hostility between India and Pakistan stands unresolved and this may serve as an impediment for India to claim its leadership in the Global South.
- The continued tussle between China and Russia for leadership of the Global South (Shin, 2023) is verified with non-participation of China in the Voice of Global South Summit. Added to this adversity is China's debt-trap diplomacy which is evident in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Besides, China's abhorrence to a rule based order- as reflected in its aggression in the South China Sea that undermines the sovereign rights of Southeast Asian Coastal States, challenges India's shouldering of leadership of the countries of the Global South.
- The reformed Multilateralism that has been proposed in the course of the Voice of Global South Summit aims at the reforming of important international institutions including the UNO. This reform is oriented towards the benefit of humankind along with critical focus on dealing with the vulnerabilities of the Global South. However, the practice of China to challenge global norms as well as the alienation of Pakistan and Afghanistan from the summit (including China) creates constraints in building consensus for reformed multilateralism. In this backdrop, it becomes difficult for India to generate shared understanding regarding the concerns of global south in the G20 deliberations.
- The past initiatives that targeted at the restructuring of the global order so as to meet the vulnerabilities of the Global South as- NIEO, BRICS, South-South Cooperation and so on; has failed to achieve their desired goal. These initiatives, such as BRICS, claimed to be forum of multilateralism; nevertheless, they have been relegated to the status of 'Mini-Laterals'- with issue-based focus (Pant, 2023); rather than pursuing any robust agenda restructuring global institutions in the interest of the Global South. Therefore, it is a challenge before India to undertake a robust agenda in G20 deliberations that will meet the concerns of the Global South.

The envisioning of India's leadership for the Global South in the context of India's G20 presidency surrounded by both prospects and challenges; and therefore,

pursuing of the goal requires not only capability-building on the part of India but also generating consensus among countries of the Global South to shoulder this responsibility to India.

References

- Ariyawardana, N. (2022). "India's Vaccine Diplomacy and Changing Geopolitics in the Global South", *Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Review*, Vol. 7, No. 3
- Bhat, J. N. (1954). "Ancient Indian Democracies/ LES DEMOCRATIES ANCIENNES DE L'INDE", *Civilisations*, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 51-59 (<http://www.jstor.org/stable/41377595>)
- Chauda (2021). Diplomacy in difficult times: India's "Vaccine Maitri" Initiative", 31st March, 2021 (www.investindia.gov.in)
- DD India (2023). Addressing Concerns & Priorities of Global South through G20, 12 January, 2023
- GoI (2020). National Education Policy 2020, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India
- High Commission of India, Canberra, Australia (2023). Summary of Deliberations: Voice of Global South Summit 2023 (January 12-13, 2023), Press Releases. (www.hcic Canberra.gov.in) (accessed on 27/3/2023)
- <https://isolaralliance.org> (accessed on 28/3/2023)
- <https://m.economictimes.com/industry/healthcare/biotech/pharmaceuticals/india-recognised-as-pharmacy-of-the-world-fm-nirmala-sitharaman/articleshow/964844228> (accessed on 05/03/2023)
- <https://m.economictimes.com/news/economy/finance/india-to-be-usd-5-trillion-economy-by-fy2026-cea-anantha-nageswaran/articleshow/97500680.cms> (accessed on 19/03/2023)
- <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaselframePage.aspx?PRID=1775120> (25 Nov. 2023) (accessed on 5/03/2023)
- <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1772949> (18 Nov. 2021) (accessed on 23/03/2023)
- <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1891153> (13 JAN, 2023) (accessed on 03/03/2023)
- <https://www.india.gov.in/spotlight/group-twenty-g20> (accessed on 20/03/2023)
- <https://www.vifindia.org/article/2018/january/12/swami-vivekananda-message-for-the-21-st-century-india> (accessed on 20/3/2023)
- Kalam, A.P.J. Abdul (2002). *Ignited Minds: Unleashing the Power within India*, Penguin Random House India
- Lok Sabha Secretariat (2017). *DIGITAL INDIA: Power to Empower*, Information Bulletin, Research and Information Division, Lok Sabha Secretariat, February 2017
- Ministry of External Affairs (2023). EAM's Remarks: Foreign Ministers' Session of #VoiceOfGlobalSouth Summit, January 12, 2023
- Ministry of External Affairs (2023). EAM's Remarks: Foreign Ministers' Session on G20 of #VoiceofGlobalSouth Summit, January 13, 2023
- Ministry of External Affairs (2023). Remarks by Environment Minister at #VoiceOfGlobalSouth Summit, 12 January 2023.

- Ministry of External Affairs (2023). Remarks by Finance Minister at Finance Ministers' Session, #VoiceofGlobalSouth Summit, January 12, 2023
- Outlook (2002). "Three Visions For India", *Outlook (Excerpted from Wings of Fire by Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam)* (<https://www.outlookindia.com/wbsite/story/three-visions-for-india/215962>)
- Pant, H.V. (2019). *Indian Foreign Policy: The Modi Era*, New Delhi: HAR-ANAND Publications Pvt Ltd
- Pant, H.V. (2021). delivering comments in "The Big Picture: Multilateral Institutions-Needs for reforms", in Sansad TV, 2 January, 2023 (<https://youtu.be/3-2yKsKhQgY>; accessed on 7/4/2023)
- Press Information Bureau India (2023). PM Modi remarks at opening session of Voice of Global South Summit, PIB Delhi, 12 January, 2023 (<https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaselframePage.aspx?PRID=1890607>) (accessed on 01/03/2023)
- Sansad Television (2023). PM Modi Address / Voice of Global South Summit, 13 January, 2023
- Shin, K. (2023). "China, India and the Fight for Global South Leadership", THE DIPLOMAT (<https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/china-india-and-the-fight-for-global-south-leadership/>; accessed on 10/4/2023)
- The Hindu (2010). "Uttaramerur model of democracy", by Subramanian, T. S., The Hindu, 13th March, 2010(<https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/Uttaramerur-model-of-democracy/article16566830.ece>, accessed on 10/03/2023)
- The Hindu (2021). "India is the mother of all democracies, says Modi at U. N. General Assembly" by Suhasini Haidar, The Hindu, 25 September, 2021 (www.thehindu.com/news/national/prime-minister-narendra-modi-addresses-the-76th-session-of-united-nations-general-assembly-in-new-york/article36668955.ece) (accessed on 21/3/2023)
- The Hindu (2023). "Leading from the front: On Voice of the Global South Summit and G20 Presidency", Editorial, The Hindu, 17 January, 2023 (<https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/leading-from-the-front-on-voice-of-the-global-south-summit-and-g20-presidency/article66383211.ece>) (accessed on 12/3/2023)
- Tiwari, A. (2018). "Good Governance and Digital India", International Journal of Advance Research, Ideas and Innovations in Technology.

India and Thailand: An Evaluation of Bilateral Ties Through the Soft Power Lens

P.C. Prasanna Kumar and Manisha Devi. A

Abstract

Since ancient times, India and Thailand have had a close association. Trade was the foundation of this relationship, while Indian culture and religion came afterward. Indian influences continue to meld with local ideas and culture in Thailand. No direct hard power from India was deployed against Thailand. Indian relations with Thailand were instead established via the application of soft power. The history of relations between India and Thailand since ancient times is briefly covered in this paper, along with the depiction of the influences of Indian socio-religious-cultural resources and India-Thailand-related policies that have helped both the nations build a cordial relationship based on Joseph Nye's soft power concept. Most importantly the soft power approach has been accepted as a methodology by a few big nations for augmenting bilateral relations.

Keywords: India, Thailand, Soft Power Assets, Religion, Art, Tourism, Foreign Relations.

Introduction

India's foreign policy is currently centred around the practical strategy of improving relations with neighbouring countries in South Asia, as well as engaging the extended neighbourhood in Southeast Asia along with keeping on effective diplomatic relations with the major global powers. India has always been changing its foreign policy perspectives tremendously according to international environment but it has always been framed keeping in mind our national interest and our relations with the nations of the world. (ShanteshKumar Singh, 2017). The methodology may have changed over the years with increased focus on multi-level engagement in world politics getting positive support from big powers. A notable aspect is that the concept of security is now broadening to encompass issues such as national development and economic interdependency, environmental protection and the promotion of democracy and human rights (Arya, 2017). The present paper is an

attempt to examine and analyse the impact of soft power approach in the relations between India and Thailand. The methodology adopted for making this study is historical and analytical in nature by following qualitative approach.

There has long been a connection between India and Thailand. If we look at the geographic specificities of India we can see that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands share a maritime border with Thailand along the Andaman Sea. Religious, cultural, linguistic and economic links have existed for almost two centuries and trade played a significant role in those relationships (Roychowdhury, 2022). The historical as well as long-standing social and cultural exchanges and significant people-to-people contacts between India and Thailand constitute the foundation of their bilateral relations. Trade has historically had a crucial impact on how Indian culture migrated to Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand. Even now, the unique friendship of both countries has been carefully preserved and handed down over the decades. India and Thailand have long had significant civilizational links which were really strengthened by soft power relations. Since India's independence in 1947, there have been diplomatic ties between India and Thailand. A striking testament to the many similarities between India and Thailand is the civilizational basis that has sustained bilateral relations for so long. The 'Act East Policy' of New Delhi and the 'Look West Policy' of Bangkok have been brought together by these ties, which have acted as concrete amplifiers of cultural and public diplomacy. In short, the past two decades have witnessed growing warmth, increasing economic and commercial links, exchange of high-level visits on both sides, and the signing of a large number of Agreements leading to a further intensification of relations (Trivedi, 2018).

Major Soft Power Assets That Bind Indo-Thai Relations:

Soft power interactions have historically strengthened the strong cultural links between India and Thailand. India was able to connect with Thailand and the ASEAN community with the help of soft power, and as these ties age and gain more significance, they will only grow stronger. This vital objective can only be accomplished through strong soft power ties, which will draw Thailand and India closer together in the economically robust Indo-Pacific region. Elements that affect a state's soft power include its cultural traditions, ideology, religious beliefs, national values, infrastructure development etc. The resources that, in terms of soft power, link India and Thailand are given below.

- **Religious and Cultural influence:** Thailand earlier known as Suvarnabhumi as mentioned in classical Sanskrit and Pali manuscripts from India, implies that the region was attracted by a large number of Indian traders. Gold trade, as well as trade in fragrant wood and spices, is known to have thrived. The Indian traders were required to approach the local Thai

lords with rewards and pleased, which further increased the former's interest in Indian culture. The religion, culture, traditions, and philosophy of India were carried to Southeast Asia by Indian traders, especially to Thailand (Singh, 2022). Along with them were Brahmin priests, Buddhist monks, scholars, and adventurers.

In addition to Buddhism, Thailand officially recognises four other religions: Islam, Hinduism, Christianity and Sikhism (2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Thailand, 2018). About 93% of the population practices Theravada Buddhism, which has a significant impact on Thai society and culture (ibid). Though Buddhism under King Ashoka of the Maurya Dynasty evolved and spread with the help of his disciples, it is believed that this religious practice originated in Bihar, India. And hence King Asoka became the first person to employ soft power to disseminate the faith across the Suvarnabhumi region. All Thai kings after King Rama Khamheng of the Sukhothai Kingdom were compelled to practice Theravada Buddhism, which is the form of Buddhism that predominates in Thailand today. As a result, one of the principal foundations for the strongest ties between the two countries is Buddhism. Together, Buddhism and Hinduism brought their respective cultures, languages, rituals, and literature to Thailand.

Many Indians especially Hindu Brahmins relocated to Siam during the end of Dvaravati reign and imparted their knowledge, particularly Brahmanism, to the local Thai population. Some of them even married Thai women and worked for the Thai royal families (ibid). During the Sukhothai era, the royals supported Brahmanism and established diplomatic relations with India. At the beginning of the Ayutthaya period, King Uthong decided to hold a Brahmanical coronation rite to commemorate his accession to the throne. Later, Indian culture, language and traditions merged with Thai religious beliefs and Indian Brahmins were invited to Thailand to perform ceremonies and rituals, especially in the royal families. Even in the contemporary period, during the coronation of kings, Thailand continues to include Brahmanical rituals performed by Indian Brahmins (Ramabadran, 2019). The Royal Brahmins are still in charge of assisting the royal family with other state rites like weddings and burials (ibid). This also involves the ceremonial royal ploughing that was done to guarantee an excellent harvest.

Hinduism and Buddhism coexisted and had a significant impact on Thailand. Several Thai kings adopted the title Rama starting in the 13th century; it is now passed down through the current dynasty. Hindu influences can also be seen in Thailand's literature, arts, sculpture and architecture. Along with the well-known Brahminical deities Ganesha, Brahma,

Vishnu, and Shiva, Thailand also has deities that are virtually absent from the socioreligious landscape of India. Cultural Cooperation: India and Thailand often host Indian cultural troupes, festivals, and events as part of a robust cultural exchange programme. An Indian Cultural Centre, presently known as the Swami Vivekananda Culture Centre, was established in Bangkok in 2009. Sri Guru Nanak Dev Ji's 550th birthday was also commemorated in Thailand with a number of festivities and a large Nagar Kirtan procession in Bangkok. The Thai version of the Indian Constitution was published in Thailand.

- **Language and literature:** Tamil-language inscriptions discovered in Nakhon Si Thammarat demonstrate a connection between the Thai peninsula and the Chola ruler. In 1568 C.E., it is thought that King Rajendra Chola I raided the Thai peninsula and camped his army around what is now known as Phuket Island. He gave the island the name "ManigGhram," which is taken from the Sanskrit word "nagara" in Tamil and Sanskrit, respectively. It was a South Indian colony, that had constructed their own temple and tanks, and lived independently. Words with major Sanskrit, Pali, and Dravidian roots are found in Thai language. The script used to write Thai is based on the Pallava alphabet of Southern India (ibid). Important Indian literary classics like Shakuntala, Hitopadesha, Tagore, and Gandhi's works have been translated into Thai.

The Hindu epic Ramayana had a significant influence on the Thai lore of Ramakien, which provided the basis for the traditional dances of Khon and Lakhon. Songkran and Loy Krathong in Thailand are inspired by the Hindu festivities of Holi and Diwali (Jamir, 2018). Similar sociocultural customs and holidays are observed by people in Thailand and India. The name of the Indian city of Ayodhya, where Ram was born, inspired the name of the old capital of Thailand, Ayutthaya (Nepali Times, 2021). Many Thai streets with Indian deities' names may be found all around the nation and the Thai Royal Emblem features a picture of Garuda, the vehicle of Lord Vishnu (Phra Narai) (ibid). A Thai monk, Buddhadasa Bhiku once commented: "There is a combination of Indian flesh and blood in ours. We unconsciously have Hinduism as our mother and Buddhism as our father...we are Thai today because Indians brought traditions, customs, culture, including Buddhism, to us. We should thank India." (Champathong, 2012) (Srichampa, 2015) As a result, both countries promote the principles of global peace, humanism, and fraternity while also upholding the ideals of Buddhism and the Ramayana.

- **Art and architecture:** Hinduism has impacted certain Thai art and architecture that may be found in Buddhist temples and stupas. The epic

Ramayana was a major inspiration for one of the magnificent mural paintings on the balcony of the Emerald Buddha at the Grand Palace (Srichampa, 2015). A few Thai stupas were also influenced by other Indian architectural styles, particularly the Sanchi stupa's "bell shape," which was altered and built to resemble Thai Chedis like the "PhraPrathom chedi" in Nakhonpathom (ibid). *Beginning in the third century A.D.*, Indian Brahmanas immigrated to southern Thailand. Brahmanism had a tiny number of adherents, yet both the monarch and the subjects were offered their services. The people of the Dvaravati Kingdom, which was headquartered in the central region of Thailand, were Mons.

According to some historians, Mons were immigrants from the northern Andra Pradesh and southern Orissa regions of India (Mishra, 2010). When there was war in India during the reign of the Great King Ashoka, people migrated to Siam and taught the locals about their knowledge, especially Brahmanism. The rulers incorporated Brahmanism and built diplomatic ties with India, during the Sukhothai period. King Uthong made the decision to hold a Brahmanical coronation rite at the start of the Ayutthaya period to mark his ascension to the throne (Hussein, 1982). Also, the names of the Ayutthayan monarchs, such as Uthong, Ramesuan and Indrajaya were used to identify them as reincarnations of the Hindu deities Vishnu and Siva. They were called *Ramathibodi*, Rama Isvara and Indra-Raja respectively (ibid).

- **Political development:** Out of a diversity of people with a common language, Pali and Sanskrit, the Indian kingship system helped unite Thailand with a common administration system. With the rise of the strong and effective Indian civilization shortly after the fall of the Dvaravati empire, people who had been living in separate and disjointed communities prior to that time began to create a collective group to form a kingdom with a robust administrative system. The Devraj ideology, which originated in India, was transferred to Thailand by King Jayavarman of the Angkor Dynasty in 802 C.E. (ibid). The Devraj concept, is believed to provide the king with supreme power. Thailand acquired Indian culture between 802 C.E. and 1431 C.E. when the Khmer Empire was at its height (ibid). The rulers maintained the Buddhist Dharmaraja of the Sukhothai Period while also adhering to the Devraj doctrine during the Ayutthaya period. Even today, the Devraj system is continued. A legal system based on the Indian Dharmasastra was established by King Ramathibodi I of the Ayutthaya period through Mons, the ethnic people of South East Asia (Srichampa, 2015). In Ayutthaya, methods of testifying were adapted from India and

blended with Thai jury groups; the Thai nobles and the royal court juries.

It is also interesting to note that the Thai royal family has never permitted one of their rituals to be performed without the participation of Indian Brahmins or priests who are familiar with Tamil and Sanskrit hymnology (Ramabadran, 2019). The former Consul-General of the Royal Thai Consulate-General in Chennai, Krongkanit Rakcharoen, stated that Thai priests had been taught Sanskrit and Tamil hymns, such as Thiruppavai and Thiruvempavai. These songs eventually become a prominent part of Thai rites (ibid). It is believed that in premodern times, Brahmins served as administrators in the Thai Royal Courts. Brahmins, who work as government employees for the Bureau of the Royal Household, carry out their religious rites in Devasthan (Brahmin Shrine). With the consent of the Thai government, Indian Brahmins are invited to Thailand to carry out rites in Hindu temples.

- **Education and Yoga:** Throughout history, India has always supported Thailand's growth of its human resources. Additionally, there are numerous other academic partnerships between India and Thailand in numerous sectors, as well as Indian students studying in Thai colleges. The Indian government has also been offering numerous scholarship programs for Thai students in the modern era including the ICCR Scholarship, Ayush Scholarship Program, the Mekong Ganga Cooperation Scholarship Program etc.) The 8th International Day of Yoga was observed in 2022 on the campus of Srinakharinwirot University in Bangkok on June 19. At the group yoga session, more than 600 yoga practitioners from different backgrounds took part. The event's chief guest was Mr. Chadchart Sittipunt, the Governor of Bangkok. As part of 'The Guardian Ring for Yoga,' another significant yoga event was organised at Wat Mahathat Historical Site in Ayutthaya on June 21, 2022. (Embassy of India, n.d.)
- **Tourism:** One of the most effective strategies for governments to generate income is tourism. Many Thai people often make pilgrimages to sites of Buddhist importance in India -the Four Holy Buddhist Sites of Lumbini, Bodh Gaya, Sarnath, and Kushinagar which reflect the shared connection to Buddhism. Her Royal Highness Princess Mahachakri Sirindhorn's visit to Bodh Gaya and other important visitors also influenced later trends among Thai Buddhists, who started undertaking yearly pilgrimages to these Four Holy Sites of Buddhism in India. (Hazarika, 2022) For the Ganesha Chaturthi event, numerous Ganesha worshippers from Thailand used to visit Mumbai each year. Similarly, Thailand is the perfect tourist destination for Indians due to its cost-effectiveness and geographical closeness.

Additionally, the option for Indians to apply for visas on arrival and better immigration procedures have helped contribute to the growth in tourism.

- **Economic and Commercial Relations:** The rise of globalisation has made it easier for both nations to understand and recognise their shared prehistoric and cultural heritage. After that, contemporary India and Thailand began to connect economically and culturally, establishing what is known in the political context as “Soft power.” The transport infrastructure played a significant role in the easing of international politics prior to the internet’s role in bringing people or nations closer in the modern era. In India, particularly in the south and west, some Thai companies have made investments, most notably Chareon Prokphand Foods and Gikiyu Hotels Ltd. The major Indian business groups, which are largely made up of Sikh people, have established themselves in Phahurat, Bangkok, thanks to commercial opportunities in Thailand.

After Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, Thailand is India’s fifth-largest trading partner in the ASEAN bloc. Thai commodities currently enjoy tax reductions under the ASEAN-India FTA in commodities, which went into force in January 2010. As a significant boost and inspiration to bilateral security cooperation the Extradition Treaty was signed in May 2013. Surprisingly, in 2018, Thailand exported \$7.60 billion worth of goods to India, while India exported \$4.86 billion worth of goods to Thailand. It may also be noted that despite the Covid-19 pandemic scenario, bilateral commerce in 2019 was worth USD 12.12 billion and reached USD 9.76 billion in 2020. Again in 2021–2022, the bilateral trade between two countries reached at the higher level of 15 billion USD.

- **Foreign Relations:** Soon after India’s independence from Britain in 1947, diplomatic ties between the two countries were established. It is notable that these two countries have not only upheld their long-standing connections but have also turned them into an important and powerful partnership on the global arena across a wide variety of policy problems. Since India and Thailand had close ties to both the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War, along with internal political radicalism and political unrest in Thailand, the relations between the two nations were put on hold. However, a paradigm changed as a result of India’s non-alignment with either of the two power blocs and the positive relationships it had with the ASEAN nations, pushing Thailand to begin interacting with India more as well. In the years following the Cold War, both nations have come to agree that their bilateral relationship is important and requires ongoing care. This is glaringly clear in light of the fact that both parties have

continued to have frequent high-level visits and conversations. With the introduction of the Look East Policy in 1992, India revised its foreign policy in terms of politics, security, and socioeconomics after the end of the Cold War in order to strengthen ties and cooperate with the East and South East Asian region (ibid). Thailand came up with a Look West policy in 1996 that included numerous cooperative initiatives in the areas of science and technology, tourism, religion, education, culture, agriculture, and trade. These initiatives were created for the benefit of both parties. Additionally, there are several high-level exchanges and visits from both countries, as well as the signing of agreements.

One of the most important and potent players in Asia is thought to be India. As a result, it works alongside Thailand in organisations at the regional and sub-regional levels, such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the East Asia Summit, the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC), the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, etc. In order to connect South and Southeast Asia and to ensure peace and stability in the region, they all include India as a crucial partner. The development of the maritime and aviation transport industries, as well as linking Thailand's road network to its neighbours, are given top importance in Thailand's infrastructure plan (2015-2022). Since both nations have prioritised connectivity, they are currently improving regional connectivity by cooperating closely on initiatives like the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (IMTTH), the Asian Highway Network under UNESCAP, and BTILS under the BIMSTEC framework. *This would expand land connectivity through Northeast India and Southeast Asia, by becoming the first-ever cross border facilitation agreement between South and Southeast Asia.* Besides, there could be seamless connectivity for the movement of products and services which would in turn permit the growth of trade and commerce in both countries.

Through their shared language, culture, and holidays, the Indian Diaspora in Thailand strengthens bonds between these two nations. Over 25,000 NRIs, the most of whom live in Bangkok, are among the estimated 250,000 persons of Indian descent in Thailand as a whole. Tamils, Malayalis, Gujaratis, Parsees, Gujarati Marwaris, and Sindhis make up the majority of the population, along with Hindus from Punjab, Gorakhpuris, Namdhari and other Sikh sects, Gujaratis, and Parsees, Gujarati Marwaris, and Gujaratis (Embassy of India, n.d.). Other linguistic and geographic groups are also significantly represented. They play a crucial role in fostering deeper tie. In 2019, approximately 1.9 million Indian tourists visited Thailand, while around 160,000 Thai tourists visited India mainly to the Buddhist pilgrim sites.

As far as India is concerned, ensuring economic growth, and building a sustainable economic basis that includes all sections of Indian society remains

salient. The soft power approach of India to strengthen the ties with any other nation might be evaluated with the opportunities and possibilities that are opened regionally and globally. When we connect the country's attempts to become a global power, multi-level capacity building is inevitable. Being a rising power military modernisation and refurbishment are also very important for enhancing the capabilities for the realisation of the strategic goals. While IR theory privileges hard power measures of rising powers, the sources of India's power lie in three distinct non-military mechanisms, which shape the kind of accommodation, Indian rulers seek: a) geo-economic and economic growth; b) public expectations and people-to-people contacts; and c) expansion and demand side effects (Paul, 2016). States in the international system are relationally and temporarily interdependent in many contexts. Moreover, states engage in a process of observational and experiential learning, in which they observe the extra-dyadic reputation and recall their dyadic historical interactions (Crescenzi, 2018). This learning process has real effects which demonstrate the utility of incorporating relational and time specific information in to models of interstate behaviour. The commitments of India and Thailand in their interactions provide a model of emulation in the line of peaceful and consistent friendship channelised through the prism of soft power approach.

Conclusion

Thailand serves as a hub for connectivity both within the ASEAN Community and between ASEAN and India, and hence, both Thailand and India's foreign policies work to maintain strong relations between our two countries. Given that it has the largest population in the world and Asia's third-largest economy, India is unquestionably an essential neighbour for Thailand. To leverage their combined might, India and Thailand have collaborated on numerous occasions at the regional and global levels. Being part of a large community nowadays or forming alliances with other countries is essential for gaining power. Cross-border travel and trade are expected to rise after the Trilateral Highway, which will connect Thailand and India via Burma, is built. India has made a great effort to support its Act East policy, along with other politico-military strategies, by emphasizing cultural interchange. Thailand is only one of the many countries that India's powerful and advanced civilisation has influenced due to which Thailand has benefited most from India's cultural wealth throughout its long history, and this effect is still extremely noticeable in Thailand's current religio-socio-cultural landscape. Thanks to the careful consideration and adaption of such Indian influences, Thai society currently demonstrates a distinct pluralism. Although both countries can trace their cultural roots to prehistoric times, the bilateral relations between India and Thailand as seen through a soft power lens are a new phenomenon. With the proper and systematic

use of such soft power resources, both countries are expected to nurture their long-lasting ties in a more strong and healthier manner.

References

- 2018 (2018). *Report on International Religious Freedom: Thailand*. U.S Department of State. Retrieved from U.S Department of State.
- Arya, D.C. (2017). *International Relations: Changing Scenario*. (p.242) Shivani Book Agency, For Indian Community in Thailand. (n.d.). Retrieved from Embassy of India, Bangkok: https://embassyofindiabangkok.gov.in/eoibk_pages/Mzgw
- Hazarika, A. (2022). *Heritage and Culture: A soft power diplomacy between India and Thailand*. Retrieved from NE Now News: <https://nenow.in/north-east-news/assam/heritage-and-culture-a-soft-power-diplomacy-between-india-and-thailand.html>
- Hussein, Z. (1982). *The silent minority: Indians in Thailand*. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University.
- Jamir, A. (2018). *Namaste Thailand*. Retrieved from The Diplomat: <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/namaste-thailand/>
- Mark J C Crescenzi (2018). *Friends and Foes*. (pp116-118) Oxford University Press.
- Mishra, P. P. (2010). *The History of Thailand*. California: ABC-CLIO.
- Paul, T.V. (2016). *Accommodating Rising Powers: Past, Present, and Future*. (pp255 -256) Cambridge University Press,
- Priya Ranjan Trivedi (2018). *Foreign Policies of Prime Minister Narendra Modi*. (p.256) Jnanada Prakashan.
- Ramabadran, S. (2019). *INDIA'S LEGACY IN THAILAND*. Retrieved from USC Center on Public Diplomacy: <https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/india%E2%80%99s-legacy-thailand>
- Ramabadran, S. (2019). *India's Legacy in Thailand*. Retrieved from USC Centre on Public Diplomacy: <https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/india%E2%80%99s-legacy-thailand>
- Roychowdhury, A. (2022). *Explained: The historical and cultural connections between India and Thailand*. Retrieved from The Indian Express: <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/historical-cultural-connections-between-india-and-thailand-explained-8098828/>
- Shanthesh Kumar Singh (2017). *India's Foreign Policy: Continuity with difference under Modi Government*. (P30). Manak Publishers.
- Singh, K. (2022). *Cultural Dimensions of India–Thailand Relations: A Historical Perspective*. Retrieved from Sage publications: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/22308075221098265>
- Srichampa, S. (2015). India and Thailand: soft Power Ties. *Journal of Social Sciences Humanities and Arts*, 121-150.
- The Hindu gods of Buddhist Thailand*. (2021). Retrieved from Nepali Times: <https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/the-hindu-gods-of-buddhist-thailand>

Interstate Migrant Workers and Healthcare System in Kerala, India: Critical Examination of Social and Institutional Inclusiveness

Navas M. Khadar and Bijulal M.V.

Abstract

Kerala is the first state in India to introduce social security and welfare schemes for migrant workers in India (Srivastava 2020). The security schemes and welfare schemes announced by the Central Government are being implemented in Kerala in an exemplary manner (IMN Report 2020). Various important tasks pertaining to the healthcare of interstate migrant workers have been showing substantial improvements related to various aspects of inclusion timely delivery of services as well as improved access to the system. This was especially visible during the time of COVID-19, which has made Kerala a centre of attention for its institutional and social mechanism for the marginal community. The Government of India passed the occupational safety health and working condition code (OSH Code) in 2020 by connecting the 13 labour laws in the country. It has accurately described the safety and health standard, health and working conditions, and welfare measures. The OSH Code covers unorganized skilled and unskilled migrant workers. In structured and unstructured living places in Kerala, the hygiene system for migrant workers is not as prescribed by the rules and can be considered a failure of the local self-governing system in Kerala that implements the rules (KILE 2020). At the same time, the fact that the local self-governing system worked successfully with the health sector in the health system of migrant workers during the Covid-19 pandemic is also proof that social institutions are integrated into the health sector (Khadar 2022). Through the National Health Mission (NHM), the Department of Health and Family Welfare introduced Link Workers in 2020 to improve access to healthcare for migrant families. In coordination with other frontline workers of the department, resourceful migrants were recruited and trained to provide health information and connect migrants to services in their own language. Migrant workers are among the most vulnerable groups in Kerala's health sector. Although the government is trying to involve them in the key changes coming in the health sector, the problems in effective communications health issues of hospitals, attitude of neglect by medical personals approach in the primary health sectors are among the few important issues causing concern among the migrant workers. This paper presents a study on the need to include migrant workers in healthcare sectors during the Covid era

and the health policies that need to be rethought. This paper is an overview of the health sector initiatives taken to ensure the safety of vulnerable communities in Kerala.

Keywords: Labour Migration, Health Policies in Kerala, Vulnerable Community, Social and Welfare Schemes, Inclusion of Migrant Rights

Article Methodology

Science and Engineering Research Board at Mahatma Gandhi University is conducting research from 2022 on the effect of a social institution and technological intervention on access to healthcare among interstate migrant labourers in Kerala. As part of the research, fieldwork was conducted in 53 areas in 10 districts of Kerala and conducted with interstate migrant workers, representatives of health institutions, government officials, trade union workers, NGO workers, agents among migrant workers, contractors, officials working in international organizations, representatives of local self-government bodies, and employers in various sectors. Information gathered from discussions and observations is used in this article. The necessary information has been incorporated into the articles from the reports of studies conducted among migrant workers and the examination of government documents.

Interstate Migrant Workers: Labour Process and Relevant Policy Frameworks

Recent decades a stressed increasing significant of interstate migrant workers in Kerala's employment sector to an unparalleled extent. This indicates the changing working environment with a section of workers who do not have a trade union or class-conscious ideological base as perceived by many, participate in the infrastructural and industrial developmental leap of Kerala. Coir industry, construction, food processing, stone carving, footwear industry, home furnishing, plywood industry, readymade garments, rice mill, road construction sites, metal craft, wood furniture factory, cashew factory, paper factory, rubber factory, brick industry, hotels, footwear industry, plastic industry, grass mat weaving, pottery & clay, wood turning & lacquerware, hand embroidery, cane & bamboo industry, street vendors, terracotta industry, tiles company, spices factory, tea planting and many other industries primary sector units and service sector entities have now been largely dominated by migrant workers. Migrant workers are now employed in the above-mentioned sectors which precisely hard employed Keralites. The changes in the employment sector in Kerala that made Keralites invisible in traditional jobs, entrepreneurial jobs, service jobs, cleaning jobs and support jobs in manufacturing unit is worth examine as well as separately Migration of Keralites to Arab and the

resultant important quality of life and work of Keralites are exposed to could be considered prime workers in this connection.

Estimates suggest that interstate migrant workers in Kerala are becoming the main labour force. According to the Economic Census of 2015-16, there are 3,355,004 enterprises in Kerala (MSPICSO Report, 2016). According to the 2021 Kerala Planning Board Survey, the number of migrant workers in various enterprises is 34.5 lakh. Radical shift in the place of arrival of migrant workers was noted between 2001 and 2011. Most of the interstate migrant workers arriving in Kerala were from the neighbouring states of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Maharashtra as per the 2001 census. But the 2011 estimate found the largest number of migrant workers were from the states of West Bengal, Assam, Odisha, and Bihar. The 2011 census also indicates that migrant workers in Kerala are shifting from seasonal migration to residential migration processes.

Kerala has set a good example in formulating policies for inter-state migrant workers and coordinating their activities. According to the Migrant Policy Index 2019, Kerala has also secured the first rank in terms of migrant-friendly policies. But whether the policies formulated for the inter-state workers are reaching them properly should be a subject of a detailed study. In this context the right to residence, the right to participate in political processes, the right to safety of life for those engaged in hazardous work, the right to prevent exploitation of wages and sexual exploitation, the right to education, and the right to a safe health care system need to be considered and discussed extensively.

The following description tries to relate a transnational non-binding instrument on migration and discuss certain issues related to interstate migration to Kerala. The first goal of the Global Compact on Migration (a draft policy adopted by the United Nations Organization in 2018 to achieve safe, orderly, and efficient migration goals) is the importance of collecting and using evidence-based, accurate, and transparent data. Though there was an inflow of interstate migrant workers to Kerala before the 90s, it was during the 90s that the migration extended to a large scale. To date, the different governments of Kerala have not adopted a proper policy to collect and collate data on migrant workers for the last 30 years.

Goal 8 of the Global Compact on Migration calls to save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants. Our research and field experience give an understanding of the current situation in Kerala shows that no specific legislation has been implemented for inter-state migrant workers in the health sector. The basic legislation formulated four decades ago is also not implemented properly. The Global Compact on Migration also discusses basic services to be provided to migrant workers. The government is yet to embark on a

new policy formations that link migrant workers in Kerala to the globally accepted draft policy to which it is a signatory.

National Policy Frameworks on Interstate Migration: Recent Trends

The Government of India has introduced four labour codes to replace the existing 29 labour laws in India (Table I). These four labour codes are the wage code, industrial relations code, social security code, and personal safety and healthy working condition code. The central government underlines that the aim of the government is to ensure minimum wages, social and health security, and all the benefits of labour laws through these codes. It is in this context that the Inter-State Migrant Workers Act, of 1979 has to be examined.

Table I: Labour Codes and Included Laws

Labour Codes	Included Labour Laws
1. Labour Code or Wage Code (2019)	● Payment of Wages Act, 1936 ● Minimum Wages Act, 1948 ● Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 ● Equal Remuneration Act, 1976
2. Social Security Code (2020)	● Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 ● Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 ● Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 ● Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 ● Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 ● Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 ● Cine-workers Welfare Fund Act, 1981 ● Building and Other Construction Worker's Welfare Cess Act, 1996 and ● Unorganised Workers Social Security Act, 2008
3. Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code (OSH Code 2020)	● Factories Act, 1948 ● Mines Act, 1952 ● Dock Workers (Safety, Health and Welfare) Act, 1986 ● Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 ● Plantations Labour Act, 1951

	● Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 ● Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 ● Working Journalist and other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provision) Act, 1955 ● Working Journalist (Fixation of Rates of Wages) Act, 1958 ● Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 ● Sales Promotion Employees (Condition of Service) Act, 1976 ● Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 and ● Cine-Workers and Cinema Theatre Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1981
4. Industrial Relation Code (IR Code 2020)	● Trade Unions Act, 1926 ● Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 ● Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) is a code for occupational safety, health, and working conditions. This code also addresses issues concerning decent working conditions, minimum wages, grievance redressal tools, protection from abuse and exploitation, improved skills, and social security for all groups of migrant workers. Kerala needs to formulate a health policy incorporating the objectives of this code for organized and unorganized workers including migrants. Making the general health system of Kerala accessible to the migrant workers in a self-sufficient manner should be the main activity to be adopted in the health policy of the migrant workers. Kerala's health policy programs have actually evolved out of a general consensus. Social reform efforts and subsequent scientific awareness have been key drivers for growth in the health sector. According to Ministry of Health and Family Welfare data (2019), there are a total of 931 Primary Health Centres (PHC) in Kerala, including 848 Primary Health Centres in rural areas and 83 in urban areas. Kerala ranks 13th in terms of PHC activity among the states in India. The top 3 states with the highest number of PHCs are Uttar Pradesh (3560), Karnataka (2562) and Rajasthan (2459). Incidentally, Uttar Pradesh is one of the largest migrant-sending states in India. 52% of internal migration also takes place in the same state. According to the NSSO report (2008), 50% of the people are looking for employment and coming for employment in Uttar Pradesh at the same time.

The data collected by us through RTI 2005 (document No: DHS2971/2023/S2B, dated 20.02.2023) from the director of the health department the total number

of PHCs in Kerala is 848. The number of PHCs is 83 less than the 2019 figures of the Government of India. If we look at the public health system, there are 6701 medical institutions in Kerala under the control of the government. PHCs have converted to family health centres (FHC) and are promoting a better system of treatment. Thus, there are currently 885 FHCs (including 41 Community Health Centres (CHC) and 844 Primary Health Centres) operating in Kerala. Out of which 156 FHCs are functioning 24X7. If the services of 6701 medical institutions are made available to migrant workers in the basic health system, there will be new developments in the health policy of migrant workers in Kerala.

Perceptions of health constantly change in trace with access to facilities the benefits of vaccination is available. 60% of the migrant workers, who shared information during the fieldwork, had received the first dose of the Covid vaccine from Kerala. There are 196 families of migrant workers living in *Etumanoor* of the Kottayam district. It was revealed to us that among them, pregnant women are receiving health-supplement pills and vaccinations are being given to babies with proper reminders. This indicates that the migrant workers are getting the basic support of Kerala's health system. But to bring this health system through a special policy for migrant workers and bring it to those who are yet to avail the benefits of the health sector are measures that the government should take.

The new policy formulations should aim to bring the state to a system where the changes are favourable to the lifeworld realities of interstate migrant workers. A discussion on whether such new policy formulation is possible in Kerala should also be initiated. Through our fieldwork, the study gave a glimpse into the larger question on the gaps left by the studies conducted on this matter on the health sector of migrant workers. The larger question of whether migrant workers are able to address their health problems under various social security schemes and what policies have been formulated at the government level to address those problems is examined here. These are the social, health and security schemes currently in existence in Kerala for migrant workers (Table 2):

Overview

Three projects namely Interstate Migrant Welfare Scheme (IMWWS), AWAZ Health Insurance, and APNA GHAR residential project are currently being undertaken by the Kerala government. However, since 2019, the Awaz health insurance scheme has been dormant. From a conversation with 300 workers in the Kottayam district, it was revealed that only around 10 percentage workers have an Awaz insurance health card. The card is often not updated after one year of application. The work of the Special Migrant Workers Team under the District Labour Officers (DLO) for Social Health Protection of Migrant Workers has become

dysfunctional and the situation is getting worse as it is not possible to find or develop the necessary facilities for registration of interstate migrant workers. Details of members of the revised health insurance scheme after 2019 are not available. Why awaz insurance card is not aware among migrant workers? Migrant workers are duped by agents who see it as a mandatory card to show up to authorities. (Raj, 2023).

A study conducted by the Kerala Planning Board in 2021 reveals that 3.7 lakh migrant workers are registered under the Awaz insurance scheme. Moreover, private insurance companies are not interested in acting as insurance agencies for Awaz Insurance Scheme. The project, which was decided to be directly implemented by the government, appears to be at a standstill.

Table 2: Social, health and security schemes in Kerala.

Scheme I: Interstate Migrant Workers Welfare (IMWWS)	Scheme II : AWAZ Health Insurance	Scheme III : Apna Ghar (Residential Project for Migrants Workers)
Scheme Introduced: 2010	Scheme Introduced: 2017	Scheme Introduced: 2019
Controlled Authority: Kerala Building and other construction workers Welfare board	Budget Allocation: 10 Crore*	Budget Allocation: More than 20 Crore* (3 projects)
Registrants: 58,888**	Active Cards: 5,16,320**	Beneficiaries: 1,140**
Benefits: ● Compensation to the ₹2 lakhs for those who enrolled and Rs family upon the death 25000 to those who not enrolled the worker ● Relief benefit ₹10000 competition during membership period for temporary disability of not less than 6 months duration due to work-related accidents ● Treatment benefit ₹25000 for treatment of members for fatal diseases that requires five or more days without hospitalisation.	Benefits: ● Free Insurance Scheme for Interstate Migrant Workmen. ● Beneficial to all migrant workmen employed within Kerala ● Free medical treatment wroth ₹15,000/- per year. ● Insurance Coverage of ₹2,00,000 for accident death. ● Cashless medical treatment to be beneficiaries through Bio-metric cards.	Benefits: ● The Government of Kerala to provide safe and hygienic accommodation. ● Dormitory available for rent (₹1000/ Month) to migrant workers ● <i>Kanjikkod</i> (Palakkad) and <i>Kinaloor</i> (Kozhikode) projects have been completed.

• Terminal benefit ₹25000 to 50000 for those who exit from the labour market after a minimum of five years and enrolment under the scheme. • Body repatriation Maximum of ₹ 50000 • Education scholarships (Annual) ₹ 1000 to 3000 for migrant's children. • Maternity benefits ₹15000/-	• Enrolment age -18 to 60 years • Any identity cards recognised by the central / state government should be produced at the time of registration. • Treatment is available from all government hospitals as well as from empanelled private hospitals. • Facilitation entre opened from all districts.	• Land acquisition for the project has started in <i>Kalamassery</i> (Ernakulam).
---	---	---

Source: Labour Commissionerate website, Awaz Insurance website, Government Documents
 *The Hindu Report -2015 ** Recorded from the government site.

Based on detailed interaction with Adv. Binu Bose, State office bearer of All Kerala Migrant Workers Union, it was understood that the Interstate Migrant Workers Welfare Scheme is very well advanced. A specially designed application -*Guest App*, registers the construction workers in the scheme by entering their details as per their Aadhaar card. Mr. Bose opines that the migrant workers who come to Kerala, start working in the construction sector, which has been marked by the International Labour Organization as the most hazardous work sector. Our fieldwork reveals that the respective contractors/employers are not trying to fully deliver the facilities the Construction and Welfare Board offers to the migrant workers.

In this unique situation of Kerala, it is necessary to find a new approach based on rights for migrant workers according to international laws and the information available thus far from Indian laws and policies. Governments are already aware of the need to legislate on the health issues of migrant workers. The poor living conditions of the migrant workers, the crisis they face if they get sick, and their unwillingness to voice issues they face is caused by the government's inaction.

What should be the health policy for migrant workers?

Infectious diseases, chemical and pesticide-related diseases, skin diseases, heat stress, respiratory conditions, musculoskeletal disorders, and traumatic injuries are common problems that migrant workers may experience during work. Unhygienic living conditions lead to chronic infections and other communicable diseases. Migrant workers working in quarries suffer from respiratory diseases such as silicosis and tuberculosis (TB) (Borhade, 2011).

Lack of knowledge and awareness on healthcare from the stakeholders is the main problem faced by the migrants. The unavailability of social institutions or technological interfaces to help them understand existing health services also points to the need for policy formulation. In most cases, migrant workers have to travel long distances from their homes after working hours, which takes up most of their time. Therefore, they are unable to access the health system. A lack of familiarity with online applications was also revealed during our fieldwork.

Basic facilities such as drinking water, toilets, etc. provided to migrant workers are unsanitary and limited. They are unaware of the legal systems that can help them get better living conditions. They get marginalized from all kinds of legal systems as mandated by the migration Act of 1979. Life in open spaces and cramped cabins makes them more susceptible to diseases. At present, judging by the social situation in Kerala, women migrant workers are coming on a large scale. Women at first accompanied their husbands and found jobs here. But now women are coming alone in search of jobs. Health problems faced by women can be considered fraught with danger. Maternal health issues (including sexual and reproductive health) and lack of awareness, knowledge, and skills to make rational choices and use the services of social health institutions are limited among women migrant workers (Borhade, 2016).

Although traditional healthcare systems, access systems, and disease prevention facilities exist in Kerala, services from modern healthcare providers are particularly difficult for migrant women. Health care, including maternal, appears to be isolated. The reasons why women migrant workers are going to their native places for childbirth should be discussed.

Changes to be incorporated in health policy formulation

Based on different regulations given by various organizations, information obtained from discussions with various academic thinkers, and social activists, and personal experience from fieldwork the following recommendations, suggestions and comments are made. Understanding the importance given to the life and health of migrant workers in various resolutions of the United Nations and the International Labour Organization, fundamental changes should be made through the formulation of a new law for migrant workers. DPSP, Article 23 (1), Article 39, Article 42, and Article 43 of the Constitution of India shall be legislated for all workers including migrant workers (See table 3).

Table 3 : International and National Laws and Rights.

Standards Governing Migration Policy
<i>International – Law and Rights</i>
Follow the UDHR ¹ Article I: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood And Article II: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” “Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.”
Follow the IHRL ² Obligation: 1. Respect – Refraining from arbitrary detention, torture, or collective expulsion of migrants. 2. Protect - Regulate recruitment agencies, sanction abusive employers, protect migrants from violence and abuse by smugglers, and take action against xenophobia and hatred. 3. Fulfil - Introducing alternatives to detention, and guaranteeing access to healthcare, education, and other social services.
Follow the Human Rights Principle: 1. Equality and Non-Discrimination 2. Participation and Inclusion 3. Accountability and Rule of Law
Review the report on the compendium of principles good practices and policies on, safe orderly and safe migration in line with the international human rights law ³ .
Refer to the International Labour Standards on the Labour Migration • ILO⁴ Instruments –Conventions
To study the GCM ⁵ 23 Objectives and manage interstate migration at different levels
<i>National – Constitutional Law and Rights</i>
Article 23 (1): Traffic in human beings and beggar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law
Article 39: Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State: The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing i. that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means to livelihood; ii. that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good;

- iii. *that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment;*
- iv. *that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women;*
- v. *that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age or strength;*
- vi. *that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment*

Article 42: Provision for just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief The State shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief.

Article 43: Living wage, etc, for workers the State shall endeavour to secure, by suitable legislation or economic organisation or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural, industrial or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to promote cottage industries on an individual or co-operative basis in rural areas.

Sources: 1. *Website of United Nation Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, UDHR, Indian Constitution, ILO.*
 2. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights.*
 3. *International Human Rights Law*
 4. *Human Rights Council Thirty-Sixth Session Report -A/HRC/36/42.*
 5. *International Labour Organisation*
 6. *Global Compact for (Safe, Orderly and Regular) Migration*

General Observations:

Insurance schemes like Awaz Insurance are meant to be made available to migrant workers and require the services of senior officials like district labour officers, but these officers are not always accessible to migrant workers. Hence governments should be cautious in appointing special officers for migrant workers in district jurisdictions.

In 2010, Kerala Government changed Interstate Migrant Workers Welfare Scheme into Awaaz Insurance Scheme and the Government withdrew from the welfare scheme activities. A new law should be enacted which includes the rights guaranteed by Indian laws and the Constitution, which are in line with the international law.

The new policy plans should incorporate those adopted by India in resolutions emphasizing the welfare and safety of workers upholding international human rights

Recommendation:

1. An 'accident grant scheme' should be announced for workers aged 18 to 65 years on the model of the "*Bihar State Migrant Mazdoor Accident Grant Scheme*" Act for migrant workers in Bihar. There are many health insurances available with very low premiums that can be paid annually. Similarly, a special accident grant scheme should be provided only to Migrant workers.
2. A new scheme for special care of women and children should be announced for migrant workers only. A special grant should be allocated for data collection of migrant workers in the home contact program conducted by Asha workers in Kerala. Extra attention should be given for pre and post natal healthcare.
3. The government should allocate a special fund for the health and social security of the migrant workers to the local self-governing bodies and appoint an officer there to deal with issues related to migrant workers.
4. A special call centre should be established for addressing queries of migrant workers, made available in different languages, making policies more accessible.
5. Similar to the Asha workers in Kerala, migrant women labourers should be employed in primary health centres to increase the interaction between the authorities and migrant labourers.
6. Collaborate with other states to negotiate at the government level for deputation services of representatives from home states for migrant workers. The Kerala Government should make use of the contract recruitment system to employ those nominated from other states on a trial basis in areas where labour mobilization is high.
7. Public relations department's advertisements on social security, health care and labour laws should also be published in the mother tongue of migrant workers.
8. The Kerala government should initiate basic orientation for the worker's program in their language of choice. The migrant workers arriving are not proficient in the local language and causes inaccessibility of existing policies. This language barrier should be given special attention.

Suggestions

1. Government policies must be developed that include the classification of 29 laws, including the Inter-State Migration Act, into four labour codes

2. To ratify and articulate the Global Compact on Migration, discussions should be held for the formulation of national legal policies.
3. Policy approaches should be adopted to change the social institutions in such a way that the migrant workers can rely on them quickly and do not face language barriers.
4. Other laws existing in India should be brought under one umbrella and regulated separately in the legislation for migrant workers.
5. In order to create awareness about the increasing incidence of sexually transmitted diseases and AIDS among migrant workers, it is necessary to recruit from among them and employ them on a contract basis to spread awareness.

Conclusion

Even though there are schemes existing to ensure the welfare of migrant labourers, in reality, investigational fieldwork revealed that there was a lack of understanding of how to run the schemes implemented by the government. Since Kerala has a huge inflow of migrant labourers, it is important to formulate new healthcare policies that help these migrant labourers. Lack of actual data is also a problem in implementing existing policies. However, an effort to estimate workers' strength according to the major occupational category through a system of accounting to include employers, LSGs, labour department, Akshaya centre and institutional workers operating at grass root level may be initiated to impact radical change in the estimated system. It is the responsibility of the government to provide clear information about their working conditions and living conditions to the migrant workers arriving in Kerala. To fulfil such responsibilities, a special team should be appointed under District Labour Officers across Kerala to provide them with a clear understanding of registration, health care and lifestyle of migrant workers. The Kerala government should also adopt procedures to make migrant workers beneficiaries of health systems in Kerala. The social health and safety schemes currently being implemented in Kerala need to continue. Such as the Awaz Insurance Scheme is currently dysfunctional. Efforts to mobilize them further and make more workers members of the scheme should also be done in the government's Labour, Health, and Education system. Beyond the above-mentioned directives, the government should urgently intervene in policy formulation for migrant workers by incorporating expert advice from those working in the sector. Due to this, Kerala's current activities in the welfare of migrant workers will get more recognition than other states. It is possible to create a positive healthcare system in our state only if we protect the inter-state workers who are crucial in Kerala's workforce.

Reference

- Appave, G. and I. David (2017). "Integration that values diversity – exploring a model for current migration dynamics In-Migration Research Leaders' Syndicate" in M. McAuliffe and M. Klein Solomon (eds). *Ideas to Inform International Cooperation on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration* Geneva: IOM
- Aravindan, A., & Prasanth, C. B. (2018). "Changing Paradigm of Kerala's Urbanisation Model with Special Reference to JNNURM at Ernakulum District" *International Journal of Management Studies*. DOI: 10.18843/ijms/v5iS1/02
- Borhad, Anjali (2011). "Health of internal migrants in India: Some reflections on the current situation and way forward" *Asia Europe Journal*, 8(4):457-460
- Borhad, Anjali (2016). "Internal Labour Migration in India: Emerging Needs of Comprehensive National Migration Policy" in Deepak K. Mishra (eds), *Internal Migration in Contemporary India*, New Delhi: Sage Publication
- Department of Economic Affairs (2020). "Economic Survey 2019-20" *Ministry of Finance, Government of India*, New Delhi.
- Department of Labour and Skills, Govt of Kerala (2023). "Aawaz – Insurance Programme for Guest Workers", <http://61.0.248.124/#>.
- Francis, Anu Maria (2022). "Kerala draft rules on labour codes: Does it liberalise women's economic opportunities?" 25 July, Centre for Public Policy Research <https://www.cppr.in/articles/kerala-draft-rules-on-labour-codes-does-it-liberalise-womens-economic-opportunities>
- GOI (1979). The Inter-State Migrant Workers Act, of 1979.
- GOI (1996). The Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Act, 1996
- GOI (2020). The Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020 - https://labour.gov.in/sites/default/files/OSH_Gazette.pdf
- Irudaya Rajan, S and K C Zachariah (2020). "New Evidences from the Kerala Migration Survey 2018", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 55 Issue No.4, January 2020.
- John Samuel (2011). "Migration from Kerala: The end of an era?", in Info Change" January 2011, Ritimo <https://www.ritimo.org/Migration-from-Kerala-The-end-of-an-era>
- John, C. P. (2004). *Social Security and Labour Welfare with Special Reference to Construction Workers in Kerala* (Discussion Paper No. 65). Thiruvananthapuram: Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram.
- Kerala Institute of Labour and Employment (2020). "Interstate Migrant Workers in Kerala: A Study on their work and life" 28 December, KILE https://kile.kerala.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/ISM-Coffe-table_compressed-1.pdf
- Khadar, Navas M (2022). "Interstate Migrant Workers and Covid-19 Situations in Kerala: A Human Rights Perspective" in Pulikalakath, Lirar and A.K Shahinamol (eds.), *Migrants and Displaced Amid COVID-19: Issues, Challenges and Policy Options*, New Delhi: Adroit Publishers.
- Kumar, Dr.B.Pradeep (2016). "Contours of Internal Migration in India: Certain Experiences from Kerala", MPRA Paper No. 80586; <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80586>
- Ministry of statistics and programme implimentation central statiscs (2016). "All india report of sixth economic census" <https://msme.gov.in/sites/default/files/All%20India%20Report%20of%20Sixth%20Economic%20Census.pdf>
- Narayana, D., Venkiteswaran, C. S. Joseph, M. P. (2013). "Study of Domestic Migrant Labour in Kerala., Department of Labour and Rehabilitation", Government of Kerala.

- National Commission on Population Ministry of Health & Family Welfare (2020). "Report of the technical group on population projection" July 2020, MHFW <https://main.mohfw.gov.in/reports-0>
- National Health Mission (2023). "Kerala - State Program Implementation Plans" https://nhm.gov.in/index4.php?lang=1&level=0&lin_kid=53&lid=66
- Raj, Ambuja(2023). "Beyond Plastic Identification welfare for migrants in Kerala" *Economics and Political Weekly*, Vol-LVIII, pp10-16.
- Singh, Priyansha. Mitra, Rohini and Rawat Chithra (2020). "How states fare in Migrant Policy Index: Kerala on top, Delhi near bottom" 10 November, Business Standards, <https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/how-states-fare-in-migrant-policy-index-kerala-on-top-delhi-near-bottom120111000539>
- Singh, Priyansha. Mitra, Rohini and Rawat Chithra (2020). "Kerala On Top, Delhi Near Bottom in New Migrant Policy Index" 9 November, Indiaspend, <https://www.indiaspend.com/kerala-on-top-delhi-near-bottom-in-new-migrant-policy-index/>
- Sreekumar N.C (2019). "Challenges Encountered for Enrolment in Aawaz Health Insurance Scheme by Construction Migrant Workers in Kerala" in Paneer S., Acharya S., Sivkani N. (eds) *Health, Safety and Well-Being of Workers in the Informal Sector in India*. Singapore : Springer https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8421-9_14
- Srivastava, R. (2020). *Integrating Migration and Development Policy in India: A Case Study of Three Indian States*, New Delhi: Centre for Employment Studies, Institute for Human Development.
- State Planning Board Kerala (2021). "A Study in-migration, informal employment and urbanisation kerala" March 2021, GOK [https://spb.kerala.gov.in/sites/default/files/inline-files/In-migration Employmnt.pdf](https://spb.kerala.gov.in/sites/default/files/inline-files/In-migration%20Employment.pdf)
- United Nations (2018). "Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration" 11 July, UN https://refugeemigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/180711_final_draft_o.pdf
- Zachariah K.C, E.T. Mathew and S. IrudayaRajan (2003). *Dynamics of Migration in Kerala-Dimensions, Differentials and consequences*, New Delhi: Orient Longman.

India's G20 Presidency and the Role of Soft Power

Priyanka Singh

Abstract

The end of the cold war brought tectonic changes in world politics. The world witnessed changes in the structure, actors as well as politics. With changing actors in world politics emerged new trends, fresh goals, advanced aspirations, and modernistic expectations. Besides the usual theoretical traditions common to International Relations, novel theories, and actors emerged that became impossible to ignore. The genesis of the concept of 'soft power' and institutions such as G20 is the upshot of this development. This period also marked the amazing emergence of developing countries such as India consolidating its capabilities and quietly asserting its ability to safeguard its core 'national interests'. From being placed at the 'receiving end' now India is reinforcing its position of being at the 'giving end'. India took up the G20 presidency in 2023, which is viewed as a critical juncture for furthering its goals and raising the nation's profile internationally by holding the attention of countries that account for 85 percent of global GDP, 75 percent of international trade, and two-thirds of the world population. The theme of India's G20 Presidency, "Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam" or "One Earth · One Family · One Future," aims to drive transformative actions globally, leading to inclusive and equitable growth for all and a more sustainable future. The purpose of this paper is to answer two research questions. The first one is how India utilizes its presidency for furthering its soft power resource internationally through civilizational and cultural prisms, and the second will G20 presidency prove to be an opportunity for India to transform its image from "rule-taker to being a rule-maker" in the current geopolitical and economic complexities.

Keywords: Culture, G20, India, Soft Power, Presidency, Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam

Introduction

International politics is dynamic in nature, with each happening around the globe there is a shift in the perception and condition. The end of the cold war marked a significant change in world politics leading to changes in the global power structure, spur in national economic integration, and the convergence of policies in different

domains leading to global governance which was the product of neo-liberal paradigm shifts in international political and economic relations (Jang et al., 2016) the end of the Cold War and increased involvement of non-state actors in global affairs represent fundamentally shifting relations of power, speeding up national economies' integration and contributing to the convergence of policies in different issue domains. This review considers the state of global governance by presenting a variety of global governance arrangements, key challenges facing governance in an increasingly globalized context and possibilities for the future governance. Current global governance arrangements favour flexibility over rigidity, prefer voluntary measures to binding rules and privilege partnerships over individual actions. This synopsis of the state of global governance examines the evolving role that sovereignty and the enduring human struggles for power and equity are playing in shaping international relations and governance. This contribution argues that individual empowerment, increasing awareness of human security, institutional complexity, international power shifts and the liberal world political paradigm will define the future of global governance. This article is published as part of a thematic collection dedicated to global governance.", "container-title": "Palgrave Communications", "DOI": "10.1057/palcomms.2015.45", "ISSN": "2055-1045", "issue": "1", "journalAbbreviation": "Palgrave Commun", "language": "en", "license": "2016 The Author(s). This period also witnessed the emergence of new types of agencies and actors in addition to national governments that go beyond the "traditional forms of state-led, treaty-based regimes" (Biermann & Pattberg, 2008) aiding the phenomenon of *globalization*. There had been a spike in the interconnection among nations, people-to-people contact, exchange of knowledge, cultural linkage, and increased international collaboration. During this period, a concept that caught fire and defined the post-Cold War era was the concept of 'Soft Power'.

Traditionally, Power has always been akin to military, security, arms, coercion, and economic might, which can be seen and touched and can have a strong deterrent effect (Jervis, 2013). These powers were known as 'hard power'. Hard power is rooted in the concept of realism which emphasizes the importance of power, interest, and security in international relations (Morgenthau, 1948). The use of hard power can provide a sense of 'security for a state's citizens and allies' (Haass, 2008). But they had certain disadvantages too. Firstly, they are costly in terms of resources, and human lives (Nye, 2009). Secondly, it can escalate the arms race. Thirdly, more of its usage can lead to long-term hostility between the states (Keohane, 1984), and most importantly, escalation in the conflict can give rise to more violence and more animosity among the states (Mearsheimer, 2014). It can create a 'nervous state of affair' which in the long run may harm the interest of the states (Johnson, 2001) Chalmers Johnson's take-no-prisoners account of the consequences of American global policies, hailed as "brilliant and iconoclastic" (Los Angeles Times).

With the end of the cold war, the need was felt to look beyond the traditional conception of power and focus on the tools of foreign policy that can help in overcoming this anxious state of affairs and the concept of 'soft power' perfectly fits into the criteria. Unlike hard power, which relies on military and economic might, soft power is based on 'attraction and persuasion', and includes elements such as culture, values, norms, attraction, and institutions. It reduces the chances of war and conflict and offers peaceful solutions to violence (Kissinger, 2015).

This term was first coined by Harvard University Professor, Joseph Samuel Nye Jr. in 1990, in his book, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*.

He defined 'Soft Power' as:

"A country's ability to influence the preferences and behaviours of various actors in the international arena (states, corporations, communities, publics, etc.) through attraction or persuasion rather than coercion."

Nye (1990) highlighted the importance of a country's cultural, ideological, and institutional appeal in influencing others. Nye's quest for establishing the concept of soft power did not end here. He further elaborated the concept in his book, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* in 2009. In this book, he stated that:

Soft Power in international politics arises from factors such as the dominant values, internal practices and policies, and the manner of conducting international relations of a State.

Simply put, the soft power of any state government depends mostly on three fundamental resources: a) The *culture of the state* which emphasizes on its people and their way of thinking, lifestyle, ancient tradition, heritage, custom, ancient history, literature, etc. b) The political system or values of the state; such as democracy, the quality of political institutions, human rights, commitment to freedom, etc. and c) The foreign policy of the government, which is framed keeping in view the interest of the nations and to increase country's image in the international sphere in a non-coercive manner. These three are the cardinal principles of soft power.

Nye (1990), opines that

If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow

This novel concept of power soon became popular among policy makers, academicians, and international media all around the world. It started pulling every

country towards itself. Not only developed but developing countries too started using it as a foreign policy tool because it was cost-effective and easy to use. Soft power soon became the key to improving one's global image, reputation, respect and admiration from other countries. This concept became so popular that it became the artifact of the post-Cold War world (Mukherjee, 2014). It was commonly accepted that for a nation to be attractive and a role model for others, its overall reputation must be strong, positive, and attractive.

The concept of 'soft power' kept expanding at its pace. In an extended definition, soft power means (Kurlantzick, 2008)-

'Anything outside of the military and security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers, like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organizations.'

Soft Power is exercised in many ways ranging from culture and heritage, business and trade, governance, international relations, media and communication, people and values, and education and science (Thomson, 2020). The conduct of foreign policy through international institutions and organizations is also another channel through which states soft power gets projected (Vuving, 2009). It has become a vital instrument for shaping a broader narrative in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in the foreign policy of nations. Because of globalization-driven economic interdependence and the rise of non-state and transnational actors, the sub-state or societal level also came within the scope of soft power (Mattern, 2005). Today the horizon of soft power has broadened so much that it is impossible to ignore its effectiveness.

India's Soft Power

When the concept of soft power was gaining so much currency across the globe, India also couldn't remain cold-eyed. India being an ancient civilizational state, its soft power rootlets are very deeply penetrated. It draws its soft power from traditional, religious, ethnolinguistic and cultural relations with other nations and its considerable success in weaving together so many ethnic, religious, caste, and other strands within its society (Malone, 2011). This blend of diversity is a strong advertisement for its eminence. The fact that India is the birthplace of Hinduism and Buddhism, carries a rich legacy of spiritual and scientific knowledge is the testimony of India's rich cultural heritage (Mullan, 2015). Whether it is Indian spiritualism, cuisine, handicraft, Bollywood, classical and popular music, writers or intellectuals, all have been the levers of India's soft power. These factors place India in the position where 'India could always count itself among the few nations with strong cards in the arena of soft power' (Mohan, 2003) and boost its capability to connect, strengthen and fix the cleavages shaped by history and politics.

The impact of soft power on Indian foreign policy is visible from the time of Pt. Nehru. Malone et al. (2017) quote one of the statements issued by John F. Kennedy:

Nehru's sense of moral importance in public diplomacy and his preferred use of soft power over hard power shaped the nature of India's early foreign policy.

During the Cold War, India sought to create a shared sense of identity for the developing world characterized by anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism opposition to apartheid, disarmament, use of peaceful means for conflict resolution and commitment to multilateralism such as support for UN. These principles helped has earn tremendous reputation and legitimacy at the international arena. The foundation of NAM was certainly the high point of India's international success. India's growing economic prosperity and success of its development model mediated through peaceful democratic means are also being considered a great source of attraction for other developing countries. Though the military defeat against China in 1962 and the subsequent deteriorating regional and global environment pushed India to pursue a hard power strategy but over the years, India has been trying to project its soft power to improve its image among the comity of nations. Since the 1990s was the age of growing interdependence and economic liberalization, the use of hard power appeared increasingly difficult. During this period the issue of influence, perception, and cultural diplomacy gained significant attention among policymakers. Concurrently India also exerted itself to support peaceful advancement and a good friendly policy towards its neighbours and the soft power to cater to its legitimacy in South Asia and create a space for itself in the unipolar world.

With the beginning of new millennium, the world politics took a new turn. Consequently the nature of international relations in the developing world too began to change in a big way (Mohan, 2022) The changed scenario affected the foreign policy of India also. It began a concerted effort to channel its soft power capabilities. There had been a growing consensus that India possesses considerable soft power resources arising from its universalist culture, democratic political institutions, and tradition of leadership among developing nations (Mukherjee, 2014) and India seemed to have skillfully combined the hard and soft power strategy to fulfill its global power ambitions.

Union Minister Anurag Singh Thakur at Raisina Dialogues in April 2022 candidly mentioned that:

the nation needs to have a hard power but to maintain a friendly relationship and to exist beyond boundaries, the nation needs soft power as well, as it touches hearts
(DD News, 2022)

Shashi Tharoor, former Union Minister of State for External Affairs is of the view that "it is not the size of the army or the economy that matters but instead, it

was the country that told the 'better story' would qualify as a global player." He opines that India's Soft power has enhanced its international standing. He also identifies the components of India's soft power as "as diverse as films and Bollywood, yoga, ayurveda, political pluralism, religious diversity and openness to global influences." (Mazumdar, 2018).

Prof. C. Raja Mohan, an Indian foreign policy analyst has also argued that

The spiritualism of India has attracted people from all over the world, and its Gurus have traveled around the world selling yoga and mysticism. Bollywood has done more for Indian influence abroad than the bureaucratic efforts of the Government. From classical and popular music to its cuisine, from the growing impact of its writers and intellectuals, India now has begun to acquire many levers of soft power.

The Hindu, 6 January 2003.

'Incredible India', the nation's possibly most significant worldwide marketing campaign, launched in 2002 was the initiative that was designed to create a 'distinctive identity and attraction for the country' (Mazumdar, 2020). It highlighted India's immense diversity through historic and religious sites, which included Hindu temples, Islamic mosques, Buddhist stupas, Christian churches, Sikh shrines, and mausoleums. India's showcased itself as a mosaic of various faiths. The Taj Mahal, the nation's most recognized notable monument was also highlighted. Other than that, the cultural sites, wildlife sanctuaries, mountains, beaches, pilgrimage sites, and many more were included as additional attractions. The promotion has been extremely effective in increasing annual tourism arrivals to the nation (Thussu, 2013) and boosted its international image and projected it as a peaceful rising power.

India is the only country that has emerged with a geopolitical heft that is part of the international consensus – democracy, vibrant civil society, free press, and judiciary – and yet, is different from the Western system. All other countries that emerged on the global stage during this period were either part of the Western consensus or not part of the international consensus or too small to matter on the global stage. This places India in a unique position that has not been available to any other country in recent centuries (Mishra, 2022). India's ideals, democratic institutions and principles like non-violence has helped to improve its relations with other countries and help attract foreign investment, technology, and tourists to promote economic growth and development (Mazumdar, 2018). The government is making attempts to project India globally through its soft power and link overseas Indians with the country's geopolitical aspirations (Pant & Ratna, 2023). This is likely to have significant implications for the conduct of Indian diplomacy and the broader role of India in global politics in the coming years (Pant, 2022). Accordingly, India has pursued a foreign policy agenda backed by the 'power of moral arguments rather than arguments of power' and used soft power to compensate for its hard power deficiencies (Kugiel, 2016).

Today the structural realities of contemporary global politics had sharpened the fault lines between various powers. In the din of this great power politics, India's growing capabilities and its rising aspirations to play a larger role and willingness to take on greater responsibilities make it an appropriate host for the G-20 event. India has always shown commitment to multilateralism. It believes "that national good and global good can be entirely in harmony" (Pant, 2022b). The abundance of political will and compassion towards all is the quality that makes India a potential global leader. This presidency can be an opportunity for all the participating countries to strategize on a collective agenda and use this platform for a prosperous future.

G20 as an institution

The G20, an organization rooted in the concept of international governance was established in 1999 after a series of major international debt crises. Initially, it was a platform for Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to discuss international economic and financial issues but now it is a crucial forum for addressing global challenges. Since its creation, the G20 has comprised the European Union and 19 individual countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Spain is invited as a permanent guest. In addition, there are standing invitations for major international organizations to participate, albeit not as formal members. Among those organizations are the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization (Bonner, 2023).

The forum aimed to provide financial stability and bring parity among the member states from all regions of the world, that included both developed and developing countries. Unlike other platforms, G20 is more representative and reflective of global power dynamics. A key requisite for membership is economic size and influence within the global economy. From being a platform exclusively committed to discussing economic issues now G20 has widened its scope and structure to include Heads of State or Government in the discussions apart from Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. It happened in the wake of the global economic and financial crisis of 2008. Within G20 other issues of global concern such as global security, terrorism, environment, pandemic, etc are also getting included. But still, its major issue of concern is economic matters to the extent that it is designated as the "premier forum for international economic cooperation" (Ministry of External Affairs, 2022).

Unlike most international organizations, the G20 has no permanent headquarters, staff, or secretariat, rather it is a group that functions primarily as an informal policy-debating club (Kaul, 2019). It is one of the few existing global

platforms where different international institutions and regional organizations can coordinate across a vast array of issue areas and emergent policy fields (Benson & Zürn, 2019). Currently, the EU and G20 nations comprise “around 85 percent of the global GDP, over 75 percent of the global trade, and about two-thirds of the world population.” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2022). The presidency of G20 rotates annually among the member states. The nation in charge of the presidency proposes an agenda and does the required setting to organize various meetings for that year’s summit. For continuity and ease current presidents are assisted by their immediate predecessors and successors, forming a ‘Troika’. The G20 presidency does not offer any formal power to the host nation but it does present an opportunity to influence the collective economic agenda of some of the most powerful and influential nations in the world. This may give India the chance to turn the discussion towards its preferred direction and further its economic agenda (Basu, 2022) when it is getting the opportunity to host this prestigious forum.

India’s G20 presidency: A watershed event

On December 1st, 2022 India assumed the presidency of the G20 forum, taking over from Indonesia. This presidency will continue until 30 November 2023. Thus, the year 2023 is surely going to be an eventful year for India. India joined the G-20 in 1998 when it was still a group of finance ministers and central bank governors. Since then, India has been actively involved in shaping the G-20’s agenda and advancing its interests on the world stage (Vaid, 2023). This Presidency is regarded by experts as an exceptional and unprecedented opportunity for India to showcase its growing influence, reputation, economic stability, and prosperity on the global stage and demonstrate its emerging soft power, and promoting the universal virtue of oneness and mutual cooperation amongst the member countries. Simon Anholt, an independent policy advisor argues that a nation’s brand can be “enhanced through strategy, substance, and symbolic actions” (Anholt, 2011). This presidency is surely going to be an image-enhancement exercise for India to find new partners, and reinforce relations. The centrepiece of every international activity organized by any state is to enhance its statute so that it can achieve the maximum possible benefits and reputation among the global community. The platform is expected to be a mirror of India’s independent foreign policy driven by its increasing economic might (Niranjan, 2023) and a harbinger of harmony and peace. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has also reiterated the fact that hosting the G-20 is an “opportunity to leverage India’s growing strategic and economic heft” (Jamrisko, 2023). Overall, the G-20 summit could provide the ideal platform for India to set the tone for its emerging global leadership and communicate what responsibilities it wants to bear under that leadership.

The logo chosen for India's G20 Presidency juxtaposes planet Earth with the lotus in tricolour which reflects the vibrant colours of India's national flag – saffron, white and green, and blue symbolizing growth amid challenges. The lotus in the logo with seven petals depicts seven continents and seven notes of music, signalling that India's presidency will transcend the limitations of geography and groupings to embrace the whole world, where no one should be left behind (Chinoy, 2022a) and the world together will live in peace and harmony. The Earth below the G20 logo is “Bharat”, written in the Devanagari script symbolizes India's rich cultural heritage.

Prime Minister Modi while unveiling the logo of G20 remarked that:

This G20 logo is not just a symbol, it is a message, an emotion running through our veins. It is a resolve, which is now being included in our thoughts

The theme of this G20 is “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam,” which conveys the meaning “One Earth, One Family, One Future.” It is inspired by the Maha Upanishad, an old Sanskrit scripture. This theme fundamentally highlights the importance of all life—human, animal, plant, and microorganism—as well as their interdependence on Earth and across the universe. It focuses on sustainable development. It also exemplifies LiFE (Lifestyle for Environment), which highlights the importance of environmentally sustainable and responsible lifestyle choices, both at the individual and national level, in creating a cleaner, greener, and bluer future. The concept of (LiFE), was introduced at COP26 in 2021. The idea of LiFE is to have human-centric, collective efforts and robust action that further sustainable development. It is a “Pro-Planet Approach”, that is, to live a lifestyle that is in tune with our planet and does not harm it.

Generally, any discussion about climate change focuses on the behaviour of the states and their responsibilities. But a major loophole of these initiatives is that the behaviour at the individual level takes a back seat. As Plato in his *Republic* mentions that *State is an individual writ large* so, it is the behaviour of the individual which shapes the behaviour of the state and thus the LiFE initiative set its sight on the behaviour of the individual. It puts the individual at the center of the discourse and to sensitise every human being, regardless of nationality and geography. If individuals make changes in their behaviour, become more conscious of their lifestyle choices, and act more responsibly, it can make a huge difference. The focus on LiFE is a step forward in the right direction considering that the pernicious effects of climate change are being felt all over the world and the most vulnerable are the developing countries given the fact that they won't be able to afford the mitigating tools to lessen the effect of climate change (Chinoy, 2022b). Thus, there is a need for ‘mindful and deliberate utilization’ of resources rather than ‘mindless and wasteful consumption’.

The logo and the theme of G20 together set the stage for meaningful and steering discussions and deliberations, responsive decisions, and concrete actions, striving

for just and equitable growth for all in the world. India is a responsible country is poised to work and bring the attention of the world towards the fact that rather than categorizing the countries into different groups such as first world, second world, and third world or developed, developing and underdeveloped, or North and South, collective efforts should be made to have an equitable world order so that we can collectively navigate through all the turbulent times, in a “sustainable, holistic, responsible, and inclusive manner” (PIB Mumbai, 2022).

To quote the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Narendra Modi:

Today, the greatest challenges we face- climate change, terrorism, and pandemics can be solved not by fighting each other, but only by acting together

PIB Delhi
01 Dec 2022

India showcasing Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas, Sabka Sahbhag

Being the host of this high-profile international gathering, in which the country is set to hold nearly 200 meetings in 32 different sectors in multiple locations across different states, India is pushing for “a new world order with the core vision enshrined in the cultural ethos of serving humanity and mankind for the benefit of all” (Omer, 2022). This summit is significant in the sense that the vision of our Prime Minister is getting reflected in its every aspect. One of the key facets of the Modi government since 2014 has been “people’s participation, people-centric governance, people-oriented policies, and people-led development”. This dimension is visible in G20 too. This G20 has moved away from a “protocol-driven G20” to a “People’s G20” (Poonawala, 2023).

To connect this summit with the common people, University Grant Commission (UGC) has made a special recommendation to the schools and higher educational institutions across the nation, to conduct and organize special programmes on G20 themes. These include Special G20 sessions in Schools/Universities, G20 University Connect programmes, lecture series, and events based on G20 including ‘Know Your G20’ quizzes, seminars, crossword, painting, marathon, declamation, Insta-Reel, etc. It has also been advised that the scheduled events of institutes, such as annual days, convocation events, cultural programmes, and sporting events, should be branded as G20 events (Sharma, 2023). UGC chairman professor M. Jagadesh Kumar stated that these programmes based on the theme of G20 aim at projecting the “youth as cultural ambassadors” who can create “long-lasting relationships with the G20 fraternity”. (Business Standard, 2023).

Not only educational institutions, but there are also instructions for civil society and the private sector by the government that they should organize model G20 meetings, G20 Pavilions in major festivals, Selfie competitions, #G20India stories, and hundreds of other G20-theme events. Civil society is playing a significant role in shaping India's G20 agenda through eleven engagement groups, namely: Women20 (W20), Think20 (T20), Business20 (B20), Youth20 (Y20), Science20 (S20), Labour20 (L20), Parliament20 (P20), Youth 20 (Y20), Supreme Audit Institutions20 (SAI20), Urban20 (U20), Civil20 (C20), and Startup20, which has been proposed under India's Presidency for the first time (Kant, 2023). As per the MEA, in-person participation during India's G20 Presidency is among the largest ever (MEA, 2023).

This presidency is also unique in the sense that, unlike previous events, this event encompasses the participation of smaller cities including Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities, apart from big metros. The prioritization of provinces/regions showcasing their history, local culture, local arts, crafts, cuisine, traditions, and scenic beauty reflects the principle of inclusive growth for all (*sabka saath sabka vikas*). The delegates of G20 actively participating in events such as the Manipur Sangai Festival 2022 in Imphal, International Sand Art Festival 2022 at Konark, Odisha, the Hornbill Festival 2022 in Nagaland, International Kite Festival 2023 in Gujarat, Surajkund International Crafts Mela in Faridabad, International Food Festival in Delhi, cultural festival in Ladakh, Ganga Aarti in Varanasi, Chapchar Kut festival in Mizoram, and most significantly attending G20 working group meeting in Jammu and Kashmir reflect India's growing stature in the world. India by organizing working group meeting in J & K despite objections raised by China and Pakistan reaffirmed its sovereignty over J & K firmly. This pan-India approach of the government to host the meetings and emphasize the concept of 'Jan Bhagidari' (citizen's engagement) truly demonstrates that this Presidency aims to make the G20 truly by the people, and for the people (Kant, 2023).

The government has also emphasized on the role of the Indian diaspora as an important dimension of 'soft power'. C. Raja Mohan (2003) opines that "people of Indian origin are extremely important sources of support for the Indian government in the execution of its policies through the influence and respect they command in the countries in which they live." They are the "bridge-builders" between their home and adopted countries. Prime Minister Modi has also repeatedly urged the non-resident Indians to share the glory of India with the next generation of Pravasi Bharatiya. As India has taken over the G-20 Presidency this year, the responsibility of the Indian Diaspora gets larger to make the world aware of the country's glorious achievements and magnificent past, which is sure to help it attain a sustainable future (Kumar, 2023).

G20 is not just a diplomatic event but it should be turned into a historic event of public participation where one can witness the spirit of 'Atithi Devo Bhava'. All overseas Indians are the brand ambassadors of India on foreign soil.

Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India

Addressing a session on the second day of Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas and emphasizing the role of the Indian diaspora in upholding the rich cultural heritage of India and making this G20 event successful Amitabh Kant, Indian emissary to G20 also asked the diaspora to "be the brand ambassadors for G-20 summit and promote India's financial inclusion and technological transformation models" (The Times of India, 2023).

The geo-strategic significance

The world is undergoing a change that is profound and unprecedented in nature. It is a post-western world where the U.S. is reaffirming its position, China, being the revisionist power is flexing its muscles and making its active offensive presence in world affairs, and emerging powers such as India are trying to act on their own terms and conditions and resisting being caught in a battle between U.S. and China. The G20 Presidency undoubtedly is a chance for India to understand the dynamics of various nations across the globe and to display its leadership role. When Prime Minister Narendra Modi took on the mantle of G20 Presidency on behalf of India during the Bali Summit, he chose four crucial words to outline India's G20 agenda - 'inclusive, ambitious, action-oriented and decisive' (The Hindu, 2022). These are the practical tools in the changing world order. These four keywords reflect the fact that G20 is going to have a significant impact on shaping the global order.

This presidency is also a chance for India to build upon the momentum generated in 2022 in Indonesia to push not only for the Global South's leadership but also a rebalancing of priorities among G-20 members so that the redistribution of world power can be attained equitably. India has often demanded space for the global south in world politics. It has emerged as a strong and clear voice of the global South and has tried to raise issues that are pertinent to the region. There is an enduring feeling among several small countries that their issues, concerns, and problems do not get the due attention of the world. India is inclined to break this notion.

Through a remarkable trailblazing initiative, India organized the "Voice of the Global South for Human-Centric Development" virtual Summit on 12th -13th January 2023. The theme of the Summit was "Unity of Voice, Unity of Purpose" which was inspired by PM Modi's vision of *Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Vishwas, Sabka Prayas*, and the concept of *Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam* (Sajjanhar,

n.d.). In this summit PM Modi gave a 4R mantra: 'Respond, Recognise, Respect, Reform'.

PM Modi during this summit remarked that:

We, the Global South, have the largest stakes in the future. Most of the global challenges have not been created by the Global South. But they affect us more...

India since its independence has raised its voice against colonialism, imperialism, apartheid, racism, north-south divide, neo-colonialism, and other unjust global practices. India holds the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibility'. Reaffirming its position as a natural leader, India assured the leaders of the global south that it will ensure that the voice of the South gets heard on international platforms and their due interest should be taken care of by the world community. They should be treated equally and fairly given the fact that the global south should have respect for international law and territorial sovereignty and integrity of each other, and all should collectively push for reform of international institutions including the UN.

Key Takeaways

This G20 summit is undoubtedly different from its previous summits as well as previous multilateral summits that India has hosted. It is much broader in scope. The kind of attention that is given to "women's empowerment, digital public infrastructure, health, agriculture, education, culture, tourism, climate financing, circular economy, global food security, energy security, green hydrogen, disaster risk reduction, and resilience, fight against economic crime and multilateral reforms" (*Big Data - Uniquely India*, n.d.) is worth admiring. None of the previous summits had been so extensive in nature. The G-20 summit is the first of its kind in Indian history also, as for the first time entire P-5 members were present (Mishra, 2022). In a meeting hosted in India. This demonstrates the rising profile of India in the world. India is surely flaunting its emerging soft power. Practicing the norm that food and culture have always been integral parts of cultural diplomacy that transcend barriers and boundaries (Sanu, 2022). India has made all the necessary arrangements for the visiting delegates of the G20 to get a glimpse of India's soft power. Starting from cuisine to practicing Yoga, excursions, or wide range of cultural performances, no stone remains unturned to showcase India's rich cultural heritage. Every event organized for delegates is the reflection of the rich tradition of the past and achievements of the present as well as of the pluralistic traditions of the nation.

Not only this, this G20 has been "people's G20" in the sense that no previous host of the G20 had paraded such an extensive list of locations for meetings as India

had done. Most of the earlier summit meetings were confined to their capital city or perhaps a few other important locations. India's decision to involve small cities is not just significant for exhibiting the country's tourism prospects; it truly reflects a decentralized and cooperative federalism approach to widespread the G20 presidency and make every state, and indeed every Indian, feel that he or she is a vital stakeholder in this massive international event.

India through this platform has also raised its voice against the fallacies present in the West-dictated world order. India had emphasized that in the era of multilateralism, institutions should be democratic in nature, therefore, democratizing the international institutions by bringing reforms in the IMF, WTO, WHO, and other UN bodies is one of the top priorities for achieving multilateralism. We all are moving towards equitable world order, if multilateral institutions will be despotic then we can never think of human rights and peace to prevail in the world. Western world order had taken the world towards disorder. The list of the plethora of goodies from "Pandora's Box" is unending. India is striving for a rightful place for all whether it is developed or developing.

India's G20 presidency is certainly offering a vision for a more equitable and sustainable future. India can leverage its leadership to promote cooperation, and inclusive growth, remove the inequality between developed and developing countries, and tackle the challenges that need collective efforts. The theme of G20 "One Earth, One Family, One Future," is an indication of its attempt to unite the G-20. This principle of the Advaita philosophy can help the world to overcome the divisions that thwart unity and progress, and it will certainly enable the world to look ahead with optimism. India is a natural leader and the global south needs a leader like India to sail through the tough times and to collectively address contemporary global challenges.

Challenges

India's G-20 presidency, however, will not be without challenges. The predominant challenge is the efficacy of 'soft power'. As the world is passing through a turbulent time where revisionist powers like China and Russia are threatening the global order and the rise of extremist groups such as the Islamic State makes hard power necessary (Pant, 2022), there is a broader debate among the academia that whether soft power really holds any lasting, tangible value in a today's milieu or it just a fallacy. India is aiming to be *Vishwaguru* by flaunting its tradition and culture and attracting the world towards it but the current complex geopolitical and economic situation will make it difficult for India to sail through multiple crises without annoying anyone. While India's unique relationship with both the United States,

Russia, and European Union seems like its *balancing act* is appreciable India needs to be more cautious to leverage for better outcomes in the situation where it is walking on the edges of the sword.

The reality of today's world politics is that it is difficult for India to bridge the divide that is getting deeper and deeper between the great powers. Although great power competition does not necessarily hinder cooperation in multilateral forums, it certainly makes significant cooperation much more difficult to achieve as 'relative gains concerns take precedence, threat perceptions are heightened, and balancing prerogatives take over in non-military issue areas as well' (Kashyap, 2023). Among the diverging and conflicting interests shaping any specific agenda will be an important diplomatic test for India. As had been reflected from the previous G20 meetings too, achieving 'consensus on contentious issues can be difficult, and global divergence of interest are likely to persist for the foreseeable future.

The relationship between East and West defined by strategic competition is in a completely fractured state. India's hope to obtain inclusivity and equality of all at the G-20 is surely not a cakewalk. India's aspiration to be the voice of the Global South needs to be strategically balanced along with its growing ties with the West to build a strong base for consensus at the G-20. It will have to show extra will and strong determination to lead on the issues most significant to the developing world. This G-20 will be a litmus test for India to demonstrate its credibility and whether as a growing economic power, it can also afford to have a strong influence at the global level of decision-making on a wide range of issues.

One of the most pressing affairs that the world is currently facing is the Ukraine crisis. India cannot afford to ignore this issue. It has to find ways to bring this issue to the center, talk about it responsibly and reach a consensus because avoidance of the Ukraine problem will surely water down the global development agenda that India aims for (Zeeshan, 2023) as well as its creditability as a responsible country. Merely hosting an international event does not suffice until and unless through that event any concrete step is taken for the real benefit of all. India's core principle of *Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam* (the world as a larger family) has always proven its credentials across the world community but still, there is a wide gap between theory and action that needs to be narrowed down.

The biggest obstacle is that a certain negative perception of the country has been dug into the minds of outsiders by the international media. The allegations of human rights violations by security forces, horrific sexual assaults against women, religious intolerance, poverty and social inequality, corruption, red-tapism, police brutality, poor governance, and hyper-nationalism get highlighted almost daily in national as well as international media (Mazumdar, 2020). These allegations

question the country's aspiration of being *Vishwaguru*. Overcoming these challenges will be a true testament to India's potential as a future global leader.

Conclusion

India is optimally flaunting its soft power through its cultural diplomacy to get the world attracted to its diverse and peculiar civilization. This presidency is a unique opportunity for India to steer global governance and play the role of a bridge maker between the developed and developing world because collective problems demand collective solutions, the problems of the developing world are not exclusive in nature. It is an inclusive problem thus without substantive international cooperation it can't be resolved. It is now high time for India to reflect on its transition from being a "rule-taker to rule-maker" and hosting high-profile international events is the right step in this direction. However, one needs to bear in mind that soft power essentially is the 'power of attraction'. It is non-obligatory in nature. It is not the power to command others to obey one's orders. Thus, it has certain limitations but its importance can't be neglected. This presidency is certainly an opportunity for India to make the world realize the true potential of India through civilizational and cultural prisms, take the attention of the world towards a 'common minimum framework', and should try to seek cooperation through national, regional, and global institutions for reaching consensus and transform its image from "rule-taker to being a rule-maker."

References

- Anholt, S. (2011). Beyond the Nation Brand: The Role of Image and Identity in International Relations. *Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy*, 2(1). <https://surface.syr.edu/exchange/vol2/iss1/1>
- Basu, A. (2022). *India's G20 Presidency: Significance and challenges as world's biggest economic powers converge on Indian soil*. Firstpost. <https://www.firstpost.com/world/indias-g20-presidency-significance-and-challenges-as-worlds-biggest-economic-powers-converge-on-indian-soil-11729961.html>
- Benson, R., & Zürn, M. (2019). Untapped potential: How the G20 can strengthen global governance. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 26(4), 549–562. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2019.1694576>
- Big Data—Uniquely India*. (n.d.). G20.Mygov.In. Retrieved May 29, 2023, from <https://g20.mygov.in/>
- Bonner, B. (2023). What role should the G20 play? *GIS Reports*. <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/g20-international-organization/>
- Business Standard. (2023). *Education institutions to organize special programmes on G20 themes: UGC*. https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/education-institutions-to-organise-special-programmes-on-g20-themes-ugc-123011900500_1.html
- Chinoy, S. R. (2022a). During its G20 presidency, India can be a voice for the developing world. *The Indian Express*. <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/during-its-g20-presidency-india-can-be-a-voice-for-developing-world-8256876/>

- Chinoy, S. R. (2022b, December 2). India's G20 Presidency: Setting the world agenda. *The Indian Express*. <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/indias-g20-presidency-setting-the-world-agenda-8301230/>
- DD News. (2022). 'Soft Power' has to be complemented by 'Hard Power': Says Union Minister Anurag Singh Thakur at Raisina Dialogues. <https://ddnews.gov.in/national/%E2%80%98soft-power%E2%80%99-has-be-complimented-%E2%80%98hard-power%E2%80%99-says-union-minister-anurag-singh-thakur>
- Haass, R. N. (2008). The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance. *Foreign Affairs*, 87(3), 44–56. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20032650>
- Jamrisko, M. (2023). G-20 host India taps soft power as it champions new world order. *The Economic Times*. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/g-20-host-india-taps-soft-power-as-it-champions-new-world-order/articleshow/98107768.cms>
- Jang, J., McSparren, J., & Rashchupkina, Y. (2016). Global governance: Present and future. *Palgrave Communications*, 2(1), Article 1. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palcomms.2015.45>
- Johnson, C. (2001). *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (1st.OWL BOOK EDITION). Holt Paperbacks.
- Kant, A. (2023). India's G20 Presidency: Human-centric. https://www.g20.org/content/dam/gtwenty/gtwenty_new/document/English_Issue_Feb_2023.pdf
- Kashyap, S. (2023). Amid Hard Times for Multilateralism, New Delhi Triumphant Over G20 Presidency. <https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/amid-hard-times-for-multilateralism-new-delhi-triumphant-over-g20-presidency/>
- Kaul, I. (2019). The G20@10: Time to shift gears. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 26(4), 563–582. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2019.1694577>
- Keohane, R. O. (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7sq9s>
- Kissinger, H. (2015). *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History* [Paperback] Kissinger, Henry. Penguin Books Ltd.
- Kugiel, P. (2016). *India's Soft Power: A New Foreign Policy Strategy*. Routledge & CRC Press. <https://www.routledge.com/Indias-Soft-Power-A-New-Foreign-Policy-Strategy/Kugiel/p/book/9781138243538>
- Kumar, S. (2023). Celebrating Strong and Vibrant Diaspora during G20 Presidency. <https://newsonair.com/2023/01/09/celebrating-strong-and-vibrant-diaspora-during-g20-presidency/>
- Kurlantzick, J. (2008). *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*. Yale University Press.
- Malone, D. M. (2011). *Soft Power in Indian Foreign Policy*. <https://www.epw.in/journal/2011/36/perspectives/soft-power-indian-foreign-policy.html>
- Malone, D. M., Mohan, C. R., & Raghavan, S. (Eds.). (2017). *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy* (Illustrated edition). OUP Oxford.
- Mattern, J. B. (2005). Why 'Soft Power' Isn't So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics—Janice Bially Mattern, 2005. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/03058298050330031601>
- Mazumdar, A. (2018). India's Soft Power Diplomacy Under the Modi Administration: Buddhism, Diaspora and Yoga. *Asian Affairs*, 49(3), 468–491. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2018.1487696>

- Mazumdar, A. (2020). India's Public Diplomacy in the Twenty-First Century: Components, Objectives and Challenges. *India Quarterly*, 76(1), 24–39. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928419901188>
- MEA 2023. (n.d.). *100th G20 MEETING DURING INDIA'S G20 PRESIDENCY*. Retrieved May 30, 2023, from <https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1917183>
- Mearsheimer, J. (2014). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (Updated edition). W. W. Norton & Company.
- Ministry of External Affairs. (2022). *G-20 and India's Presidency*. <https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1882356>
- Mishra, A. (2022). India's G-20 presidency: Seven reasons why this is a watershed moment. *The Indian Express*. <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-g-20-presidency-seven-reasons-why-this-is-a-watershed-moment-8300852/>
- Mohan, C. R. (2022). India's G20 Presidency: Championing the Global South. *The Indian Express*. <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-g20-presidency-c-raj-mohan-opinion-8307870/>
- Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace* ([1st ed.]). A.A. Knopf.
- Mukherjee, R. (2014). The False Promise of India's Soft Power. *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations*, 6(1), 46–62. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26804932>
- Niranjan, P. (2023). *India Takes the Global Stage: G20 Presidency and the Rise of S...* <https://www.investindia.gov.in/team-india-blogs/india-takes-global-stage-g20-presidency-and-rise-soft-power>
- Nye, J. S. (2009). *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics*. Hachette UK.
- Omer, K. N. (2022). *India can make G20 harbinger of harmony*. The Pioneer. <https://www.dailypioneer.com/2022/columnists/india-can-make-g20-harbinger-of-harmony.html>
- Pant, H. V. (2022a). *India's Soft-Power Strategy*. <https://www.outlookindia.com/.https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/indias-soft-power-strategy/295206>
- Pant, H. V. (2022b). *India is at the heart of global governance shifts*. ORF. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-is-at-the-heart-of-global-governance-shifts/>
- Pant, H. V. P., & Ratna, P. (2023). *India and the G-20: Taking Diplomacy Beyond Delhi*. ORF. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-the-g-20/>
- PIB Mumbai. (2022). *G-20 and India's Presidency*. <https://pib.gov.in/pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1882356>
- Poonawala, S. (2023). Under India's presidency, a people's G20. *The Indian Express*. <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/under-indias-presidency-a-peoples-g20-8470025/>
- Sajjanhar, Amb. A. (n.d.). *India Takes World Centre-Stage with G20 Presidency*. Retrieved May 31, 2023, from https://pmindiaun.gov.in/public_files/assets/pdf/India_Takes_World_Centre-Stage_with_G20_Presidency.pdf
- Sanu, S. K. (2022). *Capitalising G20 Summit To Boost India's Soft Power*. BW Businessworld. <http://businessworld.inhttps://www.businessworld.in/article/Capitalising-G20-Summit-To-Boost-India-s-Soft-Power/19-11-2022-454773>
- Sharma, P. (2023). *UGC: Educational Institutes to Conduct Special Programmes on G20 Themes*. <https://estudentbook.com/estudenttimes/ugc-educational-institutes-to-conduct-special-programmes-on-g20-themes>
- The Hindu. (2022). Narendra Modi | 'India's G20 agenda will be inclusive, ambitious, action-

- oriented, and decisive.' *The Hindu*. <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/narendra-modi-indias-g20-agenda-will-be-inclusive-ambitious-action-oriented-and-decisive/article66205332.ece>
- The Times of India. (2023). Be the brand ambassadors for G-20 summit, Amitabh Kant tells Indian diaspora. *The Times of India*. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/indore/be-the-brand-ambassadors-for-g-20-summit-kant-tells-indian-diaspora/articleshow/96869821.cms>
- Thomson, S. (2020). *Soft Power: Why it Matters to Governments, People, and Brands | Brand Finance*. <https://brandfinance.com/insights/soft-power-why-it-matters>
- Thussu, D. K. (2013). *Communicating India's Soft Power: Buddha to Bollywood*. <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9781137027894>
- Vaid, M. (2023). *Can India's G20 Presidency Facilitate Global Energy Transition*. ORF. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/can-indias-g20-presidency-facilitate-global-energy-transition/>
- Vuving, A. L. (2009). *How Soft Power works*. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1032656.pdf>
- Zeeshan, M. (2023). *For India, There's No Escaping Ukraine at the G20*. The Diplomat. <https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/for-india-theres-no-escaping-ukraine-at-the-g20/>

Beyond Globalisation, Indianisation and Market Welfarism: Kerala a Hub for Critical Knowledge and Critical Entrepreneurship?

Pramod C.R. and Ajith E.A.

Abstract

While Kerala is initiating a reform towards building knowledge economy and knowledge society, the need is to develop an alternative to the globalisation and Indianisation as forwarded in the NEP. This article proposes an integral notion of critical knowledge and critical entrepreneurship based on critical values as an alternative to functionalist, humanistic, social entrepreneurship (market welfarism) approaches. Here the task before Kerala is to create critical knowledge basing on reforms in higher education, which could serve as a transformative tool and could contribute in developing a hub for critical entrepreneurship. The need is to address critical values related to issues of class, caste, gender, environment, development inequality, communalism, superstition, post-truth, neglecting constitutional values, digital divide etc. This article argues that the development of critical entrepreneurship rooted in the critical knowledge, in turn based on critical values as a human emancipatory project. Kerala's initiative in bringing in transformation based on knowledge society and knowledge economy provides ample scope for developing this progressive venture to mainstream discourse, due to its political positioning assisted by the historical transformations.

Keywords: Critical Knowledge, Critical Entrepreneurship, Knowledge Society, Knowledge Economy, Globalisation, Indianisation, Critical Values, Market Welfarism

Introduction

As a continuation of the Budget 2021-22 presented by the then finance minister Dr. Thomas Isaac, on 11th March 2022, Kerala's current finance minister K.N. Balagopal presented the state's budget in the 15th legislative assembly, igniting debates over the notion of 'knowledge economy'. In his Budget Speech, the minister emphasized that "the knowledge economy needs to be strengthened and thereby increase value added production of the State and its domestic income is to be

enhanced” (Government of Kerala 2022). As one of the formative conditions for this ambitious project, the budget proposed radical transformations in the higher education sector, particularly by integrating the knowledge produced in the higher education sector with the productive sector of the state. In doing so, “more translational labs and incubation centres that promotes entrepreneurship are to be started” (Government of Kerala, 2022). Developing a knowledge society can be addressed through creating institutions which provides access to higher education regardless of the economic and social status which in turn could develop an ‘inclusive knowledge economy’ with ‘shared prosperity’ (Joseph & Unnikrishnan, 2021)

However, questions on Kerala’s developmental model’s ‘form’ and ‘substance’ remain pertinent amid the new initiative for knowledge society/knowledge economy, as the state’s development history is shaped by an enriched history of social and class-based movements, effective public action, redistributive programmes like land reforms and participatory policymaking like people’s planning programme, literacy mission etc. The social history of Kerala has, in fact, induced alternatives to neoliberal developmental models through strengthening state ownership and developing co-operative sector.

In the realm of higher education, there have been two dominant approaches prevalent among the policy-making circles; a) globalisation of higher education assisted by industry linked pedagogy and b) Indianisation of higher education where the search is for India’s ‘golden era’ embodying the Hindu religion to which all diverse tradition, culture and civilizational elements has been incorporated; an influential homogenization doctrine emerged after the ascendance of right-wing forces nationally. In principle, though the idea of Indianisation of higher education unfurls as a critique against the Western education model, in practice it rejects the scientific knowledge production methods and creates a strange amalgamation in creating pseudo-science. This approach romanticises the ancient Indian education, institutions, and values of India’s religious thought and philosophy based on Hinduism, while promoting traditional medicine, Sanskrit, and Yoga both within and outside the country. Notably, the recent National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 aims to enhance both globalisation and Indianisation of higher education to guide future ‘disruptive reforms’.

Though Kerala’s primary education is a success story in facilitating equitable education and rooting on public sector-based alternatives, the higher education sector has hardly achieved remarkable gains. As stated by the ‘Mission’ of the Kerala State Higher Education Council “it is generally believed that for the higher education sector of Kerala to meet the expectations of a rapidly evolving society, foundational reforms are needed” (KSHEC, 2022). The latest Kerala budget proposes a radical reform in the higher education sector within this context. However, while initiating

reforms in higher education, Kerala Government needs to critically approach the aforesaid two dominant education and development approaches asserted as part of NEP to set an alternative.

The current discussion of higher education in Kerala revolves around developing, centres of excellence, discipline wise clusters, programmes for skilling, infrastructure development of higher education institutions etc. Issues of access and equity has been addressed through opening new colleges in government sector, and allotting new courses and disciplines to existing institutions in emerging areas. (KSPB, 2017). The *Navakerala* Document (2022) published in March, which influences the Budget proposals, mentions about strengthening the state-owned institutions in higher education along with the future expansion related to access, quality, justice, investment etc. supported by cooperative sector, public private partnership and market forces. Increasing the number of patents through the industry-higher education linkages has also been envisaged as part of this document.

The NEP 2020 proposes the conceptual and pragmatic elements of centring the higher education policy debates on the 'knowledge economy' based on the aspects of globalisation and Indianisation. This article proposes a critical alternative to knowledge production and entrepreneurship models forwarded by the NEP. Further, the article develops the concept of 'critical knowledge' and 'critical entrepreneurship' as possible alternatives to both globalisation and the Indianisation of higher education, a necessary streamlining required in the pursuit of Kerala's development legacy. This paper is also an attempt to develop a conceptual framework, an alternate form of *integrated notion of knowledge society and knowledge economy*, distinct from the processes of globalisation and Indianisation.

Globalisation and Indianisation in the Context of Knowledge Society and Knowledge Economy

The period of globalisation intensifies market-oriented information and communication processes in developing knowledge society towards accomplishing wealth. This period witnessing extensive commodification of data, its collection, storage and transmission involving billions of dollars. This aggressive market activity transcends all branches of scholarships, professions and personal life (McBridge 1980). Indianisation focusses on the aspects of knowledge society and the knowledge, economy based on traditional Indian Knowledge System (IKS)/ Sanskrit knowledge system (MHRD 2020). Religion and caste serves as the basis for the discussion on Indianisation. This includes myths, rituals etc. being elevated to the status of science through a pseudo-scientific method of knowledge generation. Attempt at institutionalising IKS is evident in the efforts of All India Council for Technical

Education which announced a mandatory non-credit course on IKS for engineering students in 2018. Indian Institute of Management Bangalore developed the curriculum and the text book in association with SVYASA Yoga Institute Bengaluru and Chinmaya Vishwa Vidyapeeth, Ernakulum (Bajeli-Datt, 2022).

Commercialization of religion, myths, rituals, traditional knowledge etc. is considered as part of Indianisation and related development of knowledge economy. Religion-market interface (like the ritual economy) is considered by the dominant capitalist paradigm as an avenue to increase the market penetration (reaching societal sections hitherto untouched by the market). A mishmash of symbols of religion, traditional knowledge and Hindutva nationalism has been a prominent marketing strategy in the current phase of Indianisation of knowledge economy. The stress on value education based on Vedic belief system as forwarded by NEP undermines constitutional principles like social equity and democratisation. “By a blatant valorisation of and recurring fetish for a Vedic past, the policy [NEP] suppresses the cultural multiplicity and diversity of evolution of knowledge production in the country and reduces the same to a few sacred texts from the ancient period” (KSHCE 2020). The present endeavour is a search for an alternative in developing concepts like critical knowledge and critical entrepreneurship distinctive from globalisation and Indianisation in relation to knowledge society and knowledge economy.

Table 1: Models of Knowledge Society and Knowledge Economy

Models	Definition
Globalisation	Integrated notion of knowledge society and knowledge economy, advanced entirely through market.
Indianisation	Integrated notion of knowledge society and knowledge economy through market, religion and traditional values.
Critical Knowledge/ Critical entrepreneurship	Integration of knowledge society and knowledge economy through state, cooperative and crowd funding initiatives based on critical values, which is distinctive from market welfarism.

Source: *Compiled and Developed by the authors*

Towards Critical Knowledge and Critical Entrepreneurship

The search for an alternative to trade-related, market-friendly notions of knowledge and Indianisation is to effect the notion of knowledge society, which respectably transform the human conditions of class segregation, gender and caste inequality, communal hatred, environmental exploitation etc. Knowledge society is distinguished from information society (information as key market commodity in production, consumption and innovation) and knowledge economy (uses information

to create knowledge to fuel innovation and the market economy) because it sees information and knowledge as open to all. Its central values are openness, equity, justice and radical transformation of social relationships. (Wessels et al., 2017)

Alternate to mainstream discussions on knowledge society should be based on an ideology which critically evaluate utilitarianism, market forces and individualistic professional career growth. Through access to and contributing to knowledge, knowledge society should address the radical transformation of human condition. Globalisation talks about knowledge society within the framework of market, and Indianisation bases knowledge society on religion and market, hence in both these cases there exists contradictions since it is impossible to hold on to the basic values of openness, equity and justice. Defining knowledge society to incorporate the idea of critical knowledge could be considered as an effective conceptual framework in the search for an alternative. Again, grounding oneself in the idea of critical knowledge and developing an integrated notion of knowledge society and knowledge economy, in turn can assist in evolving the idea of critical entrepreneurship.

To document the existing debates on knowledge economy one needs to look in to the functionalist approach, the humanistic approach and the social entrepreneurship concepts. The following sections is a brief documentation in this regard. Over the past three decades scholars have argued that the world is moving towards a new phase of information/knowledge-based production, consumption and communication (Collinge & Staines 2009). The western developed economies and the emerging economies like China and South Korea has able to capitalise the production of scientist knowledge, its applications and the intellectual property to strengthen their economic base. It is assumed that, the economic output based on physical labour soon become a history because of replacement by knowledge intensive production and services.

Powell & Snellman (2004) defines knowledge economy as “production and services based on knowledge intensive activities that contribute to an accelerated pace of technical and scientific advance, as well as rapid obsolesce”. Information that creates knowledge is considered as a property and its intensiveness is one of the major feature of knowledge economy and the current globalisation, which aggravated the discontent in its process. Evidently, the demand for the knowledge contributing to an equitable social and economic life has also been concretized. However the idea of knowledge economy has been forwarded as a concept of neo-liberal model of development, which commodified knowledge to incentivise the market forces and side-lined the equity debate. The mainstream notion of entrepreneurship is rooted in the above-mentioned aspects of knowledge economy and hence defining entrepreneurship becomes relevant to extract an alternative.

French economist Jean-Baptiste Say refers entrepreneurship as an activity which “shifts economic resources out of an area of lower and into an area of higher

productivity and greater yield” (as quoted in Martin, & Osberg, 2007). Entrepreneurship describes the combination of a context in which an opportunity is situated, a set of personal characteristics required to identify and pursue this opportunity, and the creation of a particular outcome (Martin, & Osberg, 2007). Even though it addresses the social needs and satisfaction, the profit motives of entrepreneurship makes them utilitarian in nature. Although entrepreneurship is a multidimensional concept, and which calls for multiplicity in understanding, the dominant research is still functionalist in nature (Tedmanson, 2012). As a field of research, the dominant functionalist perspective has seen entrepreneurship as a “market-based phenomenon and a ‘special’ or set of behaviours which drive venture creation” (Tedmanson 2012). Knowledge economy, which is based on information, intensified the new forms of entrepreneurial activities (Stam & Garnsey, 2008). Unsustainability, inequity to its core, and the lack of societal trust are the trends that globalized knowledge economy inherited in the rush towards creating wealth, setting aside social issues. Discontent over functionalist perspective of entrepreneurship lead to the discussions towards alternative like the humanist approach.

Knowledge Economy and Humanistic Approach

The economic human being’s role as a self-centred and interest maximizing individual and relational human being as someone “who materialized freedom through value-based social interactions” forms the basis of debate between functionalism and humanistic approach to the economic activities (Pirson & Lawrence, 2010). The need for humanistic alternative, distinct from the economic conception for the enterprises, across the world has been forwarded as an alternative to address the crisis faced by the capitalist globalisation (Pirson & Lawrence, 2010). However, humanistic approach does not address the structural issues related to capitalism. This approach can at best understood as a sensitive response to a crisis ridden society, and thus reinstating what is currently existing. While welfare state declined in the era of neoliberalism, humanistic approach develops a concept of ‘market welfarism’.

Social entrepreneurship, a concept closely related with humanistic approach talks about an alternative economy that substitutes share-holder ideology by fulfilment of social needs and again identified as addressing “stable but inherently unjust, equilibrium that causes the exclusion, marginalization, or suffering of a segment of humanity that lacks the financial means, or political clout to achieve any transformative benefit on its own” (Martin & Osberg, 2007). Basing social entrepreneurship on such a notion, it develops through a “hybrid organization which combines philanthropic and market ideologies” (Dey & Lehner, 2017). Currently the

best example acknowledged globally as a social entrepreneurship, like that of microfinance, has become a tool for deepening the debt burden of poverty ridden social class. The high interest rate of this loan has created a stress on the downtrodden towards generating revenue above this interest rate. While it is true that micro finance can liberate the vulnerable sections from the clutches of money lenders, the extent of risk of high interest rate has made microfinance a best financial source only for those social sections economically capable of managing this.

Starting as a social entrepreneurship model, the failure of such initiative could be revealed in its gradual transformation in to a pure market-oriented model, either because of market pressure or due to the luring of high incentives of market-oriented transformations (Hockerts, 2010). Again, economic slowdown or crisis compels the social entrepreneurship models based on philanthropy or corporate social responsibility (CSR) to bring in austerity that could affect the vulnerable social sections depended on this economic activity (Karaibrahimolu, 2010). Consequently, the need is to go beyond such a conceptual framework to develop an integrated notion of knowledge society with that of knowledge economy distinct from neoliberal concept of assimilating knowledge and market. Relevance of Critical Knowledge and Critical Entrepreneurship could be ascertained in this context.

Critical Knowledge and Critical Entrepreneurship

This study defines critical knowledge as facts, information, skills gained through critical value-based education, experience and innovation that focusses on building an inclusive society. It also documents critical knowledge as a human emancipatory project in the circumstances of oppression and marginalization. The movements that transformed the social relationships, which later controlled the state power has at times prioritised alternate public education and research as a realm for critical knowledge. Evidently, Globalisation and Indianisation approaches of knowledge society could not address such aspects. Rooted in critical knowledge, this article proposes 'Critical Entrepreneurship' as an alternative to aggressive neoliberal globalization and marketization as well as a substitute to Indianisation within the context of knowledge economy. This concept is envisaged also as an alternative to the limitations of humanistic approach which generally addresses capitalist crisis management. David Harvey (2010) argued that there exists seven distinctive activity spheres within the evolutionary trajectory of capitalism of which one of the prominent aspect is that of the technology and organisational form. Here he states that "the bundling of new technologies and organisational forms has always played an important role in facilitating an exit from crises, it has never played a determinate one. The hopeful focus these days is on a 'knowledge-based' capitalism", but creates labour related crisis, deindustrialization, monopolization, rent seeking, decreasing

investments etc. that leads to further crisis of capitalism which is of a different kind (Harvey 2014). Hence the need is to seek an alternative approach distinctive from the search for ‘exit from crises’.

Current study defines critical entrepreneurship as a social activity that transforms critical knowledge into an enterprise to address issues related to class, caste, gender, environment, development inequality, communalism, superstition, post-truth, neglecting constitutional values, digital divide etc. The current study defines critical entrepreneurship as certain critical social-political and economic values, similar to that mentioned above. Evidently, critical entrepreneurship act as a vehicle for radical social transformation. It is understood as a concept which is rooted in critical knowledge and develops actual institutionalized practices to address the social-political and economic issues and is a viable model.

Table 2: Approaches to entrepreneurship

Approaches	Perspectives
Functionalist model	Exclusive profit-making market orientation.
Humanistic model	Corrections to exclusive market model, capitalist crisis management model.
Social entrepreneurship	Addressing social needs through market welfarism and philanthropic approaches.
Critical entrepreneurship	State, co-operative and crowd funded initiatives, based on critical values which addresses issues related to class, caste, gender, environment, development inequality, communalism, superstition, post-truth, neglecting constitutional values, addressing digital divide etc.

Source: Compiled and Developed by the authors

Documenting the Cases of Critical Knowledge and Critical Entrepreneurship:

An exercise in documenting the currently existing cases of critical knowledge and critical entrepreneurship is an effort in institutionalizing the alternate concepts. The following are attempts to organise the actually existing initiatives of state, co-operative, and crowd funded undertakings that could fuel the larger transformation in the context of critical knowledge and critical entrepreneurship. Internationalization as envisaged in NEP is an effort in creating homogenisation which could eliminate local specificities, and intended in destroying creativity (KSHEC, 2020). Rather than a universal western notion of internationalisation, the need is to develop a distinct model of higher education with a third world, developing country perspective. Kerala Institute of Local Administration which provides training in local administration/decentralisation is already attracting attention beyond borders.

Kerala having universities specifically on subject areas like fisheries and ocean studies, agriculture, digital technology etc. can be developed for third world internationalization.

Digital divide is a reality in India which got furthered during COVID-19. During the pandemic the education sector in Kerala addressed the issues related to digital divide that hindered inclusive education. Kerala Development and Innovation Strategic Council (K-DISC), Kerala Infrastructure and Technology Education (KITE) etc. has provided patronage to address digital divide.

Present discussions based on NEP forwards multi-disciplinary institutions with interdisciplinary as an element, but does not talk about “domains that have emerged to address the concerns of marginalised groups – including Dalit studies, women/gender studies, studies of discrimination and exclusion to name a few” (KSHEC, 2020). The need is further develop discipline specific institutions with interdisciplinarity, at its core similar to Digital University, Agriculture University, and Malayalam University etc. Manual scavenging is an outlawed practice in India. Still, manual scavengers are forced to clean the manholes. A group of young engineers found a new technology to end this dehumanised practice. Bandicoot, made in Kerala, is a robot capable of cleaning manholes and sewages without human scavenging. This user-friendly technology is a suitable example for critical entrepreneurship since it addresses the caste discrimination. Again, robotic technology developed using artificial intelligence to assist differently abled students is another case of critical entrepreneurship. TCS Rapid Labs based in Kerala is engaged in developing ‘socially assistive robots’ towards this cause.

Feminist movement debated upon the issues related to heterosexual relationships and the movement led to the invention and innovation of contraceptive technologies. Regarding the health issues faced by transgender community, Kerala plans to start transgender clinics at all districts, and the first one already inaugurated in Calicut Beach General Hospital. Contraceptive technologies and transgender clinics can be developed as part of critical entrepreneurship. India experienced numerous riots and is facing the threat of riots due to the hostile communal hatred and related campaigns in the recent times. The rise of right-wing forces to the state power escalated these tensions. Virtual space is generating communal hatred contents constantly. Sentiment analysis, an artificial intelligence tool, can be treated as a critical entrepreneurship towards compacting communalism and hatred. Kerala with their political positioning for compacting communalism can serve as a harbinger on this initiative.

Free and Open-Source Software (FOSS) can be an ideal starting point for critical entrepreneurship. In Kerala, ORUMA Software used by state electricity board, in Khadi Board, and IT operations of Kerala Legislative Assembly are some of the

notable initiatives. Again, over 2 lakh computers employed in the schools in Kerala are now working with OS Suite made by Kerala Infrastructure and Technology for Education (KITE). Similar to FOSS, Open-Source Drug Discovery (OSDD) models are successful in the R&D of neglected diseases. Kerala was part of the initiative to develop medicines related to tuberculosis, and in the context of Nipah and COVID-19 the OSDD discussions are again in the forefront. Kerala could serve as a hub for OSS and OSDD, thus igniting critical entrepreneurship.

In Kerala, Kaipad fields in Kannur, Pokkali fields in Kochi, Kole fields in Trissur and Ponnani, Meyyapara in Kozhikode and Kabani in Wayanad are the areas cultivating traditional rice variety suitable for geographical conditions. A survey conducted by Kerala Agriculture University identified around 62 seed varieties of traditional and endangered species of rice cultivated and preserved by farmers of Wayanad including tribal cultivators (Thomas, 2011). Paddyco co-operative in Palakkad is a farmers' Co-operative initiative in the field of rice procurement and processing. Such initiatives in the area of production, procurement and processing in the field of traditional and endangered seeds could be an example for critical entrepreneurship.

Control over media by the market forces and the communal assertions has critically curbed the civil society voices in contemporary India. Certain alternatives do exist which can be emulated by the state of Kerala. For example, News Click, Peoples Dispatch, People's Archive of Rural India, Dalit Camera etc. has provided certain solace to the current predatory situation existing in India. Media initiatives, like Alt News, in identifying fake news are also an alternative endeavour that can be considered as part of critical entrepreneurship.

Conclusion

The present article has developed a theoretical framework distinct from the functionalist approach and social entrepreneurship towards developing critical knowledge and critical entrepreneurship as a conceptual category. The attempt has also been to develop an integrated notion of knowledge society and knowledge economy, which has not been thoroughly conceptualised in the Indian context. The globalisation and Indianisation, viewing through the lens of integrated framework provides in-sights into the complex, yet deeper ways in which these trends create a web of hegemony. Instant observations could lead one to place globalisation in contrast to Indianisation, deeper examination points to an interesting inter-linkage between these two. For example, religion-market interface serves in increasing the market penetration during the time of capitalist crisis as well as touching upon the societal sections hitherto untouched by market. An integrated notion of critical knowledge and critical entrepreneurship is developed as an alternative to the

globalisation and Indianisation perspectives. Basing on the issues related to class, caste, gender, environment, development inequality, communalism, superstition, post-truth, neglecting constitutional values, digital divide etc., the development of critical entrepreneurship rooting in the critical knowledge is stated as a human emancipatory project.

Kerala's initiative in bringing in transformation based on knowledge society and knowledge economy provide ample scope for developing this emancipatory project to mainstream discourse, due to its political positioning assisted by historical factors. The models currently practiced, identified in this article, can be further emulated and developed in other areas as part of integrated notion of critical knowledge and critical entrepreneurship through state ownership, co-operatives, and crowd funding initiatives, addressing issues of access, equity, justice, investment etc. Here the task before the Kerala is to alter higher education sector to create critical knowledge, which in turn serves as a transformative vehicle and serve as a hub for critical entrepreneurship.

References

- Bajeli-Datt, Kavita (2022). "National Education Policy: Vedas, Puranas, Ancient Science Part of New Textbook for Engineering Students", *The New Indian Express*, Published on 14 May 2022.
- Castelfranchi, Cristiano (2007). "Six Critical Remarks on Science and the Construction of the Knowledge Society" *Journal of Science Communication*, Vol 6, No 4, pp 1-3.
- Collinge, Chris and Staines, Adreene (2009). "Rethinking the Knowledge-Based Economy", *Alexandrine Press*, Vol 35, No 2, pp 165-172.
- Dey, Pascal and Lehner, Othmar (2017). "Registering Ideology in the Creation of Social Entrepreneurs: Intermediary Organizations, 'Ideal Subject' and the Promise of Enjoyment", *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol 142, No 4, pp 753-767.
- Government of Kerala (2022). "Budget Speech 2021-2022", Thiruvananthapuram: Government of Kerala.
- Harvey, David (2010). *The Enigma of Capital and the Crisis of Capitalism*, New York: Oxford University Press
- _____ (2014). *Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hockerts, Kai. (2010). "Social Entrepreneurship between Market and Mission", *International Review of Entrepreneurship*, Vol 8, pp 177-198.
- Huang, Siyuan and Cummings, Jonathon N. (2011). "When Critical Knowledge Is Most Critical: Centralization in Knowledge Intensive Teams", *Small Group Research*, Vol 42, No 6, pp 669-699.
- Joseph and Unnikrishnan (2021). "Editorial: Transforming Kerala to a Knowledge Economy (Special Issue)" *Kerala Economy*, Vol 2, No 2&3, pp 5-6.
- Karabrahimolu, Yasemin Zengin (2010). "Corporate Social Responsibility in Times of Financial Crisis", *African Journal of Business Management*, Vol 4, No 4, pp 382-389

- KSHEC (2020). "Report on Six Member Committee on National Education Policy 2020 and Kerala", The Kerala State Higher Education Council, Thiruvananthapuram: Government of Kerala.
- KSHEC (2022). "Vision-Mission-Objectives", Kerala State Higher Education Council, Government of Kerala, accessed on 13.04.2022 <https://www.kshec.kerala.gov.in/index.php/commissions/reforms-in-higher-education-system/vision>
- KSPB (2017). "Report: Working Group on Higher Education", Kerala State Planning Board, Thiruvananthapuram: Government of Kerala.
- Marsan, Josianne Carillo, Kevin Daniel André and Negoita, Bogdan (2019). "Entrepreneurial Actions and the Legitimation of Free/Open Source Software Services", *Journal of Information Technology* Vol 35, No 2, pp 143-160.
- Martin, Roger L and Osberg, Sally (2007). "Social Entrepreneurship: The Case for Definition", *Stanford Social Innovation Review*, Spring, pp 28-39.
- McBridge, Sean (1980). "Communication and Society Today and Tomorrow; Many Voices One World, Towards a New More Just and More Efficient World Information and Communication", International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, New York: UNESCO.
- MHRD (2020). "National Education Policy 2020", Ministry of Human Resource and Development, New Delhi: Government of India.
- Navakerala Document (2022). "Navakeralatthinulla Party Kazhchapadu", Thiruvananthapuram: Communist Party of India (Marxist).
- Pirson, Michael A. Lawrence, Paul R. (2010). "Humanism in Business – Towards a Paradigm Shift?", *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol 93, pp 553-565.
- Powell, Walter W. & Snellman, Kaisab (2004). "The Knowledge Economy", *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol 30, pp 199-220.
- Stam, Erik & Garnsey, Elizabeth (2008). "Entrepreneurship in the Knowledge Economy" in Bessant, John & Venables, Tim, *Creating Wealth from Knowledge: Meeting the Innovation Challenge*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
- Tedmanson, Deirdre, Verduyn, Karen, Essers, Caroline and Gartner, William B. (2012). "Critical perspectives in Entrepreneurship Research," *Organization*, Vol 19, No 5, pp 531-541.
- Thomas, Jayan Jose (2011). "Paddy Cultivation in Kerala," *Journal, Review of Agrarian Studies*, Vol 1, No 2, pp 215-226.
- Wessels, Bridgette (2017). *Open Data and the Knowledge Society*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Tibet: Perceptions on the Strategic and Security Concerns of India and People's Republic of China

Rakhee Viswambharan

Abstract

Historically, Tibet was an independent entity, intermittently under the Chinese suzerainty due to the great power game in the Central Asian region. However, Tibet was a de facto independent country from 1914 to 1950, till the People's Liberation Army (PLA) occupied Tibet in 1950 under the Chinese pretext that the annexation was peaceful liberation of Tibet from imperialist forces. Tibet was forced to sign a 17-Point Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet with China in 1951. The agreement brought the Tibetan national identity under anxiety as it paved the way for China to inflict socialist transformation on the Tibetan society. The Tibetan resisted it, which eventually resulted in the Tibetan uprising in 1959, and their spiritual leader Dalai Lama along with 80,000 Tibetans crossed over to India and neighbouring countries as refugees. In India, they were lodged in several places mainly in Bylakuppe, Karnataka State, and Dharamshala in Himachal Pradesh. Even after six decades of peaceful struggle for autonomy the Tibetans lost their fight to preserve their culture intact. To have better understanding of the Tibetan history and Tibet-China relation, it can be broadly divided into four phases. The first phase from 630 to 842 represents the beginning of the consolidation of the Tibetan state and its consequent fall in 842. In the post fall-phase, political unity continued to elude Tibet till the mid-13th century, when the Tibetan Lamas established a political-spiritual relationship known as cho-yon or 'priest-patron' relationship with the Mongol empire. From 1260 to 1368 and then again from 1644 to 1911, Tibet remained a dependent state under the Mongol Yuan and Manchu Ching dynasties respectively. From 1368 to 1644, Tibet was independent of the Ming dynasty of China. During the second phase, Tibet was under the direct rule of China for a short span of three years from 1911-13. In the third phase (1914-50) Tibet had experienced an upsurge of nationalism, which was stimulated in the early 20th century by the British imperialist interference in Tibet and the Chinese attempt to impose direct control over it. However, during this phase with the British assistance, Tibet succeeded in enjoying de-facto independence, though it lacked international legitimacy. In the fourth period (1950 to the present) Tibetan independence was forcibly eradicated. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) annexed Tibet in the 1950 under the garb of 'peaceful liberation' from imperialist forces. Tibet was coerced in to

signing a 17-Point Agreement in 1951. The agreement brought the Tibetan national identity under stress as it paved the way for China to impose socialist ideology on the Tibetan society. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the Tibetan culture was once again subjected to intense assimilationist pressure. But post 1980 witnessed a revival of Tibetan culture and nationalism. During this phase, the Tibetans gained international support for the right to self-determination (Smith, 1996).

Introduction

The great power game was well-visible in Tibet from the beginning of the 20th century. In 1904 the British troops entered Tibet and forced China to sign an agreement. This British move was inspired by Viceroy Lord Curzon's perception regarding the Russian moves in Central Asia, especially Tibet. However, the British leadership in London did not approve of the invasion of the Tibet and the Chinese suzerainty was restored. The 1907 Convention by Russia, China, and British-India approved of the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. In the 1914 Shimla Convention, Tibet attended as an independent entity along with British India and China. The Convention resulted in the drawing of the Mc Mahon Line that demarcated the border between British India and Tibet. There is a difference of opinion regarding the Chinese approval of the outcome. However, given the weak power position of China at that time, it had only limited options.

It is important to note that Tibet was never formally recognized by the League of Nations or the United Nations Organization. However, between 1914 - 50 Tibet had an independent government, currency, army, judicial and postal systems. Further, the Tibetan government enjoyed formal bilateral relations with the neighbouring countries, such as Mongolia, Nepal, British India, and Bhutan, and concluded treaties with China and British India. The Tibetans claim that they have every right to self-determination as China had illegally occupied their territory in the name of peaceful liberation of Tibet. The Chinese annexation of Tibet eliminated the long-existed buffer zone from the region and a common border was formed between India and China. When two equally powerful nations based on nationalist feeling emerged, sharing a contested common border both nations try to resolve the border issues through a zero-sum game. It appears that the denial of autonomy to the Tibetan people by communist China further worsened the India-China relations and culminated in the India-China border conflict of 1962 and the annexation of 48000 Sq. Km of Indian territory in Aksai Chin by the PRC. The elimination of centuries old buffer zone through the annexation of Tibet in the Himalayas resulted in open war in the region. And the border issue between India and the PRC remains unresolved.

Tibet a Buffer Zone

Tibet remained as a buffer zone between British India and China for a long time and there was peace in the Himalayan region. However, when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) invaded Tibet in 1950 the status of Tibet as a buffer zone was also eliminated. India had no border with China except through Tibet. Thus, the annexation of Tibet by China, posed a major security threat to India as China disagreed to accept the British negotiated Shimla Agreement of 1914 and consequent Mc Mahon line as the border between British India and Tibet. Thus, the India-China border dispute can be traced to the unwillingness of China to accept the Mc Mahon line. The elimination of buffer zone by China's occupation of Tibet had created further problems in the Himalayan region. When these two equally powerful neighbours were forced to share an undefined border, it created fear among the Tibetans, arising from the massive Chinese military presence in the Tibetan plateau. The true extent of China's military presence in Tibet could not be gauged, given the extreme secrecy surrounding information about the PLA. The presence of Chinese strategic forces on the Tibetan plateau adds another dimension to India's perception of the Chinese threat.

Again, China's management of water resources emanating from Tibet, which feeds the Indian subcontinent, also features in Indian security concerns. In short, the complexities of security concerns connected to Tibet underpin the strategic rivalry between these two major Asian players, India and China. Consequently, China and India have common security concerns that are connected to Tibet. On the one hand, an autonomous Tibet is not in tune with China's strategic and security matrix. On the other hand, the presence of PLA along the Tibet border poses a major security concern to India. Thus, the question of autonomy to Tibet appears to have a bearing on the strategic and security concern of China and India. The abundance of rich mineral resources and water found in the region make it strategically significant. (Samphel, 2018)

Tibet and its Recourses

The geographic location and the presence of rich mineral resources and water make Tibet, one of the richest plateaus in the world. Therefore, those who control this geographic area have an advantage over its resources for the prosperity of its people. Further, among the scholars and strategic thinkers in Asia and elsewhere, there is a new recognition of the enormous geopolitical and environmental importance of Tibet in the continent which is home to nearly half of the world's population. In addition, Chinese geologists have identified more than 130 minerals in Tibet 'with significant reserves of the world's deposits of uranium, chromite, boron,

lithium, borax, and iron. Already, there are street protests in Tibet where the Tibetans complain bitterly of rampant mining activities that pollute river waters that harm the health of humans and animals. It is also important to note that China controls the waters of the 10 major river systems that originate from Tibet and sustain the life of about 47 percent of the world's total population. Thus, the Tibetan problem, confined earlier only to the Tibetan people, has now become a pan-Asian problem.

There is also apprehension about China's real intentions of damming, and diverting rivers from the south to the north and the likely consequences of such actions on downstream nations. China's intentions in diverting Tibet's rivers, including the Brahmaputra, to northern China to alleviate the acute water crisis also point towards an imminent water conflict in the Himalayan region. The damming of rivers and the proposed river diversion schemes in Tibet come in the wake of the looming water crisis in Asia. Experts say water is poised to overtake oil as the world's scarcest vital resource. China's plans for the various uses of water of rivers originating from Tibet are intensifying the heated debate about their likely consequences for downstream nations.

Already, there are apprehensions about water wars. It is rightly observed that "The protection of the sources of water demands that no party withdraw or divert water in such a way as to affect the ecosystems ... Although intrastate water sharing disputes have become rife in several Asian countries – from India and Pakistan to Southeast Asia and China -the potential interstate conflict over shared water resources should be of greater concern." (Arpi, 2019)

Tibet: The water tower of Asia

Tibet is known as the water tower of Asia. Ten major Asian rivers, including Indus, Sutlej, Brahmaputra, Irrawaddy, Salween, Yellow, Yangtze, and Mekong originate in Tibet and they flow through countries like China, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. About two billion people are living in South and Southeast Asia who are benefitted from these rivers. China's occupation of Tibet enabled it to control the water flow as an upper riparian state which can obstruct or divert water in case of a conflict. For instance, after the Doklam crisis in 2017 China did not share Brahmaputra and Sutlej river's hydrological data for one year with India. The upper riparian data is required for the lower riparian nations for water management, flood modeling, and other related activities.

It is noted that a large quantity of water has been taken from Tibet for the development purpose of China. The strategic significance of Tibet also depends on the fact that the Tibetan plateau is the source of Asia's ten major river systems. China

is always in need of water to sustain the world's largest population (Denyer, 2016). The Transboundary Rivers originating and flowing through the Himalayan boundaries are a significant part of the freshwater biome contributing to 60 per cent of the world's freshwater, excluding Antarctica. There are 260 river basins which are home to 40 percent of the world's population. The rivers play an important role in international politics as it open areas of cooperation and shared benefits. Water relations can never be permanently settled. Interventions and diversions on rivers impact the flow. Political relations can easily be impacted by the quantitative and qualitative nature of rivers. Varied interpretations on the use of rivers have resulted in different claims of riparian countries. In the absence of international treaties on water sharing, riparian relations will become contentious. (Denyer, 2016)

Rivers flowing from China to India

There are four rivers descending from four directions of Mount Kailash in the Nagari region of Tibet to the Indian subcontinent.

- The Tackok Khabab originates in the East of Mount Kailash and flows from the upper region of Nagari down to the valley of Tsang, where it merges with the Kyichu River of Central Tibet following through Yarlung Dagpo. It then winds to the right of the Namchang Barwe Mountains into Hustang and flows through the eastern region of India becoming the Brahmaputra. It then descends into Bangladesh and finally into the Bay of Bengal.
- The Ma Cha Khabab originates in the North of Mount Kailash and flows from the region of Purang into Nepal and then through the state of Uttar Pradesh into India. It merges with the Ganga and ends up in the Bay of Bengal.
- The Languchen Khabab originates in the North of Mount Kailash and flows through Dhapa Thoding of Nagari region and becomes Sutlej River flowing through Rampur and Kannuar valley in Himachal Pradesh and then into Punjab from where it flows through Pakistan into the Arabian Sea.
- The Senge Khabab originates in the west of Kailash and flows through Ngari Gar and then becomes the Indus flowing through Ladakh, Kashmir, then through Pakistan and finally into the Arabian Sea.

The immense water resources in Tibet are a critical factor in China's Tibet policy. Further, China's territorial position on Tibet has a significant bearing on the current and future water issues with India, which is a lower riparian vis-a-vis China. However, the more complex problem is that there exist no agreements between China and Tibet about water resources. There is no reliable information on the present or proposed water related developments and projects in the upper regions of the

rivers that flow into India from Tibet which have not been addressed. Due to the prevailing unsettled border issue between the two countries, the problem gets more complicated in the absence of international law on shared waters and when one such was attempted, China voted against the convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses in the UN General Assembly in 1997. Though India and China have entered into agreements in the recent past on sharing of hydrological data for flood control, the Chinese have not been consistent in sharing the information. To build several water projects in Tibet, including a dam on the Brahmaputra, Chinese scientists have recently completed a comprehensive satellite study of cross-border Tibetan rivers completed determining their exact sources besides measuring the length of their drainage basins. (Moynihan, 1998) Thus, the lack of transparency on the part of China in river water sharing and damming of rivers originating from Tibet has further complicated India - China relations and the security threat perception of India.

Tibet is called 'Asia's water tower' as the major river system originates from there. The Qinghai-Tibet Plateau is one of the crucial water sources and stores for China. Tibet glacier and snow-fed highlands feed Asia's great rivers, the Brahmaputra, Mekong, Yangtze, Indus, Yellow, and Salween. Mineral water from the plateau has become one of the region's first commercially tapped resources since the Qinghai-Lhasa railway cut transportation costs. It is widely known that only in a peaceful atmosphere the judicious use of water is possible. An autonomous Tibet would be more empowered to assess the environmental damage affected due to overexploitation of natural resources, including water. In this context, India, China and Tibet and other affected nations need to find an amicable solution to the grave threat posed by China (Harris, 2013)

India's Unique Strategic Challenges

India's strategic challenges are in many ways unique. It is the biggest country demographically and geographically; with natural and human resources; its industrial and technological base is sizable, and a nuclear weapon state with impressive space capabilities. With all these attributes India cannot but play an important role, not only regionally, but also globally. Even if India seems to lack a thirst for power and does not pursue it with determination and a clear sense of purpose, it will not be able to survive without being one of the world's foremost powers. (Amb.Knwal, 2013). The major strength is the growing political, economic and military power and this enables India to confront the challenges. From the historical point of view, India was threatened only from the north-west, and later during the colonial period, it was the European sea-borne power that overwhelmed India, independent India is now threatened from the north. (Amb.Knwal, 2013). For

the first time in history, China threatens India's security by occupying Tibet militarily and destroying this buffer between the two countries and, civilizations. The Indian and Chinese civilizations have never been in conflict with each other and spread their influence in Asia peacefully (Moyniham, 1998). China imposed a conflict on India in 1962 even when India had recognized Tibet as part of China, which was a huge unilateral strategic intervention. It has since militarized Tibet beyond the security requirements of the situation, as India has no intention to destabilize China's hold over that territory (Mckay, 2004).

China continues to assert its claims on Arunachal Pradesh, which it now calls south Tibet. It has challenged India's sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir through its visa policy. It treats J&K and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) on a different footing, with its increased presence in POK complicating the strategic scenario for India. The Chinese President Xi Jinping recently said that 'the border issue is not easy to resolve.' It appears that China wants to retain the border issue as a pressure point on India while seeking more entry into the Indian market with its mounting economic and financial strength. (Tsering, 2016)

China had solved all border issues with its neighboring countries, including Russia. The recent standoff between soldiers of the Indian Army and the Chinese People's Liberation Army near Pangong Lake in the Union Territory of Ladakh shows China's intransigent attitude towards India. The POK has become the key to China's links to the Arabian Sea through the Karakoram Highway and Gwadar port, and China's investment plans in Afghanistan. (Moyniham, 1998) Its increased stakes in POK, including project implementation there, contrary to the argument it uses against the funding of projects in "disputed" territories by international institutions, mean that it is positioning itself as a third party in the India - Pakistan conflict over POK. (Denyer, 2016). The economic and military gap between India and China is growing. The challenge for India is to build its own economic and military strength while also forging partnerships with others that could act as restraints on the expansionist moves by China. In this context, India should focus more on the strategic and security issues in Tibet (Amb.Knwal, 2013). An autonomous Tibet along India's border is more important to ensure its security and stability in the region than sharing an unsettled border with a hostile China (Lafitte, 2013).

Conclusion

The Tibetan plateau is home to the Himalayas, the world's tallest mountain range. The water originating from the plateau feeds rivers flowing out of China across continental Asia. All the major 10 river systems of Asia including the Indus, Sutlej, Brahmaputra Irrawaddy, Salween, and the Mekong originate from the Tibetan

plateau. Tibet also has a huge reserve of copper, lithium, gold, and silver. Most of it has never been touched, because the Tibetans had no interest in mining the land. China claims that Tibet is an integral part of it and annexed Tibet in 1950 because of its strategic and security significance. Tibet's unique history and strategic significance, sharing borders with India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar, ensure security and stability in the Himalayan region than other parts of China. Regarding the geo-political strategy, Tibet marks China's western edge and is a vital link between China, south and central Asia. Xinjiang is considered one of the ancient trade routes and invading Mongol, Chinese, Nepalese and British India. Further, in 1962, China fought a successful war with India from Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). About water, China's upper riparian position and its enormous domestic condition make water a strategic resource in the region. China values water and its utilization as fundamental to its development, and its greatest achievement being to lift more than 400 million people out of abject poverty in three decades through an accelerated pace of economic growth. Communist China's only rationale for a totalitarian regime in the age of democracy and human rights is its economic growth. Diplomatically, India needs to draw China into a water dialogue and raise the issue not only bilaterally but also multilaterally by involving Bangladesh. The principle of 'information exchange, notification and consultation' and the principles of 'no harm' are sound points on which to engage with China.

China has an ever-growing problem with water. Almost half of the Chinese water sources are so polluted that they are not fit for human consumption, so China wanted to keep Tibet. India also has issues with tap water, and the region becomes a strategically important spot to influence the whole region. Now China has control over the water flow in northeastern India. Already, there are street protests in Tibet where Tibetans complain bitterly of rampant mining activities that pollute river waters that harm the health of humans and animals. However, what China does with the waters of the 10 major river systems that originate from Tibet and sustain the life of about 47 percent of the world's total human population is another matter. It is not a problem confined to the Tibetan people alone but it has become a Pan-Asian problem. India has no choice but to safeguard economic and security interests by building dissuasion capabilities and enhancing capacities along the Northern borders and maritime domain. India can continue to lodge protests, but as the stated position is that Kashmir is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan, the protests will not be able to either stop or retard the progress of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. The prevailing environment of insecurity, militancy, and violence may pose a serious threat to the construction of the corridor; however, the strategic, economic, and political stakes being high, both Pakistan and China will ensure the completion of the project. The project once complete will be a game-changer in the

South Asian strategic and security scenario. Pakistan would strategically balance India, dominates Afghanistan, and provides a critical boost to the economy. For China, the project is pivotal to the OBOR, an alternate to Malacca Straits, and provides an access to the Indian Ocean region. Thus, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is an 'Indian dilemma' like China's 'Malacca Dilemma'. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's May 2016 visit to Iran has finally led to the signing of the Chabahar Port pact and India will develop the strategic Chabahar port. The Chabahar Port will be a game-changer for India because it will provide connectivity to Afghanistan, Iran, and Eurasia. It is also a counter to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). India aims to connect Iran's Mashhad, near the Caspian Sea, with Zahedan, next to the Afghanistan border, via a 900km rail line with the Chabahar Port will unlock a new gateway to Central Asia and Europe, bypassing the Pakistan-China arc. India will need to optimize all elements of national power and maximize its use of soft power or smart power, including diplomatic, economic, and military, informational, cultural, and political. It needs to further accelerate the ambitious "Act East Policy" to make it more dynamic and purposeful and ensure initiatives with Japan, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Mongolia which are carried to their logical conclusion. Concomitantly, India being the largest democracy in the world, the democratic country's multilateral forums including, QUAD, the quadrilateral alliance of India, the US, Australia, and Japan needs to be further strengthened.

The present force deployment along India's Northern borders is effective and capable of defending territories. In addition to the defense needs, the road-rail-air infrastructure once created will give the much-needed impetus to the development of remote border regions and contribute to education, health, tourism, and economic benefits accruing to the people of the border region. As part of pilgrimages, Indian pilgrims go to Mount Kailash and Mansarovar lakes in Tibet without taking any permission from the Chinese authorities. If China can lay claim to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh on the grounds of its cultural, historical, and spiritual links with Tibet, then India's claim to the Kailash-Mansarovar region on similar reasoning is probably more substantive. India has recently taken some positive steps to review its Tibet policy. Again, as long as the Tibetan refugees live in India, it has an active role to play in the Tibetan peaceful struggle for achieving their right to self-determination.

Thus, the question of Tibetan autonomy is closely related to the strategic and security consideration of China and India. During the Long March, of MaoTseTung had decided to annex Tibet as it considered Tibet an important area in terms of the resources available and also its strategic location, as the buffer state between British India and China. The resource availability in the roof of the world was a major

consideration of China to deny One Country Two Systems to Tibet and also de facto autonomous status. Similarly, Tibet is also an important region in the strategic and security concerns of India, however, in the initial, period Indian diplomacy failed to appreciate the strategic and security implications of Tibet to India's security. It appears that India needs to revisit its Tibet policy in the context of changing security concerns. Thus, an autonomous Tibet along India's border is a sine qua non for ensuring not only its security but stability and peace along the fragile and ecologically sensitive Himalayan region.

References

- A, M. (2009). *Tibet and the British Raj: The frontier Cadre 1904-1947*. Dharamshala: Library of Tibetan Works & Archives.
- Amb.Knwal, S. (2013). *India: Strategic Challenges and Responses*. New Delhi: Vivekananda International Foundation.
- Arpi, C. (2019). *India Tibet Relation (1947-1962)*. New Delhi: Vij Publisher.
- Denyer, S. (2016). "Tibetans in anguish as Chinese mines pollute their sacred grassland's. *The Washington Post.*, 24-30.
- Harris, T. (2013). *Geographical Diversions: Tibetan trade, Global Transactions*. United States: University of Georgia Press.
- Lafitte, G. (2013). *SpoilingTibet: China and Resource Nationalism on the roof of the world*. Zed Publisher.
- Mckay, A. (2004). *Tibet and Her Neighbours*. High Holbom: Thames & Hudson.
- Moyniham, M. (1998). The Strategic Importance of Occupied Tibet. *The Washington post*.
- Moynihan, M. (1998). The Strategic Importance of Occupied Tibet. *The Washingtonpost*, 245-259.
- Samphel, T. (2018). Director ,Tibet Policy Institute. (R. Viswambharan, Interviewer)
- Tsering.T. (2016). *China and Tibet*. London: Hurst.

Mapping Health Governance: The Encephalitis Containment Programme in Eastern Uttar Pradesh

Siddhartha Mukerji

Abstract

Health is wealth and therefore it becomes the prime responsibility of government to secure it through good quality governance. In India, special focus of health governance has been on eliminating diseases that cause high child mortality. Several action programmes were initiated in the past to eradicate chronic child diseases. In this genre, a special drive was initiated lately by the newly elected government in Uttar Pradesh to combat encephalitis, endemic mostly in the eastern parts of the state. This study is an attempt to explore the transformation of governance patterns brought in by the Encephalitis containment programme pursued by state and non-state agencies on a need-based selective engagement basis.

Keywords: Health Governance, Encephalitis, Infant Mortality, PGSS, Action Plan

Introduction

A healthy life is a basic right of all individuals. Yet it continues to be the most neglected areas of public policy on account of other policy and political priorities. Millions of people in the country die every day for the inability to access or afford medical services. Mortality rates are higher amongst women and children. The infant mortality rate for the children under 5 years of age was recorded at 39.4 deaths per 1000 live births in 2017. Although this marks a steep decline from 242 in 1960 and for first time in the history India equals the world average of IMR, the result stills appears to be disheartening when compared with countries in our own neighbourhood. India's position in South Asia doesn't appear to be better than many countries like Sri Lanka and Nepal with an IMR of 8.8 and 33.7 respectively (World Bank 2019).¹ Also, IMR varies significantly across Indian states, ranging from 47 in Madhya Pradesh to 8 the lowest in Goa in 2016. Kerala and Puducherry draw a close

with 10 IMR and Uttar Pradesh stands at 43, the fourth highest after M.P, Assam and Odisha.²

Uttar Pradesh, with its low performance on health indicators, has a large ailing population with infants constituting the bulk of it. Being one of the poorest states in the country, it is often cited as a case of failed governance. Politics in the state time long has given low priority to social policies particularly health and education as caste and religious considerations have always overridden developmental concerns. Identity appeals matter more than developmental concerns, especially during elections when parties are put to real test. Pursuing institutional change in such socio-political context thus becomes a perpetual challenge. Only a major political alarm resulting from a critical juncture can bring the leadership into action in two ways: one, by bringing in the administration of the concerned subject directly under the supervision of the central command and second, rejuvenating dormant institutions through a system of decentralized governance involving district administration, health officials, health workers, NGOs and Panchayats. Once established, the subject continues to attain policy priority in the administration and there is no looking back. Innovations continue as the programme evolves and scales new heights to further shape the institutional roles and strategies. This prompts the government to specially co-opt high-performing voluntary organizations in their policy mission. Mutuality of association leads to convergence of strategies for promoting a public programme to its pinnacle.

The sudden transformation of public health institutions in eastern Uttar Pradesh to combat the long overdue encephalitis menace is a good illustration of such institutional progression and good governance. It exemplifies the need for radical action to transform inert public institutions in economically-backward regions where avenues for quality public services like health and education are infinitesimal. The paper attempts to account for the innovations of health governance and institutional progression pursued by a newly-constituted government of Uttar Pradesh to strategically counter encephalitis endemic in the eastern part of the state. It argues that critical junctures in the form of a major public outcry and political resistance can cause a radical political action to streamline governance and promote institutional progression. This may not require an endogenous process of institutional change with gradual embeddedness of ideas shaping such change and producing radical transformation as they reach the tipping point. Ideas may sometimes emerge only as an immediate response to a critical situation and may then progress to produce higher levels of institutional and governance innovations. Such a line of progression is clearly eclipsed in much of the governance literature that tends to either qualify their arguments by accounting for institutional progression in relatively developed states like Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh or fail to distinguish the

subjects by their criticality to necessitate different forms of governance strategies and social change.

Explaining Governance Frameworks

Recent studies on comparative governance have focused on the forms and strategies of developmental collaboration between state and non-state agencies to affect governance outcomes. Scholarly interventions to explain the positioning of state and its partner agencies in such networked governance are noteworthy in this regard. Stepan and Hindmoor (2009)³ consider state as still the central player in the process of governance which is defined as the act of regulating, shaping and attempting to control human behaviour in order to achieve collective ends. The state, according to them, establishes strategic partnership with non-state actors. Peters and Pierre (2016) identifies such roles as steering and coordination by the state as necessary for pursuing collective interests. The state is seen to use multiple policy instruments for achieving greater innovation in its public policies. Its lead role in designing public policies is also put beyond doubt. But the state's overrated positioning as the governing agency and the sovereign player stands questioned when mutual dependency between the partner agencies is seen to balance the power relations. Such dependence may however shift in favour of either partner agency on the basis of subject of action, resources available with the respective organizations and the skills required to execute different components of a public programme. For instance, there could be more dependence on the state for logistic and infrastructure support in a health programme, whereas NGOs and voluntary organizations with their grounded knowledge will appear as lead players in the empowerment and awareness drive required for taking any social policy like health or education to its logical conclusion. Any likelihood of social rejection of even a well-designed policy will require timely intervention of the supportive voluntary organizations. This may specially be true in a subject like health where social prejudices loom high to deter rational thinking.

Mukherji and Jha (2017)⁴ also subscribe to state-led governance in which autonomy and creative spirit of bureaucratic agencies produce greater innovations in policy implementation. In their study of MNRGES in Andhra Pradesh, they account for the autonomous and innovative action of committed bureaucracy at the Department of Rural Development and the ability of the secretary at the Department to convince the chief minister for insulating the rich farmers and the construction lobbies from thwarting the programme. Creation of an independent regulator, an NGO, in the form of SSAT in 2009 to do the social auditing was an important innovative arrangement of this governance scheme. The co-option of an NGO within the state as a permanent arrangement to carry out social auditing was posited as a

unique strategy to promote networked governance. This may have worked well for Andhra Pradesh where ideas supporting such innovation were embedded within state institutions to produce desirable social change and policy action. Needlessly, innovations may emerge through a process of long-drawn endogenous change. But, critical junctures with an alarming public impact as the encephalitis deaths may also set the tone for a radical action plan featuring institutional change never attempted before. Secondly, once started a public programme evolves into higher stages of innovations as the state continues to look out for prospective collaborators amongst NGOs, private agencies and global institutions. Collaborations may take place at the level of central command as well as district administration. At the district level, the nature of collaboration could be more eclectic with respect to specific components of the public programme like an awareness drive, a public health campaign or monitoring of the delivery agencies in some cases. Health governance largely features such a mode of collaboration while devising innovative ways to ensure efficiency, transparency guarantees, and public participation.

Conceptualizing Health Governance

Health occupies a central place in public governance. Therefore, it becomes the core responsibility of the state to respond promptly and effectively to the diverse medical needs of its citizens. The agenda figured prominently in the World Health Report 2000 published by World Health Organization. Government's role in this report was seen to be most essential in promoting good health and making it a policy priority. The active intervention of government institutions is being defined as stewardship. It implies that government still plays the principal role in the broader network that it creates with non-state actors and institutions to offer health services. Stewardship in health governance is, 'concerned with oversight of the entire system, avoiding the short-term view, tunnel vision or neglect of a system's failing.'⁵ It therefore implies an act comprehensive regulation that covers private organizations alongwith the state delivery agencies within its ambit. The report also developed a national health index based on three cardinal goals: health improvement, responsiveness to the legitimate expectations of the people and fairness of financial contribution. The four vital functions of health institutions that it identified were: service provision, resource generation, financing and stewardship.⁶

A closer reading of such a framework shows that institutional roles are intrinsically conspicuous in designing and delivering public services. These roles may be carried out within a wider organizational network of state and non-state actors. While the strategies to undertake a programme may be formed independently at different institutional levels. Execution would require collaboration followed by integration of strategies and sometimes resources. While state remains the key actor

it doesn't show itself as the power centre in the organizational network. Also, the form and intensity of engagement between the partner agencies and their own outlook as a deliverer of the service varies from subject to subject. In the health sector, the activism and autonomy on the part of voluntary organizations is much higher considering the criticality of a situation and the impact on public life. The association evolves in a way that while carrying out their roles independently, the partner agencies seek the engagement and assistance whenever the need arises on each side. In place of a compulsory association that creates power dependence on actors with greater resources and organizational capacities, an informal pattern of networking emerges to secure ones autonomy while getting and offering assistance to the other whenever sought. Mutual learning follows without dependence on either side for sustaining an independently-framed health programme. More importantly, such association based on need-based selective engagement enhances each organization's capacities to learn and adapt their strategies in a given social environment. A long-standing compulsory association causing power and ego clashes from time to time would have dampened such mutuality. Encephalitis containment programme in eastern Uttar Pradesh has clearly witnessed this form of an engagement shaping up at different levels of execution. Involving stakeholders through active community participation is yet another imperative of health governance. In our case, pursuance by a voluntary organization to form community based organizations is a case in point.

The present study is a qualitative analysis of governance patterns based on inputs received through in-depth interviews with health officials at the Health Directorate, Lucknow; director of PGSS (a voluntary organization); a senior paediatric specialist at King George Medical University, Lucknow; and doctors and an entomologist at the BRD Medical College, Gorakhpur.

About Japanese Encephalitis

Japanese Encephalitis (JE), a variant of encephalitis, is a viral disease that is commonly found in sub-tropical regions during monsoon season when the heat and humidity levels are significantly high. It first emerged in Japan in 1924 and thereafter in China. While it dropped steadily in these countries, it became endemic by the late-1960s in many South-East Asian countries. The first case in India was reported at Tamil Nadu in 1955 and Uttar Pradesh in 1978. It has affected nearly 24 countries of the South, South-East Asian and Western Pacific regions and on an average 68000 clinical cases are reported every year.⁷ Studies conducted by Kumari and Joshi (2012) show that the total number of encephalitis cases in Uttar Pradesh has dramatically increased from 20.4% in 1978-87 to 56.68% in 1998-2007. In 2005 alone 90% of cases were reported from Uttar Pradesh.⁸ Out of this, on an average 44% of the

Encephalitis cases were reported from eastern Uttar Pradesh districts of Gorakhpur, Basti, Doeria, Siddhartha Nagar, Sant Kabir Nagar and Padrauna. Studies conducted by Murhekar et.al shows that Gorakhpur and Basti divisions have maintained the highest record of encephalitis cases with the BRD Medical College alone registering approximately 1500-2000 cases each year.⁹ In 2005, Gorakhpur BRD Medical College, where majority of patients from the city and neighbouring towns and villages are admitted witnessed the highest number of encephalitis deaths in 2015. The patients were primarily children between 3 to 15 years of age. Most of them hailed from either Gorakhpur or Basti districts. It is also reported that in Gorakhpur nearly 25,000 children have died due to encephalitis in last 40 years.¹⁰ Most recently in 2017 the death toll went up to 1378 in Gorakhpur.

JE is transmitted through the *Culis* species of mosquitoes and is widespread in *Tarai* regions where the hot and humid climatic conditions facilitate mosquito breeding. But, pigs and few birds also act as amplifier hosts in the transmission process. In India, eastern Uttar Pradesh and Northern Bihar are the centres of Encephalitis where the plague hits every year during the monsoon months of July, August and September. It may continue to linger till the mid of November. Children particularly the infants are found to be the first-hand targets of this disease and thousands of them die every year for not being able to get timely and effective treatment. It is shown that around 20-30% of Encephalitis cases are fatal and the survivors live with a severe neurological disorder.¹¹ Given its strong implications for public health, the need to control it has figured as a policy priority in recent years.

Steps to Control Encephalitis

Eradication of encephalitis requires a multi-pronged, multisectoral and inter-ministerial approach. While health is ascribed as a state subject in our Constitution, the Centre has also formulated relevant health policies and programmes from time to time. The introduction of the National Vector Borne Disease Control programme by the Central Government in 2002 was a landmark development in this regard. All vector borne disease including Kala-azar, dengue, lymphatic filariasis, JE and chikungunya were integrated into this programme. Administratively, the Directorate of NVBDCP which is a part of the Technical Division of Directorate General of Health Services, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India serves as the nodal agency for managing and regulating the programme. Apart from framing basic guidelines, it also provides technical support to states through its technical manpower placed in the 17 regional offices of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. The experts pay periodic field visits to monitor the programme in addition to conducting entomological studies, resistance studies, and cross checking of blood slides for quality control.

Under this programme, a parallel institutional framework was created at the state level with a State Vector Borne Disease Control Unit under the State Directorate of Health Services of every state government. The District Chief Medical and Health Office with a District VDB Officer carries out the district –level management and the primary health centres operate as the ‘First –Referral Unit’ at the village level.¹² Subsequently, the need for a more integrated approach to mitigate JE was felt. As a result the proposal for bringing together the relevant departments dealing with public health at the Centre by the GoM constituted on 4 November 2011 and the second order of coordination at the state level was put into effect. The GoM recommended collective involvement of seven union ministries namely health and family welfare, drinking water and sanitation, women and child development, social justice and empowerment, housing and urban poverty alleviation, human resource development and rural development in implementing the proposed National Programme for Prevention and Control of JE. The idea was to bring the concerned departments under one roof for taking concerted efforts in pursuing the high-definition health programme. While the departments focused on their respective areas of action, they were made to coordinate with each other at points where the subjects overlapped.

Drawing upon these Central measures, the Uttar Pradesh government has also taken necessary steps to control J.E in the eastern part of state where it is endemic. But this was conspicuously done in response to the political turmoil over the death of 60 infants in a week at BRD Medical College (Gorakhpur) in 2017, most of whom were suffering from encephalitis. This was the first of its kind resistance meted out on the chief minister by the opposition forces and that too in his home constituency. The incumbent government was held culpable for its callous approach towards health administration. In this political context, the authorities sprang into action with relevant administrative injunctions and policy measures to combat encephalitis. The chief minister’s direct intervention to prescribe the new course of action is striking in this regard. It resulted in a concerted action plan with the involvement of 12 state ministries and departments under the overall guidance of the health ministry and direct supervision of the chief minister. The health ministry has also been instrumental in locating departments dealing with subjects having direct bearing on encephalitis and fixing responsibilities at their respective ends. For instance, as the infected pigs are the carriers of the disease, the animal husbandry department is required to take appropriate measures in controlling pig rearing in affected colonies. Similarly, the panchayat ministry and Nagar Nigam of the respective districts are responsible for maintaining proper sanitation and hygiene in rural and urban vicinities respectively.¹³

*The Action Plan 2018*¹⁴

In pursuance of the action plan to combat encephalitis, two major concerns gauged at community and institutional levels respectively got due attention. First, the gaps in usability of the public services were identified. It was found that in a large number of cases, children suffering with encephalitis were taken to quacks and were brought to B.R.D Medical College only when their condition became critical. So, the first-hand treatment in a government hospital required to secure the patients from reaching a state of critical illness was kept at bay. Given such ignorance of the rural poor, an awareness drive corroborated with community participation became a prior necessity. Therefore to enhance community participation, the Department involved the health workers as frontrunners in the door-to-door awareness campaign in rural vicinities carried out in three phases since April 2018. The first phase that began in April disseminated preventive messages followed by both curative cum preventive messages in July and a special drive for communicating curative facilities in October. The awareness campaign used various other means like hoardings, banners, posters, folk groups, community radio to disseminate these messages. The Gram Pradhans were also co-opted as first-hand information providers in their respective vicinities and were required to collaborate with the community workers to carry out the awareness drive. A high-octane campaign was personally led by the chief minister in the last phase. It was therefore a well-coordinated awareness drive that included both state and non-state actors as promoters.

Organizationally, the Encephalitis centres of the seven districts in eastern UP lacked proper logistics, monitoring and training of medical personnel. This necessitated designing of new public institutions for better learning, adaptability and efficiency (Stoker, 2014). A policy drive required to engender a major transformation may principally require a desirable institutional framework to set the functional components of a system in order. Needlessly, this is a prior requirement in the health sector where the stakes of institutional failure and therefore the political costs of failed governance are invariably high. Keeping this in view, the government embarked upon new institutional measures to streamline and upgrade its medical services. To begin with, 104 Encephalitis Treatment Centres (ETC) were opened at the block level in the worst-affected districts of the state. These centres were deployed with 4 staff nurses, 3 ventilators and some other basic infrastructural facilities. 15 such centres were given a Paediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU) each with a paediatric specialist and necessary medical infrastructure like one ventilator and 3 beds. The monitoring of ETCs and PICUs was to be done directly by the chief minister and the health minister. It also happened for the first time that the chief minister of a state was personally inaugurating such centres in 5 districts.¹⁵ Chief Minister's direct intervention in the management and supervision of new institutions

added credibility to the newly-created architecture for health governance. It also shows that public health was required to be given priority at the highest level of management in the state.

The action plan is also a perfect embodiment of collaborative governance where the state while establishing strategic alliance with key social partners provided centralized direction in the overall management of the health programme.¹⁶ In this process, the health department has been on look-out for prospective collaborators amongst NGOs, international organizations, public sector and private companies. Presently, the department has partnered with WHO, UNICEF, Tata Trust, BPCL, Godrej and Sharnam Sansthan (an NGO) in its health mission. International agencies like WHO and UNICEF have played a significant role in monitoring the programme by seeking monthly and annual reports from the health department on the performance of ETCs, PICUs and other government hospitals in treating encephalitis. They have also provided necessary guidelines from time to time for upgrading health services in combating vector-borne diseases by the health and allied departments.

The health department's position is more of "one among equals" in the governance network. While acting as the nodal agency of health governance, it has negotiated, coordinated and facilitated its partner agencies in carrying out their prescribed tasks. To begin with, the department prepared comprehensive modules on preventing encephalitis and vector-borne diseases for the allied departments, district magistrates and chief medical officers. The modules included detailed guidelines on preventive measures to be adopted for ensuring good health, sanitation and basic hygiene especially in areas where encephalitis had become endemic. In addition, feedback was taken from the relevant departments, ETCs, and other government hospitals on delivery mechanisms, resource management, and communication strategies. This was to be reported further to WHO and UNICEF for timely modification of the existing guidelines and necessary intervention to take corrective measures.

District-level Action

The mechanism evolved to combat encephalitis can best be described as state-led decentralized governance with district administration, health officials, health workers and Panchayats as the key players. District-level management has been on the forefront in leading the health campaign with active intervention of experts or technocrats at the public health institutions. A task force under the Commissioner was constituted in every district to execute the action plan and undertake monitoring of the ETCs and PICUs at the district level from time to time. The district magistrate and the chief medical officer are also its members. In accordance with the module

prepared by the health ministry, the task force is required to prescribe preventive measures for the citizens to be disseminated at every hospital and peripheral health institutions through relevant communication modes. This includes a list of do's and don'ts to prevent mosquito breeding and maintaining good health and hygiene in the residential colonies. A glimpse of the large banners at BRD Medical College (Gorakhpur) carrying such information was taken while walking through the inner circle of the campus. An entomologist and a public health expert at the hospital informed that such banners have also been put up in peripheral health institutions and highlights basic hygiene measures that citizen's must undertake at their level and facilities that the government provides for getting the treatment.

Strengthening the peripheral health institutions has been yet another imperative of the health mission. The task force besides providing logistic and resource support, has monitored the service providers from time to time. By conducting on-the-spot inspection at the ETCs, PICUs and other health centres it has brought into light the irregularities in service availability, the staff in absentia, and maladministration at the peripheral level. The inspecting officer could seek records on patients and staff and cross-verify the information provided to look for the spurious ones. The active intervention of the task force in this manner has not only minimized false reporting but has improved citizen's access to health services.¹⁷ A senior doctor in the paediatrics department of BRD Medical College informed that one reason why encephalitis cases have dropped in last one year is because the peripheral institutions have been emboldened to do the needful at their end. Timely intervention by these institutions to provide treatment at their level has allowed the doctors and medical staff at BRD Medical College to provide quality services with limited number of patients. This implies that strategic management of the peripheral institutions has not only strengthened them but has unwittingly improved the services of big hospitals. Similarly, this has also reduced the number of referred cases from eastern UP like Gorakhpur at King George Medical University, Lucknow as informed by a paediatric specialist at the hospital.

Role of PGSS¹⁸

NGO and voluntary organizations, referred to as the social economy (Stroker 2014) have come to occupy the third space in the governance arena. Their active intervention in the health sector has been particularly notable. In this genre, the lead role of Purvanchal Gramin Seva Sansthan, Gorakhpur (PGSS) in fostering community participation and securing public health provides a good illustration of collaborative governance. Its encephalitis containment project dates back to 2011 when it decided to undertake the campaign independently to the high-risk areas of Gorakhpur rural. To begin with, a five –year plan from 2011-15 was framed with a

multipronged action strategy to prevent the spread of the epidemic and provide necessary assistance to the affected population in getting medical services. The plan programme included short-term relief measures as well as a long-term preventive action plan to mitigate the scourge. While carrying this out in its own right, PGSS has been assisted by the government and private organizations from time to time. The readiness with which the organization made a dent on the health disorder promoted the government to collaborate with it in its own health campaign in an eclectic manner.

The project was kick-started in 2011 by identifying 70 high-risk villages where the programme could be systematically implemented. The first task was to give medical relief to the patients under critical condition as an immediate step to save the ailing children. In view of this, ambulance support was provided to 25 such children to get them to PHCs or the closest district hospital. Four of them died, while those who survived with severe disability were rehabilitated by the organization. As informed, this support service continues even till date but gets provided with necessary assistance from public and private health centres.

On the curative side, the government gives special priority to the patients with referral cards issued by PGSS. The referral cards are provided by PGSS to encephalitis patients by carefully examining their health status and the urgency to get medical treatment. This helps in identifying genuine cases of JE and exclude those that show similar symptoms but concerns some other health disorder like viral infection that are equally endemic during the monsoon season. In a way, this also mitigates the public panic in high-risk areas where every health order showing similar symptoms as JE is taken to be JE.

The preventive action plan being the most significant part of the campaign was directed towards eliminating encephalitis from its root in the long run. It mainly included a massive cleanliness drive to purify the surroundings, an awareness campaign, community participation and management of animal husbandry. In carrying out many of these tasks, the PGSS received resource and logistic support from the district administration and health officials. As a foremost step, the programme focused on creating a sanitized environment to prevent mosquito breeding. For this, around 5893 hand-pumps were bleached and the water bodies in nearly 70 villages were treated with chlorine tablets. In the course of the cleanliness drive, the PGSS workers also discovered that a local fish by the name of *gambujia* consumed mosquitoes in the ponds. Since then, the fish is being bred in large numbers to be put in drains, ponds and watered fields for devouring the mosquitoes found therein. *Gambujia* farming has not only addressed the mosquito menace but has unwittingly emerged as an occupation and a new source of income for the poor farmers.

The awareness campaign is the backbone of the action plan. It has scaled new heights in sensitizing the people about public health and environmental imperatives. In all, the PGSS has organized around 150 awareness programmes comprising street plays and puppet shows in the village primary schools. An innovative leg of this campaign was the creation of an Awareness Rath, a caravan offering visual displays like documentary films and cartoon programmes on preventing encephalitis by maintaining clean environment. The success of the awareness drive in Gorakhpur prompted the district magistrates of nearby Kushinagar and Maharajgunj districts to invite PGSS for carrying out a similar exercise in their villages. This is yet another instance of co-option and collaborative governance. It exemplifies a form of collective action where there is a high degree of dependability on the partner agency to take a public programme to its logical conclusion. Second, convergence of the plan agendas framed independently by the partner agencies indicates the mutuality of association to promote public welfare. The independently framed agendas become mutually reinforcing as a higher order of association is established between the partner agencies.

PGSS has identified community participation as an indispensable strategy to drive its encephalitis containment programme. To this end, it has formed community-based organizations (CBOs) at the village level proportionately represented by women, youth and senior citizens. Each CBO is constituted with 50-60 adult residents of the village and officiated by a leader designated by PGSS. It acts in the capacity of a field agency to carry out the tasks prescribed to them by PGSS. The tasks mainly include bleaching of the hand-pumps, breeding *gambusia* fishes at appropriate places to eliminate mosquitoes, maintaining proper sanitation and organizing orientation programmes for sensitizing the villagers about health and environmental imperatives from time to time.

Management of piggeries was yet another important task to prevent the spread of encephalitis. As pigs are the hosts to mosquitoes causing encephalitis, the prevalence of the disease is higher in areas where they are reared in large numbers. Acknowledging this, PGSS undertook a massive vaccination programme in the piggeries with the support of the government veterinaries. Additionally, it has trained pig owners on ways and means to sanitize their piggeries and prevent mosquito breeding in their vicinity. Doctors from its private partner agency, Fatima hospital, assist the PGSS staff in this regard. In this way, collective involvement of private and government medical personnel with PGSS has not only rationalized the process of animal husbandry in the piggeries but has brought in new innovations to undertake environmentally-conscious rural management.

The Gram Pradhans, ANM and Anganwadi workers have been co-opted as active participants in the aforesaid activities. Familiar with the socio-cultural

contexts, they provide relevant feedback on the feasibility of preventive strategies devised by PGSS. Such inputs were useful in identifying the untrained rural medical practitioners (RMPs) and curbing their malpractices to exploit the ignorant patients. The RMPs have assumed a dominant position in the rural health sector by taking advantage of people's vulnerability and ignorance in the villages. Their longstanding presence as unqualified medical practitioners and health services still being out of reach in many remote villages have increased the dependence of ignorant people on them. Many patients who were brought to BRD Medical College in critical condition were the ones who had received prolonged treatment from the RMPs until their position was made worse and incurable.

The social action programme has helped in striking at the roots of encephalitis through social empowerment of the ignorant villagers who become easy victims of the syndrome. Lately, especially since the 2017 outbreak, PGSS has undertaken a large-scale rehabilitation programme for the disabled children. It continues to serve as a shelter home to these children with all the medical help and assistance from the doctors and staff of Fatima hospital, its private partner agency. PGSS's rehabilitation programme has complimented the action plan of government aimed for making a frontal attack on encephalitis. More importantly, the developmental collaboration between government and PGSS continues to strengthen the mutually-executed public programme in attaining a higher order of governance to secure public health.

Challenges

The multi-cornered strike on encephalitis has mitigated its occurrence. But its eradication still remains a distant goal. The 2017 outbreak was return of encephalitis after a gap of 7 years as a senior paediatrician associated with the campaign commented. It called for immediate political action to transform health institutions by setting the peripheral ones in order while leaving ample scope for quality services at district hospitals. These institutions were invigorated by equipping them with required medical infrastructure and well-trained staff. But at times even this seems ineffective when the general infrastructure to support quality services is scarcely available. Government's own monitoring of ETCs reported serious shortages of basic infrastructure like electricity required to run the ventilators and other machines at the treatment centres. Delivery of services in any sector is principally supported by two kinds of infrastructure- the domain infrastructure which is directly linked with the services offered and the general infrastructure that drives the former. In the health sector for instance, the domain infrastructure encompasses ventilators, oxygen cylinders and other medical equipments whereas power supply, internet facility, and hospital furniture would constitute the general infrastructure. Shortage of general infrastructure being a perennial problem in the state continues to debilitate

the domain infrastructure in all social sectors. The ineffectiveness of ETCs at many places is much to do with this predicament.

Secondly, orienting the government to serve its citizens is much simpler than orienting the citizens themselves towards their moral duties because given the pressures of democratic politics a crisis producing a public outcry is enough to get the government into action but is too little to break long-standing social prejudices. Such a dilemma has caused serious problems in convincing the ignorant people dependent on RMPs and quacks to seek first-hand treatment at the government hospitals. It was reported that the encephalitis symptoms often generate a feeling of a devil trap or evil possession of the patient and compel the parents to approach a local quack for the treatment. Similarly, the vaccination programme was strongly resisted by some rural families who found it unethical by their locally-interpreted religious standards.¹⁹

Also, the vaccination programme undertaken by the government fell short of meeting the targets for the partial inoculation it initiated both in 2005 and then in 2010. The medically stipulated two doses of the vaccine in 365 days that provided 97.6% immunity was not acceded by the government during the two phases of the mass vaccination drive. In place of this, just one dose that provided only 80% of the immunity was tendered. This half-hearted move was found to be principally responsible for the 2017 outbreak. It led to what a senior paediatrician associated with the campaign referred to as the “return of encephalitis”.²⁰ A discussion over the number of doses is still underway and is ridden with much political speculation.

Notwithstanding these challenges, the multi-cornered yet collaborative mission of the health campaign has taken the struggle to a much higher pedestal. The need-based selective engagement could itself be a remedy for addressing the specific challenges. Depending on the expertise and resources of the partner agency, the co-option in particular cases can help in striking the problem at its roots. For instance, PGSS with its grounded knowledge of cultural settings in rural areas may support the government in bringing social change to clear the longstanding prejudices that people hold against medical sciences due to their untrammelled faith on the local charlatans.

Conclusion

The encephalitis containment programme in eastern Uttar Pradesh is a relevant illustration of institutional progression for health governance in backward regions. An empirical account of its planning and execution posits three interrelated postulates of health governance. First, sometimes a crisis in the form a major public outcry is enough to bring paradigmatic change in the form and content of governance.

In our case, politicization of encephalitis deaths in the chief minister's home constituency emerged as a critical juncture for institutional change marking a significant departure from the past practices. It necessitated direct and active intervention of the chief minister in the action plan giving it greater substance and resilience.

Also, once started the path is sustained through a higher order of developmental collaboration with promising and committed non-state organizations. PGSS's active intervention in the health programme on its own and partly in collaboration with the government is a case in point. An extended collaboration also emerges between PGSS and Fatima hospital, a private health organization independent of the government counterpart. While the respective organizations commonly begin with an independently-framed action plan they subsequently merge selective components of their programme with each other. Therefore, instead of being a permanent and wholistic convergence, the engagement becomes subject and time-bound. The compatibility also remains stronger in such selective engagement. Lastly, a decentralized governing network functioning under the centralized oversight of the chief minister resolves the problem of unaccountability while expanding the roles of the local units of administration and health workers. The underlying idea is to reinvigorate dormant institutions and actors at every level so that the best of all could be harnessed through collective action. This may also have a snowballing effect to eliminate other chronic ailments that continue to fracture public health in the state.

Notes

- 1 <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT?locations=IN>, Official website of World Bank, accessed on 12 March 2019
- 2 <http://niti.gov.in/content/infant-mortality-rate-imr-1000-live-births>, Official website of Niti Ayog, Government of India, accessed on 14 March 2019
- 3 Stephen Bell and Andrew Hindmoor. 2009. *Rethinking Governance: The Centrality of the State in Modern Society*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- 4 Rahul Mukerji and Himanshu Jha. "Bureaucratic Rationality, Political Will and State Capacity: MNRGES in Undivided Andhra Pradesh", *Economic and Political Weekly*. 9 December 2017. 52 (5)
- 5 http://apps.who.int/gb/archive/pdf_files/WHA53/ea4.pdf, "Health Systems: Improving Performance", *World Health Report 2000*, World Health Organization, p.3, accessed on 14 April 2019
- 6 Ibid., p.3
- 7 <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/japanese-encephalitis>, World Health Organization, published on its website on 31 December 2015., accessed on 18 April 2019
- 8 <http://www.searo.who.int/publications/journals/seajph/whoseajphv1n4p374.pdf>, Roop Kumari and Pyare L. Joshi. "A Review of Japanese Encephalitis in Uttar Pradesh", India., *WHO South East Asia of Public Health*, 2012, 1 (4), p.376, accessed on 1 May 2019

- 9 Manohar Murhekar, Jeromie Wesley, Vivan Thangaraj, Mahima Mittal and Nivedita Gupta. "Acute Encephalitis Syndrome in Eastern Uttar Pradesh: Changing Etiological Understanding". *Journal of Medical Entomology*, Oxford, January 2018, 20 (10), p.1
- 10 This is an official figure quoted by Indian Express. 4 September 2017, Lucknow
- 11 <https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/89/10/10-085233/en/>, Grant L. Campbell, et.al. "Estimated Global Incidence of Japanese Encephalitis: A Systematic Review", *Bulletin of World Health Organization*, 3 August 2011, accessed on 1 May 2019
- 12 https://dghs.gov.in/content/1364_3_NationalVectorBorneDiseaseControlProgramme.aspx, official website of Directorate General of Health Service, Government of India, accessed on 2 May 2019.
- 13 Interview with Official, BRD Medical College, Gorakhpur
- 14 A large part of the information was sought through interview with an official at the Health Directorate, Uttar Pradesh
- 15 Interview with an official at the Health Directorate, Uttar Pradesh
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Interview with the entomologist and public health expert at the BRD Medical College, Gorakhpur
- 18 The information provided is based on inputs received at an in-depth interview with Director, PGSS
- 19 Interview with Director, PGSS
- 20 Interview with a senior pediatrician doing private practice, he was instrumental in opening the pediatrics department in BRD Medical College when the first case of encephalitis appeared in Gorakhpur in 1974. Presently, he runs a campaign against encephalitis in Gorakhpur and nearby affected districts of Basti, Kushinagar and Deoria.

References

- Bell, Stephen and Andrew Hindmoor (2009). *Rethinking Governance: The Centrality of the State in Modern Society*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Mukerji, Rahul and Himanshu Jha (2017). "Bureaucratic Rationality, Political Will and State Capacity: MNRGES in Undivided Andhra Pradesh", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 9 December. 52 (5)
- Murhekar, Manohar, Jeromie Wesley, Vivan Thangaraj, Mahima Mittal and Nivedita Gupta (2018). "Acute Encephalitis Syndrome in Eastern Uttar Pradesh: Changing Etiological Understanding". *Journal of Medical Entomology*, Oxford, January, 20 (10)
- Peters, Guy and John Pierre (1998). "Governance Without Government: Rethinking Public Administration". *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 8 (2)
- Stoker, Gerry (2014). "Governance as Theory: Five Propositions" in Bidyut Chakrabarty and Mohit Bhattacharya's Eds., *Public Administration: A Reader*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press
- Indian Express* (4 September 2017), Lucknow
- <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT?locations=IN>, Official website of World Bank
- <http://niti.gov.in/content/infant-mortality-rate-imr-1000-live-births>, Official website of Niti Ayog, Government of India

- http://apps.who.int/gb/archive/pdf_files/WHA53/ea4.pdf, "Health Systems: Improving Performance", *World Health Report 2000*, World Health Organization
- <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/japanese-encephalitis>, World Health Organization, published on its website on 31 December 2015
- <http://www.searo.who.int/publications/journals/seajph/whoseajphv1n4p374.pdf>, Roop Kumari and Pyare L. Joshi. "A Review of Japanese Encephalitis in Uttar Pradesh", India., *WHO South East Asia of Public Health*, 2012, 1 (4)
- <https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/89/10/10-085233/en/>, Grant L. Campbell, et.al. "Estimated Global Incidence of Japanese Encephalitis: A Systematic Review", *Bulletin of World Health Organization*, 3 August 2011
- https://dghs.gov.in/content/1364_3_NationalVectorBorneDiseaseControlProgramme.aspx, official website of Directorate General of Health Service, Government of India, last accessed on 2 May 2019

The Security Implications of Indo-Israel Space Cooperation in the Context of South Asia

Sivakumar M.V.* and Rakhil K.

Abstract

Space technologies provide immense power to the nations in the international affairs and space has transformed from the curiosity factor to the national security imperative in the present world system. The major developments in space arena began in the cold war period between the two rival powers- the USA and the USSR. The disintegration of Soviet Union has brought enough structural changes in the world system and USA thrived to be the super power. Several countries including India and Israel emerged and aspired to become technologically advanced especially in space technologies. India and Israel possess immense potential to unlock the power equations in the South Asian context with their mutually advanced space capabilities.

Keywords: National security, Space power, Geopolitics, Strategic Interests

Introduction

The outer space has become one of the major powerful domains where every country aspires to achieve progress and portray their power status. The international system is currently under major transition where nation's space capabilities have huge voice in world order. The Notion of Space power is universal and there is no clear definition regarding the same. Probably, one of the early attempts to define it was done as late as 1988. Lt Col David Lupton, in his book titled 'On Space Warfare: A Space Power Doctrine', published by Air University (U.S.) Press, offered the formal definition that "Space power is the ability of a nation to exploit the space environment in pursuit of national goals and purposes and includes the entire astronautical capabilities of the nation" (Lele, 2013). Since the advent of mankind, outer space has always been an item of curiosity to the people down here and it was this curiosity which ignited the human beings to make efforts in exploring the deeper space. Today

* This research paper is part of major research project, 'Indo-Israel Strategic Partnership in the Contemporary Context', sponsored by Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi.

developments in space could be considered an essential tool in the determination of global power status and space has transformed from the curiosity factor to the national security imperative in the present world system. We, human beings have been venturing into space since October 4, 1957 when the USSR launched Sputnik, first artificial satellite to the orbital earth. This happened during the political hostility between the USA and the USSR, known as the cold war (National Geographic, 2022). The space race continued between the two blocs resulting in the attainment of several space enabled technologies and aspired several nations from the developed to developing nations to believe in space exploration.

The journey in space undertaken by few states so far and the quest of others to join the select group of space faring nations demonstrate that a relationship exists between national identity and space technologies. Countries have historically justified space exploration by appealing to one (or a grouping) of five different motivations: human destiny, geopolitics, national security, economic competitiveness, and scientific discovery (Lele, 2013). The end of cold war and disintegration of the Soviet Union have brought structural changes in the international arena and changed the foreign policy of almost all the countries in the world where India was not an exception. India after independence maintained a pro-Arab policy and does not want to recognize the state of Israel, formed after the partition of Palestine. India reiterated that it does not want to recognize and establish full diplomatic relations with Israel on the cost of its Arab friendship. However, India accepted the state of Israel in 1950 but continued the political hostility towards Israel up to 1990s on the lines of its Muslim population sentiments.

India's dependence on Arab for Oil, liquid gas imports, remittance from the gulf nations, its self-assigned duties to the mere Palestine cause and its long alliance with the USSR have hindered the path of relations with the Jewish state (Ciprut, 2017). The structural changes in international system in 1990s changed the orientation of foreign policy of every nation around the world and opened the door of wider possibilities in several nation-to-nation collaborations. Among them space technologies became an important domain and started gearing up its relevance in the determination of power in the world. Today, Israel and India have undergone several transitions involving ups and downs resulting in the strong bilateral cooperation between the two. The changing governments in India played a significant role in the determination of India-Israel relations. Israel has become the second largest arms supplier to India and Israel considers India as a suitable and huge market for its arms sales. The bilateral partnership between India and Israel has growing steadily since 1992 when formal diplomatic relations were established between the two. The current situation enables India and Israel to engage and cooperate in several fields including space sector.

Years after the launch of first satellite Sputnik (1957), it has been realized that space exploration assumes a critical role in defining the growth, success and at times, superiority of the state. Significant achievements in this arena have impacted the feeling of nationalism. The journey of space undertaken by few states so far and the quest of others to join the select group of space faring nations demonstrate that a relationship exists between national identity and space technologies. The concept of Asian region is gaining its momentum in the current world order. The emerging Asia is no longer been viewed with the earlier stereotyped vision as a quagmire of poverty, illiteracy, religious fundamentalism and border disputes. Among the Asian states mainly Japan, China and India have significant investments in the space arena. Israel also to an extent could be said to belong to this club with their investments limited (Lele, 2013).

India's Space Capabilities

India's entry into the space age was its deep commitment to big science during the post-independence period. India, today has end to end capabilities in space; the country builds and launches its own heavy-duty rockets; designs and fabricates some of the most sophisticated satellites (Bagla, 2014). India's achievement in success of 'Mangalyaan', 'Chandrayaan' missions and its most modern launching vehicles has placed India at top of the space elite club. Despite technological, industrial and financial constraints, India is emerging as a major space power in the 21st century, which hopefully will provide the necessary impetus for technological self-reliance (Choudhury, 1998). Indian space program has evolved over the last few decades. The initial target was mainly on the development of space assets which could supplement the country's basic needs. There has been considerable shift in the policy perspective of space sector from the traditional civilian angle to national security one. The emergence of China and unpredictable Pakistan guided Indian space policy with the primary concern, its national security. The space programme of India initially focused on developing space assets that provided direct developmental benefits like in telecommunication, remote sensing satellites etc., that helped both in improving communication facilities and giving direct assistance to Indian farmers. But over the time, India has shifted a part of its focus towards space exploration and other high-profile missions that do not have any clear developmental purpose as earlier. These includes India's moon and mars missions (Rajagopalan, 2019).

Many a time, India being a developing country with its own share of problems is often criticized for allocating the essential resources for its space program. Despite having several socioeconomic problems in India, the question always arises within the country that why to invest in space? India believes and always wanted to become technologically independent. It would cost higher for a developing country like India

to import most modern technologies in order to accomplish its security requirements. Therefore, India developed a wide variety of Indigenous technology in space that makes her position powerful in international arena. Indian space program has developed a name for itself over the years in terms of low cost and high returns missions. Some of the remarkable achievements among them were the missions to mars and moon and the launch of more than a hundred satellites into orbit onboard a single launch vehicle (Kabir, 2019).

Geostrategic compulsions motivated India to achieve a position of its own in the areas of science and technology. The quest for self-reliance and indigenization has allowed and facilitated considerable advance in the space research (Husain, 1987). The origins and the evolution of Indian Space program is one of the most inspiring stories of India since its independence in 1947. The reason behind this is the context in which the country's space program developed. India was featuring very low in almost all the socio-economic indicators when the launch of Sputnik 1 took the world by storm. India was struggling as a third world country with a barrage of problems. To think of having a space program of its own at that time was in itself a very 'idealistic' idea. Many believed that India was not in a position to spend on something which 'elite nations' would do (Jha, 2018).

The history of Indian Space program began with its decision to go to space by forming the Indian National Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) in 1962 under Dr. Vikram Sarabhai's vision. The formation of Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in 1969 succeeded INCOSPAR. The pioneer of Indian space programme, Dr. Vikram Sarabhai knew the role and relevance of Space advancements in nation Building, provided the ISRO the necessary direction to perform as an agent of development (ISRO, 2022). ISRO has over the years maintained its goal of using space tech for the service of the nation. It has gradually become one of the six largest space agencies in the world. India has one of the largest fleets of communication satellites (INSAT) and remote sensing (IRS) satellites. These satellites cater to the increasing demand for fast and reliable communication and earth observation respectively (Kuchroo, 2022).

The space domain is changing, along with it, is the use of space. Perhaps it would be more accurate to state that access to and use of space is being broadened, which in general is a positive trend, but it does have consequences which could affect the stability of the space environment (Samson, 2014). Today there are more than 60 countries indulged in space related activities in the world and primarily depend on the information gathered from it. Countries view the space technology as their primary source of power as far as the national security is concerned. India has accomplished an excellent system of space technologies with its own indigenous

efforts apart from its socioeconomic challenges. Therefore, space technology is becoming an essential part of national security and international stability.

Israel's Contribution in Space Technologies

Israel has a 30-year tradition of space activity in developing, operating and launching satellite in space. In the early 1980's in order to fulfill acute security needs, Israel embarked on an ambitious space program which placed it among the group of states which are capable of self-production, maintenance and control of satellites and launchers (Paikowsky, et al., 2015). Israel's space program began with University based research in the early 1960's and at the beginning of 1980's, Israel set its sights on developing the Industrial and scientific Infrastructure required for full-fledged membership in the space community (Bhattacharjee, 2016). The creation and advancements of Israel's Space program was an extension programme of the country's defence infrastructure network. Israel officially entered the space age by the lift of its first satellite 'Ofek-1' from the locally built 'Shavit' launch vehicle on September 19, 1988. With that launch Israel joined the exclusive club of countries- Russia, US Japan, England, India, France and China- that have developed, launched and produced their own satellites (JVL, 2022).

Development of ballistic missile were essential for the survival of a country, surrounded by hostile Arab neighbours, whose intent were on physical annihilation of the Jewish state and the achieved ballistic missiles capabilities subsequently enabled space launches (Gruntman, 2017). The subsequent launches of 'ofek' series satellites enabled Israel to become one of top space faring nations during a short period of time. These satellites enabled Israel in collection and gathering of information, which spurred its geopolitical and national interests. The underlying success of 'ofek' series satellites pushed Israel to think on the development of miniaturization of satellites which could be cost effective and reliable. Israel's contribution in Laser technology, topographical mapping, radiation technology, manufacturing of enhanced nuclear fuel and the experiments in Micro Gravity Technology places the country in elite club of space technology.

The geographical factor plays a vital role in the space launches of Israel. The political constraints limit possible launch azimuth to western directions against the earth's rotation. In Israel's case, political considerations do not allow space launches in the eastern direction so the country has to launch satellites over the Mediterranean Sea in the western direction, against the earth's rotation (Gruntman, 2017). The ideal location for launching rockets into space is at the equator as such launching away from the equator may invite high risks. Here comes the significance of geography of India, where rocket launches are extensively done with accuracy. India becomes an important option for Israel to accomplish its space related technological advancements.

Israel is a small country but, in many senses, the activities which it has consciously undertaken out of recognition of its disadvantage have enabled it to undergo a process of enrichment, which has left other states in the region trailing behind. The space program assists Israel in strengthening its national security, enables it to tackle the security challenges which it faces and provides it with international prestige, and all that with modest budgets (Nardon, 2003). Israel needs to formulate a strategical policy which escalates its space ambitions and national interests in the region. The political hostility between the Arab and the Israel makes the situation tough for Israel's interests in the region.

Space Technologies in Asian Context: India and Israel

India and Israel share similar challenges to their societies from radicalism and terrorism apart from many other emerging developments on the geopolitical landscape. India considers major threats perceptions emanating from the border with China and Pakistan while Israel is surrounded by neighbours whom they consider as hostile (PTI, 2021). India's policy towards Palestine influenced its approach towards the state of Israel. China and Pakistan play a significant role in the determination of Indian foreign policy and both are historical space nations having invested in the space since the 1960's. Both countries have viewed investments in space as a part of their national development goals and a mechanism to establish autarky, help develop and sustain regime legitimacy, augment internal national pride and garner external prestige. The strategic dimension of space for China was brought to bear during the first gulf war as China watched US space-based support coordinate its forces beyond line of sight, target and track integrated air defense systems (IADS) and its Global positioning system (GPS) for precision strikes and to anticipate incoming missiles. This was a strategic shock for China, who until then had developed defense systems vis-à-vis the United States, primarily based on surface to air missiles systems. The 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis was another wake up call when China lost sight of the two of its missiles over the strait, allegedly due to the United States cutting off the GPS signal over the pacific. Consequently, China developed its own version of GPS-the 'Beidou' satellite navigation system.

For India, strategic dimension of space for Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and for national security was realized after an Indian intelligence failure to detect the Pakistani incursions into the Kargil sector of India in 1999. India also viewed China's rapid advances in space supported military deployment activities as a serious threat, especially in the Indo- China border regions of upper Himalaya and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). India is focused on developing traditional space goals like satellite launches, sending human to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and prestige

missions like those to the Moon and the Mars. But China always aims to extend its space systems to beyond borders. India has recently developed institutions to support its own national security and commercial space sectors with the primary center of focus being the traditional view (Goswami, 2022).

The USA and India have been collaborating in space since 1960's and moved ahead and mutually sought to intensify both civilian and military aspects of space technology. The Washington played a vital role in laying the foundations of Indian space programme. The single most important factor that the afflicted bilateral relationship was the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and regime found itself locked in a highly frictional and disputatious relationship with Washington (Bommakanti, 2019). The nuclear test by India in 1974 and 1999 has created concern to the United States and India's closeness towards Russia strategically signaled Washington to rethink its policy towards India. But at the same USA knew that Partnership with India is at most necessary in order to counter the aggressive China and the growing terrorism in the region.

In recent years, several Arab countries have sped up research, development and collaborations in the field of space in order to establish an independent technological-scientific infrastructure. The UAE and the Saudi Arabia are taking the lead using their vast economic resources for research, commercial and even for military purposes (Guzansky, 2019). Several other Arab countries including Jordan also indulged in space exploratory activities because they don't want to lag behind Israel and Iran, who were technologically advanced in space sector. The entry of Arab nations in the space sector has created concern over the Israel. The Arab countries view of space technology through the prism of security could pose a threat to Israel in the region. Israel needs to understand and evaluate the motives and objectives that drive the situation of security in the region.

Space technologies afford many advantages to the states which utilize it: the ability to observe from space, improvement of intelligence gathering, increased deterrent capabilities based on perceptions of capability, a diminishing sense of uncertainty, augmented offensive and defensive capabilities, keeping pace with modern military standards, creating an advanced information society, and cooperation with other countries (Paikowsky, 2007). Indo- Israel cooperation have become an unquestionable strategic asset to the country's national security. Both India and Israel are concerned about the hostility in their own regional sphere and does not want their countries to compromise their national interests. India and Israel relations have been very close and cordial under the leadership of Narendra Modi since 2014. Diplomatic relations between the two completed 30 years. The two countries have the immense potential in all spheres of development including the civilian and military perspective. The change in the leadership on both sides definitely

has a strong hold in the formulation of its foreign policy. Both countries need to unleash their power in various sectors to take their bilateral ties to the next level. Space technologies prove to be an essential soft power through which nations can project and alter the power status in the world order. Though, Israel and India have a strong strategic partnership since 2017. The active functioning of 29 Indo-Israeli centers of excellence in different parts of India, benefiting millions of farmers on daily basis showcases the potential and also depicts that both can indulge in several fields with their own experiences and expertise.

Space is considered as an essential platform where nations can project their power status both regionally and globally. Ties between the two nations flourished since 1992 primarily due to common strategic interests and security threats. Israel, having hostile relations with Arab and India on the other side having Pakistan and China as primary security threats, makes India and Israel to sit around a table and share their friendship. India and Israel are mainly engaged in defense cooperation and various sectors between them has been untouched and both need to overcome the vulnerability of their religious extremist neighbours and work productively on global issues like climate change, water security, population explosion and food scarcity (Chaudhury, 2022)

The link between India and Israel which spans both history and the present period, may open the door for later collaboration in satellites, technology and space. Israeli water management technology and expertise in manufacturing of defense equipments could help India to bolster its power capabilities. Israel remains a major source of India's niche defense requirements particularly in missiles, including the joint development of long-range surface to air missiles (LRSAM) and medium range surface to air missiles (MRSAM). Beyond defense India and Israel are partners in other high-tech fields relating to agriculture, health, biotechnology, nanotechnology, desalination, waste water recycling and waste management and processing (Ahmed, 2022).

The US president Donald Trump's announcement of formation of Space Force as the sixth branch of the United States military, is a clear-cut message to Russia, China and other countries that space is viewed as war-fighting domain especially with an eye forward safeguarding and securing its space assets. China's establishment of Strategic support force in 2015 for space and cyber operations mean that China is already ahead of the United States (Goswami, 2018). The combination of China and Pakistan in the region creates a state of concern for India's security and strategic interests. Geopolitically, India has to consider the equations of partnership in the region to cope up with the strategic ambitions both regionally and globally.

The completion of 30 years of diplomatic relations with Israel opens the way to immense possibilities and challenges too. Over these years both have built special

relationship, far away from the past and are determined to take the relationship to new heights. With India joining the Quadrilateral dialogue (QUAD), country gets a platform to seek cooperation from the like-minded minds and have informal strategic dialogue with the US, Japan and Australia with a shared objective to support a free, open and conflict free Asia-Pacific region. The recent call for the QUAD II depicts the possibilities and point out the new rearrangement of power equations in the region. QUAD II, the four-nation framework would result in the support and cooperation in several fields like Infrastructure, health, security trade and in space technologies (Karthikeyan, 2021).

India and Israel have had a low profile in the space cooperation for the last decade. The recent bilateral engagements between the two would bolster and ignite the cooperation in other fields including the space sector. Outer space is viewed through the prism of security by every nation and technological advancements in space, proves to be the ultimate power projection in the world. This eventually emphasizes the significance of bilateral cooperation between India and Israel in the present world order. Militarization of space sector would be a threat to every space faring nation, where India and Israel could play a vital role in the elimination of threat perceptions and maintain peace in the region. India and Israel could have an everlasting relationship in the sharing of technologies especially in space sector. Due to common threat perceptions, both countries need to unite and spur its technological developments and can prove an ideal example for the world society.

India-Israel Cooperation in Space

Today, India and Israel enjoy and suffer a growing reliance on space systems for day to day functions of their critical national infrastructure. Therefore both countries are eventually concerned about the rising tensions including the space militarization in their respective neighbourhoods. In this scenario, both India and Israel support mutually for their national interests and aspiration for space technologies. The Maiden and historic visit of PM Narendra Modi has entirely changed the face of Indo-Israeli relations. It has further boosted the bilateral cooperation between India and Israel including defense and space sector. The visit of PM Modi to Israel resulted in series of agreements on space technology. The first memorandum was on the cooperation of electric propulsion for small satellites, second on GEO LEO (Geosynchronous Earth Orbit-Low Earth Orbit) optical links and third was on the atomic clocks (satellite components meant to provide precise locational data) (Singh, 2022). India and Israel had been cooperating in space sector for over a decade now. ISRO had earlier received important technology support in developing small, high resolution radar imaging satellites. In 2011, Israel had supplied India with a radar imaging satellite which was later named Risat-2, which

boosted the country's defenses as it provided India with an eye in the sky to safeguard its borders (Singh, 2022).

Israeli reconnaissance satellite TecSAR, equipped with synthetic aperture radar developed by Elta Systems, was launched on 21 January 2008, by PSLV C-10 Launch Vehicle, from the Satish Dhawan Space Centre in India (Indo-Israel blog, 2022). India has been jointly developing the Barak-8 missile system, along with Israel Aerospace Industries (Madan, 2016). ISRO had launched 68 foreign satellites from Israel, along with the US, Britain, Germany, France and Canada (Bhat, 2016). The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has already successfully developed its own flagship projects of micro- and nano-satellites, which was launched in May 2016. There is significant scope for India-Israel collaboration in this sphere, furthering the scope of developing both the nations' respective space programs (Bhattacharjee, 2016). The present situation emphasizes the significance of collaboration between India and Israel both regionally and globally in space technologies. Space power is an essential soft power with which nations can project their power status and accomplish its national interests.

Conclusion

India and Israel possess immense potential in balancing the power equations in Asian region with their independent and highly sophisticated space technologies. Space advancements definitely provide strength and boost up the nation's soft power status. India and Israel were mostly conscious about their regional hostile nature and their mutual concern in this area prompted them to engage further in security related engagements. Space technology is essentially an important tool for every nation from the geopolitical point of view. In the post-cold war period, Asian region is rediscovering itself with its economical and strategical significance. The fast-growing China and hostile Pakistan in south Asia create immense concern to India. On the other hand, Israel faces greater hostility with its neighbours, especially from those having rigid relations like Iran and Saudi Arabia. India and Israel encounter similar threat perceptions in their respective regions and their mutual cooperation is significant to eliminate it. India and Israel need to formulate a pragmatic space policy and should indulge in various engagements including the space sector. The current year marks the completion of 30 years of dynamic diplomacy between India and Israel. It also entrusted them with immense possibilities and huge challenges. The current world order has witnessed the emergence of several countries in the development of space technologies. India and Israel could play an important role in the formulation of global space regime which would involve not only the disarmament agenda but also the formulation of policy towards international technological collaboration over areas of mutual concern.

References

- Ahmed, T. (2022). *The print*. Retrieved from theprint.in: <https://thepoint.in/pageturner/excerpt/why-india-wants-affair-not-serious-relationship-with-israel-stands-true/1016867/>
- Bagla, P. (2014). *Ministry of External Affairs*. Retrieved from mea.gov.in: <https://mea.gov.in/articles-in-indian-media.htm?dtl/22778/Reaching+for+the+skies++Indias+space+technology+at+its+best>
- Bhat, A. (2016). *International Business Times*. Retrieved from ibtimes: <http://www.ibtimes.co.in/indian-space-agency-bags-orders-launch-68-foreign-satellites-692052>
- Bhattacharjee, D. (2016). *Israeli Space Program- The Challenges Ahead*. New Delhi: Indian Council Of World Affairs.
- Bommakanti, K. (2019). *Observer Research Foundation*. Retrieved from orfonline.org: <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/us-india-space-cooperation-moving-away-burden-past-59282/>
- Chaudhury, D. R. (2022). *The Economics Times*. Retrieved from economictimes.indiatimes.com: <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/india-israel-launch-commemorative-logo-to-mark-30th-anniversary-of-diplomatic-ties/articleshow/89093289.cms?from=mdr>
- Choudhury, U. (1998). Twenty five years of Indian Space Programme- An Evaluation. *Economic and Political Weekly*, pp. 212-213.
- Ciprut, V. J. (2017). *Israel and India: Is the Sky the Limit?* Israel: Begin Sadat center for strategic Studies.
- Goswami, N. (2018). *The US'Space Force' and Its Implications*. The diplomat.
- Goswami, N. (2022). *The Interpreter*. Retrieved from lowyinstitute.org: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/asia-s-space-race-china-leads-india-strategy>
- Gruntman, M. (2017). *astronauticsnow*. Retrieved from astronauticsnow: <http://www.astronauticsnow.com/israelspace/index.html>
- Guzansky, Y. (2019). *Shooting for the Stars: The Arab 'Space Club'*. Tel Aviv: Institute of National Security Studies.
- Husain, T. (1987). India's Space Programme. *Strategic Studies*, 10(3), 7-9. Retrieved from <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45182711>
- Indo-Israel blog*. (2022). Retrieved from Indo-israel blog: <http://indoisraelresearch.com/india-israel-space-collaboration-tecsar-satellite/>
- ISRO. (2022). *Department of Space*. Retrieved from www.isro.gov.in: <https://www.isro.gov.in/about-isro>
- Jha, M. (2018). *Outlook India*. Retrieved from www.outlookindia.com: <https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/five-and-a-half-decades-of-indian-space-program/320609/>
- JVL, A. (2022). *Jewish Virtual Library*. Retrieved from jewishvirtuallibrary.org: <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/history-and-overview-of-india-israel-relations>
- Kabir, U. (2019). *Globely News*. Retrieved from globelynews: <https://globelynews.com/south-asia/the-history-of-indias-space-program/>
- karthikeyan, S. (2021). *India Forms New 'quad' With UAE, US & Israel: What Is It? How Will It Counter China?* Mumbai: Republicworld.

- Kuchroo, S. (2022). *Financial Express*. Retrieved from [www.financialexpress.com: https://www.financialexpress.com/lifestyle/science/aryabhata-satellite-slv-3-pslv-gslv-mission-shakti-rakesh-sharma-chandrayaan-mangalyaan-isro-indias-achievements-in-space-indias-space-programme/2628530/](https://www.financialexpress.com/lifestyle/science/aryabhata-satellite-slv-3-pslv-gslv-mission-shakti-rakesh-sharma-chandrayaan-mangalyaan-isro-indias-achievements-in-space-indias-space-programme/2628530/)
- Lele, A. (2013). *Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?* New Delhi: Springer India.
- Madan, T. (2016). *Why India and Israel are bringing their relationship out from “under the carpet*. Washington: Brookings Institution.
- Nardon, C. (2003). *UNIDIR*. Retrieved from [www.unidir.org: http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art1885.pdf](http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art1885.pdf)
- National Geographic*. (2022). Retrieved from [education.nationalgeographic.org: https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/history-space-exploration](https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/history-space-exploration)
- Paikowsky, D. (2007). Israel's space program as a national asset. *Space Policy*, 90-96.
- Paikowsky, D., Israel, I. B., & Azul, T. (2015). Israel's perspectives on Space Security. In K. U. Schrogl, P. Hays, J. Robinson, & D. Moura, *Handbook of Space Security*. Researchgate.
- PTI. (2021). *NDTV*. Retrieved from [www.ndtv.com: https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-israel-share-challenges-like-radicalism-terrorism-external-affairs-minister-s-jaishankar-in-israel-2579254](https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-israel-share-challenges-like-radicalism-terrorism-external-affairs-minister-s-jaishankar-in-israel-2579254)
- Rajagopalan, R. P. (2019). *French Institute of International Relations*. Retrieved from [ifri.org: https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/asie-visions/indias-space-program-international-competition-and](https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/asie-visions/indias-space-program-international-competition-and)
- Samson, V. (2014). *Space Technology Development*. Seoul, South Korea: Asian Institute of Policy Studies.
- Singh, S. (2022). *The Times Of India*. Retrieved from [m.timesofindia.com: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-israel-look-to-take-space-ties-to-new-heights/articleshow/89784373.cms](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-israel-look-to-take-space-ties-to-new-heights/articleshow/89784373.cms)

Baloch Nationalism and Peace Interval, 1977-1988: The Role of Internal and External Factors

Vasundra Raje

Abstract

The decade of 1977-1988 in Balochistan's history saw a period of cold peace or political silence. During Zia-ul-Haq's regime, the Baloch national rights movement was weakened and the Baloch nationalists split into three or more parties. This period after the height of insurgency, gave rise to a situation that necessitated Zia's policy of co-option with Balochs. This article deals with the question why Balochistan remained peaceful for a decade 1977-88, despite Pakistan being under the military regime. This paper examines Zia's co-option strategies towards Balochs after the early 1970s-armed insurgency in Balochistan. This article argues that Zia's unfolded plans to pacify the alienated Baloch by employing a multi-faceted strategy aimed at co-opting the leaders into office and more significantly providing political space to the religious parties of Balochistan, combined with the external factors of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, proved to be a key policy that established relative peace in the province.

Keywords: Balochistan, Co-option, Inter-tribal divisions, Peace, Zia-ul-Haq

Introduction

The management and incorporation of ethnic identities in Pakistan has been historically far more problematic in Balochistan than other provinces and regions. In the 1970s, as Pakistan attempted to cope with the trauma of a second partition, the potential for a loosening of Balochistan's ties to the central government was particularly sensitive. Zia-ul-Haq the then President of Pakistan was virtually isolated in the international system by the end of 1979 for his military coup and the one who had executed his main adversary. The new Pakistani administration led by Zia pursued the policy of economic support and revitalization of the province as an

important strategy to improve relations with the Baluchs (Ispahani, 1989). By 1978-79, special subventions to the province amounted to US\$24.8 million and the annual budget deficit covered by Islamabad reached US\$28.2 million (Cited in Harrison, 1981). Zia also accorded high priority to rapidly building infrastructure in Balochistan (Amin, 1988). During the first three years of his presidency villages in Balochistan were electrified, important roads were built including the Loralai-Dera Ghazi Khan Road and the 160-mile Ormara-Liara Road. Between 1977 and 1985, a record Rs 4,000 million was injected into Balochistan. The major projects completed during this time included the extension of Sui gas to Quetta, the Regional Cooperation for Development highway (RCD) highway, the New Quetta airport, airstrips at Pasni and Turbat, a television complex in Quetta, radio stations at Khuzdar and Turbat, and the Bolan Medical College (Jetly, 2004).

Zia's external isolation was consolidated by the fact that he had also developed serious problems with the US on the nuclear issue and the burning down of the US embassy in Islamabad. In this respect, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan came as a relief to consolidate the military regime. His decision to oppose Soviet adventurism in Afghanistan had improved his image in the Western world and his perception was changed from being a dictator to a defender of the free world holding back the wave of communism. American economic aid and weapons helped to boost the fortunes of his regime. The material and diplomatic support of the Muslim countries was equally significant for the economy and improving the regime's international image (Duncan, 1989). Internally Zia and his ruling generals cultivated close ties with conservative-Islamists groups, especially with those having extreme orthodox Islamic ideology and were ready to support the martial law and who were opposed to modern democratic institutions and processes, especially the existing electoral process, political parties and a legislature elected on the basis of universal adult franchise at that time. The catalysts to this partnership were that the military government felt that a cooperative interaction with these elements would help to legitimize their rule, undercut the support base of their adversaries, facilitate the introduction of fundamentalist Islamic reforms, and gradually bring forward a visible leadership which they could trust for sharing or transfer of power and use them to side-track the demand for early elections and the restoration of representative political process (Rizvi, 2000).

The decade of 1977-1988 in Balochistan's history saw a period of perceptible peace or silence. During Zia's regime, the Baloch nationalist movement was weakened and the Baloch nationalists split into three or more parties. In this article, I am dealing with the question: Why Balochistan remained peaceful from 1977 to 1988. This period is important as it determines General Zia-ul-Haq's multi-faceted strategies to pacify the alienated Baloch and co-opt their leaders along with external

factors like the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. In addition, Zia's main concern was strategic as he could not afford any trouble in Balochistan in the wake of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Later, this strategy proved productive to establish relative peace in Balochistan throughout the 1977-88 years. This article is divided into four main sections. The first section provides a brief background of the Baloch nationalism. After a general outline about the status of the conflict in Balochistan from 1947 to 1970, the next section provides a background of the situation that led to the rise of General Zia-ul-Haq's military coup and its power sharing arrangements with the religious parties. This is followed by an explanation of Zia's policy of release of prisoners and announcement of general amnesty and how the shock of heightened insurgency gave rise to a situation that necessitated reconciliation between Pakistani establishment and various political parties under Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)¹. The fourth section discusses the Islamization policies of Zia's regime and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan that increased the sectarian violence and militancy in Balochistan. The next section discusses how political confusion at domestic level, inter-tribal feuds, and the Zia's policy of co-option had given rise to a situation that led to relative peace in Balochistan. The last section provides the conclusion.

Background of the Conflict in Balochistan

During the colonial period, Balochistan was determined by a complex mix of administrative units like the Kalat State, the British Balochistan, and the areas that Britishers leased from Kalat. The State of Kalat was nominally independent princely domain of the Balochistan and not the part of British India, though as in other princely states, the British exerted their dominance by various means, including vetting the Khan's officials and paying subsidies to the tribal leaders (Titus and Swidler 2000). Khan of Kalat, therefore, sought a status that the British prior to independence had transferred the control of British territories in Balochistan to the State of Kalat. After independence, in spite both the houses of parliament in Kalat unanimously rejecting the proposal to merge with Pakistan, the areas of Balochistan were made a part of Pakistan. Subsequently, reacting to the initial resistance from the Khan of Kalat to accede to Pakistan, the Khan was forced to sign the merger document and Kalat was annexed (Bansal, 2006; Aslam, 2011; Zaidi, 1992). In June 1947, the tribal leaders and municipal authorities in British Balochistan who were given the authority to decide the future of the Balochistan opted to join Pakistan (Titus and Swidler 2000). This led to the first insurgency in 1948 organised by Prince Karim, the brother of the Khan (Bansal, 2006).

During the period from 1948 to 1956, Balochistan remained peaceful and was managed as an administrative unit by a commissioner in Quetta. However, the introduction of One Unit System in 1955 decreased Baloch representation at the

federal level and undermined the establishment of a provincial assembly by the creation of single provincial entity that subsumed all the administrative units of West Pakistan, including the princely states (Titus and Swidler, 2000). On the other hand, the discovery of natural gas in 1958 resulted in a disagreement between the Pakistani government and Sardar Akbar Khan Bugti over the demand to increase natural gas royalties (Aslam, 2011). The One Unit scheme and the Parity formula invoked a sharp reaction among the Balochis. The Khan of Kalat was able to mobilize various tribal chieftains against the One Unit Scheme because it was seen as centralizing too much power in the federal government and limiting provincial autonomy (Titus and Swidler, 2000). Also the dispute over the gas royalty has taken a violent turn when some rebels from the Bugti tribe tried to disrupt the supply of natural gas from the Sui area in 1958. At that point the Pakistani army tried to restrain the Baloch sardars and in response to this several political rallies were organised by the National Awami Party (NAP)². (Aslam 2011; Titus and Swidler, 2000).

The revolt was ended in 1958 through harsh government repression and the arrest of several nationalist leaders (Kupecz, 2012). Ayub Khan introduced the programme of 'Basic Democracies' to strengthen the centralized policies and attempt to restructure Pakistan, while this appears to have brought some development in Balochistan, but it failed to depoliticize the region. Through this system, he introduced a Presidential system and, in the elections of 1962, for the first time, several Baloch sardars, like Sardar Khair Bakhsh Marri, Ataullah Mengal and Ahmad Nawaz Bugti become the Member of Parliament. However, their presence in the Parliament was felt a threat to Ayub's personally oriented policies, thus were replaced by other nominated sardars (Afzal, 2001). Another development during this period was the building of new cantonments by the Pakistan army at the key points in Balochistan, this triggered another guerrilla movement, known as "Parari". Jhalawan, Mengal, Marri and Bugti tribes' large-scale encounters with the army led the Balochs to counter the armed forces by ambushing convoys, bombing trains, and raids on military camps.

During this period, the Baloch resistance was not able to make a major impact in Pakistan and internationally. The Ayub regimes policies of political restriction and economic development through functional inequality had antagonised a large portion of the population in Pakistan. Thus, the Baloch national resistance from 1958 to 1969 against Pakistan was comprised of armed resistance by tribal volunteers and political mobilization by the NAP. However, politically, the NAP became the de facto representative of the Baloch masses, the tribes armed resistance became more mature and they managed to form a cohesive resistance. Balochi's resistance strategies included resorting to political as well as militant means that began to

transform from being a tribal oriented movement into a relatively broad-based Baloch nationalist movement involving many segments of the Baloch society. In 1969 General Yahya seized power and withdrew One Unit Plan. In 1970, Balochistan became a full-fledged province after the fall of Ayub Khan and Yahya's decision to break up the one-unit system and the parity formula.

Bhutto's Politics, Zia's Military Coup and the Power-Sharing Arrangement

By 1972, Zia had been promoted to Major-General following the reorganization of the Pakistani army after General Yahya's fall and Bhutto's rise to power. There were many qualified army generals, but Bhutto appointed Zia to be the Chief of the Army staff in 1976. However, Bhutto had reasons for choosing a Mohajir as the leader of the army. Since the army was made up of mostly Punjabis and Pathans, to give this post to someone outside this circle was something the high officers could not accept and many resigned. Bhutto had hoped this would cause Zia to look to him for assistance. In March 1972, the Bhutto regime reached deals with the opposition National Awami Party (NAP) and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). The newly resorted civilian federal government permitted Balochistan to hold its first provincial elections, which brought to power the National Awami Party (NAP) by forming a coalition government led by Sardar Atalluah Mengal in Balochistan and the NWFP. For Bhutto, this deal was meant to buy some time as he was working to realign his political base. The deal, however, did not last long. Once Bhutto consolidated power, he focussed on breaking up the hold of these coalitions (Nawaz, 2008).

Bhutto removed the NAP government by dismissing the Baloch provincial government in early 1973, following allegations that they were conspiring with foreign governments. Fearing that the NAP would make the western region especially Balochistan, another rebellious east Pakistan, then Prime Minister Bhutto dismissed the Mengal government nine months after its formation, accusing it of undermining the state, exceeding constitutional limits, and getting involved with the Russians and Iraqis (Sareen, 2017). The capture of arms in a diplomatic shipment to the Iraqi embassy and the death of his right-hand man (Hayat Sherpao) in the NWFP in February 1975 gave Bhutto justification needed to challenge the NAP (Nawaz, 2008). Sardar Akbar Khan Bugti, become the all-powerful governor of Balochistan for a long time during the 1970s and 1980s. The dismissal of the provincial assembly was seen as ethnically driven. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) had come to power at the federal level and the demands of the NAP in Balochistan threatened to undermine the control of the PPP and its Punjabi support base. This set off the most violent Baloch insurgency to date. The sacking of the government first in Balochistan and then in NWFP set the stage for Balochistan's rebellion, which engulfed the province for the next four years (Sareen 2017). At

the height of the insurgency, more than 5,000 insurgents and over 3,300 soldiers were killed in the insurgency (Bansal, 2005; Kupecz, 2012).

When the National Awami Party was banned in 1975, and the Party leadership was in jail facing treason charges, Baloch politicians such as Bizenjo and Sher Baz Mazari had started political activities under the Pakistan National Party (PNP) and National Democratic Party (NDP). The religious parties, joined by the two secular parties (i.e., PNP and NDP) and the Muslim League, created the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Beside this, nine large and small political and religious parties forged what became known as the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) to overthrow a unified electoral challenge to Bhutto's PPP (Taqi, 2020). The results of the elections were suspected of being rigged, but by who remains unknown. The PNA claims it was Bhutto's PPP that rigged the elections and Bhutto seems to have at least tried to appease the PNA by offering to let the PNA run unopposed for certain National Assembly seats. The PNA decided to express their grievances on the streets of Pakistan. Mass protests broke out and Bhutto asked the military for help.

In April, the PNA and Bhutto agreed to meet for talks. However, in 1976 a conspiracy between the military and the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) took place with the intention of removing Bhutto from power. The ISI, in October of 1976, send a memo to Bhutto titled "General Elections". It advised Bhutto that if he held elections now he would win without any serious opposition. On July 5, 1977, although participants in the parleys stated the two sides were close to agreement over holding fresh elections, the military took over. They claimed that it was forced to intervene because Bhutto's talks with the PNA were going nowhere, and the country was on the brink of complete breakdown. Headway was made eventually, and an accord was about to be signed, when General Zia-ul-Haq launched his coup d'etat and abrogated the constitution (Taqi, 2020). According to the establishment when army intervenes in Pakistani politics it does so with a desire to return the country to order. In this case, by creating the chaos brought on by likely rigged elections, the military created a legitimate reason to come back into power.

Zia's Announcement of General Amnesty and the Release of Political Prisoners

In order to legitimise his military rule, Zia sought to gain greater acceptability with the disenchanted Baloch who become more alienated from the centre. General Zia-ul-Haq in 1978 announced amnesty for all those in Balochistan who had left their homes during the insurrection. Thousands of Baloch political prisoners were released from different detention centres who were allegedly tortured in the Kohlu and Loralai prisons. Prominent Baloch leaders such as Mir Gous Baksh Bizenjo, Sardar Ataullah Mengal and Nawab Khair Bakhsh Mari were released from prison

in 1977. The Baloch political activists who had gone underground re-surfaced and many fighters who had immigrated to Afghanistan returned to their homes. On the other hand, the new military setup in Pakistan expressed its intension to initiate a process of negotiation on the Baloch question with the prominent Baloch leaders like Bizenjo, Mengal and Mari, who commanded the overwhelming support of the Baloch people. The Baloch leadership showed its willingness to join a negotiated process with Zia's government to resolve the issues between the Baloch and Pakistan. Their initial demands were the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army from Balochistan, the release of Baloch prisoners and compensations for those who had suffered during the resistance movement. In the following year, General Zia disbanded the Hyderabad tribunal³, a move that was widely seen by the people as the "elimination of one of the wrong doings of Bhuttoism in Balochistan" (Dashti, 2017). Balochistan became relatively calm as army units in Balochistan had been ordered to maintain a low profile and the Baloch armed resistance was still struggling to recover from the shock and aftershocks of the 1970's insurgency.

Islamization and Sectarian Militancy in Balochistan: Involvement of Internal and External factors

Military regimes in Pakistan have sought to eradicate ethnic identities by changing provincial demographics and pursuing Islamization, or the substitution of a common Muslim identity for ethnic ones (Grare, 2013). Zia's Pakistan officially sought a new political system according to Islam. There has been much speculation on Zia's motives and timing in his efforts to bring Pakistani society in conformity with 'Islamic' values as defined by his orthodox Sunni worldview, which mirrored the views of Maulana Maududi's Jama'at-i-Islami, an Islamist political party. While claiming to implement a universal Islamic vision, Zia promoted Islamization based on orthodox interpretations of Sharia rooted in the specific Sunni Islamic revivalist teachings of the Deobandi movement (Dedalus, 2009).

Some have argued that Zia's efforts to launch an 'Islamization' campaign had more to do with seeking political and social legitimacy for his regime by appealing to specific social elements (Ahmad, 1996; Cohen, 2004; Haqqani, 2013; Kennedy, 1990; Reeves, 1984; Rizvi, 1991). In sharp contrast to former rulers of Pakistan, Zia became the first leader to argue for the introduction of an Islamic legal system as being a prerequisite for the Islamic state. Some have argued that it was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's democratically elected government (1971-1977) which actually set this reinterpretation process in motion by invoking a more 'Islamic' theme for consolidation and legitimization purposes. A case can be made that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with his window dressing 'Islamization' efforts (to seek funds/ support from Saudi Arabia et al. for his nuclear program) laid the foundation upon which General Zia built his own Islamization program (Burki, 2017).

General Zia-ul-Haq announced his intention to Islamize the penal code of Pakistan in March of 1978, reconstituted the Council of Islamic Ideology, a consultative body set up for the sole purpose of formulating a more Islamic system of government; established the Hudood laws, a series of punishments for violations of laws ranging from adultery and fornication to rape and theft; and introduced a system of sharia courts entrusted with ensuring that existing laws conformed to Islam (Grare, 2013). In Balochistan, as in the rest of rural Pakistan, Islamization brought the arrival of Islamic scholars, the establishment of madrassas, introduction of blasphemy law and the revision of school curricula in accordance to the Islamic law. Zia-ul-Haq sowed the seeds of extremism in Balochistan and the roots of sectarian strife in Pakistan is associated to Zia's regime's Islamization policies. Zia had a twofold objective in his Islamization policies. 1) He wanted to use it as a weapon against the Baloch insurgency that had ended in 1977; and 2) in order to prevent another Bangladesh, Zia also saw Islam as an effective unifying force that would subsume the Baloch ethnic identity into a larger Islamic identity (Devasher, 2019). Zia's necessary compromises with the nationalist leaders of Balochistan marked, however, the beginning of a slow process which, combined with a growing Pashtun demographic presence as well as the Afghan war against the Soviet Union, bolstered the religious parties in the Pashtun areas of Balochistan (Grare, 2013). As a result of Islamization, radicalization has increased in the province which was once secular (Notezai, 2017; Ashok & Tripathi, 2019).

The introduction of Zia's sectarian Islamization program quickly alienated the Pakistani Shi'i community (Dedalus, 2009). Shia-Sunni conflict was largely unheard of in Pakistan, least of all in Balochistan, because Pakistan's ethnic and socioeconomic diversity has meant that the Shia and Sunni communities do not constitute homogenous or internally unified groups and sectarian identity is not necessarily salient in the lives of many Pakistanis. During Zia's period this divide became more visible in the form of Zia's efforts to impose Zakat⁴ Ordinance of 1980, and to apply Sunni interpretations of the inheritance laws met with stiff resistance from the minority Shia (Grare, 2007). Until then, the payment of Zakat was treated as a private matter in Pakistan. Shi'i opposition to the imposition of Zakat was driven by the differences in calculation and the manner of payment of zakat because Shia Muslims also pay khoms (another religious contribution equivalent to one-fifth of a person's income), which Sunnis do not pay (Dedalus, 2009).

On the other hand, the Islamic revolution at the same time in nearby Iran became a source of inspiration for the Pakistani Shia community, which sought to become better organized and improve its position in Pakistan. Shia organizations such as Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria (Movement for the Implementation of Jafari School of Islamic Law) and the Imamia Students Organization were set up to advance

the interests of Shia in Pakistan as well as to enhance religious education within the community (Grare, 2007). The increased levels of organization within the Shia community led to a backlash from sections of the Sunni population, particularly in the populous Punjab province. With regard to these developments Maulana Azam Tariq and Haq Nawaz Jhangvi (Sunni clerics), had established Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) in 1985 with the support of Pakistani secret agencies, by aiming at countering purported Iranian propaganda in Pakistan (Grare, 2007; Dedalus, 2009).

Quetta was an important theatre for these ideological wars because Balochistan shares long and porous borders with both Iran and Afghanistan. In the wake of the Soviet-Afghan War, Balochistan absorbed nearly two million Afghan refugees including both Sunni Pashtuns from the south and Shia Hazaras, Uzbeks and Tajiks from the north. While Saudi money flowed to Deobandi madrassas located in the Pashtun belt along the Afghan border, Iran established a cultural centre in Quetta to extend its influence among the growing Shia community comprised of migrant Hazara and local Punjabi ethnic groups. The influx of Saudi and Iranian money set the stage for the waging of proxy wars in Balochistan, exposing and exploiting both class and ethnic fault lines in the underlying local society (Dedalus, 2009).

Historically speaking, the Baloch always have had a more secular and pluralistic view on religion as compared to other ethnic groups in Pakistan. Nina Swidler argues that, 'religion does not distinguish Baloch identity' (Swidler, 1996). Sectarianism militancy and violence is not indigenous to Balochistan, but the state has also been involved in such kind of sectarian violence. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) noted that unlike in the past, religious fanaticism was not merely being exported to the province from elsewhere, it was now being bred in Balochistan. A growing network of madrassas had contributed to aggravation of intersect tensions. There were fears that the security forces were patronizing militants and Quetta was being turned into a haven for militants (HRCP, 2012). As a result, in the past decade or so, the advent of extremist militants had led to unprecedented sectarian bloodshed in Balochistan. Balochis have been largely impervious to the persistent efforts at Islamization. They have also not allowed Islamists of any variety to gain power in their area even though references to the Quetta shura of the Taliban can confuse many (Devasher, 2019). Zia tries to subsume Baloch and other Pakistani ethnic identities into a larger Islamic one. Baloch nationalism proved, however, more resilient and Islamization policies failed in the areas where ethnic Balochs were predominant (Grare 2013). As such, the view that the Baloch nationalist sentiments are being overridden by Islamist politics is perhaps incorrect. However, this has been changed due to the continued support of radicalization and encouragement of terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) by the Pakistan state (Devasher, 2019).

In trying to pit religious extremism against Baloch nationalism, the state could be making a huge mistake. The transnational agendas of the extremist groups could pose an even bigger threat to the state (Notezai, 2017). Overall, though some Baloch have been used for sectarian killings, so far Baloch nationalism has proved to be stronger and Islamization policies have not really succeeded where ethnic Baloch have been predominant. Yet, Islamization continues to be a significant element of Islamabad's strategy. The intention of the state in the Pashtun and the Baloch areas is clearly to use Islam to curb both Pashtun and Baloch nationalism (Devasher, 2019).

Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and Baloch Nationalism

The Soviet expansionism created a challenge to the security of Pakistan, and the country emerged as a 'front-line' state, the major player in the game and the principal channel through which assistance was provided to the Afghan Mujaheddins. The Afghan war benefited Pakistan's economy and defence, at the same time, it leads to the death of Pakistan's ethnonationalist movements (Pakhtun and Baloch nationalism). Afghan war had grave implications for the internal and external security of Pakistan because of the huge influx of Afghan refugees which were given safe sanctuary in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces by the Pakistani government (headed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) as a response to Afghan government's support for Pakistani Baloch and Pashtun separatists (Hilali, 2002).

Pakistan staged counter-intervention in Afghanistan under two considerations. First was domestic and the other related to the security situation created by the Soviet intervention. Domestically, the military regime of General Zia ul-Haq was isolated and under tremendous stress from the political forces in Pakistan that wanted him to hold elections and transfer power to the elected government. Internationally, his regime was seen as brutal and illegitimate. But the Soviet intervention next door in Afghanistan changed all that. The military regime exploited the Afghan situation very effectively to gain domestic and foreign support. The foreign support came mainly from the United States and her regional and European allies. Internally, Zia was able to structure an alliance of right-wing religious political parties that shared his view of the Afghan situation and supported his drive for Islamization of the Pakistani society (Rais, 2004).

The socialist revolution in Afghanistan led by People's Democratic Party in 1978 was a milestone in the history of the region. With the Soviet backed government in Afghanistan, the equation has changed. The Western powers began to counter this apparent Soviet move to change the balance of power in the region. They organised a massive insurgency in Afghanistan in order to destabilize the pro-soviet government in Kabul. Islam was again found to be useful in this new confrontation

with Russia. Thousands of jihadists from all over the world were encouraged to participate in the “holy struggle” to oust the atheist and infidels from Afghanistan. At the behest of the Western alliance and with money from Arab countries. Pakistan began training Islamic Jihadists on its territory and funnelling arms to insurgents inside Afghanistan (Dashti, 2017; Rais, 2004). On the other side, the support to revolutionary government of Afghanistan proved to be a divisive factor in the Soviet power corridors. Neither Afghanistan was given the proper help, nor was there any substantial move made against Pakistan, who become the frontline state against Afghanistan (Hussian, 2007).

However, following the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989) the arrival of Afghan refugees in Quetta and other parts of Balochistan triggered a change in Baloch politics (Notezai, 2017). For the Baloch and other subjugated nations in the region and for secular and liberal forces, the Afghan revolution was a welcome phenomenon. The Afghan government extended the support to the Baloch and Pashtun nationalists who were pitting against the national rights in Pakistan (Dashti, 2017). Within the broader context of Afghan situation, Ataullah Mengal’s declaration regarding independence must be assessed. In Mengal’s own judgement, if circumstances compelled an alternative approach regarding the Afghan situation, then the Soviet Union might initially prefer a pro-Soviet Union Pakistan rather than to have an independent Balochistan or a Balkanized Pakistan. Future attitudes on their part, he argues, will depend on how far the Soviet Union is forced to weigh factors as they emerge and how actual forces mature within Pakistan (Lifschultz, 1983).

In 1980s many of the BSO leaders and other political activists returned from abroad or self-exile to participate in the political process, the leaders of the BSO tries to fill the gap created by the absence of the Baloch leadership (Nawab Baksh Mari and his tribesmen remained in Afghanistan until the collapse of revolutionary government) by forming their own political group. One of the unfortunate happenings during Nawab Mari’s sojourn in Afghanistan was the parting ways of his close associates, Mir Sher Muhammad Mari and Mir Hazar Khan Rahmakani. These two personalities played significant roles in the Baloch struggles of 1960s and 1970s. Their dissociation with Nawab Mari proved to be the beginning of an unending dissent within Mari tribe which only came into open after the return of Mari tribesmen in Balochistan during 1990s (Dashti, 2017).

The functions and alliances of nationalists have changed in tandem with fundamental changes in society and the ability of the central government, as well as global shifts in hegemonies. The greater developments in Pakistan, as well as the collapse of the Soviet Union and even Afghanistan’s communist government, have substantially altered Balochistan’s attitudes and functions of nationalism. The first,

to some extent flexible and semi-pluralistic, approach, which was consistent with civic nationalism, gave way to a harsher type of ethnic nationalism after the 1990s. During the Cold War, the superpowers' hegemonic activities in various regions had a significant impact on local and international conflicts, especially nationalist disputes, all over the world.

In Balochistan nationalists were mostly influenced by the Soviet Union's (USSR) ideological hegemony. Pro-Chinese and pro-American regimes in Pakistan, was an important factor for the nationalists in Balochistan to find supporters from the Eastern Bloc. The Soviet Union pursued a strategy based on non-capitalist path to development in which priority was given to building their alliances, rather than genuinely considering the nature of alliances as feudal or tribal; and promoting social and political change (Noraiee, 2020). On the other hand, sardars and their proponents, who presented themselves as a powerful representative of nationalism and tribal relations in the area, ideologically depend on an amalgamation of tribalism, feudalism, capitalism, and also socialism, in a very inexplicable way. Even if some intellectuals appeared as anti-sardars, they culturally moved in the same direction, and their criticisms of Sardari-tribal relations remained quite shallow. This hybrid product was consistent with the primordial assumptions and the methodologies that many Baloch nationalist scholars applied (Noraiee, 2020).

However, the Soviet Union used the Jargon of "the rights of self-determination of nations," but it was rather a political tool to attract the nationalists' movements, particularly in territories controlled by the western colonial powers and their allies, and put pressure on the United States and her allies whenever it was necessary. Otherwise, the Soviet Union, considering the risk of disintegration inside the country, hardly encouraged narrowly defined ethnic nationalism and their desires for separation and changing the boundaries already existed. The nationalists in Balochistan, in a broad sense, had accepted the hegemonic role of the Soviet Union in choosing their alliances and defining their strategy. However, the Soviet Union had not entirely abandoned the card of supporting separatism, as a tool, for the Baloch nationalist in Pakistan (Harrison, 1981).

The Period of Internal Political Confusion, Inter-tribal Feuds and the Zia's Policy of Co-Option

During Zia's period intra-group and inter-group cleavage strained the Baloch resistance and the Baloch movement had started to show signs of progressive decline as the growing clash between different personalities, ideologies, strategies and goals became increasingly visible. Two trends dominated Baloch politics during Zia-ul-Haq's era: ethnic conflict between Balochs and Pashtuns and intensification of tribal feuds. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 further aggravated the Baloch fear

of political domination by Pashtuns. As Afghan Pashtuns fled across the border into Pakistan, Balochs viewed them as foreigners in a land they claimed as their own. This is not a new phenomenon in Balochistan. Pakistan first attempted to marginalize the Baloch within their own province in 1971 by incorporating Pashtun areas into Balochistan. The differences between Pashtun and Baloch leaders widened as the Baloch leadership saw the Pashtuns being more accommodating of the centre, (Ahmed, 2005) which led to split in the National Awami Party (NAP) and the formation of a separate party, the Pakistan National Party (PNP)⁵, as the successor of the disbanded NAP (Jetly 2004) Fear of political domination seemed to be confirmed by the success of the Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP).

On the other hand, stunted economic development resulting from colonial era policies, as well as perceived marginalization as a result of increased Pashtun migration during the Afghan War, are important factors driving Baloch ethno-nationalism (Kupecz, 2012). The indigenous Balochs feared becoming a minority in their own province. Actually, the refugees become a useful political asset for Islamabad in neutralizing the nationalist elements in Balochistan. As for tribal feuds, three disturbing developments are noteworthy. First, the availability of sophisticated weapons due to the Afghan war made the tribal conflict more lethal. Second, attacking each other's tribal leaders and their families was violation of even 'the tribal code'. In one such case, three grandsons of Akbar Bugti were killed. Third, such conflicts also affected the provincial and national levels because the players attempted to seek the governments intervention in their favour by kidnapping government employees and attacking the infrastructure (Ali, 2005).

General Zia was aware of the tribal feuds and rivalries and also that a number of other Baloch sardars do not share Sardar Ataullah Mengal and Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri's political views and would be more accommodating and forthcoming with the centre. Ataullah Mengal, changed his stand from the idea of loose federation within the Pakistan to complete independence with the passage of time. There were differences between those who favoured an independent Balochistan, such as Khair Bux Marri and Mir Hazar. Some prominent leaders, such as Marri and Mengal, went into political exile in Europe in 1979 and started seeking external support for an independent Balochistan. These differences were exploited adroitly by General Zia, who by this time had also begun to patronise other leaders among the Baloch and Pashtuns, with whom he could establish relatively better working relationship such as Doda Khan Zarkzai and Jamali (Zeb, 2019). Zia also cultivated such influential Pashtuns as the land-owning Jomezai family to counter the influence of Baloch prince Moinuddin Baloch (younger brother of the Khan of Kalat) and Zafarullah Khan Jamali, were co-opted into the Cabinet. Many prominent leaders, such as Mir Nabi Bakhsh Zehri, the marble king, and other mining entrepreneurs belonging to the Jamali and

Raisani tribes, now extended support to the centre in anticipation of financial gains and incentives (Phadnis, 2001).

According to Niamat Gichki a Baloch author “During the days of Zia, in Balochistan, for the first time, different ideas were sponsored against other sects in Balochistan’, particularly the Zikri Baloch. Annually religious clerics would go to Turbat for functions like “khatmeNabuwwat” (Finality of Prophethood). He added, “Basically it was used for elections in Balochistan’s Makran division where nationalists were winning. That was why political parties and the government of Islamabad thought that the nationalists were winning with the support of Zikri’s. So, by cutting their relations with Zikri Baloch, they were creating rifts by weakening the strength of the Baloch nationalists so that the nationalists would lose. They continued to do that, and they succeeded to some extent by breaking this bond between them. They also bribed the Zikri sects of Muslims. But it was short-lived. Even after his assassination Zia’s policies remain unchanged by successive Pakistani governments. For example, in the 1980’s the Zikri card was again used by clerics. As a result, in the 1990’s Zikri Baloch began to face persecution at the hands of the religious fundamentalists. However, the fundamentalists did not completely succeed in wiping out the Zikri Baloch. One reason is that Makran and its adjoining areas, where Zikri Baloch are predominantly populated and where their sacred religious shrines are located are traditionally secular areas with high rates of literacy (Notezai, 2017; Ashok & Tripathi, 2019).

In spite of the Harrison’s hopeful notion, that the Baloch nationalism would overcome the coalition of tribal-feudal conflicts (Harrison, 1981). The post-cold war development in Pakistan’s Balochistan have become more divisive and fragmented. It may be argued that in the process of frequent conflicts with the Pakistani state, the nationalist awareness has broadened and deepened, but this hardly has put behind the tribal-feudal conflicts. Even, in a golden time when they captured the power, the nationalists were rarely united. Therefore, the level of fragmentations already existed and the weakness of nationalism in mobilizing forces has not been adequately covered (Noraiee, 2020).

Conclusion

The period of relative peace i.e 1977-89 in Balochistan, is determined by number of factors like the divisions in the political and militant leadership, the exile of Baloch leaders, the soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Afghan War. Even the division in the top leadership that developed during the last years of 1970s, filtered down to political workers and student activities. In addition to Islamization, Zia embarked on civilianising his military rule. The civilianisation process was naturally restrictive

and open to politicians and political parties supportive of Zia and his regime. That political elites and parties were required for the successful running of the martial law administration was evident in the martial law regime's close cooperation with the religious fundamentalist parties. Hence, it can be argued that the state during the period of Zia instrumentally deployed Islamization policy to patronize and garner support from the Baloch political elites and parties without adequately engaging with the substantive questions emerging from the ethnic identity of Baloch. The Zia's government found it easier to co-opt a fractured leadership. Zia was also able to win the favour of some tribal chiefs by accommodating them because of an ambivalent attitude towards the Zia regime; on the surface, the chiefs opposed Zia's rule but, in practice, they availed themselves of the opportunities that the regime's cooperative policies offered. While the process of accommodation remained slow, Zia's government was able to buy or mollify the leaders over time. This proves that the period of military hegemony did not alienate the political elites entirely; rather, the regime through a careful and clever policy of co-option was able to woo like-minded political elites and political parties to its side. In the absence of internal unity and effective leadership to sustain the movement, the emphasis shifted more towards Baloch rights and less towards a Baloch state. Along with these factors Afghan War provided political legitimacy to General Zia's military rule while providing a good opportunity to exploit the Afghan situation to gain domestic and foreign support.

Notes

1. The PNA includes nine opposition parties i.e, Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI), Pakistan Muslim League-Pagara Group (PML-P), Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), National Democratic Party (NDP), Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), Khaksar Tehrik (KT) and Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference (AKMC)
2. The National Awami Party (NAP) defined Pashtun and Balochi politics in the early decades of Pakistan's creation. Formed in 1957, the NAP included noted Pashtun, Baloch, Sindhi and Bengali nationalist thinkers and politicians, whose objective was for greater autonomy for the non-Punjabi populations of the country (Paracha 2014). In 1967, the party split into two factions over differences on how to achieve a socialist revolution. The pro-Soviet faction (which worked to achieve provincial autonomy in a democratic manner) was led by Wali Khan, the son of Gaffar Khan.
3. The Hyderabad tribunal also called Hyderabad conspiracy case is the judicial review used in Pakistan against the opposition leaders of NAP to prosecute them on the charges of treason and acting against the Pakistani state.
4. zakat—an Islamic tax equivalent to 2.5 percent of a person's income—on all Pakistani Muslims through the promulgation of the Zakat Ordinance
5. The Pakistan National Party (PNP) was led by Mir Gous Baksh Bizenjo, who espoused greater provincial autonomy within an overall Pakistani framework. However, within six months of its formation, the PNP was outlawed. Most Baloch leaders belonging to the PNP were forced to remain silent or operate underground.

References

- Ahmad, A. (1973). The national question in Balochistan. *Pakistan Forum: Focus on Balochistan*, 3(8-9), 4-18.
- Ahmad, Q.S. (2005). Balochistan: Overview of Internal and International Dimensions. *Pakistan Horizon*, 58(2): 27-39. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394091>
- Ahmed, I. (2012). *Pakistan The Garrison State: Origins, Evolution, Consequences 1947-2011*. Oxford University Press.
- Ahmed, M., & Baloch, A. (2017). The political economy of development: A critical assessment of Balochistan, Pakistan (MPRA: 1-21). https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80754/1/MPRA_paper_80754.pdf
- Ali Dayan Hasan, (2016). 'Balochistan: Caught in the Fragility Trap', United States Institute of Peace (USIP), <https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/06/balochistancaught-fragility-trap> accessed on 27 February 2018.
- Ali, Imtiaz, (2005). The Balochistan Problem, *Pakistani Horizon*, 58(2):41-64
- Ali, Nosheen (2019). *Delusional States: Feeling Rule and Development in Pakistan's Northern Frontier*. Cambridge University Press.
- Amin, T. (1988). *Ethno-National Movements in Pakistan, Domestic and International Factors*. Institute of Policy Studies: Islamabad.
- Ashok, D. & Tripathi, A. (2019). Balochistan Crisis and its Implications in the Region. *International Journal of Research and Analytical Reviews (IJRAR)*, 6(1):24-27.
- Aslam, R. (2011). Greed, creed, and governance in Civil Conflicts: a case study of Balochistan. *Contemporary South Asia*, 19(2): 189-203.
- Bansal, A. (2005). The Revival of Insurgency in Balochistan, *Strategic Analysis*, 29:2, 250-268, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2005.12049805
- Breseeg, T. M. (2001). Baloch Nationalism: Its Origin and Development up to 1980. Ph.D Thesis: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
- Burki, S. K. (2016). The Politics of Misogyny: General Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization of Pakistan's Legal System. *Contemporary Justice Review*, 19 (1): 103-119
- Daechsel, M. (2007). Military Islamization in Pakistan and the Spectre of Colonial Perceptions. *Contemporary South Asia*, 6(2): 141
- Dashti, N. (2017). *The Baloch Conflict with Iran and Pakistan: Aspects of National Liberation Struggle*. Black Lacquer Press & Marketing Incorporated: USA
- Dedalus, S. (2014). "The Bitter Harvest Sectarianism in Balochistan.", *Middle East Report*, 251: 42-47.
- Duncan, E. (1989). *Breaking the Curfew: A Political Journey through Pakistan*. London, Michael Joseph: Penguin Group
- Grare, F. (2007). The Evolution of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan and the Ever-Changing Face of Islamic Violence, *South Asia Journal of South Asian Studies*, 30(1): 127-143
- Grare, F. (2013). Balochistan: The State Versus the Nation. The Carnegie Papers. Washington DC.
- Harrison, S. S. (1981). *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baloch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Hilali, A.Z. (2002). The Costs and Benefits of the Afghan War for Pakistan. *Contemporary South Asia*, 11(3): 291-310, Doi: 10.1080/0958493032000057717

- Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), 'Hopes, Fears and Alienation in Balochistan', Report of the HRCP Fact-Finding Mission, May 2012, p. 45, <http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/pdf/ff/12.pdf>, (accessed on 3 March 2018).
- Hussain, Z. (2007). *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.
- Ispahani, M.Z. (1989). *Roads and Rivals: The Political use of Access in the Borderlands of Asia*. Cornell University Press.
- Javaid, U. & Jahangir, J. (2015). Balochistan: A Key Factor in Global Politics. *South Asian Studies: A Research Journal of South Asian Studies*, 30(2): 91-105.
- Jetly, R. (2004). Baloch Ethnicity and Nationalism (1971-81): An assessment, *Asian Ethnicity*, 5(1): 7-26
- John L. Esposito. (1987). "Islam" Ideology and Politics in Pakistan," in *The State, Religions and Ethnic Politics: Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan*, edited by Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner. Lahore: Vanguard, 344.
- Kundi, M. A. 2003, Militarism in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan, *Pakistan Horizon*, 56(1): 19-34.
- Kupecz, M. (2012). Pakistan's Baloch Insurgency: History, Conflict drivers, and Regional Implications, May 16, 2012. *The International Affairs Review*. <https://www.iar-gwu.org/print-archive/8erox982v5pj129srhreg98ex6u8v8n>
- Katja Riikonen, 'Sect in Stone', Herald,(2012). <http://www.cssforum.com.pk/general/news-articles/71893-herald-magazine.html>, (accessed on 2 March 2018)
- Nadeem F. Paracha, "The first left", *Dawn*, (2014). <https://www.dawn.com/news/1142900>
- Naseer Dashti, (2018). 'Resolving the Baloch National Question: Aspects of a Negotiated Settlement', https://www.theBaloch.com/050708_article.php, (accessed on 2 March 2018).
- Nasr, V. (2004). Military Rule, Islamism, and Democracy in Pakistan, *The Middle East Journal*, 58 (2): 195-209.
- Nawaz, S. (2008). *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars within*, Karachi: Oxford University Press.
- Nina Swidler, (1996). 'Beyond Parody: Ethnology Engages Nationalist Discourse', in Paul Titus (ed.), *Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan*, Karachi: OUP, p. 169.
- Noormal, A.N. (2014). Root causes of conflict in Balochistan, Pakistan. Retrieved from https://www.byeondintractability.org/sites/all/themes/at_headliner/apple-touch-icon-120x120.png
- Noraiee, H. (2015). The Modern Roots of the Social and Political Fragmentations in Baluchistan in Pakistan, *Journal of South Asian Studies*, 3(1): 15-27.
- Noraiee, H. (2020). The Baloch nationalism in Pakistan: Articulation of the ethnic separatism after the end of the Cold War. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 1-14. DOI: 10.1177/1879366520901920
- Notezai, M. A. (2017). Rise of religious extremism in Balochistan. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/regions/south-asia/>.
- Notezai, M.A. (2017). 'Spiral into Chaos', *Dawn*, 16 August 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1351870/spiral-into-chaos> (accessed on 2 March 2018).
- Paul E. Lenze Jr., (2016). *Civil-Military Relations in the Islamic World*. Lexington Books: London.

- Phadnis, U and R. Ganguly. (2001). *Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asian*, New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Rais, R.B (2004). In the Shadow of the Past: Pakistan's Afghan Policy, in C. Baxter (ed.) *Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics, and Society*, 37-52. Oxford University Press.
- Rakisits, C.G.P. (1988). Centre-Province Relations in Pakistan Under President Zia: The Government's and the Opposition's Approaches. *Pacific Affairs*, 61(1): 78-97.
- Rashid, A. (2008). *Descent into chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
- Rizvi, H. S. (1986). The Civilianization of Military Rule in Pakistan. *Asian Survey*, 26 (10): 1067-1081.
- S.V.R. Nasr (2002), "Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan," in *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?* ed. Christophe Jaffrelot. London: Zed Books.
- Samad, Y. (2014). Understanding the insurgency in Balochistan. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 52(2): 293-320, DOI: 10.1080/14662043.2014.894280
- Siddiqi, F.H. (2012). Security Dynamics in Pakistani Balochistan: Religious Activism and Ethnic Conflict in the War on Terror, *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 39:3, 157-175
- Sareen, S. (2017). "Balochistan: Forgotten War, Forsaken People", *Vivekananda International Foundation*, September 2017: 45 <https://www.vifindia.org/monograph/2017/december/07/balochistan-forgotten-war-forsaken-people>
- Swindler, N. (1996). Beyond parody: Ethnography engages nationalist discourse. In P. Titus (Ed.), *Marginality and modernity: Ethnicity and change in post-colonial Balochistan* (pp. 168– 190). Oxford University Press.
- Syed Shaoaib Hasan, (2018). 'Sectarian Militancy Thriving in Balochistan', *Dawn*, 11 April 2012, <https://www.dawn.com/news/709603>, (accessed on 2 March 2018).
- Titus, P. (2008). To join the caravan of history: External influences on the Baloch national movement. In C. Jahani, A. Korn, & P. Titus (Eds.), *The Baloch and others: Linguistic, historical and socio-political perspectives on pluralism in Balochistan* (pp. 377–390). Reichert Verlag Wiesbaden.
- Titus, P., & Swindler, N. (2000). Knights, not pawns: EthnoNationalism and regional dynamics in post-Colonial Balochistan. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 32, 47–69.
- Zaidi, A. (1992). The economic basis of the national question in Pakistan. In *Regional imbalances and the national question in Pakistan*, ed. Akbar Zaidi, 193-225. Lahore: Vanguard.
- Zaidi, Akbar. 1989. The economic basis of the national question in Pakistan. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 24(6):300-314
- Zeb, R. (2020). *Ethno-Political Conflict in Pakistan: The Baloch Movement*. London & New York: Routledge.

Caste and Cognition: State of the Art and Reflections from Cultural - Historical Perspective in Psychology

Vijith Kuniyil

Abstract

This paper argues that studies exploring the linkages between centuries old caste practices and development of cognitive abilities are set in the theoretical constructs of disadvantage and deprivation and hold the 'deficit' approach that is rooted in the concept of universality of mind. The key missing elements in these studies are the unique cultural and historical experience a caste offers to its members in their development of cognitive processes. A review of the historical and sociological studies on caste brings out the central features of caste system, and among them, this paper focuses on the concept of hereditary occupation as it would play a central role in developing cognitive abilities amongst the people since it is the collective activity that all the members of a particular caste has been engaged. The co-evolving nature of caste practices and cognition can be adequately explored with the help of cultural-historical approach in psychology. Such an approach can reflect on the historicity and contemporaneity of caste practices in studies of cognitive processes by taking a 'difference approach'.

Keywords: Caste, Cognition, Deficit Approach, Cultural-Historical Activity Theory, Hereditary Occupation, Difference Approach

Introduction

This paper critically analyses the studies in psychology that probe the interlinkages between cognition and caste practices in Indian context and makes a case for adopting conceptual framework of cultural- historical psychology to explore the interlinkages of case and cognition focussing the system of hereditary occupation, a unique feature of caste system. Caste has relatively been a less prominent variable in psychological studies than in other social sciences in India. While disciplines like sociology, history, and anthropology have made substantial contributions to understanding the role of caste system in the human life and society, psychology seems to have been somewhat indifferent to this unique Indian phenomenon. This can be attributed to the theoretical and methodological peculiarities of the discipline,

particularly its preoccupation with Euro-American psychology. Another equally important reason for this could be the individualistic enquires in psychology originating from the Cartesian philosophical underpinnings which have ultimately forced this discipline to shape its enquiries devoid of culture and societal structures. These factors have led to the Indian psychologists offering little space to accommodate caste into their discourses even if, caste has been generally viewed in other social science disciplines as a unique and fundamental character of Indian society.

Caste system and its attendant social hierarchy laid the basic structures of the Indian society. The social hierarchy based on caste acts as one of the central forces which in many ways inform the lives and activities of the people. Studies in different disciplines provided different perspectives on the caste system and define some of the principal features of the system. The practice of hereditary occupation is recognised as a fundamental feature of the caste system along with endogamy and hierarchical relationship amongst different castes. The transformation of the caste-based society started with the colonial modernity in the country and continued through the community based social reform movements, and state-initiated reforms in the post independent period. This has substantially transformed the nature of the caste practices. But how caste had worked in a rigid case society and still continues to work in the formation of cognitive processes in the contemporary period are important questions to be addressed. Given this background, the paper attempts a fresh look at the phenomena of caste and its role in the development of cognition

Psychology Studies on Caste and Cognition

Indian psychology scholarship began to probe the relationship of caste and cognition since 1970s. But even after four decades not many studies are conducted on this and even most of the few that tried to delve into the subject emphasised 'mentality' associated with caste practices. This is very visible when look at the psychological constructs they have enquired about which include the attitudes, stereotypes, prejudices, humiliation etc. (see Tripathi and Srivastava, 1981; Majeed and Ghosh, 1989; Rath and Sircar, 1960; Singh, 1988). Very few studies have been conducted to unfold the interlinkages between caste practices and cognitive processes. We get a glance of these studies from the reviews conducted by Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) (See Mitra, 1972; Pareek, 1980; Dalal, and Misra, 2001; Pandey, 2004). The following description of the studies is based on the review conducted by ICSSR. Agarwal and Mishra (1983) reveal the disadvantages of the caste and its influence on developing category organisation skills and show significant impact of one's caste status. Their study also reveals that developmental difference are sharper at early age levels than at later stages.

Jachuck (1982) examines the relationship between socioeconomic status and the different levels of cognitive abilities among Indian children. Comparing the school-going children in Grades 2 and 4 from the four sub-cultural categories—high socioeconomic status Brahmins; low socioeconomic status Brahmins; high socioeconomic status Dalits, and low socioeconomic status Dalits—they find the significant caste effects on these children but no effect of socioeconomic status. Sinha's (1985) study on the disadvantaged children finds that their cognitive and linguistic problems lie in the early childhood experiences which are connected to the socioeconomic, geographical and other closely associated factors. Sinha (1982) also finds that the disadvantages due to socio-cultural status of the Scheduled Caste children have detrimental effect on the development of their perceptual skills. Their impacts are much greater in two complex tasks between the Scheduled Caste and non-Scheduled Caste children. His study further finds that such differences are high among the elder people than younger people. Study by Misra and Shahi (1977) on 4-7 year-olds from a deprived rural group finds significant detrimental impacts of deprivation in all age levels.

Identifying the psycho-linguistic abilities/disabilities of the socially disadvantaged primary schoolchildren, the study by Sahu and Jena (1983) finds that the disadvantaged children across the grades score significantly lower in receptive, associative and expressive processes than their advantaged peers. Ghuman (1978) has also probed the association between social and cognitive dimension and also the nature of cognitive development among four groups of Punjabi children in the 10-11 age-group undergoing different practices of socialisation process. The four groups comprised the professional group derived from the Brahmins and Kshatriyas; the Brahmins and Kshatriyas engaged in shop-keeping and other skilled jobs; the Jat Sikhs (Vaishyas and small farmers); and the Shudras and farmhands. The key take away from the study is that professional groups scores better than the rest on a range of cognitive tasks. These studies point toward the interlinkages between caste and cognitive abilities.

Theoretical Constructs of Studies on Caste

Deprivation and disadvantage are the two major theoretical constructs used in understanding the interlinkages between caste and cognition in psychological studies. These constructs are not just exclusively dealing with caste but poverty and the allied phenomena as well. These constructs posit caste as a social and economic phenomenon. The concept "deprivation" has been widely used as a hypothetical construct and as an empirical variable to study poverty and disadvantage. Studies on deprivation include lack/loss of factors considered imperative for growth and adaptation of the individual (Misra and Tripathi, 2000). Misra and Tripathi, (2000)

state that “the concept of disadvantage is related to the broader socio-cultural configuration of the society which transmits and maintains deprivation in a persistent manner” (p.137). The concepts of deprivation and disadvantage have been analysed extensively by Misra and Tripathi (2000) who observes that “the use of SES (Socio Economic Scale) scale that provides a composite score based on a combination of factors like income, education occupation, material assets, and caste, has been a frequent practice. This also, however, fails to provide any suitable way to conceptualise and assess deprivation”.

The concept of prolonged deprivation proposed by Misra and Tripathi (1975) which takes precedence over the temporal elements and refers to a broader spectrum of variables constituting the basic source of experiences of the individuals. The concept enumerates many sources of deprivation as possible to differentiate from the spectrum of the sources of deprivation. It is perceived as a prolonged process relative to a defined socio-cultural setting. Misra and Tripathi (1975). Misra and Tripathi (1975) conceives socio-cultural life of community as a continuum, at one end of which are those whose physical, social, and economic needs are gratified leading to varied experiences in life, and at the other end are those who could not meet physical, social and psychological needs and thus leaving them incapable of having varied experiences (Misra and Tripathi, 2000).

Accordingly Misra and Tripathi (1978) developed a standardised Prolonged Deprivation Scale (PDS) to measure the life conditions and experiences across 15 areas, like housing condition such as home environment, economic sufficiency, food, clothing, formal educational experiences, childhood experiences, rearing experiences, parental characteristics, interaction with parents, motivational experiences, emotional experiences, religious experiences, travel and recreation, and other miscellaneous socio-cultural experiences. In another significant attempt Sinha (1982) proposes an ecological model to address the question of poverty and disadvantage. Misra and Tripathi (2000) point out the important aspects of Sinha’s model. It consists of two layers, the upper or more visible layer and the supporting or surrounding environment. The upper layer comprises the immediate social environmental factors, including home, school and peer groups. Each of these factors is based on three dimensions -physical space and materials, social roles and relationships and activities. The second layer is the “supporting or surrounding” environment, each embedding the other as provided by the physical and geographical environment, the institutional setting of the individual in terms of social class, caste, etc., and the general services and amenities available to the respective individuals. The component factors of these two layers affect the psychological functioning of the individual at their own level and also interact with each other and factors within.

Evaluation of the studies and theoretical constructs

Review of the existing studies and the theoretical constructs employed to analyse the interlinkages between of caste system and cognition show that the existing studies hold a 'deficit' approach. The deficit approach argues that disadvantageous conditions present limited opportunities that restrict psychological development (Mohanty and Misra, 2000). The 'deficit' approach is fruitful in problematizing the caste adversities and the experience of disadvantage that people undergo and along with their implication on the cognition. But this approach adopts 'universal mind' model that built on the Cartesian philosophical foundation. The main lacuna of this approach is that it leaves out the analysis the unique cultural experience that the people live with as being a member of a particular caste and its co-evolution with cognition. Also deprivation perspective is restricted on the ontogenetic development of the people, whereas the collective experiences undergone by the community that are not bring in to the analysis. However the concept of prolonged deprivation is a good attempt to trace the cumulative effect of the caste system on cognition, but it restricts itself by being subscribed to the deficit approach. It could have been better understood if the caste-specific socio-cultural experiences are given due weighting when conducting studies involving diverse socio-cultural groups, as in the case of India.

Conceptualisation of human cognition as a product of cultural processes accentuates the importance of the actual life of the people to understand their mental processes, which in turn demands studying the psychological influences of socio-cultural variables like caste more extensively. This need is more evident from the studies reviewed above that explore the cognitive differences of some social groups. The vast differences in the performance of the advantaged non-scheduled caste children and the disadvantaged children tend to get accentuated with rising age and grade disparities, leading to a cumulative deficit. It's however been noted that the performance differential is more a function of prolonged deprivation than the caste per se. The increasing gap among various social groups is explained as the cumulative effect of deprivation. The changing nature of the task, according to the higher grades, is not addressed here. In this way the lacunae in the caste studies are getting aggravated further. Often the group that are studied falls into the underprivileged caste or caste groups or are studied against the upper caste groups by comparing certain scores. Here also the deficit perspective is the underlying position. As said earlier the distinct caste experiences are not coming to the focus. When looking at the methodical specificities, it is evident that majority of such studies quantitative which is insufficient to capture the features of the caste system. This underlines the need for adopting different theoretical paradigms to better capture the salient features of caste system in the psychological enquires on caste and cognition.

To conceptualise the caste differences revealed in the existing studies more comprehensively, caste experiences must be seen as varied experiences for each caste group based on their cultural specificities. A different approach that is giving due importance to the unique caste experience and is capable of moving beyond the socio-economic perspective is still awaited in the academic psychology in India. Such specific and varied experiences of each caste group summon an addition in the 'deficit' perspective. This requires a change in approach from 'deficit' to 'difference' to bring the unique caste experience to the centre of the analysis to study its influence on cognition. This need has already proposed by various Indian scholars as Mohanty and Misra (2000) observes that 'difference' perspective is relatively less developed when it comes to studies on disadvantage and deprivation. They further argue that psychological studies of social disadvantages are now turning away from a deficit approach in favour of difference approach which suggests that the disadvantaged are different from the dominant group. Pandey and Singh (2009) also argue that the Indian social psychologists should focus on the cultural and sub-cultural diversities and analyse them systematically in their studies. But to invite this above stated requisite we must understand the central features of the caste system which has not been addressed so far. The following section covers the central features of the caste system as found in studies from different disciplines.

Central features of caste system

This session runs through the works conducted outside the discipline of psychology in order to bring out the central features of caste system. Macdonnell (1914) defines caste as a "homogenous social cooperation bearing a common name" and summarises its four key characteristics as "it is, hereditary that is, its members belong to it by right of birth, a man being born, not made, a member of caste; it is endogamous, that is, its members marry within its own circle only; its members profess to follow the same occupation; and its members do not eat with members of other caste and in varying degrees even avoid contact with them" (231). Beteille (1969) widens the definition to make it more inclusive when he describes caste as "a small and named group of persons characterised by endogamy, hierarchical membership, and a specific style of life which sometimes includes the pursuit by tradition of a particular occupation and is associated with a more or less distinct ritual status in a hierarchical system". Srinivas (2003) discusses two distinct tendencies implicit in the caste system: "The first is the acceptance of the existence of the multiple cultures, including moral and religious norms in any local society. Such acceptance is accompanied by a feeling that some institutions, ideas, beliefs and practices are relevant to one's group while not for others". Bougle (1968) accepts

this division among the castes, and goes a step further when he says that "... a society is subjected to this system if it is divided into a large number of mutually opposed groups which are hereditarily specialized and hierarchically arranged, if on principle, it tolerates neither the *parvenu* nor miscegenation, nor a change of profession" (cited in Gupta, 2007). Underpinning the diversity amongst the castes Srinivas (2003) argues "living in caste society means living in a pluralistic cultural universe: each caste has its own occupations, custom, ritual, traditions and ideas". Namboothiri (2003) echoes similar when he says since each caste differ in their hereditary occupations and rituals, different castes can be considered as different folks.

Many other scholars also highlighted the hereditary occupation as the key feature of the caste system. Observing the tendency of the formation of new castes, Macdonnell (1914) states, "It is certain that when a caste system had once been firmly stabilised, occupation became a predominant element in the formation of castes as Indian society developed" (p.242). Ghurye (1969) considers the lack of unrestricted choice of occupations as one of the key features of the caste system. He further points out that generally a caste or a group of allied caste groups considered some of the callings as their hereditary occupation protected mutually by the moral restraints and the moral check of one's caste fellows and the restraints put up by other castes against following the occupation of any other castes. In a similar vein, Dumont (2008) notes that, "there is a definite relationship between caste and profession. Thus, within certain limits, one may have recourse to a livelihood other than that which is traditional for the caste of which one is a member".

Often caste groups, differentiated chiefly by their hereditary occupations, were formed as comprehensive social systems by expressing themselves in villages as interdependent groups. Beteille (1969) observes that "the division of village into a number of castes constitutes one of the most fundamental features of its social structure" (p. 45). Madan (2002) states that "the village in India, it is believed, epitomises, the essence of Indian civilization as it is considered reciprocity of traditional mores and folk ways". There is however, diversity in the perspectives on village and its community. These perspectives on villages and village communities lie within two extremes-one that understands the caste and the village community as self-sufficient, static republics and the one that sees caste villages as colonial construction (See Madan, 2002; Fuller, 1996; Srinivas, 1987 for details). Fuller (1996) underlines the importance of the village studies when he says "ethnography as a whole provide us with a predominantly accurate record of rural society and caste as they existed as at the time of field work, a historical period when the 'traditional' society consolidated by the British rule was still largely intact".

What emerges from these observations is the idea that caste and villages are mobile units that have been transformed in the course of history. According to

Srinivas (1987), “the village is not an architectural and demographic entity but also a social entity in that all villages have some loyalty to it”. Many scholars explain the dynamics of village groups, under the concept of *jajmani*. Using this word for the first time, Wiser (1936) states that “each caste in the village at some time during the year is expected to render a fixed type of service to each other caste” (as cited in Gould, 2002). Dumont (2008) summarises the characteristics of the *jajmani* system as the one centred on a village land owned by the dominant caste, which control the means of subsistence and the rest of the castes are dependent. In such a system the link between the caste and the profession is strong with religious expression of division of labour in it.

This was the primary character of the Indian society from the medieval period to the colonial era. Beginning with overt and covert encounters with the colonial imagination of society and economy, the caste society began to get transformed through various currents of social agitations during the colonial period and also with the state intervention after the independence period. One of the major results of this transformation was the weakening of the practice of hereditary occupation which was the defining feature of the caste system as it keeps the caste groups exclusively distinct. This long process of transformation, however, has neither been similar nor of equal intensity across the region and among different caste groups.

Many studies have probed the changes and continuity in the labour activities in the context of these societal transformations. Gist (1954) claims that “...there are still remains, as a legacy from the past, more than a coincidental relationship between specific castes and specific occupation, and certainly a tendency for members of given castes to select or to be chosen for jobs that are appropriate to their caste position. This means that the range of deviation from traditional occupations tend to be within fairly narrow limits for most men”. Noting the continuity between rural and urban occupations, Srinivas (1962) observes that people carrying the hierarchical attitudes of the village to the town is especially true in case of the comparatively poor who leave their villages for towns in search of a better living.

The Cognitive contemporaneity of the caste

Many scholars noted the structural continuity of the caste system in India. On the contemporary existence and forms of caste, Fuller (1996) notes that “in many parts of rural India, things have not yet altered very much. Estimating their numbers accurately is hard, but millions certainly do still in villages, mainly the ones that are remote from urban influences, and have seen little agricultural, infrastructural, or educational development, in which there has been relatively little social change during the half century since the Independence” (p.10). According to Beteille, caste is articulated in the contemporary society in transformed forms. “Caste undoubtedly

exists in contemporary India; it does not however, exist as a complete system any more, but-if the phrase be permitted-as a truncated system” (Beteille, 1996).

In the present context, transformed forms of occupational continuity exists between the old and the new occupations and social order. Given the back ground of the disproportionate representation of the Tamil Brahmins in the IT field, Fuller and Narasimhan (2008, 2010) probes whether it can be seen as the continuity of the Brahmins’ role as literate service class and, more generally, of their position in the pre-colonial economy and the division of labour as defined by the caste system. Even though they rule out a simple continuity of the past in the present as if caste were the sole determinant, they do emphasise the continuity of the Brahmins’ longstanding traditions of education, literacy and scholarship as the key factor to understand this. For the same reason, they also believe that such a continuity makes a glimpse at Brahmins’ legacy in mathematics in the pre-modern times and its importance in the modern engineering is a question that is, yet to be answered.

Observing a connection between development of the IT sector and social system in the country, Sen (2007) says that our tradition of enhancing distinctive skills through the caste system tends to contribute in this development and among the skills, mathematics invites special attention. Gruru (2002) argues that the social science practice in the country has the division between the vast inferior mass of academics who pursue empirical social science and the privileged few who are considered to be the theoreticians with reflective capacity that makes them intellectually superior to the former. He finds the roots of this division in the hierarchical past where the majority like dalits were subjected to the manual labors that lack innovation and imagination against the upper castes who were subjected to labour which was imaginative, innovative and interesting that give opportunities for reflective capacities.

Need for a new approach

It is already shown that the psychological studies and theoretical constructs related to ‘caste’ have not paid adequate attention to the unique cultural experience of caste. Studies on caste in disciplines other than psychology show some central features of the caste system. Among these features, the concept of hereditary occupation invites special attention as it has been organising people around certain collective practical activities for many centuries. Since hereditary occupations are a collective activity and a principal feature of the caste system, it must be seen as an important factor in construction of mental processes. However, holding a ‘deficit’ approach will be inadequate to understand the co-constitutive role that caste plays in the development of cognition. Stated differently, caste plays an important role even today because mental processes undergo not just ontogenetic development but

also cultural-historical development. Therefore, it is pertinent to understand the centuries-old specific experiences of the caste by exploring the relationship between the old and the new activities, which will help historically place the processes of developing cognition and explore the contemporariness of caste experiences more extensively and effectively.

As caste is a socio-cultural phenomenon any psychological enquiry demands a theoretical framework that can better accommodate the socio-cultural and historical factors in its analytical plane. This paper proposes the use of the cultural-historical activity theory in psychology as it places human activities and cultural practices at the center of the study on cognition. The concerns raised in the review of studies on caste can only be overcome by an inter-disciplinary approach and the cultural historical- activity theory has that potential for meeting this objective. There have been some rejuvenated attempts in recent years (Cole, 1996, 1998; Engestrom, 2001; Rogoff, 1991, 1995; Shweder, 1990) accommodating the historical and cultural factors in the studies in psychology. Such attempts reasonably overcome the conception of universality of mind and they are sensitive to cultural specificity and historicity. Breaking the dualities of culture and mind and establishing a co-constitutive relationship, this approach creates a need to see the co-evolutionary nature of cognition along with the transformation of labour activities to see its continuities and changes meaningfully in the context of this discussion. The cultural-historical activity theory approach makes out a case for using the collective nature of the people in understanding their mental activities, thus giving some priority to both the immediate as well as the larger collective interacting environment. It also knocks off the concept of universality of mind by conceptualising the cultural and historical specificities of the mental processes. An analysis on cognition based on the hereditary occupation and its transformation is important in a country like India where people have been living as mutually exclusive groups in many respects based on their castes for centuries.

The Scope of Cultural-historical Framework

As the caste is a socio-cultural system, its enquiry traverses into and negotiates through different disciplinary boundaries and at such crossings the activity theory stands as an analytical plain where many categories and concepts meet and exchange meaningfully. It gives the enquiry a platform where the ontogenetic and historical factors of development of cognition can be addressed. As this has been the existing situation in the caste studies the present paper proposes cultural -historical activity theory (CHAT) as a potential theoretical framework to address the above concerns. Cultural-historical psychology emerged mainly through the works Vygotsky (1978, 1981, & 1987), Leontyev (1981, 2009), Engestrom (1987, 1996, 1999, 2001) and Cole

(1996,1998). Conceptualisation of the mind as a product of cultural-historical processes is the most important contribution of Vygotsky.

The CHAT perspective has spawned many new theoretical and methodological concerns bringing ‘culture’ to the center of psychology. It traces the evolution of cognition by taking into account the major aspects of human civilization and establishing a dialectical relationship with cognition. Within this tradition, cognition has been studied through the cultural artefacts, concepts, institutions and labour activities. Vygotsky invites attention to the mediating nature of mind that stands as his most fundamental and promising concept. Leontiev, and later Engestrom and Cole have developed Vygotsky’s theories further into a form of activity theory in their bid to advance the Vygotskian tradition and find out a meaningful unit that can overcome the duality of mind and culture. Talking about its scope, Engestrom (1999) says that “activity theory has much to contribute to the on-going multidisciplinary wave of interest in cultural practices and practice-bound cognition. Activity theory should not be regarded as a narrowly psychological theory but rather as a broad approach to develop novel conceptual tools for talking many of the theoretical and methodological questions that cut across the social sciences today” (p.8). Sannino, Danniels and Gutierrez (2009) state that “the activity theory seeks to analyse development within practical social activities. Activities organise our lives. In activities, humans develop their skills, personalities, and consciousness. Through activities, we also transform our social conditions, resolve contradictions, generate new cultural artefacts, and create new forms of life and the self”.




Figure 1: Triangular representation of activity systems (Engestrom 1987)

The concept of the activity system is vital in the analytical programme envisaged in the activity theory. “An activity system integrates the subject, object and instruments (material tools, and signs and symbols) into a unified whole” (Engestrom, 1996). It helps to locate historical relationships among multiple activities

by identifying how the results from a past activity affect new activities. It produces a conceptual and methodical platform to merge the historical and cultural causes to explain the mental processes. An activity system considers ontogeny and cultural-historical on the analytical plane by exploring the important historical forces that form activity system and ends at historical evolution of mental processes. In the triangular model, the subject is the individual or groups of individuals involved in the activity. The tool includes social others and artifacts that can act as resources for the subject in the activity. The object is the goal or motive of the activity. The rules are any formal or informal regulations that in varying degree can affect how the activity takes place. The community is the social group that the subject belongs to while engaged in an activity. The division of labour refers to how the tasks are shared among the community. The outcome of an activity system is the end result of the activity.

Using the scope of the CHAT framework, caste society can be represented using a triangular representation adopted from Engestrom (1987). People are exclusive groups oriented around their hereditary occupation in a rigid caste society without much interaction. A weak caste practicing society caste groups interact to some extent which can be portrayed using third generation activity system. In a weak caste practicing society people interact and share many of their cultural practices. They may keep their hereditary occupation and may not at sometimes. In such interacting contexts and psychological development which are marked by a systemic change can be explained using the concept of expansion. This according to Engestrom (1999) comes “within the expansive approach, learning is understood in the broader and temporally much longer perspective of a third dimension, that is, the dimension of the development of the activity”. But at the same time, he notes the local characters of an activity and its features. “According to the activity theory, any local activity resorts to some historically formed mediating artefacts, cultural resources that are common to the society at large. Networks between activity systems provide for movement of artefacts. These resources can be combined, used, and transformed in novel ways in local joint activities. Thus, local concrete activities are simultaneously unique and general, momentary and durable. In their unique ways, they solve problems by using general cultural means created by previous generations” (Engestrom, 1999). Sharing more insights on this Engestrom (1987) states that “an expansive transformation is accomplished when the object and motive of the activity are reconceptualised to embrace a radically wider horizon of possibilities than in the previous mode of the activity”.

The CHAT framework would be appealing to at least for the following reasons.

a) It offers an interdisciplinary analysis, 2) it focuses on the collective practical activity of people b) it offers a conceptual tools to study cultural historical

development along with ontogenetic development c) it offers a systemic view of cognitive development with a metaphor of expansion and d) CHAT addresses questions about diversity. Let's now look for our concerns. To make a shift possible in the caste studies the existing psychological knowledge domain should borrow from other disciplines like sociology, history, anthropology and allied disciplines. Cultural historical psychology has the potential to welcome this. Caste as a social system stretched over for centuries, psychological analysis indeed requires be accommodative for cultural- historical specificities and their transformation. As an analytical framework the CHAT is open to it. Cognitive development at the level of individual may not be capturing the whole picture. The metaphor expansion offers the analytical plane enabling a systemic approach. Being a collective around hereditary occupation caste groups has its own cultural practices, myths and narrative. Cognition could be seen as co-evolving around their concrete material conditions. By this way the caste studies would be able to address the diverse psychological world the people have been living with. This scope has been explored in the work conducted by me (Kuniyil,2021) that probed the connection between parental concept of child development among the Malayan community of north Kerala and their hereditary occupation.

Conclusion

As a social system, caste is unique to Indian society. A rigid caste society offered its groups a fixed set of activities in the form of hereditary occupational activities. Within the communities, this has created a differentiated concept of development from other communities and the concomitant learning process resulting in differentiated cognitive processes within the communities. In this way, caste system not only formed groups with different occupations and traditions but also corresponding cognitive abilities in each of them too. The weakening of the caste system has resulted in members of a particular community participate in many collective activities irrespective of their hereditary occupation. This in turn, also transforms the development of the cognitive process in the community. However after being part of a rigid caste society for centuries, the various castes/communities are in the way of transformations for some decades. This is essentially a historically conditioned process through its continuity from their traditional collective activities. Theoretical framework of cultural- historical psychology offers a powerful analytical tool to understand the complex process of co-evolution of caste practices and cognitive processes and also the transformation in the co-evolution following the weakening of the caste structure. The CHAT will help us explain how caste has been worked in the past and how it is working in the present day in the development of cognition. This can invite the required shift from 'deficit' to 'difference' in the studies

on caste. In this way addressing the phenomena of the caste and its constitutive role in cognition using the CHAT framework both as a historical reality and as a contemporary phenomenon will help us build knowledge to make the planning of educational programmes more sensitive to cultural and historical realities and leads to more rational and effective educational policies.

References

- Agarwal, S., & Mishra, R. C. (1983). Disadvantages of caste and schooling and development of category organization skill. *Psychologia: An International Journal of Psychology in the Orient*, 26(1), 54-61.
- Beteille, A. (1969). *Caste, class, and power: Changing patterns of stratification in a Tanjore village*. Bombay: Oxford University Press.
- Beteille, A. (1996). Caste in contemporary India. In C. J. Fuller (Ed.) *Caste today* (pp. 150-79). Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Bouglé, C. (1958). The essence and reality of the caste system. *Contributions to Indian Sociology (Series 1) 1957-1966*, 27-30.
- Cole, M. (1996). *Cultural psychology: A once and future discipline*. USA: Harvard University Press.
- Cole, M. (1998). Can cultural psychology help us think about diversity? *Mind, Culture, and Activity*, 5(4), 291-304.
- Dalal, A. K. & Misra, G. (Eds.). (2001). *New directions in Indian psychology, Vol.1. Social psychology*. New Delhi: Sage publication.
- Dube, S. C. (2002). A rural development project in action. In V. Madan (Ed.), *The village in India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Dumont, L. (2008). *Homo hierarchicus: The caste system and its implication*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Engestrom, Y. (1987). *Learning by expanding: An activity-theoretical approach to developmental research*. Helsinki: Orienta-Konsultit Oy.
- Engestrom, Y. (1996). Developmental studies of work as a testbench of activity theory: The case of primary care medical practice. In S. Chaiklin, & J. Lave (Eds.), *Understanding practice: Perspectives on activity and context* (64-103). London: Cambridge University Press.
- Engestrom, Y. (1999). Activity theory and individual and social transformation. In Y. Engestrom, R. Miettinen, & R. L. Punamaki (Eds.), *Perspectives on activity theory* (pp. 19-38). UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Engestrom, Y. (2001). Expansive learning at work: Toward an activity theoretical reconceptualization. *Journal of education and work*, 14(1), 133-156.
- Fuller, C.J. (1996). *Caste today*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Fuller, C.J., & Narasimhan, H. (2008). From land lord to software engineers: Migration and urbanization among Tamil Brahmins. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 50(1), 170-196.
- Fuller, C.J., & Narasimhan, H. (2010). Traditional vocations and modern professions among Tamil Brahman in colonial and post-colonial south India. *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 47 (4), 473-496.

- Ghuman, P. A. (1978). Nature of intellectual development of Punjabi children. *International Journal of Psychology*, 13(4), 281-294.
- Ghurye, G. S. (1969). *Caste and race in India*. Bombay: Popular Prakashan.
- Gist, N. P. (1954). Caste differentials in south India. *American Sociological Review*, 19(2), 126-137.
- Gupta, G. (Ed.). (2007). *Social stratification*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Guru, G. (2002). How egalitarian are the social sciences in India? *Economic and Political Weekly*, 37(50), 5003-5009.
- Jachuck, K. (1982). Patterns of cognitive ability among boys in four sub-cultural groups. In R. Rath, H. S. Asthana, D. Sinha, & J. P. Sinha (Eds.), *Diversity and unity in cross cultural psychology* (pp.60-69). Netherlands: Swets and Zeitlinger.
- Kuniyil, V. (2021). Parental Concept of child development and hereditary occupation among the Malayan community of north Kerala. *Psychological studies*.66 (4):445-454 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12646-021-00632-9>.
- Leontiev, A. N. (2009). *Activity and consciousness*. Retrieved from <https://www.marxists.org/archive/leontiev/works/activity-consciousness.pdf>.
- Leontyev, A. N. (1981). *The Problem of Activity in Psychology*. In J. V. Wertsch (Ed.), *The Concept of Activity in Soviet psychology*. New York: Sharpe.
- Macdonnel, A. A. (1914). The early history of caste. *The American Historical Review*, 19(2), 230-244.
- Madan, V. (2002). Introduction. In V. Madan (Ed.), *The Village in India* (pp.1-26.). New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Majeed, A., & Ghosh, E. S. K. (1989). Affective syndrome crises in scheduled castes. *Social Change*, 19 (3), 90-94.
- Misra, G. & Tripathi K. N. (2000). Psychological dimensions of poverty and deprivation. In J. Pande (Ed.) *Psychology in India revisited: Developments in the Discipline*. Vol. 3, Applied social and organizational psychology. New Delhi: Sage publication.
- Misra, G., & Shahi B. P. (1977). Prolonged deprivation and development of form perception. *Journal of Psychological Researches*, 21(3), 185-91.
- Misra, G. and Tripathi, L.B. (1975). Cognitive activities as a function of prolonged deprivation. *Psychological Studies*, 21, 54-61.
- Mitra, S.K. (Ed.). (1972). *A survey of research in psychology*. New Delhi: Indian Council of Social Science Research.
- Mohanty, A. K., & Misra, G. (2000). Consequences of poverty and disadvantage: A review of Indian studies. In A. K., Mohanty, & G., Misra, (Eds.), *Psychology of Poverty and Disadvantage*. New Delhi: Concept Publishing House.
- Namboothiri, M. V. V. (2003). *Jeevithavumsamskaravum. Life and Culture: Vol. 3*. Kannur: Kerala Folklore Academy.
- Pandey, J. (Ed.). (2004). *Psychology in India revisited: Developments in the discipline, vol.3. Applied social and organisational psychology*. New Delhi: Sage publication.
- Pandey, J., & Singh, P. (2009). *Social psychology in India: Social roots and development*. Retrieved from <http://e-book.lib.sjtu.edu.cn/iupsys/Origins/Adair/>.
- Parcek, U. (Ed). (1980). *A survey of research in psychology, 1971- 76. Part 1*. New Delhi: Indian Council of Social Science Research.

- Rath, R. and Sircar, N.C. (1960). The mental pictures of six caste Hindu groups about each other as reflected in verbal stereotypes. *Journal of psychology*, 51, 277-293.
- Rogoff, B. (1991). Social interaction as apprenticeship in thinking: Guidance and participation in spatial planning. In L. Resnick, J. Levine, and S. Teasley (Eds.), *Perspectives on socially Shared cognition*. Washington DC: American Psychological Association.
- Rogoff, B. (1995). Socio cultural setting, inter subjectivity, and the formation of the individual. In J. V. Wertsch, P. Del Río, & A. Alvarez (Eds.), *Socio-cultural studies of mind*. USA: Cambridge University Press.
- Sahu, S., & Jena, A. (1983). Psycholinguistic abilities of socially disadvantaged children. *Psycho-Lingua*. 13(1), 25-30.
- Sannino, A., Danniels, H., & Gutierrez, K. D. (2009). Activity theory: Between historical engagement and future-making process. In A., Sannino, H, Daniels, & K. D. Gutiérrez (Eds.), *Learning and expanding with activity theory*. UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Sen, A. (2007). Keynote Address at the NASSCOM 2007 India Leadership Forum in Mumbai on February 7, *The Hindu, e-paper*, 16 February 2007; Retrieved from <http://www.hindu.com>.
- Shweder, R. A. (1990). Cultural Psychology – What is it? In J. W. Stigler, R. A. Shweder, & G. Herdt (Eds.), *Cultural psychology: Essays on comparative human development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Singh, A. K. (1988). Intergroup relations and social tensions. In J. Pandey (Ed.), *Psychology in India: The state of the art, Vol. III*, (159–224). New Delhi: Sage publication.
- Sinha, D. (1982). Some social disadvantages and development of certain perceptual skills. In G. Misra, D. Sinha, & R. C. Tripathi (Eds.), *Deprivation, its social roots and psychological consequences*. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company.
- Sinha, D. (1985). Cognitive and motivational correlates of deprivation and their implications for the education of the scheduled caste children. *Journal of Personality and Clinical Studies*, 1 (1), 11-16.
- Srinivas, M. N. (2003). *Social change in modern India*. New Delhi: Orient Longman Private Ltd.
- Srinivas, M. N. (1987). *The dominant caste and other essays*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Srinivas, M.N. (1962). *Caste in modern India and other essays*. Bombay: Media Promoters and Publishers, Pvt. Ltd.
- Tripathi, R. C. and Srivastava, R. (1981). Relative deprivation and intergroup attitude. *European Journal of Social psychology*, 11, 313-318.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Cole, M, John-Steiner, V Scribner, S & Soubberman, E. (Eds.). *Mind in society: The development of higher psychological functions*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1981). The genesis of higher mental functions. In J. V. Wertsch (Ed.), *The concept of activity in Soviet psychology*. New York: Sharpe.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). R. W., Rieber, & A. S. Carton (Eds.). *The collected works of L. S. Vygotsky (Volume 1): Problems of General Psychology*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Wiser, W. H. (1936). *The Hindu jajmani system*. Lucknow: Publishing House.

The Concept of Human Rights: Expansion and Changing Dimensions

Sijo K. Manuel

Abstract

Human rights are the basic minimum requirements for the survival of the human beings in the society. These rights are meant to uphold human dignity and equality and to set forth liberty and fraternity to all without any discrimination. Human Rights is a universal and legal concept. Individuality, universality, paramountcy, practicability and enforceability are some of the important features of the human rights doctrine. Human Rights are universally accepted rights which have virtually been accepted by the States and societies all over the world. The concept of human rights has received importance at the global level over a period of time. The traditional bearer of human rights obligation has lost control over the globalization process and other players such as financial institutions and international Corporations are the shaping the growth. This article describes the historical development and evolution of the human rights, the role of the United Nations (UN) for the nurturing of human rights and also provides the information on globalization and Human Rights.

Keywords: International Law, Natural Law, Western Political Philosophy, Enlightenment, Social Justice.

Introduction

Human rights are the rights entitled to all human beings, irrespective of nationality, ethnicity, sex, race, colour, religion, language or any other status. There is no discrimination in enjoying these basic rights, which are equal to everybody. Most of these rights are interrelated, interdependent and indivisible. Human rights include civil and political rights, such as the right to life, liberty and freedom of expression; and social, cultural and economic rights, including the right to participate in cultural activities, the right to food, the right to work and the access to education. Human rights are protected and upheld by several international and national laws, treaties, covenants, and declarations. In the earliest stages, the concept

and benefits of Human Rights remained primarily confined to the higher classes of people. Later, the bill of rights, 1689 declared certain freedom available to all citizens. In its declaration of independence, 1776 the United States of America has declared certain unalienable rights as human rights. After the French Revolution, it was declared that “all men are born free; they remain free and have equal rights”. The concept of human right is a part of International Law. In fact, the concept of human right has acquired an International status because it has crossed all geographical boundaries and it has been recognized throughout the world today.

Historical Development of Human Rights

The concept of human rights became popular particularly in the 20th century, though it had its roots in different forms since time immemorial. Most of the students of human rights trace the historical origin of the concept back to ancient Greece and Rome, where it was closely linked with the pre-modern natural law doctrine of the Greek Stoicism¹ (Claude & Burns, 1989). This theory of stoicism played a key role in the political theories of the natural rights both in Greece and Rome. The Western political philosophy, however, contends that the “Classical Greek Philosophy was based on an examination of the individual and his role in the running of a civil society in particular ‘the polis’ – which became a precursor to the philosophical debate on ‘the rights of man’ – a debate which has continued throughout the history of the West. Even during the time of Socrates and Plato, this idea was linked to the kindred notions of natural law and political idealism. On the basis of these ideas, it was later argued that above and beyond the real world of the laws and rules promulgated by the kings and the emperors (the so called positive law), there existed certain immutable and natural laws to which all human beings are entitled and by which the rulers should be judged. Such views were taken up and developed by the Stoics and later by the Christian thinkers such as St. Augustine in the medieval period (Australian Govt. Department of foreign Affairs and Trade, 1993).

According to the ancient Greek writers, the God established a law which stands above the obligations and interdictions imposed by the rules of the community (Castberg 1967). In Roman law a distinction was made between the national law and the law which is actually common to all nations. The law of nature was regarded as that law which the nature has herself established. According to Marcus Tullius Cicero, the great Roman Jurist, there is one eternal and immutable law, which will apply to all people at all times and which emanates from the God – the Natural Law. Cicero deduced not only a common law, but also a common share in justice (Sabine, 1951).

In the medieval period which roughly ranges from the 13th century to the Treaty of Westphalia² (1648), absorbing the period of Renaissance and the decline of feudalism, certain basic changes in the beliefs and practices of the society were seen

because people felt the idea of human rights as a general social need. The concept of natural law was elaborated during the middle Ages in the works of the Christian theologians in the form of a belief in a law of God, above all human laws. The teachings of Aquinas (1224-1274) and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) on the European continent and certain declarations like the Magna Carta (1215), the Petition of Rights (1628) and the English Bill of Rights (1689) in England were added as proofs of this change (Claude & Burns, 1989). All these show that all human beings are endowed with certain eternal and inalienable rights and they could never be renounced even when the humankind contracted to enter the civil society (Claude & Burns, 1989). From that of primitive one, or from the claim of the divine rights of the kings, the progressive vision of the rights took a real meaning as the natural rights in the 17th and the 18th centuries.

The scientific and the intellectual achievements of the 17th century such as the discoveries of Galileo and Sir Isaac Newton, the materialism of Thomas Hobbes, the nationalism of Rene Des Cartes and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, the pantheism of Benedict de Spinoza and the empiricism of Francis Bacon and John Locke encouraged a belief in the natural law and Universal order (Claude & Burns, 1989). The 18th century, led it to become a more comprehensive one, due to the growing confidence in human reason and the perfectibility of human affairs, with the age of Enlightenment³. John Locke in England, Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau in France, to name a few, supported human reason and also tried to prove the superiority of natural law. John Locke, the father of modern liberalism, argued in his writings that certain natural rights like the right to life, liberty and property are self evidently necessary as they existed in the state of nature before the humankind entered into the civil society. He further argued that the State, after the contract, has to ensure those fixed natural rights and in case the State does not do so, people also have a right to revolt against the State. The Glorious Revolution was the reflection of these liberal notions of human rights (Kumar, 1998).

The philosophy associated with John Locke and others had a tremendous influence on the Western world in the late 18th and the early 19th centuries. The practical examples of England's Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the resulting Bill of Rights in 1689, provided the rationale for the wave of a revolutionary agitation which influenced the West, most notably in North America and France. Certain historic texts like the Pennsylvania Declaration⁴ (1776), the Maryland Declaration (1776), the New Hemisphere Declaration (1783), the American Declarations⁵ (1787), the French Declarations of the Rights of Man⁶ (1789) and the Massachusetts Declarations (1789) reflected the intellectual milieu of the contemporary socio-political situations spawning the struggle against political absolutism (Lauterpacht, 1950).

At the turn of the century after the French Revolution, the doctrine of natural law emerged as a doctrine of abstract and immutable principles and of eternal and inviolable human rights. In England, Burke launched his attack against the assertion of the Natural Law Doctrine (Burke, 1790). In Germany, the reaction against the philosophy of Natural Law emerged with the 'historical school of jurisprudence'. Another philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism asserted that 'right is the child of law, from real come real right; but from imaginary laws, from the law of nature come imaginary rights... . Natural law is simple nonsense; natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts' (Arora & Grover, 2004). This attack on the natural law and the natural rights, thus began during the late 18th century and became intensified and broadened during the 19th and the 20th centuries. Philosophers like J.S. Mill, Friedrich Karl Von Savigny, Sir Henry Maine and many other historians in England expressed the view that the rights are the products of cultural and environmental variables and so are very unique to particular communities. On the other hand, a group of jurists and philosophers like John Austin, Ludwig Wittgenstein and many others argued that law alone is the command of the sovereign and the truth could be established by verifiable experience.

Meantime, under the influence of the 19th century German Idealism of Hegel and the rising European Nationalism, the Marxian School of Thought emerged, which did not reject the individual rights altogether but maintained that the rights were derived from whatsoever source belonging to the community or the whole society and not only the individuals. Here there was a clear-cut depiction of the birth of the social rights. The abolition of slavery, factory legislation, popular trade unionism, and the universal suffrage movements were some of the examples of the 19th century impulses which kept alive the idea of natural rights even though it was viewed with general skepticism. But it was the rise and fall of Nazism in Germany which imparted a real meaning to the ideal of human rights. In Germany, the laws authorized the dispossession and extermination of the Jews and other minorities. They were tortured and executed without public trial. So the dignity of the individual was emphasized as a result of this realization. Consequently, certain institutional mechanisms were developed over the years to preserve and protect people's rights in a more systematic and dignified way. The League of Nations and the United Nations were such institutions.

The end of the First World War and the resultant emergence of the League of Nations paved the way for a new era in International Relations and Human Rights. The covenant of the League of Nations reflected the very limited international concern with human rights. The phrase, 'human rights and fundamental freedoms' did not appear in the covenant. The drafters of the covenant were pre-occupied with the maintenance of international peace and security, the pacific settlement of disputes, the establishment of a mandate system for the former German and the

Ottoman territories, and the protection of the minorities in Central Europe. Neither the Council nor the Assembly of the League predominantly dealt with the questions of human rights. The wholesale and the systematic suppression of human liberty in the Communist Russia, the Fascist Italy, and the Nazi Germany went officially unnoticed by the League, although the implications of these acts of tyranny were recognized by many of its member states (Green, 1956).

The International Labour Organization (ILO) which was set up in 1919, working in collaboration with the League of Nations, did a lot of work in the field of human rights. The ILO was established on the basis of the realization that universal peace could be achieved only if it were based on social justice. International action to eliminate the social evils like slavery, forced labour, the traffic in the narcotics, traffic in women and children were greatly strengthened under the League. In particular, the development of the conventions and the recommendations by the ILO emphasized a new international concern in labour questions like wages, working hours, working conditions and social security. These activities of the League reflected the growing acceptance of the concept that, the affairs of labour were the matters of national as well as international concern (Green, 1956). The major work of the League and the ILO was to provide an efficient system for developing and coordinating new international machinery for economic and social co-operation rather than to define rights and to devise measures for promoting it.

The United Nations and Human Rights

The Second World War marked a turning point in the development of international concern for human rights. The rise of Fascism and Nazism was a ruthless challenge to the steady advance in the democratic process which assured the individual an ever-broadening field for the exercise of his rights as a free person. In the Fascist Italy and the Nazi Germany, the individual was stripped of civil rights, was subjected to police tyranny, and condemned to brutal oppression on the grounds of race and religion (UN, 1950). It was the catalyst which produced a revolutionary development in international law relating to human rights. The allied leaders and their governments, reflecting the aroused conscience of the free world, insisted that the foundations of peace must be built upon with respect to human rights. In January 1941, President Roosevelt, in his message to the Congress, enunciated what are termed as the four freedoms (Freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from wants and freedom from fear). These freedoms were the goals for which the world had to strive for. The Atlantic Charter of 1941 set forth similar objectives for the post-war world (Ibid). In October 1942, Prime Minister Churchill promised that “when this struggle ends with the enthronement of human rights, social persecution will be ended” (Churchil, 1948). The Washington Conference⁷ of 1942, the Moscow

Conference⁸ of 1943, and the deliberations at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944, gave similar assurances (Bajwa, 1997).

It was with the birth of the UN that the human rights movement got a momentum in the international sphere. The first documentary use of the expression 'human rights' is to be found in the Charter of the UN, which was adopted at San Francisco on 25th June 1945. Article 1 stated the purpose which was to achieve international co-operation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction on the basis of race, sex, languages or religion (Green, 1956).

The Universal Declaration

In the autumn of 1945, the preparatory Commission recommended that the ECOSOC should immediately establish a Commission on Human Rights and direct it to prepare an International Bill of Rights. The General Assembly approved this recommendation on 12th February, 1946 and the ECOSOC enacted it four days later. The Commission of Human Rights was set up within a matter of months, initially with a nucleus of 9 members (Robertson & Merrills, 2005). The first regular session of the Commission opened in January 1947, and its first task was the drafting of the International Bill of Rights. It decided later in the year that this should have three parts: a Declaration; a Convention containing legal obligations; and 'measures of implementation', in other words, a system of international supervision or control. The work on the Declaration started without delay, and a drafting committee of eight members was appointed for the same. These members consisted of the representatives from Australia, Chile, China, France, Lebanon, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) (Jaswal & Jaswal 1996).

The chair of the Commission and of the drafting committee was Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. The change of the name from 'Rights of man' to 'Human Rights' was suggested by the Chairperson in 1947. The full Commission examined and revised the draft Declaration thus prepared and submitted it through the ECOSOC to the General Assembly in 1948. It was adopted on 10th December, 1948, with forty-eight votes in favour, none against and eight abstentions (Basic Documents on Human Rights 1992). It was not intended to impose legal obligations on the States, rather it was meant to establish goals for them to work towards (Sohn, 1968).

The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its two optional protocols (Rai, 2000). The Universal Declaration was adopted by Resolution 217 (111) of the General Assembly. The UDHR consists of a preamble and 30 articles setting forth

the human rights and fundamental freedoms to which all men and women, everywhere in the world are entitled without any discrimination. The provisions of the Universal Declaration can be classified into four categories: (1) General (Articles 1 and 2); (2) Civil and Political Rights (Articles 3 to 21); (3) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Articles 22 to 27) and (4) Concluding (Articles 28-30). Thus the Declaration basically proclaims two kinds of rights, i.e., civil and political rights on the one hand; and economic, social and cultural rights on the other (Jaswal & Jaswal, 1996).

The ICESCR was adopted by the General Assembly in 1966. It has a preamble and 31 articles divided into 5 parts. This Covenant contains a longer and much more comprehensive list of economic, social and cultural rights than the UDHR. The ICCPR was adopted by the General Assembly in 1966. The Covenant has a preamble and 53 articles divided into six parts. It contains a longer and much more comprehensive list of civil and political rights than the UDHR (Ibid). The first optional protocol to the ICCPR was adopted by the General Assembly in 1966 (Assembly Resolution XXI/2200 1996). It consists of preamble and fourteen articles. The General Assembly had decided to consider the idea of elaborating a draft of a second optional protocol to the ICCPR on 25 November, 1981, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (Assembly Resolution 30/59 1981). It was adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly on 15 December, 1989 (Assembly Resolution 44/128 1989). The second optional protocol has a preamble and eleven articles.

In 1950, the European Convention on Human Rights and Convention for Suppression of Traffic in Persons and Exploitation of Prostitution of others (UN) were adopted. In the next year, the Convention on the status of Refugees (UN) was adopted. The European Commission on Human Rights and the Court of Human Rights took birth in 1953. In the same year, the Convention on Political Rights of women (UN) also came into being. Four years later, in 1957, the Convention on Nationality of Married Women (UN) was formed. Subsequently the Convention concerning Abolition of Forced Labour (ILO) and the Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal populations (ILO) were adopted. Likewise, the Convention concerning Discrimination in Employment and Occupation (ILO) was also formed. The UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child was adopted in the next year, i.e., in 1959. Two years later, in 1961, the European Social Charter defined the economic and social rights for the member states of the Council of Europe. The Amnesty International was established in Great Britain in the same year. Then, in 1965 the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (UN) was adopted.

In 1966, the ICCPR and the ICESCR (UN) were adopted and opened for signature. In 1967, the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity⁹ (UN) was adopted. The First World

Conference on Human rights was held in Tehran in 1968. The Organization of the American States (OAS) adopted the American Convention on Human Rights in the following year. Four years later, in 1973, the International Convention on Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid¹⁰ (UN) was adopted. In Australia, the Racial Discrimination Act was enacted in 1975. In the same year, the Declaration on the Rights of the Disabled persons (UN) also came into existence. A Human Rights' Bureau was created within the United States at the federal level, named as the 'Department of States' in 1977. It was in this year that Amnesty International won the coveted, Nobel peace prize. The Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (UN) and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (UN) were adopted two years later, in 1979. In 1981, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance Based on Religion or Belief was adopted. In the succeeding year, the Principles of Medical Ethics were adopted by the UN.

The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UN) was adopted in 1984. The following year witnessed the establishment of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights¹¹. The Declaration on the Right to Development (UN) was adopted in 1986. And, in 1989, the Convention on the Rights of the Child¹² (UN) took birth. In the next year, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their families¹³ (UN) was formed. In 1993, the Vienna Declaration and the Programme of Action was adopted by 185 nations, present at the second World Conference on Human Rights. The UN Decade for Human Rights' Education was declared in the period from 1994 – 2005. An important landmark in the history of the human rights occurred in 1995, when the Beijing Declaration at the World Conference on Women declared that 'women's rights are human rights. And finally, the establishment of the International Criminal Court took place in 1998 (Nandorfy, 2007).

With the beginning of 21st century certain land mark developments in human rights took place through UN initiative. The most notable among these developments include the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity is a declaration adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2001, the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2006, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007, the United Nations Summit on the Millennium Development Goals in 2010, the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in 2012 etc.

In spite of the efforts before the Universal Declaration to establish a model standard of conduct, applicable to every individual and governments, no prior document could match the Universal Declaration in scope or participation

(Reidhert, 2003). The direct impetus for the UDHR emanated from the horrors perpetrated in Nazi Germany in the name of racial purity and superiority (Ibid). Since the General Assembly of the UN proclaimed its UDHR on 10th December 1948, the concept of human rights has become one of the most potent concepts in contemporary politics. The period from the French Revolution to the Second World War was the dark age of the concept of human rights. We are now in its second age (Freeman, 2002).

Globalization and Human Rights

Human rights have become an integral part of the process of globalization in many ways. The Western countries are increasingly using their view of human rights concept as a yardstick to judge the developing countries and to deal with economic and trade relations to extend development assistance. At the same time, globalization intensifies impoverishment by increasing the poverty, insecurity, fragmentation of the society and thus violates human rights and human dignity of millions of people. Globalization may be described as the ever closer economic integration of all the countries of the world resulting from the liberalization and consequent increase in both the volume and the variety of international trade in goods and services, the falling cost of transport, the growing intensity of the international penetration of capital, the immense growth in the global labour force, and the accelerated worldwide diffusion of technology, particularly communications.

Globalization has both positive and negative aspects. With the expansion of trade, market, foreign investment, the developing countries have witnessed the gaps among themselves widen. The imperative to liberalize has demanded a shrinking of state involvement in national life, producing a wave of privatization, cutting jobs, slashing health, education and food subsidies, etc. affecting the poor people in the society (Arafat, 2013). In many cases, liberalization has been accompanied by greater inequality and people are left trapped in utter poverty.

Meanwhile, in many industrialized countries, unemployment has soared to levels not seen for many years and income disparity to levels not recorded since the last century. The Human Development Report of 1997 revealed that the poor countries and poor people too often find their interests neglected as a result of globalization. Although globalization of the economy has been characterized as the locomotive for productivity, opportunity, technological progress, and uniting the world, it ultimately causes increased impoverishment, social disparities and violations of human rights. That is what we witness today (Arafat, 2013).

In the economic field, globalization is associated with the development of capitalism as an economic system, often based on the belief of self-regulating

markets. Globalization has developed economic freedom and allegedly raised living standards worldwide, even if, in relative terms, the gap between the rich and the poor is growing. Globalization is connected with the development of international trade, and the global distribution of the production of goods and services, through the reduction of barriers to international trade, such as tariffs, export fees, and import quotas, and the reduction of restrictions on the movement of capital and on investment. Globalization has accelerated the processes of outsourcing and offshoring. Transnational corporations (TNCs) can exploit small and medium-sized enterprises intensively and at the lowest possible cost, at a world level, due to outsourcing. The small and medium enterprises may find it difficult, though, to resist global competition and ensure their workers' rights. TNCs cannot easily be held responsible for human rights violations when the corporation is legally incorporated in one state while it conducts its operation in another state. Globalization has also had an impact on the privatization of public utilities and goods such as water, health, security, and even prison management. Recently other goods, such as seeds or medicines, have been considered as economic goods and integrated into trade agreements (Nault & England, 2011).

Globalization has contributed to the development of corporate social responsibility and the concern for the accountability of non-state actors, such as transnational corporations for their activities, particularly when impacting negatively on the environment, on communities, and so on. Today, we can also see an increase in companies developing a code of conduct for their activities. Consumer boycotts and campaigns have also led TNCs to be more attentive to social responsibility and to their reputation risk. Globalization in itself does not violate human rights; the main concern is that it affects negatively the realisation of universal human rights everywhere. These concerns include the human rights obligations of non-state actors, for example transnational companies, amplified by the fact that national governments, due to the economic and political globalization, have less control of social and economic processes. Another example regards the primacy that human rights considerations should have in governmental decisions, which is questionable, particularly when governments' economic policies depend on market fluctuations and foreign investors' actions, as well as in settlements of trade disputes.

Many of the human rights are at stake in the face of globalization. The rights to equality in dignity and to non-discrimination, for instance through poor health and safety conditions for workers in developing countries and the rights to health, food and shelter, particularly through the imposition of trade barriers to developing countries, or through the purchase of arable land in African and Asian countries for producing export crops or bio-fuels are examples of human rights that are at stake. Not only these the right to work, for example through the relocation of industries to

countries with a cheaper labour force and where lower social standards can be imposed and the rights to life, for example through trade agreements that make it prohibitive for people in poor countries to access medicines; the right to own property, for example through evictions in situations of big infrastructure projects, such as dams or pipelines and the right to health and healthy environment, for example through the concentration of hazardous waste in developing countries or through the lack of international consensus regarding climate change actions to be taken by governments are also at the verge of danger. Along with these, the right to protection against harmful forms of work and exploitation, for example by governments tolerating harmful forms of work in order not to lose the interest of foreign investors and the rights of indigenous peoples to their culture and development, for example through deforestation and/or severe pollution that destroy areas in which indigenous communities have been living, the industrial exploitation of their lands and expropriation are also under threat in the wake of globalization (Kadragic, 2006).

The WTO agreements often have human rights consequences, even if they do not necessarily mention human rights. For example, the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), adopted in 2001, contains requirements that nations' laws must meet for protecting copyrights, including in sectors such as pharmaceutical industries and other patents. For states that do not have the financial resources to pay for patented medicines – or the capacity to produce their own generics – this requirement is in conflict with the right to health (and the commitments of the same state in this respect).

Conclusion

The concept of 'Human Rights' is as old as the history of mankind. With the passage of time, different theories, approaches and areas of specialization have developed in the field of human rights. It has been asserted that the human rights are inalienable and belong to all human beings, irrespective of caste, class, language or whatever it is. Many human rights advocates have opined that the human rights are moral rights embedded in human beings, which make their freedom meaningful. The different phases in the evolution of human rights have also been aptly analysed in the article, to gain an insight into the historical background of the rights. The role of the UN in the promotion of human rights has also been examined. The history of human rights covers thousands of years and draws upon religious, cultural, philosophical and legal developments throughout the recorded history. It seems that the concept of human rights is as old as the civilization. This is evident from the fact that almost at all stages of mankind, there have been human rights documents in one form or the other in existence. Several ancient documents and later religious

and philosophies included a variety of concepts that may be considered as human rights. However, the idea for the protection of human rights increased after the tragic experiences of the two world wars. Prior to the world wars, there was not much codification done either at the national or the international levels for the protection and implementation of human rights.

Human right is a cross-cutting theme in all the UN policies and programmes in the key areas of peace and security, development, humanitarian assistance, and economic and social affairs. As a result, virtually every UN body and specialized agency is involved to some degree in the protection of human rights. Some examples are the right to development, which is at the core of the Sustainable Development Goals; the right to food, championed by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, labour rights, defined and protected by the International Labour Organization, gender equality, which is promulgated by the UN Women, the rights of children, indigenous peoples, and disabled persons. The essential value of human rights thinking and action, however, is unlikely to change. It has served and will continue to serve as a gauge of the legitimacy of the government, a guide to set the priorities for human progress, and a basis for consensus over what values can be shared across diverse ideologies and cultures.

Globalization is allegedly responsible for human rights violations on the one hand, but allows human rights movements to counter its excesses and negative effects, on the other hand. Globalization results in lower prices paid to farmers for their crops, and increases the incentive to create abusive workplace conditions including the employment of child labourers. However, it also enables a level of networking which results in the emergence of global human rights movements, for example, to create fair trade, to reduce child labour and to promote a culture of universal human rights.

Notes

1. The Stoic School - A school of the Greek philosophy which had its origin in Athens. It came into being in the early 3rd century B.C. The founder of this School was Zeno of Citium. The Stoics advocated that the errors in judgment caused the emotions that resulted in destruction. According to them, an individual's philosophy was best indicated by the behavior of a person, rather than his words.
2. The Treaty of Westphalia – A set of peace treaties was signed between May and October 1648, in Osnabrück and Münster, which came to be known as the Treaty of Westphalia. As a result of these treaties the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648) in the Holy Roman Empire and the Eighty Years' War (1568–1648) between Spain and the Dutch Republic came to an end. Those who were involved with these treaties were the Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand III; the Kingdom of Spain; the Kingdom of France; the Swedish Empire; the Dutch Republic; the Princes of the Holy Roman Empire as well as the sovereigns of the free imperial cities.

3. The Age of Enlightenment is the period in the European history from the 1620s to the 1780s. During this period, the cultural and the intellectual forces in Western Europe promoted reason, analysis, and individualism rather than the traditional lines of authority. The philosophers and local thinkers in the urban coffee houses, salons, and the Masonic lodges were the advocates of this age. The authority of the Catholic Church was questioned.
4. Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights 1776 - Pennsylvania adopted a new Constitution in 1776, which is considered as the most democratic in America. This newly formed Constitution was the result of a popular revolt against the existing government.
5. The American Declaration of Independence - The United States Congress made appreciable leap by approving the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776, which emphasized two themes: individual rights and the right of revolution. In the opinion of Thomas Jefferson, its primary author, the Declaration was a formal explanation of why the Congress had voted on July 2 to declare independence from Great Britain. This happened more than a year after the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War. He wrote about as it as a statement declaring that the thirteen American Colonies had obtained freedom from the British Empire. The Declaration of Independence was issued in several forms by the Congress. At first, it was published as a printed broadsheet and circulated among the public, which had a major influence on the French Revolution later.
6. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen is a fundamental document of the French Revolution which was passed by the National Constituent Assembly of France in August 1789. The Declaration was directly influenced by Thomas Jefferson, working with General Lafayette, who introduced it. It became the basis for a nation of independent individuals protected equally by law. The American Revolution and the Enlightenment philosophers exerted a great influence on the Declaration which incorporated the values of the French revolution.
7. The Second Washington Conference held from 19th June to 25th June, 1942, has not been provided with the status of a formal conference; instead it is considered as a set of military staff conversation. The British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill and the American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt had led to the delegations. In the Conference, the role of the Western Allies in supporting the Soviet Union was discussed. The Americans were willing to open up a Second Front in France, but the British did not consider it as a feasible option.
8. The Third Moscow Conference held from October 18 to November 11, 1943 took place at Moscow, Kremlin and Spiridonovka Palace in which the major Allies of World War II participated. This Conference resulted in the creation of a world organization, the European Advisory Commission, when the Soviet Union came to an agreement with the US to create such an organization. The Third Moscow Conference turned out to be one of the first meetings in which the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union got an opportunity to discuss important global matters, including the measures that should be taken to end the war with Germany and the Axis Powers.
9. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity – This Convention was held on 26th November, 1968. The Human Rights Commission prepared this Convention and later it was adopted and opened for signature by the UN General Assembly. In fact the “crimes against humanity” was attributed with a broad definition, when compared to the definition contained in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. There was a false illusion that the German war criminals of World War II, who had not been arrested yet, would get a chance to escape prosecution since the periods applicable to their crimes will be expired. This fear, which

had gradually developed in the mid 1960s, was one of the reasons for the occurrence of this Convention.

10. The crime of Apartheid - The term *apartheid* was the official name given to the system of isolation on the basis of race or racial discrimination in South African which came into existence after 1948. The UN received several complaints about this system, and in 1973, the General Assembly expressed consent to the text of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (ICSPCA), which came into effect in 1976.
11. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) is the name of a body of 18 experts of the UN, which holds meetings twice a year in Geneva. The goal of these meetings is to go through the five-yearly reports submitted by the UN member States on their assent with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The members of this Committee are usually elected for a term of four years by the States parties. The election is held in accordance with the ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17 of 28th May, 1985. The elected members provide their best personal potential and if nominated they can be re-elected as well.
12. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is a human rights treaty to promote the civil, political, economic, social and the cultural rights of the children. It was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20th November, 1989. It came into force on 2nd September, 1990. At present, 194 countries are the members of this Convention, excluding Somalia and the US.
13. The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and the Members of their Families is multilateral treaty of the UN that grants the protection of the migrant workers and their families. This Convention was signed on 18th December, 1990, and came into effect from 1st July, 2003 onwards. It is the responsibility of the Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) to monitor the implementation of this Convention. It has become one of the seven human rights treaty bodies which are linked to the UN. Today the situation is such that International migration has turned out to be an intrinsic feature of globalization. In 2005, the number of international migrants ranged between 185 and 192 million, according to the reports, which represents nearly three percent of the world population.

References

- Arafat, S. (2013). *Globalization and human rights: An overview of its impact*, American Journal of humanities and social sciences, 1(1), 18-24.
- Arora, Prem and Brij Grover (2004). *Political Thought: from Plato to Marx*, Gurgaon: Cosmos Bookhive (P) Ltd..
- Bajwa, G.S. (1997). *Human Rights in India: Implementation and Violations*, New Delhi: Anmol Publications Pvt. Ltd..
- Burke (1790). *Reflection of the Revolution in France*, Works II, London: Oxford Publishing Ltd..
- Castberg, Frade (1968). "Natural Law and Human Rights – an idea Historical Survey", *International Protection of Human Rights (Proceeding of the Seventh Nobel Symposium, Oslo, September 25-27, 1967)*, Asbjorn Eide and August Schou (ed), New York: Interscience Publishers.
- Charchil, Winston (1948). *The Gathering Storm: The Second World War*, US: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company.

- Claude, Richard Pierre (ed.) (2006). *Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Actions*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Freeman, Michael (2002). *Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach*, USA: Blackwell Publishers Inc..
- Green, James Frederic (1956). *The United Nations and Human Rights*, Washington: The Booking Institution,.
- Jaswal, Paramjith & Nishtha Jaswal (1996). *Human Rights and the Law*, New Delhi: APH Publishing Corporation.
- Kadragic, A. (2006). *Globalization and Human Rights*. Chelsea House Company, Philadelphia.
- Lauterpacht, H. (1950). *International Law and Human Rights*, London: London Stevens & Sons Limited.
- Nault, M.D. & England, S. L. (Ed.) (2011). *Globalization and human rights in the Developing world*, Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- Palai, Arun Kumar (1998). *National Human Rights Commission of India: Formation, functioning and future prospects*, New Delhi: Khama Publishers.
- Rai, Rahul (2000). *Human Rights UN Initiatives*, Delhi: Authorspress.
- Reichert, Elisabeth (2003). *Social Work and Human Rights*, New Delhi: Rawat Publications.
- Robertson, A.H. and J.G. Merrills (2005). *Human Rights in the World*, New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd..
- Sabine, George H. (1951). *A History of Political Theory*, Delhi: Oxford and JBH Publishing Co..
- Sohn, L.B. (1968). *A short story of United Nations documents on human rights*, New York: in The United Nations and Human Rights, Eighteenth report of the commission to study the organization of peace.
- Trivedi, Sonu (2003). "Human Rights under Democracy", *Mainstream*, Vol. XXXII, No. 5, December 13: 38 -45.
- United Nations (1966). General Assembly Resolution 21/2200, New York: UN Press.
- United Nations Charter (1945): USA: San Francisco.
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948): UN General Assembly, New York: UN Press.
- Vasan, Sudha (2004). "NGO as Employers: Need for Accountability", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 22, June 4: 2197 -2198.
- Welch Jr., Claude (2003). "Human Rights NGOs and the Rule of Law in Africa", *Journal of Human Rights*, Vol.2, No.3, September: 314 -323.
- Zohir, Sajjad (2004). "NGO Sector in Bangladesh: An Overview", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 36, September 10: 4109 -4113.

India's Green Energy Transition: Economy and Geo-Politics

Vishnu Aravind

Abstract

This paper examines the growing importance of green energy as a pivotal strategic asset in the 21st century, highlighting its centrality to India's aspirations as a major global power. As the global order increasingly shifts toward sustainability and low-carbon development, India's geopolitical significance will hinge not only on its domestic green transition but also on its ability to emerge as a global hub for clean energy production, innovation, and governance. Ensuring the availability, accessibility, and affordability of renewable energy is essential to meeting national decarbonization targets and fulfilling India's climate commitments. The study underscores the need for India to align its clean energy agenda with foreign policy, trade, and regional cooperation, thus embedding energy transition into broader strategic frameworks. Key areas of focus include India's renewable infrastructure development, securing critical minerals, and enhancing international collaborations such as the International Solar Alliance. The paper also explores how green energy diplomacy can augment India's leadership role in the Global South and contribute to greater strategic autonomy in a multipolar world. At the same time, it addresses challenges including technological dependencies, financing barriers, and supply chain constraints. Overall, the paper offers a critical analysis of India's green energy transformation and its implications for the country's global standing and policy priorities.

Introduction

The history of human evolution has been influenced by the availability and utilization of energy. From the early use of fire and animal power to today's electricity and clean and sustainable fuels, which have become essential for services such as heating, cooking, lighting, cooling, mobility, and from the operation of appliances to information and communication technology and machinery. Similarly, the history of nations in search of resources dates back centuries—the politics of resources led to the conquest of many nations and regions in the past. In the modern world, energy resources, especially oil, have become a strategic commodity that shapes the politics

among the nations to date. It leads to the conflict over energy resources in many regions of the world. However, since the second half of the twentieth century, it has been apparent that states prefer cooperation to conflict over resources. However, with the unprecedented environmental degradation and climate change caused by using conventional resources such as oil and coal, major economies are now moving towards an energy transition by developing and sharing green energy resources and technologies. The fuel of the future will therefore be nature-friendly and emission-free green energy. The transition of the energy sector is crucial for India to prove itself as a rising global geo-political power. However, there are many economic and geo-political challenges that India is currently facing at the domestic as well as global level. India's success depends on how these obstacles are effectively addressed in the coming years. This requires a comprehensive approach for India in global and at the national level.

The Concept of Green Energy

The term 'green energy' is closely linked to the idea of environmental protection. It implies the energy generated from renewable or non-conventional sources such as sunlight, geothermal, wind, hydropower, biogas, and some biomass sources, which is also referred to as clean, sustainable, or renewable energy. Unlike fossil fuels, green energy resources do not release or have little emission of hazardous greenhouse gases such as nitrous oxide (N_2O), methane (CH_4), and Carbon dioxide (CO_2) into the atmosphere when consumed. It therefore has little or no harmful effects on the environment. The US Environmental Protection Agency defines green energy as a subset of renewable energy that has no impact on the environment. This includes clean energy sources, technologies, and electricity generated from solar and wind, geothermal, biogas, biomass, and environmentally friendly small-scale hydropower (US Environmental Protection Agency, 2023). India has a similar perspective on defining green energy as electrical energy produced from renewable sources (Ministry of Power, 2022).

Solar energy is the most abundant and the key green energy resource available today. Solar technologies use photovoltaic panels or mirrors to convert sunlight into electrical energy, which can subsequently be utilized to meet various human requirements. Wind energy is another example, in which massive wind turbines produce electric power from the kinetic energy of the air. It can be installed on land, in the sea, or on other bodies of water. Similarly, Geothermal energy is obtained by utilizing thermal energy from the earth's interior. The required heat is extracted from geothermal reservoirs using specially drilled boreholes or other methods. Hydropower is generated by utilizing the energy of water moving from higher to lower levels. It can also be generated from rivers and reservoirs. Currently,

hydropower is the largest source of green energy in the world. Tidal energy is the energy generated from thermal currents and waves in seawater, which is still an emerging area of the green energy sector. (United Nations Climate Action, 2023). Biomass is the term for all organic substances that originate from trees, plants, algae, etc. Biomass energy is acquired by converting biomass into usable forms of energy such as heat, liquid fuels, and electricity via gasification, combustion, and anaerobic digestion (AL-Juboori, 2015).

India's Green Energy Transition: Potential, Capacity and Economy

India's shift to renewable energy sources is primarily intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to a net-zero target to prevent climate change, environmental degradation, and its harmful effects. As declared at COP26 in Glasgow in 2021, India aims to achieve 500 GW of installed non-conventional energy capacity by 2030. This target includes 140 GW of wind power projects and 280 GW of solar energy. This means that India will have to add an average of 40-50 GW of renewable energy annually until 2030. To achieve this ambitious target, the country is initiating several programs such as waste-to-energy plants, solar water pumps, decentralized renewable energy, rooftop solar, smart grids, clean cooking fuels, and electric mobility programs, etc. Today, India has been able to achieve a capacity of 172.72 GW from non-fossil sources by 2022. Renewable energy sources account for 119.09 GW of this, which corresponds to a share of 42.26% of the total installed electricity capacity of 408.71 GW in the country by 2022 (Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, 2022).

This is closely linked to the other goals announced by India at COP 26. One of the most important announcements in COP 26 was to generate 50 percent of India's total energy demand from green energy sources by 2030. It also aims to reduce carbon emissions by one billion tonnes between 2021 and 2030 and reduce the carbon intensity of the Indian economy by 45 percent below 2005 levels by 2030. In this way, India aims to achieve the goal of net zero emissions by 2070 (Impact and Policy Research Institute, 2023). Currently, India ranks 4th in the world in terms of installed renewable energy capacity, including large hydropower plants as of October 2022. Similarly, the country ranks fourth in the world in solar and wind energy capacity (Renewables 2022 Global Status Report, 2022). India added a total of 14.21 GW of renewable energy (RE) capacity in the period from January to October 2022. This is more than the 11.9 GW capacity added in the period from January to October 2021 (Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, 2022). This shows that the production of green energy in India is increasing every year.

Today, India has huge potential for power generation from various renewable sources like solar, wind, small hydro, biogas, biomass, etc. The total potential for

power generation from renewable sources in the country is estimated to be 2,109,654 MW by 2023. This includes 1,163,856 MW from wind power, 7,48,990 MW from solar power, 21,134 MW from small hydropower, 133,410 MW from large hydropower, 28,447 MW from biomass and 13,818 MW from bagasse-based cogeneration in sugar mills. As far as the total installed capacity of renewable energy in India is concerned, the total installed capacity of grid-interactive renewable energy in 2022 was 1,09,885 MW. It increased from 95,803 MW in 2021 to 1,09,885 MW in 2022, registering a yearly growth of 14.70%. Today, India's energy mix is shifting from more conventional energy sources to non-conventional sources. Renewable energy sources, excluding hydropower, recorded a growth of 16.4% in installed capacity in India in FY 2021-22 compared to last year. In contrast, the growth of thermal energy sources was only 0.06%. Of the total installed generation capacity of green energy sources produced in 2022, the installed capacity of solar energy including rooftops is about 49.1%, followed by wind energy at 36.7 and bio-power and waste-to-energy at 9.7. However, the installed solar capacity growth rate of 30.95% from FY 2020-21 to FY 2021-22 is a major achievement for India. A growth rate (CAGR) of 4.41% in the last ten years from 2012-13 to 2021-22 in the renewable energy sector shows that India is stabilizing its power generation. However, power generation in India is still dependent on coal. For example, in 2021-22, about 73% of electricity was generated from steam. Therefore, in the face of climate change and natural disasters, India needs to reduce its dependence on traditional energy sources for power generation. However, from renewable energy resources excluding hydro, the growth of 16.07% in FY 2021-22 compared to 2020-21 is a good sign (National Statistical Office, 2023).

Several infrastructural developments and initiatives are currently underway to achieve India's declared climate goals. The Green Energy Corridor (GEC) concept is a key enabler for future energy transmission in India. The first component of the project, the inter-state GEC, which envisages 3200 circuit kilometers (ckm) of transmission lines and substations with a capacity of 17,000 MVA, was completed in March 2020. The second component, the intrastate Green Energy Corridor, comprising 9700 circuit kilometers (CKM) and substations with a capacity of 22,600 MVA, is expected to be completed by March 2023. In addition to infrastructure development, India is also focussing on the production of green energy. The Solar Parks Scheme is one of the most important projects. This is a large-scale project to connect solar power plants to the grid, which is expected to reach a capacity of 40 GW by March 2024. As part of this program, 56 solar parks with a capacity of 39.28 GW were allocated in 14 states by October 2022. India is also prioritizing the development of solar energy storage systems. Further, the draft National Repowering Policy (NRP) for Wind Energy Projects, 2022 has been published by the government. The objectives of the Repowering policy are to maximize the use of wind energy

resources by maximizing the energy (kWh) per square kilometer of the project area and using the latest offshore wind technologies. In the period from January to October 2022, 1761.28 MW of wind energy was added in the country. However, a strategy paper published by the government, which also contains business models for offshore wind energy, provides a roadmap for achieving the target of 30 GW of offshore wind energy by 2030. Further, India has generated 30 MW of electricity under its national bioenergy program as of 2022. The country's cumulative installed capacity for electricity from biomass has been estimated at around 9.4 GW by 2022.

Another ambitious project in which India has expressed its interest is exploring green hydrogen. The National Green Hydrogen Mission was announced in August 2021 to make India an energy-independent country, decarbonizing key sectors and becoming a global hub of production and export of green hydrogen. It was a revolutionary step in India's green energy sector. In this context, the Union Cabinet approved the National Green Hydrogen Mission on 4 January 2023. The Central Government has approved an initial investment of Rs. 19,744 crore for the Mission, including Rs. 17,490 crore for the Strategic Interventions for Green Hydrogen Transition (SIGHT) program, Rs. 1,466 crore for pilot projects and Rs. 400 crore for research and development. Rs. 388 crore have also been allocated for other components of the Mission. The aim is to increase India's production capacity for green hydrogen to at least 5 MMT per year. This is equivalent to 125 GW of renewable energy capacity. As a result, 50 MMT of CO₂ emissions are expected to be reduced by 2030 (Department of Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, 2023., Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, 2023).

India has set itself the goal of becoming a 5 trillion-dollar economy in the next few years. There is no doubt that this will lead to a huge increase in India's energy consumption. Since the main driving force is still fossil fuels, their use must be decreased. However, India's focus will be on developing strategies to decouple this economic growth from greenhouse gas emissions. In this regard, Rs 35,000 crore has been allocated in the Union Budget 2023-24 for investment in priority energy. The main objective was to achieve the green growth agenda through energy availability, economic growth, energy security, and decarbonization. However, rising subsidies are a major problem in the Indian energy sector. The increase in energy consumption in the country has also been reflected in the growth of subsidies in the sector. For example, in FY 2023, total energy subsidies reached a 9-year high of INR 3.2 lakh crore, i.e. 40 percent of total subsidy. Of this, less than 10 percent was for renewable energy subsidies. The rest of the subsidies were used for fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and gas. This increases their consumption and slows down the journey towards the net zero target (Raizada et. al, 2023). To overcome this problem, it is necessary to increase the production of renewable energy in the country and take

the necessary promotional measures to increase its consumption in. Only then it will be possible to achieve India's goal of a green economy, reach the country's net zero target, and effectively tackle problems such as climate change and environmental degradation and its harmful impacts.

India's Green Energy Transition: Global Cooperation and Geo-Politics

The world's major economies have already begun to transition from fossil fuel-driven economies to green economies. This shift is more than just changing the fuel source or decarbonizing the economy. It involves a total transformation of the world's technical, environmental, political, and economic systems. However, because essential resources are scarce at home, states have sought to obtain them in other regions of the world where they are available, similar to oil politics in the past. India, which now ranks third in global energy consumption after China and the United States, needs to ensure its fuel security is in line with its economic progress. As a result of its attempts to secure green energy as a strategic commodity, India has emerged as a player in contemporary global green energy geopolitics.

India is presently adopting a 'multi-alignment strategy' for energy cooperation, in which the country is attempting to secure both conventional and renewable energy fuels through its partnerships with foreign countries. It is also critical to maintain India's supply of fossil fuels, as transitioning to a 100% green energy system is not feasible in the foreseeable future. The finest example of the importance of this is India's attitude in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, in which it refused to take sides. Because of the drop in Russian oil prices during the conflict, India's oil imports from Russia have surged by more than 50% since April 2022. This proved that the availability of energy serves as the foundation for the countries' strategic relationships. Traditionally, India has relied on West Asian countries like Iran, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia to meet its fuel requirements. Because of the existence of terrorist organizations and ongoing hostilities in the region, India has made attempts to diversify its source of energy. For example, in 2006-07, India imported crude oil from 27 oil-exporting countries, and in 2020-21, India has diversified this to 42 countries. Similarly, India is also expanding with green energy sources in a variety of areas, especially in Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which have huge potential for renewable energy production.

Resource-rich Africa is India's primary target for ensuring future green energy security. It is projected that Africa has the potential to provide 10 TW of solar energy, 350 GW of hydropower, 100 GW of wind energy, and 15 GW of geothermal energy. However, the most significant difficulty for African countries is that they lack the technology as well as the financial ability to invest. This creates several chances for India and enables transparent and mutually productive diplomatic relations. To

begin, India's National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) arrived at a deal with the African countries of Mali and Togo to build a 500 MW solar park by 2020. NTPC is exploring comparable prospects in African International Solar Alliance (ISA) member nations including Gambia, Sudan, Malawi, and Mozambique, among others. Besides, Africa possesses a substantial amount of the world's stocks of rare earth metals such as cobalt, lithium, and graphite, which are used in electric vehicle batteries and are critical components of the electric vehicle industry. Furthermore, the Democratic Republic of the Congo produces more than 70% of the world's cobalt, which is a major component of lithium-ion batteries. As a result, connections with Africa are vital to India's ambitions (Adlakha, 2023). Another region where India is expanding its presence in green energy is Latin America and the Caribbean states. Hydropower now accounts for around 60% of total electricity generation in these nations. Furthermore, nations such as Mexico, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil have abundant wind and solar energy resources. These nations are major biofuel exporters and account for approximately 15% of global oil and natural gas resources. This region also has about half of the world's lithium deposits, as well as one-third of copper and silver reserves (International Energy Agency, 2023). This moves India closer to the region. Furthermore, the potential for green energy in Central Asian nations, as well as their keen interest in this sector, is bringing Indian attention to the region. The region holds 4% of the world's natural gas reserves and around 3% of its oil reserves (Kaulgud, 2021). In addition, hydrocarbon resources have been discovered onshore and offshore in the Caspian Sea region. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have emerged as significant solar and wind energy producers in the region. Till 2022, solar power generation accounted for 23% of Kazakhstan's total renewable energy capacity, with wind energy accounting for 22%. In Addition, Kazakhstan has set a target of generating 15% of its power from renewable sources by 2030 and 50% by 2050. Uzbekistan has also set its goal of generating electricity in this way. India, therefore, has a favourable environment in the region.

Apart from this, India is strengthening bilateral collaboration in the sphere of green energy with other individual nations. For example, India has increased bilateral collaboration in green hydrogen with various nations, including France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, the United States, and Germany. Furthermore, India has developed a hydrogen task group in collaboration with Germany and the United States. It leads to active technological collaboration on hydrogen in the quadrilateral grouping or QUAD, which includes Australia, Japan, and the United States. India's green energy aspirations have put the country in geopolitical competition, primarily with China, another emerging power in the region. China is at the top in terms of energy consumption in the world. However, China's most essential energy resources such as crude oil and natural gas, rely on imports mostly from West Asia and Africa.

According to some assessments, China's overall need for oil and gas would increase to 32% of its energy mix by 2050. However, most of these energy resources travel through the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), where Beijing has little direct influence (Kumar, 2023).

China is consequently exploring a variety of strategies to address these limits. The most important of these is China's investment in the green energy sector all over the world. China presently has an upper hand over India in terms of green energy cooperation and investment with other countries. China has invested \$546 billion in solar and wind energy, as well as batteries for electric cars, by 2022 (Zhou, 2023). However, India's investments reached 240 billion US dollars by 2023. India is largely investing in projects for solar cell manufacturing, advanced chemical battery manufacturing, and supply chain resilience (Kumar, 2023). China's 'Green Belt and Road' initiative encourages Chinese investors to build green infrastructure abroad (Zhou, 2023). Between 2000 and 2021, China invested \$13 billion to produce 10 gigawatts of sustainable energy in Africa. Since 2010, China has boosted its investment in Africa's rich solar, hydro, and wind energy industries by 26% (Omolere, 2023). Chinese companies possess 80% of Africa's cobalt mines, which are used to produce electric batteries (Adlakha, 2023). Chinese companies currently provide about 90% of renewable energy in Latin America, including wind and solar technology. In 2018, Tianqi Lithium acquired a 23% interest in Sociedad Química y Minera, Chile's largest lithium producer company. Similarly, in 2022, China's Ganfeng Lithium paid USD 962 million for a major evaporation lithium project in Argentina. By April 2023, Brazil had signed around 20 agreements with China to boost cooperation in commerce, climate change, and energy transition. China also has a substantial influence on Caspian resources.

However, India has been able to establish and play a decisive role in the world's two most important green energy alliances, namely, the International Solar Alliance (ISA) and the Global Biofuel Alliance (GBA). The International Solar Alliance was founded by India and France during the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris in 2015 as part of efforts to mitigate climate change through solar energy generation. Currently, 119 nations have signed the ISA Framework Agreement. By 2030, ISA intends to supply energy access to 1,000 million people and construct 1,000 GW of solar energy capacity, with a total investment of \$1,000 billion (International Solar Alliance, 2023). The Global Biofuel Alliance (GBA) is an alliance of international organizations, countries, and industries. The Alliance was announced during India's G20 presidency following a decision by Brazil, India, and the United States as leading biofuel producers and consumers. The alliance aims to increase the use of sustainable biofuels, including in the transport sector, and to facilitate cooperation between countries. The platform

focuses on facilitating global trade in biofuels, providing technical support to national biofuel programs worldwide, strengthening the market, and exchanging technologies (Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas, 2023). These multinational partnerships help India get access to energy markets in many parts of the world.

China and India's interest in Africa, West Asia, and Latin America's energy sectors has pushed the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to the forefront of a major geopolitical battle. China's Malacca dilemma and India's military presence in the Indian Ocean Region are leading China to pursue a variety of geopolitical strategies. In this environment, China has undertaken several military and marine strategies, including the 'string of pearls' to increase military influence in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. India is also devising methods to retaliate. India's Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) membership, Malabar, and other military exercises are all intended to combat such predators. To balance China's expansion in Africa and its Belt and Road Initiative, India and Japan signed the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor agreement with several African countries in 2017 (Kurzydowski, 2020). However, India and China collaborate with Latin American and Central Asian nations through the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. At the G-20 meeting in Delhi, India admitted the African Union as a member to facilitate future energy cooperation. Therefore, investing in different regions of the world is crucial for India's transition to a completely green economy. This requires cooperation with more countries than conflict.

India's Green Energy Transition: Advantages and Challenges

India's green energy transition brings several advantages for India as well as the world. Firstly, Renewable energy is considered a sustainable energy source. Energy sources such as solar and wind are not depleted like fossil fuels. They can be utilized for a long time. Secondly, Renewable energy is environmentally friendly. Unlike fossil fuels, which destroy the environment, renewable energy sources emit little or no greenhouse gases. The fact that India's joining in the green energy transition will be a significant contribution to the global effort for the protection of the environment. Thirdly, Renewable energy sources are health friendly. The use of clean energy sources can significantly reduce air and water pollution and improve public health. Fourthly, One of India's main goals is to increase self-reliance by strengthening renewable energy. Currently, India is dependent on fossil fuels to meet its energy needs and has to turn to various countries for the same. With self-reliance on renewable energy production, it is possible to reduce the cost of fossil fuels and realize economic gains by exporting renewable energy. Fifthly, the infrastructure and technology for renewable energy are cheaper than traditional fossil fuels. By increasing the production of green fuels, the country can provide

clean and affordable energy to the people at low prices. Finally, the renewable energy sector has high employment potential. Over 52,000 new jobs were created in India's solar and wind energy sector alone in FY2022. As a result, the number of people employed has increased to 1.64 lakh in FY2022 (Council on Energy, Environment and Water, 2023). By 2030, solar and wind energy sectors are expected to create around 3.4 million new jobs in India. Emerging sectors such as energy storage, onshore wind power, green hydrogen, batteries, solar cells, and module manufacturing will create new jobs and meet the future demand for skilled labor. India's new National Green Hydrogen Mission itself is expected to generate 8 lakh crore investment and over 6 lakh jobs.

Similarly, India is also facing many challenges as part of the energy transition. Firstly, India faces serious challenges in achieving the current sustainable energy targets within the given time frame. India's inefficient energy mix, large population, and lack of financial resources for investment hinder India's sustainable energy goals. Addressing these challenges requires proper planning and policies at the political and bureaucratic levels. Secondly, Achieving the renewable energy target is very difficult for a coal-dependent economy like India. Moreover, to achieve the net-zero target, existing coal-fired power plants will have to be closed or energy production will have to be significantly reduced. It is a major challenge to achieve this in a way that does not jeopardize economic development. Thirdly, the major challenge for India is the availability of skilled labour to operate renewable energy systems. Therefore, the focus needs to be on providing adequate training to the labourers currently working in non-renewable energy plants and making them aware of the long-term benefits of renewable energy. Fourthly, India needs to achieve the stability of energy-related policies and laws. Despite the rapid pace at which renewable energy is being installed, policy changes continue to adversely affect the renewable energy sector. Fifthly, the unhindered flow of investment in renewable energy is one of the biggest challenges for India. The country is still struggling to attract international investors to India. Sixthly, In India, it is imperative to formulate policies that address the social and environmental concerns arising from the growth of renewable energy. Apart from this, the country needs to formulate policies and laws for the welfare of people displaced by large-scale infrastructure development projects in the renewable energy sector. Finally, the financial constraints pose a challenge for India to achieve its large-scale energy transition goals. Therefore, finding cost-effective ways is a major challenge for India.

Conclusion

Today, the world has taken up the great challenge of decarbonizing all the world's economies. In this context, countries around the world are working to reduce

greenhouse gas emissions and switch to cleaner energy sources. Such a transition is essential for the world to eliminate the negative impacts of climate change as a result of centuries of fossil fuel-driven economic development and the negative effects of ever-increasing global warming. As far as India is concerned, several factors motivate the country to do such a mission. Firstly, as the third largest carbon emitter in the world, it has a global responsibility to reduce air pollution and protect the environment. Secondly, India, which wants to have a decisive influence on global politics and become a world power, has to control the availability and distribution of energy, which plays an important role in it. Thirdly, a large part of India's wealth is currently used to import fossil fuels. Such an energy transition is necessary to reduce the financial cost of fossil fuel imports and utilize the money for the welfare of the people of India.

References

- Adlakha, Latika (2022). Prospects of India-Africa Energy Ties," *Centre for Public Policy Research*. <https://www.cppr.in/articles/future-prospects-of-india-africa-energy-ties>.
- AL-Juboori, Sameer Saadoon (2015). "Green Energy: An Introduction," *Energy Sci. & Tech*, 1:316-340.
- Banerjee, Samprikta (2023). "Panchamrit – A Striding Step Towards Achieving India's Goal of Net Zero by 2070," Impact and Policy Research Institute, <https://www.impriindia.com/insights/panchamrit-india-net-zero/#:~:text=Objectives%20of%20Panchamrit,tonnes%20from%20now%20to%202030>.
- Department of Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (2023). *National Green Hydrogen Mission*, New Delhi: Government of India. <https://www.nsws.gov.in/portal/scheme/greenhydrogenpolicy#:~:text=About%20the%20Scheme,includin%20an%20outlay%20of%20Rs>.
- International Energy Agency (2022). "Uzbekistan 2022: Energy Policy Review", 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/0d00581c-dc3c-466f-b0c8_97d25112a6e0/Uzbekistan2022.pdf.
- International Energy Agency (2023). "Latin America to play an essential role in the global transition to a more secure and sustainable energy system," <https://www.iea.org/news/latin-america-to-play-an-essential-role-in-the-global-transition-to-a-more-secure-and-sustainable-energy-system>.
- International Energy Agency (2022). *Kazakhstan 2022: Energy Sector Review*, <https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/fc84229e-6014-4400-a963-bccea29e0387/Kazakhstan2022.pdf>.
- International Renewable Energy Agency (2023). "Energy Profile: Kazakhstan," https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Statistics/Statistical_Profiles/Asia/Kazakhstan_Asia_RE_SP.pdf.
- "International Solar Alliance", <https://isolaralliance.org/>.
- Kumar, Raghvendra (2023). "China's Energy (In)Security amidst India's Geostrategic Advantage in the Indian Ocean Region," *South Asian Voices*, <https://southasianvoices.org/chinas-energy-insecurity-amidst-indias-geostrategic-advantage-in-the-indian-ocean-region/>.

- Kumar, Somesh (2023). "Unleashing India's renewable energy potential: a global manufacturing", EY, hub-https://www.ey.com/en_in/energy-resources/unleashing-india-s-renewable-energy-potential-a-global-manufacturing-hub.
- Kurzydowski, Christian. (2020). "What Can India Offer Africa," The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/what-can-india-offer-africa/>
- Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (2022). *Year-End Review 2022*, New Delhi: Government of India, <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1885147>.
- Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (2023). *National Green Hydrogen Mission*, New Delhi: Government of India. <https://mnre.gov.in/national-green-hydrogen-mission/>.
- Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas (2023). *Global Biofuel Alliance: One of the priorities under India's G20 Presidency*, New Delhi: Government of India. <https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1898274>.
- Ministry of Power (2022). *The Gazette of India: Extraordinary – Notification*, New Delhi: Government of India, [https://www.acma.in/uploads/circular-attachement/Electricity%20\(Promoting%20Renewable%20Energy%20through%20Green%20Energy%20Open%20Access\)%20Rules,2022.pdf](https://www.acma.in/uploads/circular-attachement/Electricity%20(Promoting%20Renewable%20Energy%20through%20Green%20Energy%20Open%20Access)%20Rules,2022.pdf)
- Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (2023). *Energy Statistics India 2023*, New Delhi: Government of India, https://www.mospi.gov.in/sites/default/files/publication_reports/Energy_Statistics_2023/EnergyStatisticsIndia2023.pdf.
- Myslikova, Byzdenka., Dolton, Thornton Nathaniel (2023). "Global China is a big part of Latin America's renewable energy boom, but homegrown industries and 'frugal innovation' are key," *Fortune*, <https://fortune.com/2023/07/08/china-secretly-fueling-latin-america-renewable-energy-boom-chile/>.
- "Number of Indians employed in clean energy sectors increased by 47% between FY21 and FY22," <https://www.ceew.in/press-releases/number-of-indians-employed-in-clean-energy-sectors-increased-47-per-cent-between-fy21-and-fy22>.
- Raizada, Swasti., Sharma, Deepak., Laan, Tara., Jain, Saumya (2023). "Mapping India's Energy Policy 2023: A decade in action," *Global Subsidies Initiative*, <https://www.iisd.org/story/mapping-india-energy-policy-2023/>
- "Renewables (2022). Global Status Report," https://www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/GSR2022_Full_Report.pdf.
- Vikrant Kaulgud, Mihir (2022). "India-Central Asia Energy Relations: Prospects and Barriers." SPRF India, https://sprf.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/SPRF-2022_IB_India-Central-Asia-Energy-Relations.pdf.
- "What is renewable energy?" <https://www.epa.gov/green-power-markets/what-green-power>.
- "What is renewable energy?" <https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/what-is-renewable-energy>.
- Zhou, Yipeng (2023). "Greener Pastures: China's Clean Energy Engagement in Central Asia", RETCA Project, Program on Central Asia, Davis Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University. pp 1-11.

About the Authors:

M. VENKATARAMAN Assistant Professor, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Madras, Chepauk, Chennai, drvenkat65@gmail.com

RAVEENA KOUSAR Research Scholar, Department of Social Work, Central University of Rajasthan, Bandarsindri, (NH-8), Kishangarh, Ajmer, Rajasthan

SUBHASIS BHADRA Associate Professor, Department of Social Work, Central University of Rajasthan, Bandarsindri, (NH-8), Kishangarh, Ajmer, Rajasthan

RAJEEV M.M. Assistant Professor, Department of Social Work, Central University of Rajasthan, Bandarsindri, (NH-8) Kishangarh, Ajmer, Rajasthan

AKRITI KHAJURIA Research Scholar, Amity Institute Of International Studies (Auup), Channi Himmat, Jammu, Jammu And Kashmir

SHREESH KUMAR PATHAK Assistant Professor, Amity Institute of International Studies (AUUP), Amity University Uttar Pradesh

ANWESHA DASGUPTA Research Scholar, Presidency University, Kolkata and Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Netaji Satabarshiki Mahavidyalaya, Ashoknagar

TULIKA CHAKRAVORTY Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Bangabasi Morning College, 19, Rajkumar Chakraborty Sarani, Kolkata, tulikachakravorty1@gmail.com

MOHAMMAD REYAZ Assistant Professor, Department of Journalism and Mass Communication, Aliah University, Kolkata, reyaz@aliah.ac.in

MUHAMMED. K.V. Assistant Professor School of Pedagogical Sciences, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam. Kerala

JONATHAN KITHI ALEXANDER ICCR Researcher, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam, alexjkithi@gmail.com

C. VINODAN Professor, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam, vinodan.c@gmail.com

KAMALA KUMARI Assistant Professor, Delhi University, kamala_2003@yahoo.com

LIRAR PULIKKALAKATH Assistant Professor, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam.

VINNY DAVIS Research Scholar, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam.

MUNMUN MAJUMDAR Professor, Dept of Political Science, North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong

T.T. HAOKIP Professor, Dept of Political Science, North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong

PARIMITA BHUYAN Assistant Professor in Political Science, Government Model College, Kaziranga, Assam

JAYANTA KRISHNA SARMAH Professor and Head, Department of Political Science, Gauhati University, Guwahati, Assam, Email: jayanta1947@gauhati.ac.in

P.C. PRASANNA KUMAR Associate Professor, Department of International Relations & Politics, Central University of Kerala

MANISHA DEVI A. Research Scholar, Department of International Relations & Politics, Central University of Kerala

NAVAS M. KHADAR School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, navasmkhadarmgu@gmail.com

BIJULAL M.V. Associate Professor, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University.

PRIYANKA SINGH Assistant Professor and Head, Department of Political Science, DAV PG College, Affiliated to BHU, Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh

PRAMOD C.R. Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Sree Kerala Varma College, Thrissur, Kerala, pramodcr@yahoo.com

AJITH E.A. Assistant Professor on Contract, Department of Political Science, Sree Kerala Varma College, Thrissur, Kerala, ajithkeralaa@gmail.com

RAKHEE VISWAMBHARAN Assistant Professor & Head, Department of Political Science, Sree Narayana College (Affiliated to University of Kerala), Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala

SIDDHARTHA MUKERJI Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar University, Lucknow

SIVAKUMAR M.V. Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Central University of Kerala, Capital Centre, Thiruvananthapuram, mvsmangalam@gmail.com

RAKHIL K. Research Scholar, Department of political Science, Maharaja's College, Ernakulam, rakhilkannur@gmail.com

VASUNDRA RAJE Research Scholar, Department of Strategic and Regional Studies, University of Jammu, Jammu-180006 (J&K) INDIA, vasundraraje15@gmail.com

VIJITH KUNIYIL Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology, Government Arts and Science College Nadapuram, Kerala, vijith123@gmail.com

SIJO K. MANUEL Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, St. Thomas College, Palai, Arunapuram P.O., Kottayam, Kerala, sijokmanuel007@gmail.com

VISHNU ARAVIND Research Scholar, Centre for the Study of Law and Governance, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

IJPAIR: Aims and Scope

IJPAIR is a refereed biannual journal published by the School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam, Kerala. IJPAIR is committed to providing a space for the best of writings in Political Science and International Relations (IR). It publishes topical, scholarly work on significant debates in Politics and IR and on all major socio-economic, cultural and political issues affecting India and other countries. IJPAIR seeks to uphold a pluralist perspective. Editorial policy promotes variety in subject matter and methodology. IJPAIR welcomes articles from all perspectives and on all subjects pertaining to Politics and International Relations, besides conceptual essays and policy analysis. Each volume will carry peer-reviewed research articles, and a mix of review essays, interviews and debates. Special issues will also be published from time to time.

Periodicity

IJPAIR will be published in January and July every year. The articles and reviews will be sent for peer-review as soon as they are received. There will be a panel of referees who will look into various aspects of the articles/reviews received, such as topicality, contents, theoretical as well as empirical components and methodology.

Copy Right

Copyright of the journal, alongside the articles/reviews published, shall be with the Registrar, Mahatma Gandhi University except in cases where essays are reproduced with the permission of the author/publisher.

Manuscript Submission Guidelines

All manuscripts should be sent to: The Editor, IJPAIR, School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Priyadarshini Hills PO., Kottayam, Kerala, India, PIN Code: 686560. Three copies of the double spaced manuscript should be provided. The author's name, full contact details (address, telephone number and e-mail address), and biographical note should be enclosed on a separate sheet of paper. In addition, the authors should also send the manuscript as an e-mail attachment in MS Word format to the Editor. The title page should contain the full title, subtitle (optional), preferred abbreviated running head, abstract (100-150 words) and key words (5-10) in alphabetical order for online search. Biographical notes (50-100 words) should give current affiliation, research interests and recent publications. Research articles should be of 6000 words, including footnotes. Lengths for review essays shall be 2,000 words. English (UK) spelling should be used for the preparation of the manuscript. Spell out numbers from one to nine and use figures for 10 and above except in tables. Indent all quotations of more than 50 words and make sure that all subheadings are clearly indicated. Dates should be in the form 14 May 2002. Use single quotation marks and double marks inside single. Use endnotes as a referencing system listing authors as they name themselves. Please see the format given below for details of the reference style.

Reference: Format

Citations to sources are arranged in the text of the essay in order to identify sources for readers and facilitate them to locate the source of the cited information in the bibliography/references. The parenthetical (in text) references include the author's last name, the year of publication enclosed in parentheses and page number(s), wherever necessary. Citations are placed within sentences and paragraphs so that it would be clear what information is being quoted/paraphrased and whose information is being cited.

Works by a Single Author

The last name of the author and the year of publication are inserted in the text at the appropriate point. For example,

There is a view, however, that the agreement is, in fact, a continuation of the process of the last few decades (Bajpai 2005).

If the name of the author or the date appear as part of the narrative, cite only missing information in parentheses. For example,

Writing on a hypothetical possibility of India threatening to proliferate, Perkovich (2005) writes, ".....China proliferated to Pakistan and Pakistan proliferated to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. Nor does proliferation that occurred before the NPT was negotiated justify promiscuous proliferation behaviour today."

Works by Multiple Authors

When a work has two authors, always cite both names every time the reference occurs in the text. In parenthetical material join the names with "&". For example, as has been shown,

(Vanaik & Bidwai 1989)

In the narrative text, join the names with the word "and."

as Vanaik and Bidwai (1989) demonstrated

When a work has three, four, or five authors, cite all authors the first time the reference occurs. For example,

Srinivasan, Grover, and Bhardwaj (2005) found

In all subsequent citations per paragraph, include only the surname of the first author followed by "et al." and the year of publication.

Srinivasan et al. (2005) found

Works by Organisations, Government Agencies, etc.

The names of agencies/organisations that serve as authors (corporate authors) are usually written out first time they appear in a text reference as follows:

(World Trade Organisation (WTO) 2006)

When appropriate, the names of some such authors are spelled out in the first reference and abbreviated in all subsequent citations. The general rule for abbreviating in this manner is to supply enough information in the text citation for a reader to locate its source in the Bibliography/References without difficulty.

(WTO 2006)

Works with No Author

When a work has no author, use the first two or three words of the work's title (omitting any initial articles) as your text reference, capitalizing each word.

Encyclopaedia Britannica (2007)

Specific Parts of a Source

To cite a specific part of a source (always necessary for quotations), include the page, chapter, etc. (with appropriate abbreviations) in the in-text citation.

(Srinivasan, Grover & Bhardwaj 2005: 5183-88)

Journal Article: where the page numbering continues from issue to issue

Bajpai, Kanti (2005): "Where Are India and US Heading?," *Economic and Political Weekly*, XL(41), August 6: 3577-81.

Perkovich, George (2005): "Faulty Promises: The US-India Nuclear Deal," *Policy Outlook*, 34(4), September: 18-20.



Newspaper Article

Rappai, M.V. (1998): "China: a status quo nuclear power," *The Hindu*, 18 June.

Book

Jalan, Bimal (1991): *India's Economic Crisis*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Article or Chapter in an edited Volume/Book

Thomas, A. M. (2005): "India and Southeast Asia: The Look East Policy in Perspective," in Rajan Harshe and K.M. Seethi (eds.), *Engaging with the World: Critical Reflections on India's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi: Orient Longman.

Website:

"President Meets with Displaced Workers in Town Hall Meeting," at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/print/20011204-17.html>

FORM IV

Statement about ownership and other particulars of the Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations under Rule 8 of the Registration of Newspapers (Central), Rules, 1956.

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Place of Publication | School of International Relations and Politics (SIRP)
Mahatma Gandhi University,
Priyadarshini Hills P.O.,
Kottayam, Kerala, India-686560 |
| 2. Periodicity of Publication | Bi-annual |
| 3. Printer's Name
Nationality
Address | C. Vinodan
Indian
Director, SIRP,
Mahatma Gandhi University,
Priyadarshini Hills P.O.,
Kottayam, Kerala, India-686560 |
| 4. Publisher's Name
Nationality
Address | C. Vinodan
Indian
Director, SIRP,
Mahatma Gandhi University,
Priyadarshini Hills P.O.,
Kottayam, Kerala, India-686560 |
| 5. Editor's Name
Nationality
Address | C. Vinodan
Indian
Director, SIRP,
Mahatma Gandhi University,
Priyadarshini Hills P.O.,
Kottayam, Kerala, India-686560 |

I, C. Vinodan, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Sd.) C. Vinodan
Signature of Publisher

Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations

IJPAIR is a refereed biannual journal published by the School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam, Kerala. IJPAIR is committed to providing a space for the best of writings in Political Science and International Relations (IR). It publishes topical, scholarly work on significant debates in Politics and IR and on all major socio-economic, cultural and political issues affecting India and other countries.

Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations is available against subscription. Rates of subscription for one year will be as follows:

	Annual	
	Institutional	Individual
India	Rs. 1500	Rs. 1000
SAARC countries	US\$ 50	US\$ 30
Other countries	US\$ 70	US\$ 50
	Single	
	Institutional	Individual
India	Rs. 800	Rs. 500
SAARC countries	US\$ 25	US\$ 15
Other countries	US\$ 40	US\$ 25
Special Issue	Rs. 1500	Rs 1000

Subscription can be sent to The Editor, IJPAIR, School of International Relations and Politics (SIRP), Mahatma Gandhi University, Priyadarshini Hills PO., Kottayam, Kerala, India-686560 along with a Cheque/Demand Draft drawn in favour of the Editor, IJPAIR and payable at Kottayam. E-mail: sirmguniversity@gmail.com; kmseethingu@gmail.com

@ Registrar, Mahatma Gandhi University 2023 Vol. 16 No. 1

ISSN 0973-5011

The views expressed in IJPAIR are those of the authors and not necessarily of the SIRP.

